The Genesis of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda

Responses and Reflections

Lambert Schmithausen

KASUGA LECTURES SERIES
I

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In memory

of my dear friend and distinguished colleague

Tilmann Vetter

(1937-2012)

Contents

Preface

The present book requires an apology, because it is not a fresh assessment of the formation of classical Yogācāra or Vijñānavāda thought or its key concepts but merely an all too lengthy defence of my former theories concerning two of them. No such study had been planned by me, but during the last decade a couple of books and articles were published in which central theses and presuppositions of some of my former publications have met with detailed and severe criticism. One of the main targets of this criticism is my hypothesis on the origin of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, the continuous, subliminal form of mind, as set forth in my book *Ālayavijñāna* published in 1987. Another issue that has attracted criticism are my ideas concerning the origin of the concept of "representation only" (*vijñaptimātra*), especially as they appear in an article published in 1984 on the reconstruction and interpretation of what seems to be the earliest occurrence of this term, namely *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* VIII.7, and in another article of 1973/1976 that deals with this passage in the broader context of the question of the relation of theoretical positions and spiritual practice in the Buddhist tradition.

Criticism is, no doubt, essential for progress in academic research, but for the very same reason the position of the critics and their arguments cannot be uncritically taken for granted either, and it is the right of scholars who have become the target of criticism to critically examine the conclusiveness of the arguments adduced against them, in order to determine whether the criticized position is to be abandoned, to be modified or to be maintained. It has to be admitted that in many cases the criticized scholar tends to be caught up in his patterns of thinking and to adhere to his former position, and I am no exception. Even so, I feel entitled to explain why I find many of the arguments adduced by my critics against my own position as well as many of those produced in order to prove a counter-thesis inconclusive.

I readily admit that in several details I have made mistakes and that some of my former statements are infelicitous or misleading, and I am thankful to my critics for having pointed out a number of such cases. I also want to emphasize once more that I regard my theses as mere hypotheses and nothing more, and that I by no means exclude that they may have to be replaced by more appropriate ones or will be falsified by new discoveries. I do not even exclude the possibility that in the end the positions taken by my critics will be proven right and my own false. But for the time being I cannot but state that the arguments produced to date have, on the whole, failed to convince me and that I consider my former hypotheses to be, so far, unrefuted, though readily admitting that some modifications, clarifications and restrictions are required. It must be left to unbiased younger scholars to finally decide the matter, if that is possible at all.

Since the present book is merely a collection of responses, it does not aim at a comprehensive or innovative treatment of the respective subjects. I am fully aware that a systematic and exhaustive study of pertinent secondary sources, particularly in Far Eastern languages (unfortunately, I do not know Korean, my familiarity with modern Chinese, even in traditional characters, is close to null, and even my reading of Japanese is far from being fluent), would surely yield plenty of additional arguments and materials, both pro and contra, that ought to have been taken into consideration and might even have entailed considerable modifications of my position or line of argumentation. However, for personal reasons I have to bring my contribution to the discussion of the issues concerned to an end and must leave the book as it stands. I am sure the discussion will go on, and most probably my responses

will trigger counter-responses, but I have no intention of being further involved in what may otherwise easily become a pointless debate.

This book consists of four main parts, which are, apart from a few cross-references, more or less independent of each other, although Pt. III and Pt. IV were originally annexes to Pt. II.

Pt. I, the largest of the four, is a response to Sh. Matsumoto's (2005) and H. Buescher's (2008) extensive criticism of my hypothesis concerning the origination of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*. In this part, philological arguments in a wider sense are crucial, but considerations concerning the history of concepts and the history of ideas, the emic implications of certain concepts or theorems as well as methodological aspects of the interpretation of texts are also of central importance. Although it was not always possible to avoid repetitions, I presuppose, in this section of my responses, some familiarity on the part of the reader with my former study on *ālayavijñāna* (1987).

Pt. II (actually written first) is a defence of my reconstruction and interpretation of the passage in *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* VIII.7 which I consider as documenting the introduction of the key concept of "representation only" (*vijñaptimātra*), presented in the 1984 paper. My proposal has been extensively criticized in MATSUMOTO 2004 and, in less detail, in BUESCHER 2008. This part of the present book is likewise mainly a philological study but contains also sections concerned with the logical structure of the argument.

In Pt. III — properly speaking a kind of appendix to Pt. II — I have collected some material for a semantic clarification of the controversial expression *prabhāvita*, but it must be emphasized that a comprehensive investigation of this polysemous expression, including non-Yogācāra sources like late and post-canonical Pāli texts, Mahāyāna sūtras and commentarial explanations in non-Yogācāra texts, is still a desideratum. The same, by the way, also holds good for the pre- or non-Yogācāra use of the word *vijñapti*, especially its meaning in texts like the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*.

Pt. IV is dedicated to a response to criticism raised by several scholars (R. Sharf, J. Bronkhorst and especially E. Franco) against my old 1973 paper (and its partial English version of 1976) on the relation of the theory of "representation only" and the older idea of "mind only" (*cittamātra*) as well as some other Buddhist theories to spiritual practice. This part was presented in the form of three lectures at the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies in November 2012, and I take the opportunity to express my heartfelt thanks to the College, its members, its staff and its president, Prof. Imanishi, for giving me the chance to advance my views, and for their generous hospitality, and to the audience for many stimulating questions and suggestions.

It was only when the present work had already been nearly completed that I received N. Yamabe's article on *ālayavijñāna* (2012), which, albeit much more in line with my own study of the matter, nonetheless arrives at a different result as regards the origination of this concept. Yamabe's proposal is, as far as I can see, a serious alternative to my own hypothesis, though not without problems either (see Pt. I § 8). At a still later point, N. Aramaki presented me a copy of a forthcoming paper (2013) in which he proposes a completely different picture of the genesis and early history of *ālayavijñāna*, but entering into a detailed discussion would have completely overthrown the arrangement of the present study and would defer its completion beyond the limits I can afford. I therefore have to confine myself to a few provisional remarks (see Pt. I § 9) and must leave a more thorough and comprehensive reinvestigation of the questions involved to others.

There are, to be sure, further issues in my previous Yogācāra-related studies that have met with criticism, and some critical contributions may not even have come to my notice. But in view of the time at my disposal I have to confine my response to those cases which I consider most urgent and let the others rest (which need not mean that I feel convinced), apart from a few casual remarks, mainly in one or the other footnote.

Since most parts of the present study (except, perhaps, Pt. IV) are mainly concerned with rather specific issues of philology and the clarification of Buddhist concepts and their 'emic' implications, I expect that it will attract only very few non-specialist readers. For this reason, I have sometimes left Indian terms untranslated when they reoccur, especially if they do not lend themselves to being adequately represented by English expressions on account of their polysemy or because their semantic field does not coincide with that of Western concepts but overlaps with several of them. In more problematic cases, I have added a brief discussion of their meaning in a footnote. Still, an exhaustive treatment of much discussed crucial expressions like *vijñāna* or *rūpa* is beyond the scope of this study, especially as regards their meaning in earliest Buddhism, which is not in the focus of my argument.

I am afraid that even specialists will argue that in some cases I have let myself be drawn too much into a discussion of minor details. I apologize, but it is usually only in response to some criticism that I have felt the need to do so. And actually it is often the little things that cause the trouble. But I have tried my best to keep the exposition readable by relegating marginal details, accessory complications, additional textual evidence, etc., to the footnotes, though admittedly at the cost of inflating them beyond measure, for which I cannot but apologize.

Writing in English is not an easy thing for a person whose mother tongue is different and who has never lived in an English-speaking country for longer than a couple of weeks. I can only apologize for not having always been able to find the ideal formulation for what I intended to express. Fortunately, Dr. Anne MacDonald kindly took the trouble of reading the whole manuscript; she not only corrected a number of mistakes in my English and suggested stylistic improvements but thanks to her extraordinary perspicacity also inspired many clarifications in my arguments. I am unable to find the right words for expressing my deep gratitude. If any blunders should have remained or crept in afterwards, it is of course my mistake. It is likewise a great pleasure for me to thank all the other friends and colleagues who in some way or other helped me in the course of preparing this book. In particular, I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Prof. Deleanu for kindly reading the manuscript and for a number of most helpful suggestions and for constant encouragement, as well as to Dr. Ulricht Timme Kragh, Dr. M. Maithrimurthi, Prof. Alexander von Rospatt, Prof. Dorji Wangchuk, Prof. Nobuyoshi Yamabe, Prof. Michael Zimmermann and, last but not least, my dear friend and colleague Prof. Tilmann Vetter, taken away suddenly from our midst, for most valuable remarks and suggestions or other kinds of help; to Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda for kindly sending me a facsimile and transcription of the partial manuscript of the *Viniścaya-saṁgrahaṇī* he is working on and for generously allowing me to quote from it; to Dr. Jowita Kramer and to Dr. Luo Hong for kindly allowing me to quote from their still unpublished editions of Sthiramati's *Pañcaskandha-vibhāṣā* and Ratnākaraśānti's *Prajñāpāramitā-upadeśa*, respectively. Responsibility for whatever mistakes have remained or crept in is of course entirely mine.

Finally, I should also like to express my heartfelt thanks to the International Institute for Buddhist Studies, Tokyo, for kindly including the book in its newly created Kasuga Lectures

Series, and to Ms Kanako Shinga for kindly taking over and carrying out, with great effort and admirable competence, the arduous work of preparing the index and also for a number of corrections. Responsibility for the final version and layout of the index as well as for all shortcomings and mistakes is, however, entirely mine. Last but not at all least, I want to express my gratitude to Helga, my wife, for her untiring help, patience and encouragement.

Postscript: The manuscript of the present study had already been sent in when the volume that contains the above-mentioned article by N. Aramaki — along with many other articles in one way or other concerned with the *Yogācārabhūmi* — was finally published (KRAGH 2013). I have tried my best to take the contents of the volume into consideration as far as the problems discussed in the present study are involved, but in view of the constraints of time this was possible only on a very limited scale, and for technical reasons I could discuss some issues only in the form of an annex (see Addenda et Corrigenda).

Technical Remarks

1. When quoting texts according to page and line, I use the pattern "x,y" ("page x, line y"; "f" = plus next page or line, "ff" = plus two or more subsequent pages or lines). Normally, I do not indicate the page number with "p." or the line number with "l.". When quoting texts according to chapter + paragraph or chapter + verse-number, I use the pattern "x.y" ("chapter x. paragraph or verse y").

2. The abbreviation "fn." (plural "fns.")is used *only* in references to footnotes of the *present* study. In the case of other works, I simply use "n." (plural "ns.") for footnotes or endnotes.

3. I use "§" *only* when referring to paragraphs of the *present* study. When referring to paragraphs in other works, I use "#".

4. Cross-references to chapters (ch.) refer to chapters of the same part (I, II) of the present study unless marked otherwise. Cross-references to chapters or paragraphs that contain subdivisions are intended to refer to the whole unit (e.g., a reference to ch. 2 refers to the whole of ch. 2 including its sub-chapters, and a reference to § 2 is meant to include §§ 2.1, 2.2 and 2.3 as well).

5. Chinese texts are mostly quoted from the *Taishō Tripiṭaka* (大正新脩大藏經, CBETA version, abbrev. T) and the *Hsü-tsang ching* or *Zokuzōkyō* (卍新纂續藏經, CBETA version, abbrev. X). The sequence is volume number, text number, page number, column, line (e.g., T 30.1579: 691b2 = T vol. 30 no. 1579: p. 691, column b, line 2).

6. As for Tibetan texts, in the case of the Tanjur I have tried to refer to both Peking and Derge as far as they are available to me, but in the case of less important references I have been content with indicating only one of them. In the case of Kanjur passages, I ought to have used Peking and sTog throughout, but occasionally I had to use Derge instead of Peking since some parts of Peking are not constantly available to me.

7. My references to primary sources are normally to the original texts. References to translations into modern languages have been added only exceptionally.

8. In order to reduce the use of italics, I desist from employing them in the case of grammatical or metrical Indian terms like 'bahuvrīhi', 'śloka', 'pāda', etc., as well as in the case of the terms 'arhat ', 'śrāvaka', 'pratyekabuddha' and 'bodhisattva'. I have capitalized 'Bodhisattva' only if the historical Buddha in his former lives is meant, but the term 'Buddha' (in sg. and pl.) has been capitalized throughout.

9. Strictly speaking, when using Indian terms or words, cases where these terms or words refer to the respective designata should be distinguished from cases where the terms or words themselves, as such, are the subject of discussion by putting the latter in quotation marks ('x'). I have done so only exceptionally, because a systematic application of this procedure proved both cumbersome and unnecessary, since in most cases the distinction is obvious from the context.

Pt. I: Reconsidering the Problem of the Origination of the Concept of *ālayavijñāna*

1. Introductory Remarks

1. In my monograph on *ālayavijñāna* (S 1987), I tried to reconstruct the introduction and early developments of this concept in the Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) school, i.e., the tradition codified in and developing from the voluminous *Yogācārabhūmi* (YBh)[1] ascribed, by tradition, to Maitreya or Asaṅga, but, from a historical point of view, rather an organized compilation of various strands and pieces of materials handed down or produced in what seems to have been a larger, not entirely homogeneous community, which we may call the early Yogācāras. In these materials, some of the typical terms of the more developed doctrinal framework of this school as known from later sources are completely absent, while others, like the term *ālayavijñāna*, make their appearance only in certain parts of the materials, probably representing comparatively late layers. My hypothesis was that the original context of the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* may be mirrored in a passage of the *Samāhitā Bhūmi* (SamBh) of what I had called the 'Basic Section' (MauBh)[2] of the YBh in connection with a discussion of the attainment of the cessation [of conscious mental processes[3] and feelings] (*(saṁjñāvedita)nirodhasamāpatti*), and for convenience sake I called this passage the 'Initial Passage' (*IP*).

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[1] For the meaning of the title, see DELEANU 2012: 1f n. 2; DELHEY 2013: 501; KRAGH 2013: 49f. Both elements of the title are ambiguous; *yogācāra* may mean "spiritual (*yoga*) practice" as well "one whose practice is yoga", and *bhūmi* may mean "area, ground, foundation" as well as "stage, level". In view of the singular (cf. YBh_{Bh} 3,2: *yogācārabhūmiḥ katamā*; likewise, the colophons in YBh_{Bh} have *Yogācārabhūmau X-bhūmiḥ ... samāptā*) "Area/Foundation of spiritual Practice" or "Area/Foundation for yoga practitioners" may seem more adequate, and the latter pattern may also work for chapter titles like *Śrāvakabhūmi* or *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, but in the case of other chapters (like *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ*, etc.) or sub-chapters (like *gotrabhūmi*, etc.) the meaning "level" is obvious, and in this perspective the title *Yogācārabhūmi* is perhaps better understood as an abbreviation of *Yogā-cārabhūmiśāstra*: "(Treatise on) the level(s) of spiritual practice" or "(Treatise on) the level(s) of those who engage, or intend to engage, in spiritual practice". For various commentarial explanations of the expression *yogācārabhūmi* and its use as the title of the text designated thus, see YVy P yi 83b1–85a6 and T 30.1580: 883c23–885a7.

[2] I.e., the *Maulī Bhūmiḥ* or perhaps rather the Section containing the *maulyo bhūmayaḥ* or 'basic [treatment of the] levels [of spiritual practice, or of those who engage, or intend to engage, in such practice]', because after checking the occurrences of the expression *maulī bhūmiḥ* in the VinSg I have the impression that this expression refers not so much to the 'Basic Section' (本地分 = **Maulabhūmi-bhāga* [cf. *AiGr* II.1: 50, § 21b]?) as a whole but to the corresponding chapter, i.e., to the specific Bhūmi of the 'Basic Section' that corresponds to the Bhūmi of the VinSg where the reference occurs. It should also be kept in mind that the term *maulī bhūmiḥ* seems to have been coined in, and from the perspective of, the VinSg.

[3] For the semantic range of *saṁjñā*, see VETTER 2000: 24–27. Cf. also HAMILTON 1996: 53–65; SKILLING 1997: 477–480 (n. 31); BAYER 2010: 314–320 (n. 41). In the present context, *saṁjñā* would

2.0. However, this hypothesis has not gone unchallenged.

2.1. In particular, a detailed refutation has been attempted by Shiro MATSUMOTO in the second part of his book *Bukkyō shisō ron* (仏教思想論), first pt., Tokyo 2004 (henceforward: M2). For Matsumoto, the starting point of the *ālayavijñāna* concept is the fifth chapter of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṁdh). Matsumoto's main concern is, if I understand him correctly,[4] to prove that initially the new kind of mind was essentially conceived in line with the canonical *Bījasūtra* (SN 22.54; $SĀ_c$ no. 39), where the mind is compared to the five kinds of seeds or reproductive parts of plants. However, in Saṁdh V.2–3 the mind (*citta*, called *ādānavijñāna* but also *ālayavijñāna*) *is* the Seed (*bīja*) of the basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*) of the next life, establishes itself on this new basis-of-individual-existence as its support ('locus') and clings to this support by taking it as the self (*ātman*)[5]. It is only in a second step, starting off already in the later paragraphs of the fifth chapter of the Saṁdh, that this new kind of mind came to be transformed into an underlying principle or support ('locus'), viz., of the usual six forms of *vijñāna*, and into the *object* of the notion of a self or ego. Still later, in post-Saṁdh sources, it was, in addition, no longer conceived as *being* the Seed of all dharmas but became the carrier or 'locus' of all Seeds (*bīja*) and, ultimately, the support or 'locus' of all actual dharmas as well. For Matsumoto (M2: 418,5-9), this amounts to an assimilation of the original Buddhist concept of *vijñāna* to non-Buddhist Indian mainstream thought, i.e., *ātmavāda* or, in his terminology, *dhātuvāda.*[6]

2.2. Independently,[7] my thesis was vehemently rejected and subjected to scathing criticism, from a methodological, philosophical, historical and even philological perspective, by Hartmut BUESCHER in his book *The Inception of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda*, Vienna 2008 (henceforward: B). According to Buescher, the early Yogācāra tradition as documented in the earlier layers of the YBh was transformed into "Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda" by the introduction of a "novel epistemological and ontological basis" (B: 4,33), indicated by the terms *svabhāvatraya*, *vijñaptimātra(tā)* and *ālayavijñāna.*[8] For Buescher, as I understand him, these three terms and the concepts they represent are facets of a structural whole that logically imply each other (cf., e.g., B: 162,8: "necessitate each other complementarily"). Hence, they must have been introduced conjointly, in the context of one single creative act of philosophical thought.

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seem to comprise all conscious mental activities, be they perceptual or conceptual, cognitive or imaginative.

[4] Cf. § 36 and the more detailed outline of Matsumoto's views and arguments in ch. 4.2.2.

[5] For a justification of the rendering of *ātman/attan* as 'self' see WYNNE 2010: 200 n. 41.

[6] For 'Critical Buddhism' as the ideological context of this evaluation, which is itself not thematic in the present study, the reader is referred to the essays in HUBBARD & SWANSON 1997 and to the excellent and admirably nuanced critical assessment in STONE 1999 as well as to the fundamental discussion in O'LEARY 1998.

[7] Buescher does not refer to Matsumoto.

[8] As will become clear from my response, I do not believe in such a clear-cut division, last but not least in view of the fact that even some post-YBh (and post-Saṁdh) texts are, on the whole, written from a traditional Yogācāra point of view, with no or only sparse references to *vijñaptimātratā* or corresponding notions (see §§ 13 and 15.2). Unless quoting or rephrasing Buescher's views, I shall therefore, for the sake of simplicity, use "Yogācāra" or "Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda)" for the tradition as a whole, reserving "Vijñānavāda" or "(Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda" for the doctrinal position of *vijñaptimātratā*, and using "early Yogācāra" or "pre-Vijñānavāda Yogācāra" in cases where a statement is felt to require being expressly narrowed down to the early period.

This happened, and in this regard Buescher's position agrees with Matsumoto's, in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, which he takes to have solved a tension still unresolved in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, and he (B: 200,18-22) compares the step from the latter text to the former with the one from Kant to Husserl (Buescher's favourite philosopher). His decidedly positive *evaluation* of the development, from a Western philosopher's point of view, would thus seem to be diametrically opposed to MATSUMOTO's negative evaluation deriving from the latter's idea of 'true Buddhism'.

2.3. While from a philosopher's or theologian's (if I may use the term in a broader sense) point of view an evaluative approach to the study of former systems of thought or religious practices and convictions is no doubt legitimate, from the point of view of the philologist and historian of ideas it is important that such an evaluative approach should be based on a philologically accurate understanding of the sources and on an interpretation guided by the effort to do one's best to understand the concepts and arguments of the early masters on their own terms and in their historical framework, without superimposing one's own agenda on them. Otherwise, one may easily overlook important and interesting facets of systems and practices. Now, in the case of Matsumoto, his philological competence is indisputable and his familiarity with a huge number of sources is most impressive. But from a methodological point of view I must admit that I have some reserves, the main problematic points being, to my mind, the overstreching of the concept of 'locus' and its application (as an element of criticism of what is not 'true Buddhism'), a tendency to exclude unwelcome passages as interpolations, and a certain inclination to disregard the polysemy of concepts where it is inconvenient. As regards Buescher, I do not hesitate to admire his familiarity with modern Western philosophy, but I am afraid that his own philosophical convictions have led him to certain questionable apriori assumptions and modernist interpretations of Indian concepts and have prevented him from carefully investigating their emic meaning and implications. Unfortunately, his philological competence is not really adequate and has led to quite a few unnecessary misinterpretations, as will be shown in the course of this study.

3. It appears that Buescher regards his thesis as incontrovertible because according to him there are only two alternatives, both of which he claims to have finally rejected.[9] One of these is the "*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*-theory" advanced by Chr. Lindtner (B: 5 # 7), according to whom an "ur-*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*", which had already contained the three key concepts of (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda, was already known to Nāgārjuna (B: 23f). The other is my "*Ālayavijñāna*-theory" (B: 5f # 8), according to which, as indicated above, one of the three key concepts, viz., *ālayavijñāna*, predates the Saṁdh because it is already found in pre-Saṁdh portions of the YBh. Since Buescher does not reject, as a matter of principle, the chronological precedence of the respective portions of the YBh over the Saṁdh, he inevitably has to declare the occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in these portions to be post-Saṁdh interpolations. This holds good, above all, for the above-mentioned 'Initial Passage' (*IP*: see § 31), which I had taken to explain both the introduction of a new concept and the term chosen to denote it. In this regard, Buescher's views are essentially in agreement with Matsumoto's, who equally considers all occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh of the YBh, including the *IP*, to be post-Saṁdh interpolations (see §§ 33 and 143).

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[9] Cf., e.g., B: 40,23-26 (for the '*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*-theory'); 100,6-13 (for my hypothesis); 201,27-30 (for both theories).

4. In the present study, I am not going to discuss Buescher's rejection of the "*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*-theory", because I basically agree. Nor shall I comment on the parallel development in modern Western philosophy suggested by him, because this is beyond my competence.

5.0. Likewise, I can only casually address problems posed by Buescher's deliberate but sometimes very peculiar translations of Buddhist terms. The reason is that a thorough assessment would not only require a detailed investigation into the respective Buddhist terms and their history but in many cases also into the semantic implications and the Western conceptual background of the English renderings.

5.1. One of the problems that should be addressed in this connection are renderings in which the semantic content of the Indian term, or the metaphor on which it is based, is replaced, in the English rendering, with an abstract concept, especially one geared towards what is regarded as the systematic function of the Indian term. Such a replacement is especially problematic if the English term is taken from the language of modern Western philosophy or science, since the choice of such concepts may imply a considerable shift of perspective. For example, if the Buddhist term *kleśa* ("[moral and spiritual] defilements", secondarily "afflictions": cf. B: 127,20ff) is rendered as "psychic (or psychological) dysfunction" (B: 128,14f) and, in this connection, *anuśaya* as a "negative, i.e., neurotic, inclination" (B: 129,3), it is moved from the sphere of morality and spiritual practice to that of modern psychology or psychiatry; and the fact that according to the Buddhist view not only all human beings (except for perfect saints) but also animals are beset with *kleśa*s and *anuśaya*s would mean that even they are all neurotics, which may not be the common view of modern psychology.

5.2. Another problem in this connection is the rendering of traditional Buddhist terms in a way that may be in tune with their interpretation in Vijñānavāda texts but does not fit their use in other currents or in the earlier period. For example, it may be defensible to understand dharmas in Vijñānavāda texts as "states of consciousness" (B: 114,6f) — though the equation of these with "noemata" (in a Husserlian sense) may pose additional problems[10] —, but this will not work in early Buddhism or Vaibhāṣika Abhidharma, and not even in early Yogācāra, and it may be preferable to choose, if possible, a rendering that is applicable throughout the history of Buddhist thought, or rather leave the term untranslated, as I shall do. Similarly, for *vipāka* (lit. "ripening, maturation"), Buescher suggests the rendering "heterogeneous repotentialization" (B: 112,4f), which, if interpreted accordingly,[11] makes sense in Yogācāra thought but can hardly be adopted in Vaibhāṣika or Theravāda texts.

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[10] *WEBSTER* p. 1533c: "*in Husserlian philosophy*: the objective aspect of or the content within an intentional experience – distinguished from *noesis*". Is the *noesis* ("the subjective aspect of or the act in an intentional experience": ibid.) not also a dharma (if this term is used in its comprehensive sense)?

[11] A detailed study of the history and precise meaning of the terms *vipāka* and *vipākaja* and their doctrinal applications and implications in the different Buddhist schools would be a demanding but no doubt rewarding task but is far beyond the limits of this study. In connection with Buescher's rendering of *vipāka* as "heterogeneous repotentialization" it should, however, be noted that there are some problems even with regard to the meaning of the term in Yogācāra. [1.] The main problem is that "repotentialization" suggests a *process*, but as far as I can see *vipāka* is, in Yogācāra sources, not normally used for a process. What may be called 'repotentialization' would seem to be, in the first place, the idea that karmically productive factors leave an imprint (*vāsanā*) in the basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*), in the mind(-series) or in the subliminal *ālayavijñāna*, and, second, that at

6. Thus, instead of dealing with the aforementioned issues, I shall rather concentrate on Buescher's and Matsumoto's criticism of my evaluation and understanding of the 'Initial Passage' (*IP*) (ch. 3), and on their interpretation of the V[th] chapter of the Saṁdh and its relation to the MauBh of the YBh (ch. 4). But before doing so, a critical remark on Buescher's thesis of the logical inseparability of the central concepts of Vijñānavāda would seem to be required (ch. 2). In connection with these issues, pertinent philological problems will be discussed either in the text or in the notes. A number of philological details that are not directly relevant to the main discussion will, without claiming exhaustiveness, be treated in appendix 1 to Pt. I.

7.1. I do not expect that my response will settle the dispute. My aim is merely to restore the balance by substantiating why I find Buescher's and Matsumoto's criticism inconclusive and their own positions unconvincing, so that unbiased scholars may form their own judgement. Actually, I still consider my own position as nothing more but a hypothesis; to be sure, the more plausible one so far in my opinion, but nevertheless just a hypothesis, and one which admittedly may not provide a completely satisfactory explanation for all facets of the textual evidence.

7.2. A more precise and detailed text-historical analysis and stratification of the YBh and the other early Yogācāra materials, provided that a consensus can be reached at all, may one day supply a more solid basis for conclusions, but for this purpose thorough philological studies of the textual materials concerned are needed, and above all reliable critical editions of those extant in Sanskrit, some of which have not yet been edited at all so far.[12]

7.3. In the meantime, I provisionally presuppose my earlier view (S 1987: 14):

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death this imprint becomes mature (*vipacyate*) or effective (*vṛttilābha*) and generates a new *ātmabhāva* or re-establishes the mind-series or (*ālaya*)*vijñāna* in a new existence in such a way that it is characterized by a second-step repotentialization (or actualization of a specific set of Seeds) entailing, among other things, pleasant or unpleasant experiences in accordance with the quality of the previous karmic factors. But what is normally termed '*vipāka*' is not the process but the entity generated by it, i.e., the new and at the same time re-potentialized *ātmabhāva* or (*ālaya*)*vijñāna*. — [2.] In this connection, I have to admit that I find Buescher's (B: 113,13ff) assertion that in TrBh *7,17f (L. 18,26–19,1: *sarvadhātugatiyonijātiṣu kuśalākuśalakarmavipākatvād vipākaḥ*) the term *vipāka* occurs twice, in the first case referring to "a state (*-tva*) achieved through ... a previous *process* of repotentialization" and in the second simply to "the *result* as defined in this way", somewhat puzzling. Actually, the abstract-suffix in the first occurrence is syntactical (nominal style), and the passage merely explains that *ālayavijñāna* is [called] *vipāka* because it *is* the *vipāka*, in any [world-]sphere (*dhātu*), mode of existence (*gati*), mode of birth (*yoni*) or caste/species (*jāti*), of [previous] wholesome and unwholesome karma. Both occurrences of *vipāka* clearly refer to the result, the new *ālayavijñāna* repotentialized at the moment of 'linking up' a new existence. It is true that the *explanation* as a whole also mentions the causes, and that a process of repotentialization of the *ālayavijñāna* of the *previous* life is also implied, but this *process* is not called *vipāka* here. Nor is AKBh 25,11f (B: 113,7-11) a convincing example for *vipāka* as referring to the *process* of repotentialization as contrasted with the result, for the analysis of *vipāka* as *vipacyata iti* is expressly stated to refer only to karma at the moment of bearing fruit (*phalakālaprāptaṁ karma*), not to the process. Besides, there is no reason to connect this AKBh passage with the *bīja* theory; it makes perfect sense in the conceptual framework of the Vaibhāṣika system.

[12] For the present state of research (editions, translations, studies) concerning the YBh, see DELHEY 2013.

1. Roughly speaking, the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh) and the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) of the MauBh[13] as well as the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg; more precisely: the *Sūtramātṛkā* portion) constitute the oldest layers of the YBh, with no trace of the innovative concepts typical of later Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda).

2. The second oldest layer would be the remaining chapters of the MauBh, with materials in which the innovative concepts are on the whole likewise lacking, but with sporadic exceptions, some of which show traces of having been added to earlier material, but since (exceptions apart) these additions may well have been made by the compiler(s), they are not necessarily *later* interpolations. The chronological relation of these passages to the *Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra* (Saṁdh) (and even to the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*: see §§ 9.1, 34.1, 37.1) is controversial. The formation of (parts of) the Saṁdh text and the compilation of the MauBh may overlap. In my opinion, arguments for priority must be presented for each case separately.

3. The latest portion of the YBh (in terms of its compilation) is no doubt the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* (VinSg). Its compilation or final redaction as well as part of the materials included indubitably presuppose not only the MauBh[14] but also the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, which has even been incorporated in its entirety. But in much of the textual materials contained in the VinSg the innovative concepts do not figure, even where one would expect them, which would seem to mean that these materials are either earlier or deliberately conservative. Therefore, in the case of the VinSg materials, too, arguments for chronological priority or posteriority must be presented for each case separately.

8.0. When this study had almost been completed, I received, thanks to the kindness of the author, N. YAMABE'S recent article on the *ālayavijñāna* theory (YAMABE 2012). Yamabe, too, disagrees with my hypothesis and seems to regard the *IP* as an interpolation,[15] and anyway as too short and isolated to elucidate the full picture of the background of the new introduction of *ālayavijñāna*.[16]

8.1. Yamabe's own proposal starts from the assumption that yoga practioners usually do not promulgate a new conviction or idea and the experience on which it was based in a written form from the outset, but in the beginning rather tend to communicate such innovations orally from person to person, and that this may also hold good in the case of *ālayavijñāna*.[17] Even so, Yamabe admits that for such an early period we have no other

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[13] Cf., in this connection, the linguistic feature of gerunds in °*tvā* from verbs with prefix, ubiquitous in ŚrBh and BoBh but extremely rare in the first five Bhūmis of the MauBh (i.e., those edited in YBh_{Bh}, where I have not noted such gerunds except for two occurrences of the form *viṣkambhayitvā*: 84,4 and 86,10f). There seems to be no occurrence in the SamBh, but there is at least one in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* (ed. in ŚrBh_{Tai} II: 318,7: *parivarjayitvā*, confirmed by YBh_{ms} 102b5).

[14] If the VinSg had been planned from the outset as a separate section reserved for the detailed treatment of certain issues that were (as, e.g., the concept of *ālayavijñāna*) deliberately merely hinted at or mentioned in passing in the MauBh, wouldn't one expect that in such cases in the MauBh an explicit reference to their full treatment in the VinSg, or, at any rate, a general remark to this effect at the beginning of the MauBh? But as far as I know there is no instance of such reference throughout the MauBh.

[15] YAMABE 2012: 218 n. 74.

[16] Ibid. 202,12f. 「三摩呬多地」における短い孤立した記述に基づいてアーラヤ識導入の背景の全体像を解明することには、かなりの困難があるのではないだろうか。

[17] Ibid. 201,7-12; 202,1-6.

choice but to try to reconstruct the situation in which the new concept or idea was introduced from traces that the not yet systematized concept may have left in the transmitted texts because these are our only source.[18] But he thinks that for this purpose we must not confine ourselves to the MauBh but have to take into account the *ālayavijñāna* treatise right at the beginning of the VinSg (i.e., in the PañcMBhVin, the combined *Viniścaya* of the *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* and the *Manobhūmi*) as well, especially its first part, the 'Proof Portion'.[19] Actually, what he considers relevant in this connection is the association of *ālayavijñāna*, in the sixth argument of the 'Proof Portion', with all kinds of corporeal sensations (*kāye kāyānubhavāḥ*) experienced by a person involved in correct or incorrect thinking (*yoniśo vâyoniśo vā cintayato vā*)[20] or pondering (*anuvitarkayato vā*) both in and outside meditative concentration (*samāhitacetaso vā 'samāhitacetaso vā*).[21] According to Yamabe, these sensations may represent corporeal ease or pliancy (*praśrabdhi*) and unease or inertness (*dauṣṭhulya*), respectively.[22] As he then points out, in the process of the Renewal[23] or Transmutation of the Basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) unease/inertness is, in meditative concentration, successively replaced by ease/pliancy, both in the body and in the mind.[24] If I understand him correctly, it is in direct yogic experience that the Yogācāra practitioners discovered the existence of a fundamental layer of the mind — a layer that is not only the basis of the surface layer of the mind (in that it is or carries its Seed(s)) but also (and perhaps in the first place) the biological basis of the respective sentient being, and which they called '*ālayavijñāna*', i.e., "mind dwelling in the body".[25] As evidence for a direct perception of *ālayavijñāna*, YAMABE mentions a passage of the 'Nivṛtti Portion' of the *ālayavijñāna* treatise of the VinSg where along with this direct perception one perceives oneself as bound by the fetter of phenomena (*nimittabandhana*) and that of unease/corruption (*dauṣṭhulyabandhana*).[26]

8.2. Yamabe's assumption that the yoga practitioners in the circle(s) to whom we owe the materials compiled in the YBh most probably did not promulgate new experiences or

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[18] Ibid. 201,15–202,1.

[19] Ibid. 202,13-17.

[20] Hsüan-tsang adds "or not [involved in] thinking" (YBh$_c$ 579c9: 或無思慮; ASVy$_c$ 701c21: 或不思惟), but this is not confirmed by the Skt. or by the Tibetan versions and not even by Paramārtha (VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019a14).

[21] YBh$_t$ P zi 3b6-8 (YBh$_c$ 579c8-12; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019a12-15) = ASBh 13,8-11; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 13f # vi and 19 (Japanese transl.) = 2001: 335f and 343; English transl.: GRIFFITHS 1986: 136; SPARHAM 1993: 131. Cf. S 1987: 44 # 3.7.1. The translation from the Tibetan in WAYMAN 1996: 460 ignores the existence of the Sanskrit original and is incorrect in several regards.

[22] YAMABE 2012: 203,1-3, referring to my own suggestion (S 1987 # 5.4.2.1); cf. also 203,11.

[23] For this rendering of '*āśrayaparivṛtti*', see fn. 2174.

[24] Ibid. 203,15-204,2.

[25] Ibid. 204,2-5: ... 瑜伽行者達は禅定の中で直観的に気づき、それを「身体に内在する識」すなわち「アーラヤ識」と呼んだのではないだろうか。 For this thesis of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* deriving from direct experience in the context of yogic practice, YAMABE (2012: 203,7-14) refers to K. YOKOYAMA and N. HAKAMAYA and points out that he disagrees with my critical discussion of their position in S 1987 # 7.4.

[26] Ibid. 204,5-8, with reference to S 1987 # 7.4. The passage is YBh$_t$ P zi 9a7f (YBh$_c$ 581b28–c2; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020b5-8; HAKAMAYA 1979: 40 [2001: 405] # **5.b**.B.2; WALDRON 2003: 187). Cf. also MSA XIX.51 (S 1987: 207).

innovative ideas connected with these experiences from the very outset, and surely not in a written form, sounds reasonable. He is also right in pointing out that we nonetheless depend on the written sources as the only evidence available to us and have to sift them for traces of the situation from which such ideas may have emerged. I also accept that in the case of *ālaya-vijñāna* we should not limit ourselves to the MauBh passages but should take into account also the VinSg materials because they, too, may have preserved traces of the original situation and because the relative chronology of the incorporated materials is not automatically identical with that of the compilations. From this point of view, I consider his thesis regarding the origination of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* a serious alternative to my own, one that deserves careful consideration in future research on the matter.

8.3. Still, there are, to my mind, also problems, especially as regards Yamabe's assumption that the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* is, if I understand him correctly, in the first place a conceptualization and verbalization of a direct experience made in what is now called 'altered states of consciousness' (cf. Pt. IV). Without intending to deny such a possibility, I cannot but have some reserves with regard to the conclusiveness of the evidence adduced,[27] i.e., the passage from the 'Nivṛtti Portion' according to which *ālayavijñāna* is directly perceived, for the first time, in the *darśanamārga*. The *darśanamārga* is, traditionally, the first full and direct comprehension of the four Truths of the Noble Ones[28] (*āryasatya*). If, as is the case in the 'Nivṛtti Portion', *ālayavijñāna* is defined as the Truth of Suffering in the present life and as that which generates the Truth of the Origin [of suffering] in the present life and the Truth of Suffering in the future,[29] hence as representing the deepest layer and fundament of these two Truths, the conclusion that it must form the content of the *darśanamārga* was almost inevitable. This being the case, the passage may rather be prescriptive than descriptive; in other words: it may be the result of a doctrinal consideration, and not so much the description of an actual experience. It may also be noteworthy that the experience of *ālayavijñāna* as bound by the fetter of *dauṣṭhulya*, here both in the sense of unease and in that of spiritually negative corruption, is somehow at variance with Yamabe's assumption that the concept of *ālayavijñāna* may have emerged in connection with the Renewal of the Basis in deep meditation (*dhyāna*) where the experience is that of ease or pliancy (*praśrabdhi*), of a pliancy at that which becomes, in the course of meditative practice, intensive (*audārika*) and easily perceptible (*sūpalakṣya*),[30] quite unlike *ālayavijñāna*, which is essentially subtle and hard to perceive, inaccessible to a person who has not yet seen the Truth(s).[31] The statement in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' would thus in any case seem to belong to a somewhat different (in my opinion: later) strand of the development of the *ālayavijñāna* concept, and one would have to ask for the reasons for this (by no means inconsiderable) change.

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[27] For the idea of a yogic perception of the *vijñāna* attached to the body one could refer to the *Śrāmaṇyaphalasūtra* (Saṅghabh II 245,24f; DN I 76,16-20; see fn. 203), but I do not know whether this passage is made use of anywhere in the YBh.

[28] See ENOMOTO 2009.

[29] YBh_t P zi 8b1f (YBh_c 581b4-6; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020a19f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 38 [2001: 402f] # **5.b**.A.4; WALDRON 2003: 186).

[30] $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 432,13-18; SAKUMA 1990: II 26,7–27,1 (#G.2).

[31] YBh_t P zi 9a5f (YBh_c 581b24-26; HAKAMAYA 1979: 40 [2001: 405] # **5.b**.B.2; cf. WALDRON 2003: 187): *bden pa ma mthong ba...s ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ... rtogs par mi nus pa'i phyir ro.*

8.4. As for the sixth argument of the 'Proof Portion', Griffiths takes it to mean that the "fact that at any given time physical experience for a given individual is variegated" implies that *ālayavijñāna* must be postulated "since only the store-consciousness can hold 'seeds' of various and mutually incompatible qualities at one and the same time".[32] This interpretation is rightly discarded by Yamabe (2012: 191,1f) with the remark that the text does not mention Seeds in this connection. Though expressly admitting that the argument is very brief and its purport not immediately obvious (ibid. 191,1), he suggests interpreting it as connected with the doctrine of *ālayavijñāna*'s function of biologically appropriating the body as a whole so as to keep it alive and sentient (ibid. 191,2f), to the effect that it is only the presence of *ālaya-vijñāna* that allows us to explain the various corporeal sensations that can be observed in the body[33] regardless of what happens in the surface layer of the mind and without being related to this layer (ibid. 191,4-6). In this way, the concept of *ālayavijñāna* would be rooted in a very concrete body-experience (極めて具体的な身体感覚), in contrast to its being "postulated" in order to explain a theoretical problem as assumed by Griffiths (ibid. 191,8-10).

8.5. Still, though admitting that the argument clearly points to a particular experience as its starting point, I am not sure that this experience should be taken as a kind of direct revelation of a psychological reality *sui generis* spontaneously designated as *ālayavijñāna*, without any doctrinal reflections being involved. If it is appropriate to understand the corporeal sensations not in the sense of a kind of continuous diffuse awareness of the body but more specifically as an experience of bodily ease or pliancy (*praśrabdhi*) in the context of successful meditative practice[34] and as an experience of bodily unease or inertness (*dauṣṭhulya*) in case of

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[32] GRIFFITHS 1986: 102f.

[33] Tsong-kha-pa expressly takes them to pervade the whole body (*lus la khyab par skye ba'i myong ba*, see fn. 35). As for the explanation of the passage in Bu-ston's commentary on the AS(Bh) (Śatapiṭaka vol. 60, fol. 232,2-4) referred to in HAKAMAYA 1978a: 20 = 2001: 343f, viz.,

> *lus kyi tshor ba mi rung ba ni | 'di ltar | tshul bzhin nam | tshul bzhin ma yin par sems shing rtog{s?} pa'am | sems mnyam par bzhag pa'am | ma bzhag pa gang zhig gi lus la tshor ba rnam pa mang po mi 'byung bar thal te | yid shes tshul bzhin sems pa lta bu gcig la gtad la kun gzhi 'ang med pa'i phyir | khyab pa yod de | yid yul gzhan la chags sam yengs pa na | de las gzhan 'dzin mi nus so || kun gzhi 'ang med na | tshor ba mang po'i rgyu med pas so ||*,

I doubt that the expression *khyab pa yod de* (YAMABE 2002: 367,21–368,9) refers to *ālayavijñāna*'s pervasion of the body. I rather prefer to take it in a logical sense (thus also, independently, Dorji Wangchuk, who kindly took the trouble to have a look at the passage). Tentative translation:

> As for the impossibility of corporeal sensation, [the argument is] as follows:
>
> [*pratijñā*:] There would be the undesired consequence that in the body of one who is thinking and reflecting correctly or incorrectly, [regardless of?] whether his mind is concentrated [in meditation] or not, manifold corporeal sensations could not arise;
>
> [*hetu*:] because the *mano*[*vi*]*jñāna* is focused on one single [act like] correct thinking and because the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] is [presupposed by you to be] non-existent.
>
> The logical pervasion (*vyāpti*) holds good (i.e., the *hetu* does imply the *sādhya-dharma*); for if the mind (= *manovijñāna*) is attached to another [object] or is distracted, it cannot apprehend anything else [like tactile impressions], [and] if the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] does not exist either, there would be no cause for the multiple [corporeal] sensations.

[34] Cf. the statement, ascribed to Hsüan-tsang (法師云 / 三藏云) by Chi 基 (T 43.1829: 172b9f) and To-ryun 道倫 (T 42.1828: 595b16), that 'corporeal sensation' (*kāyiko 'nubhavaḥ*) means the sensation/feeling (*vedanā*) aroused by *praśrabdhi* in contact with the body (身受 即輕安觸身起受). It is interesting that in the CWSL (16a25-29) Hsüan-tsang obviously does not consider the corporeal sensations connected with the *vipākavijñāna* (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) to be directly experienced but rather

insufficient progress or wrong orientation, we cannot but recognize that in the ŚrBh this kind of experience is well known and simply taken for granted without being associated with the (obviously still unknown) concept of *ālayavijñāna*. This being the case, it may well be that it was only in the wake of additional reflections and doctrinal considerations that these corporeal sensations led to the introduction of or came to be associated with the concept of *ālayavijñāna*. For a well-founded clarification of this problem, a comprehensive investigation of the issues involved, including a critical study of the complex exegetical literature on the argument,[35] would be required. Still, from a preliminary perspective it would seem to me that one of the reasons involved might have been the tendency to exclude sense perception (including ordinary tactile awareness) from states of meditative concentration (*samādhi*),[36] and perhaps also from states of intensive mental reflection (*cintā*) that precede this stage. Similarly, the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun*'s (顯揚聖教論) explanation of well-being (*sukha*) in the canonical formula of the first two (and also the third) *dhyāna* as a smooth or agreeable (*sāta*) kind of feeling (*veditaṁ vedanāgatam*) that consists in a fostering (*anugraha*) and refreshment (*āhlāda*) of the body (*āśraya*) based on the *ālayavijñāna*[37] can, in view of the controversial discussion of the matter as transmitted in the *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*,[38] hardly be dissociated from doctrinal reflections.

8.6. As Yamabe rightly points out,[39] in view of the association of the systematized *ālaya-vijñāna* with *neutral* feeling, the idea of its being, somehow, connected with *agreeable* feeling may well be a feature remounting to the formative phase of the concept. Likewise, the idea that there must be some special form of *vijñāna* that pervades and animates the body in order to explain the arising of manifold corporeal sensations even in states of meditative concentration when ordinary tactile awareness is normally taken to be absent may indeed deserve to be taken into consideration as an alternative starting-point of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*. However, if my argument is correct, in this case, too, this introduction would not have taken place independent of a *reflection* on *doctrinal* or exegetical problems emerging in connection with certain aspects of meditative practice or experience. In this regard, the hypothesis that starts from the sixth argument of the 'Proof Portion' would thus not be essentially different from my hypothesis deriving the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* from exegetical (and, in the background, doctrinal) problems connected with *nirodhasamāpatti*. Both assumptions are also alike in that they imply the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as dwelling in the body and keeping it

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postulates their existence on the basis of well-being (怡適) or fatigue (勞損) experienced after those states of meditative concentration or intense pondering.

[35] Especially the Chinese commentaries on the YBh passage (T 43.1829: 172a29–b17; T 42.1828: 595b7–c9), but also the rephrasing of the argument in CWSL 16a25-29 along with the commentaries (esp. T 43.1830: 360a1-23) and subcommentaries on this passage as well as the Tibetan commentaries on the quotation of the argument in the ASBh (13,8-11) and the remark on the argument in Tsong-kha-pa's *Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' 'grel* (YidKun 71,8–72,2; KELSANG & ODANI 175 fol. 44a2-5 and 94 [Jap. transl.]; SPARHAM 221,25–222,9 and 131 [Engl. transl.]) along with the commentaries thereon (cf., e.g., KELSANG & ODANI 207 fol. 31a6–b1).

[36] Thus expressly, in connection with the present argument, T 43.1829: 172b1f and 16; T 42.1828: 595b9f and 20; c4f; T 43.1830: 360a9. Cf. also fn. 365.

[37] HsienY 487a5f (quoted ASBh 61,3-5; cf. S 1987: 44 # 3.7.2) and 487b3-7.

[38] AKBh 438,15–440,5 (LO.SA. III: 2388–2393). Cf. S 1987: 683f.

[39] YAMABE 2012: 203,3-6.

alive and sentient (see § 43.2). Nor is the textual evidence for my hypothesis weaker, for the *IP* is by no means more succinct than the passage from which YAMABE starts, and even if the *IP* is disregarded, the derivation of the existence of *ālaya-vijñāna* from exegetical and doctrinal requirements in connection with *nirodhasamāpatti* is, in a slightly more formalized form, likewise found in the 'Proof Portion' (# vii) and is, moreover, presupposed by a couple of further YBh passages.[40] On the other hand, it too does not fully fit in with the systematic assumptions of the systematized treatment of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin (see § 22) and may thus likewise belong to an older strand. In either case, Yamabe's supposition of an oral prehistory, so to speak, of the textual evidence for *ālayavijñāna* could serve to explain the fact that in most parts of the MauBh this concept surfaces only sporadically (see also § 24) from its underground oral (and mental) process of formation, before becoming (as I understand it) systematically integrated in the analysis of the six *vijñāna*s at the beginning of the MauBh and in its *Sacittikā* and *Acittikā Bhūmiḥ*, focused upon in Saṁdh V and, finally, fully elaborated in the *ālayavijñāna* treatises of the VinSg.

9.1.1. In a recent paper kindly made accessible to me before its actual publication, N. ARAMAKI (2013)[41] presents a thought-provoking philosophico-historical attempt to show "how Nāgārjuna's philosophy influenced the formative process of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda".[42] An adequate assessment of this demanding essay as a whole is far beyond the scope of the present work and also beyond my competence. Still, a partial comment is inevitable since within the broader framework of his article Aramaki, too, proposes a theory on the origination and early history of the Yogācāra concept of a subliminal form of mind explicitly established as a layer of its own in addition to the six traditional, supraliminal kinds of awareness that is completely different from my own hypothesis. Similar to Buescher, and obviously with a similar philosophical background,[43] Aramaki, too, considers the references to *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh to presuppose the Saṁdh. In his words,

> the *ādāna-* or *ālayavijñāna*, which is newly formulated as constituent of the supreme truth in ... SandhN ... chapter 5, ... further develops into a founding principle of the formative process of the MaulBh as the mundane truth. (418,10-13; cf. also 421,27-29)

Aramaki does not, however, reject the idea of a precursor of *ādānavijñāna* in pre-Saṁdh layers of the YBh, but he locates them in the VaSg and in the BoBh. According to him, in the VaSg (pre-Mahāyāna stage) the Yogācāras

> began to formulate two layers of *vijñāna*: 1) a subconscious layer consisting in the pursuing consciousness (*ādānavijñāna*), and 2) a conscious layer consisting of the five perceptive consciousnesses (*pañcavijñānakāya*) along with the conceptual consciousness (*manovijñāna*). (418,21-25)

In the BoBh, he finds the two layers represented, respectively, by the idea of the eight concepts (*vikalpa*) and the 'things' (*vastu*) that are "their referent bases supporting them (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and being conceived by them (*ālambana*)" as taught in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* ($BoBh_D$ 34–36), the former being equated by him with the "superficial conciousnesses" and the latter with the subconsciousness (*ādānavijñāna*). But it is, according to Aramaki, only in

[40] See fn. 95.

[41] Unspecified page references in § 9 are to ARAMAKI 2013.

[42] ARAMAKI 2013: 402,2f; 429,3-7; 430–434

[43] ARAMAKI 2013: 412 n.18.

the Saṁdh that the structure of *vijñāna* is taught "as the mundane truth to the initiated bodhisattva yogācāras" (421,10f), which seems to mean: to bodhisattvas capable of thereby penetrating the supreme truth of *śūnyatā* (421,35-44).

9.1.2. The next important step in the development of the theory of mind in early Yogācāra is, according to Aramaki (421–425), the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg (SacBhVin), where the new two-layered structure is extended to a three-layered one by the addition of *manas* (later: *kliṣṭaṁ manaḥ*) as an innate and largely continuous subtle conception of self or ego. The new structure is designated as "an exposition from the point of view of the theory of the supreme truth" and contrasted with "an exposition from the point of view of the theory of the mundane truth" (Aramaki 423,5-7). For the latter the reader is, in the SacBhVin text itself, referred to the *Manobhūmi*. This reference is the crucial point of Aramaki's further analysis of the textual history of the YBh, for he writes:

> This reference seems to imply that at this point in time when the above passage of the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* chapter of the VinSg was written, the entire MaulBh was still in the process of being compiled. The compilation of the whole MaulBh had not yet been completed, because ... it was first in the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* chapter of the MaulBh that the fundamental principles behind the compilation of the entire MaulBh were formulated on the basis of the new theory of the three layers of *vijñāna* presented in the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* chapter of the VinSg. (424,26-34)

Thus, if I understand him correctly, Aramaki takes the SacBhVin to precede the *Sacittikā* + *Acittikā Bhūmiḥ* (SacAcBh)[44] of the MauBh and considers the SacAcBh of the MauBh to formulate the compilatory principle of the entire MauBh and hence to precede the compilation of the latter in the form as we have it, which, according to Aramaki, is "as a whole ... an exposition of the mundane truth (*saṁvṛtisatya*)" (425,37). This need not mean that all the materials compiled are of later origin (418,15f), but it would seem to imply, in Aramaki's opinion, that the occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh presuppose not only the Saṁdh but even the SacBhVin. For Aramaki, there is thus no need to postulate interpolations in order to get rid of the occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh; for him, the whole structure of the MauBh (though not all materials incorporated, and at any rate not the ŚrBh and the BoBh) is rather post-Saṁdh and, it seems, even post-VinSg (though not necessarily later than all the materials incorporated in the latter, since he seems to regard the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin to be post-MauBh: 427,43-50).

9.2.0 In spite of my great admiration for Prof. Aramaki's profound understanding of an incredibly wide range of Buddhist sources, I must confess that on the issue under discussion I have some problems with his argumentation. Since my assessment of the doctrinal and historical position of the Saṁdh will be exposed in ch. 4.2, I will confine myself here to an (admittedly provisional) discussion of some other issues involved.

9.2.1. As regards the precursors of *ādānavijñāna* assumed by Aramaki, it is no matter of dispute that in the VaSg (and not only there) *vijñāna* occurs in functions which are different from its function of perceiving or cognizing an object, like appropriating the primary elements of the sense faculties, i.e., keeping the body alive, or being laden with the Seeds of defilements.[45] But there is no clear distinction of *vijñāna* in these functions from *vijñāna* as

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[44] To be precise, in the MauBh the treatment of the two levels *sacittikā bhūmiḥ* and *acittikā bhūmiḥ* are combined in one chapter (SacAcBh).

[45] See §§ 199; 222; 252.

cognitive awareness, let alone an explicit designation of *vijñāna* in the non-cognitive functions as '*ādānavijñāna*', as Aramaki's formulation suggests. Still more problematic, in my opinion, is his interpretation of the mutual conditioning of imagination (*vikalpa*) and the 'thing' (*vastu*) that forms its basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and objective support (*ālambana*) in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh. There is no doubt that imagination (*vikalpa*) corresponds to the ordinary cognitive acts, controlled and impregnated by linguistic conventions. But Aramaki's identification of the *vastu* with subconsciousness (*ādānavijñāna*) seems anachronistic. There is no such expression in the whole BoBh (nor, by the way, in the corresponding section of the VinSg), and I myself definitely prefer not to superimpose later concepts on earlier materials but try to understand them as they stand. In the present case, this would mean that according to the *Tattvārthapaṭala*, imagination (*vikalpa*) impregnated by linguistic conventions creates a kind of corresponding pseudo-reality (*vastu*), which in its turn reproduces the respective imagination (see § 303.2). This would seem to be all we can glean from the text as it stands, however one might *interpret* it by hindsight in terms of later developments.

9.2.2. As regards the SacBhVin, it may or may not have introduced the concept of *manas* as a *vijñāna* of its own characterized by a continuous innate conception of an ego for the first time, but at any rate it seems to be the first text in which this innate subtle conception of an ego is utilized as the decisive principle of pollution, suppressed in states of supramundane insight and completely exterminated in arhats. This would allow *ālayavijñāna* to be exempted from the role of being exclusively the principle of pollution (which it is conceived as having in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' of the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin: see § 22 and ch. 4.2.5.8.2) and to be (re)established as a neutral carrier of all kinds of Seeds and as a principle of biological life even in an arhat, but the text does not contain any hint in this direction. This is, however, not the crucial point in the present context, since Aramaki's conclusions regarding the compositional history of the MauBh are rather based on the fact that for the exposition of the functioning of mind in terms of mundane truth (**saṁvṛti*) the SacBhVin refers to the *Manobhūmi*. Still, I have to admit that I fail to see the problem. The VinSg often refers to the corresponding or some other Bhūmi of the MauBh either for a point of contact or for a more detailed treatment, so why not here? What would be required is a passage in the *Manobhūmi* (of the MauBh) where *vijñāna* is treated in the conventional way, i.e., as a linear sequence of ordinary cognitive acts without any reference to the two subliminal layers, or at least one of them. Actually, such a passage is easily found, viz., at YBh_{Bh} 57,18–59,15, esp. 58,13–59,6. It is thus hardly justified to conclude from this reference that the MauBh was still under construction.[46] The situation would still not change if the reference to the *Manobhūmi*

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[46] One might argue that the reference should be to the definition of the six *vijñāna*s distributed, in the transmitted version of MauBh, over the PañcBh and the ManoBh, and that this implies that when the SacBhVin was compiled these two Bhūmis had not yet been separated into two (cf. fn. 47) and could thus summarily be referred to as '*Manobhūmi*'.[1] And one might further argue that at that time the definitions should not yet have included a reference to the *ālayavijñāna* (and that this reference was introduced only later in order to create a point of contact for the incorporation of the treatment of *ālayavijñāna* at the beginning of the VinSg). Still, even if this much were conceded (though I hardly would), it would not automatically imply that all references to *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh must be of post-VinSg or post-Saṁdh origin. In particular, it would not necessarily have such an implication for the SacAcBh, and still less so for the *IP*.

[1] Cf. the reference to '**Manobhūmiviniścaya*' (*Yid kyi sa rnam par gtan la bab pa*) at YBh_t P zi 199b4 and 227b2 (YBh_C 655c22 and 665c19).

were taken to have been part of the textual unit even before its inclusion in the VinSg (which is, however, anyway extremely improbable).

9.2.3. As I understand Aramaki's thesis, it includes the assumption that the "philosophy of the three layers of *vijñāna*" as established in the SacBhVin "became the presupposition for founding the compilatory principle of the MaulBh as a whole as … laid out in the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* chapter of the MaulBh" (401,30-35). This would seem to involve the assumption that the SacBhVin existed as a chapter of the VinSg before the respective chapter of the MauBh, in other words, that the Bhūmi-structure of the MauBh was established only after the establishment of (at least part of) the Bhūmi-structure of the VinSg. To me at any rate, this sounds extremely improbable. Actually, there is, according to Suguro (1989: 265), not a single cross-reference to the VinSg in the whole MauBh, whereas there are plenty of references to the MauBh in the VinSg. It is true that the VinSg, too, contains a lot of materials that are quite conservative, but on the basis of an unprejudiced comparison one can hardly deny that there are also quite a few pieces that are (like the SacBhVin!) decidedly more advanced than the most advanced pieces of the MauBh (with the exception, perhaps, of a very small number of demonstrably interpolated passages). This fits in with the fact that the chapters of the VinSg usually end with the statement that no further material pertaining to the respective *bhūmi* has emerged — a statement which makes sense if the VinSg is a kind of supplementary collection, structured along the lines of the MauBh, but surely not the other way round. Under these circumstances, I consider it highly improbable that the SacBhVin influenced the SacAcBh of the MauBh. To be sure, the latter, too, does show the dichotomy into the surface forms of mind and the subliminal *ālayavijñāna*, and it does show the distinction between the conventional, mundane (*saṁvṛti*) analysis of mind and an analysis in terms of the supreme truth (*paramārtha*) constituted by the recognition of precisely this dichotomy. But it ignores the *(kliṣṭa-)manas* and thus shows no trace at all of the SacBhVin's three-layered analysis of *vijñāna*. To me, this makes much better sense if the SacAcBh of the MauBh is taken as the earlier text and the SacBhVin as an advancement in which the dichotomic structure on the *paramārtha* level is further developed into a three-layered structure. This would even hold good if the text that constitutes the SacBhVin had existed separately before becoming incorporated in the VinSg.

9.2.4. As regards the enumeration of the first five *bhūmi*s in # 1 of the *SacAcBh* (of the *MauBh*), I doubt that this is a programme for how the MauBh *should* be structured. I rather take it to refer to the already existing framework, more precisely: to the first comprehensive set of *bhūmi*s — comprehensive insofar as it starts with the (spiritually) lowest level (sense perception), continues with the level of everyday non-sensory cognitions (*manobhūmi*),[47] and

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[47] The first two Bhūmis (as chapters) are no doubt somehow interconnected in that a source dealing with the six conventional *vijñāna*s has been distributed over them, the treatment of the sense perceptions forming the bulk of the first Bhūmi, whereas the analogous treatment of *manovijñāna* (though in the beginning deranged by a modernizing modification) follows in the initial part of the second Bhūmi, and a verse summarizing this analogous treatment (of all the six *vijñāna*s) follows towards the end of the *Manobhūmi* (cf. YBh_{Bh} 71,5-9), after a lengthy discussion of several other subjects. Likewise, the above-mentioned treatment of the six *vijñāna*s in terms of their causes and their subsequent arising in a one-layered *santāna* (YBh_{Bh} 57,18–59,15) has a parallel in the *Pañcavijñāna-kāyasaṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* (YBh_{Bh} 9,10–10,7). It is thus not impossible that the two *bhūmi*s (as spiritual levels) had, originally, been dealt with in one single chapter (like the three *bhūmi*s from the *savitarkā savicārā bhūmiḥ* onward, or the *sacittikā bhūmiḥ* and the *acittikā bhūmiḥ*), as in the VinSg. But on the

then moves on to the three levels of meditative concentration, the purpose of the SacAcBh being to decide which of them are, in conventional terms, endowed with mind (*sacittaka*, i.e., conscious) and which are not (viz., a part of the last *bhūmi*). That the two subsequent *bhūmi*s (*samāhitā* and *asamāhitā*) are not mentioned may easily be explained by the fact that they merely consist in a different division of the same area that is already covered by the preceding five *bhūmi*s, just as the division of this same area into a *sacittikā* and an *acittikā bhūmiḥ*. Aramaki's (403,1-7) suggestion that the *Samāhitā* and *Asamāhitā Bhūmiḥ* may "somehow correspond to" the 'mindless' states on the *avitarka-avicāra* level (viz., *āsaṁjñika* as a meditative concentration and as a form of existence, and *nirodhasamāpatti*) does not convince me, for the *Asamāhitā Bhūmiḥ* does not mention any of them,[48] and although two of them, viz., the two *samāpatti*s, are in fact dealt with in the *Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ*,[49] they are by no means its only subject but just one among many other forms of meditative concentration.

9.2.5. If there is no reason to regard the SacAcBh of the MauBh as dependent on the SacBhVin and if the latter is a later development, there is also no reason to regard the occurrence of *ālayavijñāna* in the SacAcBh of the MauBh as post-VinSg. And if Aramaki is ready to accept genuine precursors of *ādānavijñāna* in texts as early as the VaSg and in the BoBh, why not in the MauBh if the latter must have been compiled before the VinSg and thus at a time when the Saṁdh (not mentioned anywhere in the MauBh) was, most probably, likewise at best *in statu nascendi*? The fact that the first seven Bhūmis are mainly concerned with what, in the perspective of the SacBhVin (but also the SacAcBh of the MauBh) is the mundane (*saṁvṛti*) level is easily explained by the fact that the materials compiled belong, like the ŚrBh, to the conservative strand of early Yogācāra. And if the concern with mundane truth did not exclude occasional references to *ālayavijñāna* at a later date of compilation (as assumed by Aramaki), it is hard to see why such references should be excluded if the compilation took place at an earlier date (as assumed by myself), provided that the concept had recently emerged in materials or circles within the reach of the compilers of the MauBh. In my opinion, it was in such a group, and, in the first place, as a principle of biological life, continuing even in arhats until their entrance into final Nirvana at death, that the subliminal layer of mind came to be established as a *vijñāna* of its own, called *ālayavijñāna*, and it was in the Vth chapter of the Saṁdh that it was renamed *ādānavijñāna* in connection with a shift of emphasis. Actually, in the Saṁdh the subliminal *vijñāna* is not only the principle of biological appropriation and a neutral principle of Seeds. Rather, there is additional emphasis on its being, specifically, also the principle of rebirth or entanglement in saṁsāric existence, because it is (probably under the influence of VaSg texts: see ch. 4.2.5.6-7) expressly stated to be invested with the imprints of spiritually negative clinging (*upādāna*) as represented by the canonical *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, a function that in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' became predominant, to the extent that it excluded the presence of *ālayavijñāna* in an arhat even as a principle of keeping up biological life.

10. To conclude these introductory remarks, it may perhaps be appropriate to call to mind that already in the canonical texts of early Buddhism there are passages, however they are to be interpreted or explained, that give the impression (and especially so from a Yogācāra

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other hand, in its *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* (YBh$_t$ P zi 229b1; YBh$_c$ 666b27) the VinSg expressly refers to the *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* (i.e., to the passage YBh$_{Bh}$ 8,20f).

[48] DELHEY 2006: 134–136 (text) and 140–144 (transl.); ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 276–279.

[49] SamBh 205–208 (## 4.1.3.3.1–4.1.3.4.3.5).

perspective) that the concept of *vijñāna* was not limited to single states, moments or processes of sensory perception or non-sensory cognition of specific objects. In certain contexts, especially in connection with reincarnation and death, *vijñāna* appears more like a basically continuous principle of life and sentience, even as the transmigrating element, without any focus on a specific object being expressed.[50] This facet of *vijñāna* tends to be obfuscated in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma in favour of a strictly actualistic theory in which *vijñāna* is consistently reduced to the usual six kinds of perception and cognition. In the pre-*ālaya-vijñāna* strands of the YBh, the situation is, to a certain extent, similar, but if I am not mistaken there is, in connection with the vital functions of *vijñāna*, a certain tendency to either associate these functions with *manovijñāna* (in a somewhat vague sense) or to simply leave the concept of *vijñāna* unspecified, as in the canonical texts, and this is also true of contexts where *vijñāna* functions as (the container of) Seed(s) or is stated to be fraught with evil propensities (*anuśaya*) or karmic residues. The problem is thus not so much the introduction of an aspect or layer of *vijñāna* responsible for life and sentience and for the continuity of latent forces but rather why this layer came to be established as a form of mind expressly distinguished from the usual six forms by way of a name of its own, viz., *ālaya-vijñāna*, and it is with regard to this question that opinions diverge. What was, so to speak, the spark that triggered this conceptual change? Or could there even have been several of them?

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[50] Cf., apart from the short remark in S 1987 # 1.3.4.1, especially FRAUWALLNER 1953: 204f, 1956: 29 (2010a: 19; 2010b: 33), WIJESEKERA 1954, VETTER 2000: 66–73, LANGER 2001, and WALDRON 2003: xii, 12 and 19–22, 28–30 and 41–45; cf. also JUREWICZ 2000: 87,14 ("*vijñāna* ... as the transmigrating element"); see also fn. 1553. In view of these two facets covered by the concept of *vijñāna*/*viññāṇa*, an English (or, for that matter, German) rendering covering both sides is hard to find. In addition, this rendering should distinguish *vijñāna* from *saṁjñā* (see fn. 3), the semantic range of which may, however, sometimes overlap with that of *vijñāna*, especially in the case of *manovijñāna*. VETTER chooses "sensation" (alternatively: "primary awareness", "sensory perception") for the surface aspect (*vijñāna*) while leaving it untranslated with an initial capital letter (*Vijñāna*) when the deeper layer is referred to. WALDRON contrasts "consciousness" for the deeper layer with "cognitive awareness" for the surface processes. Perhaps one could use "sentience" for the deeper layer, and "sensory or cognitive awareness" for the surface processes including sense perception as well as *manovijñāna*. In the present study, I have mostly preferred to leave '*vijñāna*' untranslated or to render it by the neutral term "mind", in spite of the fact that the same rendering has also been chosen to render '*citta*', because the two terms are more or less synonymous in many contexts. When '*vijñāna*' clearly refers to actual sensory perception and/or mental cognition, I tend to render it as "sensory or cognitive awareness" or, for simplicity's sake, just as "awareness". Quotations from other scholars apart, the common rendering "consciousness" has been avoided, not only for the reasons pointed out by VETTER (2000: 64f and 68, but contested in WYNNE 2010: 197 n. 26; cf. also 204) but in the first place because in the case of *ālayavijñāna* this rendering would, strictly speaking, imply the somewhat self-contradictory idea of a subconscious consciousness, whereas the idea of a subconscious or subliminal awareness may sound less awkward, provided that 'awareness' can be taken to include a lower level of sensation, perception or representation than 'consciousness'.

2. The Thesis of the Logical Inseparability of the Central Concepts

11. As has already been pointed out above (§ 2.2), the concepts of *ālayavijñāna*, *vijñapti-mātratā* and *svabhāvatraya* — i.e., the concept of a continuous subliminal form of mind, the idea that the objects of sensory and cognitive awareness are nothing but representations, and the theory that things have three natures (*svabhāva*)[51] or characters (*lakṣaṇa*): a fictive (*pari-kalpita*) one, a dependent (*paratantra*) one and a perfect (*pariniṣpanna*) one — form, according to Buescher, a structural whole of logically inseparable ideas that must have originated together, and it appears to be this thesis that constitutes the deeper motive of his aversion to the assumption that one of these three concepts might have originated without being connected, from the outset, with the other two.

12. To my mind, however, such a logical inseparability is hard to uphold. Since this insepa-rability is clearly not a matter of mere formal logic but of conceptual implications, the fact that a Western philosopher feels bound to assume a logical nexus does not automatically mean that the Yogācāras, who may have started from different presuppositions, felt the same constraint. From an 'emic' point of view, the three concepts under discussion may thus rather have been understood to complement each other (or to be at least susceptible to an interpretation in which they do so) without *logically* presupposing each other.

13. It is, in my opinion, only on the basis of such an assumption that we can explain the fact (not unknown, of course, to Buescher)[52] that in some texts, even later on, the three concepts occur separately. If the three were logically inseparable, how could an author like Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra)[53] demonstrate or at least indicate, in the *Karmasiddhi* (KSi), the

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[51] *PW* s.v.: "die eigene Art des Seins, inhärentes Wesen, Natur". *Svabhāva* can mean the specific, distinctive nature or essence of something (e.g., oak), but also the essential characteristics it has in common with other things (e.g., tree, plant), or its *true* nature in the sense of a deeper level of understanding. In connection with the threefold *niḥsvabhāvatā*, *svabhāva* not only means 'own-being' in the sense of "distinctive or essential nature" (as in the case of the *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*, corresponding to the *parikalpita-svabhāva*) but also in the sense of "inherent existence" (as in the case of the *utpattiniḥsvabhāvatā*, corresponding to the *paratantra-svabhāva*; cf. Saṁdh VII.5; YBh$_t$ P 'i 18a2f [KRAMER 2005: 97 and 174 # 8.1.2.1.2]; TrBh *47,1f [L. 41,17]: *na svayaṁbhāva etasya, māyā-vat parapratyayenôtpatteḥ*; ASBh 114,21-23).

[52] See fn. 60.

[53] I.e., Vasubandhu as the author of those works (like VyY, KSi, PSVy, PSk, Vś and Tr) which for intrinsic reasons can be safely attributed to the same person who composed the AKBh. As for texts like MAVBh, MSABh, MSgBh and *Trisvabhāvanirdeśa*, I continue to have reservations. In order to ground an ascription of these texts (perhaps as early works, or as written for a different audience) to the author of AKBh, etc., on sufficiently firm evidence, what would be required is a meticulous investigation not only into doctrinal peculiarities (as far as comparable) but also into sophistication of argument, terminology and language (even subconscious stylistic peculiarities, if the Sanskrit original is available), etc., of the texts in question as compared with the uncontroversial works mentioned above. To my knowledge, this has so far not been carried out in a sufficiently critical as well as both meticulous and comprehensive way.

Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā (PSVy) and the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk),[54] the necessity of accepting *ālayavijñāna*, without even mentioning *vijñaptimātratā*[55] and *svabhāvatraya*? And how could he prove, in the *Viṁśikā* (Vś), *vijñaptimātratā* without making use of *ālayavijñāna* and *svabhāvatraya*?[56] This does not of course mean that Vasubandhu himself did not tacitly accept the other elements as well,[57] as he indeed does in the *Triṁśikā* (Tr), and if scholars like HARADA[58] or KRITZER[59] are right he would have done so from the outset. But if his intention was, from the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* onward, to lead fellow-monks rooted in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma gradually towards (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda, the fact that it was possible for him to argue in one work for *ālayavijñāna* only and in another for *vijñaptimātratā* only clearly shows that there is no inseparable logical connection between the two. Rather, each of them could obviously be demonstrated to make sense without taking recourse to the other. And if they are not inseparable logically for later authors, it is hard to see why they should have been so in the beginning, in the phase of their original introduction, as Buescher seems to maintain;[60] for why should the logic at the time of their original introduction be different from the logic holding good about a century (or even less) later? If, however, the fact that the three concepts are, no doubt, suitable for complementing each other does not mean that they are *logically* inseparable, there is no need that they *must* have originated together as different aspects of one single entirely new philosophical paradigm.

14. The logical separability of the three concepts is confirmed by other texts as well. Thus, in his *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, Dignāga, though not using the term, develops an epistemological position amounting to *vijñaptimātratā* without mentioning or logically presupposing *ālaya-vijñāna*,[61] and as far as I know this latter concept is, whatever his personal view may have been, not used by him in any of his other works either. In the case of Dharmakīrti, I must leave it to specialists to discover his personal conviction, but at any rate his reasoning does not depend on the assumption of *ālayavijñāna* when he argues for an 'idealist' epistemology. The only verse in which *ālaya(vijñāna)* is mentioned in the *Pramāṇavārttika* (III.522) may admit of different interpretations in this regard,[62] but in the argumentative context its function

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[54] KSi ## 30ff, esp. 33–34 (KSi$_{Mu}$ 37,1ff, esp. 39,26–41,23); PSVy P chi 24a1ff, esp. 25a5–b6 (MUROJI 1993: 33*,17ff, esp. 39*,1–40*,16; 182ff); PSk 16,8–17,6 (cf. also Pt. II fn. 2134).

[55] Cf. KAJIYAMA 2000: 81 (corresponding to 2011: 342f, esp. 342,18–343,2).

[56] Cf. SUGURO 1983:6–9.

[57] Cf. FRANCO 1994: 367–370.

[58] HARADA 1996, esp. 154–160 and 192 n. 89 (last paragraph, second half); 2001/2002: 19–28..

[59] KRITZER 1993, esp. 45–49; 1999: 199–204; 2003b: 375–381.

[60] B: 49 n. 1: "That these three technical notions have been employed separately in different texts is easy to prove ..., but at this point we are concerned with the question of their original introduction."

[61] Dignāga only speaks of the *vijñāna* that appears as the object (FRAUWALLNER 1930: 178,7-13; 179,19; 182,22-29; 184,3f; 1959: 160,4-10; 161,13f) and of the faculty of sight as a capacity (*śakti*) present within the *vijñāna* (FRAUWALLNER 1930: 179,8-12; 183,18-24; 1959: 161,1-6), without any specification. In the latter case, Frauwallner in his earlier article (1930: 191,2) — though significantly enough not in the later one (1959: 131) — interprets *vijñāna* as *ālayavijñāna*, but it is only in Hsüan-tsang's translation (T 31.1624: 889a3 and 8; cf. CWSL 19c23) that Dignāga's unspecified *vijñāna* is, in this case, equated with the *mūla-* or *vipākavijñāna*.

[62] Cf. FRANCO 1994: 370f.

is merely to show that even the assumption of *ālayavijñāna* cannot explain the specific course of actual cognitive processes without taking into account the impact of the preceding moment of actual cognition in its function as *samanantarapratyaya*. This is also clear from Prajñākaragupta's comment, for he explicitly takes the argument to be directed at one for whom *ālayavijñāna* is the cause [of the arising of actual cognitions].[63] Since, however, the problem under discussion cannot be solved without recourse to the *samanantarapratyaya*, Prajñākaragupta concludes that *ālayavijñāna* is irrelevant [in this connection] and need not be taken into account, although, he adds, it might facultatively (*vā*) be postulated as the support of imprints or impregnations (*vāsanā*).[64] The subcommentator Yamāri, on the other hand, explicitly states that he does *not* accept *ālayavijñāna*.[65] A comprehensive investigation into the attitude of the Buddhist epistemologist tradition towards *ālayavijñāna* is, however, beyond the scope of this study.[66] Let me only add that in Ratnākaraśānti's *Vijñaptimātratā-siddhi*,[67] *ālayavijñāna* does not figure at all and is hence obviously not considered indispensable for the argument.

15.1. As for early (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda texts, in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA) and in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (MAV), ideas amounting to the principle of *vijñaptimātratā* are repeatedly met with, but the terminology varies, *vijñapti* being rare in this context[68] and *vijñaptimātra* being altogether absent.[69] The three *lakṣaṇa*s or *svabhāva*s do occur, and are, in spite of the absence of the term *vijñāpti(mātratā)*, unambiguously interpreted in terms of a principle that is more or less equivalent, viz., phenomena as fictitious products of *vijñāna* = *abhūtaparikalpa* ("imagination of what is unreal").[70] However, *ālayavijñāna* (or *ādāna-vijñāna*, or any unambiguous equivalent, for that matter) is not mentioned anywhere, and where we might expect it we meet with other concepts, like 'Seeds' (*bīja*: MSA XI.44c; XIX.49), 'mass of corruption' (*dauṣṭhulyakāya*: MSA XIX.51c), or 'mind [that functions as] condition' (*pratyayavijñāna*: MAV I.9a). Although in all these cases the *Bhāṣya* explicitly introduces the concept of *ālayavijñāna*,[71] its complete absence throughout the two basic texts

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[63] PVA 457,18ff, esp. 24 (*yasyâpy ālayavijñānaṁ kāraṇaṁ, tasyâpi ...*).

[64] PVA 457,25-28: *ataḥ sa eva tatrâpi samanantarapratyayaḥ, tata eva tarhi viguṇ(āviguṇ)ād vijñāno-dayānudayau, kim ālayavijñānena | āstām iyam ālayavijñānacintā | vāsanādhāratayā vā parikalpitan tad iti na doṣaḥ |*

[65] Tj D no. 4226, tshad-ma, me 325b3: "As for our part, *ālayavijñāna* has not been accepted" (*bdag cag gis ni kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa khas ma blangs te*).

[66] For Śākyamati, Iwata (1991: I 143) quotes a passage in which the Vijñānavāda model of the simultaneous occurrence of *vipākavijñāna* (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) and several *pravṛttivijñāna*s is accepted.

[67] Tj P no. 5756 (tshad-ma, ze 326b1–329b6); D no. 4259 (tshad-ma, zhe 306b4–309b3).

[68] A remarkable exception is MSA XI.24; for MAV III.14 see fn. 69. The use of '*vijñapti*' in MAV I.3, though embedded in a (provisionally) 'idealist' context, is traditional ("act of cognition").

[69] Yet, the reference to the sevenfold *tathatā* in MSA XIX.44 (without specification) and the enumeration of a corresponding set of concepts, including *vijñapti(tattva)*, in MAV III.14 would seem to show that both texts are acquainted with Saṁdh VIII(.20.2) and hence with the concepts of *vijñaptitathatā* and *vijñaptimātratā*.

[70] MSA XI.39–41; MAV I.3–5; III.3ff.

[71] See also B: 192 n. 1, who remarks that this "may also be taken as indicating that, below the designative surface, MAV did not altogether dispense with these correlated connotative values". To my mind, it merely tells us something about the understanding of the commentator.

can hardly be accidental. Especially in MAV I.9a, the author could, from a metrical perspective, easily have used *ālayavijñāna* instead of the ambiguous *pratyayavijñāna* if he had wanted to do so.

15.2. Both the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論: HsienY) and the *Abhidharma-samuccaya* (AS) contain plenty of materials taken over from the YBh or at least written in the spirit of pre-Vijñānavāda Yogācāra, but they also contain parts where *ālayavijñāna* figures or is presupposed[72] as well as references to the three *svabhāva*s and the three *niḥsvabhāvatā*s.[73] For *vijñaptimātra(tā)*, however, I have noted only two occurrences in the HsienY,[74] and none in the AS. In the AS, there is, however, a passage that corresponds to the practice of attaining nonconceptual insight by means of first eliminating the notion of objects through recognizing the 'ideality' of their appearance and then transcending the subjective aspect as well,[75] and

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[72] E.g., HsienY 480c3-16; 23; 28; 481a1; 13; 26; 483a16; c9; 487a5; b5; 504b13; 505b20f; 565a12–568a2 (substantially identical with the *ālayavijñāna* section at the beginning of the PañcMBhVin); AS 3,4 and 9 (*yac ca ... bījam upacitaṁ vaipākyaṁ cālayavijñānam*: see § 250.3.3 with fn. 1377); 12,1f and 3 (read *manaḥ ... ālayavijñānālambanaṁ* with AS_G 19,14); 28,9; 30,21; 32,9 (see fn. 1378); *ālayavijñāna* implied: e.g. AS 10,19–11,3 (cf. S 1987 n. 220 subn. 1); 13,9-11 (reconstr.; see AS_t P li 62b7–63a1).

[73] Esp. HsienY 557b7–559b28; AS 84,13-15 (AS_G 35,16-18); cf. also 40,18f (odd reconstruction), for which now AS_{Li} 247,23f: *prathamā* (ms. °*mo*) [sc., *śūnyatā*] *parikalpitaṁ svabhāvam upādāya draṣṭavyā, dvitīyā paratantra⟨ṁ? L.S.⟩ svabhāvam upādāya, tṛtīyā pariniṣpanna⟨ṁ? L.S.⟩ svabhāvam upādāya draṣṭavyā* (ms. °*vyāṁ*); 103,2 (cf. ASBh 141,5): *svabhāvārthas trayaḥ svabhāvāḥ*. For AS 31,6-11, see § 16.1.

[74] [1.] HsienY 491b11-14 enumerates, among seven kinds of comprehension (通達, **prativedha*), the comprehension of what apprehends (**grāhakaprativedha*) and the comprehension of what is apprehended (**grāhyaprativedha*). The former is explained as correctly understanding, in the case of mental factors connected with an object (??),[1] their character of being nothing but [acts of] representation (**vijñaptimātra*?),[2] the latter as correctly understanding, in the case of all objects of the mind, their character of being nothing but representations (**vijñaptimātra*) [in the sense of] images [in the mind] (三 能取通達。謂 於所緣相應心法 唯了別相 如實覺了。... 四 所取通達。謂 於一切諸識境界 唯識影相 如實覺了。). This appears to be a modification of the seven kinds of *prativedha* of YBh_t P zi 206b3-7 (YBh_C 658b17-25) under the influence of Saṁdh VIII.7–8. — [2.] In connection with a definition of the sevenfold *tathatā*, HsienY 493b17-20 agrees with Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3 in defining *vijñaptitathatā* as the fact that all conditioned factors are nothing but representations (*vijñaptimātratā*: cf. fn. 2516). This is then stated to entail an understanding of [the canonical statement (SN III 151f)] that pollution and purification of sentient beings depend exclusively on the pollution and purification of their minds (*citta*).

[1] Admittedly a somewhat strange formulation; I would rather expect 能緣 here: factors associated with the mind (?) that apprehend [an object].

[2] Does this mean that according to this passage the mental factors, i.e., those usually regarded as associated (相應) with the mind (心), are in reality nothing but special functions of the mind (cf. MSA XI.34)?

[75] AS 82,14ff, esp. 20-23, corresponding to AS_t P li 123a6f (two verses quoted as from a [Mahāyāna] sūtra, identical with MSg III.17 where they are said to stem from a text called **Yogavibhāga*. The last line of the second verse is preserved in the AS ms. and the first pāda is quoted in ASBh 100,21. The remaining three pādas of the first verse and the first line of the second are reconstructed and partly doubtful, but much of the phraseology is preserved in ASBh 100,12-20; cf. also FUNAHASHI 1986: 28f):

> Contemplating the [visualized?] image as [being nothing but] mind (*pratibimbaṁ manaḥ paśyan*), the bodhisattva in deep concentration (**bodhisattvaḥ samāhitaḥ*), should, after having removed (*vyāvartya*) the conception/apperception of an [external] object (**arthasaṁjñā*), ascertain his own conception /apperception [as the source of objective appearances] (**svasaṁjñām avadhārayet*). His mind being, in this way, fixed inside (/on itself) (**sthitacittas tathâdhyātmam*), he will understand the non-existence of an [object] to be apprehended (**grāhyābhāvaṁ pravedayet*), and thereupon also the non-existence

another passage which can perhaps be understood as implying the ultimate unreality of matter (*rūpa*).[76] A systematic connection of the three key terms is not indicated in the AS or in the HsienY.

15.3. The earliest transmitted[77] text containing an explicit systematic integration of the three concepts is, as far as I can see, the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg), but even in this text *ālayavijñāna* is, in the first chapter, introduced and proved to be indispensable without any reference to the other two concepts, which means that it is *logically* independent of them, and it is only from the second chapter onward that *ālayavijñāna* is integrated into a system based on the other two concepts.

16.1. In the *Yogācārabhūmi*, the concept of *vijñaptimātratā* — and, as far as I can see, also the idea it stands for — is, if we disregard the quotation of the entire Saṁdh[78] that has been incorporated in the VinSg (probably towards the very end of the process of the compilation of the YBh), nowhere expressed or necessarily implied. In the VinSg's own extensive treatment of *svabhāvatraya*[79] neither *ālayavijñāna* nor *vijñaptimātratā* are mentioned or, to the best of my knowledge, presupposed, and in the detailed discussion of *ālayavijñāna* at the beginning of the PañcMBhVin, the *svabhāvatraya* pattern is merely alluded to marginally,[80] whereas in the closely related treatise on *citta* (= *ālayavijñāna*), *manas* and *vijñāna* that makes up the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg (SacBhVin)[81] this pattern is not referred to at all. In the MauBh, there are passages which refer to *ālayavijñāna* and a few others that mention the three *svabhāvas* (or *lakṣaṇas*), but they are entirely disconnected from each other.[82] Besides, in the only case where the three *svabhāvas* (/*lakṣaṇas*) are specified[83] this is done in a way which appears compatible with pre-Vijñānavāda Yogācāra ontology (*paratantra* = *pratītya-*

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of an apprehending [subject] (*tataś ca grāhakābhāvaṁ*). Then, he will experience the [state of] not perceiving (i.e., apprehending) [anything whatsoever] (*nopalambhaṁ spṛśet tataḥ*).

76 AS 41,19–42,2 (AS$_G$ 31,8-10), at least if taken in the sense of ASBh 54,1-3 (cf. S 1972: 158 with n. 16; BAYER 2010: 20 n. 23). But cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 53,9-15, and especially VinSg$_{ms}$ 22a1 (YBh$_t$ P zi 52b2f; D zhi 49b6–50a1; YBh$_c$ 597c19-21), where the purport is obviously only to establish atoms as a designation for the utmost lower limit up to which matter can be split up in thought (*rūpāpakarṣa-paryantabuddhiparicchedataḥ paramāṇuvyavasthānaṁ*), and not as ultimate physical constituents (*no tu śarīrataḥ*) of which material aggregates are composed.

77 The sūtra indicated in the MSg (Prastāvanā 1) as its basic source under the name **Abhidharma-mahāyānasūtra* (cf. PSVy P chi 25b5 [MUROJI 1993: 116,13; cf. 196,4f]: *btsun pa Sa ston pa'i Chos mngon pa'i chos kyi rnam grangs*, i.e., "the *Abhidharma-dharmaparyāya* of the venerable Mahīśāsakas") appears closely related but has not been transmitted. Perhaps an almost synchronous creation.

78 Apart from the introductory part preceding chapter I. — For the Saṁdh itself see ch. 4.3.1–3.

79 YBh$_t$ P 'i 19b6–29a5; D zi 18b1–27a1; YBh$_c$ 703a23–706b26. Cf. TAKAHASHI 2005: 140–149 and 203–212.

80 Viz., in the concept *parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśa-vāsanā* (see § 22.3).

81 YBh$_t$ P zi 189a7–190b6 (D zhi 181b7–183b1; YBh$_c$ 651b5–652a6).

82 For the *ālayavijñāna* passages of the MauBh (apart from the *IP*) see S 1987: 109–143; for the passages on the three *lakṣaṇas* or *svabhāvas* S 2000a.

83 Viz., in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* (ed. in ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 332,2-6;[1] cf. S 2000a: 260).

1 First edited in: *Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taishō University*, no.15/1993: 289,2-7.

samutpanna),[84] and the passage does not mention or cogently presuppose *ālayavijñāna* or *vijñaptimātratā*. Cf., in this connection, the fact that in AS 31,6-11 a similar pattern (see § 308.1) is interpreted in strictly traditional terms (*pudgalanairātmya*) and that this interpretation is referred to the usual *svabhāvatraya* pattern in the ASBh (45,15-20).

16.2. In view of the large size of the YBh and the comprehensiveness of the materials concerned, the complete absence, even in sections propounding a Mahāyāna-inspired ontology where it would fit in well, of the term *vijñaptimātra* and, as far as I am aware, also of any explicit formulation of the idea it stands for, can, to my mind, only have three reasons: either the term and the idea it conveys were unknown to the authors and even to the redactors of the materials concerned, or they disapproved of this idea, or they considered it inacceptable or unsuitable for the audience for whom the materials were authored or compiled. In all these cases, we have to interpret the YBh materials in a way not presupposing *vijñaptimātratā*, at least as long as we want to understand the message of the text in its own context and not from the point of view of later commentators or systematizers.

16.3. Buescher, if I understand him correctly, does not accept this conclusion. On the basis of his assumption of the inseparability of the three key concepts of Vijñānavāda, he takes the *vijñaptimātratā* ontology to be presupposed wherever any of the other two concepts appears, also in the YBh. From the fact that the *vijñaptimātratā* ontology, although (according to him) logically implied, remains (for whatever reason) consistently unexpressed he rather deduces that the passages using the term *ālayavijñāna* or the pattern of the three *lakṣaṇa*s/*svabhāva*s presuppose the existence of another source where the whole, logically interconnected new model had been created, namely, according to Buescher, the Saṁdh. But the very fact that the compiler(s) of the YBh, and especially of the VinSg, could propound, and even elaborate on, the theory of *ālayavijñāna* as well as that of the three *svabhāva*s without even mentioning *vijñaptimātratā* confirms once again that the three concepts are logically independent of each other. And even if it were granted that in those portions of the text that address, in the first place, a traditional, Śrāvakayāna audience the concept of *vijñaptimātratā* was deliberately withheld, there would not have been any reason to do so in the Mahāyānist sections.

17. It should have become clear from the preceding observations that there is sufficient evidence that speaks against the assumption that the three concepts of *ālayavijñāna*, *vijñapti-mātratā* and *svabhāvatraya* necessarily presuppose or imply each other. This does not of course exclude that they admit of being integrated and that they have been construed as a systematic whole by the representatives of fully developed (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda (as in chapter II of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* or in the *Triṁśikā*), but it would seem to be only at this stage that an author like Sthiramati can state that *svabhāvatraya* can be established only on the basis of *vijñaptimātra*.[85] The very objection to which Sthiramati's statement responds, viz., that the assumption of *vijñaptimātratā* would be incompatible with the sūtra teaching of the three *svabhāva*s,[86] rather shows that understanding the *svabhāvatraya* pattern in terms of *vijñaptimātratā* had *not* been a matter of course.

18. If the assumption that the three concepts necessitate each other logically is untenable, Buescher's contention that the three concepts *must* have been newly introduced together, as

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[84] Similarly, by the way, also Saṁdh VI.5 (cf. § 304.1).

[85] TrBh *43,3 (L. 39,6f; see B: 189 n. 2): *vijñaptimātra eva sati svabhāvatrayavyavasthānāt.*

[86] TrBh *43,1f (L. 39,4-6).

facets of an entirely new philosophical paradigm, appears hardly justified. They *may* have been introduced in this way, but they need not. It is equally possible if not probable that they sprang from separate roots and only in a second step came to be integrated. As long as we do not know for certain how, precisely, the Saṁdh was composed, we may have to leave the answer in suspense. But whatever the solution of this problem may be, the logical inseparability of the three concepts is contradicted by the evidence of plenty of sources, and there is thus, at any rate, no *logical* reason to deny the *possibility* that each of the concepts, or at least significant prefigurations of them, developed separately.

19. One of the roots of Buescher's assumption of the logical inseparability of the three key concepts of Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda seems to lie in the fact that his

> hermeneutical presuppositions are rather that various stages of exegetical development have taken shape in the form of relatively coherent conceptual structures. ... The components of a model received designations to indicate their technical function within a particular structural framework. (B: 97f)

These "hermeneutical presuppositions" seem to exclude stages of transition, or initial steps. When we come across a term of the later model, we have to assume that the *whole* later model is presupposed. I disagree. I do not deny the possibility of a new model popping up, at least in our transmitted sources, as if fallen from heaven ready-made. But normally I would expect a gradual development, from an earlier model or even from different roots and inspirations. It would also be quite natural that not all possible implications of a novel idea were realized by its author(s) from the very outset, but even if they were, this does not mean that there was no hesitation or debate about which implications were acceptable and which were not. When reading a text like the *Vibhāṣā* one is at every step confronted with the fact that even accomplished Abhidharma masters ventured theories which other equally accomplished masters regarded as leading to inacceptable consequences, and such criticism quite naturally often enough forced the target group to refine or modify their position. Thus, when Buescher (B: 97) blames me for "ascribing theoretical inconsistencies and ambivalences to Yogācāra scholars", his problem with these (actual or alleged) inconsistencies and ambivalences may well result from the inflexibility of his own "hermeneutic presuppositions".

20. Let me just take up the issue from which Buescher derives his reproach, viz., my hypothesis that "*ālayavijñāna* had initially not been regarded as a proper *vijñāna*", i.e., as a *vijñāna* structurally similar to the traditional cognitive processes, to the effect that even the assumption of its continuous presence need not have been considered to violate the Abhidharmic principle, accepted also by the early Yogācāras,[87] that in one sentient being two or more *vijñāna*s cannot occur simultaneously. Buescher seems to think that as accomplished Abhidharma masters the early Yogācāras can be expected to have done only one of two things:

a) If they did introduce *ālayavijñāna*, they must have recognized *ālayavijñāna* as a 'proper *vijñāna*' and, consequently, abandoned the principle of non-simultaneity, or

b) if (and as long as) they kept to the principle of non-simultaneity, they cannot have introduced *ālayavijñāna*.

I do not think that this argument is compelling. If my view that *ālayavijñāna* was first conceived as a kind of hypostatization or 'upgrade' of the Seeds of the mind in a special situation (see §§ 43 and 46) but was, on closer reflection, understood as comprising the

[87] See § 288.2 with fn. 1568.

continuum of Seeds (*bījasantāna*) as a whole (cf. § 89) is correct, I do not see any reason why the early Yogācāras should, from the outset, have felt its presence to be incompatible with the principle of non-simultaneity, which had, after all, been conceived with regard to *actual* perceptions and cognitions. It would rather have been a matter of decision whether the simultaneous presence of a latent layer of mind with the flow of actual cognitive acts was significantly more incompatible with this principle than the simultaneous presence of a continuum of Seeds (*bījasantāna*: YBh_{Bh} 61,8), which had definitely *not* been felt incompatible (since Seeds ar not regarded as entities distinct from the dharmas themselves). At any rate, the pertinent passages in the MauBh of the YBh do not indicate any recognition of such an incompatibility.

21. It is true that mere silence on a certain thesis does not necessarily mean that an author is unaware of this thesis or even against it. But especially in the case of an innovative idea it is still less admissible to assume the opposite, viz., that in spite of being silent on a certain thesis an author should be credited with accepting it. And as regards the application, to the *ālaya-vijñāna*, of the traditional Abhidharmic definition, viz., that a *vijñāna* is the cognition of some *object*, the evidence is much stronger. To be sure, in this case, too, the pertinent passages in the MauBh of the YBh are simply silent. But whereas in Saṁdh VIII and in the treatise on *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin *ālayavijñāna* is expressly adapted to this Abhidharmic definition,[88] even a fairly systematic Vijñānavāda text like the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* is remarkably reticent: in the long first chapter on *ālayavijñāna*, this aspect is not mentioned at all, and in the second chapter it is only introduced in one short paragraph (II.13) as a kind of *option*.[89] In the light of this fact, it is hardly accidental that in the definitions of the eight *vijñāna*s in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* the objective support (*ālambana*) is indicated in all cases *except ālayavijñāna*.[90] Thus, with regard to this issue even certain post-YBh texts show some reluctance regarding the application of a traditional Abhidharmic pattern to *ālaya-vijñāna*.[91] Even Vasubandhu's[92] qualification, in *Karmasiddhi*, *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* and *Pañcaskandhaka*, of *ālayavijñāna* as a form of mind "the objective support and mode of

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[88] See S 1987: 89–92 (# 5.6).

[89] Cf. S 1987: 100f (# 5.12.2-3).

[90] AS 11,25–12,12; AS_G 19,12-22.

[91] As another example for the fact that Abhidharmic principles were not regarded as binding by everybody in every situation, one might adduce the assumption, on the part of some masters, of the presence of a *citta* without *saṁjñā* and *vedanā* in *nirodhasamāpatti* (Vi 775a22f; Vi_2 332b27f, etc.; cf. § 42) — an assumption that would seem to run counter to the principle, accepted by the Vaibhāṣikas as well as by the early Yogācāras, that every *citta* is accompanied by a certain set of *caitta*s, including these two (AK II.23a and 24; YBh_{Bh} 59,21f; Tr 9a+10a). However, in view of the fact that in one source (see § 42) the aforementioned assumption is attributed to Buddhadeva, we may have to see it in the context of a different understanding of the nature of the *caitta*s, viz., not as entities of their own associated with the mind (*citta*) but as mere names for specific states of the mind (cf. Vi 8c8f; 661c17f; 730b25-29; see also KATSURA 1974: 132ff), to the effect that in *nirodhasamāpatti* the mind is in a state which does not justify speaking of 'apperception' or 'feeling'. On the other hand, it is worth noting that some Yogācāra texts, in spite of being basically in agreement with the Vaibhāṣikas in their understanding of the nature of the *caitta*s, are, in the case of *ālayavijñāna*, remarkably silent with regard to the question of its being associated with *caitta*s (cf. S 1987 ## 5.5.2, 5.12.1, 5.13.1 and 5.14.1).

[92] For the Vasubandhu-commentaries on MAV and MSA, see S 1987: # 5.13.1 with notes.

apprehension of which is not [easily] ascertained" (*aparicchinnālambanākāra*),[93] though formally coming up to the Abhidharmic principle, still sounds somewhat evasive.

22.1. What may be even more significant from the perspective of a historical development is the fact that there are two divergent concepts of *ālayavijñāna* in the YBh, indicating a fundamental difference in conceiving its nature and function.[94] This discrepancy surfaces in connection with the question whether *ālayavijñāna* may contain or incorporate also Seeds of purificatory or supramundane dharmas, which is closely related to the question of its presence or absence in saintly persons (arhats, etc.). The latter question, in its turn, has a bearing on the issue of its presence in *nirodhasamāpatti*, a context in which *ālayavijñāna* is mentioned not only in the *IP* but also in quite a few other YBh passages. In all of these passages except one, *ālayavijñāna* is stated to be present in *nirodhasamāpatti* without any restriction, implicitly or even explicitly including arhats.[95] Against this, in a passage that follows immediately upon what I have called the 'Nivṛtti Portion' of the systematic analysis of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin, it is expressly stated that (ordinary) arhats, pratyekabuddhas, Tathāgatas and bodhisattvas no longer liable to retrogression are without *ālayavijñāna*, even in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti*, when the active *vijñāna*s have ceased as well.[96] It is obvious that this passage presupposes a concept of *ālayavijñāna* that is fundamentally different from that of the first group of passages:

1. In the first group, *ālayavijñāna* is, essentially, a spiritually neutral principle of sentience that keeps the body alive and comprises the Seeds of the actual cognitive functions, which include both unwholesome and wholesome mundane states of mind and mental factors, but there is no reason why it should not also comprise Seeds of purificatory and supramundane dharmas.[97] Its presence in *nirodhasamāpatti* not only enables the subsequent re-emerging of

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[93] KSi # 36 (KSi_{Mu} 45,6f); PSk 16,10; PSVy P 24b6 (MUROJI 1993: 108,12f); cf. S 1987: 103f (# 5.14.1). Cf. also below § 315 with fn. 1671.

[94] Cf. S 1987: 81–84 (## 4.9–4.10.2). In later sources, this divergence is solved by introducing a more differentiated terminology (cf. ibid., 84 with n. 608)

[95] [1.] SacAcBh of the 'Basic Section', ## 4–5 (ed. see S 1987: 222): *nirodhasamāpatti* is *acittikā* in a conventional sense, but not from the perspective of the highest truth (*paramārthataḥ*), because *ālaya-vijñāna* ceases only in Nirvana without remainder, i.e., *after death*.

[2.] 'Proof Portion' of the '*Ālayavijñāna* Treatise' at the beginning of the PañcMBhVin (YBh_t P zi 3b8–4a2 = ASBh 13,12-15; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 14 # vii; GRIFFITHS 1986: 136f; cf. SPARHAM 1993: 131f): without *ālayavijñāna*, a person in *nirodhasamāpatti* would die. Cf. also S 1987: 35 # 3.2.1, ignored by WAYMAN (1996: 460), who wrongly charges me with not referring to this reason and, translating the argument from the Tibetan — obviously aware of the existence of the Sanskrit original (quoted in S 1987 n.227) —, completely misses the point, even from a syntactical point of view. For this reason, his polemical remarks (1996: 461) are not worth considering.

[3.] YBh_t P zi 76b2-5 (D zhi 73a1-4; YBh_c 607b4-10): if *ālayavijñāna* is part of the system, saints *including arhats* may obtain *nirodhasamāpatti* in all the three world-spheres.

[4.] YBh_t P 'i 138a5-8 (D zi 123a1-4; YBh_c 748a14-19; S 1969: 46f # 4.B.1): when *an arhat* dies, he enters into *nirodhasamāpatti* and thereby effectuates the cessation of manifest sensory and cognitive awareness, and subsequently also of *ālayavijñāna*.

[96] YBh_t P zi 10b5f (D zhi 9a2f; YBh_c 582a10-12; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020c11f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 44 [2001: 409f] # II.2.d; Engl. transl.: WALDRON 2003: 189).

[97] See fn. 119 and S 1987: 77 (# 4.8.1).

the actual cognitive functions (*pravṛttivijñāna*) but also prevents the person from dying,[98] and this of course holds good in the case of an arhat as well.[99]

2. In contrast to this, the passage following immediately upon the 'Nivṛtti Portion' presupposes a concept of *ālayavijñāna* that is obviously incompatible with the spiritual level of saintly persons. Such a spiritually negative character of *ālayavijñāna* is indeed in agreement with the basic position of the 'Nivṛtti Portion' as a whole.[100] In this text, *ālayavijñāna* is conceived as referring, in the first place, to the latent, subliminal source of pollution and of keeping *saṁsāra* going, and not so much to what keeps a person alive. If this concept of *ālayavijñāna* as a principle of pollution is consistently applied, *ālayavijñāna* cannot be assumed to contain Seeds or incorporate imprints of purificatory or supramundane dharmas,[101] nor can it be assumed to be present in saintly persons, and cannot therefore, at least in the case of saintly persons,[102] function as the principle that in the state of *nirodha-samāpatti* prevents them from dying.

22.2. The spiritually negative concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' is obviously based on *ālayavijñāna* being, in this text, equated with the "mind connected with [spiritually negative] clinging"[103] (*sopādānaṁ vijñānam*),[104] which is the 'seed' of rebirth, and hence of saṁsāric existence, according to the *Bījasūtra* of the *Saṁyuktāgama* (SĀ$_c$ no. 39). As Matsumoto rightly emphasizes,[105] this identification goes back to the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (V.2), where one of the two appropriative functions of the subliminal mind (*ādānavijñāna*), viz., its appropriation (i.e., intake and storing) of the imprint(s) (*vāsanā*) of the multifarious conventional dealing (*vyavahāraprapañca*) with phenomena (*nimitta*), names (*nāman*) and imagination (*vikalpa*), would seem to be a Mahāyānist modification of the function of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* as it had been understood in the VaSg (see ch. 4.2.5.6). If the identification of *ālaya-* or *ādānavijñāna* with the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is understood in terms of coextensiveness, i.e., if functioning as *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is taken to be an *essential* aspect of *ālaya-vijñāna*, it is *essentially* a latent source of pollution — bound up with (spiritual) corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*)[106] and the cause of the arising of defilements (*kleśa*) but not the cause of the

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[98] Thus explicitly 'Proof Portion' # vii (see fn. 95 [3.]): *tataḥ kālakriyaîva bhavet.*

[99] Cf. fn. 95 [4.], where the arhat is stated to pass away only after, and immediately after, the cessation of *ālayavijñāna.*

[100] See S 1987 # 4.7.1–3.

[101] Cf. S 1987 ## 4.8.1–4.8.5.

[102] According to the 'Nivṛtti Portion', after *ālayavijñāna* has been abandoned (**prahīṇa*), the body of an arhat continues (for the rest of his life) like an apparition (*nirmāṇa*), free from all corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*): see § 238 with fn. 1306. For more sophisticated positions, see S 1987 # 4.10.2.

[103] According to Matsumoto (see § 173.1), *upādāna* should, in this expression, be understood in a passive sense: "that which is clung to" or "that which is taken as support".

[104] Cf. YBh$_t$ P zi 9b4 (D zhi 8a4; YBh$_c$ 581c9; HAKAMAYA 1979: 41,15f [2001: 406,10f] # **5.b**.C.2(a)): *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni ... len pa dang bcas pa yin la ...*; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020b12f has 有漏, usually = *sāsrava*, for *sopādāna* (cf. WALDRON 2003: 188 with n. 38).

[105] See § 141.2 and ch. 4.2.5 (esp. § 226).

[106] I.e., corruption in the sense of *kleśadauṣṭhulya*, in contrast to, e.g., *vipākadauṣṭhulya*, of which even an arhat (in contrast to the Buddha) is not free (see S 1987 # 4.10.2).

arising of the Path (*mārga*)[107] — and hence cannot be present in an arhat. Actually, in the 'Nivṛtti Portion', *ālayavijñāna* is expressly stated to cease immediately after the Renewal /Transmutation of the Basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) has been completed,[108] i.e., upon attainment of arhatship. This position is maintained in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*[109] as well as in the *Triṁśikā*.[110]

22.3. This development is also palpable in the preceding section of the text, which I have called the 'Pravṛtti Portion', for in this section *ālayavijñāna* is quite explicitly associated with the twofold appropriative function of the *ādānavijñāna* of Saṁdh V.2. In the 'Pravṛtti Portion', the imprint of dealing with phenomena, etc., has, however been replaced with the imprint of clinging to the fictitious nature [of dharmas] (*parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśa-vāsanā*),[111] which means that the *sopādāna-vijñāna* function of *ālayavijñāna* has been adapted to the terminology of the pattern of the three *svabhāva*s. If, as another passage of the VinSg makes explicit,[112] *all* Seeds in *ālayavijñāna* are caused by, and thus imprints of, this clinging to the fictitious nature, which is the basic factor for being entangled in saṁsāric existence, the implication is, here too, that *ālayavijñāna* is understood as the latent force from which this entanglement is continuously and spontaneously reproduced and which, therefore, must have ceased in arhats.[113]

22.4. Unless we want to charge the adherents of one of the two strata with simply having misunderstood the concept (or term) — something Buescher surely will not do —, we are left with the assumption that (at least) one side has deliberately revised it, that is, either:

a) the author(s)/redactor(s) of the 'Pravṛtti Portion' and the 'Nivṛtti Portion' took hold of this concept/term, which originally referred to a neutral subliminal *vijñāna* that appropriates the body and keeps it alive even in states like *nirodhasamāpatti*, and reinterpreted it — almost

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[107] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 9b5f (D zhi 8a5f; YBh$_{c}$ 581c11-13; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020b14-17; HAKAMAYA 1979: 41 [2001: 406f] # **5.b**.C.2.(b,c); WALDRON 2003: 188): *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas ngan len dang ldan pa yin la ... nyon mongs pa rnams kyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ⟨yin pa?⟩ dang lam gyi 'jug pa'i rgyu ma yin ...* ||.

[108] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 9b2f (D zhi 8a3; YBh$_{c}$ 581c6f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 41,4f [2001: 406,3] # **5.b**.C.1; WALDRON 2003: 187): *gnas gyur*[1] *ma thag tu kun gzhi rnam par shes pa spangs par brjod par bya ste*; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020b10f has: "When one has abandoned [all] dharmas (or: the status?) of a worldly person, *ālayavijñāna* ceases" (捨凡夫法 阿羅耶識滅).

[1] So with the quotation in SaṁdhVy P co 105a8; YBh$_{t}$ (D, P): *'gyur*.

[109] MSg I.49 (20,12-14): *gnas rnam pa thams cad du gyur na rnam par smin pa'i rnam par shes pa* (= *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa*: 20,8) ... *rnam pa thams cad du spangs pa ... yin no* ||. This statement holds good for the followers of all the three vehicles (cf. 20,5-9). For *ālayavijñāna* as the cause or source of pollution (*saṁkleśa*), see MSg I.45 and I.3.

[110] Tr 5a: *tasya* (= *ālayavijñānasya*) *vyāvṛttir arhattve*.

[111] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 4b2 (D zhi 3b7f; YBh$_{c}$ 580a4-6; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019b1-3; HAKAMAYA 1979: 26 [2001: 390] # **1.b**.A.1; WALDRON 2003: 179; cf. TrBh *8,4f (L. 19,7f)).

[112] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 30a5f and 7 (D zhi 27b2 and 3; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1025c10f and 12-14; YBh$_{c}$ 589a9-11 and 13f); cf. YAMABE 1989: 53 and especially YAMABE 1990b: 67–73.

[113] Cf., in this connection, also the statement that *ālayavijñāna* is *always*, in conscious as well as unconscious states, accompanied by *manas*, the innate conception of a self or ego (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 6a5-8; D zhi 5a7–b2; YBh$_{c}$ 580c1-5; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019c6-9; HAKAMAYA 1979: 32f [2001: 396f] # **4.b**.A.1(a); WALDRON 2003: 182; cf. fn. 209[A.]). Taken as it stands, this statement excludes the presence of *ālayavijñāna* in arhats.

certainly under the influence of Saṁdh V.2, which is not at all concerned with *nirodha-samāpatti* (cf. § 283) — as a latent source of pollution, with the effect that the term is no longer applicable in the case of arhats, or

b) some Yogācāra master(s), or YBh redactor(s), transformed a latent source of pollution or spiritually negative appropriation of saṁsāric existence into a neutral principle of biological life, which functions even in arhats until their entrance into final Nirvana.

A third possibility would perhaps be that

c) the concept was originally introduced to serve as the common ground of both forms of 'appropriation', including situations where only one of them is in operation, i.e., existence in the sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*: no biological appropriation) and the state of an arhat (no spiritually negative appropriation). The *ādānavijñāna* of Saṁdh V.2 could be taken to represent such a concept, provided that we interpret the absence of a reference to the situation of the arhat as due to mere lack of interest in this issue.[114] But even when interpreted in this way, the teaching of Saṁdh V may as well represent the extension of an earlier concept of a subliminal mind originally introduced to guarantee continuous 'biological appropriation' (= alternative **a**).

Whereas Matsumoto expressly advocates alternative **b**[115] and Aramaki and Buescher would probably prefer alternative **c**, I consider alternative **a** more probable because I still think, against these scholars, that the *IP* is more likely to mirror the context that led to the emergence of *ālayavijñāna* than Saṁdh V, as I shall try to substantiate in chs. 3 and 4.

23. It may be worth noting in this connection that the position according to which *ālaya-vijñāna* has ceased in arhats seems to be related to a fundamental modification of the early Yogācāra theory of Seeds (*bīja*) and imprints (*vāsanā*) from a Mahāyānist point of view, for which the Saṁdh may be responsible. As N. YAMABE has convincingly shown,[116] according to the basic view on Seeds in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials of the YBh all the 18 constituents of the continuum (*santāna*) of a sentient being are by nature present in the continuum (**santānapatita*) or inherent in the basis [of individual existence] (*āśrayasanniviṣṭa*) as the 'ore' (*dhātu*: basic element or potentiality) or Seed (*bīja*) of their own reproduction:[117] Seeds

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[114] This may even hold good for the 'Pravṛtti Portion' as long as the *parikalpitasvabhāvābhi-niveśavāsanā* is not regarded as comprising *all* Seeds.

[115] M2: 222ff, following SUGURO 1989: 566. It should, however, be noted that both Matsumoto and Suguro start from an original concept of *ālayavijñāna* as involving some form of clinging to a self (*ātmagrāha*), later on separated from it and converted into a *vijñāna* of its own, viz., the defiled *manas*. It is this process that Suguro has in mind when he postulates a process of freeing *ālayavijñāna* from its character of a defiled form of mind, a process that is, according to Suguro, completed in the MSg. However, as will be pointed out in §§ 123–127 (cf. also S 1987: 144–166), I fail to see any reliable textual support for such an original meaning and function of *ālayavijñāna*. The pollutional character I have in mind is rather its being, in one strand of the earlier textual materials and especially so in the MSg (cf. I.3; I.45–49; S 1987 # 4.8.5), the latent source of spiritual pollution (*saṁkleśa*) or saṁsāric existence, in the sense of being or containing the Seed(s) (see ch. 4.2.6.1) of all contaminated (*sāsrava*) dharmas, but not the Seed(s) of purificatory or, at any rate, uncontaminated dharmas.

[116] YAMABE 1989; cf. also YAMABE 1987, 1990a and 1990b.

[117] Cf. ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 244,12–245,11 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 110,14-23; cf. YAMABE 1997: 212); YBh$_t$ P 'i 330a3f (D zi 288b1f; YBh$_c$ 846c18-20: VaSg III.7.i; see YAMABE 1987: 26–28, partly revised in YAMABE 1990b: 76f).

of defilements, called 'harmful propensities' (*anuśaya*) and also 'corruption' (*dauṣṭhulya*), Seeds of neutral factors like the Seeds that are actualized by the maturation of previous karma — Seeds that are not harmful but characterized by a latent uneasiness or inertness and in this sense also called 'corruption' (*dauṣṭhulya*) —, and also Seeds of wholesome dharmas,[118] even uncontaminated (*anāsrava*), supramundane ones.[119] The Seeds of the wholesome and unwholesome factors may be strengthened by habitual practice (**abhyāsaparipuṣṭa*),[120] but basically all Seeds are intrinsically present. Against this, the concept of *vāsanā* is used only in the very specific sense of an unproductive trace or after-effect of already eradicated defilements (*kleśavāsanā*) in an arhat (but not in a Buddha)[121] and in the sense of the imprint or impregnation left by wholesome and unwholesome karmic acts and activating the respective Seeds so that they generate an agreeable or disagreeable new life in the future.[122] However, in the Saṁdh the concept of *vāsanā* is, in a Mahāyānist perspective, applied to the imprint or impregnation left in the mind (*citta*) by dealing with (**vyavahāra*) reality in terms of a merely imagined, fictitious character (**parikalpitalakṣaṇa*),[123] or, as indicated above, in terms of phenomena (*nimitta*), names (*nāman*) and imagination (*vikalpa*),[124] i.e., of the constituent factors of the deceptive, saṁsāric world,[125] and this view has basically been adopted in the 'Pravṛtti Portion'. In the context of the occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh, such a use of the term *vāsanā* is not found.

24. What is admittedly disconcerting is the fact that, apart from the initial parts (the *Pañcavijñānakāyasamprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* [PañcBh] and the first portion of the *Manobhūmi* [ManoBh]), the concept of *ālayavijñāna* crops up, quite haphazardly, only in very few places of those parts of the MauBh[126] which I have, very roughly, called the second stratum of the YBh (§ 7.3), while it is absent in so many other places where one might expect it with equal right.[127] Since some of the occurrences have obviously been inserted into older, pre-*ālaya*-

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[118] YBh_{Bh} 26,11-16.

[119] This is still presupposed in argument iv of the 'Proof Portion' (see fn. 2415), where the necessity of positing *ālayavijñāna* is derived from the fact that the six traditional *vijñāna*s cannot be one another's Seed (in such a way that the previous moment is the Seed of the subsequent one) because the consecutive moments may be heterogeneous: not only may a wholesome moment of mind be immediately followed by an unwholesome one and vice versa, but also a contaminated (*sāsrava*, cf. fn. 559) or mundane one may be followed by an uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) or supramundane one and vice versa.

[120] YBh_t P 'i 330a5f (D zi 288b2f; YBh_C 846c20-23: VaSg III.7.i; see YAMABE 1987: 28f).

[121] Cf. S 1969: 55; 154; 157; YAMABE 1989: 49.

[122] YAMABE 1989: 49.

[123] Saṁdh VI.9 (62,19f: *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid kyi tha snyad kyi bag chags*; cf. YAMABE 1989: 52) and VII.10 (cf. § 307 with fn. 1649).

[124] Saṁdh V.2 (see § 290); YAMABE 1989: 52.

[125] Viz., in the five-*vastu*-pattern, systematically dealt with in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the VinSg, where *nimitta*, *nāman* and *vikalpa* contrast with *tathatā* and *samyagjñāna*, which epitomize the realm of *Nirvana* and liberation, the *samyagjñāna* being either exclusively or at least in some regard supramundane. For details see KRAMER 2005 and TAKAHASHI 2005: 34–49; 121–139; 181–202.

[126] For a detailed discussion of these occurrences (apart from the *IP*), see S 1987 ch. 6.

[127] Basically, this holds good for the VinSg as well, and even for the HsienY and the AS; for the Saṁdh, see ch. 4.3. The difference is that Saṁdh, VinSg and HsienY contain sections where *ālaya*-

vijñāna materials, and especially so in the PañcBh and the ManoBh, one might think that a redactor may have added them on the occasion of a later revision, or perhaps even in connection with the compilation of the VinSg, just in order to introduce a point of contact for the inclusion of the detailed materials on *ālayavijñāna*. But this would not explain the haphazard, very sporadic appearance of the term in some other chapters. Could it be that the concept was occasionally introduced by some member(s) of the compilation team who happened to belong to, or had contact with, a special oral tradition (see §§ 8.1 and 8.6) or a somewhat marginal circle in which this concept had recently emerged, and that the new concept quickly gained momentum towards the end of the compilation process of the MauBh, and even more so in the meantime up to the compilation of the VinSg? If such an assumption makes sense, this may explain why the new concept crops up only sporadically, and why more detailed, explanatory material, perhaps still in the making and not yet codified, was not included. And if the circle concerned was, in view of the fact that the *ālayavijñāna* passages in the MauBh do not show any specific Mahāyānist features, somewhat different from the circle in which the Saṁdh was created, this would not only explain the choice of a different term for the subliminal mind in this sūtra but also explain the difference between the two concepts of the subliminal mind indicated in § 22.1. Finally, it would justify searching for at least some trace or echo of the original motive or 'trigger' of the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, at any rate for its reception into the MauBh. As I hope to be able to demonstrate, the passage I have called the *IP* is still a promising candidate, though not necessarily the only one.

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vijñāna (/*ādānavijñāna*) is discussed in some detail or even systematically, whereas the references to it in the MauBh (but also in the AS) are somewhat laconic.

3. The 'Initial Passage'

25. What I have called the 'Initial Passage' (*IP*) has recently been edited in context in M. Delhey's edition of the whole *Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh of the YBh (DELHEY 2009: I 207,6-9 [# 4.1.3.4.3.3]):

nirodhaṁ samāpannasya cittacaitasikā niruddhā bhavanti. kathaṁ vijñānaṁ kāyād an-apakrāntaṁ[128] *bhavati? tasya hi rūpiṣv indriye⟨ṣv a⟩pariṇateṣu pravṛttivijñānabīja-parigṛhītam ālayavijñānam anuparataṁ bhavaty āyatyām tadutpattidharmatāyai.*

Though it will be shown later (§ 72) that the text most probably requires a slight but decisive modification, this does not concern my previous interpretation, which, essentially in accordance with Tibetan[129] and Chinese,[130] ran thus (S 1987: 18 # 2.1, slightly abbreviated):

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[128] The ms. has *anava*°, but cf. ASBh 52,12: *vijñānāpakrāntyā*. Cf., however, also *SHT* VIII (2000): 86 (no. 1900 R4), where a parallel passage (see fn. 1188) has *vijñānāvakrāntyā* for Chin. 離身 (NA 534c5).

[129] YBh_t P dzi 172a6-8 (D tshi 151a1-3; DELHEY 2009: II 374):

'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa'i sems dang sems las byung ba rnams 'gag par gyur na | rnam par shes pa lus dang ji ltar 'bral bar mi 'gyur zhe na | de'i dbang po gzugs can yongs su ma gyur pa rnams la | 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa'i sa bon gyis yongs su zin pa kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med pa ma yin te | phyis de 'byung ba'i chos nyid yin pa'i phyir ro ||.

Translation:

If [somebody] objects: 'In view of the fact that in the case of a person who has entered *nirodha-samāpatti* mind and mental factors have come to cease, how does this not amount to *vijñāna* being separated from the body?', [we answer:] In the physical sense faculties of that [person], which have not completely changed/decayed,[1] *ālayavijñāna*, studded with the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, is not absent, so that they are destined to rearise afterwards.

[1] For this meaning, see *JÄSCHKE* p. 96b, stating that *'gyur ba* sometimes means "to decrease, abate, vanish, die away", as in *mthu-stobs ... yongs su 'gyur ba* "the total decay of strength ...".

[130] YBh_c 340c27–341a1: 問。滅盡定中 諸心心法 並皆滅盡。云何說識不離於身。答。由不變壞諸色根中 有能執持轉識種子阿賴耶識 不滅盡故，後時彼法 從此得生。The Japanese rendering of the passage in KIK(Yuga) 1: 219,16-18 would seem to suggest the following translation:

Question: In *nirodhasamāpatti*, mind and mental factors have, all of them, ceased. How can [the sūtra] say that *vijñāna* has not departed from the body? Answer: Because, while [there is] no[thing to] alter-and-ruin the physical sense faculties (KIK: 諸の色根を變壞せざる中に), the *ālayavijñāna*, which holds-and-supports the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, is [still] there and does not cease [in this state], those dharmas can afterwards rearise from this [*ālayavijñāna*].

Yet, a transitive understanding of the verbal expression 變壞 as proposed in KIK is incompatible with the Sanskrit original (past participle of an intransitive verb), and this would seem to exclude an understanding of the Chinese rendering in the sense of an absolute locative because in the case of an intransitive or passive verb the verb should follow the subject instead of preceding it. In view of the Sanskrit, Hsüan-tsang's 不變壞 will rather have to be construed as an attribute of 諸色根, and in this case 中 must represent a locative properly speaking. In addition, in view of the purport of the original as I feel bound to understand it (cf. ch. 3.3.6) I should prefer to make a full stop after 故, taking the syntagma 由...故 (= *hi*) to delimitate the reason produced in response to the question ("How/why ...?"), and to understand the remainder (from 後時 onward) as a separate sentence (although I do not deny that this statement is indeed, in a sense, a logical consequence of the preceding one). I would therefore propose translating the passage as follows:

> When [a person] has entered [Absorption into] Cessation, his mind and mental [factors] have ceased; how, then, is it that [his] mind has not yet withdrawn from [his] body? [Answer: No problem;] for [in] his [case] *ālayavijñāna* has *not* ceased [to be present] in the material sense faculties, which are unimpaired: [*ālayavijñāna*,] which comprises (/possesses /has received) the Seeds of the forthcoming [forms of] mind, so that they are bound to rearise in future (i.e., after emerging from absorption).

26. Buescher attacks my interpretation of the passage from various angles, which may be subsumed under three headings:

1. criticism of methodological issues,
2. criticism of the conclusions drawn by me from the passage on the basis of how I understand it, and
3. criticism of my understanding of the meaning and purport of the passage.

I shall try to respond to this criticism in chs. 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3, respectively. Matsumoto's criticism, directed, in the first place, against the chronological priority of the *IP* and concerned with philological details only incidentally, will be dealt with in the appropriate places (see, especially, §§ 35–37 and 80.1–80.3).

Question: In *nirodhasamāpatti*, mind and mental factors have, all of them, ceased. How can [the sūtra] say that *vijñāna* has not departed from the body? Answer: Because *in* the physical sense faculties that have not changed-and-decayed there is [still] the *ālayavijñāna*, which holds-and-supports the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, and does not cease [in this state]. [For this reason, it is also plausible that] those dharmas can afterwards rearise from this [*ālayavijñāna*].

3.1. Some Methodological Issues

27. In connection with his attacks on my interpretation of the *IP*, Buescher criticizes that in "contextualizing" the *IP*, I isolate it from "from all other contexts that might have provided further clues as to the connotative implications of the novel concept" (B: 50,9-11), including the other occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh, and he complains that "the actual internal evidence" of the passage "is getting secondarized" by me in favour of an interpretation of the passage in the light of the exterior, larger context of scholastic discussions on the "mind-problem" in *nirodhasamāpatti* (B: 50,24-29).

28. There can hardly be any doubt that the correct procedure for interpreting a given text differs in accordance with the type of text concerned. But in any case the internal evidence of the passage to be interpreted will, normally, have absolute priority; even more so when we are dealing with a compilation of more or less heterogeneous materials, as in the case of the YBh. Nonetheless, a statement belongs to a context: to a textual or situational context, but also to a context of contemporary discourse and/or tradition, and if the passage is too succinct we may not be able to understand it adequately without taking this context into account. In the case of a compilatory text, we cannot of course be sure that the actual textual context of a given passage is the original one and that it situates the passage in its original context of discussion and historical background, but we cannot *a priori* exclude this either. In order to avoid arbitrariness we have to accept the transmitted context as long as there are no concrete indications of heterogeneity. In many cases, even if the passage concerned fits into its context homogeneously, additional clarification may be wanted, and in the case of doctrinal concepts and terms the most promising resource is then parallel textual materials. But especially when dealing with a compilatory text from the formative period of a tradition like the YBh, falling back on (apparently) parallel materials is fraught with risks and often a kind of balancing act because we cannot always be sure to what extent the passage under investigation and the parallels belong to precisely the same conceptual context and stage of development. This holds good even for parallels within the compilation, and still more so for parallels from other, especially later works. They too may, to be sure, yield valuable information, but must be used with utmost care.

29. For Buescher, however, the situation seems to be quite different, at least in the case of key concepts like *ālayavijñāna*, because of his "hermeneutical presuppositions" (§ 19), according to which these concepts are part and parcel of a new model and hence do not admit of a gradual conceptual formation or development preceding the formation of the full-fledged new model. Consequently, he assumes the presence of the complete model wherever one of its key-terms occurs, and feels entitled to interpret one passage by freely making use of the others. As stated above (§ 19), I do not share Buescher's "hermeneutical presuppositions" but believe in the possibility or even probability of a formation process that took place in steps and was perhaps triggered off by a specific problem. Therefore, my approach was necessarily different. I had to start from what I consider the earliest text concerned, viz., the MauBh of the YBh, and to judge each passage where *ālayavijñāna* occurs on its own and (provided that the contextual embedding offers no clue for suspicion) by its specific context, without prematurely mixing them up, because we cannot be sure that all occurrences reflect the same stage of development.

30. In the case of the *IP*, the disagreement between Buescher and me as regards its meaning and purport indicates that the internal evidence of the passage itself may not be sufficiently unambiguous. Thus, a look at the closer *context* is inevitable. Now, it cannot reasonably be denied that the closer context of the *IP* is in perfect harmony with the *IP* itself, because it unequivocally confirms the fact, attested by the question at the beginning of the *IP*, that the discussion is about *nirodhasamāpatti*, with special reference to a canonical pericope[131] that forms part of the *Dharmadinnāsūtra* of the *Madhyamāgama* and of a parallel text in the *Saṁyuktāgama* (see §§ 40 and 69). This source is also implicitly but unmistakably referred to in the question part of the *IP*. Hence, the respective sūtra passage and its context must by all means be taken into account in interpreting the *IP*. We can be absolutely sure that the author of the *IP* argues in the context of the exegesis of this pericope and that he presupposes the reader's familiarity with it. In addition, we cannot but presuppose that the author of the passage was, to a certain extent, familiar with previous or ongoing discussions about his subject, especially such discussions or theories as had developed in his own surroundings or circles, and we must be ready to recognize allusions to such discussions or theories. In my opinion, the closer context and its sūtra background as well as the pertinent discussions traceable in the YBh material supply sufficient clues for ascertaining the proper place of the *IP* in an ongoing debate and for venturing the hypothesis that the *IP* documents the introduction, into this debate, of a new aspect of mind aptly described by the expression '*ālayavijñāna*' (contrasted with the ordinary functions of mind as '*pravṛttivijñāna*s') or at least mirrors the doctrinal situation in which this event took place. I shall come back to this in ch. 3.2.

31.1. Since Buescher considers *ālayavijñāna* to be an integral part of a novel paradigm newly introduced, as a whole, in the Saṁdh, he has to regard all occurrences of this term in the MauBh as post-Saṁdh, and since he seems to agree with me in considering the compilation of the MauBh to precede the Saṁdh, he has to take *all ālayavijñāna* passages in the MauBh, including the *IP*, as *interpolations*.

31.2. In order to prove a piece of text to be an interpolation, it is not of course necessary to point out *internal* inconsistencies, for in itself the interpolated text may well be homogeneous. But if we allow ourselves to postulate interpolation wherever the occurrence of a certain term or idea in a text runs counter to one's hypothetical assumptions, without any obligation to adduce further evidence, we surely open a door to sheer arbitrariness. To be sure, unless a certain passage is protected by an *uddāna*[132] or is indispensable for the logic of the argument or required for formal reasons, it may be next to impossible to exclude the mere *possibility* that it is an interpolation, and it is true that the paragraph under discussion (i.e., the *IP*) is not protected by an *uddāna* (because there is none), and could be omitted without creating a formal or logical incoherence (because the text consists of comments on a somewhat loose sequence of statements concerning *nirodhasamāpatti* in the sūtra commented upon). But if we delete the paragraph (i.e., the *IP*), a crucial and by no means self-explanatory statement of the sūtra would remain unexplained, unless one presumes that the original version of the paragraph has been replaced with a modernized one by a later redactor, which, however,

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[131] For the application of this term from New Testament criticism to the early period of the transmission of Buddhist traditions in the sense of "passages of scripture which were standardized and used as units to compose larger texts" see GOMBRICH 1987: 77; GRIFFITHS 1983: 56.

[132] Like, e.g., the eight proofs in the 'Proof Portion': see § 231 with fn. 1274.

would, without further evidence, once again be altogether arbitrary. Therefore, in order to avoid arbitrariness it is indispensable to point out syntactical, stylistic, terminological, conceptual or historical inconsistencies between the interpolated piece and the *surrounding* text,[133] or to provide other reasons like the absence of the piece of text in question in significant textual witnesses.

31.3. I admit that one of the *ālayavijñāna* passages of the MauBh (viz., YBh$_{Bh}$ 11,3-8) does indeed exhibit all the signs of being a somewhat later interpolation or reshuffling,[134] and that also in the passages where the key concepts of Saṁdh VI (and VII) are mentioned there are formal or other clues suggesting that something has been added to older materials.[135] I also admit that the other references to *ālayavijñāna* in the first three chapters[136] of the MauBh (PañcBh, ManoBh and SavitBh) give the impression of having been introduced into older materials,[137] but I do not perceive any cogent reason why these additions should be attributed to the influence of the Saṁdh, last but not least because '*ālayavijñāna*' is not the typical term used by this text and because in these passages the latter's typical term, viz., '*ādānavijñāna*', would have served the purpose equally well.[138]

31.4. In the case of the *IP*, however, there is no formal indication of its being an interpolation. It is not missing in any of the textual witnesses, nor do I perceive any formal inconsistency in the embedding of the passage, as, for example, intrusiveness to the structure of the context (see § 30), or the occurrence of an anaphoric pronoun that cannot be connected with any suitable and sufficiently close noun in the preceding context, and Buescher does not point out anything of the kind either. His postulate of an interpolation rests solely on the

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[133] Or inconsistencies between the higher textual unit (of which the passage in question forms part) with *its* surrounding text, but in the case of the higher textual unit of which the *IP* forms part I cannot detect any such inconsistency.

[134] See S 1987: 117–127 (# 6.2.1–4).

[135] See S 2000a.

[136] The sequence of chapters in the MauBh follows systematic considerations and does not of course correspond to a chronological sequence of their compilation, not to mention of the textual materials they contain. See § 7.3.

[137] See S 1987: 110–117 (# 6.1.1–4) and 127–137 (## 6.3.1–6.5.4).

[138] Buescher may argue that the YBh prefers '*ālayavijñāna*' in order to emphasize the aspect of latency of this *vijñāna*. However, if the specific context of *nirodhasamāpatti* (and similar states) is excluded as secondary, there is no particular emphasis on its latency in the MauBh and even less in the VinSg, at any rate not more emphasis than in the Saṁdh, where there is indeed explicit reference to its being subtle (*sūkṣma*: V.7) and subconscious (**asaṁvidita*: VIII.37.1.1), but this does not entail a switch from the standard term '*ādānavijñāna*' to '*ālayavijñāna*'. In addition, even in Saṁdh V.3 the term '*ālayavijñāna*' is, as will be shown (ch. 4.1.6, esp. §§ 122 and 127), not explained in terms of abstract latency but rather as "attaching itself to", "settling down in" or just "dwelling in" the body, and (as a connotation) perhaps "hiding / lying hidden *in*" the body. This being the case, the only way to explain why — if the idea of a subliminal form of mind in the YBh were indeed borrowed from the Saṁdh —the YBh came to prefer the term '*ālayavijñāna*' instead of '*ādānavijñāna*' would seem to assume that the borrowing took place in the context of describing the process of 'reincarnation' (YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,1ff), starting with the *vijñāna*'s merging (*saṁ-√mūrch*) with the body. Still, I myself consider the other way round more probable (see ch. 4.2.8.3). A more complicated process (e.g., first step: pre-*ālayavijñāna* YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,1ff + *IP* [or some orally circulating concept of *ālayavijñāna*] → Saṁdh V.2–3; second step: (*IP* +) Saṁdh V.2–3 → YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,1ff with *ālayavijñāna*) may, to be sure, not be impossible either.

assumption of the presence of later terms and concepts, but as I shall try to demonstrate (ch 3.3.1.2), the only expression which, in Buescher's interpretation, might suggest a later period, viz., ⟨*a*⟩*pariṇata*, does not, on closer inspection, serve the purpose. And to base the postulate on the presence of the expressions *ālaya-* and *pravṛttivijñāna* would, without additional evidence, amount to a circular argument and thus hardly be conclusive, still less so if I am right in assuming that they make perfect sense precisely if newly created in the *IP* or at least in the context it mirrors (see § 44).

32.1. Towards the end of his discussion of the *IP*, Buescher (B: 77 # 44) even attempts to justify his position (viz., that the *IP* is a later interpolation) from a compositional point of view, to the extent that he tries to turn the tables on me. According to his interpretation, the *IP*

> evidences its appurtenance to an exegetical stage where the *whole* previous Early Yogācāra solution of the problem of *nirodhasamāpatti* had to be *replaced*[139]

by a description in the form of an advanced terminological framework, and hence

> it is not at all surprising that we do not find any traces of inserted materials *within* this *nirodhasamāpatti* passage.[140]

It is, so Buescher, rather in the case of my interpretation of the *IP* that one "would in fact expect traces of interpolation" since it presupposes "the older conceptual framework as the setting into which merely the name of *ālayavijñāna* had been inserted".[141]

32.2. I am afraid that Buescher's argument involves some confusion with regard to the concept of 'interpolation'. In textual studies, this normally means heterogeneous textual matter inserted later into a given text, and this is what the *IP* would indeed be according to Buescher's thesis. But in my own understanding the *IP* is not an interpolation, for I have never pretended that its author used a ready-made *formulation* of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' (i.e., the theory that mind and corporeal matter contain their own as well as each other's Seeds: see § 39) and merely inserted an advanced terminology ('*ālayavijñāna*' and '*pravṛttivijñāna*') into it, and the fact that a given *theory* is rephrased and modified by an author by amplifying, redefining or reinterpreting one of its elements and introducing a new terminology has nothing to do with interpolation. Such a procedure may, to be sure, create tensions in the theoretical framework that was subject to modification, but these will normally subsequently be worked out, and this is precisely what I assume to have happened in the case of the *IP*.

32.3. As for Buescher's (misleading) reference to a "previous Early Yogācāra solution of the problem of *nirodhasamāpatti*", the reader is referred to § 40.

33. The conviction that the *IP* must be an interpolation, and a fairly late one at that, is shared by other scholars as well, especially by Harada,[142] Matsumoto[143] and (with reference to the former) Yamabe,[144] but they, too, do not point out any formal inconsistency. They, too, rather argue in terms of content and terminology.

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[139] B: 77,24-26; Buescher's emphasis.

[140] B: 77,31-33; Buescher's emphasis.

[141] B: 77,34 and 37-39.

[142] HARADA 1996: 166 n. 52; 2004: 154f, n. 30 (p. 154 line 7 from below to p. 155 line 4 of the note).

[143] M2: 404–410.

[144] See § 8.1 with fn. 15.

34.1. According to Harada,[145] the *IP* must be a later, even post-VinSg interpolation because its use of *ālayavijñāna* in connection with problems concerning *nirodhasamāpatti* must be later than the treatment of the case of *nirodhasamāpatti* in the context of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', which does not yet presuppose *ālayavijñāna*, but is first found in the VinSg.

34.2. This argument presupposes the assumption that all textual materials found in the VinSg are later than those in the original text (i.e., interpolations apart) of the MauBh. I do not see how this can be taken for granted. The VinSg is, in its own words, a kind of supplementary collection of materials.[146] But I fail to see why all of these materials must have been produced after the completion of the MauBh, nor am I convinced that these materials can be assigned to two textual layers (or even to two phases of compilation), an earlier and a later one, according to whether they make use or do not make use of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.[147] To me, it appears much more probable that among the materials incorporated in the VinSg there may as well have been earlier pieces that had somehow escaped collection or incorporation during the compilation of the MauBh, and that the larger (and perhaps even extending) community from which textual materials were collected was by no means completely homogeneous, to the effect that the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in some circle(s) need not immediately have spread to or met with approval in other circles (cf., e.g., the complete absence of this concept in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the VinSg (BoBhVin), the incorporated Saṁdh apart).

34.3. From this perspective, the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' as transmitted in the VinSg may well have been in existence for some time before its incorporation in the VinSg and predate the *IP*. And even if in its systematized form it did not, its basic components can, as N. Yamabe has shown,[148] be found already in pre-*ālayavijñāna* layers of the MauBh. The fact that an explicit application of this theory to the case of *nirodhasamāpatti* is not found in the MauBh would rather seem to be due to the fact that the problem of how one emerges from this absorption is not thematic in the respective sections.

34.4. Still, this is not the full truth, since at least an implicit application is found in the SavitBh when it is said that not all of the twelve members of origination in dependence are found in all forms of existence and meditative attainments in terms of actual occurrence (*samudācārataḥ*), because in an existence among the unconscious heavenly beings (*āsaṁjñika*) as well as in *nirodhasamāpatti* and in the meditative attainment where one is unconscious (*asaṁjñisamāpatti*) only the physical (*rūpin*) members are found [in this way], not the immaterial (*arūpin*) ones, whereas in the case of a being reborn in [one of] the spheres

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[145] HARADA 2004: loc.cit.: このアーラヤ識を前提としない滅尽定のケースは『瑜伽論』「摂決択分」に至って初めて説かれたのであり，『瑜伽論』「本地分」のアーラヤ識を前提とする滅尽定のケースの記述 (Samāhita-bhūmi) の一節) が「摂決択分」成立以降の付加であることは明らかである。

[146] Cf. the recurrent remark at the end of each Bhūmi that no further clarifying textual material is found (*rnam par gtan la dbab pa'i gzhung lhag ma ni mi snang ngo*, e.g., YBh_t P zi 111b2 [D zhi 107a3f; YBh_c 620c19f: 於二地中餘決擇文更不復現]); 174a1f; 188a8f; 189a6. Cf. S 1969: 21 and # III.1.b.

[147] Cf. HARADA 2004: 155 (line 3-4 of n. 30): 「摂決択分」もアーラヤ識という前提の有無によって新古の層に分かれる。

[148] YAMABE 2000, esp. 135f.

of incorporeality (*ārūpya*) it is the other way round.[149] The qualification *samudācārataḥ* would seem to imply that the other members are *not* missing there completely but continue in the latent form of *Seeds* (*bījataḥ*),[150] as is expressly confirmed for the spheres of incorporeality in another passage of the SavitBh.[151] Thus, the passage under discussion implicitly confirms the presence of the Seeds of the immaterial constituents of a person in *nirodhasamāpatti*, etc., and since in these states no immaterial constituent is assumed to continue in terms of actual occurrence, their Seeds can only be based on the physical constituents, i.e., the five physical sense faculties and their seats. There is thus good reason to assume that the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' as a whole, including its application to *nirodha-samāpatti*, predates not only the VinSg but also the *IP*.

35. One of Matsumoto's arguments is that Saṁdh V cannot be dependent on the *IP* because it does not even mention *nirodhasamāpatti*,[152] which is the central topic of the latter. But Saṁdh V.2–3 is, like YBh_{Bh} 24,1ff,[153] concerned with the context of rebirth, and since *nirodhasamāpatti* is not a place of rebirth there is no reason at all to mention it, just as for the *IP*, concerned with the special issue of *nirodhasamāpatti*, there is no reason at all to touch on problems concerning rebirth or the sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*). The common ground for both passages, be it explicitly or implicitly (see § 40), is the 'appropriation' (*upā-dāna*) of the sense faculties (and their seats, i.e., the body), attributed to a type or layer of the mind that dwells or sticks or lies hidden in the sense faculties or in the body (cf. M2: 407) and comprises Seeds or is furnished with them, or functions as a Seed. I do not see how an influence of one of these two passages on the other can be excluded on the mere basis of a contextually specific element of one of them not being mentioned in the other.

36. Matsumoto (cf. M2: 406,14ff) would perhaps argue that the choice of the name *ālaya-vijñāna* in the *IP* points to an advanced stage of the development of the idea of the new type of mind, because this term is better suited for an understanding of this new type of mind as being hidden in, submersed in or at the bottom of other phenomena, i.e., in Matsumoto's

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[149] YBh_{Bh} 227,4-7: *kiṁ sarvopapattisamāpattiṣu sarvāṇy aṅgāny upalabhyante samudācārataḥ | āha: nôpalabhyante | āsaṁjñike*[1] *nirodhasamāpattyasaṁjñisamāpattyoś ca rūpīṇy upalabhyante nârūpīṇi | ārūpyeṣûpapannasya punar arūpīṇy upalabhyante na rūpīṇi |*

[1] Ed. *asaṁjñikaṁ*; ms. *asaṁjñike* (sic).

[150] For the opposition *bīja* vs. *samudācāra* cf., e.g., YBh_t P zi 25a5–b2 and 76a6f (D zhi 22b1-5 and 72b5f; YBh_c 587a10-20 and 607a25-27) and AS 35,2-16. (AS_G 29,29–30,11). See Addenda ad § 80.2.4, [A.2].

[151] YBh_{Bh} 200,1-3 (see § 321), identical with YBh_t P 'i 285b7–286a1 (D zi 247a4f; YBh_c 827c29–828a2: VaSg III.1.i).

[152] Cf. M2: 407,6-10 and 409,10ff. As far as I can see, *nirodhasamāpatti* is, apart from a short reference to it in a comparison at X.9, not mentioned in Saṁdh, at any rate not in unambiguous terms (cf. Pt. IV fn. 2521). My (admittedly insufficiently verified) impression is that, exceptions like KP_{SH} 209 (KP_{VD} 51) # 144 (quoted PrasP 45,5-11) apart, Mahāyāna sūtras are not much interested in *nirodhasamāpatti*, in contrast to, e.g., a strong interest in the three *samādhi*s of *śūnyatā*, *ānimitta* and *apraṇihita* (cf. § 597.1).There is also, significantly, no reference to *nirodhasamāpatti* in the decidedly Mahāyānist treatises MSA and MAV, whereas it is referred to, and in connection with *ālayavijñāna* at that, in the MSg (I.50–55; cf. I.7.4) — a text which, although equally Mahāyānist, is, especially in its first chapter, much closer to Abhidharmic patterns — and, in a more or less detailed way, in most works of Vasu-bandhu (the Kośakāra), in particular in those where he argues for *ālayavijñāna*.

[153] As for the problem of this passage in relation to Saṁdh V, see § 254.

terminology, as their 'locus',[154] whereas the term *ādānavijñāna* in Saṁdh V cannot be interpreted in such a way. Now, for Matsumoto, the new *vijñāna*'s turning into a 'locus' is a process already starting in Saṁdh V.4–5, where the *ādānavijñāna* becomes the support or 'locus' of the traditional *vijñāna*s (see § 145.1). According to Matsumoto, a further step takes place in the MauBh when *ālayavijñāna* is characterized as endowed with or containing /carrying all Seeds or the Seeds of all [dharmas, or forms of individual existence] (*sarva-bījaka*), hence as the 'locus' of Seeds (see § 143), whereas, according to him, the original idea — as found in Saṁdh V.2 (see § 142) and as preserved even in the detailed treatment of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin (see §§ 143 and 250.3.1) in spite of the fact that this text uses the term *ālayavijñāna* throughout — was that the new type of mind *is* the Seed of all [dharmas]. Yet, even if we take it for granted for the time being that in the phraseology of the *IP* *ālayavijñāna* is furnished or studded with Seeds, Matsumoto's concept of 'locus' is, especially in connection with Seeds, highly problematic (see ch. 4.2.6.1) and hardly an appropriate tool for stratification. An explicit explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna* as "*vijñāna* that is the 'locus' of Seeds" is anyway not attested before Vasubandhu (see § 120.1).

37.1. Another argument set forth by both Harada[155] and Matsumoto[156] is concerned with the expression *pravṛttivijñāna*. Both scholars argue that since the term *pravṛttivijñāna*, used in the *IP* for the ordinary cognitive functions as contrasted with *ālayavijñāna*, is absent in the Saṁdh but obviously based on the verbal form *pravarta(n)te* used there in connection with these functions,[157] the *IP* must be later than Saṁdh. According to Harada, it was only in the VinSg that the term *pravṛttivijñāna* was introduced to denote the elements that constitute the surface layer of the mind, and since the term is taken there in a sense that includes the *kliṣṭaṁ manaḥ*, the *IP* presupposes a stage of development where *manas* had already come to be established as the seventh *vijñāna*, and must therefore be a post-VinSg interpolation. As Matsumoto (M2: 494 n. 326) rightly points out, Harada's contention that the term *pravṛtti-vijñāna* must include the *kliṣṭaṁ manaḥ* is not conclusive because in the first argument for the existence of *ālayavijñāna* in the 'Proof Portion' the expression *pravṛttivijñāna* is actually used for the six traditional *vijñāna*s only.[158] Nonetheless, he (M2: 408) agrees with Harada in that the use of the complementary concepts *ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna* in the *IP* must have been borrowed from the *ālayavijñāna* materials of the VinSg, and that the *IP* must hence be a fairly late interpolation, because it does not explain these terms but presupposes them as well-known. Had the terms been newly introduced by the author of the *IP*, one would, according to Matsumoto, expect him to have added an explanation.

37.2. This is, no doubt, Matsumoto's most serious argument. It is undeniable that the passage does not explain or define the concepts *ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*, let alone expressly declare them to be innovations, and I agree that the message of the text would not be affected if we assume that the concepts, or at least that of *ālayavijñāna*, had already been

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[154] Cf. also M2: 398,18–399,3.

[155] HARADA 1996: 166 n. 52; 2004: 154f, n. 30 (p. 154, last line, to 155 line 3 of n. 30).

[156] M2: 407–409; cf. 393f.

[157] Cf., especially, Saṁdh V.5 as quoted in TrBh *33,18ff (L. 33,26ff: ... *cakṣurvijñānaṁ pravartate, ... yāvat pañcānāṁ pravṛttir bhavati*).

[158] 'Proof Portion' # i(a) (see fn. 160). Occasionally this happens even in later sources, e.g., TrBh *36,10 (L. 35,14). Cf. also fn. 1581 (SacAcBh of the MauBh).

in existence and thus could be presupposed as familiar. But even this would surely not be sufficient to warrant the assumption of an interpolation unless we can exclude the possibility that at the time of the composition of the SamBh the concept of *ālayavijñāna* had already emerged in some circle(s), at least in oral communication (see § 8). If such an oral prehistory of the *IP* were to be accepted, we cannot, of course, be sure that the *IP* has recorded, in a succinct form, the original motive of the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, but this would at least be a possibility, still more so if the motive for such an introduction is strong enough and if my judgement that the expressions *pravṛttivijñāna* and *ālayavijñāna* are self-explanatory in the context of the *IP* (see § 44) is correct. There is, in any case, no need to draw on Saṁdh V.4-5 in order to explain the expression *pravṛttivijñāna*, for the use of the verb (*pra-*)√*vṛt* together with *vijñāna* is current already in pre-*ālayavijñāna* passages of the YBh,[159] and the author of the *IP* (or whoever coined the expression) may as well have been inspired by this usage.

37.3. Even if the phraseology of the *IP* is not accepted as being contextually self-explanatory, this does not necessarily imply that the *IP* is a later interpolation presupposing the existence of the full-fledged *ālayavijñāna* theory as found in the systematic treatments on *ālayavijñāna* in the VinSg; still less so since in these treatments, too, the expressions *ālaya-vijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*[160] (now definitely terminological) are not explained with regard to their literal meaning, but are taken for granted as ready-made terms and merely dealt with in a systematical perspective. Although the author(s) of these treatments must have been familiar with the literal explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3, he/they did not feel the need to quote it, or deliberately refrained from doing so. Similarly, the *IP*, too, may reflect some more explicit discussion which for whatever reason has not been included in the MauBh (cf. § 24). But I doubt that this was Saṁdh V, because in Saṁdh V the expression *ālayavijñāna* is referred to only in passing, and probably as a term already in existence (see § 281–282), the Saṁdh's standard name for the new type of mind being *ādānavijñāna*. The absence of the expression *pravṛttivijñāna* in the Saṁdh as well as in the *ālayavijñāna* passages at the beginning of the MauBh is, one might note, easily explained on the assumption that this expression was introduced as a convenient generic designation for the ordinary cognitive functions in contrast to the subliminal mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* (not thematized in these passages) and became terminological only in connection with a systematic analysis of the new paradigm of mind as a multi-layered structure, as documented in the detailed treatments of *ālayavijñāna* in the VinSg.

38. In view of the preceding considerations and in the absence of any formal inconsistency I for my part am not aware of any cogent reason that would justify, in the case of the *IP*, the assumption of an interpolation — an assumption I cannot but regard as altogether arbitrary. And although the introduction of the new paradigm of the mind as a multi-layered structure and the systematization of the *ālayavijñāna* theory as found in the respective detailed

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[159] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 199,10 *vijñānasya pravṛttir bhavati* or 200,2 *vijñānaṁ ... pravartate*; cf. also 10,4f *cakṣurvijñānaṁ ... pravartate*.

[160] 'Proof Portion' # i(a) (YBh_t P zi 2b5; ASBh 12,2; HAKAMAYA 1978: 8 = 2001: 328) says *cakṣurādi-pravṛttivijñānam* — doubtless identical with the six traditional kinds of *vijñāna* (*ṣaḍ vijñānakāyāḥ*) mentioned in # i(b)-(d); cf. also # i(e) —, but this is merely an identification of the items included (which is self-evident in the *IP*) but not an explanation of the expression as such, and there is no indication of its being a neologism either.

treatments in the VinSg must precede the compilation or at least the final redaction of the latter, I consider it highly improbable that these texts already existed, more or less in their present form, at the time of the compilation of the MauBh. If they did, I find it hard to imagine them as already having been part of the (written or oral) textual heritage created and/or transmitted within the very group or ambience that was involved in the compilation of the MauBh, for in this case it is hard to see why these texts were not already incorporated into the MauBh. In view of the basic difference in the conception of *ālayavijñāna* pointed out in § 22.1, all I might suggest is that some members of this group were inspired to make use of this concept in their own way, and in this sense the *IP* may reflect the motive or 'trigger' for the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* into early Yogācāra proper, as the ambience in which the MauBh was compiled, even if the concept preexisted outside this ambience, where it may, in view of the basic difference just mentioned, have originated from a different (set of) motive(s), still to be pointed out in a sufficiently concrete and persuasive way. But I should like to emphasize that I consider this scenario less probable. In my opinion, the scenario sketched in § 24 is more likely.

3.2. Defense of the Conclusions Drawn from the *Initial Passage* as Understood by me

39. In my interpretation of the *IP* (cf. S 1987 # 2.5), I have taken this passage to presuppose a doctrine according to which, roughly speaking, mind and corporeal matter — especially the physical sense faculties (*rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*)[161] along with their seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*), or simply the physical sense faculties (see § 76.1–76.7) — are furnished with their own as well as with each other's Seeds (*bīja*) and are, in this sense, both characterized as "containing all Seeds" (**sarvabījaka*), to the effect that the mind can rearise from corporeal matter after its cessation in *nirodhasamāpatti*, and corporeal matter (*rūpa*) from the mind (*vijñāna*, *citta*) after an existence in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*). Buescher calls this the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. In its full form, it is described only in the VinSg,[162] and it is explicitly

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[161] This concept will be discussed in detail in ch. 3.3.1.1.

[162] YBh_t P zi 15b5–16a6 (D zhi 13b1–14a2; YBh_C 583b21–c10; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1021c4-14). An excellent analysis and discussion of this text along with parallel materials from the earlier portions of the YBh is YAMABE 2000. Cf. also YBh_t P zi 228b7 (D zhi 217b1):

> The Seeds of the primary elements (**mahābhūta*) that are connected with (/accompany) the physical sense faculties and the mind (**citta*) are in their turn connected with (/accompanied by) the Seeds of derivative matter (**upādāyarūpa*).
>
> *'byung ba chen po'i sa bon dbang po gzugs can dang | sems dang ldan pa gang dag yin pa de dag ni rgyur byas pa'i gzugs kyi sa bon dag dang ldan pa yin te |*

The Chinese version (YBh_C 666b5-7) is slightly different:

> If there is, in the physical sense faculties and the mind, a continuous flow of the Seeds of the primary elements, then there is [also] a continuous flow of the Seeds of derivative matter.
>
> 若諸色根及心中有諸大種種子隨逐, 即有造色種子隨逐。

Cf. also ASBh 17,1f:

> [It is called] 'eye-awareness' [in the sense of] awareness [arising] from the eye (/faculty of vision), for [it] arises from the [latter] since the eye (/faculty of vision) is connected with the Seeds of awareness.[1]
>
> *cakṣuṣo vijñānaṁ cakṣurvijñānam, vijñānabījānubandhāc cakṣuṣas tannirvṛtteḥ.*
>
> [1] Translated in accordance with $ASBh_t$ P shi 16b3f; starting from the Skt., the latter part could of course also be translated as "for it (=eye-awareness) arises *from the eye* (/faculty of vision) since [the latter] is connected with the Seeds of awareness."

For the latter part, $ASVy_C$ (703b7f) has 由識種子隨逐於眼而得生故 ("for [since] the Seed of awareness follows (/is continuously present in) the eye, [eye-awareness] can arise [from the eye]").

Since the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' and its two components are well documented in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials of the YBh, it is hardly admissible to contrast it with the (early) Yogācāra position (taken to admit only the mind as containing Seeds or imprints) and ascribe it to the so-called Sautrāntikas conceived as different from the early Yogācāras (CHEN 1999: 90). Rather, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' was almost certainly developed by the early Yogācāras (YAMABE 2000: 142), for in the AKBh (72,20f) it is actually ascribed to the '*pūrvācāryāḥ*', most of whose views can be traced in the YBh (HAKAMAYA 1986b; YAMABE 2000: 128). As regards the label 'Sautrāntika' in the AKBh, most of the views concerned are likewise traceable in the YBh (HARADA 1996: 138–161; YAMABE 2000: 128; KRITZER 2003b, esp. 332f), but Changhwan Park suggests that the main source is a lost work of Śrīlāta (see KRAGH 2013: 232) and that "Vasubandhu uses the term 'Sautrāntika' in the sense of being a scripturalist who adheres to the literal interpretation of the scriptures", i.e., in the sense of an "exegetical strategy" (PARK 2013: 954).

stated there to hold good as long as *ālayavijñāna* has *not yet* been established.[163] The pre-*ālayavijñāna* origin of this 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is also confirmed by the fact that it is obviously presupposed in the pre-*ālayavijñāna*[164] analysis of dependent origination (*pratītya-samutpāda*) in the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* of the MauBh,[165] one characteristic aspect of it (viz., the continuity of corporeal matter (*rūpa*) in the form of Seeds in the *ārūpyadhātu*) being found not only here but also in the VaSg,[166] while the complementary aspect can be traced back to the ŚrBh.[167] According to my interpretation, the *IP* seems to presuppose this 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' insofar as *ālayavijñāna*, said to comprise, or be studded with (*-parigṛhīta*, see ch. 3.3.4), the Seeds of the ordinary forms of mind that reappear when one re-emerges from *nirodhasamāpatti*, is located in the physical sense faculties (for a discussion of Buescher's objections to this point see ch. 3.3.1 and 3.3.3).

40. Now, Buescher (B: 51,8f; 53f) first objects that if this is true the introduction of *ālaya-vijñāna* as a novel concept is superfluous because the problem of the *IP* had already been solved by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. However, this assertion is hardly acceptable. The 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is, at least in our sources, only concerned with the re-emerging of cognitive functions after their interruption during *nirodhasamāpatti* (and with the rearising of corporeal matter after an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu*). But this is not the central problem of the *IP* but, as will be elaborated below (ch. 3.3.6), rather a side-issue, additionally referred to in order to show that the modified theory proposed in the *IP* is no less suitable for the solution of this issue than the original 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' it presupposes. As is unambiguously clear from the introductory question, the central problem of the *IP* is rather the need for some *presence* of *vijñāna* during *nirodhasamāpatti*. In the first place, this is an *exegetical* problem: as indicated above (see § 30), such a presence is required by a pericope contained in what may be called the Mūlasarvāstivāda version[168] of the *Dharmadinnāsūtra* and in a parallel text in the *Saṁyuktāgama*. In contrast to the Pāli version and to that of the Chinese *Madhyamāgama* (probably Sarvāstivāda),[169] in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of this text, which is the one

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[163] YBh_t P zi 17b6 (D zhi 15a6f; YBh_c 584a27f): *sa bon rnam par gzhag* (D : *bzhag* P) *pa'i tshul 'di ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rnam par ma bzhag* (D : *gzhag* P) *pa la rig par bya'o*.

[164] Because this analysis is not merely characterized by the complete absence of the term *ālayavijñāna* but also clearly represents a pre-*ālayavijñāna* stage of conceptual development.

[165] YBh_{Bh} 227,4-7 (see § 34.4).

[166] YBh_{Bh} 200,1-3 (see fn. 151).

[167] $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 431,14-16: ... *asty* (ms.) *eṣāṁ sarvveṣāṁ vijñānānām asmin kāye caturmahābhūtike bījaṁ dhātur gotraṁ prakṛtir ity adhimucyate*. This is, to be sure, a deliberate visualization or imagination (*adhimukti*) of the yogi, which may, but need not necessarily, extend beyond reality, and in the present case obviously does not (*asty ... asmin kāye* = "there *exists*, in this body, ...").

[168] I.e., belonging to the redaction of the canonical sūtras that basically agrees with the one presupposed by the Mūlasarvāstivāda *Vinaya*, regardless of how the designation 'Mūlasarvāstivāda' and the affiliation of the group(s) connected with this redaction are to be understood (the most recent discussion of this controversial issue accessible to me is WYNNE 2008; cf. also YAO 2007).

[169] For the complications involved, see CHUNG & FUKITA 2011: 13–36. I still think that an affiliation with some Sarvāstivāda community is the most probable alternative. A Middle Indic original in a NW Indian Prākṛt (or partly sanskritized Prākṛt) would hardly contradict this assumption, for like the Dharmaguptakas the Sarvāstivādins living in that area must also have started from a Middle Indic transmission of canonical texts. Incidentally, the affiliation of the Chinese *Dīrghāgama* with the Dharmaguptakas would seem to be supported by the fact that its list of the various states of mind (*citta*)

presupposed also by the YBh, it is stated that in *nirodhasamāpatti vijñāna* has not left the body of the respective person (*vijñānaṁ câsya kāyād anapakrāntam*).[170] Since the context in which this statement occurs in the sūtra is the question how to distinguish *nirodhasamāpatti* from death, we can, against Buescher,[171] be perfectly sure that for the *IP*, for which this sūtra is the point of departure (see § 30), the presence of *ālayavijñāna* distinguishes a person who has entered *nirodhasamāpatti* from one who has died. In other words: it is the presence of *ālayavijñāna* that guarantees, in the absence of the ordinary cognitive states, that this person is still alive, that life goes on for this person. Thus, in this state *ālayavijñāna* functions as the *vijñāna* that keeps the body alive or, in Abhidharmic language, appropriated (*upātta*: cf. ch. 4.2.5.5). This implication can, against Buescher,[172] be safely presupposed, the more so since the connection between *vijñāna* not departing from the body and *vijñāna* appropriating (**upādātṛ*) the primary elements of the [physical] sense faculties (**indriyamahābhūta*), i.e., keeping the body alive, had already been expressed in the *Saṁyuktāgama* commentary that constitutes the main part of the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* and belongs to the earlier layers of the YBh (cf. § 7.3), viz., in VaSg III.5.i.[173] The characterization of dying as *vijñāna*'s departure from

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to be discerned by the supranormal knowledge of other people's states of mind (*paracittajñāna*) ($DĀ_c$ 86a25-27) corresponds exactly to that of *Vinaya* of the Dharmaguptakas (T 22.1428: 965b12-14), unless we attribute this coincidence to the identical team of translators; but cf. the substantially identical list of the ŚA (different team of translators!): S 1987a: 318 # 5.1.2 and 390f). For the significance of this list, see S 1987a: 318–337 and 390–393 (table).

[170] [1.] I presuppose that this phrase was not arbitrarily added to the sūtra text by innovative Yogācāras or early Vijñānavādins in order to have a canonical basis for *ālayavijñāna*, because in this case starting from it (*IP*) or quoting it in support ('Proof Portion' # vii: S 1987 # 3.2.1) would have had little strength even in the eyes of the more conservative Yogācāras, let alone of other communities. Actually, the reading is taken for granted even by an opponent like Saṅghabhadra and merely interpreted in a different way (NA 403c13-17; see § 43.4). If secondary, it may well have been introduced, at an earlier date, under the influence of the statement, immediately preceding the passage on *nirodhasamāpatti* and death in most versions, that the body turns into a corpse when abandoned by life-force or life-span (*āyus*), [body-]heat (*uṣman*) and *vijñāna* (cf. also DN II 335,14-19 and 338,16-28). Cf., in this connection, also the presence and absence of the word *vijñāna* in the different versions of the sūtra passage (*Mahākauṣṭhilasūtra*, etc.) discussed in fn. 188. In this case, too, it is *not* the Dārṣṭāntikas' or Vibhajyavādins' *reading* but only their *interpretation* that is criticized by the Vaibhāṣika opponents (Vi 771a7-19; 431c20-25 ≈ Vi_2 325b17-29; T 28.1555: 995a8-10; NA 757b27–c6 and 403c17-21); similarly, in this case, CSL 345b27–c2. — [2.] According to A. PIERIS (2003: 48ff), the redactors of MN no. 43 (provided that this version basically represents the original form of the sūtra) may deliberately have refrained from committing themselves with regard to the presence of *viññāṇa* in *nirodhasamāpatti*. Actually, while the statement that *viññāṇa* leaves the body at death together with life-force and heat strongly suggests that it is one of the indispensable principles of sentient life, the fact that *viññāṇa* is not mentioned in the paragraph on the inseparability of life-force and body-heat would seem to allow for exceptions, and its definition in an actualistic way (*vijānāti vijānātîti ... viññāṇaṁ*) in the beginning of the text (MN I 292,24-29) hardly favours the idea of its presence in *nirodhasamāpatti*. Later exegetes obviously were not inclined to leave the issue up in the air, but opted for opposite positions, and those who advocated the presence of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* obviously based themselves on a version of the sūtra that lent direct and/or indirect support to their view (see [1.]).

[171] B: 55 (Ex. 10); 74 (# 38).

[172] B: 95,11-13: "... the *Initial Passage* does not contain any positive statement about biological appropriation. *Ālayavijñāna* is not getting related to a physical basis at all, ...".

[173] YBh_t P 'i 311b2f: see § 222.2 with fn. 1235 and S 1987: 354 n. 502.

the body (*vijñānasya kāyād apakrāntiḥ*) is also confirmed by a passage in the SavitBh of the MauBh.[174] The conviction that the presence of some form of *vijñāna* even during *nirodhasamāpatti* was indispensable in order to keep the body of the meditator alive may well have been the deeper doctrinal motive for doing justice to the sūtra statement in a literal way (see § 43).[175]

41. However, Buescher raises a couple of objections against this too, which, provided that I have not overlooked anything important, may be subsumed under the following items:

1. First, he also thinks that the problem connected with the canonical assertion that *vijñāna* has not departed from the body in *nirodhasamāpatti* had already been solved by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model':

> And as is evident from the passages referred to above, those who had adopted the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' had done so with the explicit intention of accounting for a form of *nirodhasamāpatti* in which *vijñāna*, though totally inactualized, had clearly not left the body, but resided in it in a *bīja*-state. (B: 60,31-35)[176]

2. Second, he argues that if my suggestion that *ālayavijñāna* may initially have been conceived only for the sake of bridging the gap created by the absence of the ordinary forms of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* were taken for granted, the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* would, to be sure, have solved this problem but not the complementary problem of the re-emerging of corporeal matter after an existence in the sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*). The *ālayavijñāna* theory would thus have been less comprehensive than the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' and hence inferior to it, to the extent that following my understanding of the *IP* "the *ālayavijñāna* theory would be stigmatized as a philosophical failure, ... would represent a nonsensical theoretical regress" (B: 62, esp. 62,14f).

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[174] YBh$_{Bh}$ 211,10f (in an explanation of traditional quasi-synonyms of dying): *bhedaḥ katamaḥ | yā vijñānasyâśrayād apakrāntiḥ*. Cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,19f: *yadā câsyâyuṣaḥ kṣayād vijñānam upāttaṁ*[1] *kāyaṁ vijahāti* ... and 18,16-20: *cyutikāle ... ūrdhvabhāgād (/adhobhāgād) vijñānam āśrayaṁ muñcati, ūrdhvabhāgaś (/adhobhāgaś) câsya* (so ms. also in 18,17) *śītībhavati*. It is obvious that in the latter passage the *āśraya*, having an upper and a lower part, getting cold and being finally left by the *vijñāna* from the area of the heart (*hṛddeśāt*; cf. also ParySg in MATSUDA 1994: 98,12f), can only be the *body*, not the whole psycho-physical basis of individual existence.

[1] HARADA (2004: 162,16 and n. 45) emends to *vijñānopāttaṁ* in view of Hsüan-tsang' s rendering 便捨識所持身 (YBh$_{c}$ 322a11) and Tib. (YBh$_{t}$ P dzi 118a7 and 'i 287b3 *rnam par shes pas zin pa'i lus spong bar 'gyur te*. The Chinese is no doubt unambiguous, but I am not sure whether it is impossible to construe *rnam par shes pas* (also) as the agent of *spong*. And as Harada himself points out, in the VaSg Hsüan-tsang's rendering (YBh$_{c}$ 828c3f: 能執持識 捨所執身) rather supports the ms. reading. At any rate, in view of YBh$_{Bh}$ 18,16-20 as well as of argument viii of the 'Proof Portion' (see ASBh 13,16-20; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 15: *cyavamānasya vijñānaṁ ūrdhvadehaṁ vā ... vijahāti, adhodehaṁ vā*) it is obvious that the *vijñāna* not only appropriates (*upā-√dā*) the body at reincarnation and keeps it appropriated throughout life but also abandons it at death, so that there is no difficulty in keeping, in the passage under discussion, the ms. reading and taking *vijñāna* (and not the person referred to by *asya*) as the subject of *vijahāti*.

[175] As Buescher himself (B: 148,28-30) says, "survival in *nirodhasamāpatti* demanded that the new consciousness efficiently perform what has been called **kāyopātta*". I fully agree — provided that the inappropriate compound **kāyopātta* (which could hardly mean anything but "appropriated by/through /in/from the body") is replaced by the required action noun, viz., *kāyopādāna*, as found in PSk 17,6 —, and I am sure the author of the *IP* was sufficiently erudite to be aware of this as well.

[176] Cf. also B: 56,4-6: "... in view of the fact that the Early Yogācāras had already developed a model that accounted for some presence of consciousness in *nirodhasamāpatti* ...".

3. Third, he criticizes my vacillation between characterizing *ālayavijñāna* in the *IP* as a "new, subliminal kind of mind" on the one hand, but likewise as "hardly anything but Seeds" on the other (B: 54,2ff).

4. Fourth, he vehemently rejects my assumption that the original meaning of '*ālaya*' in the expression *ālayavijñāna* was "sticking in/to", "lying hidden in", and favours the meaning of (abstract) latency instead (e.g., B: 70,14-17; 71,1-4; 72,1f; cf. also 48 n. 3).

5. Finally, he considers the introduction of a fundamental new concept in a *śāstra* without canonical (i.e., sūtra) authority highly improbable (B: 54,20ff).

42.0. Let me start by responding to the first objection, viz., that the problem of how to explain the canonical statement that *vijñāna* has not departed from the body in *nirodha-samāpatti* had already been solved by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', so that there would have been no need at all to introduce a new kind of *vijñāna*; I shall reply to the other objections as the opportunity arises in the course of the ensuing reflections.

42.1 As a matter of fact, the VinSg passage codifying the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is merely concerned with the question of continuity, i.e., of how *vijñāna* (and *rūpa*, for that matter) can rearise after periods of interruption, but does not at all address the problem of *vijñāna* not having departed from the body in *nirodhasamāpatti*. Perhaps the proponents of this model had simply not yet paid attention to this problem, or had felt it to be basically solved by their assumption of *vijñāna-bīja*s continuing during that state. At any rate, there is, as far as I can see, no explicit treatment of the issue in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials of the YBh or in any other sufficiently early source.[177]

42.2. What is well documented is a position — ascribed to the Dārṣṭāntikas[178] or Vibhajya-vādins[179] (or, more precisely, to Buddhadeva,[180] and, by Vasubandhu, to (Bhadanta-)Vasu-mitra[181]) — according to which some form of mind (*citta*) must be present even in *nirodha-samāpatti*.[182] In the *Vibhāṣā*[183] this position (which seems equivalent to the statement, found elsewhere in the same context, that there is no sentient being without mind)[184] is, moreover,

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177 For later sources, see § 43.3 with fn. 193 and fn. 194.

178 Vi 774a14f (see fn. 185); 775a22 (≈Vi_2 332b27); NA 403a21-23; cf. also Vi 772c21f (*asaṁjñi-samāpatti*).

179 Vi 774a15 (see fn. 185); cf. also Vi 772c21f (*asaṁjñisamāpatti*).

180 Vi_2 331c2 (see fn. 185).

181 AKBh 72,21f; KSi # 24 (KSi_{Mu} p. 27,5f; cf. also ibid. p. 28, quoting PSVyṬ D chi 117a2-6 [P chi 139a5–b3]).

182 Cf. also CSL 345b6-21 (no ascription); Ps II 351,17-19: *tattha keci "nirodhaṁ samāpannassa citta-saṅkhārā va niruddhā ti vacanato cittaṁ aniruddhaṁ hoti, tasmā sacittakā ayaṁ samāpatti" ti vadanti* (cf. PIERIS 2003: 58f); cf. also Mil 299f (op.cit. 60–62), where we read that in *nirodhasamāpatti* (300,5f) just as in deep sleep (*middha*) the mind (*citta*) is, although the body is still there (= alive), no longer active (*appavattaṁ hoti*), because it (i.e., *citta*: 299,15 and 20) or the respective person (300,5) has lapsed into the *bhavaṅga* mode (i.e., "the passive, inactive state of the mind — the mind when resting in itself": GETHIN 1994: 15).

183 Cf. also $AKBh_{LVP}$ II: 212 n. 2 (LO.SA. I: 825 n. 620).

184 CSL 345b7f (入此定者 是眾生。世間無有無心眾生。; opposite position: ib. b25f); NA 403a22f (以定無有無心有情。).

associated with the complementary view that there is no sentient being without corporeal matter (*rūpa*) either,[185] which corresponds to the opinion that even in the *ārūpyadhātu* some form of *rūpa* is present.[186] The representatives of a presence of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* also argue that the person would otherwise die,[187] but only Vasubandhu and Saṅghabhadra have them quote the sūtra passage according to which *vijñāna* has not left the body in *nirodhasamāpatti*.[188] None of these early representatives of the presence of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* (or of matter in the *ārūpyadhātu*) is reported to have made use of the concept of Seeds.[189] They rather speak of a *citta* without conscious mental activity (*saṁjñā*) and feeling (*vedanā*),[190] and as far as I can see it is only in somewhat later sources that this *citta* is expressly defined as a (subtle) kind of *manovijñāna*.[191]

42.3. What, precisely, the early representatives of this theory had in mind remains somewhat enigmatic, and whether or not the *IP* was influenced by them is hard to decide; there is, as far as I know, no trace of this theory in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* YBh materials. Thus, we probably have to start from other presuppositions like the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model',[192] which, however, in its documented form does *not* explicitly address the issue of the sūtra statement that *vijñāna* must not have departed from the body in *nirodhasamāpatti* because the opposite would mean death. It is, as far as I can see, only in the *IP* that this question is expressly raised

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[185] Vi 774a14-16: 譬喻者分別論師 執滅盡定 細心不滅。彼說 無有有情 而無色者, 亦無有定 而無心者。); Vi_2 331c1f: (或有說者: 滅定有心。彼作是說: 無有 無色衆生 無心之定。如尊者佛陀提婆。).

[186] Vi 431b6f (或有說: 無色界有色, 如分別論者。); Vi_2 324c28; AKBh 434,11ff; NA 757b17ff.

[187] Vi 774a16f (若 定無心, 命根應斷; 便名為死 非謂在定。); Vi_2 331c3f (若滅定無心者, 不應說有從彼定起者。是名為死, 不名為定。); CSL 345b18f (入滅定者 不名為死。心滅名死。...); cf. also Vi 772c22-24 (*asaṁjñisamāpatti*).

[188] KSi # 24 (KSi_{Mu} 27,10-12); PSVy P 18b7f (MUROJI 1993: 74,2-8 and 151f); NA 403a23f (經說 "入滅定 識不離身" 故). Cf. also PSkBh P hi 188b4f (D si 102b5f). In the CSL (345b8f), the advocate of the presence of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* rather quotes a sūtra passage according to which *āyus*, *uṣman* and *vijñāna* are inseparable (a variant of $MĀ_c$ 791b29 and AKṬU P tu 191a5 [*Mahākauṣṭhila-sūtra*], both of which lack, however, a reference to *vijñāna*; cf. also MN I 295,23-26 [no. 43: *Mahā-vedalla-sutta*]). This passage is also adduced by Saṅghabhadra's Dārṣṭāntika in our context (NA 403a24), and, in the *Vibhāṣā*, by [certain] Vibhajyavādins as evidence for the presence of *rūpa* in the *ārūpyadhātu* (Vi 431b8-12; Vi_2 324c29–325a5; Vi_3 500c15-22; cf. NA 757b17-19; in AKBh 434,19 and AKVy 667,29f without *vijñāna*!) as well as for the view (Vi 770c4-9) that *āyus* is *cittānuparivartin* (which by the way implies the presence of *citta* in *nirodhasamāpatti*). I have not noted any reference to *this* sūtra passage in earlier Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) works, but in the CWSL (16c6-22) it is used to prove the existence of *ālayavijñāna*. In this sūtra passage, too, *vijñāna* had possibly (cf. fn. 170) been added, in some strand of the tradition, under the influence of the subsequent passage according to which the body falls dead when abandoned by *āyus*, *uṣman* and *vijñāna* (MN I 296,6-11; $MĀ_c$ 789a1-5; 791c9-14; AKṬU P tu 9b1f = D ju 8b1-3; $SĀ_c$ 150b4-10 (no. 568), but missing in SN 41.6).

[189] We might perhaps say that at that stage the notion of potentiality had not yet taken clear shape, to the effect that an entity could only either be absent or present. Potentiality could then be expressed only in terms of a *hidden*, unmanifest presence of the actual thing, as in Sāṅkhya thought.

[190] Vi 775a22f: 此定有心 唯滅想受; Vi_2 332b26-28. Cf. the remark in fn.91.

[191] MSg I.52; KSi # 25 (KSi_{Mu} 27,14f); PSVy P 19a1 (MUROJI 1993: 74,10-13 and 152f); AKVy 167,5-7; CWSL 18a18. Cf. GRIFFITHS 1986: 68.

[192] For an alternative suggestion, see § 78.2.

and is answered in such a way that the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' may be presupposed but would at the same time have been modified by a slight but momentous shift.

43.1. In view of the context (cf. § 30) it cannot reasonably be doubted that the starting point of the *IP* is precisely the aforementioned sūtra statement that *vijñāna* has not departed from the body in *nirodhasamāpatti*. Still, this does not automatically imply that the statement had to be taken *literally*, for in view of a multitude of frequently conflicting sūtra statements the exegetes had developed a technique of distinguishing between statements to be taken literally, or in an unrestricted sense, and others that were taken to require some interpretative clarification or restriction. As can be seen in the above-mentioned discussion (§ 42.2), in texts like the *Vibhāṣā*, on mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* or on matter in the *ārūpyadhātu*, different schools or exegetes, even when presupposing the same wording, often disagreed with regard to which passages were to be taken literally and which were to be 'interpreted'. But we can be sure that the exegetes resorted to 'interpretation' only when they thought they could not avoid doing so, and kept to the literal sense as much as possible, especially when there was a strong doctrinal motive.

43.2. The presupposition of my hypothesis is that the sūtra statement quoted in the *IP* was exactly such a case. On the one hand, the possibility of a literal interpretation of the passage was opened up by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', for only a seemingly small shift was necessary to make the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' consonant with the requirement of the sūtra: the Seeds of *vijñāna* contained in the physical sense faculties merely had to be conceived as a Seed-like state or form of *vijñāna* itself. On the other hand, such a shift may have been strongly motivated by the different doctrinal concern in the background of the *IP*, viz., the question of what guarantees the continuity of *life* during *nirodhasamāpatti* — a function for which the mere presence of Seeds of *vijñāna* in the the physical sense faculties or in the physical organism in the sense of a causal capacity to reproduce cognitive activity afterwards may have appeared insufficient. From this point of view, what was required (both doctrinally and by the wording of the sūtra) was rather some form of *vijñāna* itself, preserving, above all, the physical organism as a living, sentient one during *nirodhasamāpatti* (and, once established, also lending itself to functioning as the proper source of the subsequent reproduction of cognitive acts).

43.3. It may indeed be worthwhile to think about how a Yogācāra master in the period before the introduction of what Buescher calls the new model or paradigm might have answered the question of how, after the cessation of all cognitive processes in *nirodhasamāpatti*, *vijñāna* can, in the sūtra, nonetheless be stated not to have departed from the body. On the basis of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', he may have answered that *vijñāna* is still present in the physical sense faculties, or in the physical organism, in the form of Seeds, which is precisely how Yaśomitra[193] and Sthiramati[194] put it. But the interlocutor might have argued that Seeds are, after all, nothing apart from the dharmas themselves insofar as they have a certain causal capacity,[195] which would mean that there is, in *nirodhasamāpatti*, no *vijñāna* but only the physical organism capable of reproducing it afterwards. The response would then

193 AKVy 322,3-6 (ad AKBh 156,7): *nirodhasamāpattiṁ ... samāpannasya ... cittam āśraye bījabhāvenâsti.*

194 AKṬT P tho 95b2: *lus dang 'brel ba* (= *āśrayapratibaddham*: AKBh 156,6) *zhes bya ba ni lus la sa bon gyi ngo bor gnas zhes bya ba'i don to.*

195 See § 251 with fn. 1390.

have been: These Seeds are not simply causal capacities pertaining to the physical sense faculties but have to be understood as constituting a hidden, latent form of *vijñāna* itself — and this is precisely what, according to my interpretation as proposed in S 1987, the answer given in the *IP* amounts to. This may also sufficiently explain the fact that the answer is presented to the questioner as a matter of course, deducible, though with a slight but admittedly momentous shift, from "a shared basis of a logically acceptable conceptual framework" signalized by the particle *hi* (cf. B: 65,15-18).

43.4. In contrast to the early Yogācāras whose doctrinal system appears to have still been in a formative process, Saṅghabhadra, as a representative of the consolidated Vaibhāṣika system, was, though taking the wording of the sūtra passage for granted, forced to *interpret* it by taking it to mean that the mind is taught not to have left the body merely because it will rearise after one's re-emergence from the state of absorption,[196] the doctrinal presupposition probably being the assumption that even the past mind exists and that its 'possession' (*prāpti*) continues during *nirodhasamāpatti*.[197] The author of (or behind) the *IP*, on the other hand, was, on the basis of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', in a position to take the passage literally by conceiving of the Seeds of *vijñāna* as a latent mode of *vijñāna* itself (*bīja*s of *vijñāna* → *bīja*-like *vijñāna*, or *vijñānabīja*s → *bījavijñāna*, so to speak).[198]

43.5. The crucial question is whether this scenario fulfils criterion (1) of S 1987 # 1.7, i.e., that the introduction of a new type of *vijñāna* must have appeared *inevitable*. In my opinion, it does, if we presuppose that the *sūtra* passage from which the *IP* starts had to be taken *literally* for the *doctrinal* reason that without the presence of some form of *vijñāna* the physical organism of the meditator in *nirodhasamāpatti* would not remain *appropriated*, i.e., kept alive, since the past *vijñāna* is no longer existent and since a Seed of *vijñāna* conceived of as a mere causal capacity of the physical organism to reproduce cognitive acts on re-emerging from absorption was, on closer inspection, simply no entity in its own right that could function as the 'subject' of keeping the physical organism appropriated (*upātta*), i.e., alive.

44.1. Being present even in *nirodhasamāpatti*, where all manifest, conscious cognitive functions have ceased, this Seed-like type of *vijñāna* is doubtless characterized by, or in a state of, latency (to use Buescher's terminology), contrasting with the manifestness of the ordinary cognitive functions. It may thus aptly have been called '*ālayavijñāna*',[199] provided

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[196] NA 403c13-17; COX 1995: 271.

[197] Cf. CSL 345b23-27, where, although the sūtra passage is quoted as saying that in *nirodhasamāpatti* only life-force and body-heat have not departed, while *vijñāna* has indeed ceased (345b24f: 入滅盡定者 但心滅 而命熱不離於身) and left the body (345c1: 識離於身), the statement that a person in *nirodhasamāpatti* still has mind (= is a sentient being?) is also said to be justified (亦名有心) because in this person the 'possession' (**prāpti*) of mind continues to be present (心得常在).

[198] If the early Yogācāras were, after all, somehow aware of the controversy about *nirodhasamāpatti* as recorded in the *Vibhāṣā* (see § 42), the transformation of the Seeds of *vijñāna* into a Seed-like *vijñāna* may even be understood as a shift from a, in a sense, Vaibhāṣika-like position (no presence of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* but only *bīja*s, replacing the *prāpti* of the Vaibhāṣikas) to a Dārṣṭāntika-like position (presence of a special form of *vijñāna*), but without the problems the Dārṣṭāntika position involved in view of its being caught up in the traditional, actualistic Abhidharmic concept of *vijñāna*, admitting only of either actual presence or complete absence, without the intermediate category of a latent presence.

[199] Cf. the enumeration of *ālaya* among the quasi-synonyms of the term *bīja* at YBh_{Bh} 26,18. Actually, however, *ālaya* is in this passage equivalent to *satkāya*, *upādāna*, etc., as quasi-synonyms of *ātma*-

that the word *ālaya* was sufficiently common in the sense of "latency". This, however, cannot simply be taken for granted.

44.2. Actually, the noun '*ālaya*' is derived from *ā-√lī*, which primarily means "to cling to", "to stick to or in", and only occasionally has the connotation "to withdraw to", "to hide in, lie hidden in" (cf. § 103), and therefore should be connected, in the first place, with the root *lī* "to cling" and not with the presumably different root *lī* "to dissolve".[200] To be sure, in the course of time the border-line between these two roots seems to have become blurred both formally[201] and semantically, to the effect that an employment of the noun '*ālaya*' that deliberately included the nuance of lying hidden or latency may have suggested itself. But hardly in the sense of abstract latency, since *ā-√lī* is mostly used with a complement in the accusative or locative.[202] Therefore, '*ālaya*' strongly suggests, against Buescher (§ 41.4), an action or state related to an object or locus. For this reason, and in view of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' and the presence of a corresponding locative in the *IP*, I suggested taking '*ālaya*' here as "sticking *in*" the physical sense faculties, in the sense of "lying hidden *in*" them (Buescher's objections to this interpretation of the locative will be discussed in ch. 3.3.3). Even if this locative is not taken in a local sense, the sūtra statement that *vijñāna* has *not departed from* the body implies anyway that *vijñāna* is still *present in* the body, though in a hidden, imperceptible form.[203]

44.3. This makes excellent sense in contrast with '*pravṛtti*' as "coming forth" (*from* the hiding-place, so to speak). Contrary to Matsumoto's[204] contention that *pra-√vṛt* does not mean "forthcoming" or "coming out" ("hervorkommen") but is essentially construed with a locative and therefore means "occurring *on* something", the basic meaning of the prefix *pra-* is no doubt "forward", "forth",[205] and the examples collected in the *PW* contain plenty of instances of *pra-√vṛt* being construed with the *ablative*, thus supporting the meaning "to come forth, to come out" *from* somewhere.[206] This does not of course exclude a perspective

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bhāva, the *ātmabhāva* being considered as functioning as the Seed of all future *ātmabhāvas*: see § 104.1 with fn. 545; cf. also fn. 1379.

[200] For the presumable distinctness of these two roots (originally with different present stems), see GOTŌ 1987: 279; *EWA* II 474f (s.v. *LAY*[1]).

[201] Already in the Brāhmaṇa period, the present stem of √*lī* "to cling" (*-láya-*) was replaced by that of √*lī* "to dissolve" (*-lī́ya-*) (GOTŌ 1987: 279).

[202] Cf. the examples adduced in *CPD* and *DP* s.v. *allīna* and *allīyati*; cf. also fn. 539.

[203] Cf. also passages like DN I 76,16-20, which state that in the fourth *jhāna* a monk may become aware of his *viññāṇa* as it is bound (*ettha sitaṁ ettha paṭibaddhaṁ*) to the to material body consisting of the four primary elements; similarly the parallel in the *Mūlasarvāstivāda Vinaya* (Saṅghabh II 245,24f; MEISIG 1987: 330; cf. 324f), where the *vijñāna* is stated to be settled in the body and to be included in it: *⟨ayaṁ mama kāyo rūpī au⟩dārika⟨ś cāturmahābhūtikaḥ; vi⟩jñānam atra pratiṣṭhitaṁ atra paryāpannam*. Another question is to what extent such statements should be understood as an expression of what Stanisław SCHAYER (1936) has called "somatism" or as mere spatial metaphors, as suggested, e.g., in the passage from the *Paṭṭhāna-aṭṭhakathā* (B[e] 381) quoted in KARUNADASA [2]1989: 115 (with n. 2) that "when consciousness arises it seems to spring forth from within the sense-organs" (*cakkhādīnaṁ ... abbhantarato nikkhantā viya uppajjanti*).

[204] M2: 393,8-11 with 489 n. 299 and n. 300; 413,10-19.

[205] *EWA* II 173: *pra* = "vor, voran, ... hervor, vorwärts".

[206] *PW* s.v. *vart* + *pra*, esp. meanings 2 ("aufbrechen ...") and 4 ("hervorkommen, heraustreten, ... hervorbrechen, ..."). Cf. also *AiSynt* 461: "(*pra* mit ...) *vart* hervorkommen, entspringen".

in which things "come forth" *on* something (loc.), as when in Saṁdh V.4 the cognitive processes are said to come forth *on* the *ādānavijñāna* as their basis,[207] but the primary aspect is the movement forth or forward, and in Saṁdh V.4, too, we can presuppose that the cognitive processes come forth not only *on* the *ādānavijñāna* as their basis but also *from* it as their Seed. To be sure, such a movement of "coming forth" or "moving forward" may be envisaged in different ways: as starting or departing, as arising ('being produced') or occurring, or as going on, continuation, and hence not necessarily as an emerging from some source or hiding place. Still, as far as I can see it is only in the latter sense that '*pravṛtti*' would contrast with '*ālaya*' in a significant way. This contrast is, however, obscured if *pra-√vṛt* or '*pravṛtti*' is, at the same time, also used of the continued arising of *ālayavijñāna*, as is the case in the 'Proof Portion'[208] and, particularly, in the 'Pravṛtti Portion'[209] of the *ālaya-vijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin.[210] In the context of such a usage, the term *pravṛtti-vijñāna* as a designation of conscious cognitive functions in contrast to the latent *ālayavijñāna* can hardly have been invented. This fact would seem to indicate that these texts have

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[207] Matsumoto's reference (M2: 489 n. 300) to his discussion (M2: 440–442 n. 103) of the use of *pravartate* with the locative in connection with a word or denomination as referring to a certain designatum is hardly relevant to the present context, since we are surely not concerned with the problem of linguistic reference (a *viṣayasaptamī* should definitely not be mixed up with a locative specifying a spatial or ontological substratum).

[208] [1.] In # ii of the 'Proof Portion' (YBh$_t$ P zi 3a3f = ASBh 12,14f; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 10 and 17 = 2001: 331 and 340f [with YAMABE 2002: 366b25–367b5];[1] GRIFFITHS 1986: 133f and 99f [with the critical remarks in YAMABE 2012: 187,17–190,3]; cf. also SPARHAM 1993: 127f), a conservative opponent objects that if the existence of [a continuous] *ālayavijñāna* were accepted, this would imply the simultaneous occurrence (*pravṛtti*) of two *vijñāna*s [because the occurrence of ordinary cognitive functions, traditionally only one at a time, would be accompanied by an *occurrence* of *ālayavijñāna*] (*yady ālayavijñānam asti, tena dvayoḥ vijñānayoḥ yugapat pravṛttir bhaviṣyati*). — [2.] In # v (YBh$_t$ P zi 3b4-6 = ASBh 13,4-7; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 13 = 2001: 334f; GRIFFITHS 1986: 135f and 101f [with the critical remarks in YAMABE 2012: 190,4-15]; cf. SPARHAM 1993: 130f), four cognitive acts are stated to be observed as occurring (*pravartamānāḥ*) simultaneously, two of them being cognitive functions of *ālayavijñāna*.

[1] The emendation of *itaretara-* to *anyatara-* or *anyatama-* in the penultimate sentence of proof ii suggested by HAKAMAYA (2001: 359f) would seem to be unnecessary in view of *SWTF* I 313a (*itaretara* = "dieses oder jenes", "irgendein", i.e., in the present case: one or the other of them, as opposed to all of them at the same time).

[209] [1.] In the 'Pravṛtti Portion', the continued arising or functioning (*'jug pa*, **pravṛtti*) of *ālayavijñā-na* is established from four points of view, the first of which is that *ālayavijñāna* arises-and-continues (*pravartate*, cf. § 239 with fn. 1313) by means of a twofold objective support (*ālambana*). In this text, the term '*pravṛttivijñāna*' also covers the (largely) continuous *manas*, the innate, subtle conception of a self or ego (YBh$_t$ P zi 6a5f [cf. fn. 113]: *res 'ga' ni 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa gcig kho na dang lhan cig tu 'jug ste | 'di lta ste yid dang ngo ||*).— [2.] The same holds good for the parallel treatment of the eight forms of mind in the SacBhVin. Here, too, *pra-√vṛt* is also used, though in a less conspicuous way, for the continued arising or functioning of *ālayavijñāna* (cf. YBh$_t$ P zi 189b5-7 [D zhi 182a6–b1; YBh$_c$ 651b24-27]), and here too the *manas* is included in the category of *pravṛttivijñāna* (YBh$_t$ P zi 189b2 [D zhi 182a3f; YBh$_c$ 651b15f; M2: 393f texts [211] and [212]]).

[210] Such a usage would also conflict with MATSUMOTO's understanding of *pravṛtti* as "occurring *on* [something]", since in this case, too, the label '*pravṛttivijñāna*' would be intended to *distinguish* the ordinary cognitive processes as occurring *on* the basis of *ālayavijñāna* from *ālayavijñāna* itself as their 'locus', while at the same time *pravṛtti* has the function of a key term designating the continuous arising of *ālayavijñāna* itself (in contrast to its cessation: *nivṛtti*).

inherited the term *pravṛttivijñāna* from an earlier source, and I fail to see any reason why this source should not be the *IP* or the exegetical and doctrinal reflections it mirrors, be it directly or by mediation of passages like # 5 of the SacAcBh of the MauBh, where the complementary concepts *ālaya-* and *pravṛttivijñāna* are used in a similar but wider systematic context.

44.4. Thus, in the *IP*, *pravṛttivijñāna* is, in the first place, *vijñāna* characterized by coming forth, by manifesting itself, i.e., the ordinary cognitive functions, as is perfectly clear from the context, without any explanation being required. By way of contrast, *ālayavijñāna* is *vijñāna* characterized by remaining 'stuck' and withdrawn or hidden in the sense faculties or in the body as its abode or lair, so to speak, i.e., the subconscious *vijñāna* that according to the sūtra must be present, or continue, even in *nirodhasamāpatti*. In my opinion, in the specific subject dealt with in the *IP*, viz., the problem that in *nirodhasamāpatti vijñāna* must not have departed from the body in spite of the cessation of all cognitive functions, the meaning of the expression *ālayavijñāna*, contrasted with the self-explanatory expression *pravṛttivijñāna* that precedes it, is obvious from the context and not in need of an additional explication; still less so if my suggestion (S 1987 # 2.12) that — in view of the fact that this context implies the thought pattern of latency and manifestation — the choice of the expressions *pravṛtti* and *ālaya* may even have been additionally inspired by the phraseology of Sāṅkhya, the leading philosophical system of the period, is tenable.

45. Thus, in my perspective, namely, that of a hypothesis taking the *IP* as mirroring, so to speak, the germination of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*,[211] the expression *ālayavijñāna* need not yet be terminological here. I rather take it to be used as a *characterization* of *vijñāna* in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti*, in contrast to the ordinary forms of mind (i.e., processes of sensory and cognitive awareness), which are explicitly stated by the questioner to have ceased in this state. If the expression is still merely *descriptive*, its use is, at this stage, hardly in need of justification, still less so since both of its components ('*ālaya*' and '*vijñāna*') are by no means alien to the language of the canon.[212] Moreover, since the introduction of the idea as such is more than justified by the sūtra on which the *IP* is based, Buescher's last argument, viz., that a fundamental new concept could not have been introduced without sūtra authority (§ 41.5), is hardly to the point. Likewise, the problem of aligning this form of *vijñāna* with the traditional pattern of six *vijñāna*s may not have posed itself from the outset, no more than it had, e.g., for Buddhadeva or other masters who had asserted the presence of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti*, for as was mentioned above, it seems to be only from Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi* onward that this *vijñāna* or *citta* is explicitly specified as a (subtle form of) *manovijñāna*.[213] As for *ālayavijñāna*, its advocates had no serious problem with subsuming it, if this was required, under traditional categories, e.g., by equating it with the *citta* of the

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211 One might even be tempted to take the sequence of words in the *IP* to mirror the historical development: sense faculties unimpaired (sūtra) → therein the Seeds of (conscious) cognitive states ('bi-polar *bīja*-model') → constituting a latent form of mind (*ālayavijñāna*). Such an assumption, entirely hypothetical though it is, would not only make sense as a didactic device but would also explain why the word *ālayavijñāna* is separated from the locative by the attribute °*bījaparigṛhīta*.

212 For the use of *allīyati* or *allīna* in the sense of "to stick to" see § 103 with fn. 540, for the nuance of "hiding in" or "lying hidden in" ibid. with fn. 539.

213 See fn. 191.

(originally quasi-synonymous) triad of *citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*.[214] As regards its relation to the traditional set of six *vijñāna*s, one possibility was to solve the problem by subsuming *ālayavijñāna* under *all* of them because it stores their Seeds.[215] Alternatively, one could take it to be included in *manovijñāna*.[216] Finally, one could, as Vasubandhu[217] does, simply declare the traditional set of six *vijñāna*s to be incomplete. To the objection that an express mention of *ālayavijñāna* is completely absent from the early canon, Vasubandhu replies that many words of the Buddha have been lost, or that *ālayavijñāna* was taught only implicitly.

46. My understanding of the expression *ālayavijñāna* and of the function of its designatum in the *IP* would also sufficiently explain why in this text *ālayavijñāna* is connected only with the Seeds of the 'forthcoming' forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*), i.e., of actual cognitions and perceptions. If we start from the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', the *IP* reflects this model only with reference to a special situation, viz., that of *nirodhasamāpatti*, where the continuity of mind is guaranteed only because the physical sense faculties (along with their seats) are furnished with the Seeds of mind (and mental factors), now transformed into a Seed-like, latent state of mind (see § 43). As for the Seeds of corporeal matter, the physical sense faculties (along with their seats) are, according to the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', furnished with them as well, but this is not relevant to the problem under discussion in the *IP*. Likewise, the normal situation outside *nirodhasamāpatti* or the specific situation during an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* are not under discussion either, nor in need of revision. Nothing prevents us from presupposing, for their explanation, the respective elements of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. Thus, Buescher's second objection (§ 41.2), viz., that my interpretation of the *IP* would mean that the superior 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' was replaced with an inferior or fragmentary one, or that the older integral structure was spoilt by introducing into it a disintegrated theoretical fragment (B: 62), is hardly to the point. His irritation with my characterization of *ālayavijñāna* in the *IP* as, on the one hand, hardly more than Seeds and, on the other, a special form of mind proper (§ 41.3) is understandable, but what I wanted to express is merely that the *IP*, on account of the sūtra passage to be explained, hypostatizes or 'upgrades' the Seeds of mind into a Seed-like, latent state or form of mind. I strongly doubt that we can expect the author to have felt a need to justify this step by explicitly meeting all the requirements of the Abhidharmic analysis of cognitive states and indicating, e.g., an objective support (*ālambana*) of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., of *vijñāna* in its latent phase. He may even have deliberately avoided such a commitment, for as pointed out in § 21, even some later sources are remarkably reticent in this regard.

47. Even so, it has to be admitted that by converting the Seeds of *vijñāna* in the physical sense faculties into a Seed-like, latent *vijñāna*, the *IP* creates a certain *imbalance* in the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. Though (according to my interpretation of the *IP*) the "*vijñāna* in the state

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[214] YBh_{Bh} 11,3-8 (*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna* as an analysis of *manas* in a comprehensive sense; cf. also YBh_{Bh} 65,1+3); Saṁdh V.3; MSg I.6 and 8.

[215] HsienY 505b21f: 問。阿賴耶識 於六識中 何識所攝。答。通六識所攝, 藏彼種故. That this may come close to the original idea of *ālayavijñāna* would seem to be supported by SamBh 206,10-14 (# 4.1.3.4.2), where it is stated that at the moment of entering into *nirodhasamāpatti* the mind ceases on account of having been kept away from its objective support (*ālambanasaṁniruddhaṁ cittaṁ nirudhyate*), which seems to preclude a cognitive act in this state.

[216] Thus Paramārtha, who in his *Hsien-shih lun* (顯識論, **Khyātivijñānaśāstra*?) classifies *ālaya-vijñāna* as a subtle kind of *manovijñāna* (T 31.1618: 879b3f).

[217] PSVy P chi 24b7–25a2 (MUROJI 1993: 37* and 188–190; cf. KSi_{Mu} 45,14ff).

of latency" is still conceived as dwelling or hiding in the physical sense faculties (or in the body: § 78.2.1) and very close to the Seeds it comprises or is furnished with, this shift, though slight, nonetheless implies a kind of hypostatization or 'upgrading' of the Seeds of mind, as a name for nothing but a causal capacity of the physical sense faculties (and their seats), to a latent form of mind as an entity in its own right — an entity which is itself Seed-like (as the latent cause of future cognitive functions) but may as well be conceived as being possessed of or studded with Seeds in the sense of various causal capacities (cf. §§ 80.3, 251). Theoretically, it would have been possible to restore the balance by adopting a similar 'upgrade' for the Seeds of matter continuing in the mind during an existence in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*), just as the Dārṣṭāntikas, etc. (§ 42), had posited not only a presence of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* but also a presence of matter in the *ārūpyadhātu*. Yet I do not remember having come across any traces of a hypostatization of the Seeds of corporeal matter in mind into some subtle state or form of matter anywhere in the YBh or other Yogācāra sources.[218] For the *IP*, the issue may, to be sure, simply have been outside the subject under discussion, but on closer reflection the dynamics of its innovative shift could not but unfold, and must have started to do so more or less immediately. The direction this unfolding took was clearly not that of a restoration of the old balance[219] but that of the development of a new model in which *ālayavijñāna*, fused with the Seed-continuum (*bījasantāna*) in the mind,[220] or the latter's latent layer, and taking over the function and the name of the 'All-Seed Mind'[221] (*sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam*), came to play a central, fundamental role. But I shall come back to this later (§ 89). In any case, I find it misleading to characterize the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* in the *IP* as I understand it as a "philosophical failure" (§ 41.2). I rather regard it as the momentous starting point of an innovative theory that became part and parcel of a new paradigm. In contrast to Buescher, I have no problem with taking this theory to have started from a seed-like new idea and to have evolved in steps, instead of having popped up all of a sudden in its full-fledged form, like an *aupapāduka* heavenly being.

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[218] According to VinSg_{ms} 17b6 (≈ YBh_{t} P zi 41b8f; D zhi 39b3-5; YBh_{c} 594a12-15; cf. also VinSg_{ms} 21b7(f) ≈ YBh_{c} 597c10f [YBh_{t} P zi 52a7 = D zhi 49b3f refers only to the *rūpadhātu*]), the rejection of the presence of matter in the *ārūpyadhātu* refers only to its arising under the influence of karma (*karmādhipateyani⟨r⟩vṛttitām upādāya*), but not to subtle (*sūkṣma*) matter produced through mastery of meditative concentration (*no tu samāpattivaśitām upādāya*). This, however, would seem to be a different issue.

[219] One reason would seem to be that in the Mūlasarvāstivāda canon there was no sufficiently strong statement to this effect, like the one adduced by the Dārṣṭāntikas, etc. (see fn. 188), to overthrow the inherited position that that there is no *rūpa* in the *ārūpyadhātu* (cf., e.g., YBh_{Bh} 77,7). Moreover, a hypostatization of the Seeds of matter in the mind to a form of matter "lying hidden in the mind" would seem to involve serious conceptual problems. Cf. also fn. 522.

[220] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 61,8f: *sarvatra vijñānasantāne sarvo bījasantānaḥ sahacaro vyavasthāpyate*. The word *sahacaro* is illegible in the ms. copies at my disposal, but cf. Tib. *lhan cig rgyu bar* and Ch. 具行.

[221] I use this rendering in order to leave the precise relation of the *vijñāna* to the notion of Seed(s) (*bīja*) undetermined for the time being, i.e., my rendering is intended to be open to be understood as "mind containing all Seeds", as "mind consisting of all Seeds", or "Mind that is, or functions as, all Seeds (or as the Seed of all dharmas, or at least all dharmas under consideration)". The term will be discussed in detail in ch. 4.2.6.

3.3. Critique of Buescher's Interpretation of the *Initial Passage*

48. The main argument Buescher produces against my interpretation of the *IP* (see § 25) and for its being a rather late interpolation is concerned with

1. the expression '*rūpiṣv indriyeṣv apariṇateṣu*'. According to Buescher (B: 66), three aspects need to be clarified:
   (i) the interpretation of the expression '*rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*',[222] which I shall, for the sake of neutrality, for the time being simply render as "sense faculties" or "the five sense faculties" (see ch. 3.3.1.1),
   (ii) the interpretation of '*apariṇata*' (see ch. 3.3.2), and
   (iii) the interpretation of the locative case (see ch. 3.3.3).

In addition, according to Buescher

2. the attribute '*pravṛttivijñānabījaparigṛhīta*' excludes the possibility of conceiving of *ālayavijñāna* as "sticking in" the sense faculties and implies its ongoing flow before and after *nirodhasamāpatti* (B: 71–73 [## 34–36]; see ch. 3.3.4),
3. the expression '*anuparata*' is meant to express that "the latent potentiality of *ālaya-vijñāna* is not one that is statically present, but one that continues to flow in time", including the time before and after *nirodhasamāpatti* (B: 73 [# 37]; see ch. 3.3.5), and
4. the phrase '*āyatyām tadutpattidharmatāyai*' shows that the main purpose of the *IP* is not to teach the presence of *vijñāna* during *nirodhasamāpatti* in order to establish its difference from death but is rather "geared to the framework of the *ālayavijñāna–pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness" (B: 75,35f) in the sense of Vijñānavāda ontology (B: 74–76 [## 38–42]; see ch. 3.3.6).

3.3.1. The Five Sense Faculties (*rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*)

3.3.1.1. The Problem of the Materiality of the Sense Faculties

49. In connection with the interpretation of the concept of the expression '*rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*', Buescher (B: 67) charges me with assuming their materiality without adducing a single reference to substantiate this assumption. Sorry, but I did not expect anybody to call into question the fact that the Buddhist Abhidharma masters regarded the five sense faculties as material.[223] After all, in the Abhidharmic traditions familiar to me (and we are not concerned

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[222] The uncompounded form is more frequent, but the compound *rūpīndriyāṇi* is also occasionally met with, e.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 54,9 (= ms.), VinSg$_{ms}$ 23b8 (*rūpīndriyāṇi srotodvayavarttīni veditavyāni*), or PrasP 469,15 (see fn. 348), where the mss. are stated to hesitate between *rūpīndriya* and *rūpendriya*.

[223] The situation may have been different in the early canonical period (cf. HAMILTON 1996: 8; 14–20). It may well have been only in the context of Abhidharmic systematization that the sense faculties proper came to be neatly distinguished from their perceptible seats and that the question of how they were to be conceived in terms of 'material' (*rūpin*) and 'immaterial' (*arūpin*) was raised. The absence of the senses in the list of parts of the body enumerated in a couple of sermons is hardly related to this issue, for the original context of these enumerations would seem to be the contemplative dissection of the body (*kāya*) into mostly disgusting components for the sake of detachment, and in this context it

here with the Nikāya/Āgama period) the sense faculties are, in contrast to the *mana-indriya* and other mental faculties, expressly subsumed under *rūpa* or categorized as *rūpin*,[224] i.e., possessing *rūpa* (or, if we presuppose a more precise use of the suffix *-in*: possessing a *rūpa* peculiar to them).[225] In addition, they are classified as derivative matter (*upādāya-rūpa*) and defined as '*rūpaprasāda*',[226] a compound circumscribed by Vasubandhu as "pellucid entities having *rūpa* as their nature" (*rūpātmakāḥ prasādāḥ*)[227] and explicitly resolved by Yaśomitra as a karmadhāraya compound,[228] hence unambiguously understood as denoting a particular, pellucid form of *rūpa*.[229] Nor did I envisage the possibility that anyone might contest the equation of *rūpa*, in an Abhidharmic context,[230] with *matter*, as opposed to mind (*citta*) and

would not be unnatural that not only the sense faculties as mere capacities but even the (potentially attractive) visible sense organs are disregarded, just as the genitalia and the secondary sex characteristics.

224 For early Yogācāra, see, e.g., YBh_{Bh} 4,8: *tatra cakṣū rūpī* (sc. *āśrayaḥ cakṣurvijñānasya*); 54,4-6; $VinSg_{ms}$ 17a2 (YBh_t P zi 40a2f): *cakṣus*, etc., belong to the *skandha rūpa*; 17a3 (YBh_t P zi 40a5): *rūpitvāt pañcānām indriyāṇām*; HsienY 483a29; c9-12 (*cakṣus*, etc., subsumed under the *skandha rūpa*. Other Abhidharma traditions: [1.] Theravāda: Vibh 2,13f and 3,1f (cf. KARUNADASA ²1989: 38f); 14,28. [2.] Dharmaguptakas: ŚA 543a13f: five sense faculties subsumed under the **rūpa-dharmas*; 543a27: five sense faculties subsumed under *anidarśanaṁ sapratighaṁ rūpam*. [3.] Sarvāstivāda: $Prak_H$ 696b17: ten *āyatanas* (comprising, of course, the five sense faculties) are *rūpin*; 766a9: ten *dhātus*, ten *āyatanas* and one *skandha* are exclusively *rūpin*; AKBh 5,20-22. — Cf. also KRITZER 2000: 239: "*indriyas*, of course, consist of *rūpa*", and especially the detailed criticism of Buescher's views on the physical sense faculties in BAYER 2010: 390f.

225 Cf. THIEME 1995: 1074 + 1080 n. 1.

226 E.g., YBh_{Bh} 4,9f, 6,7f, etc.; 207,6f and 10; $VinSg_{ms}$ 21a2f; HsienY 483c9f; AS_t P li 53a5-8 (AS 3,18-23 [reconstr.]). Cf. also Vibh 70,28f: *cakkhāyatana = yaṁ cakkhuṁ catunnaṁ mahābhūtānaṁ upādāya pasādo attabhāvapariyāpanno* ... (the use of *pasāda* instead of *rūpaprasāda* as in the other traditions does not of course exclude its referring to a variety of *rūpa*); ŚA 525c12f: 若眼我分攝 ... 四大所造淨色, 是名眼入; DhSk quoted AKBh 114,14f: *cakṣurdhātuḥ katamaḥ | catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya yo rūpaprasādaḥ* ... (cf. $DhSk_c$ 502c19 + 498c5f; cf. KRITZER 2000: 239 with n. 16). Cf. also A. SAITO 2011: 1–20. A similar definition of the sense faculties is also found in the *Saṁyuktāgama* of the (Sarvāstivāda and?) Mūlasarvāstivāda canon: $SĀ_c$ no. 322, with quotations in AKBh, AKVy and AKṬU and fragments from Bamian and Turfan (see ENOMOTO 1989a, esp. 15f). But there is no corresponding sermon in the Pāli *Nikāyas*.

227 AKBh 6,1f, quoted by Buescher himself (B: 69 n. 2); see also AKṬT P to 48b2 (*gzugs kyi rang bzhin can*).

228 AKVy 24,3: *rūpāṇi ca tāni prasādāś ca ta iti rūpaprasādāḥ*; cf. BAYER 2010: 391. — For *prasāda* used in the *Carakasaṁhitā* in the sense of "pure matter" or "pure [body tissues]" in contrast to impure [waste products] (*mala*) see MAAS 2008: 135f.

229 Cf., in this connection, also the expression *indriyarūpa* (TrBh *8,5 [L. 19,8]), i.e., "the matter (*rūpa*) [constituting] the (subtle) sense faculties", distinguished from its gross support (*adhiṣṭhāna*), i.e., the visible organs or the body (TrṬ P ku 17b6 [D hi 15a7]: *gnas dang bcas pa zhes bya ba la gnas ni lus la bya'o*).

230 Cf. KARUNADASA ²1989: 11f. For the meaning of *rūpa* (as denoting the first of the five *khandhas*) in the *Nikāyas* /*Āgamas*, see VETTER 2000: 20–22; cf. also HAMILTON 1996: 14 ("body", more precisely: the living body of a human being). Concerning the meanings of *rūpa* in different contexts as distinguished by the Theravāda commentators, see KARUNADASA, op. cit.: 1–11; for the Sanskrit tradition: VyY 16f. As regards the inappropriateness of the habitual rendering "form", see SEYFORT RUEGG 1998: 137.

mind-like factors (*caitta*). To be sure, the Indian Buddhists' emic notion of matter, or attribution of materiality, may not always be identical with our modern view (provided that the latter is homogeneous), but in order to understand the Buddhist arguments we have to presuppose *their* concept of matter, and not our own.[231]

50. Buescher, however, has his own idea about the meaning of *rūpaprasāda*, and he charges me (B: 68 n. 2) with ignoring the fact that a number of scholars translate it as "sensitivity".[232] But all the scholars he quotes insist on materiality: "*matière* sensible", "sensitive *material* phenomenon", "*physische* Sensitivität", etc.[233] Apart from this, my

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[231] [**1**.] From a modern perspective, Shinkan Murakami's (2011) contention that "*rūpa* is not matter" is not unjustified, for he expressly presupposes a modern scientific concept of matter according to which "matter is permanent" and "not always perceptible" (ibid. 1373,12-14; cf. 858,26f; 856,23-26; 855,15-17), whereas the original Buddhist concept of *rūpa* means what is "perceptible and recognizable" (ibid. 1373; cf. 851,24f) and implies impermanence. But aren't mental phenomena, too, recognizable? Perhaps, to be sure, not for other (ordinary) persons, intersubjectively. Even so, why can't we use, in an approximative way, our everyday concept of matter, which in the first place refers to the perceptible and often enough impermanent material, physical, corporeal things of everyday life, including one's body as well as external things, in contrast to mental or psychic phenomena or abstract notions? [**2**.] It is indisputable that in the canonical texts *rūpa* is often used in the sense of a person's figure or outward appearance, especially a sexually attractive, beautiful appearance (cf. VETTER 2000: 20f), and that in the scheme of the 12 *āyatana*s and 18 *dhātu*s it is used in the specific sense of "visible objects". Even in the scheme of the five *skandha*s, *rūpa* would seem to mean, in the first place, the body as it appears or is experienced, but since the other four *skandha*s consist in mental phenomena, *rūpa* tends to comprise the physical aspects of a person as a whole (SN 22.56–57: VETTER 2000: 21f). [**3**.] As Murakami (2011: 855–853) rightly points out, in MN no. 28 (VETTER 2000: 111–115) *rūpa* has come to be understood to comprise, in the first place (i.e., apart from derivative matter, which is, however, not specified in the text), the four primary 'elements' (*mahābhūta*), both in the body and in the external world. I agree with Murakami (855,14f, etc.) in that the four 'elements' or constituents as they occur in the body (and likewise as they occur in the external world) are described, in this text, as perceptible (mainly visible) phenomena, or at any rate as manifesting their presence through perceptible effects (the constituent *tejas* in the body is, strictly speaking, not described *as* the function of heating the body and digesting food but as that *by which* these functions take place: *yena ca saṁtappati .... yena ca ... pariṇāmaṁ gacchati* [MN I 188,7f]). But I think there is sufficient similarity to justify, for this concept of *rūpa*, the rendering "matter" (as used in everyday speech). Cf. also the occasional replacement of *rūpin* with *mūrta* (see § 51.2.2 with fn. 251 and § 53.2 with fn. 282). [**4**.] Moreover, in the Abhidharmic notion of *rūpa*, which is the one I am primarily concerned with, perceptibility is no longer a pervasive characteristic: neither the physical sense faculties nor the atoms are perceptible, nor is, for us, the body of a being in the intermediate existence, not to mention specific forms of *rūpa* like *avijñapti* (see § 57.2.2) of the Sarvāstivādins or the element water (*āpodhātu*) of Theravāda Abhidhamma (KARUNADĀSA [2]1989: 30,4f).

[232] Accordingly, in his translation of the PSk, Buescher (2010: 342) translates *rūpaprasāda* as "[nervous] sensitivity of organic matter".

[233] Similarly HAMILTON 1996: 21, but her proposal "sensitive surface" also suggests a physical component. Actually, in the passage on which she bases her interpretation (Asl 312,3-7 = VisM XIV.37) the sense faculties (*cakkhu*, etc.) — listed as instances of *upādāyarūpa*, in contrast to *bhūtarūpa* = elementary matter — are defined not as "sentience" or "sentience for phenomena" but as *bhūtappasāda*, which literally means "pellucidity of the elements" (cf. VisM-mhṭ [Rew.] II 967,26: *catunnaṁ bhūtānaṁ pasādo*; 968,19f: *evaṁvidhānaṁ (*sc. ...°*kammasamuṭṭhānānaṁ) bhūtānaṁ pasādo*), and are stated to have precisely these elements themselves (that have arisen from a special kamma) as their basis (/proximate cause) (°*kammajabhūtapadaṭṭhānaṁ (*sc. *cakkhu)*, mistranslated as

rendering of *rūpaprasāda* as "pellucid matter" is by no means idiosyncratic but in basic agreement with the understanding of many other scholars like Louis de La Vallée Poussin ("matière subtile": AKBh$_{LVP}$ I: 15; LO.SA. IV 2757a: "pellucid/subtle material elements"), Erich Frauwallner (1956b: 112 = 2010a: 70: "feine Materie"), Tom Tillemans (1990 I: 150: "subtle matter"), Karin Preisendanz (1994: II 444,19: "feine und transparente Materie"), Collett Cox (1995: 229: "subtle form"), etc.[234] Actually, "sensitivity" is an attempt to express an essential *property* of *rūpaprasāda* in the case of the sense faculties, but it does not work when *rūpaprasāda* is used to qualify objects (see § 52), nor does it correspond to the *semantic* possibilities of the word *prasāda*, which definitely means "clarity", "clearness".[235]

51.1. Buescher (B: 69,5ff) concedes that my interpretation of *rūpaprasāda* as pellucid matter would perhaps "have been suitable with regard to the Vaibhāṣika understanding of this notion". But in his opinion "it does hardly reflect the manner of how the term was understood by the Sautrāntikas". In support, he quotes a passage from Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (AKVy) as contrasting the Vaibhāṣika understanding with that of the Sautrāntikas[236]. In connection with explaining the function of the element *prasāda* in the definition of the sense faculties, Yaśomitra states, according to Wogihara's edition (punctuation mine):

Vaibhāṣikā hi bruvate: bhūtavikāraviśeṣā evêndriyāṇîti. pravacane tu naîvaṁ. kiṁ tarhi rūpādiviṣayavyatiriktāni acchāni atīndriyāṇi svavijñānānumeyāni indriyāṇi, yeṣāṁ cakṣurādīni adhiṣṭhānāni dṛśyante.[237]

This would mean that according to the Vaibhāṣikas the sense faculties are just particular modifications of the [primary] elements (*bhūta*: earth, etc.), but that in the Buddha's teaching (*pravacana*) this is not so. Rather, the sense faculties are distinct from the sense-objects, transparent, inaccessible to sense[-perception],[238] only to be inferred from their own *vijñāna* (i.e., from the sensory perception generated by each of them, respectively),[239] and it is only their seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*), the [fleshly] eye, etc., that are seen [by us]. From this, Buescher (B: 70,7ff) concludes that, in contrast to the Vaibhāṣikas, for the Sautrāntikas (represented by Yaśomitra) and likewise for the early Yogācāras *rūpaprasāda* was understood to denote not a particular form of organic matter itself but rather a sensitive *capacity of* organic matter.

51.2.0. I must confess that I have some problems with the AKVy passage and with the conclusion Buescher draws from it.

"it has the *being produced* by action ... as proximate cause", but cf. VisM-mhṭ [Rew.] II 969,8f: *yesaṁ bhūtānaṁ pasādo te v'assa āsannakāraṇaṁ*).

[234] Nor do the current Tibetan and Chinese equivalents (*gzugs dang ba*, 淨色) justify any suspicion.

[235] Cf. KARUNADASA [2]1989: 44f, who, though also using "body-sensibility" for *kāya-prasāda*, nevertheless makes clear that the literal meaning of *p(r)asāda* is "clearness" and that what is meant is that the sense-organs consist of a very subtle and delicate matter; cf., e.g., 45,16: "Since the sense-organs are conceived as a species of extremely subtle matter, ...".

[236] For the use of this name in the AKBh see fn. 162.

[237] AKVy 24,12-14; B: 69.

[238] Thus also VinSg$_{ms}$ 21a8 (YBh$_t$ P zi 51a5; YBh$_c$ 597a28f): *cakṣurādīni tu paṁcaîkena manovijñānena* (sc., *vijñeyāni*). For Theravāda Abhidhamma, cf. KARUNADASA [2]1989: 44f.

[239] Cf. AKBh 461,7-11.

51.2.1. My first problem is that the opinion ascribed to the Vaibhāṣikas is contrasted here with *pravacana*, i.e., the Buddhist teaching,[240] and hence implicitly characterized as non-Buddhist. What is more, the ascription is, after all, unjustified, for the Vaibhāṣikas' own definition and understanding of the sense faculties does *not* agree with the one ascribed to them in the above-quoted passage. On the contrary, in the *Vibhāṣā* as well as in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) and in Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāra* (or *°sāriṇī*) (NA) the view that the various types of derivative matter (*upādāya-rūpa*), and hence also the five sense faculties, are just specific formations of the four primary elements (*mahābhūta*) is ascribed to the (fairly 'unorthodox') master Buddhadeva or to the Dārṣṭāntikas, and is *rejected*.[241] It is also advocated in Harivarman's *Ch'eng-shih lun* (成實論),[242] a text often upholding positions close to those of the Dārṣṭāntikas.[243] As against this, the Vaibhāṣikas' own understanding of the nature of the physical sense faculties is essentially the same as that of the canonical Abhidharma treatises of the Sarvāstivāda school[244] and does not show any essential difference from Yaśomitra's,[245] which is merely more explicit with regard to the imperceptibility of the sense faculties. It is hard to imagine that Yaśomitra was not aware of this fact. There is indeed another solution for the problem, one that also explains the disturbing fact that by contrasting the discarded theory with the *pravacana*, Yaśomitra virtually characterizes it as non-Buddhist. Actually, the view that the senses are specific transformations (*vikāra*) of the primary elements is the doctrine of the Brahmanical Vaiśeṣika-system.[246] This arouses the suspicion that the reading *Vaibhāṣikāḥ* in Wogihara's edition is a corruption of *Vaiśeṣikāḥ* — a suspicion that is corroborated by the fact that the Tibetan translation of this passage (P cu 24a8) has in fact *Bye brag pa dag*, which corresponds to *Vaiśeṣikāḥ*[247], not to *Vaibhāṣikāḥ* (which would require *Bye brag tu smra ba dag*)[248].

51.2.2. My second problem is with Buescher's conclusion, irrespective of the question to whom the view he criticizes should be ascribed. Does the fact that Yaśomitra distinguishes the *indriya*s, as *rūpaprasāda*, from the primary elements as well as from the perceptible sense

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[240] Cf. *BHSD* s.v.; AKBh 61,18 (rendered as 正法 by Paramārtha and as 契經 by Hsüan-tsang: see *AKBh-I* pt. 1: 257); 478,14 (*buddhānām pravacanadharmatā*); $BoBh_D$ 58,23 (*bauddha-pravacana-*, $BoBh_W$ 83,2: *buddha-°*); ADīVṛ 89,1 (*iha pravacane*, contrasted with the doctrine of *tīrthika*s) and 257,1 (*iha pravacane*, referring to four Buddhist currents, though three of them are then stated to maintain wrong positions).

[241] Vi 661c16ff, esp. c18f and 25-27; cf. 730b25ff; AKBh 24,1ff (EJ. 37,1ff); NA 356b21ff. Cf. KARUNADASA [2]1989: 34; KRITZER 2003a: 205 with n. 7.

[242] CSL 265b23ff. Cf. KATSURA 1974: 114–118.

[243] Cf. KRITZER 2003a: 209.

[244] Cf. Vi 358b5-11 and Vi_2 265b21-24, quoting the definition of *cakṣurindriya* from the *Dharmaskandha* (and, in the case of Vi, also that of the *Prakaraṇa*) as authoritative. In the *Dharmaskandha* (see fn. 226), the physical sense faculties are expressly defined as *rūpaprasāda* and as derivative (*mahābhūtāny upādāya*).

[245] The qualification of the sense faculties as pellucid (*accha*) corresponds to their being *prasāda*, which in the context of the passage means *rūpaprasāda*, and the rejection that they are modifications (*vikāra*) of the primary elements is in accordance with their being derivative matter (*upādāyarūpa*).

[246] FRAUWALLNER 1956a: 49; 201–203; KARUNADASA [2]1989: 47; PREISENDANZ 1994: esp. 758.

[247] MVy no. 3518 (MVy[ISH] no. 3516).

[248] MVy no. 5148 (MVy[ISH] no. 5145); *AKBh-I* pt. 3: 184a.

organs indeed imply that they are mere *capacities* of organic matter, in the sense that they were not regarded, by the Buddhist thinkers themselves, as *consisting of* a subtle form of matter? Is Buescher's 'etic' perspective identical with the 'emic' perspective of the Buddhist masters? I have serious doubts.[249] The passage from the AKVy itself does not even confirm the facet of sensitivity but, on the contrary, confirms the meaning "pellucidity" for '*prasāda*' in that the sense faculties are characterized as "transparent" (*accha*), and their imperceptibility is easily understood as a consequence of this transparence and subtlety. This is confirmed by a passage of the AKBh according to which the sense faculties are neither the subject nor the object of acts of cutting or burning, nor do they have weight, because they are pellucid, like the lustre of a jewel.[250] Yaśomitra in his commentary on this passage adds that the issue of cutting, etc., is not discussed with regard to those of the 18 *dhātu*s that are incorporeal (*amūrta*, i.e., immaterial) since in their case cutting, etc., is out of the question just because of their incorporeality[251] — a statement which implies that the sense faculties, in the case of which a special argument had been considered necessary, are *mūrta*, lit. "coagulated", i.e., solid, corporeal, having shape.[252] I shall come back to this issue later (§§ 54–55).

52. As for the term '*rūpaprasāda*', it may be worth adducing some explanatory material from Yogācāra-affiliated texts. An interesting elucidation of the concept of *rūpaprasāda* is found in Sthiramati's and *Pṛthivībandhu's (/[Pseudo-]*Vasubandhu's) commentaries on Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka* in connection with the definition of the five sense faculties as "pellucid matter that has colour (etc.) as its object" (*varṇaviṣayo rūpaprasādaḥ*, etc.).[253] According to Sthiramati,[254] '*prasāda*' means that just as in a clear mirror or in a vessel filled with (clear) water there emerges, due to the presence of a face, a reflection that looks like the face, in the sense faculties whose nature is *rūpaprasāda* representations appearing as objects (*tatpratibhāsā vijñaptayaḥ*) emerge due to the presence of the respective objects (viz., something visible, etc.). *Pṛthivībandhu's explanation[255] agrees with Sthiramati's but is specified with regard to each sense faculty. Both authors emphasize that *rūpaprasāda* alone would not suffice as a definiens of the sense faculties because it would include translucent material *objects* (*viṣayaprasāda*, *viṣayarūpātmakaḥ prasādaḥ*), like a mirror, a crystal or

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[249] Cf. also A. Bayer's (2010: 391f) critical remarks on Buescher's interpretation of the passage.

[250] AKBh 24,18–25,5 (EJ. 38,12–39,12), esp. 24,23 and 25,2: *maṇiprabhāvad acchatvāt*. The lustre of a jewel, as a form of light, must fall under the visibles (*rūpa*), which include light (*āloka*: AKBh 6,9-12).

[251] AKVy 69,5f: *amūrtānāṁ tu dhātūnāṁ amūrtatvād eva chedādyasaṁbhava iti teṣāṁ chedādi na cintyate*. Cf. also ADī 15,10 (vs. 17b), 24,12 (vs. 35c) and 26,4 (vs. 38c), where *(a)mūrttāḥ* seems to be employed m.c. instead of *(a)rūpiṇaḥ*. Similarly BCA IX.97a: *vijñānasya tv amūrtasya*. Cf. perhaps also ASBh 22,9f, where the use of *rūpin* in the sense of "filling space" (*deśavyāptitaḥ*) is explained as "pervading the regions with [its] body (Ch: with the size of its figure/body)" ($ASBh_t$ P shi 21a8: *phyogs rnams su lus kyis rgyas pa'i phyir ro*; $ASBh_c$ 706a12: 形量遍十方故), for which the ed. has *dikṣu pratyāsparaṇāt*; but I read the ms. as *dikṣu mūtyāsparaṇāt*, suggesting an emendation to *dikṣu mūrtyā spharaṇāt*.

[252] Cf. *PW* s.v.: "1) zusammengeronnen, ... geronnen ... 2) festgeworden, gestaltet, körperhaft ...".

[253] PSk 2,6-10 (## 1.2.1–5).

[254] PSkV ms. 6a5f ($PSkV_t$ P hi 6a6f). Cf. also AKṬT to 48b4f.

[255] PSkBh P hi 107a4f, etc.

(clear) water.[256] Still less so would *prasāda* alone be sufficient because it would include faith (*śraddhā*) defined as mental clarity.[257]

53.0. In a later section (B: 84ff: Ex. 16), Buescher tries to substantiate his contention that the five sense faculties (*rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*) are to be understood as "biophysical capacities" (B: 84,30f) or "bio-molecular controlling forces" (B: 86,35), which he obviously takes to imply that they are not material in a sense that would allow the *ālayavijñāna*, or anything else, to "stick in" them (B: 70,15-17, etc.) and that therefore the locative in the *IP* cannot be interpreted as an ordinary one (B: 71,16-18; cf. 84,19ff).

53.1.1. Buescher (B: 85f) starts from the traditional Buddhist derivation of '*rūpa*'[258] from *ruppati* (Skt. *rūpyate*), found already in the canon[259] and appearing in systematic treatises in the nominalized form *rūpaṇa* (n.) or *rūpaṇā*.[260] According to Buescher, this means that *rūpa* has this name "because it is disrupting" (B: 85,1f). For this understanding, he bases himself on the explanation of *rūpaṇā* as *bādhanā* (B: 85,9: "disintegrating"), which in its turn is explained as being subject to deterioration (*vipariṇāma*).[261]

53.1.2. Actually, the primary meaning of *bādhyate* and hence of *ruppati* (*/rūpyate*) taken in this sense is rather "is harassed, vexed, hurt, harmed", "suffers pain", as in the verse from the *Arthavargīyāni*[262] quoted in support by Vasubandhu.[263] This meaning fits in quite well as long as *rūpa* is, in the context of the five *skandhas*, restricted to the body as the physical constituent of a sentient being.[264] A reinterpretation in terms of (unfavourable) modification

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256 PSkV ms. 6a6–b2 (PSkV$_t$ P hi 6a7–b1); AKṬT P to 49b7 (*skye mched kyi gzugs dang ba*, i.e., pellucid matter belonging to *rūpa* as an *āyatana*, i.e., to visibles (**āyatanarūpaprasāda*)); PSkBh hi 107b4-6 (*... me long dang shel dang chu la sogs pa yang gzugs dang ba yang yin pas ...*). Cf., in this connection, also the transparency of matter in the world-sphere of [pure] corporeality (see fn. 305).

257 PSkV ms. 6b3-5 (PSkV$_t$ P hi 6b2f); PSkBh P hi 107a6–b1 (D si 37a5-7; at the end, we should probably read *mig gi dbang po ni gzugs kyi rang bzhin yang yin {no |}| dang ba'i rang bzhin yang yin pas so ||*; P seems to be corrupt here). Cf. also AKṬT P to 49b7f.

258 Somewhat disconcertingly, in Buescher's discussion of the meaning of *rūpa* its Abhidharmic use in the comprehensive sense of "matter" is mixed up with its use in the more specific sense of "visibles", i.e., objects of the sense of *sight*, also expressly distinguished by the Buddhist exegetes themselves: cf. VyY 17,1-3.

259 SN III 86,23-28 (no. 22.79); SĀ$_c$ 11b26-29 (no. 46), quoted AKBh 9,10-12 (EJ. 13,19f).

260 Vibh-a 3: *ruppanaṭṭhena rūpaṁ*; AKBh 9,10 (EJ. 13,17f): *kasmāt ... rūpaskandha ity ucyate? rūpaṇāt*; 10,5: *rūpaṇād rūpaṁ* (so with AKVy 36,9 and EJ. 15,13f); 108,9: *rūpaṇālakṣaṇaṁ rūpam*; AS 2,10 (reconstr.; AS$_{Li}$ 244,1: *kiṁlakṣaṇo rūpaskandhaḥ | rūpaṇālakṣaṇaḥ*); ASBh 62,8 (cf. BAYER 2010: 129 with 303 n. 13). Cf. KARUNADASA ²1989: 9–14. Cf. also CSL 261b7.

261 Buescher (85,7-10) refers to Yaśomitra (AKVy 34,14), but actually the explanation goes back to AKBh 9,12+15. Cf. also ASBh 2,10: *sparśena rūpaṇā anyathībhāvo veditavyaḥ* (e.c.; ed. *rūpāṇām anya°*; ms. *rūpāṇā anya°*; ASBh$_t$ P śi 3a5 = D li 2b5 *reg pas gzugs su yod pas* [DP : read *pa*? or < *°ṇayânya°/°ṇād anya°*?] *ni gzhan du 'gyur bar rig par bya'o*).

262 Cf. Sn 767, corresponding to T 4.198 (*Arthavargīyasūtra*) 175c18f; for parallels, see ENOMOTO 1989b: 35.

263 AKBh 9,13f (EJ. 14,2f) and PSVy P 28a2f (D 25a1f). For the meaning of *rūpyate/ruppati*, cf. K.R. Norman's (1992: 90) transl. of Sn 767 ("is hurt"). Cf. also VETTER 2000: 20; LÜDERS 1954: 33f (# 29): Pā. *ruppati* = "Schmerz empfinden" (< ved. *rūpyate* "Reißen in Leibe haben", i.e., to have colic).

264 Cf. AKVy 34,15 (*śalyaviddhaḥ kāmayānaś ca duḥkhavedayitṛtvād bādhyata iti yuktam*).

(*vipariṇāma*, AKVy: *vikriyā*), i.e., deformation, deterioration or even destruction,[265] becomes necessary only when the body is analytically dissociated from the sentient being as a whole and taken as mere matter, and when external material things come to be included.[266]

53.1.3. What is more important in the present context is, however, that the *factors by which*, in the canon as well as in later sources, pain/harm or deterioration is caused are passed over in silence by Buescher. As the sources put it, *rūpa* may be harmed by cold and heat, hunger and thirst, contact with gnats, mosquitos, wind, burning sun, and (dangerous) reptiles, to which the Sanskrit version adds (at the beginning): contact or collision (*saṁsparśa*) with a hand, a stone or clod (*loṣṭa*), a staff, a knife.[267] If the definition of being subject to injury or deformation/deterioration through contact with such factors is understood to be, some way or another,[268] valid for all kinds of *rūpa*, including the five sense faculties, as is indeed expressly affirmed or tacitly presupposed in pertinent sources,[269] this would surely support the assumption that the five sense faculties are, according to the Buddhist thinkers, sufficiently similar to the other material factors to be called 'material' as well.

53.1.4. Actually, the five sense faculties may not only undergo deterioration (*vipari-ṇāma*)[270] but are even expressly stated to be, against Buescher (B: 95,23: "the *indriya*s cannot putrefy"), subject to *putrefaction* when abandoned, i.e., no longer (biologically) 'appropriated' (see ch. 4.2.5.5), by *vijñāna*,[271] just like the physical basis, or corporeal matter, in

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[265] Cf. VETTER 2000: 57 n. 116 ("dissolution").

[266] Cf. AKBh 9,15 (EJ. 14,4) with AKVy 34,15-17; PSVy P 28a3f (D 25a2) with PSVyṬ P 165b1f (D 137b3): *'byung ba dang 'byung ba las gyur pa la cis gnod ce na zhes bya ba ni sems pa med pa la sdug bsngal gyi tshor ba med pa'i phyir ro zhes bsam pa'o ‖ de'i phyir lag pa'i 'dus te reg pa la sogs pas gzhan du 'gyur bar byas pa'o zhes smras pa'o* ||.

[267] VETTER 2000: 20 with n. 22. Cf. AS_t P li 52a3f (AS 2,11f [reconstr.]; original now in AS_{Li} 244,2-4); YBh_{Bh} 68,6-8 + 3f; $BoBh_D$ 167,19 + 17; YBh_t P zi 212b6f ≈ YBh_c 660c16-18.

[268] I admit that more precise information on this point would be welcome, especially in view of the fact that certain kinds of damage, like being cut or burnt, are expressly excluded in the case of the sense faculties (see § 51.2.2 with fn. 250). On the other hand, they are stated to collapse in the absence of nutrition (see fn. 310). The mere fact that they are affected by damage done to their respective seats would no doubt be explicable also on the assumption that they are mere capacities.

[269] *Rūpaṇā* as the *sāmānyalakṣaṇa* of all *rūpa*: $VinSg_{ms}$ 17b3 and 21b5 (YBh_t P zi 41a8 and 52a1f; YBh_c 593c28 and 597b27f; cf. also $VinSg_{ms}$ 17a2 [YBh_t P zi 40a3]: *sarvaṁ ca* [sc. *rūpaṁ*] *rūpaṇālakṣaṇam*) and YBh_t P zi 212b5 + b6-8 (YBh_c 660c12 + c16-19). In the latter passage, allowance is made for certain exceptions, which do not, however, concern the sense faculties but only the heavenly world and the *rūpadhātu*. Cf. also ASBh 2,10f, stating that the AS's second characteristic of *rūpa*, viz., admitting of localization (*deśanirūpaṇā*, cf. MVy no. 7547), also holds good for images visualized in meditation (which would not be *rūpa* in the sense of being subject to harassment or deformation).

[270] YBh_{Bh} 211,6: *rūpīndriyavipariṇāmo*. Being subject to deterioration alone is, admittedly, not enough to prove the materiality of the sense faculties since, as the immediately preceding phrase (YBh_{Bh} 211,5f: *arūpīndriyavipariṇāmo*) confirms, the immaterial faculties (e.g., the faculty of thought) may undergo deterioration as well. According to ASBh 22,16 (cf. also 23,1f), all the five *skandha*s can be harmed or disturbed by contact with a hand, etc., or by grief, etc., respectively, the former alternative clearly referring to material entities, the latter to psychic factors.

[271] $MSgBh_t$ P li 160a2 (D ri 135b3f; ad MSg I.35): *mig la sogs pa rnams rul bar 'gyur ro* ≈ $MSBh_{Hs}$ 332a24f: 眼等諸根 ... 便應爛壞. Cf. also $MSgBh_t$ P li 150a2f (ad MSg I.5), where it is stated that if

general.[272] If the expression "sense faculties" (*rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*) in the respective passages should be understood in a loose sense including their primary elements or even their perceptible seats, this could, in the same right, be assumed for the *IP* as well (see § 76.6-76.7).

53.1.5. Buescher's (B: 144 n. 1) assertion that the sensory capacities are considered to be *upātta* "though only in the very moment they produce a sensation" is definitely wrong. The passage he adduces from AKBh (23,13: *tatra cakṣuḥśrotraghrāṇajihvākāyāḥ pratyutpannā upāttāḥ*) merely excludes past and future sense faculties (AKBh 23,13f: *atītānāgatā anupāttāḥ*) but not present inactive (*tatsabhāga*, see § 63.4) sense faculties.[273] That *pratyutpanna* excludes only past and future sense faculties and not those presently existent but inactive is also clear from ASBh 43,16f (ad AS 29,24), where we read that *upātta* is that part of the *rūpaskandha* which is included in the sense faculties along with their seats (*sādhiṣṭhānendriyasaṁgṛhītaḥ*), corresponding to five *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s, viz., eyesight, etc., and to part of four *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s (viz., the sense objects as far as they are *indriyāvinirbhāgin*), with no restriction to *pratyutpanna* because in the system of the AS(Bh) past and future dharmas are non-existent.[274] The same holds good for the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk),[275] for if the inactive (*tatsabhāga*) sense faculties were regarded as not appropriated, they should be mentioned in the PSk (23,2-4) among the *dhātu*s that are *anupātta*, and the appropriated ones should be restricted to the active (*sabhāga*) sense faculties, but this is not the case, and Sthiramati[276] explicitly states that the five sense faculties (*cakṣus*, etc.) are exclusively appropriated (*upāttā eva*), never unappropriated (*nânupāttāḥ*). That all the five sense faculties must be appropriated throughout life, and not only when they actually produce a sensation, is also unmistakably presupposed in the first argument of the "Proof Portion",[277]

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the sense faculties were not appropriated by *ālayavijñāna*, they would lapse into the state of *vinīlaka*, etc., like a corpse (*shi ba'i lus bzhin du sngon po la sogs pa'i gnas skabs su 'gyur bas* ...); similarly $MSgU_t$ P li 240a6f.

[272] The same phraseology is used at $MSgBh_t$ P li 160b3 ≈ $MSBh_{Hs}$ 332b15f (ad MSg I.37) with regard to the physical basis or body (*rten* / 所依 = **āśraya*), which would putrefy like a corpse unless appropriated (i.e., kept alive) by the *(ālaya)vijñāna* (*shi ba'i ro bzhin du rul bar 'gyur ro*, Ch. 應同死屍 不久爛壞; cf. $MSgBh_t$ P li 160b6 ≈ $MSBh_{Hs}$ 332b19, using *lus*/身 = **deha* instead of *rten*/所依). Cf. also ASBh 45,5f and 52,12f (see § 215 with fns. 1187 and 1188); PSVy P 28b3 (D 25a7; cf. PSVyṬ P 167b5 = D 139b1): "And when it (PSVyṬ: *gzugs* = *rūpa*) is abandoned by that (PSVyṬ: *ming* = *nāman*, i.e., mind and its associates), it undergoes putrefaction" (*des btang na yang rul bar 'gyur ro*).

[273] Likewise, his statement that *rūpa*, *rasa*, etc. (i.e., sense objects) are *upātta* "as long as they are experientially not separated from the sensory capacities" (B: 144 n. 1) is equally problematic if "experientially" means that in order to be *upātta* they must be actually perceived. What the text (AKBh 23,14f; EJ. 36,8-10) says is that those sense objects are *upātta* that exist in the present (cf. § 206.2) and are inseparable from the sense faculties (*indriyāvinirbhāgin*), i.e., form part of the living body to the extent that it is pervaded by sense faculties (thus excluding the *rūpa*, etc., of hair, finger-nails, etc.), irrespective of whether they are actually experienced or not.

[274] Cf. T 42.1828: 656b10: 何故不說過未根塵非執受耶。答。以無體故。

[275] This is made explicit in PSkV ms. 72a5 ($PSkV_t$ P hi 66a5f; D shi 249b3): *tatra* (i.e., in AKBh 23,13f) *hy atītānāgatā anupāttā uktās, te ca na santy eva. na câsata upāttatvam anupāttatvaṁ vā yujyate.*

[276] PSkV ms. 72a6 ($PSkV_t$ P hi 66a6f; D shi 249b3): *vartamānās tu ... upāttā eva cakṣurādayo, nânupāttāḥ.*

[277] See § 233 with fn. 1278 and fn. 1279.

for according to this text it would amount to a fault if at the moment of, e.g., visual awareness only the sense of sight were appropriated but not the others; and it would likewise amount to a fault if in view of the intermittence of sense perceptions the respective sense faculty would remain unappropriated when the respective perception is interrupted, and would therefore have to be appropriated again and again when the respective perception reappears.

53.2. A property that the five sense faculties share with the objects of sense-perception is, as Buescher (B: 86,4ff) rightly points out, their being *sapratigha*, which, I might note, comes close to an alternative interpretation of *rūpaṇā* as *pratighāta.*[278] Still, his translation "reacting" is misleading in this connection. It is true that in the case of the sense faculties, '*sapratigha*' may be used in the sense of *viṣayapratighāta*, i.e. "striking, or being struck,[279] against an object", i.e., reacting to it. But when discussing the characterization of the sense faculties and their objects as *sapratigha*, Vasubandhu expressly states that in this connection '*sapratigha*' has to be understood in the sense of *āvaraṇapratighāta*,[280] i.e., "(physical) resistance". Thus, participation in this property, too, corroborates the material nature of the sense faculties. This would seem to be further supported by one of the explanations of '*sapratigha*' (qualifying both the five external and the five internal *āyatana*s that are *rūpin*) offered by the *Vibhāṣā*, viz., as "having shape-and-materiality" (有形質),[281] which corresponds to Skt. *mūrta* at YBh$_c$ 358b14[282] (cf. § 51.2.2).

53.3.1. As Buescher (B: 86) correctly points out, according to the Vaibhāṣika treatises the sense faculties and the sense objects are also similar in that they are accumulated or conglomerated (*saṁcita*), i.e., are aggregates (*saṁghāta*) of ultimate particles (*paramāṇu*).[283] However, the real ultimate particles (*dravyaparamāṇu*)[284] or 'atoms' never arise separately but always in union with ultimate particles of other kinds of *rūpa*, the smallest recognizable[285]

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278 AKBh 9,15f; read *pratighāto rūpaṇêty apare* (for ... *rūpeṇêty* ...; cf. EJ. 14,4f) with Tib. *gzugs su rung ba ni thogs pa'o*. The problems posed by this definition do not concern the nature of the sense faculties but only the atoms and *avijñapti* (AKBh 9,16ff).

279 Cf. *BHSD* s.v. *pratihanyate*.

280 AKBh 19,18 (EJ. 30,16f): *tad ihâvaraṇapratighātena daśānāṁ sapratighatvaṁ veditavyam, anyonyāvaraṇāt*. Cf. also PSkV ms. 68a6 (PSkV$_t$ P hi 62b5f; D shi 246b1).

281 Vi 391a21 + a27f.

282 以屬有色... 比...有形質 = *rūpi...sambandhena ... mūrtatām anuminoti* (YAITA 1992: 524(=13*),9. Cf. also YBh$_c$ 308b12-14 with YBh$_{Bh}$ 141,4-6.

283 AK I.35d + AKBh 24,16 (EJ. 38,10f): *saṁcitā daśa rūpiṇaḥ* || *pañcêndriyadhātavaḥ pañca viṣayāḥ saṁcitāḥ*; cf. AKVy 68,4: *paramāṇusaṁcayasvabhāvā daśaîvêty arthaḥ*. Cf. also VinSg$_{ms}$ 22a2 (YBh$_t$ P zi 52b4f; D zhi 50a1f; YBh$_c$ 597c21-24), adding, to the five kinds of sense faculty atoms and the five kinds of object atoms, four kinds of primary element atoms (which are, strictly speaking, included in the object of touch: YBh$_{Bh}$ 8,19f; AKBh 7,8) and the atoms of matter belonging to the *dharmāyatana* as far as it is *dravyasat*.

284 Both terms AKVy 123,17; AKṬT P to 210a7f; MiśAHṛd 882b16f; VinSg$_{ms}$ 22a2 (YBh$_t$ P zi 52b5f); *dravyaparamāṇu*: AKBh 13,22; YBh$_{Bh}$ 54,11.

285 AKBh 52,23. The ed. has: *sarvasūkṣmo ... rūpasaṁghātaḥ ..., yato nānyataro vijñāyeta*. Buescher (87,20-22) paraphrases: "the subtle state of any physical aggregate ... to be distinctly conceivable as such, and not as another." Though *anyatara* may perhaps, in a Buddhist text, mean "any other" (*BHSD* 41a), Tib. (*de las ches chung ba ni mi mngon no*; cf. also AKṬT P to 210b1) as well as the Chinese translations (AKBh$_{Hs}$ 18b22; AKBh$_{Pa}$ 1559: 177c17f) suggest that one should emend to *nâlpataro*,

existing unit being a composite ultimate particle (*saṁghātaparamāṇu*) or 'molecule' consisting of eight 'atoms': one of each of the four primary elements (*mahābhūta*) and one of each of four sense-objects, viz., visibles, smells, tastes, and tangibles.[286] This basic 'molecule' may be augmented by the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*) and, in addition, by one of the other four sense faculties.[287] Besides, all varieties may or may not comprise a sound-'atom'.[288] In Theravāda Abhidharma, *rūpa* does not consist of ultimate particles in the sense of *dravya-paramāṇus*, but the view of later authors equals that of the Vaibhāṣikas in that material entities are taken to be composed of 'bundles' or groups (*kalāpa*) basically similar to the *saṁghātaparamāṇus* postulated by the Vaibhāṣikas.[289] In the YBh, the ultimate particles are occasionally stated to be merely the utmost limit up to which things can be split up *in thought*, but are not taken to exist as real entities.[290]

53.3.2. From a structural point of view, I cannot detect, in this pattern, any clue that would support the assumption that, for the Abhidharmic Buddhist thinkers, the five sense faculties were categorically different from the other kinds of *rūpa*.[291] Being present only in certain aggregates while absent in others is a feature they share with sound. And being, as derivative matter (*upādāyarūpa*), based upon the primary elements and inseparable from them to the extent of occupying the same space[292] is a property they have in common with the sense objects.[293]

54.1. The impression that for the Buddhist authors themselves the five sense faculties were indeed a kind of subtle matter is further reinforced by the fact that not only in Vaibhāṣika sources but also in a work affiliated with the Yogācāra school, viz., *Pṛthivībandhu's commentary on the *Pañcaskandhaka*,[294] we find detailed remarks on the localization and arrangement of the ultimate particles of which the *rupīndriyas* (here clearly the sense faculties themselves, not their perceptible seats)[295] consist.

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which is graphically close, or, alternatively, to *nâny⟨o 'lp⟩ataro*: "the most subtle aggregate of matter, beyond which a still smaller one is not recognized" (the ms. quite clearly has *vijñāyate*, not *vijñāyeta*).

286 AK II.22ab + AKBh 52,24f; B: 87.

287 AKBh 53,1-7.

288 AKBh 53,7f.

289 For details see KARUNADASA ²1989: 142ff, 155f.

290 YBh_{Bh} 53,10-12; $VinSg_{ms}$ 22a1 (YBh_t P zi 52b2f ≈ YBh_C 597c19-21). Similarly AS 41,19f (cf. fn. 76).

291 Cf. also BAYER 2010: 391,18ff.

292 YBh_{Bh} 53,3f.

293 YBh_{Bh} 53,16-18.

294 PSkBh P hi 107a6 (D si 37a5), etc.

295 Cf. NA 374a2-4; AKṬT P to 156b1f. It does not matter for my argument whether the ultimate particles of the sense faculties are understood here as the *dravyaparamāṇus* of the imperceptible sense faculties or as their *saṁghātaparamāṇus*, i.e., the 'molecules' consisting of the sense faculty-'atoms' in union with the other 'atoms' with which they are inseparably united (YBh_{Bh} 53,16-18), especially those of the primary elements on which they are based, and which are explicitly distinguished from the primary elements of the perceptible seat (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the respective sense faculties in YBh_{Bh} 24,11f (cf. also 199,10-13 [see § 166.2.2 with fn. 820]). For if the latter alternative is preferred here, this may hold good for the sense faculties in the *IP* as well.

54.2. In the case of the faculty of sight, e.g., the *Vibhāṣā*[296] and the AKBh[297] raise the question whether the ultimate particles constituting it are arranged side by side or in several layers. In the first case, an opponent suspects that they might be dispersed by the wind. In the second case, the deeper layers would be covered (and hence be prevented from functioning) by the front layer. The answer is that in the first case the ultimate particles, arranged on the pupil of the eye in the form of a cumin flower (*ajājīpuṣpa*) or spreading over it like dust over the surface of a vessel brimful of water, are protected from the wind by a pellucid membrane (*acchacarmāvacchādita*). In the second case there is no obstruction because these ultimate particles themselves, arranged in the form of a ball (*piṇḍa*), are pellucid (*accha*) like a crystal.

54.3. In the case of the faculty of touch (*kāyendriya*), *Pṛthivībandhu says that its ultimate particles envelop the whole body like a skin or hide. In addition, he mentions another opinion according to which they have the colour of a *vaiḍūrya* and are located [somewhere] above the middle of the body, quickly moving to any spot [of the body] where an object of touch emerges.[298]

54.4. I find it very unlikely that ideas of this kind were contrived by persons who understood the sense faculties as mere abstract capacities and not rather as capacities conceived as subtle matter, or subtle forms of matter that *have* these capacities. In fact, after stating that the meaning of '*indriya*' is *ādhipatya* ("mastery", "control", Tib. *dbang byed pa*), Vasubandhu goes on to ask: "Which of them *has* control with regard to what?" (*kasya caîṣāṁ kvâdhipatyam*), and gives the answer in the kārikā: "The five *have* control or power with regard to four things" (*caturṣv artheṣu pañcānām ādhipatyaṁ*),[299] like embellishing or guiding and protecting the body, or engendering the respective perception.

55. Similarly, in classical Theravāda Abhidhamma[300] not only the visible sense organs (like the eye-ball) but also the sense faculties (the *pasādacakkhu*, etc.) are expressly

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[296] Vi 63a12-21; Vi₂ 52a5-15.

[297] AKBh 33,14-17 (EJ. 53,1-4); cf. PREISENDANZ 1994: 445.

[298] PSkBh P hi 108b1f (D si 38a5f): *de'i rdul phran ni pags pa'am ko ba bzhin du lus thog thag khyab par gnas so || kha cig na re "bai ḍū rya'i kha dog 'dra bar lus kyi dbus nas yar gnas te | gang du reg bya byung ba der rgyug go" zhes zer ro ||*.

[299] AK(Bh) 38,3-5; cf. also the 'etymology' *indantîti indriyāṇi* (AKBh 38,3), i.e., "they are [called] *indriyas* in the sense that they wield power", and BAYER's (2010: 391,26-29) remark on this passage. Cf. also AKBh 19,8f+15f (EJ. 29,18 + 30,11f): the sense faculties react to their objective domain (*viṣaya*), the objective domain of a sense faculty being that with regard to which it *has* a function or activity (*yasmin yasya kāritram*; AKVy 59,4f: *kāritraṁ puruṣakāraḥ; cakṣuḥśrotrādīnāṁ rūpaśabdādiṣu ālocanaśravaṇādikāritram*); AAvat 82,14f (T 28.1554: 980c19f; VAN VELTHEM 1977: 3)): "The [faculty of] eyesight is the pellucid matter (*rūpaprasāda) that is like (or perhaps rather: apt (*lta bu* = *°sthānīya*?)[1] to [become]) the *basis* of visual awareness and *has* the function of seeing visibles" (*mig ni mig gi rnam par shes pa'i rten lta bu gzugs la lta ba'i bya ba can gzugs dang ba'o*). All this should not, of course, be misunderstood as implying that "activity", "power" or "control" are entities of their own. They are nothing but functions of the sense faculties, but the sense faculties cannot be reduced to these functions: they continue to exist, as pellucid matter, even when (at least some of) these functions, like generating the respective perception, are interrupted (*tatsabhāga* status, see § 63.4).

[1] Cf. ŚrBh 490,10 *sukhasthānīyeṣu saṁskāreṣu* "with regard to conditioned factors suitable for (or: apt to generate) pleasure". For this meaning of *sthānīya* see fn. 946.

[300] Asl 306f (## 615–616); VisM XIV.47. For the other sense faculties: Asl 310f (## 622–625) and VisM XIV.49–52. Cf. KARUNADASA ²1989: 45f.

subsumed under the "fleshly eye" (*maṁsacakkhu*)[301] and thus clearly material. Here, too, the faculty of vision is precisely localized, viz., in the middle of the black circle that is surrounded by the white sphere of the eye-ball. It is stated to pervade the seven eye-membranes like oil soaking cotton-cloth, and its size is compared to that of the head of a louse. This, too, is much easier understood in terms of subtle matter *having* a certain capacity than in terms of a mere capacity.

56. We may, perhaps, disregard the ancient Buddhist authors' own culture-bound metaphors and translate them into contemporary ones (B: 68 n.) if our aim is to make sense of their ideas for our present-day concerns or to adapt them to modern concepts. But such disregard is inadmissible if we want to reconstruct, as far as possible, the emic way of thinking of the Buddhist authors themselves and the inner logic of their arguments and conclusions. And I think that this is what we have to do first in order to understand the presuppositions and the motives of the development of their ideas. And it may well be that even for a translation of their ideas into modern concepts a clarification of the emic concepts and modes of thinking of the Buddhist masters is indispensable if arbitrary and premature equations are to be avoided.

57.0. The preceding comment does not of course mean that there are no distinctions between the sense faculties and the sense objects, and Buescher (B: 86f) is doubtless right in asserting that there are. The question is, however, whether these distinctions are such as to indicate that the Buddhists themselves conceived the sense faculties as mere capacities and not as some special kind of matter.

57.1. The first distinction discussed by Buescher (B: 86) is that according to Vasubandhu (AKBh 13,12f) one master, titled Bhadanta, who is classified as a Sautrāntika by Yaśomitra, describes the sense objects as coarse (*audārika*) as compared to the other kinds of *rūpa* stated to be subtle (*sūkṣma*). Buescher, referring to Yaśomitra's explanation of the passage,[302] takes the other kinds of *rūpa* to mean "the *capacities* of eyesight, hearing, etc.", and then continues (B: 86,28-32):

> Here we can understand the difference between gross and subtle to be such that *rūpī-ndriya* is itself sensorily inaccessible (*anidarśana*, *avijñapti*, *atīndriya*), i.e., subtle, while representing the *paramāṇu*-level capacity, which is responsible for apprehending the perceptual field (*viṣaya*) constituting the physically gross level (...).

57.2.0. There are a number of problems:

57.2.1. Being *anidarśana* ("invisible") is not a specific property of the sense faculties but qualifies the sense objects as well, the only exception being visibles (*rūpa* as one of the 18 *dhātu*s or 12 *āyatana*s).[303]

57.2.2. '*avijñapti*' is not of course a qualification of the sense faculties but designates a special kind of karma (e.g., the bad karma accruing to a person who has ordered someone else to commit a murder but is occupied with something quite different when the murder is committed), conceived as a kind of imperceptible derivative matter classified with the *dharmā-*

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[301] Asl 306,22f: *maṁsacakkhu pi sasambhāracakkhu pasādacakkhū ti duvidhaṁ hoti.*

[302] AKVy 44,23f: <u>*sūksmam anyac*</u> *cakṣurādipañcakaṁ, avijñaptiś ca.*

[303] AK(Bh) 19,1f (EJ. 29,7f).

yatana and *-dhātu*.[304] Buescher's mistaken association of the term with the five sense faculties is due to his misunderstanding of Yaśomitra's explanation of the Bhadanta's statement that "the other kinds [of *rūpa*] are subtle" (*sūkṣmam anyat*). Actually, Yaśomitra specifies these other kinds as "the five [senses, viz.,] eyesight, etc., *and* (*ca*) the *avijñapti*".

57.2.3. There is no mention of *capacities* (spaced in Buescher's text) in Yaśomitra's sentence, nor of a "*paramāṇu*-level capacity". It is true that it is as *paramāṇus* (though, to be sure, not as single *paramāṇus* but only in combination) that both the five sense faculties and the sense objects are causally efficient in producing the respective perceptions (cf. B: 87), and in this sense it may perhaps be meaningful to call the sense faculties "forces functioning on a bio-molecular level" (B: 90 below). But I fail to see why this, or the fact that they are qualified as subtle and imperceptible,[305] should exclude that the Buddhist masters conceived these "capacities" as a kind of pellucid, transparent matter.[306]

57.2.4. Such a conception is also not excluded by the fact that there are certain differences in the causal efficiency of the *paramāṇus* of the sense objects on the one hand and those of the sense faculties on the other (B: 87). As Yaśomitra points out (AKVy 47,4-14), the *paramāṇus* of a certain category of sense objects, e.g., visibles, are divided into groups, e.g., different colours, each of which is only the cause of a perception of this specific colour (blue, yellow, etc.). As against this, the function of the *paramāṇus* of the sense faculties is not restricted in this way; the sense of vision, e.g., is indiscriminately the cause of all kinds of visual awareness, regardless of the specific colour of the object. For this reason, the two sets of *paramāṇus*, viz., those of visibles and those of eyesight, are, in spite of their being dependent on each other for generating visual awareness, established as two different *āyatanas* [in the traditional scheme of twelve *āyatanas*] and not as one (*na dvayānām eṣāṁ ... ekāyanatvaṁ vyavasthāpyate*)[307] — a statement which Buescher has misunderstood to mean that the

> biomolecular force endowed with the capacity of generating vision ... is not restricted to such a monotonous scope (*ekāyatanatva*), (B 87,10f)

i.e., as are the various groups of *paramāṇus* of sense objects.

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[304] AK I.11 + AKBh 7,25 and 8,3-9 (EJ. 11,9ff).

[305] According to VinSg$_{ms}$ 21b4 (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 51b6f; YBh$_{c}$ 597b20-22), this also holds good for corporeal matter in the world-sphere of [pure, asexual] corporeality (*rūpadhātu*), stated to be subtle because it is not accessible to the senses of the lower sphere (*rūpāvacaraṁ rūpam ... sūkṣmam, adha-indriyā-gocaratvāt*), but at the same time characterized as transparent or pellucid (*accha*) because it emits much light (*prakarṣataḥ prabhānirmokṣāt*).

[306] Similarly, viewed from an emic perspective, both (mainstream) Vaibhāṣikas and (most) Yogācāras conceived mental faculties like faith (*śraddhendriya*) as entities in their own right associated with the mind (*cittasamprayuktā dharmāḥ*), and not as being merely specific states (**avasthāviśeṣa*: cf. YBh$_{t}$ P zi 80b3 [YBh$_{c}$ 609a5]: view of an opponent; cf. fn. 2121) or appearances (*ābhāsa*: MSA[Bh] XI.34: Yogācāra, but different from the standard view) of the mind, let alone mere capacities of the mind.

[307] AKVy 47,5f; cf. 47,11-13 (AKVy$_{t}$ P cu 49b5f): *ity ataś cakṣurindriyaparamāṇubhis tadviṣaya-paramāṇūnām atulyavartitvāt* (Tib.: *mi 'dra bar 'jug pa... 'i phyir*) ... *na cakṣūrūpaparamāṇūnām ekā-yatanatvavyavasthāna{tva?}ṁ yujyate*.

3.3.1.2. *Kāyendriya*, Sensory Awareness and the Feeling of Pain in the Early Foetal State

58. Another difference between sense faculties and other forms of matter pointed out by Buescher (B: 87–90) is that the presence of *indriya*s, or, more precisely, of the *kāyendriya* as the most basic one, turns "an inorganic into an 'organic molecule' (*sendriyaḥ paramāṇuḥ*; AKBh 53,1)" (B: 87,29f), or "inorganic matter into organic matter" (B: 90,19). In this function, *kāyendriya* is, according to Buescher, to be distinguished from the sense of touch, or tactile capacity, understood as a proper sense faculty in a mature organism. The term *kāyendriya* therefore has a double connotation (B: 90,13). If it is used to denote the "capacity of nervous organization" (B: 90,12; 88,34), '*kāya*' should be understood in the sense of "collection" (B: 87,32) or "pattern of organization" (B: 88,1), and it is in this function that it is presupposed by all sensory capacities in the proper sense (B: 90,21-24). Buescher's main reason for attributing to the expression *kāyendriya* a second meaning is its presence in any sentient being from the very beginning onward,[308] for, as he puts it,

> even in the case of human beings ... it is difficult to imagine that already the fertilized egg, i.e., the pre-embryonic globule right after conception (*kalala*), is endowed with a 'sense of touch'. (B 88,13-16)

In this stage, therefore, he understands *kāyendriya* as

> the capacity of organic (in this context better: neuroanatomic) organization in terms of organizing a rudimentary nervous system (B: 88,30-32)

or as "[genetic] capacities" (B: 89,14), and the primary elements of the 'organic' molecule (*indriya*(*mahā*)*bhūta*) as 'genetic elements' (B: 88,29f), and he does not hesitate to use this modernizing interpretation even in his translation of YBh_{Bh} 24,7ff, a passage he (justly) adduces (B: 89f) as evidence for the presence of *kāyendriya* in the early embryonic stage.[309]

59. When Buescher writes that the presence of *kāyendriya* turns "an inorganic into an 'organic molecule'" (B: 87,29f), this should perhaps not be understood in terms of modern chemistry. As he himself adds, the *kāyendriya* constitutes the basic sensory faculty of a *living* physical organism, more precisely, of an (at least potentially) sentient being (cf. B: 88,10), for plants are not included. When, however, Buescher subsequently understands '*kāya*' in the term *kāyendriya* (when used in this function) as "collection" or "pattern of organization" and takes the compound to mean a "capacity of organic ... (neuroanatomic) organization" or

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[308] Cf., apart from YBh_{Bh} 24,10-12 (see fn. 309), GarbhV_{t} S ta 203a4f (D tha 133b3; GarbhV_{c} 255a26f): *dbang po gsum po lus kyi dbang po dang | yid kyi dbang po dang | srog gi dbang po dag ni des sngon ma'i mngal du zhugs pa na thob par 'gyur ro*; cf. also the quotation of this passage in PSVy P 32a7 + b1f (D 28b4 + 5f); for further passages, see fn. 310. — For Theravāda Abhidhamma, cf., for womb-born (*gabbhaseyyaka*) beings, Vibh 413,26 (*kāyāyatanaṁ* and *manāyatanaṁ*) and 415,37f, 416,4f, 417,8f, etc. (*kāyindriya* and *manindriya*); cf. also Kv 14.2 with Kv-a 148,1-3; KARUNADASA ²1989: 79. At the moment of reincarnation (*upapattikkhaṇe*), there is, however, no tactile awareness (*kāya-viññāṇa*) and only *manoviññāṇa* (Vibh 414,29). This holds, one might note, good for all sentient beings (418,3f; 419,19f; 420,41f), except for the unconscious heavenly beings, in whom mind and mental factors are completely absent (419,21-29). The *manoviññāṇa* is normally accompanied by neutral feeling (*upekkhā*: 417,10 and 16; cf. also 416,17, etc.), but under certain conditions, as in the case of morally or spiritually advanced (*sahetuka*) persons, the accompanying feeling may alternatively be joy (*somanassa*: 415, 39; 416,6).

[309] Even apart from such modernist renderings, Buescher's translation of the passage contains a number of inaccuracies, for which see the discussion in § 319.

"capacity of [nervous] organization" (see § 58), the evidence on which he bases himself is hardly convincing.

59.1. The rendering "[genetic] capacities" for '*indriya*' is anyway a modernist interpretation and not a translation. In the Indian context, the five sense faculties — at this stage only *kāyendriya* — are, in the first place, products of one's own previous karma.[310]

59.2. Among the passages Buescher (B: 88,3f) adduces in order to support his contention that '*kāya*' in the term *kāyendriya* means, in the first place, "collection" (and not "body", as the seat of the specialized sense of touch), none at all is actually concerned with the concept *kāyendriya*.

1. At AKVy 100,12f, all the five sense faculties are called *kāya* in the sense of being aggregates of ultimate particles in order to explain the expression *kāyikī vedanā* ("physical feeling") in the sense of feeling connected with any of the five sense faculties, as opposed to *caitasikī vedanā* ("mental feeling").[311] Thus, this meaning of *kāya* is used here with reference to all the five sense faculties insofar as they are capable of producing sensations and feelings, not with special reference to the sense of touch, and definitely not with reference to a *kāyendriya* in the sense of a mere capacity of organic organization.

2. In KSi # 44,[312] what is explained as a collection of ultimate particles (or, alternatively, impure substances) is '*kāya*'[313] in the compound *kāyakarman* (bodily action).

3. In AVinSūN 210,5[314] it is the body as contemplated in the context of the application of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) that is stated to be an aggregate, probably of impure substances in the first place.

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[310] Cf., e.g., VinSg$_{ms}$ 22b7 (YBh$_t$ P zi 54a8; D zhi 51b4; YBh$_C$ 598c6f): *ādhyātmikānām ... āyatanānāṁ pūrvakarmāvedhāt prādurbhāvo bhavati*; ASBh 44,19: *cakṣurādikaṁ ... vipākajam*. Cf. also JP$_H$ 994b11f with Vi 751b23-25 (cf. AKBh 47,16-19; NA 381c27-29), where it is stated that when linking up with a new life in the world-sphere of sensuality one first, i.e., in the *kalala*-phase, obtains two of the karma-generated faculties, viz., *kāyendriya* and *jīvitendriya*. According to some masters (NA: the **yogācāras* 觀行者), the other karma-generated faculties, viz. the other sense faculties and the faculty of femininity or masculinity (cf. Vi 751c22-24), are also obtained in this phase, though only in the form of Seeds (**bīja*). This means, according to Saṅghabhadra, that only the *kāyendriya* (hence unambiguously the sense of touch!) is, in this phase, able to produce its *vijñāna* (i.e., tactile awareness), whereas the sense of sight, etc., are not (然但身根 能生自識, 眼等不爾。). — If the later maturation of the sense faculties is taken into account, it may be worth noting that according to the Vaibhāṣikas they consist of two parts: a continuum that is karma-produced (*vipākaja*) and another one that has accumulated through food, etc. (*aupacayika*), the latter protecting the former like a rampart (*prākāra*): Vi 62c8-10; AKBh 25,8-10 and 15 (EJ. 39,15-17 and 40,5); ADī I.38ab with *Vṛtti*; PREISENDANZ 1994: 477. This distinction is also found in the VinSg (ms. 23b8f corresp. to YBh$_t$ P zi 57a2-4, D zhi 54a3-5 and YBh$_C$ 599c9-14; cf. also YBh$_t$ P zi 233b5f corresp. to YBh$_C$ 668a8f). In the *Treatise on the Four Truths* (四諦論), it is stated that when, at the time of dying, the digestive fire becomes extinct, the sense faculties, being without nutrition, also collapse (T 32.1647: 383c15-18). Such ideas also doubtless support the material character of the sense faculties (cf. ADī I.38c: *amūrtā naûpacayikāḥ*).

[311] *kāyikîti mānasīnivṛttyartham. tatra kāyaś cakṣurādayaḥ paṁca, paramāṇusaṁcayātmakatvāt.*

[312] = KSi$_{Mu}$ 52,13-15: *bstsags pa'i don gyis lus yin te | 'byung ba dang 'byung ba las gyur pa'i rdul phra rab bstsags pa'i phyir ro ||.*

[313] According to KSi #43 (KSi$_{Mu}$ 52,10f): the body endowed with sense faculties as a specific aggregate of primary elements and derivative matter.

[314] *atha kāya iti ko 'rthaḥ? saṁghātārthaḥ.*

59.3. It is surely inadmissible to interpret '*kāya*' in the term *kāyendriya* the way Buescher does by simply adducing the fact that "aggregate" (but, as far as I can see, hardly "pattern of organization") is a possible (even the etymological)[315] meaning of '*kāya*', unless one is able to adduce a passage explicitly applying this meaning to the expression *kāyendriya*. For this purpose, Buescher might have resorted to a passage of Vasubandhu's *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* where the question is raised why the specific pellucid [matter] (**prasādaviśeṣa*) that has tangibles as its object (**spraṣṭavyaviṣaya*) is called "body [sense]" (*kāya*).[316] The answer is that this is so because the sense of touch pervades the whole body[317] and because it is

[315] *CPD* III 404a: "accumulation (etymol. meaning, hence): 1.a. (inanimate) mass, multitude; 1.b. (animate) group, assembly; 2. (living) body as an accumulation of elements etc. ...".

[316] PSVy P chi 31a2f (D chi 27b2): *ci 'i phyir 'di las* (sc., in the *Pratītyasamutpādasūtra*: PSVyṬ) *reg bya yul dang* {*bya* DP : om. PSVyṬ P chi 176a8 = D chi 146b1} *ba'i bye brag ni lus zhes bya zhe na* |

[317] Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 70,6: *kārtsnyenêndriyānugataḥ kāyo 'yam iti kāyaḥ*; no need for emendation, YBh_t P dzi 41b3f [D tshi 36b2f] reads: *lus 'di ni dbang po zad par gyi rjes su song bas na lus so*). As regards the precise meaning of this somewhat obscure 'etymology' (cf. the preceding, manifestly etymologizing explanations of *cakṣus*, etc.), my spontaneous understanding was: "[The sense of touch is called] 'body[-sense]' because [thanks to it] this body (i.e., the present, living physical organism) is completely pervaded by a sense faculty". But Tib. suggests an active meaning of *anugata*, so that we would have to translate: "... because this body[-sense] pervades the [other] sense faculties completely". This interpretation would seem to be supported by YBh_{Bh} 64,17f, where the sense of touch is characterized as *sarva-traga(ḥ) ... sarvendriyānugatatvāt* (YBh_t P dzi 37a8: *dbang po thams cad kyi rjes su 'jug pa'i phyir kun tu 'gro ba'o*), i.e., "omnipresent, because it pervades all the [other] sense faculties". Cf. also $VinSg_{ms}$ 17a4 (YBh_t P zi 40a8; D zhi 38a3; YBh_c 593b20): *kāyāvinirbhāgāt tad-anyeṣāṁ rūpiṇām indriyāṇām*. However, YVy P yi 142a7f remarks that *kāya* (*lus*) means "aggregate" (*bsags pa*). In this case, we should probably translate "...because this [sense] is an aggregate [of atoms] that pervades the [other] sense faculties completely." A similar interpretation is also presupposed by Hsüan-tsang (YBh_c 294a4f: 諸根所隨周遍積聚 故名為身, i.e.: "It is an aggregate that is followed by the [other] senses [and hence] pervasive, therefore it is called *kāya*"). However, such an interpretation looks somewhat strained for the YBh text and may, in view of its similarity to the explanation of the PSVy (see fn. 319; cf. also KSi in fn. 313), be post-Vasubandhu. The similarity becomes still more obvious in an explication supplied by Hsüan-tsang's pupil Chi (基):

> Although [*kāya* means aggregate and although] the sense faculties, as [matter] generated from the elements (大造, i.e., derivative matter),[1] are, all of them, aggregates, the 'body-sense' (= sense of touch), being the support of all those many factors, is the only one among those aggregates to be called '*kāya*'.
>
> 雖諸根大造 竝皆積集, 身根 為彼多法依止 積集其中獨得身稱。(T 45.1861: 298b16-18).

That this *kāya* is the sense of touch and not merely a 'capacity of neuroanatomic organization' is confirmed by the Fa-hsiang master T'an-k'uang (曇曠, eighth century) when he explains the *kāyendriya* as follows:

> There are pellucid atoms that pervade all parts of the body, [i.e.?,] are accumulated in such a way that they are followed (= presupposed?) by the [other] sense faculties and [hence] pervasive, and are capable of *sensing all tangibles*; therefore (i.e., because of being accumulated in such a way), they are, in Sanskrit, named '*kāya*', [and] '*kāya*' is, in [the language of] this [our] country,[2] [to be] rendered as 'accumulation'.
>
> 有淨極微 遍諸身分 諸根所隨 周遍積聚 能受諸觸。是故梵語目為迦耶。迦耶此土翻為積聚。(T 85.2810: 1060c1-3).

[1] In this case, 大造 would be shorthand for 大種所造, as at T 45.1861: 296,19f and 298a21f. Alternatively, if the sense faculties were taken to comprise both the sense faculties proper (*indriya*) and *their* primary elements (i.e., the *indriyamahābhūtas*), 大造 could be taken to mean "consisting of primary elements (大) *and* derivative matter (造)", as ibid. 294c3+5f and 9f.

[2] For this meaning of 此(土) or 此間, cf. FUNAYAMA 2008 (2010): 155–158.

characterized by a *specific*[318] aggregate of atoms.[319] Still, this passage explicitly refers to the ordinary sense of touch, and not to Buescher's alleged pre-sense-faculty 'pattern of organic organization'. And anticipating Yaśomitra's aforementioned explanation (see § 59.2.1), Vasubandhu goes on to state that in connection with the expression 'physical feeling' (*kāyikī vedanā*) all the five sense faculties are called 'body' (*kāya*) because they are, each of them, aggregates of atoms and because they are based on the body.[320] As a matter of fact, I am not aware of any textual evidence for *kāyendriya* being understood otherwise than as the sense of touch, the sense faculty responsible for the perception of tangibles (*spraṣṭavya*).

60.0. Buescher's argument that

> it is difficult to imagine that already the fertilized egg, i.e., the pre-embryonic globule right after conception (*kalala*), is endowed with a 'sense of touch' (B: 88,14-16)

may hold good from a modern perspective, but what we are concerned with in the first place is how Indian and especially Buddhist thinkers in the first half of the first millennium C.E. thought about these things. It would require much more time than I have at my disposal to study this issue in a sufficiently thorough and comprehensive way, but some pertinent observations will suffice to show that Buescher's superimposition of modern premises on medieval Indian thought is highly problematic.[321]

60.1. That the old Indian views on experiences in the embryonic phase are somewhat different from ours may be exemplified by referring to the Brahmanical idea that the embryo, albeit in a later phase, is able to remember his or her previous births and karmic deeds, a capacity which, however, gets lost in consequence of the severe pain experienced in the process of delivery.[322] In Buddhism, spiritually advanced persons are believed to enter the womb in a state of full consciousness and mindfulness, some of them preserving this capacity during their stay in the womb, some even during the process of delivery, but ordinary persons are bewildered (*mūḍha*) throughout.[323] This does not, however, mean that they are unconscious. Rather, they merely have *wrong* expectations or notions about where they are going or staying,[324] but towards the end, they may even produce correct notions, if only in connection with becoming weary of staying in the womb so as to become disposed to enter upon the

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[318] PSVyṬ P chi 176b4 (D chi 146b4) states that this aggregate is specific in that it comprises many more [atoms than the other senses] (*phal che ba'i phyir*).

[319] PSVy P chi 31a3 (D chi 27b2): *lus la khyab pa nyid kyi phyir dang | rdul phra mo bstsags* (D : *bsags* P) *pa'i bye brag can yin pa'i phyir ro* ||.

[320] PSVy P chi 31a3f (D chi 27b2f): *gang gi tshe lus kyi tshor ba zhes ston pa de'i tshe ni lnga la yang ming lus zhes bya ste | re re la yang rdul phra mo bstsags* (D : *bsags* P) *pa yin pa'i phyir dang | lus* (D : *lus dang lus* P) *la gnas pa nyid kyi phyir ro* ||

[321] For more details, the reader is referred to KRITZER 2009.

[322] HARA 1980: 147–153.

[323] DN III 231; YBh$_{Bh}$ 49,13-17; Vi 863a11ff; AKBh 127,25–128,10 (LO.SA. II: 973). Cf. also the longer version of the *Garbhāvakrāntisūtra* (see fn. 336): GarbhV$_t$ S ta 216a6–224b4 (P de 136b2–141a7; D tha 142a2–147b1), corresp. to GarbhV$_c$ 257c19–258c6 (Garbh$_I$ 332b21–333b8); cf. YAMABE 2013: 730–733.

[324] AKBh 128,15-21; Garbh$_{Bo}$ 324c4-7; similarly GarbhV$_t$ S ta 206b7-207a2 (P de 130a8–b1; D tha 136a1f), corresp. to GarbhV$_c$ 256a2-5 (Garbh$_I$ 330c6-9): 28th week. Cf. KRITZER 2009: 86.

subsequent process of birth.[325] In this connection, it may also be worth noting that AKBh and *Vibhāṣā* mention an opinion according to which the [embryos in the] eggs of certain large sea-beings survive only if they keep thinking of their mother but putrefy if they don't.[326]

60.2. In a number of textual sources from different schools, we find more or less detailed descriptions of the *physical suffering* of the embryo in various stages.[327] Thus, in the *Visuddhimagga* (VisM XVI.37–38) we read that the embryo does not arise in lotus-flowers but in the womb, wedged in between stomach (*āmāsaya*) and abdomen (*pakkāsaya*), in deep darkness, in a horrible place permeated by ugly, fetid smells.[328] Likewise, the embryo suffers from sudden movements of the mother, or from her drinking cold water or eating hot, salty or sour food.

60.3. To be sure, this description, which has parallels in Brahmanical sources[329] and, as far as the first part is concerned, also in Yogācāra texts,[330] may in the first place evoke the later stages of embryonic development. Actually, according to the Vaibhāṣika doctrinal system both dying (*cyuti*) and entering into a new existence (*upapatti*) take place in a state of neutral feeling (*upekṣā* = *aduḥkhāsukhā vedanā*).[331] But even here, the neutral feeling at the time of entering a new existence (i.e., at the moment of conception) is not a mere metaphor for lack of sensation. Rather, it is taken seriously as a real feeling, and as such associated with the mind (*citta*, *vijñāna*), specified as non-sensory cognitive awareness (*manovijñāna*).[332] This mind is,

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[325] $Garbh_{Bo}$ 324c19-23; similarly $GarbhV_t$ S ta 207b6–208a1 (P de 131a1f; D tha 136b2f), corresp. to $GarbhV_C$ 256a17-20 ($Garbh_I$ 330c19-22): 36th and 37th week. Cf. KRITZER 2009: 87; YAMABE 2013: 680f.

[326] AKBh 154,2f+6f; Vi 676b16-20. See KRITZER 2003b: 350f.

[327] Cf. also the general reference to this fact, *contra* Buescher, in BAYER 2010: 393,17-19, and the detailed addendum (2012) ad locum (to which I owe the reference to KRITZER 2009).

[328] Cf., in this connection, also the description of suffering in the mother's womb "for about ten months" in vs. 13 of Mātṛceta's **Caturviparyāsajihāsākathā* (DIETZ 2008: 31).

[329] HARA 1980: 147–149.

[330] Cf. ASBh 49,11f: "'Birth is suffering' ... in the sense that [as a foetus] seated in the mother's womb in between stomach and abdomen or when coming out of her womb one experiences pain in the form of being wedged in (/harassed by) all kinds of impure substances and having one's limbs squeezed together" (*jātir duḥkhaṁ ... iti mātuḥ kukṣāv āmapakvāśayayor antarāle āsīnasya niṣkrāmato vā kukṣer vividhāśucidravya*[1]*saṁpīḍāṅgasaṁmardaduḥkhānubhavanārthena*); MAVṬ 40,1f: *tathā mātur āmāśayapakvāśayayor antarāle parivarta⟨nāt kliśyate⟩*. Cf. also T 15.607: 234c10f and 606: 187c24-26 (*Yogācārabhūmi* of Saṅgharakṣa; see KRITZER 2004: 1090).

[1] Ed. °*dravyāsaṁ*°. Cf. $ASBh_t$ P shi 45a1: ... *rdzas sna tshogs kyis gzir te* ... (no negation).

[331] AK III.42d (*upekṣāyāṁ cyutodbhavau*) + AKBh 156,2 (*etāv aduḥkhāsukhāyāṁ vedanāyāṁ bhavatas, tasyā apaṭutvāt*); Vi 509b13f: 命終結生心 唯捨受相應; 787b7f and 10. Some kind of *vedanā* is also implied at YBh_{Bh} 24,15f (see fn. 694) since the *kalalarūpa* is stated to be amalgamated (*sammūrcchita*) with mind and mind-associates (*cittacaitasikā dharmāḥ*).

[332] AK III.42bc + AKBh 155,21f.(*cyutir upapattiś ca ... manovijñāna eva* ...). This seems to have also been the view of early (pre-*ālayavijñāna*) Yogācāra; cf. YBh_{Bh} 12,8: *cyavate upapadyate* (ms.), at the end of a list of functions characteristic of *manovijñāna*, which must have been the original definiendum of this section. Cf. also PSVyṬ P chi 234b6 (D chi 194b4): *yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i gnas skabs la 'chi ba yin no.*

to be sure, expressly characterized as faint (*apaṭu*),[333] but as such it is, after all, present even at this moment.

60.4. There are, however, also sources, like Vasuvarman's *Treatise on the Four Truths* (四諦論, **Catuḥsatyaśāstra*), according to which suffering starts already at the moment of conception.[334] The treatise goes on to state that also in the subsequent, proto-embryonic stages of *kalala*, *arbuda*, *ghana*, *peśī*, etc., physical pain is experienced in the form of being increasingly 'cooked' or maturated, like the pain of an ulcer.[335] Similarly, the *Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra*[336] has physical suffering start right from the first seven days of the embryo onward:

> During the first week, the embryo, dwelling in the mother's womb like a wedge or an ulcer, is lying in faeces and dirt. As in a cooking-pot, *kāyendriya* and *vijñāna* are dwelling together in one place; being roasted by violent heat, [the embryo] experiences extremely bitter pain; [this] is called the *kalala*[-phase].[337]

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[333] AKBh 156,3: *na ca paṭuvijñāne cyutyupapattī yujyete*. Cf. Vi 787b9f: "Among the ten phases [of a womb-born being's life: cf. Vi 88b; Vi$_2$ 73a], there are none that are as faint as the phases of dying and reincarnation" (於十時中 無有昧劣如死及生時者).

[334] T 32.1647: 381c25f: "On the point of reincarnation, when semen and blood merge, [if] there is a *vijñāna* that comes to settle down [there], [it (or: the reincarnated being)] experiences the pain of pollution" (臨受生時 赤白和合 有識來託 受雜穢苦). Cf. also Nidd I 17,11f (ad Sn 770): *gabbhokkantimūlakaṁ dukkhaṁ* as contrasted with *gabbhe ṭhitimūlakaṁ dukkhaṁ* and *gabbhā vuṭṭhānamūlakaṁ dukkhaṁ*; MAVṬ 39,23f (ad MAVBh 21,19 *duḥkhanāj jātyā* ...): *punarbhavābhinirvṛttau satyām ādita eva garbhādhāne śukraśoṇite vijñānasaṁmūrcchanāt kliśyate*.

[335] T 32.1647: 381c26f: "Then, in the stages of *kalala*, *arbuda*, *ghana*, *peśī*, etc., [the embryo] experiences the pain of being increasingly cooked (**pāka*), like the pain of an ulcer [in the process of] becoming mature" (次 柯羅囉 頞浮陀 伽那 卑尸 等位 受轉熟苦 如癰熟苦). The text goes on to describe the suffering experienced in the subsequent phases up to the new-born child.

[336] There are two versions of this text (cf. DE JONG 1979: 359–361; KRITZER 1998; 2009: 77; 2013: 738f; cf. also YAMABE 2013: 598):

[1.] a shorter one transmitted in two different Chinese translations:

a) transl. by Dharmarakṣa as a separate text: Garbh$_{Dh}$ (T 11.317), and

b) transl. by Bodhiruci (II), included in the *Ratnakūṭa*: Garbh$_{Bo}$ (T 11.310 no 13). The corresponding Tibetan translation (*Tshe dang ldan pa dGa' bo mngal du 'jug pa bstan pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*) was translated from the Chinese according to the colophon (SKORUPSKI 1985: 47);

[2.] a longer one transmitted

a) in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*: Chin. transl. by I-ching: GarbhV$_c$; Tib. transl.: GarbhV$_t$.

b) in the *Ratnakūṭa*, transl. by I-ching, practically identical with GarbhV$_c$ and probably extracted from I-ching's *Vinaya* translation (YAMABE 2013: 598,34-37): Garbh$_I$ (T 11.310 no. 14). The corresponding Tibetan translation (*dGa' bo mngal na gnas pa bstan pa theg pa chen po'i mdo*) is also considered to have been translated from the Chinese[1] (YAMABE 2013: 599 with n. 16, referring to *BusshoKD* 9: 259b).

[1] Cf. Kj S vol. 37 (dKon-brtsegs, ga) 418b2f *snying 'phyang zhing gdung ba* "the heart hangs down and hurts", which is obviously a hyper-literal rendering of Chin. (Garbh$_I$ 333a7f) 心懸熱惱 (where 懸 "to suspend" is rather used in the meaning "anxious", "worried"). GarbhV$_t$ (S ta 219b1; P de 138a7) is quite different: "the heart has dried up and is in an unbearable state due to narrowness and anxiety" (... *snying ni bskams* [S : *skams* P] *te* | *dog pa dang nyam nga bas mi bzad par gnas pa*).

[337] GarbhV$_c$: 254b2-4 (Garbh$_I$ 329a18-20): 初七日時 胎居母腹 如㮇如癰 臥在糞穢, 如處鍋中 身根及識 同居一處 壯熱煎[1]熬 極受辛苦, 名羯羅藍. The corresponding passage in GarbhV$_t$ (S ta 197a5–b2; P de 124a7–b2; D tha 129b2-4) runs thus:

This pain is explicitly stated to continue during the next week, the *arbuda*-phase, and in the course of the description of the embryo's development the various kinds of suffering it experiences are occasionally described in a more comprehensive way.[338] In summary, it is stated that entering the womb, staying there and leaving it at birth are all painful.[339]

60.5. It is self-evident that such experiences of physical pain are not possible without some sense-perception and that on these conditions the presence of at least one veritable sense faculty, the sense of touch, is required from the very beginning. Indeed, both Saṅghabhadra and Sthiramati explicitly declare that in addition to non-sensory mental activity (*manovijñāna*), which is there from the outset, *tactile awareness* (*kāyavijñāna*) also occurs already in the phase of *nāmarūpa*, i.e., before the complete formation of all the six sense faculties.[340] From the perspective of these old Indian masters, it is therefore hardly justified to reduce the *kāyendriya* to a mere "capacity of organic, or neuroanatomic, organization".

61. It has to be admitted, however, that there seem to have been occasional reservations regarding the presence of functioning sense faculties in the early phase of the formation of the

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In the first week, the [embryo], staying in the pain[ful place] of the womb,[2] a filthy, putrid, sweltering swamp, its whole sense of touch afflicted with pain,[3] very hard [to bear], squeezed and uncomfortable, having an exclusively painful experience, becomes, in the mother's belly, the *kalala*. ... Staying there for [this first] week, it is, during this week, tortured, thoroughly tortured, heated, thoroughly heated, completely heated.

(... *zhag bdun pa dang po la ni mngal gyi zug rngu mi gtsang ba | rul ba | rab tu 'bar ba'i 'dam gyi* (S 198a1: *'dam rdzab kyi*) *nang na 'dug pa lus kyi dbang po thams cad sdug bsngal ba | shin tu dka' ba* (S 197b3: *shin tu mi bzad pa*) *| dog pa dang | nyam nga bar gyur pa | sdug bsngal bar ro gcig pa'i rnam par shes pa can de* (D : *de'i* S) *ma'i ltor nur nur por 'gyur ro || ... de der zhag bdun du gnas shing de zhag bdun po der gdung ba dang | kun tu gdung ba dang | tsha ba dang | kun tu tsha ba dang | yong su tsha bar 'gyur te | ...*)

In the shorter version ($Garbh_{Bo}$ 323a10-12; $Garbh_{Dh}$ 887a22-25), there is no reference to suffering in this place but only to heat/cooking. Cf. KRITZER 2009: 82.

[1] Thus $Garbh_I$; $GarbhV_C$ has 前 instead.

[2] $GarbhV_t$ S ta 217b7f: *ma'i lus kyi nang gi mes ni gdung | kun tu gdung | ...*

[3] $GarbhV_t$ S ta 219a7: *lus kyi dbang po thams cad ni tsha.*

[338] $GarbhV_t$ S ta 206a5–b5 (P de 130a1-6; D tha 135b2-7) and ta 217b4–219a3 (P de 137a7–b2; D tha 142b6–143b5), corresp. to $GarbhV_C$ 255c18-28 and 258a12–b3 ($Garbh_I$ 330b22–c4 and 332c14–333a5). The first passage is contained in the description of the 27th week (cf. KRITZER 2009: 86) and is also represented in the shorter version ($Garbh_{Bo}$ 324b24–c1; $Garbh_{Dh}$ 889a18–b1). The second passage refers to the foetal state in general but belongs to a section that is found only in the longer version. To offer just an excerpt ($GarbhV_t$ S ta 217b4–218a2): "Developing in the form of *kalala*, *arbuda*, etc., [the embryo] is (intensely, thoroughly) tormented, heated and burnt in the mother's body and experiences great, severe, intense, unbearable, horrible pain" (*nur nur po dang | mer mer po...'i ngo bor yong su 'gyur zhing ... ma'i lus kyi nang gi mes ni gdung | kun tu gdung | yongs su gdung | tsha | kun tu tsha | yongs su tsha | sreg | kun tu sreg | yongs su sreg cing | sdug bsngal gyi* (P,D) *tshor ba chen po drag pa | rtsub pa | mi bzad pa | yid du mi 'ong ba myong bar 'gyur ro ||*).

[339] $GarbhV_t$ S ta 219b4 (P de 138b1f; D tha 144a3; $GarbhV_C$ 258b8f = $Garbh_I$ 333a10f): *de ltar na ma'i mngal du 'jug pa yang sdug bsngal ba | ma'i mngal na gnas pa yang sdug bsngal ba | ma'i mngal nas 'byung ba yang sdug bsngal ba yin na | ...* (in a section that is only found in the longer version).

[340] NA 486b25f: "To begin with, there is no phase in which *manovijñāna* does not arise, [and already] in the phase of *nāmarūpa*, tactile awareness, too, emerges, how much more in the phase of *ṣaḍāyatana*" (且無一位 意識不生。名色位中 身識亦起，況六處位。); similarly AKṬT tho 41a1f: *yid kyi rnam par shes pa gnas skabs 'gar yang mi skye ba ma yin zhing | lus kyi rnam par shes pa ni ming dang gzugs kyi gnas skabs su yang 'dod do ||*.

embryo, i.e., before the phase of the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*), which the *Garbhāvakrānti-sūtra* allocates to the 19th week.[341] In his *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*,[342] Vasubandhu discusses the view, ascribed by Saṅghabhadra to (Bhadanta-)Rāma,[343] that in the *nāmarūpa* phase the sense of touch (*kāya*, *kāyendriya*) and the faculty of thought (*manas*, *mana-indriya*) are in existence but are not called *āyatana* because they are not yet a basis (*āyatana*) for an impression[344] (*sparśa*) resulting from concurrence of sense faculty, object and mind (i.e., sentience in the form sensory perception). Yet even this divergent opinion hardly justifies interpreting the *kāyendriya* in the early embryonic phase (i.e., that of *nāmarūpa*) as anything else but a rudimentary sense of touch, still undeveloped[345] but nonetheless not necessarily incapable of some kind of faint contact and sensation.[346]

62. The reason why the sense of touch, in Sarvāstivāda-affiliated doctrinal thought as well as, as far as I can see, in early Yogācāra, is considered to be omnipresent in all living beings of the world-sphere of sensual pleasures (*kāmadhātu*) and the world-sphere of [subtle] corporeality (*rūpadhātu*)[347] would seem to be that the sense of touch, normally enabling some form of tactile experience, is regarded as one of the basic, indispensable factors by which a *corporeal sentient* being is constituted as such,[348] similar to the assumption of the Jains that

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[341] GarbhV$_t$ S ta 203a3f (P de 128a2-4; D tha 133b2f; GarbhV$_c$ 255a25f); *kāya-*, *jīvita-* and *mana-indriya* are present already before, from entering the womb onward (see fn. 308).

[342] PSVy P chi 31b8ff (D chi 28a5ff): *kha cig rtog pa: ming dang gzugs kyi gnas skabs na lus yod kyang lus kyi skye mched ma yin la | yid yod kyang yid kyi skye mched ma yin no ‖ ...*

[343] NA 485c24-26 and 28f. Cf. FUKUDA 2003: 272f. According to Saṅghabhadra, Rāma was a pupil of Śrīlāta (Saṅghabhadra's 'Sthavira'): ibid. 259 (with n. 12); 282.

[344] For this rendering and a discussion of the meaning of *phassa* see VETTER 2000: 113 n. 30.

[345] Cf. also MAVṬ 38,7-9: *⟨asti⟩ ca tasyām* (sc., *nāmarūpa-*) *avasthāyāṁ kāyāyatanaṁ* (1*mana-āyatanaṁ ca*1)*, tad apy aparipūrṇam eva.* Cf. also VGPVy P li 416b3 (D ri 346b7), where the Sautrāntika rejects tactile awareness, albeit only for the very moment of entering the mother's womb, with the argument that the sense of touch is still weak (*de ni lus kyi rnam par shes pa yang ma yin te* ⟨|⟩ *lus kyi dbang po zhan pa'i phyir ro* ‖).

(1...1) Not represented in Tib. (MAVṬ$_t$ P tshi 41b7).

[346] Cf. PSVy P chi 33a5f (D chi 29b1) with PSVyṬ P chi 183a4f (D chi 152a2f); NA 486a4.

[347] Vi 793a7f + 11f: being endowed with life-force (*jīvitendriya*) necessarily implies being endowed with the sense of touch if one is born in the *kāma-* and *rūpadhātu*, but in the *ārūpyadhātu* the sense of touch is of course lacking. What holds good for life-force, holds good for the *mana-indriya* (practically: sentience) as well (Vi 793a19). Thus, in the *kāma-* and *rūpadhātu*, being a living, sentient being is coextensive with being endowed with the sense of touch.

[348] Cf. AKVy 323,9f: "In the sphere of sensual pleasures and in the sphere of [subtle] corporeality, the occurrence of mind is dependent on the [presence of the] sense of touch" (*kāyendriyapratibaddhavṛtti hi kāmadhātau rūpadhātau ca vijñānam*); ASBh 18,11f: "[Outside the *ārūpyadhātu*,] one whose sense of touch is destroyed is no longer a living (i.e., sentient) being" (*praṇaṣṭakāyasya ... ajīvatvāt*; ms. °*naṣṭa*° and *ajīvi*°, ed. *ajīvita*°, Tib. *mi 'tsho ba'i phyir*). Cf. also PSVyṬ P 178a8f (D 148a4, ad PSVy P 31b4 = D 28a2), where it is stated that the other sense faculties depend in their functioning on the sense of touch (*mig la sogs pa ni lus kyi skye mched dang 'brel par 'jug pa*) and cannot subsist when the latter has perished completely (*lus kyi skye mched ma lus par 'gags pa la mig la sogs pa gnas pa med pa'i phyir ro*); similarly PrasP 469,15: *kāyendriyahetukāni sarvāṇi rūpīndriyāṇi kāyendriye nirudhyamāne nirudhyante.*

even the most rudimentary sentient beings, like plants, must have one sense faculty, viz., the sense of touch.

3.3.1.3. The Sense Faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti*

63.0. However the sense faculties in the early embryonic state were conceived by the Buddhist Abhidharma masters, it is hardly admissible to equate their status in this state with that in *nirodhasamāpatti*.

63.1. For the Vaibhāṣikas, a person in unconscious (**acittaka*) states (like *nirodha-samāpatti*) lacks a present-time *mana-indriya* but possesses present-time sense faculties:

> If [someone] possesses the sense of sight, [there are] eight *indriya*s this [person] invariably does not possess as past and future ones: the eight *indriya*s that are karmically indeterminate (*avyākṛta*, i.e., neither wholesome nor unwholesome), [viz.,] life-force (*jīvitendriya*), etc. (including the five sense faculties and the faculties of femininity and masculinity), [for one can] only possess them as present ones, not as past and future ones, because their power is weak. Two [*indriya*s such a person] invariably possesses as past and future ones, and three as present ones. The two [such a person invariably possesses as] past and future ones are *mana-* and *upekṣendriya*. As for these [two], in the present [that person] does not invariably possess [them] because he/she may be abiding in a state without [any] mind [processes] (where they, too, are absent). The three [which that person *invariably* (hence also in 'mindless' states!) possesses as] *present* ones are the *senses of sight*, *touch* and life-force. As for the remaining [*indriya*s], it is not fixed [whether a person possessing the sense of sight possesses them or not] (...).[349]

This passage clearly states that in a person who possesses the sense of sight (i.e., is not blind) this sense faculty as well as the sense of touch is present also in 'mindless' states like *nirodhasamāpatti*. The same holds good, *mutatis mutandis*, in the case of the other sense faculties as well.[350]

63.2. According to (Bhadanta-)Rāma (as cited by Saṅghabhadra), in *nirodhasamāpatti* even the *mana-āyatana* (意處) does not collapse (不壞), so that it can even be admitted that *mano-*

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[349] Vi 793b20-25: 若成就眼根, 彼定不成就過去未來八。謂 命等八無記根。唯成就現在, 非過去未來, 勢羸劣故。定成就過去未來二 現在三。過未二者, 謂 意捨根。此於現在非定成就, 以彼或住無心位故。現三者, 謂 眼身命根。餘不定...。 Cf. also Vi 774a24f, listing only *mana-indriya*, *upekṣendriya* and the five spiritual faculties *śraddhā*, etc., but *not* the five sense faculties and the *jīvitendriya*, as ceasing when one enters into *nirodhasamāpatti* (入滅盡定幾根滅。答七。謂 意捨信等五根). — Cf., in this connection, also the Abhidharmic principle, unconditionally defended by the *Vibhāṣā* (Vi 764a29f: 阿毘達磨者 不欲令異熟生色斷已續; similarly b28) with reference to a material entity that is, like the sense faculties, the result of the maturation of previous karma (**vipākaja*), i.e., obtained by birth (**upapattipratilābhika*), viz., that once cut it cannot recontinue, i.e., does not admit of interruption; cf. also AKBh 341,3f: *na hy etad* (AKVy 528,29f: *punaḥpratisaṁdhānaṁ*) *vipāka-rūpasya* (AKVy: *vipākātmakasya rūpasya cakṣurāder*) *asti*. Although diverging views are reported (Vi 764b14ff), these are not concerned with the issue of *nirodhasamāpatti* but rather with that of the divine eye (*divyaṁ cakṣuḥ*) and with legendary matter like the story of the king 'Giving away everything' (一切施王, *Sarvaṁdada), who donates his eyes to a brahmin but gets them restored (cf. the story of king Śibi in *Jātakamālā* ch. 2; for Śibi being called Sarvaṁdada see SCHLINGLOFF 1987: 89). — For the presence of sense faculties in the heavenly sphere of unconsciousness (*āsaṁjñika*) see COX 1995: 241 n. 2.

[350] Vi 793b25-29.

vijñāna arises [in this state],[351] and yet due to the lack of the other conditions there is no impression[352] [and hence no apperception (*saṁjñā*) and feeling (*vedayita*)]. By way of analogy, we may assume that for Rāma the five sense faculties also continue in *nirodha-samāpatti* as fully developed, unimpaired *āyatana*s but that their normal function is interrupted because the other conditions are lacking.

63.3. The sources on the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', too, agree in explaining the re-emergence of mind processes after *nirodhasamāpatti* by the presence of the Seeds of mind in the physical sense faculties (and their seats), or particularly in the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*),[353] or in the body endowed with sense faculties (*sendriyaḥ kāyaḥ*).[354] The phraseology leaves no room for denying the presence of the sense faculties in this state.[355]

63.4. Nor does the fact that the sense faculties remain inactive justify the assumption of a regression of the sense faculties into their undeveloped, early embryonic state. In Abhidharmic thought, the sense faculties are conceived as being in existence not only when they actually generate a corresponding perception but also when they do not, as in *nirodha-samāpatti*. In the former state, they are called *sabhāga*, in the latter *tatsabhāga*.[356] And

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[351] This assumption would agree with the position of Rāma's teacher (see fn. 343) Śrīlāta (FUKUDA 2003: 273, referring to NA 420b17-20). My understanding of the present passage (viz., NA 485c26-28) is somewhat different from FUKUDA's. (p. 272). One point is that in the sentence 由斯亦許有意識生 he seems to construe 亦 not with 許 but with 生, because he (ibid. and p. 274 n. 40) translates the passage as "Therefore, it is allowed that mental perceptual consciousness (*mano-vijñāna*) will be produced once again [after one exits the meditative state of cessation]", but this is contradicted by the resumption of this point at NA 486a5-7, where Saṅghabhadra refers to Rāma's statement concerning *nirodhasamāpatti* as follows:

> And he (i.e., Rāma) [himself] even admits that there are *āyatana*s without impressions (*sparśa*: see fn. 344), for he himself declares that in *nirodhasamāpatti* the *mana-āyatana* does not collapse and yet there is no *sparśa*. In view of this, [I should like to ask him:] In the phases of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, which factor [is there that] impairs the mind (*citta*) so that [in these phases] it is not *mana-āyatana*? (又彼亦許有處無觸, 由彼自說 滅盡定中 意處不壞 而無有觸。既爾 於識名色位中 何法壞心 令非意處。)

The situation in *nirodhasamāpatti* is thus similar to that in the early embryonic state only in that no *sparśa* comes about, but the reason is different: In the early embryonic phase, *manas* and the sense of touch are not yet *āyatana*s, i.e., incapable of generating *sparśa*, which would seem to mean: not yet sufficiently developed. In *nirodhasamāpatti*, on the other hand, their *āyatana*-status is not called into question, and the absence of *sparśa* is entirely due to the absence of other conditions. Since the *mana-āyatana* is (unlike the physical sense faculties) not conceived as an entity in its own right but merely as the immediately preceding moment of mind, the fact that it does not collapse (i.e., continues to be present) <u>*in*</u> *nirodhasamāpatti* would seem to imply the presence of some [faint? *mano*]*vijñāna* in this state.

[352] NA 485c26-28: 滅盡定中 意處不壞。由斯亦許有意識生。然闕餘緣 故無有觸。Cf. FUKUDA 2003: 272.

[353] See § 76.3.3.

[354] AKBh 72,19f; NA 404a2, etc.

[355] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 227,4-6, confirming that in *nirodhasamāpatti* only the immaterial (*arūpin*) members of dependent origination are not found in terms of actual presence (*samudācārataḥ*, cf. fn. 165), whereas the material (*rūpin*) ones, which of course include the sense faculties, are found.

[356] AKBh 28,2 (EJ. 43,23): *yaḥ svakarmakṛt, sa sabhāga*(*ḥ*), and 27,25f (EJ. 43,21f): *ko 'yaṁ tatsa-bhāgo nāma? yo na svakarmakṛt*. In the Yogācāra tradition, the application of these two terms is normally confined to the sense faculties: cf., e.g., YBh_t D zhi 78a1-3 (P zi 82a3f [defective]; YBh_c 609c3-

nothing speaks against their having been, in either state, conceived as subtle, pellucid matter. In the VinSg, the two terms are defined as follows:

> The [sense faculties consisting of] pellucid matter (*rūpaprasāda*) that are accompanied by [a corresponding] sensory awareness (*vijñāna*) are called 'similar' (*sabhāga*) [to this *vijñāna*] because they share the object (*viṣaya*) with [the] sensory awareness (*vijñāna*) [based on them]. Those which are without sensory awareness are called 'similar to them' (*tatsabhāga*) because they occur successively in such a way that they are similar to [the *sabhāga* sense faculties in] their respective continuum.[357]

Thus, there is no reason why the sense faculties should not be present, in their inactive (*tatsabhāga*) form, even in *nirodhasamāpatti*.

63.5. Even in a text as late as Hsüan-tsang's *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論: CWSL), and, what is more, in the context of a proof arguing for the necessity of a subliminal *vipākavijñāna* (which in its polluted state is called '*ālayavijñāna*'), the presence of the sense faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti* is taken for granted:

> Moreover: if there were no [subliminal] *vipākavijñāna* in this state, what could appropriate and support sense faculties, life-span (**āyus*) and [body-]heat (**uṣman*)? Due to lack of appropriation and support, they would all collapse and perish, and just as in a corpse there would be no life, etc., [in *nirodhasamāpatti*].[358]
>
> Thus, just as in conscious states, [so also] in unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti*, [some form of] *vijñāna* must really be present, because [in these states, too, one] is provided with *sense faculties*, life and [body-]heat [and] belongs to [the class of] sentient beings.[359]

In the context of refuting a pre-*ālayavijñāna* position, the presence of the sense faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti* is also expressly confirmed in the *Pañcaskandhaka-bhāṣya*.[360]

64. The presence of the sense faculties during *nirodhasamāpatti* may also be implied by a certain idea occasionally indicated in connection with the way re-emergence from this state may be scheduled. According to the *Vibhāṣā*, the first moment of mind of a person re-emerging from *nirodhasamāpatti* belongs either to the sphere where there is neither [full] consciousness nor [complete] unconsciousness (*naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana*) or to the

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6); YBh_t P 'i 7a3f (D zi 6b4f; YBh_c 698b2-4; KRAMER 2005: 79 and 128f [# 10.2.11]); AS 29,19-22 and ASBh 43,8-14; PSk 23,5-8 (see fn 357). In the Vaibhāṣika tradition, they are applied to all the 18 *dhātus*: AK(Bh) 27,16–28,22; cf. V i 368a20ff; b8ff; 370b23ff; c10ff; KRAMER 2005: 128f n. 144).

[357] YBh_t P zi 212b3f (D zhi 203a6f; YBh_c 660c9-11): *rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs dang ba rnams ni rnam par shes pa rnams dang yul mtshungs pa'i phyir mtshungs pa rnams zhes bya'o* || *rnam par shes pa dang bral ba gang dag yin pa de dag ni rim gyis rang gi rgyun dang 'dra bar 'byung* (P : *'gyur* D) *ba'i phyir de dag dang mtshungs pa rnams zhes bya'o* ||. Similarly $VinSg_{ms}$ 17b4 (YBh_t P zi 41b2f; YBh_c 594a2-4). Cf. also PSk 23,5-8: *sabhāga* are the five material internal *āyatana*s insofar as they have the same object as their *vijñāna*s; *tatsabhāga* are these very same *āyatana*s insofar as they belong to the same class (*jāti*) [as the *sabhāga* ones].

[358] CWSL 18a8-10: 又異熟識此位若無, 誰能執持諸根壽煖。無執持故 皆應壞滅。猶如死屍 便無壽等。Cf. also 18a5-7.

[359] CWSL 18a15-17: 然滅定等無心位中 如有心位 定實有識, 具根壽煖 有情攝故。

[360] PSkBh P hi 189a1 (D si 103a2, in the context of rejecting (Bhadanta-)Vasumitra's position of the presence of an indistinct *manovijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* in favour of the presence of *ālayavijñāna*): *'gog pa la sogs pa dus na dbang po ma nyams pas mig la sogs pa'i dbang po yang yod do.*

sphere of nothingness (*ākiṁcanyāyatana*),[361] which would relegate sense perception to a later phase. In fact, Saṅghabhadra explicitly states that mind re-emerges in the form of *mano-vijñāna*.[362] But occasionally *nirodhasamāpatti* meditators are stated to be, due to a previous resolve, wakened up, so to speak, by the sound of a gong,[363] and it may be with this case in mind that it is stated in the SamBh (DELHEY 2009: 208) that one of the objective supports (*ālambana*) by which one may emerge from *nirodhasamāpatti* is objects (*viṣaya*). But this is anything but certain, and I am, unfortunately, not aware of any passage explaining exactly how the sound of the gong might succeed in arousing the person from absorption. The commentaries on the *Buddhabhūmisūtra*, basing themselves on a quotation from the *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā*, rather suggest that even in such a case re-emerging from *nirodha-samāpatti* comes about exclusively by the force of the previous resolve of the meditator, without any reflective act or auditory awareness: "the sound of the gong does not reach the meditator's faculty of hearing (**na śravaṇapatham āgacchati*)"[364]. The question of just how the sound of the gong can have an effect on a deeply absorbed meditator is, by the way, not specific to the case of *nirodhasamāpatti* but is also occasionally raised in connection with emerging from other states of meditative concentration, the problem being whether sense perception is possible at all in meditative concentration and how the sound could have an effect on the meditator if in such states only non-sensory cognitive awareness (*manovijñāna*) is admitted.[365]

3.3.2. The Meaning of *apariṇata*

65. In my translation of the *IP*, I have rendered *apariṇata* (said of the physical sense faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti*) as "unimpaired", on the basis of the canonical sūtra which I take to be referred to by the *IP* and on the basis of Hsüan-tsang's rendering (see § 71). Buescher finds my understanding of *apariṇata* "quite surprising" (B: 67,2). According to him, such a meaning is unaccounted for, even in Pāli, for which he adduces from *CPD* the meaning "not transformed or ripened" (B: 66 n. 4). Accordingly, he (B: 83) rejects my understanding of *apariṇata* not only for the *IP* but also for the sūtra on which my understanding of the expression is based, and he even denies that the sūtra is concerned with the sense faculties. For him, what is *apariṇata* ("not transformed/transferred [into another existential condition]":

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361 Cf., e.g., Vi 774a27–b4; Vi_2 331c12-21.

362 NA 404b3-4; COX 1995: 275.

363 Vi 779c7-15; Vi_2 226b19-26. As regards emerging from *nirodhasamāpatti* due to a former resolve, cf. also YBh_t P 'i 140b1f (YBh_c 747a1-4; S 1969: 56–59 [# 11.c]) and Saṁdh X.9, although the gong is not mentioned here.

364 See BBhVy 70,18-25 (D chi 251b6–252a1); BBhU 306b22-25; *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā*: T 13.400: 509c26-29. Cf. S 1969: 165.

365 Cf. CWSL 26b27–c3 (LVP 1928: 294f), quoting YBh_c 650c20-24 (YBh_t P zi 188a7f) in support of the assumption that one may emerge from meditative concentration due to hearing a certain sound while still being in the state of concentration, the concentrative *manovijñāna* alone being unable to perceive sounds. The statement of the ASVy (not in ASBh [61,3]; but cf. 8,4f) that in states of meditative concentration there is only *manovijñāna* but no sense perceptions ($ASVy_c$ 726a26f; $ASVy_t$ P shi 236a2) is interpreted as referring to what holds good in most cases (依多分說: CWSL 26c6f). For the assumption that sense perception is absent in the *dhyāna*s see also AKBh 438,20 (cf. also 41,14) and *Asamāhitā Bhūmiḥ* # 1 (DELHEY 2006: 134). Cf. also DELHEY 2009: 448 and S 1987: 683f.

B: 83,17f) in the context of the sūtra is rather "the [whole vital] capacity" (B: 83,17), i.e., *jīvitendriya* (B: 84,7), or even the faculties of touch, life, thought and neutral feeling (*kāya-jīvita-mana-upekṣendriyāṇi*: B: 84,6). In the *IP*, on the other hand, what is *apariṇata* in *nirodhasamāpatti* are the five sense faculties, and *apariṇata* has, according to Buescher, to be understood in the terminological sense of *pariṇāma* as it is used in Sautrāntika and Vijñānavāda thought from Vasubandhu onward (B: 66,21-27, referring to AKBh and KSi), i.e., it indicates the

> sensory capacities while they are untransformed [into sensory actualizations][366] (B: 71,15f)

or the

> non-transformed ... condition of *pravṛttivijñāna* (involving the sensory capacities), be it from *bījas*, from a psychic /cognitive continuum (*citta-*° /*vijñāna-santāna*), or from *ālayavijñāna*. (B: 83,33–84,2)

In other words: in *nirodhasamāpatti*,

> not a single sensory capacity is getting transformed into cognizable sense data. (B: 91,5f)

Understood in this way, the expression *apariṇata* is considered by Buescher to mirror later terminology and thus to corroborate his assumption that the *IP* must be an interpolation. Accordingly, Buescher criticizes me for referring to the sūtra passage as the basis for my interpretation of the *IP*

> without, however, performing the slightest effort of trying to reconcile the differences. (B: 83,27f)

66. Actually, I did not try to do so because I failed, and still fail, to perceive these differences, which I am afraid are nothing but the outcome of Buescher's fundamental misinterpretation of both passages. His reluctance to accept the meaning "unimpaired" for *apariṇata* may not be entirely unintelligible, but if there is a difficulty its solution has to be sought in an altogether different direction, as I shall show later (§ 72).

67. Let me start with Buescher's interpretation of *apariṇata* in the *IP*. As for traditional Abhidharma (including early Yogācāra), I am not aware of a use of *pariṇata* or *pariṇāma* as referring to an actualization of the sense faculties (which could only mean their shift from the *tatsabhāga* state into the *sabhāga* state: see § 63.4), or of *apariṇata*/*apariṇāma* referring to the absence of such an actualization. In fact, what Buescher seems to have in mind is the 'Sautrāntika' and (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda terminology as found in texts from the works of Vasubandhu onward.[367] As far as I can see, what is, in Vasubandhu's and even Sthiramati's works, stated to undergo transformation or to develop (in this technical sense) is either the

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[366] Or "into cognitive experiences" (B: 73,11), "into excitements of sensation" (B: 73,30).

[367] In connection with his interpretation of Saṁdh V.3, Buescher (B: 154 n. 2) declares that the notion of *santatipariṇāmaviśeṣa* already existed at that time but does not point out any textual evidence. The *idea* may indeed go back to the YBh (cf. YAMABE 1990a: (14)f; KRITZER 2005: xxix; 60; 110f), but the *term* itself, well known from the AKBh, etc., and also found at MSABh 152,21, does not seem to occur in the YBh (what appears to come closest to it are passages like YBh_{Bh} 25,20–26,1, 128,2-4 or YBh_t P zi 20b6, but none of these passages uses the word *pariṇāma*). — The expression *vijñānavipariṇāma* at YBh_{Bh} 138,11 (after *mahābhūtavipariṇāma*) belongs to a different context (*śāśvatavāda*, in connection with the *Brahmajālasūtra*) and may refer to the Sāṅkhya concept of transformation of an identical, permanent substance (cf. the reference to this doctrine in precisely the same context at Vi 996c11-14, cf. also 997a26–b1), but the passage requires closer study.

continuum (*santāna*, *santati*)[368] of a sentient being, or the (continuum of the) mind (*vijñāna*, *citta*),[369] or (the continuum of) *ālayavijñāna*,[370] or the latent Seeds (*bīja*)[371] or imprints (*vāsanā*).[372] Having undergone such a transformation, the latter may occasionally be called "transformed" or "ripened" (*pariṇata*).[373] In the *Triṁśikā*, the term *pariṇāma* may also denote the result of such a process of transformation or ripening: the threefold *pariṇāma*,[374] i.e., the eight *vijñāna*s (in the sense of actual cognitive acts) as results of the transformation process of the potentiality aspect or stratum of (*ālaya*)*vijñāna*. In the CWSL, the meaning of *pariṇāma* is transferred to the transformation of each actual moment of mind into the appearance of an external object,[375] or into an image-part and a vision-part,[376] and the former includes, in the case of *ālayavijñāna*, also the sense faculties along with their seats.[377] But I am not aware of any passage in which the product of transformation is designated as *pariṇata*, in the sense of "arisen as the result/product of a process of transformation or maturation (of *bīja*s or *(ālaya)-vijñāna*)", not to mention its designation as *apariṇata* in case it does not arise. Thus, to speak of "the non-transformed or the transformed condition of *pravṛttivijñāna* (involving the sensory capacities)" (B: 83,33–84,1) sounds highly problematic, and one should not use or presuppose such a phraseology unless one is able to produce unambiguous textual evidence for it.

68.0. Moreover, it is not clear in which way Buescher considers the sensory capacities to be "involved". Actually, there are, apart from the traditional Abhidharmic view as found not

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[368] AKBh 64,5; 198,1ff; 477,10ff; PSVy P 22a4 (MUROJI 1993: 93,1f; 171); VśVṛ 9,16f; TrBh *42,9 (L. 38,26).

[369] KSi ## 20 (KSi_{Mu} 21,15f); Vś 6cd + VśVṛ 5,7f; 5,14; Tr 17a.

[370] PSVy P 24a1 (MUROJI 1993: 102,17f; 182f); KSi # 32 (KSi_{Mu} 37,22-24; 39,2-7); TrBh *38,2f (L. 36,14f); MAVṬ 146,4f.

[371] VśVṛ 5,27f; VGPVy P li 370b7 (D ri 308b4): *mig gi sa bon yongs su 'gyur ro*).

[372] MAVṬ 17,21 (reconstructed; $MAVṬ_t$ P tshi 29a6f); 146,17; cf. PSVy P 22b2f (MUROJI 1993: 94,8-10 and 174f).

[373] Cf. MAVṬ 42,16: *karma vāsanāvasthaṁ pariṇa⟨taṁ ... vipākadānāya {pra?}vṛttiṁ*[1] *labdhvā ...⟩* (cf. $MAVṬ_t$ P tshi 44b3: *las ...bag chags su gnas pa yongs su gyur na ... rnam par smin pa 'byin pa'i phyir 'jug pa rnyed nas ...*).

[1] Cf. AKBh 126,5; cf. also 193,23; 219,5f; 435,20; 478,11; TrBh *6,17 and 19; *42,10 (L. 18,7 and 9; 38,26f).

[374] Tr vs. 1; vs. 17.

[375] CWSL 1b2f: "The *vijñāna* within transforms in such a way that it appears as an external object" (内識 轉似外境).

[376] CWSL 1a29f: "*Pariṇāma* means that the *vijñāna* as such transfors in such a way that it appears as two parts: objective appearance (*nimitta*) and vision (*darśana*)" (變 謂 識體 轉似二分, 相見 ...).

[377] CWSL 10a13-19; 11a8f: "The *vipākavijñāna* ... transforms into what appears as the physical sense faculties and their seats; these are precisely the internal primary elements and the [internal] secondary matter (*upādāyarūpa*)" (異熟識 ... 變似色根 及根依處。即内大種 及所造色。); 20a25-28: "The *ālayavijñāna* transforms into what appears as the physical sense faculties and their seats. ... How can you deny [the existence of] the physical sense faculties, ... [and] not admit that the sense of sight, etc., are transformations [manifested] by the *ālayavijñāna*!" (阿賴耶識 變似色根 及根依處 ....。如何汝等 撥無色根, ... 不許眼等藏識所變。).

only in pre-*ālayavijñāna* Yogācāra sources[378] but also in some later texts,[379] (at least)[380] two different views regarding the sense faculties in (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda.

68.1. The basically traditional and, as far as I can see, more common one is, as indicated above (§ 67), the view that the five sense faculties along with their seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*: see § 51.1) are, just as the surrounding world (*bhājanaloka*), (part of) the objective support (*ālambana*) of *ālayavijñāna*[381] and hence, in Vijñānavāda phraseology, comprised in its image-part[382] and, in the terminology of the CWSL, a *pariṇāma* of *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of being the result of *ālayavijñāna*'s transforming itself into such an image-part. But as already indicated, textual evidence would be required to make sure that this theory justifies designating the sense faculties as *pariṇata*. Apart from this, it would likewise have to be corroborated by textual evidence that the transformation of *ālayavijñāna* into the sense faculties was regarded to take place only when they are active, and not rather throughout life, hence also when they are inactive, as in deep sleep or in *nirodhasamāpatti*. In view of the Abhidharmic distinction of sense faculties as *sabhāga* and *tatsabhāga* (see § 63.4), the latter alternative would appear more natural, and it is indeed this alternative that would seem to be confirmed by the passages adduced in § 63.5.

68.2. The situation changes if we presuppose the completely different theory of the sense faculties that is introduced in Vasubandhu's *Viṁśikā*,[383] in a line of thought, mind you, that (in my opinion: deliberately) does *not* resort to the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.[384] According to

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378 E.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 4,6-8, etc.: sense faculty as the physical (*rūpin*) simultaneous support of sense perception, expressly distinguished from the latter's Seed (for the interpretation of the term *bījāśraya*, see § 253.2). For the traditional Abhidharmic definition of the sense faculties, see ch. 3.3.1.1.

379 At MSABh 169,7 (ad XIX.49), e.g., the sense faculties (*cakṣurādayaḥ*) are designated as the bases (*āśrayāḥ*) of the mental factors (*cittacaitta*) and unambiguously distinguished from the latter's Seeds (*bīja*). Similarly AS$_t$ P li 52b6–53a1 (AS 3,7-10 [reconstr.; cf. fn. 1377]).

380 The concept of the sense faculties in MSg II would seem to require a separate investigation. In any case, in MSg II.5 the six internal *āyatana*s, including the sense faculties, are taken to be not Seeds but appearances, representations (**vijñapti*).

381 This view goes back to the analysis of *ālayavijñāna* in the VinSg, esp. YBh$_t$ P zi 4b1f (see fn. 1313; WALDRON 2003: 179) and YBh$_t$ P zi 189b4f (D zhi 182a5f; YBh$_c$ 651b21f); cf. S 1987: 90–92). Cf. also Tr vs. 3ab, where the formulation is, however, not unambiguous, as Sthiramati's explanation shows (see S 1987 # 5.15.1).

382 The idea that the sense faculties are mere appearances in the mind — specified as *ālayavijñāna* only in Sthiramati's MAVṬ (17,13f)! — is already expressed in MAVBh 18,23f (ad MAV I.3): "[The mind] that appears as sentient being(s) is the one that [appears] as the five sense faculties in one's own or others' continuum" (*satvapratibhāsaṁ yat pañcendriyatvena svaparasantānayoḥ*). However, this obviously does not so much refer to the imperceptible sense faculties strictly speaking as to their visible seats, i.e., to sentient bodies (see § 76.6).

383 Vś 9 + VśVṛ 5,27–6,4; similarly ĀP vs. 7c–8d.

384 Cf., in this connection, the remark of Hsüan-tsang's pupil Chi (基) in his commentary on the *Viṁśikā* that [in Vś vs. 9 and in ĀP vs. 7c–8d] the sense faculties are stated to be just Seeds (or potentialites) because in the context of refuting the existence of real matter outside the mind as assumed by the Sautrāntikas and others, the sense faculties would remain entities existing apart from the six forms of sensory and cognitive awareness unless they are reduced to mere Seeds, since [in the context of the argument] it has not yet been established that there is an eighth form of mind (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) [so that the sense faculties cannot be interpreted as images in the *ālayavijñāna*]

this theory, which is combined with the concept of *ālayavijñāna* only in later sources[385] and appears to have remained controversial even among Vijñānavādins,[386] the sense faculties are reduced to the Seeds (*bīja*) of the respective perceptions.[387] As Seeds, they may indeed undergo a process of transformation or ripening (*pariṇāma*). If the culmination of this transformation or ripening is taken to coincide with an actual production of the respective sense perception, this would indeed imply the absence of 'transformed', i.e., ripened, fully developed sense faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti*. In this case, it would, theoretically, be possible to characterize the sense faculties (= Seeds of actual perceptions) in *nirodhasamāpatti* as 'untransformed' (*apariṇata*, i.e., unactualized), but one would still like to have unambiguous textual evidence for such a phraseology applied to the sense faculties in a Vijñānavāda text.

69. Buescher's contention that *apariṇata* has to be understood in the light of later, i.e., Vijñānavāda terminology and therefore unmasks the *IP* as a comparatively late (post-Vasubandhu?) interpolation is thus anything but convincing. In addition, it is altogether unnecessary, for Buescher's arguments against understanding the passage in the light of the *Dharmadinnā-sūtra* can easily be disproved. Actually, it is only by arbitrarily de-

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(T 43.1834: 990c17-19: 破經部等心外實色 由未建立有第八識 若不說種為眼等根 眼等便離六識而有 故說種子。).

[385] Especially CWSL 19c12-25, especially c23f. Similarly Sthiramati in his commentary on MSA IX.41 (SAVBh P mi 141b4-8; D mi 126a5–b1; syntactically rather odd), expressly quoting Vś vs. 9, and perhaps also in MAVṬ 146,3-5, but the latter passage would require a more careful investigation than I can afford at present. — Most interesting is VGPVy P li 370b1-4 (D ri 308a7–b2). In this text, the statement that *ālayavijñāna* has the Seeds, the sense faculties (faculty of sight, etc.) and the sense objects (visibles, etc.) as its objective support (*ālambana*), gives rise to the question of how the sense faculties can be defined [in the Vijñānavāda system]. The answer is that one speaks of sense faculties when the immature Seeds of the faculty of sight, etc., which have been present throughout the beginningless *saṁsāra*, have matured. This maturation means that in a world-sphere where there is corporeal matter (**rūpiṇi dhātau*) [this Seed] has, under the influence of the impregnation (**vāsanā*) of the appropriate karma (= *bhava*) and of the impregnations of the respective name (*abhilāpa*, sc., 'sense of vision', etc., up to 'sense of touch'), developed (**pariṇata*) into a determinant condition (**adhipatipratyayabhāvena*) of perceptions of [visibles like] blue, etc. (... *mig la sogs pa gang dag yin zhe na* ⟨|⟩ *mig la sogs pa'i sa bon yongs su ma smin pa 'khor ba thog ma med pa nas gnas pa gang gi tshe yongs su smin par gyur pa de'i tshe mig la sogs pa zhes bya'o* || *yang ji ltar yongs su smin par 'gyur zhe na* | *mig la sogs pa 'grub par 'gyur ba'i las srid pa'i yan lag gi bag chags dang* | *mig mig ces bya ba nas lus lus zhes bya ba'i bar gyi mngon par brjod pa'i bag chags la yang brten nas gang gi tshe gzugs can gyi khams su sngon po la sogs pa'i rnam par shes pa rnams kyi bdag po'i rkyen gyi dngos por yongs su gyur pa de'i tshe yongs su smin pa zhes bya'o* ||). Here, too, what is stated to develop or to have developed is the Seed (cf. also P li 370b7 = D ri 308b4: *de ltar mig gi sa bon yongs su 'gyur ro*). Moreover, the statement that the Seed develops or transforms itself into the faculty of eyesight (as the *adhipatipratyaya* of visual awareness) under the influence of the karmic and linguistic imprints (and not, e.g., under the influence of some occasional stimulus) suggests that this developed or transformed state is not limited to occasional sensory actualizations but refers to the persistent presence of intact sense faculties throughout one's life. Still, I admit that more systematic investigation is required.

[386] Cf. the detailed criticism in CWSL 19c27–20b3.

[387] In CSWL 19c27ff, the view that the sense faculties are nothing but the Seeds of the sense perceptions is first criticized under the presupposition that they are the homogeneous Seeds (which are normally regarded as *hetupratyaya*, cf. 20a4f), but in the course of the argument (20a14-25f) a revised theory is adduced (and also criticized) according to which they are karmic Seeds.

contextualizing the *IP* (see ch. 3.1) that he can superimpose on it a Vijñānavāda interpretation, allowing him to discard the passage as a later interpolation. But in the absence of a formal clue for such an assumption we first have to try to understand the passage in its closer textual context as well as in the light of the stage of doctrinal development as recorded in the YBh materials, and only if this proves odd are we entitled to consider the possibility of a late interpolation. Now, the context in which the *IP* is (organically) embedded[388] is dedicated to an exegesis of the remarks on *nirodhasamāpatti* in either the *Dharmadinnā-sūtra*[389] of the *Madhyamāgama* or a close parallel included in the *Saṁyuktāgama* ($SĀ_c$ no. 568),[390] and it is, incidentally, the latter from which the quotation in Guṇamati's commentary on the *Pratītya-samutpādavyākhyā*[391] is taken. The sequence of the exegetical discussion (question+answer pattern throughout) in the SamBh is by and large in agreement with the sequence of the discussion in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of both sūtras, the main exception being that the first paragraph corresponds to the last paragraph of the sūtra,[392] but this poses no problem because in the sūtra itself the questioner is expressly told that the question he has asked last ought to have been asked first.[393]

70.0. However, as pointed out above (§ 65), Buescher also disagrees with me with regard to the understanding of the respective passage of this sūtra, for instead of referring the term '*indriya*' in the sūtra's statement that in the case of death the *indriya*s are **pariṇata* but are

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388 SamBh 206–208: ## 4.1.3.4.3.1-5.

389 The Mūlasarvāstivāda (see fn. 168) version has been preserved in AKṬU P tu 7a7–12b3 (D ju 6b2–11a5: *Chos sbyin gyi mdo*, *Dharmadinnāsūtra*[1]), particularly 9b2–10b2 (8b3–9b1). In the Pāli canon, the corresponding passages are partly found in MN no. 43 (*Mahāvedallasutta*): I 296,11-23, partly in no. 44 (*Cūḷavedallasutta*): I 301,30–302,27. In $MĀ_c$ (probably a Sarvāstivāda collection: cf. fn. 169) they are found (with some additions) in no. 210 (法樂比丘尼經, ≈ MN no. 44 and corresponding to the *Dharmadinnāsūtra*): 789a7–b13 and in no. 211 (*Mahākauṣṭhilasūtra*, ≈ MN no. 43): 791c16–792a23. Cf. also Vi 780c7–781b25 (Vi_2 337b7–338a19: quotations from the *Dharmadinnāsūtra*[2] interspersed with comments). For further details and references concerning MN nos. 43 and 44 and their parallels, see ANĀLAYO 2011: 268–286.

[1] Cf. MVy no 1073: *Dharmadinnā* in a list of names of names of disciples (*śrāvaka*).

2 Cf. Vi 780c7f 達磨陣那苾芻尼 and Vi_2 337b7f 曇摩提那比丘尼 = *Dharmadinnā bhikṣuṇī*.

390 $SĀ_c$ no. 568 (150a17–c7), corresponding to SN no. 41.6 (IV 293–295: second *Kāmabhūsutta*). $SĀ_c$ represents a textual tradition that seems to be close to the (so-called) Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the *Saṁyuktāgama* (cf. ENOMOTO 1994: xiii and ANĀLAYO 2010a: 12, both with further references).

391 PSVyṬ P 139a6–b3 (D chi 117a2-6); see KSi_{Mu} p. 28. It may be worth noting that the author of the PSVyṬ, Guṇamati, seems to have been affiliated with a different school, viz., one that negated the concept of an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*): cf. AKBh 120,13 with AKVy 267,26f; MEJOR 1991: 56f. Cf. also the idea of *manovijñāna* being based on the heart (**hṛdaya*: see § 272.3 with fn. 1518), which sounds similar to its being based on the *hadayavatthu* according to later Theravāda Abhidhamma (VisM XIV.60).

392 SN IV 295,25-30 (# 13) ≈ $SĀ_c$ 150c3-6; missing in MN no. 44 (cf. I 302,27) and $MĀ_c$ no. 210 (cf. 789b13) as well as in no. 211 (cf. 792a23), but found in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the *Dharmadinnāsūtra* (AKṬU P tu 10a8–b2; D ju 9a7–b1).

393 Strictly speaking, the second paragraph in the SamBh discussion (207,1-5: # 4.1.3.4.3.**2**) should, according to the sequence in the sūtra, rather stand between the fourth and the fifth paragraph, but its anticipation can be explained by the fact that the subject of the cessation of the three *saṁskāra*s (for which cf. VETTER 2000: 37f # 64) had already been touched in connection with the difference between death and *nirodhasamāpatti*.

not so in the case of *nirodhasamāpatti* to the five sense faculties, he takes it to refer to the life-force (*jīvitendriya*), and in the case of death he renders the phrase as

> the [whole vital] capacity is transformed/transferred [into another existential condition]. (B: 83,17f)

70.1. This interpretation poses a number of problems:

1. What does "transformed/transferred [into another existential condition]" mean? Doubtless at death the *jīvitendriya* of the present life *ceases*,[394] and the next life starts with a new one.[395] Thus, its transfer into another existential condition amounts to its annihilation. And by way of contrast the *jīvitendriya*'s being "untransformed" (*apariṇata*) in *nirodhasamāpatti* would just mean that it continues unimpaired.

2. The concept of *jīvitendriya* is extremely rare in the canonical sermons.[396]

3. Reference to the life-force would be superfluous because in all versions of the passage the fact that in the case of death the life-span (*āyus*, hardly substantially different from *jīvitendriya*)[397] has wasted away, whereas in *nirodhasamāpatti* it has not, had already been adduced separately immediately before the phrase under discussion.[398]

4. All versions agree with the Pāli version (*indriyāni*) in expressly marking the concept of *indriya*, in at least one case of its occurrence, if not both, as plural.[399] This precludes an exclusive reference to *jīvitendriya* alone.

70.2.1. Even when taking account of the last-mentioned fact, Buescher apodictically denies that the passage may be concerned with the five sense faculties (i.e., the *rūpīṇîndriyāṇi*) but thinks of

> all *indriya*s or, if these were analytically specified, the *kāya-jīvita-mana-upekṣendriyāṇi*, (B: 84,5f)

basing himself on AKBh 48,22 (B: 48,24!) ≈ ADīVṛ 56,18f.

70.2.2. This passage, however, is concerned with death only, not with the difference between death and *nirodhasamāpatti*. Apart from this, the passage enumerates only the

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[394] AK(Bh) 48,13-23 (see also below); YBh_{Bh} 211,13f.

[395] AK(Bh) 47,18f and 48,10-12; YBh_{Bh} 209,6+15.

[396] According to *PTC*, only one occurrence, viz., SN V 204 (list of *indriya*s; no Chinese parallel in AKANUMA 1958, but cf. NidSa 16.14 [*SWTF* s.v. *jīvitendriya*]).

[397] Cf. AK(Bh) 73,14f, quoting the *Prakaraṇa* (T 26.1542: 694a23).

[398] AKṬU P tu 9b4f (D ju 8b4f): *tshe dang drod dang bral zhing dbang po rnams gzhan du gyur cing* and 5f: *tshe dang drod 'gags par mi 'gyur zhing dban po* (D : *du* P) *gzhan du 'gyur ba...r mi 'gyur ro*; $SĀ_C$ 150b12-14; MN I 296,16f = SN IV 294,16f (*āyu parikkhīṇo usmā vūpasantā indriyāni viparibhinnāni*) and 20 (*āyu aparikkhīṇo usmā avūpasantā indriyāni vippasannāni*); $MĀ_C$ 789a8-11 (=791c17-19); cf. also CSL 345b24f (no mention of *indriya*s). The *Saṁyuktāgama* version quoted by Guṇamati (see fn. 391) lacks the reference to *āyus* in the case of death but has it in the case of *nirodhasamāpatti* (*tshe dang ma bral ba yin | drod dang ma bral ba yin* | …), so that its absence in the case of death is almost certainly due to a transmissional error.

[399] AKṬU P tu 9b4f (D ju 8b4f; cf. fn. 398) *dbang po rnams* but 9b6 *dbang po* (D); KSi # 24 (KSi_{Mu} 27,11) *dbang po dag* and T 31.1608: 779b6 諸根不轉, but T 31.1609 (Hsüan-tsang): 784a5 根無變壞; PSVyṬ P chi 139a8 (D chi 117a4; KSi_{Mu} p. 28) *dbang po yongs su gyur pa yin no* against b1 *dbang po rnams yongs su ma gyur pa yin*; $SĀ_C$ 150b12 諸根悉壞 and b14 諸根不壞; $MĀ_C$ 789a10f and 791c189: 諸根(不)敗壞.

indriyas that cease, in the case of gradual dying (*kramamṛtyu*, possible only in the *kāmadhātu*), at the very moment of death, viz., the sense of touch, and the faculties of life, thought (*manas*) and disinterestedness (*upekṣā*). This does not of course mean that the other four sense faculties (sense of sight, etc.) do not cease; they have rather already ceased,[400] in the process of gradual dying. In the case of sudden death (in the *kāmadhātu*), they too cease at the very moment of death.[401] There is thus no reason to exclude them from the *indriyas* mentioned in the sūtra.

70.2.3. There is, however, good reason to exclude the *upekṣendriya*, the "faculty of disinterestedness". Since this faculty is conceived as a special form of feeling (*vedayita* or *vedanā*),[402] it is hardly compatible with *nirodhasamāpatti* as a state of cessation of conscious mental activity (*saṁjñā*) and feeling (*vedayita*), and is in fact expressly stated to cease in this state.[403] However, in the context of the difference between death and *nirodhasamāpatti* its inclusion would make sense only if, in contrast to death, it had *not* ceased in *nirodhasamāpatti*.

70.2.4. Similarly, it would not be easy to explain the presence of *mana-indriya* in *nirodhasamāpatti*,[404] unless *mana-indriya* is taken as a kind of dormant faculty of thought or latent presence of mind, in which case, however, the assertion of its presence would, in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the sūtra, overlap with the statement that *vijñāna* has not left the body, and would hence be superfluous.

70.2.5. As against this, in the context of distinguishing a state of extremely deep absorption in which all conscious mental activity has merely been interrupted and life continues, on the one hand, from, on the other, death, it would seem quite natural to emphasize that in this state, in contrast to death, the physical sense faculties have not suffered any change or damage. For this reason, and especially in the Mūlasarvāstivāda version of the sūtra, the only reasonable explanation of the statement that in contrast to death in *nirodhasamāpatti* the faculties (*indriya*) are unchanged is, to my mind, that in this state the *five physical sense faculties* are unchanged, i.e., unimpaired; still more so since in the canonical sermons this is (if *manas* is disregarded) the normal meaning of *indriya* (pl.) when used without any specification. Actually, a few lines before the passage under discussion, the five *indriyas*, expressly specified as the five physical sense faculties (viz., the faculty of sight, etc.), are stated to subsist in dependence on life-force or life-span (*āyu*) and body-heat (*usmā*).[405] Since in the passage under discussion, too, the *indriyas* are mentioned immediately after life-force and body-heat, there is no room for doubt that here, too, the five physical sense faculties are meant.

71. I admit, however, that there is a semantic problem, because usually *pariṇata* merely means "transformed", often in the sense of "ripened", occasionally in the sense of "digested".

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[400] AKṬT P. to 198b2: *mig la sogs pa rnams sngar 'gags zin pa'i phyir.*

[401] AKBh 48,18-20 (*tāni cāṣṭau* refers to 48,16 *tāni ca trīṇi cakṣurādīni* ⟨*ca*: ADīVṛ 56,14f⟩ *pañca*).

[402] SN V 209,24-26 (no. 48.36): defined as *kāyikaṁ vā cetasikaṁ vā n'eva sātaṁ nâsātaṁ vedayitam.*

[403] SN V 215,27-31. — According to the Vaibhāṣika system, a person in an unconscious state (like *nirodhasamāpatti*) possesses *upekṣendriya* and *mana-indriya* only as past and future, but not in the present (Vi 793b23-25; see fn. 349)

[404] For the Vaibhāṣika system, see fn. 403.

[405] MN I 295,18-26.; MĀ$_C$ 791b11-26 (intercalating *manas* between the five physical sense faculties and life-force; ANĀLAYO 2011: I 272f with n 44).

However, a negative connotation, albeit rare, is not untraceable either. Thus, in the *Abhidharmasamuccya* (AS 27,13f) 'old age and dying' (*jarāmaraṇa*) are defined as that which "yokes sentient beings to the *decline* of youthfulness (/vital vigour) and to the *decline* of life" (*vayaḥpariṇāmena jīvitapariṇāmena ca sattvān yojayati*).[406] The negative connotation is made explicit by the *Bhāṣya*: "because they yoke [them] to the *destruction* of youth and life-span" (ASBh 33,15f: *yauvanāyuṣor vināśena yojanāt*).[407] Similarly, in the *IP* the expression which I restored to ⟨*a*⟩*pariṇata* is rendered by Hsüan-tsang (YBh$_c$ 340c28) as "do not undergo change-and-breakdown"[408] (不變壞), and in the corresponding sūtra quotation in KSi # 24[409] as "without change-and-breakdown" (無變壞),[410] i.e., unimpaired. Likewise, the Chinese version of the canonical source (SĀ$_c$ 150b14) has "do not break down" (不壞).[411] In addition, the purport of the expression is confirmed by its explanation as "not (yet) faded, withered, worn out" (*ma rnyis pa*) in Sumatiśīla's commentary on KSi # 24.[412] The Pāli version of the sūtra (MN I 296,16f; SN IV 294,17), too, confirms this purport insofar as it has indeed "broken down" (*viparibhinna*; Ps II 351,16: *upahata*, *vinaṭṭha*) in the case of the sense faculties at death. In the case of *nirodhasamāpatti*, on the other hand, they are taught to be "perfectly clear, or bright" (*vippasanna*),[413] and in the commentary (Spk III 95,23) this explicitly refers to the five *pasāda*s, i.e., the five pellucid physical sense faculties.[414]

72. Still, some feeling of unease with regard to this somewhat atypical use of (*a*)*pariṇata* may remain. A solution, which at the same time confirms the connection with the sense

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[406] Similarly ParySg (MATSUDA 1994: 98,2 and 3, in the context of explaining the quasi-synonyms for *jarā*): *pariṇatavayaskasya*.

[407] Cf. KRITZER 1999: 50. For a similar connotation in Pāli (passed over in silence by Buescher [B: 66 n. 4]), see *CPD* s.v. *apariṇata* (b) "not ripe for decay", with the textual example *apariṇataṁ akhīṇaṁ āyuṁ* (Sv III 810,27).

[408] For the meaning of 壞 (*huai*[4], used in an intransitive function), see UNGER 1989: 29: "entzweigehen, zusammenbrechen (Dach, Mauer), zerbrechen, zerschellen; Verderb, Ruin".

[409] KSi$_{Mu}$ 27,11.

[410] T 31.1609: 784a5.

[411] Similarly, in the MĀ$_c$ version (789a10f; cf. 791c19), the corresponding expression is rendered as "have not undergone decay and breakdown" (不敗壞), although in this case we cannot be sure of the precise wording of the Indian original.

[412] KSiṬ P ku 95a3 (D hi 84b2f): *ma gyur pa yin zhes bya ba ni ma rnyis pa yin zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*.

[413] In a couple of other passages (Vin I 8,13; DN II 190,24; 205,9-11; SN V 301,23f), this expression refers to a *visible* state resulting from recent Awakening, spiritual progress or meditative practice, but in one of the latter cases (DN II 190,23-27) another person mistakes this state for a symptom of approaching death (*mā h'eva kho rājā ... kālam akāsi* "I hope the king ... is not about to die!"), and in another passage (AN III 380,25f) the senses are indeed stated to become very bright at the time of dying in the case of a person who had recently attained the state of a *sotaāpanna* (cf. 381,7f).

[414] According to Spk III 95,17-24 (cf. BODHI 2000: 1443 n. 302), the sense faculties are perfectly clear or radiant in *nirodhasamāpatti* because they are not, as in ordinary life, fatigued (*kilamanti*) — affected and soiled, so to speak (*upahatāni makkhitāni* [v.l.] *viya*) — by contact with (or impressions from) sense objects, like a mirror secured in a case (hence free from the dust of the crossroad) and shining within (*anto yeva virocati*). This radiance of the sense faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti* implies, of course, their being unimpaired.

faculties, is suggested by a passage of the *Savitarkādi-bhūmi* of the YBh that forms part of a detailed explanation of the twelve members of dependent origination, more precisely: the member 'old age' (*jarā*).[415] After explaining a traditional set of quasi-synonymic characterizations of old age,[416] the text adds a kind of systematizing resumé, towards the end of which it is stated that old age involves, to be sure, a degeneration or decay (*vipariṇāma*) of immaterial faculties (*arūpīndriya-*) like memory (*smṛti*) and intellect (*buddhi*)[417] but also a decay (*vipariṇāma*, Ch. 變壞,[418] Tib. *yongs su 'gyur ba*[419]) of the physical sense faculties (*rūpīndriya-*), i.e., their deterioration (*paripāka*, lit.: [over-]ripeness),[420] manifesting itself as natural dullness, and their breakdown (*paribheda*).[421] Especially the latter aspect doubtless characterizes old age at the verge of dying, which in its turn is marked by the [complete and definitive] collapse and cessation of the physical sense faculties (*rūpiṇām indriyāṇāṁ nirodhaḥ*).[422] The closeness of this text to the description of death in the *Dharmadinnā-sūtra* and in $SĀ_c$ no. 568 is further confirmed by the characterization of dying as the cessation of life-

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[415] YBh_{Bh} 210,1–211,7.

[416] Cf. NidSa no. 16.15 (cf. $SĀ_c$ no. 298: 85b13-16; SN no. 12.2: II 2,28-30); PrĀVNS 118,11-14; AVinSū 13,4-9. Cf. also DhSk 480b1 and 513b2: 根熟變壞, where 熟 renders *paripāka* and 變壞 *paribheda* ($DhSk_D$ 68,12f is abbreviated).

[417] YBh_{Bh} 211,5f (*arūpīndriyavipariṇāmaḥ*), resuming 210,12f (*hāniḥ katamā | yā smṛtibuddhyoḥ* (sc. *hāniḥ*) | *parihāṇiḥ katamā | yā smṛtibuddhyor māndyāt kuśaladharmasamudānayanāpratibalatā* |).

[418] YBh_C 324a5.

[419] YBh_t P dzi 123b7, ignoring the prefix *vi-*, just as in the *IP*, where it has *yongs su ma gyur pa* (dzi 172a7: see fn. 129).

[420] Cf. NidSa p. 163 n. 10; cf. also *PW* s.v. *pac + pari* (2): "... seinem Ende zugehen"; s.v. *paripakva* (3): "ganz reif, so v.a. dem Verfalle –, dem Ende –, dem Vergehen –, dem Tode nahe"; similarly *MW* and *APTE* s.v. *paripakva* (*APTE*: "6 Decaying, on the point of decay or death").

[421] YBh_{Bh} 211,5f (*rūpīndriyavipariṇāmaḥ*), resuming 210,13f (*indriyāṇāṁ paripākaḥ*[1] *katamaḥ | yā prakṛtimandatā | paribhedaḥ katamaḥ | yā teṣām eva viṣayāpracuratā*). For the concept of *paribheda*, cf. $VinSg_{ms}$ 24b7 (YBh_t P zi 59a5f; D zhi 56a5f; YBh_C 600c2f), where the breakdown of the sense faculties (*indriyaparibheda*) is, in a different context, defined as comprising their becoming weak (*mandībhāva*) as well as their complete destruction (*sarveṇa sarvaṁ vināśaḥ*). Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 57,19f: *katham indriyam aparibhinnaṁ bhavati | ... avināśato 'mandībhāvataś ca.* In the PSVy, old age in the sense of breakdown (*yongs su nyams pa'i rgas pa, paribhedajarā*) insofar as it is characterized by the decay of the sense faculties (*indriyavipariṇāma*) is referred to both the weakness of the sense faculties with regard to the perception of their objects (*viṣayopalabdhidaurbalya*) and to their destruction (*vināśa*) (P chi 56b8 + 57a5f; D chi 49b1+4f: *dbang po rnam par 'gyur ba'i mtshan nyid ni yul la dmigs pa'i stobs zhan pa dang nyams pas so*; for the Sanskrit equivalents, see the parallel in AVinSūN 152,11f).

[1] Ed. *pariṇāmaḥ*, but ms. clearly *paripākaḥ*, as in NidSa 16.15 and PrĀVNS 118,13f.

[422] YBh_{Bh} 211,11f. Cf. also PSVy P chi 58a5 (D chi 50b1f), quoting from the **Ādiviśeṣavibhāga-dharmaparyāya*[1] (T 16.716: 833a12f; 717: 840a25f) the statement that the specific characteristic (**svalakṣaṇa*) of death consists in the departure and disappearance (?) of *vijñāna* from the body and in the fact that the physical sense faculties have declined (/collapsed?) (*dge slong dag de la shi ba'i rang gi mtshan nyid ni lus las rnam par shes pa bral zhing 'jig pa dang | dbang po gzugs can rnams nub par 'gyur pa las rig par bya'o* ||). Cf. MATSUDA 1982a: 64.

[1] On this text, see MATSUDA 1982a; cf. also MUROJI 1993: 195 n. 358.

span[423] and body-heat and, above all, as the *vijñāna*'s departing from the body (*vijñānasyâ-śrayād apakrāntiḥ*).[424] In view of this evidence, I have no doubt that in the sūtra passage under discussion one of the distinctions between death and *nirodhasamāpatti* consists in that in the former the sense faculties have collapsed,[425] whereas in the latter they are unimpaired. But the wording of the sūtra passage is not better reconstructed as *(*a*)*pariṇata* but as *(*a*)<u>*vi-*</u>*pariṇata*. Likewise, in the *IP* the defective reading of the ms. should probably be restored to *rūpiṣv indriye⟨ṣv a<u>vi</u>⟩pariṇateṣu*. This reading would remove the semantic uneasiness caused by *apariṇateṣu* and agrees perfectly with the combined evidence of the Tibetan and the Chinese translation,[426] which are both exactly the same in the *IP*[427] and in the SavitBh passage, the Tibetan focussing on the 'literal' meaning of the main constituent (°*pariṇata*) but disregarding the specific connotation conferred on it by the additional prefix *vi*°, whereas the Chinese does justice to both constituents by combining the literal and the factual meaning. Yet, even if further evidence should prove that the *IP* and the sūtra on which it is based had, after all, not (*a*)*vipariṇata* but (*a*)*pariṇata*, the meaning "(un)impaired" or "(un)decayed" would still be unassailable in view of the fact that there is textual evidence for this nuance even in connection with the sense faculties, viz., in DBhS$_{R}$ 6G (50,15),[428] where one of the effects of old age (*jarā*) is to cause the degeneration or decay of the sense faculties (*indriya-pariṇāmaṁ karoti*).

3.3.3 The Locative

73. As for the syntactical function of the locative *rūpiṣv indriye⟨ṣv a(vi)⟩pariṇateṣu*, there are two possibilities: we may take it either as an absolute locative, or as a locative proper. While I decided for the latter alternative, Buescher emphatically rejects this possibility and

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[423] Cf. also the statement of VinSg$_{ms}$ 21a6 (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 50b8; D zhi 48a5; YBh$_{c}$ 597a18f) that 'dying' (*maraṇa*) refers to a calamitous unbalance (*vaiṣamya*) [consisting in or due to] the decline or dissolution (*vipariṇāma*; cf. fn. 425) of the life faculty (*jīvitendriya*).

[424] YBh$_{Bh}$ 211,10-13.

[425] For this meaning of *vipariṇāma*, see fn. 265. For the doubtfulness of Buescher's contention that "as forces in the organism, the *indriya*s cannot putrefy" (B: 95), see § 53.1.4 with fn. 271.

[426] Actually, in Hsüan-tsang's translation of YBh and AKBh, in the majority of cases 變壞 corresponds to forms or derivates of *vi-pari-√nam*, occasionally to *vipaḍumaka*, to forms or derivates of (*vi-*)*pra-√naś* and to *rūpaṇā*/*rūpyate*, but to *pariṇāma*/*pariṇata* only in the sense of "digestion" /"digested", with, as far as I can see, very few (doubtful) exceptions. I have noted:

1. YBh$_{c}$ 452c5 = ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 374,5 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2008]: 70,2), where *apariṇatā* (fem. sg.) clearly has the meaning of *a<u>vi</u>pariṇatā* because it contrasts with *vipariṇatā* (Tib. *rnam par gyur pa*) in ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 374,6 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2008]: 70,3). It should perhaps even be emended accordingly in view of YBh$_{t}$ P wi 165a6 <u>*rnam par*</u> *ma nyams pa*.[1]

   [1] By the way: for ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III (2008): 70,1-3 *yathā câ*° ... *yāvad ba*°, Tib. (YBh$_{t}$ P wi 165a6: ... *gang yin pa dang* ... *gang yin pa ni*) and Chin. (YBh$_{c}$ 452c4f: 若 ... 若 ...) suggest an emendation to *yā câ*° ... *yā ca ba*°.

2. YBh$_{c}$ 690c8f, where 壽命變壞 may indeed correspond to **āyuḥpariṇāma* in view of YBh$_{t}$ P zi 289b1 *tshe 'i tshad* = **āyuḥparimāṇa*.

On the other hand, even in AS 27,13f Hsüan-tsang renders *pariṇāma* as "change" (變異: T 31.1605: 671a16), though seemingly with a negative connotation.

[427] See fn. 418.

[428] DBhS$_{K}$ 99,15f. Cf. KRITZER 1999: 52. The reading is confirmed by ms. B fol. 30b3 (MATSUDA 1996a: 76), while the respective folio in ms. A is missing (ibid. p. xxvi).

opts for the former. On the basis of his understanding of *apariṇata* as "untransformed" in the sense of "unactualized", he seems to understand the locative phrase as explicating *nirodha-samāpatti*

> as a state in which the sensory capacities are not transformed (*apariṇata*) [into cognitive actualizations], (B: 76 # 43)

whereas

> "[u]nlike the sensory capacities, *ālayavijñāna* has not stopped to move on (*anuparata*). (B: 77,2f)

We may thus, perhaps, render the locative phrase, in terms of Buescher's understanding, as

> while/whereas the sense faculties [remain] untransformed/unactualized.

Still, one might ask why the continued functioning of *ālayavijñāna* is contrasted only with the absence of the functioning of the sense faculties, hence with the absence of sense perceptions, but does not take into account the absence of *manovijñāna* and its conditions, although this is the cognitive activity that would, if any, be the most likely to arise on such a level of deep meditative absorption. Alternatively, one might take the phrase as purporting an implicit criticism of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', viz., by pointing out that its solution of the problem of the continuity of *vijñāna* does not work because the material sense faculties, considered to carry the Seeds of mind during *nirodhasamāpatti*, cannot do so because they are themselves unactualized, i.e., in a state of Seeds. But I am not sure that this is what Buescher has in mind, and if so it would, of course, entirely depend on his understanding of the meaning of *⟨a⟩pariṇata*, which is hardly tenable (see ch. 3.3.2) and at any rate incompatible with Hsüan-tsang's rendering of this word (§ 71) and with the fact that probably we have to restore it to *⟨avi⟩pariṇata* (72).

74.0. I myself prefer the second alternative, i.e., to take *rūpiṣv indriye⟨ṣv a(vi)⟩pariṇateṣu* as a locative complement locating the *ālayavijñāna* "in the physical sense faculties, which are (or, in view of the position of *⟨a(vi)⟩pariṇateṣu* after the noun it qualifies, perhaps: since they are) unimpaired". My choice is based on three main reasons:

74.1. The Tibetan translation and probably also the Chinese translation render the expression as a locative proper.[429] Buescher (B: 80, Ex. 14) mentions this fact but seems to deny its importance. Considering a locative proper to be irreconcilable with the nature of the sense faculties, Buescher — to use his own style of arguing[430] — virtually charges the Tibetan translators and a distinguished Abhidharma and Yogācāra master like Hsüan-tsang

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[429] YBh$_t$ P dzi 172a7: *de'i dbang po gzugs can yongs su ma gyur pa rnams* ***la*** (see fn. 129); YBh$_c$ 340c28f: 不變壞諸色根中 (see fn. 130).

[430] Cf. B: 53 n. 2, where Buescher accuses me of having thought of the author(s) of Saṁdh V.2–3 "as having not yet really understood what they were doing" and thus of having assumed "a stunning theoretical incompetence on par of the Y.(-V.)scholars", because I pointed out (S 1987 # 3.9.2.6) a certain inconsistency between two statements of the text: on the one hand, the explanation (in Saṁdh V.3) of *ālayavijñāna* having this name because it sticks or hides in the body, and on the other the recognition (in Saṁdh V.2: 55,13-15) of its presence also during an existence in the incorporeal world-sphere (where there is no body to hide in). I remorsefully confess my orientalist arrogance. Actually, the apparent inconsistency could indeed be explained by the assumption that the author(s) of the text preferred to elucidate the subliminal mind's being called *ālayavijñāna* (as also its being called *ādāna-vijñāna*) in terms of features or functions it has in our present form of existence (cf. § 124), and in terms that allowed an etymologizing pattern at that. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that there was also a historical reason for this preference.

with not having correctly understood a fundamental concept of Buddhist philosophy. To be sure, even these masters may occasionally have been wrong or inattentive; but if we assume that they were so in a given case, the *onus probandi* is of course on us.

74.2. Although the opposition *pravṛttivijñāna* versus *ālayavijñāna* as well as the context of *nirodhasamāpatti* strongly suggests the connotation of latency for '*ālaya*', it is, as pointed out above (§ 44), important to take notice of the presence of the prefix *ā-*, i.e., we have to do not with '*laya*' (which may indeed mean just disappearance or latency) but with a derivate of the verb *ā-√lī*, the primary meaning of which is "to cling to, stick to or in", with the occasional nuance of "to withdraw into" or "hide oneself in", preferably construed with an accusative or locative. Thus, a locative complement is perfectly consonant with the linguistic expectation aroused by a form or derivate of *ā-√lī*, and is indeed regularly found or implied also in later etymologizing explanations of the term *ālayavijñāna* (see § 107, etc.).

74.3. The third reason for my decision was my understanding of the *IP* as a development or refinement of what Buescher calls the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' (see § 39), or, more precisely, a refinement of one of its components, viz., of the assumption, devised for the sake of bridging the interruption of mental activities during unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti*, that not only the mind (*vijñāna*) but also the five sense faculties along with their seats (*sādhiṣṭhāna*) — i.e., the subtle sense faculties along with their visible areas of the body where they are located (practically: the sentient physical organism as a whole) — are accompanied by, or endowed with, the Seeds (*bīja*) of mind (*citta*) and mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*). In S 1987 (# 2.11), I have pointed out that the Seeds are sometimes qualified as "sticking in" (*sanniviṣṭa*) the entity endowed with them. Of course, Seeds do not stick in the mind or in corporeal matter like seeds in a fruit. 'Sticking in' is just another metaphor for presence or inherence. The Seeds are merely potentialities explaining, according to the 'bi-polar model', that mind and corporeal matter are not only able to keep themselves going but are also capable of re-establishing each other after phases of interruption. Since I understand *ālaya-vijñāna* in the *IP* as an attempt, stimulated by the requirement of the sūtra text (see § 43), to conceive the Seeds of mind inherent in the sense faculties (along with their seats) as a Seed-like, latent form or state of mind, it sounds natural to me that this latent form of mind, too, is, in the beginning, still conceived of as somehow[431] inherent, or 'sticking', in the sense faculties.

75. Against this interpretation, Buescher (B: 70,31ff) objects that in the VinSg passage where the 'bi-polar *bīja-* model' is set forth we only read that the sense faculties are "associated with / accompanied by / endowed with" Seeds, but not that these Seeds "stick in"

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[431] Cf. NA 475a14-17:

If you say that immaterial [dharmas] do not have a place where they stay (i.e., are not localized in space) ..., [we answer that] ... the expression 'do not have a place where they stay' is intended to (**adhikṛtya*, **saṁdhāya*?) reject [the idea] that the *vijñāna*s stay in the sense faculties and the objects just as a man [sits] in a chair. [But] it is *not* the case that there is absolutely no way (lit. sense, meaning) in which *vijñāna* is united with matter (*rūpa*), for the *sūtra*s speak of "the body endowed with mind" (*savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ*), and in another sūtra it is said that "*vijñāna* has not departed from the body".
若謂非色無所住處 ... 者, ... 無所住言 依遮諸識住根及境 如人座故。非識與色合義全無。以契經言有識身故。又經說識不離身故。

them. This is true,[432] but from other passages it becomes clear that the two expressions "X is accompanied by, or endowed with Seeds" and "Seeds are stored/assembled or 'stick' in X" are equivalent and exchangeable. Cf., e.g., YBh_{Bh} 52,16 (*cittasantatau bījāni sanniviṣṭāni*) and 55,14 (*cittasanniviṣṭasya ...bījasya*)[433] beside 200,16f (*vijñānaṁ ... bījopagatam*). In the *Karmasiddhi*, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is actually expressed in terms of 'sticking in' or inherence (Tib. *la*, dependent on *gnas pa*, corresponding almost certainly to a locative, as in the *IP*, or a locative-tatpuruṣa):

> The Seeds of mind and mental factors are present both *on/in* the continuum of mind (**cittasantati*) and *on/in* the continuum of the physical sense faculties (**rūpīndriya-santati*).[434]

A passage of the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* of the VinSg states that the Seeds of (moral and spiritual) defilements (*kleśa*) *on/in* (*la*, 於...中) pellucid matter (**rūpaprasāda*, i.e., *in* the sense faculties; cf. ch. 3.3.1.1) and *on/in* mind and mental factors, provided that they have not yet been destroyed and abandoned, are called *anuśaya*s.[435] And the statement of the *Pratītya-samutpādavyākhyā* (PSVy) that according to the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' the mind processes rearise, after *nirodhasamāpatti*, from the continuum of the sense of touch (*kāyendriya*) that had been impregnated by [previous] mind processes (**cittaparibhāvita*)[436] is rephrased in

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[432] Apart from stating that the mind as well as the sense faculties along with their seats are **sarva-bīja(ka)*, the text (cf. fn. 162) oscillates between a twofold phraseology, which is most clearly reflected in Hsüan-tsang's rendering (for Paramārtha, see fn. 1388):

1. "A is B-種子(之)所隨逐" (YBh_c 583b26f; c2f; c7), and
2. "B-種子 隨逐(於)A" (583c5; c10) or "隨逐 A 有 B-種子" (583b22-26).

This could be based on a passive and an active use of an expression like **anuga(ta)* or **upaga(ta)* (cf. *YBh-I* [1996]: 485b and 625), respectively:

1. "A is B-*bījānugata*", i.e., "A is accompanied by the Seeds of B", and
2. "the *bīja*s of B are A-*anuga(ta)*", i.e., "the Seeds of B accompany A", or
"[among the *bīja*s that are] A-*anuga(ta)* (or A-*upaga(ta)*) there are the *bīja*s of B", i.e., "[among the Seeds that] accompany A there are the Seeds of B".

In the Tibetan translation, we have, accordingly,

1. "A (*ni*) B *kyi sa bon dang ldan pa* (*yin no*) (YBh_t P zi 15b8f; 16a2f; 16a4f; lit.: "A is connected with = accompanied by the Seeds of B"), and
2. "B *dang ldan pa ni* A *kyi sa bon yin no*" (P zi 15b6-8; lit.: "as for what is connected with = accompanies B, it is the Seeds of A").

[433] Cf. also, e.g., VśVṛ 5,13 or MAVṬ 168,11.

[434] KSi # 23 (KSi_{Mu} 25,3-5): *sems dang sems las byung ba dag gi sa bon ni sems kyi rgyud dang | dbang po gzugs can gyi rgyud gnyis la gnas pa yin te* |. The Chinese version by Hsüan-tsang (T 31.1609: 783c20f) has "rest on" (依附, 依) for Tib. *la gnas pa*, suggesting **sanniviṣṭa* (cf. *YBh-I* 1996: 84b), whereas in the earlier translation (T 31.1608: 779a25) the locative is rendered as "in" (中).

[435] YBh_t P zi 215a5f (D zhi 205b2): *dang ba'i gzugs dang | sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos ... la nyong mongs pa'i sa bon yang dag par ma bcom pa dang | ma spangs pa gang yin pa de ni bag la nyal zhes bya ste*, ≈ YBh_c 661b26-28: 若於清淨諸色 及於...心心所中 煩惱種子 未害未斷 說名隨眠.

[436] PSVy P chi 20a7 (MUROJI 1993: 84,5-7): *sems las de 'byung ba ma yin gyi | sems kyis yongs su bsgos pa nyid ni lus kyi dbang po'i rgyun las yin pa'i phyir ro*, which should be based on something like **na tac cittād utpadyate, api tu cittaparibhāvitāt kāyendriyasantānāt* (*nyid ni* is problematic: cf. MUROJI 1993: 162 with n. 216; °*paribhāvitāt* misread as °*paribhāvitatā*? Or should we read *nyid kyi* = °*paribhāvitād eva*?).

Guṇamati's commentary in terms of Seeds [of previous mind processes] being present *on/in* (*la*) the sense of touch.[437]

76.1. In addition, Buescher (B: 70,14-30; 71,16-18) stresses that in the passage describing the 'bi-polar *bīja*- model' what is stated to be endowed with Seeds is not just the sense faculties but the sense faculties along with their seats (*sādhiṣṭhāna*), and that this is essential and would hold good for *ālayavijñāna* as well, so that in the *IP* the locative could possibly be understood as an ordinary locative only if the qualification *sādhiṣṭhāna* had been added or if some term for corporeal matter (*kāya* or *āśraya*) had been used.

76.2. This argument is obviously based on the postulate that the sense faculties themselves are mere capacities and cannot reasonably be regarded as material and thus as something Seeds could "stick in" — a postulate that in an emic perspective (which is the only one relevant here) is hardly tenable, as I have tried to show in ch. 3.3.1.1.

76.3.0. Moreover, Buescher's contention that Seeds (and hence *ālayavijñāna* in the *IP*) cannot be stated to 'stick'/inhere in the sense faculties alone can easily be discarded by a closer look at the passages describing the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'.

76.3.1. Even the basic description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg, though starting with the statement that both the physical sense faculties along with their seats (**sādhiṣṭhāna*) and the mind (*vijñāna*) are furnished with all Seeds (**sarvabījaka*),[438] subsequently specifies this statement by enumerating the Seeds that accompany the physical sense faculties, *without* mentioning their seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*).[439] Similarly, in connection with *nirodhasamāpatti*, first it is the sense faculties along with their primary elements (*mahābhūta*) that are stated to be endowed with the Seeds also of the mind and the mental factors, but at the end only the sense faculties themselves are mentioned.[440]

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[437] PSVyṬ P chi 156b3 (D chi 130b4): *lus kyi* (P : *kyang* D) *dbang po la* (*la* | D : *las* P) *sa bon gnas pa yin no* ||.

[438] YBh$_t$ P zi 15b5f (D zhi 13b1f): *dbang pa gzugs can rten dang bcas pa gang yin pa dang* | *rnam par shes pa gang yin pa 'di gnyis ni mdor na sa bon thams cad pa zhes bya'o*; similarly YBh$_C$ 583b21f (諸色根根依). Cf. also VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c4f: "The sense faculties that have *rūpa*: i.e., those that have a seat. [These] along with (?) the mind: these two kinds of dharmas are *sarvabīja(ka?)*" (根有色者 有依者是。以是識者，此二種法 為一切種。).

[439] YBh$_t$ P zi 15b6f (D zhi 13b2f):

> As for the [Seeds] accompanying the physical sense faculties, [these] are the Seeds of these physical sense faculties and [those of] the other material dharmas as well as the Seeds of definitively all [forms of] mind and mental factors.
>
> (*dbang po gzugs can dang ldan pa ni* | *dbang po gzugs can de dag dang* | *de las gzhan pa'i chos gzugs can rnams kyi sa bon kyang yin la* | *sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos thams cad kho na'i sa bon kyang yin no* ||)

Similarly YBh$_C$ 583b22-24 (隨逐色根 有諸色根種子...) and VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c5-7:

> The Seeds of all the physical sense faculties, the Seeds of all [other] material dharmas, the Seeds of all [kinds of] mind and mental factors: they all are based on the physical sense faculties (and are also based on the mind).
>
> 一切色根種 一切色法種 一切心心法種 悉依色根 亦依於識。

[440] YBh$_t$ P zi 16a2-4 (D zhi 13b5-7):

> If the physical sense faculties along with their primary elements were not equipped with the Seeds of mind and mental factors, then in the case of a [person] who has entered *nirodhasamāpatti* ... the mind should not rearise afterwards, but it does. Therefore one must know that it is on account of [the fact

76.3.2. In a passage referring to the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' that is found in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmi* of the VinSg,[441] *only* the sense faculties are mentioned but *not* their seats. This is also the case in the passage from the same chapter that had been quoted in § 75, in a passage at that where the use of the locative clearly characterizes the Seeds as 'sticking' or inherent in the physical sense faculties. The same holds good for the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the *Karmasiddhi* (see § 75).

76.3.3. In the PSVy (see § 75), what receives the impregnation of the mind or contains its Seed(s) is the sense of touch (**kāyendriya*). According to another passage of the same text, however, it is simply the body (**kāya*).[442] In the *Śrāvakabhūmi* we even find the statement that the Seed of all *vijñāna*s is present in the body consisting of the four primary elements (*asmin kāye caturmahābhūtike*),[443] whereas in a passage of the VaSg (II.4.iii) the 'sixfold basis' (**ṣaḍāyatana*, i.e., the six senses) is the carrier of the Seed(s) of the six *vijñāna*s.[444]

76.4. A similar oscillation can also be observed in connection with '[biological] appropriation' (*upādāna*), i.e., keeping the physical organism alive: According to a passage from the VaSg (III.5.i),[445] what is appropriated by *vijñāna* is the primary elements of the sense faculties (**indriyamahābhūta*). In Saṁdh V.3, the subliminal mind appropriates simply "this body" (*lus 'di*; cf. § 124), and in V.2 the physical sense faculties along with their seats (**sādhiṣṭhāna*). In *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg) I.5,[446] however, only the five physical sense faculties (*dbang po gzugs can lnga po*) are mentioned in this connection.

76.5. One possibility for interpreting the evidence is that strictly speaking it is not so much the seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the sense faculties, i.e., the visible organs or the body, but the sense organs themselves that are the main carrier of the Seeds of the mind (and the mental factors), and that the seats may or may not be mentioned separately. This would mean that these Seeds

that] the physical sense faculties [are] equipped with the Seeds of mind and mental [factors][1] that [mind can] rearise.

[1] YBh$_c$: "the Seeds of mind ... accompany the physical sense faculties". Cf. fn. 432.

gal te dbang po gzugs can rang gi 'byung ba chen po dang bcas pa dag sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos rnams kyi sa bon dang ldan pa ma yin du zin na | 'di na 'gog pa la snyoms par zhugs pa... 'i rnam par shes pa phyis yang 'byung bar mi 'gyur ba zhig na 'byung ste | de lta bas na dbang po gzugs can sems dang sems las byung ba'i sa bon dang ldan pa la brten te 'byung bar rig par bya'o ||

Similarly YBh$_c$ 583c2-6 (若諸色根及自大種 ....。是故當知 心心所種子 隨逐色根。...). VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c9-11 mentions only the physical sense faculties (有色根, 色根), with no reference to their primary elements.

441 YBh$_t$ P zi 228b7 (see fn. 162). Cf. also YBh$_t$ P zi 124a2f (D zhi 118b3f; YBh$_c$ 625a16-18; AHN 2013: 1219), stating that the *anuśaya*s to be removed by the *darśanamārga* may be divided into two groups: those that accompany pellucid matter (隨逐清淨色, i.e., the sense faculties) and those that accompany the mind and mental factors (*dang ba'i gzugs dang rjes su 'brel pa dang sems dang sems las byung ba dang rjes su 'brel pa ...*).

442 PSVy P 20b1f (MUROJI 1993: 86,1-3 and 163 n. 219): ... *yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i sa bon rgyud gnyis la yod par 'gyur te | gcig ni sems kyi rgyun la{s} bsgos pa'o || gcig ni lus kyi rgyun la'o ||*.

443 See fn. 167.

444 YBh$_t$ P 'i 252a4f (D zi 218b2f; YBh$_c$ 814b11-13): *rnam par shes pa'i tshogs drug po rnams kyi ni ... skye mched drug ni rgyu yin la ... | skye mched drug ni de dag gi sa bon gyi gnas yin pa ...*

445 See ch. 4.2.5.6; cf. also fn. 173.

446 Thus also MSgBh$_t$ P li 150a2f (*mig la sogs pa'i dbang po gzugs can rnams*) and MSgU$_t$ P li 240a6 (*dbang po gzugs can thams cad*).

are considered to inhere, in the first place, in the most subtle and at the same time most stable,[447] enduring part of the body,[448] i.e., in the sense faculties, or in the sense of touch as the most basic of them (cf. § 58), and only in the second place, or indirectly, in their gross support. Since this would likewise hold good for the *IP*, there is no reason to query the idea that the latent form of mind, as that which the Seeds of mind in the sense faculties have come to be conceived of here, likewise somehow inheres in the latter, albeit with a clear contextual shift of accent from 'sticking in' to 'lying hidden in',[449] in contrast to the ordinary forms of mind characterized by 'coming forth' (*pravṛtti*: see § 44.3).

76.6.0. Another (and perhaps more probable) explanation would be that the expression "sense faculties" (*indriya*) is not always used in its strict, Abhidharmic sense of a specific, pellucid kind of derivative matter, but is, for the sake of simplicity and perhaps under the influence of its less specific use in the canonical texts, also used in a looser sense tacitly including the primary elements of the sense faculties and perhaps even their seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*). There is, indeed, sufficient additional evidence for such an assumption. A few examples may suffice:

76.6.1. In the VinSg,[450] one of the four causes for a modification (*vikāra*) of the sense faculties is previous karma, because under its influence they are modified so as to become either beautiful or ugly, etc. (*pūrvakarmādhipatyena saurūpyavairūpyādibhiḥ*). This can hardly refer to the invisible sense faculties. The same holds good for another passage of the VinSg[451] where a sūtra passage[452] speaking of our material, coarse body, made of the four elements, built up by (= achieving growth through) boiled rice and/or coarse gruel, always requiring ointment, bathing, and massage, and [yet] bound to be broken, cut, scattered and destroyed is taken to refer to the seven physical faculties, i.e., the five senses and the faculties of femininity and masculinity.

76.6.2. In the *Madhyāntavibhāga-bhāṣya* (MAVBh), the statement

> The 'mind that appears as sentient being(s)' (MAV I.3) is the one that [appears] as the five sense faculties in one's own or others' continuum[453]

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[447] Cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 252a5 (D zi 218b3: VaSg II.4.iii): "The [six internal] *āyatana*s invariably continue to exist (√*vṛt*?) *in the same form*, just as they have been obtained" (*ji ltar thob pa'i skye mched gcig tu nges par rnam pa gcig tu 'gyur ba'i phyir ro* ||; YBh$_c$ 814b13f: 又內六處 相續一類 如先所得 畢竟轉故。).

[448] The sense faculties normally remain appropriated as long as life lasts (MSg I.5). Once abandoned, they cannot recontinue (see fn. 349). The sense of touch (*kāyendriya*) is in any case present from the very beginning of life to its end (see fn. 347).

[449] In the case of the Seeds, latency is self-evident, and thus emphasis is on where they inhere. In the case of *vijñāna*, however, latency is unusual and hence in need of emphasis in order to explain the possibility of its presence in *nirodhasamāpatti*.

[450] Cf. VinSg$_{ms}$ 24b7f (YBh$_t$ P zi 59a7–b2; D zhi 56a6–b2; YBh$_c$ 600c4-10). Cf. MATSUDA 1988: 17(b).

[451] YBh$_t$ P zi 100b5-8 (D zhi 97a1-3; YBh$_c$ 617a2-6).

[452] See, e.g., SĀ$_c$ 282b23f (no. 1079) and MN I 144,2-4 (no. 23). For the Sanskrit original see ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 442,10-13, revised in DELEANU 2006: I 322,5-7, for further Pāli parallels ibid. II 501; my paraphrase is an adaptation of DELEANU's translation (II 449).

[453] MAVBh 18,23f: *satvapratibhāsaṁ yat pañcendriyatvena svaparasantānayoḥ*. Cf. fn. 382.

does obviously not refer to the imperceptible sense faculties strictly speaking but to sentient bodies. Similarly, the sense faculties (*cakṣurādayaḥ*) at *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra-bhāṣya* 169,7 (ad XIX.49) are understood by Sthiramati as the body endowed with the six senses,[454] and in MSg II.5 the five sense faculties are identified with the representation (**vijñapti*) of the (living, sentient) body.[455]

76.6.3. That the term *indriya* may also be used for the *seats* of the sense faculties proper is explicitly confirmed by Vasubandhu in his PSVy,[456] although reference is to sūtra passages and everyday language. Interestingly enough, one of the canonical passages adduced is a sūtra in which the body of the Buddha is described as having become old and wrinkled, and his *indriyas* are stated to have changed (*gzhan du gyur pa*).[457] Since the Buddha is still able to see, etc., this cannot, according to Vasubandhu, mean that the sense faculties proper have deteriorated but can only refer to a change of their seats, i.e., to an alteration (for the worse) of their appearance.

76.6.4. The *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍa-vyākhyā* (VGPVy) expressly defines the *rūpīṇîndriyāṇi* in MSg I.5 (see § 76.4) as being meant to include also the primary elements on which they are based[458] and the sense objects (visibles, etc.) that exist unseparated from them, i.e., the whole 'molecules' furnished with sense faculties.[459]

76.7. From this point of view, nothing prevents us from also presupposing such a loose employment of the concept of sense faculties for the *IP*, still more so since the [sense] faculties (*indriya*; cf. § 70[1–2]) are also mentioned in the sūtra to which the *IP* refers, and surely without presupposing the sophisticated Abhidharmic differentiation between the sense faculties proper and their primary elements or even seats. In this perspective, the idea of (*ālaya*)*vijñāna* 'sticking' or lying hidden in the sense faculties would not be essentially different from the idea of its merging with, lying hidden in or pervading the body (*kāya*).[460]

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454 SAVBh P tsi 242a7f (D tsi 208b6): *dbang po drug dang bcas pa'i lus.*

455 Cf. MSgU$_t$ P li 269b4f (D ri 220a5; ad MSg II.2.1): "In this connection, the representation of the body (**dehavijñaptiḥ*) is [the one that] appears as the physical sense faculties (*rūpīndriyapratibhāsā*)" (*de la lus kyi rnam par rig pa ni dbang po gzugs can du snang ba ste*). MSgBh$_t$ P li 170b3: *de la lus ni mig la sogs pa'i khams lnga'o*; thus also MSBh$_{Pa}$ 181c10; MSgBh$_{Dh}$ 284a6f; MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 338a12f.

456 PSVy P 24a3-6 (D 21b2-5; MUROJI 1993: 104,3-18 and 183f).

457 MUROJI (1993: 105 n. 82) refers to SN V 217,4-6, which has *dissati ca indriyānaṁ aññathattaṁ*. In Ps ad MN II 110,17, *aññathattaṁ* is explained as *vivaṇṇatāya aññathābhāvo* (*CPD* I 56a).

458 Cf., in this connection, also the passage quoted from Chi (基) in fn. 317.

459 VGPVy P li 376a3f (D ri 313a2f): *dbang po gzugs can thams cad ni 'dir rten du gyur pa'i 'byung ba chen po dag dang | de dag dang tha mi dad par 'dug pa yul gzugs la sogs pa dang bcas pa la dgongs pa yin no ||.*

460 This has also been suggested, in the context of this controversy, by A. BAYER when he writes (2010: 390,29f) that '*rūpīndriya*' "is often a code word for the body, the appropriated *rūpaskandha*", or (393,29f): "Still, I hope to have shown that the expression *rūpiṣv indriyeṣu* does at least implicitly mean 'in the body'." Cf. also MATSUMOTO's (M2: 225,16f) paraphrase of my understanding of *ālaya-vijñāna* in the *IP* as "*vijñāna* that even in *nirodhasamāpatti* continues to be present in such a way that it sticks or lies hidden in the physical sense faculties or in the body (諸の有色根 *(rūpīndriya)*、または身体 *(kāya)* に)". Similarly, in the context of *upādāna* (see § 76.4), MATSUMOTO (M2: 319,17f) remarks that the meaning of '*indriyamahābhūta*' and '*rūpīndriya*' may not be too different (大きく意味の異なるものではないであろう).

This idea is attested in the MauBh of the YBh[461] and in the Saṁdh,[462] and is of central importance in the proofs for the existence of *ālayavijñāna* assembled in the 'Proof Portion'[463] of the treatment of this concept in the PañcMBhVin.[464] It is even found in later Yogācāra-(-Vijñānavāda) sources,[465] and the same also holds good for the idea of *ālayavijñāna* pervading the sense faculties.[466] Moreover, the idea of *ālayavijñāna* dwelling in the body would seem to have its prehistory in certain features of the canonical concept of *vijñāna*.[467]

77. Apart from this, I am afraid that Buescher's polemical focus on the aspect of "sticking in" as the "dominant conception of ālayavijñāna" (B: 71,21) in my thesis is somewhat biased. Actually, I expressly stated (S 1987: 155) that, although basically accepting Suguro's proposal to take *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of "*vijñāna* that sticks in the body", I would lay more stress (at any rate in the case of the *IP*) on the nuance of its hiding or *lying hidden* (cf. § 44) in the body, or in the physical sense faculties (either as the most subtle and stable component of the corporeal basis of individual existence, the one that is closest to *vijñāna* as the principle of life and sentience, or in a less strict sense including their primary elements or even their seats and thus the whole sentient body: see § 76.5–76.6). Admittedly, emphasis on the nuance of 'lying hidden in' has no bearing on the fact that I take the *IP* to describe *ālaya-vijñāna* as somehow located in the physical sense faculties. Yet, Buescher's contention (B: 71,25ff) that this location is excluded by the fact that in the *IP* it is *ālayavijñāna*, and not the sense faculties, that is qualified as "comprising the potentialities of actual consciousness

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[461] YBh_{Bh} 24,1–25,1 (cf. S 1987 # 3.3.1.1–2).

[462] Saṁdh V.3 (see § 122.1).

[463] See § 231 with fn. 1274.

[464] Among the eight proofs, only five are positive proofs, while three merely defend the simultaneity of *vijñāna*s in one and the same mind continuum. Of the five positive proofs, four are based on *ālaya-vijñāna*'s inhering in and pervading the body (see § 89.3; cf. S 1987: 195 # 9.2[A.1]).

[465] PSk 17,5 (see § 121.2); $GhVy_{c1}$ 731c3: "The *ālayavijñāna*, dwelling in the body, stores all Seeds" (藏識住於身 攝藏諸種子) ≈ $GhVy_{c2}$ 756c20 (賴耶住於身 ...) ≈ $GhVy_t$ S 321a6f ≈ D 21b7f (*de bzhin kun gzhi rnam par shes* || ... *'gro ba dag gi lus la ni* || *khyab gnas sa bon kun can* [D] *no* ||); $GhVy_{c1}$ 738a24: "In this way, the home-ground (*ālaya*) of all [manifest forms of] mind abides in the body" (諸識阿賴耶 如是身中住); the corresponding verse in $GhVy_{c2}$ (765b27: 藏識與諸識 住身亦如是) and $GhVy_t$ (S 344a4 = D 37b1f: *rnam shes rnams dang kun gzhi yang* || *de bzhin lhan cig lus la gnas*; cf. also the quotation in YVy P yi 99b5f: *de bzhin kun gzhi rnam shes dag dang lhan cig lus la gnas*) is slightly different, stating that the *ālaya*(*vijñāna*) abides in the body together with the other *vijñāna*s.

[466] According to CWSL 20b24–c1, some masters (T 43.1830: 383c8: "*Śuddha- [or Śuddhi-?] -candra 淨月 and others") advocated the view that in those spheres of existence where there is corporeal matter *ālayavijñāna* is based on the physical sense faculties because without pervading all of them it could not appropriate (執受 = *upā-dā*) them (in the sense of keeping them alive). See also § 234 with fn. 1282. — Cf., in this connection, perhaps also $GhVy_t$ S 343b4f (D 37a4; $GhVy_{c1}$ 738a12f; $GhVy_{c2}$ 765b11f): "Shaken by the wind of karma, it keeps pervading the sense faculties and proceeds together with the seven *vijñāna*s like waves" (*las kyi rlung gis bskyod pa ni* || *dbang po rnams la khyab* [D and Ch. 遍住 and 遍在 : *khyad* S] *par gnas* || *rnam shes bdun dang lhan cig tu* || *dba' rlabs bzhin du rgyu ba ste* ||). Although the subject of the preceding two lines is *yid* (*manas*, compared with the wind and, by the way, also stated to be present in the body: *lus gnas*, 在身中), the subject of the present verse should, in view of its being accompanied by the seven *vijñāna*s, rather be *ālayavijñāna*, compared to the water of a stream or of the ocean, of which the cognitive activities are the waves (cf. Laṅk II.99ff)

[467] Cf. the sūtra references cited in fn. 203 and in the NA passage quoted in fn. 431.

processes" (*pravṛttivijñānabījaparigṛhīta*) is hardly conclusive if my thesis is accepted that at this stage, and in the context of the problem to be solved in the *IP*, *ālayavijñāna* is merely a kind of 'upgrade' of these *bīja*s to a latent state, phase or aspect of *vijñāna*. In *nirodha-samāpatti*, the mind would then have been conceived as lying hidden in the physical sense faculties in a latent form, and from the perspective of its reactualization after re-emerging from *nirodhasamāpatti* this latent form of the mind is bound to be differentiated as comprising, or being studded with (see § 80.3), a set of potentialities corresponding to the six forms of *pravṛttivijñāna*s.[468]

78.1. Even if we decide to separate the locative phrase syntactically from *ālaya*° and take it as an absolute locative, the reference to the sense faculties being unimpaired or undisrupted (though, of course, not active) would still seem to make sense against the background of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', i.e., the purport of this reference could be to indicate that since in *nirodhasamāpatti* the senses are, as the sūtra states, unimpaired, the Seeds of *vijñāna*, to be taken as a hidden, latent form of *vijñāna*, continue to be present [*in them*].

78.2.1. Alternatively, one could perhaps understand the argument in the light of the VaSg passage (III.5.i) mentioned in § 40, according to which *vijñāna*, by appropriating the primary elements of the sense faculties, enables them to continue along with life-force or lifespan (*āyus*) and bodily heat (*uṣman*), this continuance being, in its turn, the cause of *vijñāna* not departing from the body (**vijñānasya kāyād anapakrāntiḥ*).[469] The argument of the *IP* would then run thus: In view of the fact that in *nirodhasamāpatti* the sense faculties are undisrupted (which is evident from the fact that they resume their function when one re-emerges from *nirodhasamāpatti*), their primary elements must continue to be appropriated by *vijñāna*, and this implies that *vijñāna* has not departed from the body, i.e., continues to be present *in it*, albeit in a latent, *hidden* form (*ā-laya*°), but comprising, or studded with, the Seeds of the 'forthcoming', manifest forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*), as documented in the pre-*ālaya-vijñāna* analysis of dependent origination in the SavitBh.[470]

78.2.2. In this perspective, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' may or may not have contributed, as a background element, to this innovative step. If not, we would rather have to understand the emergence of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as a direct consequence of the early Yogācāra view of *vijñāna* as the principle of sentient physical life and as being, at the same time, studded with Seeds. Since these aspects of *vijñāna* stand out especially in connection with rebirth, or reincarnation,[471] starting from them may suggest reincarnation as the most probable context for the novel introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, which is indeed one of the contexts where it makes excellent sense and where it is actually attested already in the MauBh.[472] But in view of the fact that earlier descriptions of the process of reincarnation had managed well without introducing such a new concept (in an explicit form, marked by its designation as *ālaya-vijñāna*), it would still be necessary to point out the specific motive(s) for its sudden

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[468] Even if we take the sense faculties as Seed-like capacities, this would, in early Yogācāra, not necessarily preclude their containing further Seeds, or the Seeds of later products: see § 251 with fn. 1384.

[469] See fn. 173 and § 222.2 with fn. 1235.

[470] YBh_{Bh} 206,14-16 (see fn. 1382).

[471] I.e., rebirth with special focus on rebirth corporeal forms of existence.

[472] YBh_{Bh} 24,5. See S 1987: 127–132 (# 6.3.1–3).

emergence.[473] In the context of *nirodhasamāpatti*, on the other hand, the specific wording of the sūtra version on which the Yogācāras relied would seem, also in the scenario of the present paragraph, to have supplied a sufficiently strong motive for affirming that even in this state *vijñāna* has not departed from the body but continues to 'stick' or *dwell in* it in a *hidden*, latent form, thus guaranteeing the continuation of life as well as the re-emergence of conscious mental processes afterwards. In this connection, it may be worthwhile to remember that the number of passages in the YBh where *ālayavijñāna* is mentioned in the context of *nirodhasamāpatti* is quite remarkable (see § 22.1 with fn. 95).

3.3.4. The Expression *pravṛttivijñānabījaparigṛhīta*

79. In my translation of the *IP* in S 1987 (# 2.1; see § 25), I took the expression *pravṛtti-vijñānabījaparigṛhīta* to qualify the *ālayavijñāna* as that which "*comprises* (/possesses / has received) the Seeds of the forthcoming [forms of] mind". This translation was intended to indicate my hesitation with regard to the precise meaning of °*parigṛhīta* and hence with regard to the precise character of the relation obtaining between *ālayavijñāna* and the Seeds of the manifest cognitive functions. Normally, one would no doubt understand X-*parigṛhīta* in a passive sense, with connotations like "taken possession of by X", "furnished with X", "accompanied by X", "comprised or included in X", "supported by X" or even "seized, controlled by or overwhelmed with X". In the case of *ālayavijñāna*'s relation to the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, the most natural connotation would seem to be that it is furnished, or studded, with their Seeds. Such a phraseology may, however, be taken to suggest that *ālaya-vijñāna* is already conceived as an entity distinguished from Seeds as their container or support. Since I had some doubt in this regard, I suggested understanding °*parigṛhīta* in an active sense (S 1987 n. 147), so that the passage can be taken to mean that *ālayavijñāna* comprises the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, which would also make sense if *ālayavijñāna* was, in the *IP*, simply conceived as the Seeds of mind hypostatized to a Seed-like, latent form of mind, "hardly, or, at best, but dimly, acquiring as yet an essence of its own" (S 1987: 30). In order to support my understanding of °*parigṛhīta* in an *active* sense, I adduced a passage from the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*, viz.,

> *tāny etāni sarvavidyāsthānaparigṛhītāni pañca vidyāsthānāni bhavanti* ($\mathrm{BoBh_D}$ 68,6f),

where a passive meaning does not seem to make sense; rather, what must be meant is that the aforementioned (*tāny etāni*) domains of knowledge, and hence the five branches of knowledge constituted by them, comprise all branches of knowledge. I also referred to the fact that Hsüan-tsang renders °*parigṛhīta* in the *IP* by an active phrase ($\mathrm{YBh_C}$ 340c29: 能執持轉識種子阿賴耶識, i.e., "*ālayavijñāna*, which receives-and-supports the Seeds (*bīja*) of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s").

80.1. For Matsumoto (M2: 419ff n. 11), the idea that in the *IP* *ālayavijñāna* is still understood as comprising, i.e., "consisting of" (から成る: 419,19) Seeds is basically in tune with his own view (cf. 421,8f) that its being understood as the support or 'locus' of Seeds is a later development (see § 143) and that *ālayavijñāna* is, in the *IP*, still conceived as identical with or corresponding to Seeds (420,15f). But he rejects my proposal to take the participle °*parigṛhīta* in an active sense as grammatically inappropriate (419,16; 421,10f). On the basis

[473] Cf. S 1987: 131.

of a passage from the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh),[474] he (420,18ff) rather concludes that °*parigṛhīta* may be used in the same sense as °*saṁgṛhīta*, i.e., "included in" "comprised of" (...によって摂される, = instr.-tatp.), which he moreover takes to be more or less equivalent to "corresponding to" (...に相当する: 421,5) or to an equals sign (等号: 421,19), and he considers this meaning to be appropriate both in the case of the *IP* and the BoBh passage adduced by me in support of an active use of °*parigṛhīta* (§ 79). Hsüan-tsang's rendering is inconclusive for Matsumoto (420,10-15) because it presupposes the later view according to which *ālayavijñāna* is the support or 'locus' of Seeds.

80.2.1. To begin with the issue of taking °*parigṛhīta* in an active sense, it is surely not grammatically impossible, for the fact that in Middle Indic and Buddhist Sanskrit (and even in Epic Sanskrit)[475] the active use of participles in °*ta* extends beyond what is usual in standard Sanskrit is well known (see the references in S 1987: 277). In fact, °*parigṛhīta* is almost certainly used in an active sense in the introductory paragraph of the *Prajñāpāramitā* in 25,000 lines in a sequence of attributes of bodhisattvas, one of which qualifies them as

> *anantabuddhakṣetravyūhapraṇidhānaprasthānaparigṛhīta*,[476]

translated by Tilmann Vetter as

> who had embraced the setting-out [in the Great Vehicle] by means of a vow [to contribute to] the marvellous arrangement of endless Buddha-fields.[477]

Even so, unless unambiguous evidence from the YBh or related texts can be produced, an active use of °*parigṛhīta* in the *IP*, though not grammatically impossible in a comparatively early Buddhist text, may still be rather unlikely.

80.2.2. Likewise, the fact that Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the phrase reflects the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as the 'locus' of Seeds is not necessarily incompatible with his having understood the participle in an active sense. If he actually did, this would, on the contrary, be a fairly strong support for such a possibility. But it may be difficult to exclude the possibility that he merely chose, for some reason, to render the passive phraseology of the original by an active idiom.

80.2.3. Matsumoto's explanation of °*parigṛhīta* in BoBh_{D} 68,6f as "corresponding to" in the sense of an equals sign (or coextensiveness) would, in that passage, fit in perfectly well from a logical point of view. But although from a *logical* perspective "A is included in B" would be equivalent to coextensiveness in cases where "B is included in A" is equally true, this does not automatically explain how "included in" (°*parigṛhīta* ≈ °*saṁgṛhīta*) can *semantically* come to mean "corresponding to" or "coextensive with". Perhaps in a similar way as in English "to be comprised of" has come to mean "to consist of"?

80.2.4. As regards the ŚrBh passage[478] on which Matsumoto bases his interpretation of °*parigṛhīta*, it speaks of three phases of a comprehension in which object and subject are

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[474] ŚrBh 499,12-16 (see § 80.2.4).

[475] Cf. the examples in OBERLIES 2003: 271f. As for Pāli, Oberlies (2001: 261f, rem. (a)) points out that this use beyond certain limits is rare and generally late.

[476] Gilgit ms., ed. ZACCHETTI 2005: 367,10 and 148 # 1.46 (with parallels); cf. ibid. 252 with n. 64 ("... here *parigṛhīta* must be active in meaning"). For other participles in °*ta* used in an active sense see ibid. ##1.18 and 1.22 (°*pratilabdha*), 1.30 (°*prāpta*, not unusual), 1.32 (°*pratiprasrabdha*) and, above all, #1.21 *praṇidhānākalpita* in Pañcav_{D} 4,8 (instead of *akalpitapraṇidhāna* in the Gilgit ms.).

[477] VETTER 1993: 75.

completely alike (*samasamālambyālambakajñāna*),[479] and these three phases are distinguished by being accompanied by or included in (/comprised of) a feeble, medium and strong intellectual receptivity (*kṣānti*), respectively, the expressions for "accompanied" and "included/comprised" being °*sahagata*, °*parigṛhīta* and °*saṁgṛhīta*, respectively. Matsumoto (M2: 421,3-5) considers the three expressions to be synonymous here, just like Hsüan-tsang (YBh$_C$ 475c8-11), who renders all the three by "included/comprised" (所攝). This would imply that we are dealing with a case of stylistic variation, and not, e.g., with a kind of climax intended to indicate that the relation of the *kṣānti* to the comprehension was considered to intensify ("accompanied by" – "taken possession of" – "[fully] comprised of"?).

80.3. In the case of the *IP*, an interpretation of °*parigṛhīta* in the sense proposed by Matsumoto would not create difficulties for my interpretation, at least as long as it is merely taken to imply that the latent form of mind basically consists of Seeds (instead of being explicitly distinguished from them as their 'locus'), without confining these Seeds to those of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, to the exclusion of others (like those of the mental factors: cf. § 82.2). But as indicated before I am not quite sure that Matsumoto's transition from "included in" to "corresponding to" (in the sense of an equals sign) is semantically unproblematic. On the other hand, an (admittedly cursory) check of the edited parts of the YBh and some other texts did not yield unquestionable evidence for the use of °*parigṛhīta* in an active sense. Unless the above-mentioned BoBh passage (§ 79) is, in spite of Matsumoto's alternative understanding, acknowledged as an example for such a use, it may therefore be preferable to understand °*parigṛhīta* in the *IP* in the usual passive sense, probably in the meaning "furnished, or studded, with".[480] I now think that this would not be in conflict with my idea of the *ālayavijñāna* being, originally, a hypostatization of Seeds, because as a hypostatization it is no longer merely a set of capacities inhering in something else but rather an entity on its own, a unit, a latent form of the mind that may as well be envisaged as *being* the Seed of manifest cognitive functions (if emphasis is on the latent form of the Seed-like mind as a *unit*) as well as in terms of being furnished or *studded with* the Seeds of those cognitive functions (if

[478] ŚrBh 499,12-16: ... *yan* (ms.) *mṛdukṣāntisahagataṁ samasamālambyālambakajñānaṁ tad ūṣmagatam ity ucyate* | *yan madhyakṣāntiparigṛhītaṁ tan mūrddhêty* (ms.) *ucyate* | *yad adhimātrakṣāntisaṁgṛhītaṁ tat satyānulomā* (ms.) *kṣāntir ity ucyate* ||.

[479] In my understanding (cf. S 1982a: 79), in the context of the ŚrBh this is just a comprehension in which the immediately preceding contemplative act is contemplated (in terms of the four *āryasatya*s) as impermanent, unsatisfactory, etc., by the subsequent contemplative act, which is equally impermanent, unsatisfactory, etc., and will in its turn be contemplated as such by the next subsequent contemplative act, and so on, with no implication of *vijñaptimātratā*. The history of the concept is carefully examined by Y. SUGAWARA (2010: 216f and 384–402), who, however, in this latter regard seems to have a different opinion (cf. ibid. 217,5-7). A discussion of the issue is beyond the limits of this study (but see Addenda).

[480] Thus probably at YBh$_t$ P zi 225b1f (D zhi 214a6f; YBh$_C$ 665a17f), where the *vipāka* of 'white [actions] having a white result' is stated to be exclusively agreeable because it is "studded with Seeds of exclusively agreeable feelings" (*gcig tu 'dod pa'i tshor ba'i sa bon gyis yongs su zin pa*, 一向可愛受種子所攝受, **ekānteṣṭavedanābījaparigṛhīta*). In this text, the '*vipāka* containing all Seeds' (YBh$_t$ P zi 224b6f; D zhi 213b4f; YBh$_C$ 664c25f) is the state of mind (*citta*) immediately after 'linking up' as well as all subsequent states of mind that remain in an unaltered state (**prakṛtistha*), i.e., are neither wholesome nor defiled nor indeterminate-but-active (**sābhisaṁskāra-avyākṛta*) (YBh$_t$ P zi 224b3-5; D zhi 213b2f; YBh$_C$ 664c19-23).

emphasis is on the *variety* of its capacities). For a more detailed discussion of Matsumoto's view with regard to these two different perspectives, I refer to ch. 4.2.6.1.

81. Buescher's (B: 71,25ff) assertion that the qualification of *ālayavijñāna* as comprising (or studded with) the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s excludes the possibility of conceiving it as "sticking in" the *indriya*s has already been briefly rejected in § 77 but may require a more detailed comment. If I understand the argument correctly, what is intended is that since *ālaya-vijñāna* is expressly characterized as the *container* of Seeds it cannot itself be a Seed-like entity 'sticking' or being contained in the sense faculties. But in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* analysis of dependent origination we do find the idea that Seeds can comprise or contain further Seeds (§ 251), and it hardly makes a difference whether these further Seeds refer to a sequence of results (*nāmarūpa*, *ṣaḍāyatana*, etc.) or to a differentiation (the six *pravṛttivijñāna*s). Thus, a Seed-like form of mind comprising, studded with or containing the Seeds of specific cognitive acts may well be contained or lie hidden in the sense faculties. Against this, Buescher will object that the sense faculties themselves are, at least during *nirodhasamāpatti*, nothing but Seeds and must therefore themselves be contained in *ālayavijñāna*, and not the other way round. But as has been pointed out (ch. 3.3.2) this objection is based on an anachronistic concept of the sense faculties and on an untenable understanding of *(a)pariṇata*. Moreover, the "sense faculties" may even represent the physical organism as a whole (§ 76.6), and the idea of *ālayavijñāna* 'sticking' or abiding or lying hidden in the body is well attested even in later texts (see § 76.7). In case we presuppose the alternative scenario of § 78.2, it is anyway only this latter idea that would be implied.

82.1. According to Buescher, another implication of the attribute *pravṛttivijñānabījapari-gṛhīta*, if (reasonably, I think) taken to refer to the Seeds of *all pravṛttivijñāna*s, is that *ālaya-vijñāna* must be

> provided with the *bīja*s of *sarvadharmāḥ*, because the correlates of all *pravṛttivijñāna*s are necessarily all the *dharma*s. (B: 72,18-20)

But obviously this argument would only work on the condition of Buescher's assumption that the *IP*, in spite of the absence of internal textual evidence, presupposes *vijñaptimātratā* (see §§ 2.2 and 3; cf. also B: 54 n. 1).[481] I hope to have sufficiently demonstrated that the basis of Buescher's assumption, viz., the logical inseparability of the concepts of *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātratā* as well as the ensuing assumption that all the *ālayavijñāna* passages in the MauBh, including the *IP*, must hence be post-Saṁdh interpolations, is anything but conclusive (see ch. 2 and § 31). If, however, the question of what kinds of Seeds *ālayavijñāna* may have been considered to comprise in the *IP* is examined in the context of the actual purport of the passage and its presumable historical background or ambience (i.e., pre-*ālaya-vijñāna* Yogācāra), it cannot be taken for granted that all dharmas must arise from Seeds in *ālayavijñāna*, just like the *pravṛttivijñāna*s, merely because they are the possible objective correlates of the latter, for in early Yogācāra at least ordinary, everyday objects are not just

[481] Even then, the argument would hardly hold good in the case of the unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*), which is nonetheless included in the *sarvadharmāḥ* and expressly enumerated among the possible objective correlates of *manovijñāna* in one of the passages adduced by Buescher, viz., YBh_{Bh} 11,12. Even if the *asaṁskṛta*s were taken as mere concepts, this is hardly possible in the case of *tathatā* as it really is and as it is the *ālambana* of nonconceptual insight (*nirvikalpakaṁ jñānam*); as it really is, *tathatā* is unborn and has no Seed.

images in mind but entities on their own, mental and material dharmas existing side by side in interdependence.[482]

82.2. In the context of the *IP*, the natural assumption would thus be that external material things simply continue to exist as such during a person's *nirodhasamāpatti* and are therefore available as sense objects when the person has re-emerged from absorption. Likewise, the body continues unimpaired during *nirodhasamāpatti*, and the same is expressly stated for the physical sense faculties (§ 72).[483] The question of their origination, and hence the problem of their Seeds and the question where these should be localized during *nirodhasamāpatti*, are simply not at stake in the *IP*. The only issue the *IP* is concerned with in this connection is the rearising of cognitive acts after *nirodhasamāpatti*, and therefore it is only *their* Seeds that the latent *vijñāna* is stated to comprise. Speculation beyond that would depend on the model considered to be presupposed by the *IP*. If we start from the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', the Seeds of the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) associated with the *pravṛttivijñāna*s were almost certainly taken for granted to be likewise comprised in the latent *vijñāna*,[484] but going beyond that may have required further reflection (see § 85–89). If, however, we take *ālayavijñāna* as an extension of the *vijñāna* of the pre-*ālayavijñāna* theory of dependent origination (§ 78.2.2), it must, as a matter of course, from the outset have been conceived as transporting the Seeds not only of mind and mental factors but also karmic imprints and the Seeds of the physical organism of the next life (or lives). If we presuppose a theory like the one set forth in YBh$_{Bh}$ 52,12ff (see § 263.6), this would probably even imply the presence of Seeds of external matter.

83.1. In this connection, I readily admit that Buescher (B: 96,1ff) is perfectly correct in criticizing my remark (S 1987 # 3.13.1) that a causal dependence of the physical sense faculties and the body on *ālayavijñāna* is not explicitly stated anywhere in the MauBh of the YBh. He rightly points out that such a dependence is unambiguously expressed in YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,7-9. Strictly speaking, however, the sense faculties and the body as a sentient organism are, in this passage, only stated to arise by the force (*°sāmarthyāt*) of the "mind comprising all Seeds" (*sarvabījaṁ vijñānam*),[485] and it is only because this "mind comprising all Seeds" had, a few lines before (YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,4f), been specified as *ālayavijñāna* that the statement that the sense faculties arise by the force of the "mind comprising all Seeds" automatically implies, in its present context, their causal dependence on *ālayavijñāna*. For Buescher, this fact is of no importance since according to him both terms presuppose the Saṁdh and hence unmask the whole(?) passage as a post-Saṁdh interpolation. From my point of view, however, the

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[482] Cf. the idea of the *anyonyayogakṣematā* of corporeal matter and mind (YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,14-17; see § 127). Quite explicit is, though admittedly somewhat later, PSVy P 34b5f (D 30b5): "... because we observe that body and mind conform (**anu-vi-√dhā*) to each other" (*lus dang sems gnyis gcig la gcig rjes su byed par mthong ba'i phyir ro*), i.e., in situations of fear, e.g., the body trembles or becomes stiff under the influence of the mind, and in old age memory and intellect may deteriorate under the influence of physical decline (cf. PSVyṬ P 186a2-4; D 154b3f). Cf. also fn. 504.

[483] Unless, as we read in Vi 779c3-5, a person in the *kāmadhātu* remains in *nirodhasamāpatti* for more than one week; for in this case the primary elements of the sense faculties would lack nourishment, and although one's body would not suffer damage during *nirodhasamāpatti* one would die as soon as one re-emerges from it.

[484] YBh$_t$ P zi 15b6f (D zhi 13b2f; YBh$_c$ 583b22-24; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c6): *dbang po gzugs can dang ldan pa ni ... sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos thams cad kho na'i sa bon kyang yin no.* Similarly 16a2f (D 13b5f; YBh$_c$ 583c2f; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c9).

[485] See § 254.

expression *sarvabīj(ak)aṁ vijñānam* belongs, just like the expressions *sarvabīj(ak)o vipākaḥ* and *sarvabījaka ātmabhāvaḥ* (see § 263.4), to the early Yogācāras' pre-*ālayavijñāna* analysis of *pratītyasamutpāda* (see §§ 261–262). There is thus no reason to dissociate the passage under discussion and its context from this stratum, with the exception of the equation of the "mind comprising all Seeds" with *ālayavijñāna*, which I take to be the work of the compiler(s) of the (respective part of the) MauBh (in my opinion still before the composition of Saṁdh V).[486] Even so, it must be admitted that it is, at the latest, by being equated with the "mind comprising all Seeds" in this specific context that *ālayavijñāna* invariably came to be conceived as being, by means of the Seeds it contains, responsible for the formation of the physical sense faculties and the body as a sentient organism.

83.2. It is therefore all the more disconcerting that even in a somewhat later text, the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論), it is only the active kinds of mind and the mental factors that are stated to arise from Seeds in *ālayavijñāna* (or from *ālayavijñāna* as their Seed), whereas the physical sense faculties are only said to be *appropriated* by *ālayavijñāna*, and in the case of the sense objects *ālayavijñāna* is not referred to at all.[487] In the *Abhidharmasam-uccaya* (AS 3,3f), on the other hand, the pattern of the 18 *dhātu*s is explained in such a way that the *dhātu*s of the sense faculties include, beside the past and present sense faculties, *ālayavijñāna* as the Seed (*bīja*) of the respective future sense faculty (see § 250.3.3). And in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' of the analysis of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin, *ālayavijñāna* is expressly stated to generate not only the mental and physical constituents of sentient beings but also the external world (*bhājanaloka*).[488] To complicate the situation still further: the idea that even the external material aggregates originate from their respective Seeds stored (*sanni-viṣṭa*) in the mind is already expressed in the ManoBh of the MauBh (see § 263.6), but here the mind is just the traditional *mind continuum* (*cittasantati*), with no reference to the concept of *ālayavijñāna*. To decide to what extent such differences point to different theories concerning the origination of material factors or rather mirror a different focus in the usage of the concept of 'Seeds' (*bīja*) is a task that exceeds the limits of this study since it would require a much more systematic and comprehensive study of the pertinent materials. My aim was merely to indicate the complexity of the issue.

3.3.5. The Expression *anuparata*

84. According to Buescher (B: 73 # 37), *anuparata* designates the "'functional presence' of *ālayavijñāna*" (73,16), which in *nirodhasamāpatti* "has *not ceased to move* or to be active" (73,18f), i.e., "is not one that is statically present, but one that continues to flow in time" (73,31f). This special emphasis on continuous functioning, which also implies for Buescher that *ālayavijñāna* was present and functioning before *nirodhasamāpatti* and will continue beyond (cf. B: 76 # 42), derives from the assumption of an "antonymous relationship" (B: 73,24) between *anuparata* and *apariṇata*, the latter being referred by Buescher to the *indriya*s' having "ceased to be transformed ... into excitements of sensation" (73,29f). As this

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[486] Cf. S 1987 # 6.1.1–4. Cf. also ch. 4.2.3.3 and ch. 4.2.4.

[487] HsienY 480c–484a, especially 480c16, 23 and 27f, 480c29f, 481a13 and 481a26f and 483a16 (意者, 謂 從阿賴耶識種子所生, etc.) against 483c9f (眼, 謂 一切種子阿賴耶識之所執受) and 14f (色, 謂 眼所行境 眼識所緣 四大所造...), etc. Cf· S 1987 # 3.13.1 with ns. 439 and 440.

[488] YBh_t P zi 8a4-6 (D zhi 7a2f; YBh_c 581a25-29; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020a13-16; HAKAMAYA 1979: 37f [2001: 402f] # **5.b**.A.1-2; WALDRON 2003: 185).

meaning of *apariṇata* (and probably even the reading ⟨*a*⟩*pariṇata*) has to be abandoned (see ch. 3.3.2), this emphasis on functioning becomes problematic. In my opinion, what *anuparata* stands in contrast to is rather the expression *niruddha* in the introductory question. Whereas the question formulates the traditional Abhidharmic (and also early Yogācāra) position that in *nirodhasamāpatti* mind and mental factors have ceased or have been stopped (*niruddha*) completely, the answer declares that *vijñāna* in a hidden form has not ceased, i.e., continues to be present.[489] In my opinion, emphasis is, in the first place, on the continued *presence* of *vijñāna* (not, of course, as a static entity but as a flow of moments) and, as far as its function is concerned, on its keeping the body alive, i.e., on 'biological appropriation' (*upādāna*), *during nirodhasamāpatti*, and only in the second place on guaranteeing the re-emergence of actual cognitive processes afterwards, as I am going to substantiate in ch. 3.3.6.

85. With regard to the question whether the *IP* implies the continuity of *ālayavijñāna* before and after *nirodhasamāpatti*, Buescher comes up with yet another argument. For him, the fact that *ālayavijñāna* comprises the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s necessarily presupposes its temporal continuity, which

> may thus also be taken to explain certain aspects of how it comes to comprise the *bīja*s. Generally speaking, the *bīja*s accumulated by *ālayavijñāna* are the maturation /repotentialization (*vipāka*) of previous intentional experiences (corresponding to cognitive actualizations). (B: 76,14-17)

And

> the particular *vipāka*-conditions of the *bīja*s must have been accumulated whenever the *pravṛttivijñāna*s were active. (B: 76,20f)

This implies that

> *ālayavijñāna* ... flows parallel to, or simultaneously with, the *pravṛttivijñāna*s in ordinary states of consciousness. (B: 76,18-20.)

86.1. From a systematic point of view, Buescher's argument is basically justified; of course, if the hidden *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* comprises or contains the Seeds of the *pravṛtti-vijñāna*s, it must have received or inherited them from somewhere, and this implies some form of continuity. Likewise, the karmic imprints (*vāsanā*), accumulated before, must continue through *nirodhasamāpatti* in order to generate their result in a future life.

86.2. Still, I am afraid that in turning these systematic requirements against my interpretation of the *IP* Buescher's argument becomes circular, for when he tries to prove that *ālaya-vijñāna* must be understood in terms of the fully developed concept because confining it to the situation of *nirodhasamāpatti* would lead to inconsistencies, these very inconsistencies are merely the result of his tacitly presupposing the systematic framework of the fully developed concept of *ālayavijñāna* as a layer of the mind that is, so to speak, numerically different from the surface mind continuum. I admit that some of my former remarks in this connection (in S 1987) may not be entirely felicitous, but I still think that the aforementioned systematic requirements are not incompatible with an understanding of the *IP* as mirroring the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the making, so to speak, i.e., if the expression '*ālayavijñāna*' is regarded here as still being a merely descriptive designation of a specific phase of the undivided mind continuum (see § 45). However, since the *IP* is not concerned with the problems raised by

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[489] Cf. the Tibetan rendering of *anuparata* as "is not absent" (*med pa ma yin te*: see fn. 129); cf. also Chin. "has not completely vanished" (不滅盡: see fn. 130).

Buescher but has a quite different purpose (see ch. 3.3.6), all we can do is to speculate. But in order to avoid a circular argument, we have to start from the presumable systematic presuppositions of the *IP*, including the pre-*ālayavijñāna* Yogācāra view on Seeds and karmic imprints (see YAMABE 1989), and according to this view all dharmas arise from their respective homogeneous Seeds, which are always there in a natural, undeveloped state (*prakṛtistha*)[490] but may (especially in the case of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas) be nourished (*(pari)puṣṭa*) by repeated practice (*abhyāsa*)[491] and selectively actualized by karma or its imprint (*vāsanā*), with which the flow of Seeds, the mind or the whole personality is imbued (*paribhāvita*).[492]

87. If we start from the alternative scenario (§ 78.2), according to which the presence of a latent *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* was introduced in the *IP* on the basis of the concept of *vijñāna* keeping the sentient body alive and of the *vijñāna* of dependent origination receiving the imprints of karma and functioning as the Seed of future *vijñāna*s as well as of the whole psycho-physical personality of the next life, it would, as merely a special, latent phase of this *vijñāna*, as a matter of course have been conceived as carrying on all Seeds as well as karmic imprints. In order to develop this latent phase of *vijñāna* into *ālayavijñāna* as a continuous flow, the only necessary step was to identify it with the continuous flow of Seeds (*bījasantāna*) within the mind continuum (*vijñānasantāna*),[493] i.e., to conceive this flow of Seeds as a latent layer of the mind continuum, and the hidden presence of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* as nothing but a special phase of this latent layer (i.e., a phase during which the manifest, actualized layer of the mind is interrupted).

88.0. If, however, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is taken as the starting point, it is important to note that the aforementioned systematic questions (§ 86.1) should, first of all, be raised already with reference to this model itself, for it is only concerned with the problem of the carrier of Seeds in connection with the problem of the continuity of mind and corporeal matter, but takes the presence of Seeds for granted and does *not* mention *karmic* imprints. Of course, the proponents of this model must have presupposed some answer to these questions as well, but as for the details we can only speculate. The answer would depend on what, precisely, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' was meant to imply.

88.1. One possibility (not without problems: see §§ 257–261) would be to take the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' to mean that the Seeds of mind (and mental factors) are as a rule transported in the mind, and analogously the Seeds of corporeal matter in corporeal matter, and that only in situations of interruption the mind *transfers* its Seeds (or reproductive potential) to corporeal matter, i.e., survives, so to speak, in corporeal matter in the form of Seeds,[494] and vice versa.

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[490] This is not the place to enter into a discussion of the meaning of *prakṛtistha*, but as far as I can see two aspects stand out: 1. "innate, inherent" (Tib. *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa*; cf. BoBhVy D yi 5a7f: *rang bzhin gyis gnas pa zhes bya ba ni ngo bo nyid kyis {s}grub pa ste | ma bsgrubs pa* ...); 2. "being in its natural, unrefined state" (Tib. *rang bzhin du/la gnas pa*; cf. $BoBh_W$ 331,11f: *suvarṇaṁ prakṛtisthaṁ* [$BoBh_D$ 226,21 °*sthitaṁ*]).

[491] Cf. YBh_t P 'i 330a3-6 (D zi 288b1-3; YBh_c 846c18-23: VaSg III.7.i); cf. YAMABE 1987: 24–29; 1989: 47; 1990: 63. Cf. also $BoBh_D$ 276,21.

[492] YBh_{Bh} 18,21–19,1; 25,20–26,1; 107,20–108,2; 128,2-4; 206,15; cf. YAMABE 1989, esp. 49f.

[493] YBh_{Bh} 61,8f (see fn. 220).

[494] Cf. § 75 with fn. 436.

In this case we would have to assume that mind and corporeal matter transfer, in such situations, their own Seeds to each other along with the karmic imprints they may have accumulated, and this would likewise hold good when, in the *IP*, the Seeds of mind transferred to corporeal matter are expressly conceived as a latent form of mind.

88.2. The other possibility would be to assume that mind and corporeal matter are *always* accompanied not only by their own Seeds but also by each other's, or just by nature capable of reproducing not only themselves but, if required, also each other. Such an interpretation would seem to be presupposed when, in later sources, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is occasionally criticized with the argument that the assumption of a double series of Seeds of mind — one in the mind and one in corporeal matter — would (in ordinary states) imply the simultaneous arising of two cognitive acts of the same type.[495] It would also seem to imply a duplication of karmic imprints, one for each series of Seeds. Since the latent mind in *nirodha-samāpatti* postulated by the *IP* would, in this interpretation, merely be (the exegetically motivated 'upgrade' of) a special phase of the flow of the Seeds of mind in corporeal matter, it would automatically take over and carry on all the Seeds and imprints of this flow.

88.3. Yet, I am not quite sure whether the interpretations 1 and 2 do justice to the deeper intention of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. What was envisaged may rather have been a kind of flexible potentiality of the basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*) of a sentient being as a whole,[496] consisting, in its complete form,[497] of mental and physical constituents (*nāma-rūpa*)[498] or of the five *upādānaskandha*s,[499] or at any rate of their centre, the *ṣaḍāyatana* insofar as it is the result of karmic maturation in the present life,[500] comprising both body and

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[495] PSVy P chi 20b1f (D chi 18b1f; MUROJI 1993: 86,1-5; 162f); PSkV ms. 53b1f (PSkV$_t$ P hi 49b1f; D shi 235a3f); PSkBh P hi 188a4–b1 (D si 102a6–b2). Cf. also KSi # 23 (KSi$_{Mu}$ 25,13-15).

[496] Cf. also YAMABE 2000: 137,16-18, stating that the purport of the 'bi-polar bīja-model' of the VinSg is not so much the mutual causality of corporeal matter and mind as rather the idea that simply the whole of body and mind preserves the Seeds (単に身心の総体が種子を保つ); cf. also ibid. 141,15-17.

[497] In the context under discussion, *ātmabhāva* is expressly used also with reference to the *ārūpya-dhātu* (see YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,5-7), where the basis of individual existence naturally consists of the immaterial *skandha*s (= *nāman*) only. Cf. also fn. 672.

[498] See § 121.1.3 and S 1987 # 3.11.2 with n. 372. Cf. also KARUNADASA ^{2}1989: 114: "empiric individuality as composed of mental and physical factors". In terms of the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination, the *ātmabhāva* is stated to be complete when it has developed from the stage of *vijñāna* into that of *vedanā* (cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 200,20f: *vijñānādyo veditaparyavasānaḥ kṛtsna evâtmabhāvaḥ*), i.e., into a sentient body with fully developed, functioning sense faculties.

[499] Cf. VisM IX.54: *attabhāvo vuccati sarīraṁ, khandhapañcakaṁ eva vā.* Cf. also ASBh 2,5-8 (see § 237.3), implying the equation of the *ātmabhāva* with the *skandha*s; cf. also 46,1 (read *pratikṣaṇam*: SAKUMA 1996: 18). That in the present context and similar cases *ātmabhāva* is used in the wider sense and not in the sense of "body" is obvious from the fact that it is also used with reference to an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* (see fn. 497). Likewise, the expression *āśraya*, though mostly just denoting the (preferably living, sentient?) body, can at least occasionally be used in this wider sense: cf., e.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 99,5: *kathaṁ traidhātukāvacarāṇāṁ sattvānām āśrayo draṣṭavyaḥ.*

[500] ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III (2009) 32,6: (*tatrâtmabhāvaphalaṁ yad etarhi vipākajaṁ ṣaḍāyatanam*; with the correct reading *etarhi* instead of ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 384,8f *etad*, Matsumoto's suggestion to supply *vartamānaṁ* [M2: 439 n. 87] becomes superfluous); AKBh 21,16 (EJ. 33,14).

mind, or physical and mental dharmas.[501] Understood in this way, the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' would basically agree with some passages of the *Manobhūmi* where the basis of individual existence as a whole is stated to contain all Seeds (*sarvabījaka*),[502] in the sense of being endowed with the Seeds of all (possible future) bases of individual existence (*sarvātmabhāva-bījopagata*).[503] The 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' could perhaps be understood as an explication or rephrasing of this position with explicit reference to exceptional situations in which one of the two basic components of a sentient being, viz., mind and corporeal matter, is interrupted. In such cases, the *whole* potentiality, i.e., all Seeds and imprints contained in the complete basis-of-existence, is preserved in the remaining component, and this would of course hold good also for the situation in *nirodhasamāpatti*.[504]

89.1. The introduction of the expression *ālayavijñāna* in the *IP* as characterizing the hidden presence of mind in *nirodhasamāpatti* does thus not pose any problems concerning the question of how it comes to be furnished with the Seeds of the *pravṛttivijñāna*s or with regard to the preservation of karmic imprints, for the *vijñāna* called thus is not of course conceived as something arising out of nothing at the beginning of *nirodhasamāpatti* and ceasing at its end. It is rather, in my interpretation of the *IP*, merely a special, latent phase of the continuous flow of the mind, or a special phase of the continuous flow of its Seeds, 'upgraded' into a latent state of mind in response to a specific exegetical requirement. The main problem arising from this assumption is rather the question how the concept of *ālayavijñāna* came to be extended beyond the state of *nirodhasamāpatti* and similar unconscious states (including faint and deep sleep)[505] so as to comprise the flow of Seeds, or the latent layer of the mind, as a whole, i.e., in the normal state as well,[506] with the effect of initiating a new model of the structure of the mind that enabled advanced solutions for a number of fundamental doctrinal as well as exegetical problems (S 1987: 3–6; 34ff).

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[501] Cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 314b8 (D zi 274b2; YBh$_c$ 840a25f: VaSg III.5.⟨vi?⟩), speaking of the body endowed with mind (**savijñānakaḥ kāyaḥ*, i.e., the sentient body) comprised by the *ṣaḍāyatana* (*rnam par shes pa dang bcas pa'i lus skye mched drug gis bsdus pa*).

[502] YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,12: *sarvabījakāyām ātmabhāvābhinirvṛttau.* Cf. also BoBh$_D$ 218,11f (BoBh$_W$ 318,20f), locating the Seeds of all *buddhadharma*s in the *ātmabhāva* or *āśraya* of a bodhisattva, or VaSg II.4.iii (YBh$_t$ P 'i 252a4f; D zi 218b2f; YBh$_c$ 814b12f), identifying the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*) as the carrier (*gnas*, 所依附) of the Seeds of the six *vijñāna*s.

[503] YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,3: *yaś ca kaścid ātmabhāvo 'bhinirvartate sarvo 'sau sarvātmabhāvabījopagato veditavyaḥ*; cf. also 26,10: *sarvātmabhāvabījakatvāt pratyekaṁ sarvātmabhāvānām.*

[504] The 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' would thus be telling evidence for what HAMILTON (1996: 149ff) has called "the lack of ontological discontinuity" (151,9), especially between matter and mind.

[505] Cf. SacAcBh (S 1987: 222) ## 4 and 5.

[506] This step would not be difficult to understand if we presuppose the alternative scenario of § 78.2. It would, however, appear a bit more complicated if we start from the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', especially its second interpretation, because in this case we have to do with two parallel flows of Seeds of the mind, and there is no reason why one of them should be conceived in terms of a latent form of mind but not the other. Now, two parallel flows of Seeds of mind are ontologically compatible because Seeds are no entities of their own but merely capacities inhering in entities (see § 251 with fn. 1390). Two parallel sets of a latent form of mind, however, are hardly acceptable in one person and therefore had to be fused. Thus, on this presupposition, too, the outcome was almost inevitably a concept of *ālayavijñāna* comprising the latent side of mind in all its aspects.

89.2. In this connection, the *vijñāna* at the moment of reincarnation, of entering into the mother's womb, is of special interest because it is similar to the *ālayavijñāna* of the *IP* (as understood by me) in that it merges (*saṁ-√mūrch*) into or with corporeal matter, in this case with the mixture of semen and blood in the mother's womb, 'appropriating' it and thus establishing it as a living, sentient body, and also because this *vijñāna*, too, represents a faint, rudimentary state of mind[507] and contains the Seeds of the unfolding organism. It is thus obvious that this form of *vijñāna* was particularly suitable for being identified with, or realized to be another manifestation of, the latent *vijñāna* as found in *nirodhasamāpatti*. From this point of view, it would seem quite natural that the concept of *ālayavijñāna* was extended so as to take over the role of the mind that is a 'seed' (*bījabhūtaṁ vijñānam*) since it is imbued with the imprints of previous karma and comprises the Seeds of the new existence,[508] or the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam*, i.e., the "mind comprising all Seeds" or "mind [insofar as it functions as] the Seed of all [dharmas], or of all [forms of individual existence]" (see ch. 4.2.6),[509] of the pre-*ālayavijñāna* Yogācāra theory of origination in dependence (*pratītyasamutpāda*) (VaSg, SavitBh). At any rate, in the *Manobhūmi* of the MauBh[510] as well as in Saṁdh V.2–3, *ālayavijñāna* is expressly equated with the "mind comprising all Seeds" in precisely its function of merging with proto-embryonic matter at the moment of conception (see § 83.1).

89.3. At the beginning of the MauBh[511] and still more explicitly in the 'Proof Portion'[512] of the *ālayavijñāna* treatise of the PañcMBhVin,[513] *ālayavijñāna* monopolizes the function of 'appropriating' the physical basis of individual existence, i.e., keeping the whole body alive and sentient until death, and in the 'Proof Portion' further 'somatic' functions of *vijñāna* are pointed out to reveal its presence: not only the fact that life continues even in unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti*[514] but also the gradual becoming cold of the body in the process of dying[515] and the occurrence of manifold corporeal sensations in the body (*kāye kāyānu-*

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[507] Cf. § 60.3. I am not quite sure whether the expression *saṁmūrcchati* was also intended to convey the nuance of "fainting", but the CWSL (16c25f; LVP 195f) nevertheless asserts that the mind of the embryo immediately after conception is dull, as in deep sleep or swoon.

[508] See § 251 with fn. 1382 (and fn. 1384). Cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ (SavitBh) 198,22f and 200,13-17, corresponding to YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 285a5f and 286a5-7 (YBh$_{c}$ 827c8f and 828a13-18: VaSg III.1.i).

[509] To be more precise, I assume that the two were fused in such a way that *ālayavijñāna* took over the function and the name of the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam*, while the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* (originally rather the *ordinary vijñānasantāna* insofar as it contained all Seeds) was reduced to its potentiality layer (the *bījasantāna* in the *vijñānasantāna*: YBh$_{Bh}$ 61,8f; see fn. 220), now *identified* with *ālaya-vijñāna* and conceived of as a *vijñāna* sui generis, continuously present, even when the ordinary *vijñānasantāna*, the series of conscious mental activities, is interrupted, as in *nirodhasamāpatti*.

[510] YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,1-17. Cf., in this connection, also YBh$_{Bh}$ 4,11f + 4,7.

[511] YBh$_{Bh}$ 4,7 and 24,5 (ms.): *āśrayopādātṛ ... ālayavijñānam*.

[512] See fn. 1274.

[513] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 2b4–3a3 = ASBh 12,1-13; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 8–10 (# i). Cf. ch. 4.2.5.8.1.

[514] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 3b8–4a2 = ASBh 13,12-15; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 14 (# vii); cf. fn. 98.

[515] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 4a2-4 = ASBh 13,16-20; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 15 (# viii); Engl. transl.: GRIFFITHS 1986: 137; SPARHAM 1993: 133; cf. also S 1987: 41 with n. 281 (pace WAYMAN 1996: 460f, whose rendering is, in this case, too, rather faulty). Cf. AS 42,19f (AS$_{G}$ 31,24); MSg I.42. This function is ascribed to *vijñāna* (unspecified) at YBh$_{Bh}$ 18,16-20 and in the ParySg (MATSUDA 1994: 98,12f); cf. also AKBh 156,14-21; Vi 359b9-11; Vi$_{2}$ 266a14-16.

bhavāḥ) even when one is absorbed in thought or meditation[516] (which would seem to exclude the simultaneous function of ordinary sense perceptions).[517]

3.3.6. The Phrase *āyatyāṁ tadutpattidharmatāyai* and the Purpose of the *Initial Passage*

90. In Buescher's opinion, my assertion that in the *IP ālayavijñāna* is, in the first place, taught to be present and to prevent death *during nirodhasamāpatti*, and that the passage is tacit about its occurrence outside *nirodhasamāpatti*, "has little to do with what the Initial Passage actually tells us" (B: 74,11f). Though not denying the fact that the introductory question "implicitly points to the difference between death and *nirodhasamāpatti* as thematized in a Mūlasarvādivāda exegetical context" (B: 74,14f), Buescher rejects my aforementioned assumption with, it appears to me, mainly three arguments:

1. In the *IP*, a statement that teaches "the prevention of death as being the explicit purpose of *ālayavijñāna*" is lacking, such a purpose being explicitly stated only in the 'Proof Portion' of the treatment of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin[518] (B: 74,15-20).

2. Before the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, the problem had already been solved by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' "with a direct reference to the body and to consciousness (in the form of *bījas*) that has not left the body" (B: 74,37-39). After the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, "there was no longer an urgency to solve the problem of death in *nirodhasamāpatti*" (B: 75,6-9).

3. The purpose of the *IP* is explicitly

> indicated by means of the dative case: ... . This statement of purpose is not related to death, or to the body, but it is evidently geared to the framework of the *ālayavijñāna-pravṛttivijñāna* model of consciousness. (B: 75,31-36)

If I understand him correctly, Buescher sees the purpose of the *IP* as an endeavour to contrast or replace, in the context of *nirodhasamāpatti*, the concept of the continuity of mind (or personal existence) as conceived in the previous 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' with the novel *ālaya-vijñāna* model that had come to be introduced in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda (cf. B: 75,4-12). For Buescher, this model is inseparably "correlated to the *vijñaptimātra* ontology" (B: 75,18f), and the continuity envisaged is not just that of bridging over *nirodhasamāpatti* but rather includes the perspective of how *ālayavijñāna* has come to comprise the *bīja*s through previous experiences as well as its ongoing flow in the future (*āyatyām*), i.e., outside *nirodha-samāpatti* (cf. B: 76 # 42), as an uninterrupted "functional continuum" (B: 77,14) flowing parallel to, or simultaneously with, the *pravṛttivijñāna*s (see § 85). Quite naturally, this involves, for Buescher, that

> from a compositional point of view, it is indeed necessary to argue for a relatively late date of the Initial Passage (B: 77,22-24),

i.e., to take it as a comparatively late interpolation.

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516 YBh$_t$ P zi 3b6-8 = ASBh 13,8-11; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 13f (# vi).

517 Cf. T 43.1829: 172b1f: 入定時 五識不行; b16: 入定等無餘五識; T 42.1828: 595b9; b20; c4f: 處有心定 五識不行. For the problem of sense perception in states of meditative concentration, see also fn. 365.

518 See fn. 514.

91.1. As for the first objection, I should think that the specific context of the sūtra passage under consideration (factors that distinguish *nirodhasamāpatti* from death) and the purport of the question problematizing the presence of *vijñāna* in the body of a person who has entered into *nirodhasamāpatti* is sufficient to make the reader expect an answer explaining precisely this issue, without any additional explicit indication of this purport being required. As against this, in Buescher's interpretation the answer would address an issue that is different from what had been asked for, which is definitely odd.

91.2. I agree that by assuming the presence of Seeds of *vijñāna* in *nirodhasamāpatti* the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' had indeed *implicitly* furnished a conceptual basis for the solution of the problem of the presence of *vijñāna* in that state, so that the use of the particle *hi* in the answer of the *IP*, pointing to a common ground of argumentation (cf. § 43.3), appears justified. But the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is *explicitly* concerned only with the problem of *continuation*, i.e., the reappearance of mental activity *after*, or at the moment of, re-emerging from from *nirodhasamāpatti*, and for this purpose the assumption of a continuity of *Seeds* of *vijñāna* is doubtless sufficient. The problem of the *presence* of *vijñāna* in the body *during nirodha-samāpatti*, however, is *not* explicitly raised, at least not in the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' as we find it in the VinSg. It is only in the *IP* that this problem is focussed upon, and if we take the *IP* to presuppose the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', its innovation would consist in expressly *adapting* this model to the solution of *this* problem by 'upgrading' the *Seeds* of mind accompanying the physical sense faculties to a latent form of *mind* lying hidden in them, because only in this way could the wording of the sūtra be taken literally (cf. § 43).

91.3. The dative *āyatyāṁ tadutpattidharmatāyai* need not be a final dative properly speaking, denoting an aim or purpose.[519] It can as well be understood as denoting the result,[520] in the sense of "serving to, conducive to".[521] And in the context of *nirodhasamāpatti*, the qualification *āyatyām* certainly refers, in the first place, to the time, or even moment, of re-emerging from this absorption. For this reason, I translate the expression as

> *so that* they (viz., the 'forthcoming', manifest forms of mind) are bound to [re]arise in future (i.e., when one re-emerges from absorption) (see § 25).

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[519] It may be worth noting that in Hsüan-tsang's rendering (YBh$_C$ 340c28–341a1), however its syntactical structure is analyzed (see fn. 130), there is no equivalent of a final dative.

[520] COULSON 1976: 71.

[521] THUMB/HAUSCHILD 1959: 24 (# 239.3); SPEYER 1968 [1886]: 65 (# 88); cf. also MACDONELL 1955 [1916]: 314 (*śriye* "for beauty = *so as to* produce a beautiful effect"); *AiSynt* 148 (*śriye* = "*so daß* es schön ist"). As a passage from the YBh with a similar use of the (abstract of the) dative, let me just quote BoBh$_D$ 253,22–254,1: "Having been cultivated in this way, this mundane but completely pure meditation removes from his 'personality' the corruption (or: evil disposition) correlating with the defilements that lead into unfortunate states of existence (lit.: 'basis'; cf. fn. 499 and fn. 502). Due to the removal of this [corruption], the 'personality' of this bodhisattva soon transforms *so that* he will definitely no longer commit any evil act that would lead him into an unfortunate existence and will [therefore] no longer go to unfortunate states of existences" (*tasya tathā paribhāvitaṁ tal laukikaṁ pariśuddhaṁ dhyānam āpāyikakleśapakṣyaṁ dauṣṭhulyaṁ āśrayād apakarṣati | acireṇa tasya pra-hāṇād āśrayo 'sya bodhisattvasya parivartate pāpakasyâpāyikasya karmaṇo 'tyantam akaraṇatāyai apāyāgamanatāyai ca*). Similarly BoBh$_D$ 257,23f: ... *mandarajaskasya svacittavaśitā ... sarvārtheṣu kṣiprābhijñatāyai* ("... *so that* he understands everything quickly"); YBh$_{Bh}$ 230,7 *kalalatvāya saṁ-mūrcchate* "coagulates *so as* to become a *kalala*" (YBh$_t$ D tshi 119a2f: *mer mer poṟ 'dres par 'gyur la ...*). Cf. also *saṁvartate* c. dat. "conducive to" (e.g., BoBh$_D$ 201,18).

This means that in this context the dative need not indicate the explicit and primary purpose of the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* but may rather point to an additional welcome consequence of the assumption that *vijñāna* in a hidden form continues to be present in *nirodhasamāpatti*.[522] In other words: by adding this expression, the text makes clear that 'upgrading' the Seeds of *vijñāna* in the physical sense faculties (and thus in the body: cf. § 76.6) to a hidden form of *vijñāna* comprising these Seeds not only solves the problem of the presence of *vijñāna* during *nirodhasamāpatti* and hence of the continuation of life but is, in addition, as good as (or even better than) the basic 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' for the purpose of explaining the rearising of ordinary mental activity at the end of *nirodhasamāpatti*. The same would also hold good if the alternative scenario of § 78.2 is preferred.

92. Such an explanation has the advantage of having the answer of the *IP* fit the question, and it makes perfect sense in that it allows us to understand the introduction of a new pair of concepts into the conceptual framework of early Yogācāra thought (as documented in the YBh) in a doctrinally and contextually plausible way. By contrast, in Buescher's interpretation the purport of the answer does not harmonize with the question, and he has to dismiss the passage as a later interpolation in spite of the fact that there is not the slightest formal incoherence, and on the basis of, as I have tried to show, untenable doctrinal and terminological assumptions.

3.3.7. Resumé

93. In summation, I hope that I have shown that Buescher's interpretation of the *IP* is burdened with severe problems.

1. In Buescher's interpretation the answer does not fit the question (§ 91.1).

2. His understanding of the expression ⟨*a*⟩*pariṇata* as characterizing the sense faculties in *nirodhasamāpatti* as "untransformed" in the sense of "unactualized" is, as far as I can see, not supported by textual evidence (§§ 67 and 68.2) and at any rate irreconcilable with Hsüan-tsang's Chinese rendering (§ 71) and with the meaning of this expression in the sūtra in the exegesis of which the *IP* is contextually embedded (§§ 69–70.2). Buescher's understanding is probably even incompatible with the original text itself since we may have to restore the critical word not to ⟨*a*⟩*pariṇata* but to ⟨*avi*⟩*pariṇata*, which can only mean "unimpaired" (§ 72).

3. Buescher's explanation of the sense faculties as mere capacities is incompatible with the Abhidharmic view, shared by the early Yogācāras, according to which they consist of pellucid matter, for this is how, against Buescher's contention, the term *rūpaprasāda* is clearly understood by the sources (§§ 49–56). Apart from this, the texts often speak of 'sense

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[522] Similarly, at YBh_{Bh} 200,1-3 (pre-*ālayavijñāna*, 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'; for more details see § 321) the primary purpose of asserting the presence of a Seed of corporeal matter (*rūpabīja*) in the world-sphere of incorporeality is to adapt the situation of an existence in this sphere to the canonical statement that *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* are interdependent (cf. YBh_{Bh} 199,13f; 230,4f), and it is only in the sense of a welcome corollary that the passage adds the remark that this Seed also serves as the cause from which the corporeal matter that had been cut off can re-emerge. That in this case the *Yogācāras* did not feel obliged to posit the presence of some subtle kind of corporeal matter in the *ārūpya-dhātu* would seem to be due to the fact that in this case the exegetical constraint was much weaker than in the case of *nirodhasamāpatti*, because there is no sūtra that expressly states the presence of *rūpa* in the *ārūpya* sphere and because the very term *ārūpya* seems to preclude such a presence.

faculties' in a less strict meaning, coming close to the sentient body as a whole (§ 76.6), and this may hold good also for the *IP*.

4. Buescher's interpretation of the sense faculties as mere capacities or Seeds (*bīja*) (on which his misunderstanding of ⟨*a*⟩*pariṇata* as "unactualized" is based) does not even correspond to the dominant view of Vijñānavāda masters, let alone early Yogācāras, but corresponds to a view that was first introduced in Vasubandhu's *Viṁśikā* (in an argumentative setting that makes *no* use of *ālayavijñāna*) and that was by no means adopted by all later Yogācāra masters (§ 68.2).

5. It is, in the first place, on the basis of these misunderstandings that Buescher feels entitled to regard the *IP* as a later interpolation and to discard it as textual evidence that might mirror the context in which the concept of *ālayavijñāna* was first introduced. But in the absence of any compositional disharmony (§ 31) this assertion, which is also made by Matsumoto and Harada (§ 33), is entirely arbitrary if the passage admits of a plausible interpretation in its transmitted context.

94.0. As I hope to have shown (ch. 3.2), such an interpretation, and at the same time an interpretation of the *IP* in which the answer fits the question, is indeed possible without running into any incongruities, at least as long as we move on the emic level.

94.1. Contrary to Buescher's assertions, the idea of the sense faculties as material entities (pellucid matter or in a wider sense) which may deteriorate or even putrefy (§§ 53.1.4 and 71–72) and as the locus of *bīja*s (§ 75–76.3) is well attested in early Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources, as is also, later on, the idea of *ālayavijñāna* lying hidden in, or pervading, the sense faculties or the body (§ 76.7). In addition, I have tried to demonstrate that Buescher's criticism of my unterstanding of the *IP* by means of a different interpretation of the meaning, function or implications of the expressions *pravṛttivijñānabījaparigṛhīta* (§§ 81–82 and 85–86), *anuparata* (§ 84), *hi* (§§ 43.3 and 91.2), and *āyatyāṁ tadutpattidharmatāyai* (ch. 3.3.6) is inconclusive. Even if Matsumoto is right in emphasizing that *°parigṛhīta* must not be understood in an active sense but has to be taken in its usual passive meaning (§ 80.1), this would hardly undermine my interpretation of the *IP* (§ 80.3).

94.2. Matsumoto's (and Harada's) argument that the complementary use of the concepts *ālaya-* and *pravṛttivijñāna* without an explicit definition can only be explained by their having been borrowed from the *ālayavijñāna* materials in the VinSg does not work if I am right in taking them to be self-explanatory in the context of the *IP*, or if the *IP* is part of a kind of succint record of a more detailed oral discussion (§ 37). Nor does the different thematic context exclude the possibility that the reference to the name *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 alludes to the *IP* (§ 35), in case its occurrence in the ManoBh of the MauBh could convincingly be proved to be post-Saṁdh.

95. 1. Buescher finds it deplorable that my interpretation of the *IP* misses the wealth of information to be gathered from it "once the total evidence of how the Initial Passage systematically adumbrates the concept [of *ālayavijñāna* (L.S.)] with diachronic and synchronic implications is exploited" (B: 76,31-33), but I am afraid that such an "exploitation" is nothing but an ahistorical 'eisegesis' of a later stage of development on the basis of arbitrarily declaring the *IP* to be a late interpolation, without any conclusive arguments.

2. I also hope to have demonstrated (§§ 46 and 47) that Buescher's reproach that, if my interpretation were accepted, the message of the *IP* would have to be rated as "a philosophical failure", "a nonsensical theoretical regress" (B: 62,14f) or "a sort of philosophical regress" (B:

97,24) is the result of a basic misjudgement of the purport of the passage and its historical context.

3. Buescher's assertion that the *IP* (as interpreted by me) does not serve any purpose that had not already been fulfilled by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is unwarranted. Actually, the *IP* addresses an exegetic problem that is *not* identical with the problem of the continuation of conscious mental activity *after nirodhasamāpatti* and had *not* been addressed by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' as we have it (nor, as far as I know, anywhere else in the YBh),[523] viz., the problem that according to the sūtra *vijñāna* must not have left the body *during nirodha-samāpatti* (§§ 42–45 and 91.2).

4. In order to solve this problem, the *IP* would have administered a slight but momentous change in the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' by 'upgrading' the Seeds of the mind in the sense faculties to a Seed-like form of *vijñāna* appositely called "mind in a state of lying hidden" (*ālaya-vijñāna*), viz., in the sense faculties, representative of corporeal matter. This 'upgrading' was necessary to satisfy the requirement of the sūtra statement. The introduction, or rather working out, of this state, or facet, of *vijñāna* is thus, at this stage, no unwarranted innovation but legitimated and even called for by canonical authority, and the new phraseology is a skilful and felicitous attempt at an appropriate description of this facet of *vijñāna*, in contrast to its conscious, manifest functions, by means of compounds entirely made up of traditional expressions (§ 45). Far from disqualifying this slight modification of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' as a "philosophical failure", I rather consider it a seminal first step, which by the slight unbalance it introduced into the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' gave rise to the development of a fundamentally new structure.

5. Alternatively, I would suggest understanding the *IP* as having adapted, to the afore-mentionened sūtra utterance concerning *nirodhasamāpatti*, a statement of the VaSg according to which the *vijñāna* does not depart from the body only as long as it appropriates the primary elements of the sense faculties, as well as the concept of *vijñāna* as comprising Seeds that had been developed in the context of the exegesis of the formula of dependent origination (§ 78.2).

96. I should also consider it misleading to characterize my understanding of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the *IP* as "materialistic", as Buescher does (B: 62,4), quoting S 1987 (# 3.10.2), where I attribute to *ālayavijñāna* "the original feature of essentially being bound, and somehow subordinate, to corporeal matter". The expression "somehow subordinate" may not have been the best choice, but what I wanted to say is that in the *IP* the special state of mind called *ālayavijñāna* (cf. § 45) is, similar to that of the Seeds of mind in the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', characterized by its 'sticking', or lying hidden, in the sense faculties or in the body (cf. the sūtra phrase *kāyād anapakrāntam*). But this is hardly materialism, for even in the case of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' the Seeds of mind contained in the sense faculties, and certainly those in the actual mind continuum, are surely not just an epiphenomenon of organic matter. On the contrary, we can be fairly sure that it is, in the first place, the mind continuum that continues beyond death so as to merge, once again, with matter developing, under its influence, into a living organism.[524] This no doubt also holds good for the *IP*, and by

[523] As regards the comparable theory ascribed to the Dārṣṭāntikas, etc., see § 42. If this theory was somehow known to the authors of the YBh materials, it may well have stimulated them, but on the other hand their theory of *bīja*s supplied them with conceptual resources for a more sophisticated solution.

[524] Cf. § 260.6 with fn. 1448.

'upgrading' the Seeds of mind to a Seed-like state of mind itself the role of the mind continuum is even strengthened.

97. In understanding the *IP* as mirroring a doctrinal situation in which the idea of a latent form of *vijñāna* was explicitly set forth and named *ālayavijñāna* for the first time in the Yogācāra tradition, I do not pretend to have definitively solved the problem of the origin of *ālayavijñāna*. All I claim to have done is to have presented a sufficiently plausible hypothesis, and I still think it basically meets the two criteria established by me (S 1987 # 1.7), Buescher's objections being, as I hope to have demonstrated, partly untenable, partly inconclusive. This does not, however, exclude the possibility that further comprehensive and thoroughgoing studies of early Yogācāra literature, especially of the composition and textual history of the YBh, may open up alternatives or better solutions.[525] After all, the *IP* does not *expressly* introduce *ālayavijñāna* as a new concept and would also make perfect sense if this concept had already been introduced before for some other reason. But with Buescher's thesis that *ālayavijñāna* (both as a concept and as a term) was newly created in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, as part of a novel model in which *ālayavijñāna*, *vijñaptimātratā* and the three-*svabhāva*-pattern form an integral whole, I have serious problems, at any rate as regards the argumentative basis on which it rests, as I shall explain in the next chapter (ch. 4). This chapter will also include my response to Matsumoto's arguments in favour of the position that Saṁdh V has to be regarded as the original source of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

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[525] As for the hypothesis that the real origin of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* may be found in direct psychological or mystical experience (cf. CHEN 1999: 78f, referring to HAKAMAYA 1978a: f; cf. S 1987: 197–207), now advocated, with new arguments, by N. Yamabe, see § 8.

4. The '*Saṁdhinirmocana*-thesis'

4.1. Semantic Possibilities and Exegesis of the Expressions *ālaya* and *ālayavijñāna*

98. Before embarking on substantiating his thesis that *ālayavijñāna* was first introduced in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* in the context of an entirely new theoretical model, Buescher (B: 102ff) tries to clarify the basic meaning of the term *ālayavijñāna* in a chapter entitled "Outlining a hermeneutical horizon for the comprehension of the phenomenological notion of *ālayavijñāna*". In this connection, he first comments on the use of the word *ālaya* in the early Buddhist canon. Thereafter, he discusses the criticism of Śrāvakayāna interpretations of *ālaya* (as used in a doctrinal context) raised in Yogācāra-Vijñānavāda sources (especially in MSg I.13), and then the (re)interpretation(s) of this expression in connection with the new concept of *ālayavijñāna*, that of Saṁdh V.3 being taken up last.

99. My own understanding of the expressions *ālaya* and *ālayavijñāna* may not be entirely incompatible with Buescher's, but it at any rate differs in terms of emphasis, i.e., I cannot follow Buescher in his tendency to emphasize, or give prominence, to certain facets of the semantic field of *ālaya* in contrast to others even where textual evidence or context do not support this. On the other hand, CHEN I-biau's (1999) attempt to correlate the main stages of the systematic development of *ālayavijñāna* with successive etymologizing explanations of its name is well argued, and it is only in more specific regards (like the original purport of the etymologizing explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna* in MSg I.3) that I have a somewhat different opinion.

4.1.1. The Early Buddhist Canon

100. As for the use of the word *ālaya* in the early Buddhist tradition, Buescher (B: 102) admits that it comprises both an active /subjective meaning (action noun) and a passive /objective /locative one: "clinging to" vs. "what is clung to", or "resorting to" vs. "resort, abode", etc.,[526] just like other semantically related words such as *kāma*, *upādāna*, *upadhi* or *parigraha*.[527] But he tends to prefer the objective meaning (Buescher: "home[-ground]") and to regard, following Steven COLLINS (1982: 170), "attachment" as an "extended meaning" (B: 103).[528] I am not convinced that the assumption of such a priority of the objective meaning is justified. And even if it could be shown that the objective meaning is predominant in the earliest linguistic layer of the canon, this need not exclude that in the bulk of the textual material the subjective meaning has become more important.[529] In any case, each passage has

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[526] Cf. also CHEN 1999: 81–85.

[527] Cf. S 1987 n. 201; for *upādāna* see § 172(1–2).

[528] Cf. also *PTSD* 109b ("orig. roosting place, perch, i.e. abode ..."). Both *CPD* (II 197b) and *DP* (I: 335b), though listing the locative meaning first, simply juxtapose both meanings.

[529] Thus unambiguously MN I 191,4: *upādānakhandhesu chando ālayo anunayo ajjhosānaṁ* (cf. B: 103f [# 52(b)]; VETTER 2000: 114), or *SHT* I (1965): 263 (no. 592 V2, corresp. to MPS # 34.142 [to

to be assessed in its own context. Thus, at Vin I 10,35 (I.6.21),[530] in a series of expressions referring to the cessation of craving (... *taṇhāya asesavirāganirodho cāgo paṭinissaggo mutti anālayo*), Buescher's rendering of *anālayo* as "being without a home-ground" (B: 106), although not without problems from a formal point of view,[531] may not be impossible,[532] but in the passage under discussion it would seem more natural to take *anālaya* as a tatpuruṣa compound[533] in the sense of "non-attachment".[534] Buescher even tries to derive the meaning

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be restituted accordingly]): *chando vā rāgo vā premā vā ālayo vā niyatir adhyavasānaṁ vā*, = AKBh 245,19f (read *prema* for *yena*; cf. *SHT* I no. 592 V2). Likewise, Jā II 336: *na jīvite ālayaṁ kubbamāno*, and perhaps also in the expression *ālayasamugghāta* (AN II 34,25, etc.; *CPD* II 199a: "the complete extinction or eradication of attachment to sensuality"), occurring in a series together with *pipāsā-vinaya* and *taṇhakkhayo* (but also with *vaṭṭūpacchedo*, and hence not quite unambiguous). A clear example from a text related to the Yogācāra tradition is $PSVy_{Tu}$ 243,21f ($PSVy_t$ P chi 41b5), defining *tṛṣṇā* as *kāmarū⟨pārū⟩pyāvītarāgāṇāṁ ... yā kliṣṭā prārthanā saktir ālayaḥ*. Cf. also YBh_t P zi 70a5 (D zhi 67a1): *de la sred pa gang zhe na | lus dag la chags shing sbyor bar* (D : *ba* P) *byed pa gang yin pa'o* ‖ (YBh_c 605a1: 愛云何。謂 於自體 親昵藏護。), probably representing something like **tatra tṛṣṇā katamā? ya ātmabhāveṣu sneha ālayaḥ.*

[530] Cf. also, e.g., DN II 310,6f; MN I 49,2f; 299,24f; III 251,4f; SN III 26,6f; V 421,30f.

[531] Grammatically, the *state* of being *without* a home would, strictly speaking, correspond to the abstract of a bahuvrīhi. For this reason, I myself my part would, in this case, rather expect an abstract formation (like *anagāriyaṁ*). Even in the Dhp-a passage referred to in fn. 532 it may perhaps be more accurate to understand *anālayo* lit. as "the not home" (cf. *CPD* 233a, s.v. *anoka* 2: the not home, the houseless ... state), i.e., that which is not a home, not a place to which one sticks or clings. But I have to leave the decision to specialists of Pāli grammar.

[532] The meaning "homeless state", suggested in *CPD* I 167a (s.v. ²*an-ālaya* m.) as the literal meaning, would no doubt fit well at Dhp-a II 162,10f, where *okaṁ* = *ālayo* is contrasted with *anokaṁ* = *anālayo* (= *nibbānaṁ*). For the passage under discussion, a similar meaning is presupposed by Dharmayaśas when he renders, at ŚA 553c1, *anālaya* as "[the state of] not having a home" (無宅). Similarly, T 32.1648 (*Vimuttimagga*) 452b8f: "[the state of] not having a place" (無處). Perhaps, the passage deliberately alludes to both facets: homeless state and non-attachment.

[533] Formed with *an-* + *ālaya* in the sense of an action noun. — I am not quite sure whether the proposal of "freedom from desire" as the actual meaning of ²*an-ālaya* m. in *CPD* I 167a and "freedom from clinging or attachment, independence" in *DP* I: 335b (s.v. *anālaya* 2) are just paraphrases of a simple negation ("non-attachment") or based on a different analysis. Cf., in this connection, Spk II 264,19f (similarly VisM XVI.65), stating that *nibbāna* (= *dukkhanirodha*) is called *anālaya* in the sense that there is, in this [state], no longer any attachment to sensual pleasures or to [inappropriate] views (*n'atthi ... ettha kāmālayo vā diṭṭhālayo vā ti*; alternatively: any object-of-attachment consisting in sensual pleasures or [inappropriate] views: cf. Spk-pṭ [CSCD: *Saḷāyatanavagga-ṭīkā* ## 377–409; My. II 388]: *kāmā eva puthujjanehi allīyitabbato ālayā*; similarly VisM-mhṭ I 347,18, quoted *CPD* III 380b s.v. *kāma-guṇâlaya*); cf. also *Ṭīkā* ad Abh 6d (CSCD): *n'atthi ālayo taṇhā etthā ̄ti anālayaṁ*, i.e.: *nibbāna* (= *nirodha*) is called *anālaya* in the sense of "that where there is no attachment = craving".

[534] [1.] "Non-attachment" could be taken in an absolute sense (RHYS DAVIDS & OLDENBERG 1882: I 95: "the destruction of desire"), but it should perhaps, like the preceding quasi-synonyms, be construed with *taṇhāya* (cf. FRAUWALLNER 1956b: 11 [2010a: 8]: "das ... nicht daran Haften"; 2010b: 14: "not holding on to it"; WALSHE 1996 [1987]: 347: "detachment from it"; BODHI 2000: II 1844: "nonreliance on it"). This alternative is supported by Sv III 800,38f: *taṇhā cajiyati paṭinissajjiyati vi-muccati na allīyati*. Since *allīyati* is (until the *Ṭīkā*s: see fn. 574) normally used in a medial sense, it may also be worth considering keeping to this use in the present case and taking *taṇhā na allīyati* to mean "craving does no longer stick [to such a person]", instead of assuming an unusual passive use in analogy to the preceding verbs. Accordingly, *taṇhāya anālayo* may have to be understood in a similar way, viz., as "[the fact] that craving does not stick [to such a person any more]", with *taṇhāya* as a

"pretence, ruse"[535] from "home" as the starting-point, quoting Vin II 82,24 *anummattako ummattakālayaṁ karoti* and proposing, as a literal rendering: "though not mad he makes himself the 'home of madness'", but this is not very convincing. Perhaps we may start from the meaning "refuge",[536] but I am anything but sure.[537]

101. The reason why Buescher favours the objective meaning (slightly shifted from "abode" or "home" to "home-*ground*") is that according to him this meaning admits of being understood not only as the place where one is peacefully at rest but also as implying the connotation of a place from which one goes forth

> to act in order to *bring* something home for the sake of keeping it up or, better still, enriching it, i.e., potentializing it by bringing ever more things home. In this way, a home(-ground) implies both a state of being there at rest ('latency') and a place of resource ('potentials'), (B: 104,21-25)

and as a home(-ground) of attachment it is thus not only the locus (of identification) *to* which one is attached but also

> the source (or motivating cause, *hetu*) *on account of* which attachment arises for things found suitable ... to be assimilated to it (...). (B: 104,27-29)

Understood in this way, *ālaya* in the sense of "home(-ground)" supplies Buescher with a

> *broader spectrum* of adumbrations that may retain some useful validity when trying to understand *ālaya* as a member of the compound *ālayavijñāna*. (B: 105,1-3)

102. However, I cannot help confessing that in the absence of corroborative textual evidence I find this elaboration of "adumbrations" somewhat speculative and tortuous, and that I should prefer to have them illustrated by concrete textual instances. It would, e.g., doubtless be possible to derive the connotations of "latency" and "source" from the primary meaning "home(-ground)" when the ocean is called the "home" — in the sense of "reservoir" or "repository" — of lots of gems (*ratnagaṇānam ālayaṁ* [acc.]: SN V 400,21 [no. 55.41]). In this case, the connotation may be that the ocean is the place where gems lie hidden, and also

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subjective genitive, though in this case an objective genitive ("[the fact] that [such a person] does not stick, or hold on, to craving [any more]") makes equally good sense. — [2.] The series of quasi-synonyms found in the ŚA (553c1; for **anālaya*, see fn. 532), belonging to the Dharmaguptaka tradition, seems to correspond exactly to that of the Pāli texts, but in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda sources the series is somewhat different and does not contain *anālaya*: cf., e.g., CPS # 14.9; AVinSū 15,7-9 (cf. AVinSūN 166 n. 6): ... *tṛṣṇāyāḥ ... aśeṣataḥ prahāṇaṁ pratiniḥsargo vyantībhāvaḥ, kṣayo virāgo nirodho vyupaśamo 'staṁgamaḥ*; cf. also AKBh 93,23f[1] ($SĀ_c$ 88a9; cf. LAMOTTE 1976: 2077 n. 1); $MĀ_c$ 468c21f; AS 63,13f (AS_t P li 108b6; AS_c 682a10f) with ASBh 74,18-26. It may be worth noting that the series of quasi-synonyms in Pāli does not follow the law of waxing syllables (at the end we have 2+5, 2+4). In the Sanskrit version, this law is unambiguously followed only in the second of two sets (2+3+3+4+4), whereas the first set would conform to it only if we presuppose, for *vyantībhāvo*, a mi. reading with svarabhakti (*viyantī°*) (3+5+5).

[1] Read *yat khalv asya* for *yat svalpasya*.

[535] *CPD* II 197b: "3 feint, pretence, ruse, ...".

[536] Cf. *DP* I: 335b s.v. *ālaya* 3: "refuge; concealment, pretence, ruse". Perhaps 'refuge' > 'subterfuge'?

[537] Cf., in this connection, the presumable use of the medial causative *(ā)lāpayate* in the sense of "to win over (by deception)" or "to seduce" (from "to make cling to" ["sich anschmiegen lassen"]: GOTŌ); cf., also for further references, GOTŌ 1987: 279 n. 648; ICKLER 1973: 54f; WERBA 1997: 315.

that it is their source.[538] Similarly, the statement that the body is the "home" or seat of many pains (*bahudukkhānam ālayo*: Thī 270) may be taken to imply that it is their source.

103. Apart from this, for exploring the semantic potential of the expression *ālaya*, it would seem indispensable to turn to the semantic field of the verb *ā-√lī*, from which *ālaya* is derived. The more so since *ālaya* does not seem to have developed into a definite doctrinal term in early Buddhism. It is, to be sure, occasionally (but comparatively rarely) used in a spiritual sense ("attachment" or "what one is attached to"), but as will be seen in connection with its Śrāvakayāna interpretations its concrete referent is, especially in the most important passage, somewhat elusive. It is thus possible that when the expression *ālayavijñāna* was coined or (re)interpreted it is not only the connotations of *ālaya* in its occasional use in spiritual contexts but also suitable facets of the semantic field of *ā-√lī* in secular contexts that we have to take into account. And it is in this way that the nuance of latency can, to my mind, be derived in a more direct way; for although *ā-√lī* obviously belongs to the root *lī* "to cling" and not to the different root *√lī* "to dissolve" (see § 44.2 with fn. 200), its semantic field seems to include, occasionally at least, the facets of "stooping" ("sich ducken"), "burrowing" ("sich verkriechen") or "hiding" ("sich verstecken"),[539] and the borderline between the two roots would seem to have become somewhat blurred (see ibid.). But one should not loose sight of the fact that the primary meaning of *ā-√lī* is "to cling or stick to",[540] entailing "to be (emotionally) attached to" as well as "to settle down on/in", "to resort to", and strongly suggesting an accusative or locative complement (cf. § 44.2). In the *Niddesa*,[541] we find *allīna* in sets of quasi-synonyms containing expressions like *niviṭṭha*, *satta* (< *sakta*), *lagga*, *nissita*, *upagata*, *ajjhosita*. It would therefore seem that even in the sense of "hiding" *ā-√lī* hardly expresses the bare sense of latency but may, at best, have the connotation of hiding or lying hidden *somewhere*. Accordingly, also its nominal derivate *ālaya* is, as has already been

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[538] Cf. Aṣṭ 40,8: *yāni kānicid ratnāni ..., sarvāṇi tāni mahāsamudraprabhāvitāni.*

[539] Cf. *PW* (and *pw*) s.v. *lī* + *ā*: 1. sich anschmiegen (*pw*: an (Loc.)); 2. sich setzen auf, in (von Insecten); 3. sich ducken, kauern, sich verstecken; (pw:) *ālīna* 1. angeschmiegt an (Acc.), aufliegend; 2. darin sitzend; 3. versteckt, sich versteckt haltend. The third meaning is also found in *MW* and *CDIAL* ("to stoop, crouch") but not in *APTE*, *CPD* and *DP* or in Sheth's *Pāia-sadda-mahaṇṇavo* (s.v. *ālī*, *ālīṇa*). Among the copious textual examples quoted in *CPD* and *DP* (s.v. *allīna* and *allīyati*), there are indeed only very few that might suggest the nuance of "hiding in" (like Spk I 37,29f *sakuṇā ... rattiṁ kulāvakaṁ allīyanti*: "resort to", but perhaps with the connotation "withdraw into"), and even the textual examples adduced in *PW* for this meaning (which is more typical for *ni-√lī*) may require reconsideration. — In contrast, Matsumoto (M2: 219) splits the semantic field of *ā-√lī* into 1. to lie hidden in (...に潜む), to exist in (...に存在する), to depend on (...に依存する), and 2. to cling to (...に執着する), but for the first two meanings of (1.) unambiguous examples from non-Yogācāra sources would be welcome.

[540] See fn. 539. An unambiguous example is DN III 19,4-6, where a person who impolitely remains seated is asked whether his buttocks stick to the chair (*pāvaḷā su nāma te pīṭhakasmiṁ allīnā*) or the chair to his buttocks. Other examples: MN I 81,24f: on account of excessive self-mortification, the skin of the belly sticks to the backbone (*udaracchavi piṭṭhikaṇṭakaṁ allīnā hoti*), or II 139,21f: the Buddha's garment does not stick to his body (*na ... kāyasmiṁ allīnaṁ*).

[541] E.g. Nidd I 38 (ad Sn 774b), 91 (ad 791a), 106 (ad 798b), 162 (ad 824c), 315 (ad 901a); Nidd II (Nāl.) 292 (ad Sn 57b). Similarly MN I 233,9-11: *dukkhaṁ allīno ... upagato ... ajjhosito dukkhaṁ "etam¯mama, eso 'ham¯asmi, eso me attā" ti samanupassati*. Cf. also the interesting entry in *DP* I: 241a: *allīno ti ekībhūto* (Nidd-a I 193,30), and *Ṭīkā* ad MN I 65,20f (CSCD: *Mūlapaṇṇāsa* #142; My. II 10): *allīnā ti nissitā. Upagatā ti avissajjanavasena ekibhāvam¯iva gatā.*

pointed out above (ibid.), not easily interpreted i the abstract sense of latency but will, at most, connote either the act of hiding or lying hidden *in* something, or a place or entity *where* somethi g else hides or lies hidden.

4.1.2. Śrāvakayāna Interpretations

104.1. As regards the Śrāvakayāna interpretations of the expression *ālaya* criticized in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg I.13) in connection with the interpretation of the sūtra statement according to which creatures delight in *ālaya* (**ālayārāmā prajā*),[542] they are not criticized from a strictly semantic point of view, i.e., because they take *ālaya* to mean either what is clung to, or the act of clinging, or both. Rather, they are criticized because they take the expression to refer to the wrong entities, viz., to the five *upādānaskandha*s, or to pleasant feeling (*sukhā vedanā*) associated with passionate attachment (*rāga*), or to the wrong view of (i.e., conceptual clinging to) a substantial ego (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*),[543] instead of taking it to refer to the deeper layer of *ālayavijñāna*. At least the interpretation of the expression *ālaya* as referring to the *upādānaskandha*s, and also its connection with the conception of an Ego (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) in the traditional understanding of this term, would seem to fit in quite well with the ideas of the early (pre-*ālayavijñāna*) Yogācāra tradition. Actually, in YBh 26,18f *ālaya* forms part of a list of expressions (comprising *satkāya*, *prapañca*, *upādāna*, *duḥkha*, *satkāyadṛṣṭyadhiṣṭhāna*, and *asmimānādhiṣṭhāna*)[544] that are, in this passage, best understood as equivalents of the term *ātmabhāva*, designating the [basis of] individual existence (see § 88.3), i.e., the sentient being as a whole, consisting of the five *(upādāna)skandha*s or their centre, the *ṣaḍāyatana*, as that to which a spiritually immature person clings as his/her ego (cf. *satkāyadṛṣṭyadhiṣṭhāna*) in spite of their being ultimately unsatisfactory (cf. *duḥkha*).[545] For

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[542] Quoted (in MSg I.11.1) from the *Ekottarikāgama*; cf. AN II 131,31-35. For further parallels and references, see LAMOTTE 1938: II 7*; CHEN 1999: 84f; M2: 492 n. 317.

[543] For *ālaya* equated with the five *upādānakkhandha*s see S 1987 n. 204 (VisM-mhṭ), for *ālaya* juxtaposed or equated with *tṛṣṇā* see Vi 338a3f and 746c11-14 (S 1987 n. 193; CHEN 1999: 86f), and for *ā-√lī* in the sense of clinging to the 'sixfold basis' as one's self see fn. 687. In Theravāda commentarial literature, *ālaya* is often understood as the five objects of sensual pleasure (*kāmaguṇa*: S 1987 n. 203). Cf. also S 1987: 165f (on *ālayatṛṣṇā* as found at ŚrBh$_{\mathrm{Sh}}$ 16,15f ≈ ŚrBh$_{\mathrm{Tai}}$ I 24,10-12 [with em. *utpīḍya* for *utpādya*, for which I proposed *utsādya*, which I still find preferable]).

[544] Cf. S 1987 # 7.1B.2.1.3.

[545] For the basis of (personal) existence (*āśraya*, *ātmabhāva*) as 'suffering' (*duḥkha*) see YBh$_{\mathrm{Bh}}$ 26,16f (S 1987 # 4.1.2 with n. 469) and 25,15f, for its being the objective support (loc.) of *satkāyadṛṣṭi* and *asmimāna* ibid. 25,15 (*tatra câtmabhāve bālānām aham iti ... asmîti vā bhavati*), for *ṣaḍāyatana* as the point of reference of the notion of self cf. ParySg (MATSUDA 1994) 98,15 (see fn. 687). — MATSUMOTO's (M2: 75–77) contention that in YBh$_{\mathrm{Bh}}$ 26,18f *ālaya* should be equated with *ālayavijñāna* appears arbitrary, and his arguments do not convince me. The mere fact that the term *ālayavijñāna* does occur in the ManoBh is, in view of the obvious compilatory character of this *Bhūmi*, surely not conclusive, for these occurrences are extremely sporadic and, as MATSUMOTO himself admits, obviously a redactional addition to earlier materials (see S 1987 ch. 6.2 and 6.3). The compiler(s) or redactor(s) who introduced this concept may tacitly have read the passage under discussion in a similar sense, but had it been newly created or amplified by them one would surely expect them to have used the new term *ālayavijñāna* instead of the traditional concept of *ālaya*. Nor can it be argued that in the present passage '*ālaya*' must mean *ālayavijñāna* because it is equated with the objective support of the notion of an ego (*satkāyadṛṣṭyadhiṣṭhāna*) and because in later sources the objective support of this notion is precisely *ālayavijñāna* (MATSUMOTO [M2: 76] refers to TrBh *13,14f and

although the aforementioned expressions are adduced here as quasi-synonyms of 'Seeds' (*bījaparyāya*), this takes place in a context where it is the *ātmabhāva* that is taught to be endowed with all Seeds, or with the Seeds of all forms of individual existence (*sarvātmabhāvabījopagata*),[546] obviously on the assumption that the Seeds are nothing but the dharmas themselves insofar as they are capable of producing certain effects.[547]

104.2. It is clear that the *ātmabhāva* had to cede this role to *ālayavijñāna* when the latter was conceived as representing the entire latent layer of individual existence and the primary result of karmic maturation. But I do not of course share Buescher's (B: 109 n. 1) conviction that such a rejection of the traditional understanding of the expression *ālaya* in its sūtra context has to be presupposed as having taken place along with the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* from the very outset, at any rate not as long as the *IP* is the most likely candidate to mirror the starting point of this notion. Since in the earlier tradition the expression *ālaya* appears only sporadically in a doctrinal or spiritual context and was hardly terminological, no conflict may have been felt in the beginning. It was probably only when *ālayavijñāna* had evolved into a full-fledged innovative concept for which textual evidence in the early canon had to be tracked down that the meaning of *ālaya* in the respective canonical passage and in the concept of *ālayavijñāna* had to be harmonized.

4.1.3. *Triṁśikābhāṣya*

105. As for the etymologizing explanations of the term *ālaya*(*vijñāna*) found in the Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources, Buescher (B: 113ff) starts with Sthiramati's *Triṁśikābhāṣya* (TrBh). According to Buescher, Sthiramati's explanation[548] comprises three parts, later on (B: 116,18) expressly declared by Buescher to form an "integral whole". However, in the first of these parts *ālayākhyaṁ (...) vijñānam* is, just as in the verse commented upon, not the definiendum but the definiens, the definiendum being the *vipāka*(*pariṇāma*) of verse Tr 1d–2b.[549] Only the second and the third part are actually explanations of the component *ālaya* in

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*14,17-19 [L. 22,22-24 and 23,14-17]), for it is surely inadmissible to superimpose later views on a passage embedded in earlier materials as long as an interpretation in terms of these earlier materials makes perfect sense. And as far as I can see it does (see above).

[546] YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,3 and 12; 26,10. (see § 88.3 with fn. 502 and fn. 503).

[547] The equation of the concept of Seed(s) with that of the entity endowed with Seeds (see § 251 with fn. 1390) is explained in YVy P yi 115b3f (D 'i 95a3) by means of a quotation from the VinSg (YBh$_t$ P zi 29b1f: see fn. 1390) according to which Seeds cannot be established as entities distinct from the *saṁskāra*s (in the wider sense of conditioned-and-conditioning dharmas) but are nothing but the *saṁskāra*s themselves insofar as the latter have arisen in such a way (that they are capable of producing a certain effect).

[548] TrBh *7,12-17; L. 18,22-26.

[549] Moreover, *ālaya* is, in this passage, surely not "defined *as* a *state* that technically is called *phalabhāva*" (B: 114,1; my emphasis), for in the passage from which this expression seems to have been taken (viz., TrBh *6,15f [L. 18,5f]) °*bhāvena* is syntactical (X-*bhāvena* = "by being X" or "as X": cf. § 108.3): "This [transformation] is ... differentiated (lit.: split) [into two, viz.,] *as* cause [on the one hand] and *as* effect [on the other]" (*sa ... hetubhāvena phalabhāvena ca bhidyate*).[1] In its *vipāka*-aspect, *ālayavijñāna* is not an abstract state of result but the concrete ('repotentialized') result (*phala*) itself of the ripening of the imprints of previous karma.

[1] The Tibetan translation (TrBh **6,18: *de ... rgyu'i dngos po dang 'bras bu'i dngos po tha dad pa'o*) is strange. Actually, TrṬ P ku 15b1 (D hi 13a7) has the expected wording: ... *'bras bu'i dngos pos tha dad do*.

the term *ālayavijñāna*. But even these two explanations are interpreted by Buescher in a way I cannot but feel to be extremely strained and unnatural, his interpretation being affected by his endeavour to understand the expression *ālaya* as "latency" at all costs.

106. Thus, in the simple statement of TrBh *7,13f (L. 18,23f)[550] that *ālayavijñāna* is thus designated because it is the *ālaya* (repository), i.e., place[551] (*sthāna*), of the Seeds of all pollutional dharmas (*sāṁkleśikadharma*)[552] — a specification[553] of an explanation that seems to go back to Vasubandhu: see § 120.1 —, Buescher manages to introduce the connotation of latency for '*ālaya*' by interpreting *sthāna* as denoting the "basic possibility of establishment".[554] For this he resorts to the meaning *sthāna* has when used in opposition to *asthāna* ("what is possible" vs. "what is impossible") or in the expression *nedaṁ sthānaṁ vidyate* ("there is no such possibility").[555] This sounds rather far-fetched. It is hardly admissible to equate the logical or factual (im)possibility expressed by these phrases with potentiality or latency. Actually, Vinītadeva's subcommentary unequivocally confirms that *sthāna* is used in its ordinary meaning of "place, abode" by glossing it with *rten* ("support").[556] The same holds good for *Pṛthivībandhu's commentary on the corresponding passage of the *Pañcaskandhaka*.[557]

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[550] *tac ca sarvasāṁkleśikadharmabījasthānatvād ālayaḥ*. Similarly PSkV ms. 58a1 (PSkV$_t$ P 53b1f).

[551] Thus also Matsumoto (M2: 220,1: 処).

[552] Buescher's (B: 114,6-8) rendering of this expression as "the *dharmas* ('states of consciousness' = noemata) pertaining to the whole context of psychic dysfunctionality" is rather unwieldy and in any case hardly applicable to pre-Vijñānavāda Yogācāra (cf. § 5.2). It is also odd to say that the "notion of *saṁkleśa* refers to the totality of *kleśas* included in the three categories of *kleśa-*, *karma-* and *janma-saṁkleśa*" (B: 126 [Ex. 20]; underlining mine), because among these three categories only that of *kleśasaṁkleśa* comprises the *kleśa*s, whereas the other two are *saṁkleśa* but not *kleśa*s. *Saṁkleśa* is the wider concept, comprising all aspects of saṁsāric existence, whereas the concept of *kleśa* is confined to certain psychic attitudes that may indeed be called 'dysfunctional' in the sense that they are soteriologically counterproductive or even tend to trigger bad karma.

[553] Obviously added under the influence of the source of Sthiramati's second explanation, viz., MSg I.3 (see § 110), where only the pollutional dharmas — i.e., all dharmas comprised in the three categories of pollution (*saṁkleśa*, see fn. 552) —, are stated to be causally connected with *ālaya-vijñāna*, whereas in Vasubandhu's explanation no such restriction is expressed. Sthiramati has simply shifted the specification from the MSg's explanation to the one corresponding to Vasubandhu's because he had placed the latter first and because he obviously considered the specification appropriate in this case as well.

[554] B: 115,3f; 116,28f.

[555] B: 115 n. 1.

[556] TrṬ P ku 16b7f (D hi 14b3): *'di ltar rnam par shes pa 'di ni kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos thams cad kyi rten du gyur pa ste | de bas na kun gzhi zhes bya'o ||*.

[557] PSkBh hi 199a5: *kun gzhi zhes bya ba dang | gnas zhes bya ba dang | rten ces bya ba ni don gcig ste ming gi rnam grangs su zad do ||*. Cf. also Guṇamati's (PSVyṬ P 159a8; D 132b6) gloss on the corresponding definition of PSVy P 24b2 (Muroji 1993: 106,15f): *sa bon gyi rten rnam par bzhag pa ni ji skad du | "chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gnas gang yin pa'o" zhes bstan pa'o ||*. Buescher's remark that in his commentary on the PSk (PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b1)

> Sthiramati directly equates **sarvabījālaya* and **sāṁkleśikadharmasthānatva* when he says: *sa bon thams cad kyi kun*[1] *gzhi nyid ni kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos kyi gnas nyid do ||* (B: 115, end of n. 1)
>
> [1] Sic Buescher, but both D and P lack *kun*, just as in P hi 53a7 and D shi 238a7 = PSk 80,15.

107.0. Likewise, in what Buescher (B: 115f) adduces as the third facet of his alleged tripartite integral delineation of *ālaya*, no reference to the aspect of latency is recognizable. Actually, the respective passage is explicitly marked as an *alternative* (*athavā*; cf. TrṬ P ku 16b8: *bshad pa gzhan*), viz., to the preceding explanation of *ālaya* in the sense of *sthāna*:

> *athavâlīyante upanibadhyante 'smin sarvadharmāḥ kāryabhāvena, tad vâlīyate upanibadhyate kāraṇabhāvena sarvadharmeṣv ity ālayaḥ* | (TrBh *7,15-17 [L. 18,24-26])

Buescher (B 116,33-37) translates as follows:

> Or, again: as all *dharmas* get to be latently present (*ālīyante*) in it, [that is] they get bound up in this [condition] as [their] effected state (*kāryabhāva*) or, again, as it is latently present, is getting bound up, in all *dharmas* as [their] causal state (*kāraṇabhāva*) — it is [designated as] 'Latency' (*ālaya*).

107.1. Buescher (B: 116,10-15) takes the first part of this explanation, which is based on a similar one of MSg I.3 (see § 110), to mean that

> the *dharmas* have become 'attached to' this latency (i.e., *ālayavijñāna* [L.S.]) in the sense of having merged into it as their effected state (*kāryabhāva* = *vipāka*) ...; the *dharmas* get to be latently present (*ālīyante*) in the latent consciousness,

or (B: 117,1-3):

> *Ālaya* has been described ... as an effected ('potentialized') condition, the locus ('home-ground') in which the *dharmas* are getting bound up.

And the second part, according to Buescher's explanation, would seem to amount to a kind of *satkāraṇavāda*, affirming the latent presence, or continued existence, of the cause in the effect:

> *ālayavijñāna*, containing all the potentialities, is the causal condition (*kāraṇabhāva*) for all actualized states of consciousness; and as such it is latently present in each of them" (B: 116,15-17), "the latent prestructure inherent in every single cognitive state. (B: 117,6f)

107.2. I cannot but find Buescher's interpretation somewhat strange. As I understand him, he seems to take the passage in the sense of a kind of *satkāraṇavāda*, of a latent continuity or 'survival' of the cause in the effect: the dharmas (as the cause) continue to exist in a latent form in the *ālayavijñāna* (which is their *vipāka*-effect), and the *ālayavijñāna* (as the cause) is latently present as a prestructure in the dharmas (which are its effect). As far as I am familiar with (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda teachings, *ālayavijñāna*, the subliminal mind underlying the ordinary cognitive states, contains homogeneous Seeds of the actual dharmas or actual cognitive states and hence functions as their primary cause (*hetupratyaya*), and when actual dharmas arise as an effect they may in their turn have an effect on the *ālayavijñāna* in two ways: 1. by reinforcing the respective homogeneous Seeds (*bīja*) or former imprints (*vāsanā*), thus favouring an increased rearising of similar dharmas in the future, and 2., if they are karmically significant, by generating karmic imprints, which entail a heterogeneous effect, a *vipākaphala*, in that they condition the quality of the 'linking-up' (*pratisandhi*) of *ālaya-*

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is misleading: First, the Tibetan text is defective and should, at the end, be corrected (with D shi 238b1) to ... *pa'i chos kyi <u>sa bon thams cad kyi</u> gnas nyid do* (Skt. ms. 58a1: <u>*sarvasāṁkleṣikadharmabīja-*</u>*sthānatā*). Second, what is equated with °*sthānatva* (or rather °*sthānatā* [ms.]) is not °*ālaya* but °*ālaya*<u>*tā*</u> (*gzhi <u>nyid</u>*), i.e.: the *fact* that (°*tā*) *ālayavijñāna* is the *ālaya* of all Seeds is explained as the *fact* that it is the *sthāna* of the Seeds of all defiled dharmas, and there is no reason whatsoever not to understand *sthāna* in its usual meaning of "place" or "locus", glossing on *ālaya* in the sense of "receptacle".

vijñāna after death and, thereby, the quality of the ensuing future life.[558] On these presuppositions, it would seem quite natural to speak of a "latent prestructure" of actual dharmas (or cognitive states) as inherent in *ālayavijñāna* (in the form of homogeneous Seeds), or of *ālayavijñāna* as a "latent prestructure" underlying, or hidden in, the continuum of ordinary cognitive states as a whole, but I have problems with understanding *ālayavijñāna* as "the latent prestructure inherent *in every single* cognitive state", or as "the causal condition" which "*as such* is latently present in *each of* them". Likewise, it would make good sense to speak of a "re-potentialization" of *ālayavijñāna* through actual dharmas in the two ways indicated above, but whether this can be expressed in terms of actual dharmas merging into *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of a kind of latent survival of the cause in the effect (or in the sense of their future reproduction after a phase of latency, if this is what Buescher means) is anything but certain.

108.0. From my point of view, there are four problems involved in Buescher's understanding of the TrBh passage under discussion, and likewise in his understanding of its prototype in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg I.3: see § 110) as well as of the parallel in the *Madhyāntavibhāgaṭīkā* (MAVṬ).[559]

108.1. The first problem is Buescher's bias for "latency" as the dominant notion of *ālaya*, and, accordingly, of *ālīya(n)te*, which is anything but obvious.

108.2. The second problem is Buescher's interpretation of the locative *asmin* as "in this [condition]", although there is, in the context, no substantive denoting "condition" to which the pronoun could refer. Actually, the pronoun must refer to *ālaya(vijñāna)* as the explanandum of the 'etymology', just like *der* in MSg I.3, *tatra* in MAVṬ 33,8 or *tasmin* in ASBh 11,11, all of which Buescher himself (B: 118,1; 119,5) correctly translates as "in it". This is in fact not only in accordance with the usual phraseology in such 'etymologies'[560] but is also required by the complementary structure of the two sentences of the passage under discussion, and is moreover confirmed by MSg I.27, where we have **vijñāne* instead of the pronoun.

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[558] See fn. 639.

[559] MAVṬ 33,8f: *ālīyante sarve sāsravā dharmās tatra phalabhāvena, tac ca teṣu hetubhāvenêty ālayaḥ*. Buescher (B: 118,1-3):

> As all anticipative *dharmas* get to be latently present in it as [their] resultant state, and as it is in them as [their] causal state, it is [called] 'latency'.

I must leave it to others to decide whether Buescher's rendering of *sāsrava* as "anticipative" (amply argued for in n. 1 on B: 118) is felicitous; at any rate, it does not mirror the connection of this term with the concept of *āsrava* ("evil influxes", "contaminants"). And although it makes sense in the case of beneficial factors aimed at a fortunate rebirth, it is not easy to see in which sense dharmas that are the result of previous karma (*vipāka(ja)*), or even the five *skandhas* of an arhat (as far as they are *vipāka(ja)*), which are *sāsrava* because arisen under the influence of defilements belonging to a previous life (*paurvajānmikakleśasaṁbhūtatvāt*: ASBh 24,1), might be 'anticipative'. I prefer, in this study, the rendering "contaminated", in a wider sense including both consisting in, being associated with or being favourable for *āsravas* ("contaminants"), being subject to their latent force (as mundane beneficial factors), or being a product arisen under their influence. Cf. AS 18,4-6 (AS_G 20,23f); ASBh 23,15–24,2; YBh_t P zi 215a1–216a4 (D zhi 205a6–206a5; YBh_c 661b21–c23). Cf. also § 184.

[560] Cf., e.g., MAVṬ 6,17: *lakṣyante 'nenêti lakṣaṇam*; AKVy 5,29: *saṁsaranty asmin sattvā iti saṁsāraḥ*; 331,4: *saṁvartante ... 'sminn iti saṁvartaḥ*.

108.3. The third problem is the syntactical construction of the expressions *kāryabhāvena* and *kāraṇabhāvena*, which Buescher translates "as [their] effected (/resultant) state" and "as [their] causal state", respectively. But it is the function of the *abstract* in the instrumental to signify "*in what quality* somebody or something acts", to be rendered by means of "as" (SPEYER 1886 # 237), and *°bhāva* is just one of the formatives of nominal abstracts, equivalent to *°tva* and *°tā* (ibid. # 235). Thus, *kāryabhāva* is, to be sure, "the state of effect", but *kāryabhāvena* merely means "as effect",[561] not "as the state of effect". Thus, the passage can only mean that *ālayavijñāna* is called as it is [1] because dharmas adhere to it (Buescher: get to be latently present in it) *as effect*, or [2] because it adheres to them (Buescher: gets to be latently present in them) *as cause*.

108.4. What still remains to be clarified is, beside the precise meaning of *ālīya(n)te*, the question whether in [1] dharmas adhere to *ālayavijñāna*, or get to be latently present in it, as *its* effect or (as Buescher seems to assume: see §§ 107 and 107.1) as *their* effect (=*vipāka*), and, analogously (if we want to be exhaustive), whether in [2] it adheres to them, or gets to be latently present in them, as *their* or as *its* cause. In other words: in view of the mutual causality of *ālayavijñāna* and dharmas (MSg I.27) it is legitimate to ask which direction of the causality (*ālay.* → dharmas, or dharmas → *ālay.*) is at stake in [1] and [2], respectively. Unfortunately, none of the sources concerned contains a pronoun that would settle the matter unambiguously. Thus, debate is necessary. Still, I must confess that I find Buescher's decision to take *kāryabhāva* in [1] as the resultant state of the subject of the sentence (i.e., the dharmas: "their") but *kāraṇabhāva* in [2] as the causal state of the noun in the locative (i.e., once again the dharmas: "their") somewhat unexpected, and at any rate in need of some argument.

109.1. As for Sthiramati's understanding of *ālaya* in the passage under discussion, his formulation in the TrBh, which is identical with the one found in his *Pañcaskandhaka-vibhāṣā*,[562] agrees substantially with that of MSg I.3, from where it has been taken, with one significant exception: the addition of the word *upanibadhya(n)te* after *ālīya(n)te*. There cannot be any reasonable doubt that this is a gloss by which Sthiramati wants to clarify his understanding of *ālīya(n)te*. Buescher's rendering of *upanibadhya(n)te* as "get bound up in" would seem to be an attempt to bring the meaning as close to "latent presence" as possible, but the ordinary meaning of *upa-ni-√bandh* in Buddhist texts is "to tie, fasten, connect to",[563] and since this meaning is well attested also in connection with the notions of cause and

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[561] Thus also Matsumoto (M2: 220,3: 果 *(kārya)* として).

[562] PSkV ms. 58a2 (PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b2; D shi 238b2; Skt. ms).

[563] Cf. *CPD* II 460 and *DP* I: 457f (s.v. *upanibandha*, *upanibandhaka*, *upanibandhati*, *upanibandhana/°nā*); *BHSD* 137b (s.v. *upanibadhnāti*). In the ŚrBh, *upanibaddha* is, on the one hand, used in connection with a corpse that is stripped of skin, flesh and blood, [its bones being] merely *connected* by sinews (*apagatatvaṁmāṁsaśoṇitaṁ snāyumātropanibaddhaṁ*: ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 372,5f = ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2008]: 66,1f; cf. ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 66,4f). On the other hand, it is used to denote the *fixation* of the mind (*citta*), or mindfulness (*smṛti*), on the objective support (*ālambana*): cf., e.g., ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 293,13 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 180,10f); 362,17f (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2008]: 40,9); 387,6 (read *°ālambanopanibaddhacittasya* with ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2009]: 42,6); 419,19 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2011]: 142,9; em. to *ālambane smṛtyupanibandhaṁ kuru*?); see also BoBh$_D$ 77,6; 78,13f and 16; cf. also the examples from post- and paracanonical Pāli sources in *DP* I: 458 (s.v. *upanibandhati*), and from the *Yogalehrbuch* in *SWTF* I: 387a and II 253a. An interesting use is YBh$_{Bh}$ 28,4: *śaropanibaddhaṁ antardravaṁ kalalaṁ*, i.e.: "the *kalala* is kept together (or enveloped, covered?, cf. Tib. *yogs pa* = covered) by a film [on the outside] but liquid inside."

effect[564] there is no reason to diverge from it in the present case.[565] This means that in glossing *ālīya(n)te* with *upanibadhya(n)te* Sthiramati makes clear that he understands *ā-√lī* in its primary meaning of "to stick to, adhere to", not, of course, in an emotional but in an ontological sense. This is also supported by Vinītadeva,[566] who glosses *'brel pa* (*upanibadhyante*) with *'dre ba* ("are mixed, or intertwined, with"), probably representing **saṁsṛjyante* ("are united, related"), and by the Tibetan rendering of *ālīya(n)te* as *sbyor (ba)*[567] ("stick to, adhere to, attach themselves to") in the PSkV parallel as well as in the MAVṬ passage (§ 108.0).[568] Thus, in this passage Sthiramati takes *ālaya* to refer to the connectedness or *relatedness* of (actual) dharmas and *ālayavijñāna* as effect (*kāryabhāvena*) and cause (*kāraṇabhāvena*), with no explicit reference to latency.

109.2. There is good reason to assume that the same holds good for Sthiramati's analogous explanation of the term in the MAVṬ; still more so since in this case the passage is contextually closely connected with the causal function of *ālayavijñāna*. This text is also quite unambiguous with regard to which kind and direction of causal relation is envisaged. For what is to be explained here is the designation of *ālayavijñāna* as *pratyayavijñāna*, "mind functioning as condition [for the manifest forms of mind]".[569] A questioner[570] objects that in view of the *mutual* conditioning of *ālayavijñāna* and manifest forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*) the latter, too, should be called *pratyayavijñāna*, but this is *rejected* by a reference to the fact that the manifest forms of mind are only an determinant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*) for *ālayavijñāna*, not its primary condition (*hetupratyaya*), whereas *ālayavijñāna* is precisely this primary condition for all contaminated (*sāsrava*) dharmas.[571] Thus, it is clear that in this text the phrase under discussion, intended to corroborate, by way of 'etymology', that only *ālayavijñāna* can be called *pratyayavijñāna*, must refer to the relatedness of dharmas to *ālayavijñāna* as *its* effect and of *ālayavijñāna* to dharmas as *their* cause.

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[564] Cf. VisM VIII.27 (cf. *DP* I: 363a s.v. *āhārūpanibandhaṁ* "having a dependence on food", noting a v.l. °*baddhaṁ* ["dependent on ..."]); *BHSD* 137b, s.v. *upanibandha*: "connexion, dependence (of effect on cause)", referring to a passage from the *Śālistambasūtra*.

[565] Thus also Matsumoto (M2: 220,3f: 結合される "is/are tied together, united"), who nevertheless renders *ālīya(n)te* as "lie(s) hidden in" (に ... 潜み: ibid.).

[566] TrṬ P ku 17a1f (D hi 14b4): *'jug* (see fn. 567) *ces bya ba ni 'brel pa dang 'dre ba zhes bya ba'i bar du'o* (**ālīyanta ity upanibadhyante, saṁsṛjyante iti yāvat* (?)).

[567] In the Tibetan translation of the TrBh (**7,21f), *ālīya(n)te* is, however, rendered as *'jug*, which may mean "to enter", but has other meanings as well, like "to approach", "to engage in", "to set out", "to proceed", "to become active" (Skt. *pra-√vṛt*). I presume that the translators may have chosen *'jug* for *ālīya(n)te* in view of the semantic closeness of *ā-√lī* to *ni-√viś*, *upa-√gam*, etc. (see § 103 with fn. 541), i.e., in the sense of "to resort to", "to approach", "to enter into a relation with". Cf. also the use of *'jug (pa)* to render *saṁ-√murch* in the sense of *ālayavijñāna*'s merging with proto-embryonic matter at the moment of conception in $\mathrm{YBh_{Bh}}$ 24,5f ($\mathrm{YBh_t}$ P dzi 13b2) and Saṁdh V.2 (see §§ 127 and 279), a usage which reminds one of the canonical view of *vijñāna*'s descending (*avakrānti*) into the mother's womb, also rendered by *'jug pa* (cf. *AKBh-I* pt. 1: 325, s.v. *vijñāna-avakrānti-yoga*).

[568] $\mathrm{MAVṬ_t}$ P tshi 38b4f.

[569] The immediately preceding sentence is (MAVṬ 33,7f = MAVBh 21,3f): *ālayavijñānam anyeṣāṁ vijñānānāṁ pratyayatvāt pratyayavijñānam* (corrected in accordance with MAVBh).

[570] MAVṬ 33,20–34,2.

[571] MAVṬ 34,7-13.

109.3. In this sense, the phrase under discussion (TrBh *7,15-17: § 107.0) should, without any unnecessary complications, be translated as follows:

> Or (alternatively) [1] *ālaya* [in the term *ālayavijñāna*] means that all (/all contaminated) dharmas stick, i.e., are tied/related, to it (sc., *ālayavijñāna*) as [*its*] effects (*kārya-bhāvena*), or (/and) [2] that it sticks (i.e., is tied/related) to them (/to all dharmas) as [*their*] cause (*kāraṇabhāvena*).

Understood in this way, the 'etymology' of *ālaya* is based on a uni-directional causal relation, viewed from both perspectives: [1] *ālaya* as "that to which [dharmas] stick or adhere" (*ālīyante 'sminn ity ālayaḥ*), i.e., that to which they are ontologically attached or related as *its* effects, or/and[572] [2] *ālaya* as "that which sticks or adheres to [dharmas]" (*ālīyata ity ālayaḥ*), i.e., that which is ontologically attached or related to them as *their* cause.[573]

4.1.4. *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* I.3 and Its Exegesis

110. As regards the MSg passage on which Sthiramati's alternative explanation of *ālaya-(vijñāna)* (§ 107) is based (§ 109), it runs as follows:

> MSg I.3: *skye ba can kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos thams cad 'bras bu'i dngos por der sbyor ba'am | de yang rgyu'i dngos por de dag tu sbyor ba'i phyir kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'o* ||.

Buescher (B: 119) translates:

> It is [called] Latent Consciousness because all the originating dysfunctional *dharma*s get to be latently present (*ālīyante*) in it as [their] resultant state (*phalabhāva*), and [because] it is latently present in them as [their] causal state (*hetubhāva*). ...

111. In this case, the situation is, however, more complicated than in the case of the TrBh. This is already apparent in the considerably different ways the Tibetan and Chinese translators render **ālīya(n)te*.[574] For whereas the Tibetan translators use *sbyor ba* ("to stick to,

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[572] In TrBh and PSkV (as well as in MSg) the two phrases are connected by "or" (*vā*, Tib. *'am*), i.e., presented as alternative perspectives, whereas in MAVṬ 33,8f they are connected by "and" (*ca*, Tib. *dang*), i.e., taken as complementary perspectives. Either makes sense because both perspectives refer to the same causal relation and because the 'etymology' may be construed from either perspective.

[573] Syntactically, we have, in both sentences, the pattern "*ālīya(n)te* A^{loc} B^{nom} C-*bhāvena*", and in my interpretation the entity in the nominative (B) would be the C of the entity in the locative (A). Precisely the same holds good without doubt for the exactly parallel construction in PSkV ms. 58,5f (see fn. 650).

[574] NAGAO (1982: 82) prefers the perfect participle *ālīna*, against the testimony of the parallels (TrBh: § 107; MAVṬ: fn. 559; cf. also the quasi-quotation in YVy P yi 98a8f, which has *sbyor bar byed pa*) but in accord with MSg I.27. This would not make much difference as long as the middle voice character of *ā-√lī* and the ensuing present perfect function of the participle (as in the case of, e.g., *sthita*) is taken into account. The problem is rather that NAGAO (and CHEN) appear to have understood it in a passive sense (cf. also M2: 395,1f and 5f, adducing "being hidden/concealed by the pollutional dharmas" [... 染汚の諸法によって"潜まれるもの"] as one of three explanations of the name *ālaya-vijñāna* in MSg I.3). However, such a passive use of *ā-√lī* seems to be unusual and would have to be supported by unambiguous evidence from sufficiently close sources. The only evidence for a passive use I have noted so far is from Theravāda *Ṭīkā*s, e.g., Sv-pṭ II 75: *ālīyanti abhiramitabbaṭṭhena sevī-yantīti ālayā pañca kāmaguṇā* ("The five objects of sensual pleasure are called '*ālaya*' because they are stuck to, [i.e.,] pursued in the sense of something to be enjoyed"), ad Sv II 464,13f, where *allīyanti* is, however, clearly active (in a middle voice sense): <u>*ālayarāmā*</u> *ti sattā pañcasu* (CSCD) *kāmaguṇesu allīyanti, tasmā te ālayā ti vuccanti* ("'[Beings] delight in *ālaya*': sentient beings stick (= are attached)

adhere to, attach oneself to"), just as in MAVṬ and PSkV (see § 109.1), Buddhaśānta and Dharmagupta have 依 and 依(住) ("to rest or rely on", "to depend on"), respectively. Hsüan-tsang, on the other hand, has chosen 攝藏 ("to be gathered and stored/hidden in"),[575] and Paramārtha even 隱藏 ("to lie hidden in").[576] It seems that the last two renderings have particularly influenced modern translations:

Lamotte 1938: II 13: "gîte[nt] en...";

Hakamaya 1978b: 216 = 2001: 564 (# A2): ...に埋没している "lie buried in ...";

Nagao 1982: 81: ...の中に ... 内蔵されている "have been incorporated into ...", taken over by Chen 1999: 98f: 被内蔵在 ... 當中;

Matsumoto (M2) 240,4 and 6: において ... 潜む ("to lurk, lie dormant, be hidden in ...").

It also appears that Hsüan-tsang's rendering, and still more so Paramārtha's, would support Buescher's pleading for "latency" much better than the Tibetan equivalent *sbyor ba* or Sthiramati's gloss *upanibadhya(n)te*.

112.0. However, as far as I can see there is good reason for the assumption that the author of the MSg most likely understood his 'etymology' of the term *ālaya(vijñāna)* in more or less the same way as Sthiramati did, and that the Tibetan translators' rendering of **ālīya(n)te* as *sbyor ba* ("to stick to, be [ontologically] attached to") is appropriate.

112.1. The expression also occurs, in the form of its perfect participle *ālīna*, in MSg I.27, where a verse from the lost *Abhidharma-(Mahāyāna)sūtra* is quoted as evidence for the *mutual* causal relatedness of the subliminal mind and the actual cognitive states (/dharmas). Here, too, the Tibetan translators convincingly translate *ālīna* as *sbyor ba*, i.e., "being stuck or attached to" in the sense of "[ontologically] connected with":

> All dharmas are always stuck (*ālīna*, *sbyor*, i.e., ontologically attached) to [*ālaya*]-*vijñāna*, and likewise it to them, as effect and cause, mutually.[577]

Although the Chinese translators use the same renderings here as in MSg I.3, the (closer as well as wider) context merely suggests *causal* interrelatedness,[578] and the commentaries, too, take the verse to express just mutual causal dependence.[579] This interdependence includes, of course, both the origination of actual dharmas from their Seeds in *ālayavijñāna* and the

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to the five objects of sensual pleasure, therefore these [objects of sensual pleasure] are called *ālaya*s [i.e., what one sticks to, objects of attachment]").

[575] Cf. his more explicit rendering of the 'etymology' of *ālaya* at Saṁdh V.3 as 攝受藏隱 (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 692b17).

[576] See fns. 594, 595, 614, and 615, respectively.

[577] Quoted MAVṬ 34,1f: *sarvadharmā hi ālīnā vijñāne teṣu tat tathā | anyonyaṁ phalabhāvena hetubhāvena sarvadā ||*. Cf. B: 117 n. 1, again with "latently present" for *ālīna* and with the same misunderstanding of °*bhāvena* (see § 108.3) as in his translation of TrBh *7,15f (§ 107), MSg I.3 (§ 110) and MAVṬ 33,8f (fn. 559).

[578] The verse is, in MSg I.27, expressly adduced in order to corroborate that *ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*s condition each other mutually (*rnam par shes pa de gnyis ni gcig gi rkyen gcig yin te*), an idea explicitly stated also in MSg I.14.1–3 and I.17.

[579] Cf. MSgBh$_t$ P li 157a5f (D ri 133b2f): "When *ālayavijñāna* is the cause, then they (i.e., the actual dharmas) are the effect; when they are the cause, *ālayavijñāna* is the effect" (... *gang gi tshe kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rgyu yin pa na de'i tshe de 'bras bu yin la | gang gi tshe de rgyu yin pa na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa 'bras bu yin no ||*).

repotentialization of *ālayavijñāna* through the actual dharmas,[580] but there is no need to burden *ālīna*, in this verse, with a nuance of latency, nor is it explained here in such a way in any of the Indian commentaries.

112.2. In MSg I.27 and the sūtra verse quoted there, *ālīna* is used for the *mutual* causal relatedness, or causal *inter*relatedness, obtaining between *(ālaya)vijñāna* and actual dharmas but *not* in connection with an etymologizing justification of the term *ālayavijñāna*. Indeed, as indicated in the MAVṬ (§ 109.2), such a justification would not easily be derived from *mutual* conditioning unless there is some specific feature qualifying one correlate of the relation, namely the subliminal *vijñāna*, to be called *ālaya*, but not the other, namely the actual cognitive states or dharmas. According to the MAVṬ, this special feature is the fact that the subliminal *vijñāna* functions as the primary cause (*hetupratyaya*) of the actual cognitive states but not the other way round. This seems to be the position of some other texts as well,[581] but the MSg (I.17) accepts both sides as *hetupratyaya*.[582]

112.3. Even so, the subliminal mind is, probably in view of its continuity, characterized as the fundamental layer (*shes bya'i gnas*, **jñeyāśraya*: MSg I.1), and in a verse from the *Abhidharmasūtra* quoted in support in MSg I.2 it is stated that the *vijñāna* that contains all Seeds is the *ālaya* of all dharmas[583] — here Buescher's rendering 'home-ground', in the sense of abode and source, or of a nest or receptacle where they lie hidden in a latent form and from which they come forth, would fit well — and is therefore [called] *ālayavijñāna*.[584] Since it is immediately after this quotation that the author of the MSg formulates his own etymologizing justification of the name *ālayavijñāna* in terms of causal relatedness, we can be fairly sure that what he has in mind is *ālayavijñāna* as the (fundamental) cause of all dharmas

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[580] As may also be gleaned from the fact that in this connection MSgU$_c$ 390b25–c15 (not in MSgU$_t$) and VGPVy (P li 407b3–408a3; D ri 339b3–340a2) quote in extenso the passage on the mutual dependence of *ālayavijñāna* and *pravṛttivijñāna*s from the 'Pravṛtti Portion' of the VinSg (see § 118.3 with fn. 638 and fn. 639).

[581] AS 28,9 (AS$_G$ 27,2f): *hetupratyayaḥ katamaḥ | ālayavijñānaṁ kuśalavāsanā ca* (ASBh 35,21f: *sāsravā⟨ṇām a?⟩nāsravāṇāṁ ca saṁskārāṇāṁ yathākramam*); YBh$_{Bh}$ 110,18 (see fn. 2179); YBh$_t$ P zi 16a1f (D zhi 13b5; YBh$_c$ 583b28–c1): *sa bon gyi rgyud dang ldan pa ... gang yin pa de ni rgyu'i rkyen ces bya'o*.

[582] As CWSL 8c3-13 suggests, the disagreement may be related to the opposition between a traditional Yogācāra assumption of inborn, natural Seeds as against a Mahāyānist view that Seeds are generated by impregnation (*vāsanā*), on which see YAMABE 1989 and 1991.

[583] According to the *Bhāṣya* (MSgBh$_t$ P li 147b8f; D ri 126a5f), containing all Seeds is the reason for its being the *ālaya* of all dharmas: "The first pāda is explained by the second pāda" (*rkang pa dang po ni rkang pa gnyis pas bshad do*).

[584] MSg I.2: *chos kun sa bon thams cad pa'i || rnam par shes pa kun gzhi ste || de bas kun gzhi rnam shes te || ...*; Skt. according to J. TAKASAKI (see HAKAMAYA 1978b: 223 = 2001: 571; CHEN 1999: 97):

**ālayaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṁ vijñānaṁ sarvabījakaṁ | tasmād ālayavijñānam ...*

This reconstruction is to be preferred to YAMAGUCHI's (HAKAMAYA, loc. cit.) and NAGAO's (1982: 79–81 and 10[lr]: **ālīnaṁ sarvadharmeṣu ...*) in view of the evidence supplied by the VGPVy for the genitive plural *sarvadharmāṇāṁ* (P li 374a1f; D ri 311a6: *chos rnams kun gyi kun gzhi ni*; cf. also P 370a5 (D 308a4): *chos kun zhes bya ba ni kun nas nyon mongs pa can thams cad kyi'o*) and, partly, for the sequence of words: after some remarks on *ālaya*, the words *sarvadharmānāṁ*, *vijñānaṁ* and *sarvabījakam* are explained in precisely this order (P li 370a2-7; D ri 308a2-5).

(deliberately specified by him as the pollutional dharmas),[585] and hardly the opposite causal relation.[586]

112.4. This is expressly confirmed by the (anonymous) *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍa-vyākhyā* (VGPVy),[587] where we find the remark that regardless of whether we say that the other dharmas stick to it (= *ālayavijñāna*) or that it sticks to the other dharmas, the *ālaya(vijñāna)* [is] in both cases [envisaged] only in its aspect of cause, for the only thing in question is an explanation of the reason for the use of the term (sc., *ālayavijñāna*) by means of an 'etymology', and *not* a full treatment of the *mutual* causal relatedness, which will be examined later (viz., in MSg I.14ff). It may also be worth mentioning that the Tibetan master Tsong-kha-pa (1357–1419) in his *Yid dang kun gzhi'i dka' 'grel* explains the text along the same lines: *ālaya(vijñāna)* is named as it is because 'all dharmas stick to it', i.e., because, since *ālaya(vijñāna)* in the sense of its Seed-part is the *hetupratyaya* of all pollutional dharmas, they stick to it as *its* (= *ālayavijñāna*'s)[588] effects, or because *ālaya(vijñāna)* as the cause *of these dharmas* sticks to them.[589]

112.5. In the light of these materials, I would translate MSg I.3 as follows:

> It is [called] *ālayavijñāna* because all dharmas that are subject to origination and are pollutional (**sāṁkleśika*) stick (**ālīyante*, i.e., are related) to it as [its] effects (**phala-bhāvena*), or because it sticks (**ālīyate*, i.e., is related) to them as [their] cause (**hetu-bhāvena*). ...

112.6. Still, as already indicated, it is a fact that the exegetical tradition of the passage is multi-faceted, the interpretation represented by Sthiramati, the VGPVy and Tsong-kha-pa being only one strand (though, in my opinion, the one that comes closest to the intention of the author of the MSg). In the following paragraphs, I shall try my best to present an outline of the explanations offered by other exegetes.

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585 Cf. $MSgU_t$ P li 239a7–b3 (D ri 195b1-3; $MSgU_c$ 383b5-9; cf. § 114.1) and MSg I.45–49 and III.1 (cf. S 1987 # 4.8.5).

586 In this regard, I thus basically agree with the Dharma-master YIN Shun (印順法師) quoted in CHEN 1999: 99f. CHEN's criticism (ibid. 100f) appears justified as far as the syntax of Hsüan-tsang's Chinese rendering of the passage (from which YIN's argument proceeds) is concerned, but from a systematic point of view I find CHEN's argument problematic because it does not sufficiently distinguish between the MSg's theory of the causal relationship between *ālayavijñāna* and (pollutional) dharmas (which is indeed mutual) and the 'etymology' of the name *ālayavijñāna* (which makes better sense if understood as making use of only one side of this relationship).

587 VGPVy P li 374b1-3 (D ri 311b5f): *'dir yang gal te gzhan dag der sbyor ro zhe 'am | de gzhan du sbyor ro zhes byas kyang rung | gnyi ga ltar na yang kun gzhi ni rgyu'i ngo bo kho na yin te | sgra 'jug pa'i rgyu mtshan nges pa'i tshig gis byas pa tha snyad par zad do || ... lhan cig phan tshun rgyu dang 'bras bu'i ngo bo yin pa ni rkyen rnam par bzhag par* (P : om. D) *dpyod par 'gyur ro ||*.

588 See also KELSANG & ODANI 1986: 73,17f: この〔種子分のアーラヤ識の〕結果として (i.e., "as the result of this [Seed-part *ālayavijñāna*]"); cf. also SPARHAM 1993: 95,19: "as its results".

589 YidKun 47,5f (KELSANG & ODANI 1986: 165 fol. 29a1f; SPARHAM 1993: 200,12-16): ... *bye brag tu kun gzhi sa bon gyi cha la kun gzhi zhes pa ni | ... kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos rnams kyi rgyu'i rkyen yin pas de dag 'di'i 'bras bur 'dir sbyor ba'am | yang na kun gzhi de nyid chos de dag gi rgyu'i dngos por 'dir sbyor ba'i phyir na kun gzhi'o* ||. KELSANG & ODANI (p. 73,15-19) appositely translate ...*-r sbyor ba* as ... に付着する ("stick/adhere to ..."); cf. also SPARHAM's rendering of the MSg passage (p. 95,8f: "adhere(s) to").

113.1. Vasubandhu's commentary (*Bhāṣya*: MSgBh) on MSg I.3[590] is rather short but at least contains a gloss on *ālīya(n)te*. In the case of the alternative 'etymology' of MSg I.3, according to which *ālayavijñāna* is named as it is because ordinary sentient beings attach themselves (*ālīyante*) to it as their self (*ātman*),[591] *ā-√lī* has, according to Vasubandhu, the meaning "to grasp, to cling to" (*'dzin par byed*, 執, 執取). In the 'etymology' under discussion, however, he takes it to mean "to abide" (*gnas pa*). In Hsüan-tsang's translation, the corresponding equivalent is 轉, lit. "to turn round", but frequently used to render Skt. *√vṛt* (with or without prefix),[592] which may mean "to turn" but also "to abide" as well as "to proceed", etc.; Dharmagupta has 共轉 "to occur, or proceed, together". This may point to the idea that the dharmas are, in the form of Seeds, (latently) present in the *ālayavijñāna* as its future effects,[593] but also simply to that of the connectedness of *ālayavijñāna* and dharmas as cause and effect. Still, on account of the extreme brevity of Vasubandhu's gloss and because its original wording has not been preserved and hardly admits of a reliable reconstruction, its precise purport remains a matter of speculation.

113.2. The same holds good for Buddhaśānta's[594] and Dharmagupta's[595] Chinese renderings of the MSg passage under discussion (cf. § 111), according to which *ālayavijñāna* is designated as it is because [1] the pollutional dharmas lean or rest (依(住)) on it as effect, and because [2] it leans or rests on them as cause. As far as I can see, this formulation, too, would not appear incompatible with an interpretation of the relation between *ālayavijñāna* and actual dharmas as cause and effect, respectively. Especially the first phrase ([1]) presents no difficulty if understood to mean that all dharmas rest on *ālayavijñāna* as [its] effects. This would be in agreement with the immediately preceding quotation from the *Abhidharmasūtra* according to which *ālayavijñāna* is that on which all dharmas rest (**sarvadharmasamāśraya*, in Dharmagupta's terminology: 諸法所依住) [because] it contains their Seeds (i.e., is their

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590 MSgBh$_t$ P li 148a1-3 (D ri 126a6f; MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 157a28–b3; MSgBh$_{Dh}$ 273b25-28; MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 324b18-21).

591 MSg I.3: *yang na sems can dag* (VGPVy P li 374b3: *rnams*) *de'i bdag nyid du sbyor bas* (YVy P yi 98b1 [D 'i 81b1]: *de la bdag tu sbyor ba'i phyir*) *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'o*; Cf. S 1987 n. 137, suggesting **sattvā vā tad ātmatvenâlīyante* ..., whereas NAGAO (1982: 10 lr) proposes *atha vā sattvās tadālīnā ātmatvenêty ālayavijñānam*, which makes no substantial difference. Cf., in this connection, also the similar formulation with *ṣaḍāyatana* instead of *ālayavijñāna* quoted in fn. 687.

592 Cf. LAMOTTE 1938: II 13: "ils y sont présent", suggesting Skt. *pravartante*, which, however, may not fit *gnas pa*.

593 Cf. the use of *gnas (pa)* in Guṇaprabha's commentary of PSk 17,4(f) (see fn. 644).

594 MSg$_{Bu}$ 97b28–c1 (tentative translation:)

> As regards dharmas that have (i.e., are subject to) origination: in dependence on this [*vijñāna* as their cause?] all polluted dharmas function as effects, and with regard to them (?) this [*vijñāna*] on its part, in dependence on the [actual] *vijñāna*s, functions as cause. Therefore it is called *ālayavijñāna*.
>
> 有生法者, 依彼 一切諸染法作果, 於彼彼亦依諸識作因, 故說為阿梨耶識。

I have to admit that the passage is not at all clear to me; I provisionally take 於彼 to render the presumable **teṣu* (*de dag tu*) of the original, and 諸識 to be an addition of the translator (or someone else) that supplies 依 with an object.

595 MSg$_{Dh}$ 273b23f:

> It is called *ālayavijñāna* because all dharmas that have origination and are polluted lean and rest on [it] as [its] effect, and because this *vijñāna* in its turn leans on those dharmas as [their??] cause (or: for being a cause?).
>
> 一切有生染法 依住為果, 此識 亦依彼法為因, 故名阿梨耶識。

cause). In the case of the second phrase ([2]), an analogous interpretation sounds less obvious, but we might still take the sentence that *ālayavijñāna* rests on the dharmas as [their] cause to mean that insofar as it is a cause it is dependent on them, because without an effect it would not be a cause at all.[596]

114.0. As regards *Asvabhāva's commentary (*Upanibandhana*: MSgU) on MSg I.3,[597] the evidence is more complicated.

114.1. On the one hand, *Asvabhāva's explanations appear to support my interpretation of *ālīya(n)te* in terms of causal relatedness; for when explaining the expression "pollutional dharmas", he states that it is intended to exclude the purificatory dharmas,[598] because in view of the fact that *ālayavijñāna* is polluted by its very nature and — as the store-house of all defilements — the 'enemy' (*vipakṣa*) or evil to be eradicated, the purificatory dharmas, as the 'opponent' (*pratipakṣa*) or antidote, cannot 'stick' or be ontologically attached (*ā-√lī*) to it as its effect (**phalabhāvena*).[599] The reason is that contradictory things like the *vipakṣa* and the *pratipakṣa* may, to be sure, coexist,[600] but a causal relation between them is impossible,[601] just as a drop (or: bit?) of a remedy may coexist with (i.e., lie in) a pot of poison but never originates from poison as its cause.[602] Coexisting, however, is expressed by the concept of support (*āśraya*),[603] whereas *ālaya* (or the verb *ā-√lī*) means the relation of cause and

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[596] Theoretically, it might perhaps be possible, by interpreting 為 in the sense of 以為, to take Dharmagupta's rendering to mean that the dharmas rest on *ālayavijñāna* as *their* effect, and that *ālayavijñāna* rests on them as *its* cause, but this sounds extremely improbable since it would one-sidedly describe *ālayavijñāna* as the effect and the dharmas as the cause, which is surely at odds with the fact that *ālayavijñāna* is the basic layer (cf. MSg I.1–2), and not the dharmas.

[597] $MSgU_t$ P li 239a7–b5 (D ri 195b1-5; $MSgU_c$ 383b4-11).

[598] $MSgU_t$ P li 239a7f (D ri 195b1): *kun nas nyon mongs pa'i chos thams cad ces bya ba ni rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams las rnam par dbye ba'o* ||

[599] $MSgU_t$ P li 239a8–b1 (D ri 195b1f): *rnam par byang ba'i chos rnams ni rang bzhin gyis* (P : *gyi* D) *kun nas nyon mongs pa can nyon mongs pa thams cad kyi bang ba dang mdzod lta bur gyur pa mi mthun pa'i phyogs la bras bu'i dngos por sbyor ba ma yin te* | *de'i gnyen po yin pa'i phyir ro* ||. It is worth noting that Hsüan-tsang ($MSgU_c$ 383b5-7) renders the phrase **ālīyante kāryabhāvena* here as 種子體性之所攝藏, i.e., "(... the [Seeds of the] purificatory dharmas are not) comprised-and-stored in the Seed-nature (of the *vipakṣa*, i.e., of *ālayavijñāna*)", i.e., he interprets the phrase as if it read **bīja-bhāvena* instead of **kāryabhāvena*. Cf. § 116.1 with fn. 619.

[600] $MSgU_t$ P li 239b2 (D ri 195b2): *gang na mi mthun pa'i phyogs yod pa de na* (D : *ni* P) *gnyen po yod pa'i phyir gnas ni yin no* (P: *ma yin no*, which in view of the preceding sentence (see fn. 601) might perhaps stand for *mi rung ba ma yin no*); $MSgU_c$ 383b8f: "But it can be its support, for if in some place there is the *vipakṣa*, the *pratipakṣa* may also be there" (然得為所依，若處有所治亦有能治故。).

[601] $MSgU_t$ P li 239b1f (D ri 195b2; $MSgU_c$ 383b7f): *mi mthun pa dag ni rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos por mi rung ngo* ||.

[602] $MSgU_t$ P li 239b3 (D ri 195b3): *sman nad med kyi thigs* (D : *thegs* P) *pa dug gi bum pa dang lhan cig gnas pa ni dug gi rgyu las byung* (P : *'byung* D) *bar mi rung ngo* ||. Not represented in $MSgU_c$. — According to *Tshig-chen* 1515a, *nad med* can mean *a ru ra*, i.e., *harītakī* (MVy 5798), a myrobalan fruit (= Terminalia chebula [or citrina]: cf. DAS 1988: 227) used as a strong purgative.

[603] $MSgU_t$ P li 239b3 (D ri 195b3): *lhan cig 'jug pa'i don ni gnas kyi don te* |. Not represented in $MSgU_c$.

effect.[604] In view of the example (the remedy or antidote that may lie in a pot of poison but cannot be its effect) it would seem obvious that *Asvabhāva wants to make clear that unlike the pollutional dharmas the purificatory dharmas cannot 'stick', i.e., be ontologically attached or related, to *ālayavijñāna* as *its* effect.

114.2. On the other hand, when moving on to the explanation of the words *der* (**tatra* or **asmin*)[605] and *sbyor ba* (probably: **ālīyante*),[606] *Asvabhāva, if I understand the text correctly, says that the purport (**ity arthaḥ*) of the latter is that [the pollutional dharmas?], covering up (**abhivyāpya*?) [the *ālayavijñāna*?], infuse/repotentialize (**bhāvayanti*) latent imprints (**vāsanā*) (?).[607] This suggests that by adhering to and covering up (**abhi-vy-√āp* may explain *ā-√lī*: cf. § 121.2.2) *ālayavijñāna*, the dharmas have a causal effect on *ālaya-vijñāna* as the support of latent imprints.[608] This, again, may be taken to imply that this time *Asvabhāva takes phrase [1] of the passage under discussion to mean that the dharmas adhere to *ālayavijñāna* as *their* effect. Yet, in view of the succinctness of the text and the absence of the original Sanskrit I am anything but sure. Unfortunately, this explanation has no equivalent in the Chinese version. But in his translation of MSgU ad I.2 Hsüan-tsang takes the statement of the *Abhidharmasūtra* that the subliminal mind is the *ālaya* ('home-ground', cf. § 112.3) of all dharmas to mean that it stores or incorporates them by being impregnated, (re)potentialized, [by them].[609] Still, this passage, too, is not only somewhat terse but also dubious, for this time it is the Tibetan version that lacks a corresponding phrase.

115. An explicit transformation of the bipartite etymologizing explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna* in MSg I.3 in terms of *mutual* causality is found in the *Pañcaskandhaka-bhāṣya* (PSkBh) ascribed to *Pṛthivībandhu.[610] Here, the subject of both phrases is *ālayavijñāna*, and **ālīya(n)te* is replaced by "is/are intertwined and connected" (*'dre zhing 'brel pa*, probably rendering **saṁsṛjyate* and **upanibadhyate*: cf. § 109.1).[611] Phrase [1] thus comes to be

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[604] MSgU$_t$ P li 239b2f (D ri 195b3): *rgyu dang 'bras bu'i dngos po'i don ni kun gzhi'i don no* ||. Not represented in MSgU$_C$.

[605] MSgU$_t$ P li (D ri 195b3f; MSgU$_C$ 383b9f): "The word "to/in it" refers to [*ālayavijñāna* as] the support of impregnations (*vāsanā*)" (*der zhes bya ba ni bag chags kyi gnas ston te* | ...).

[606] It is not very probable that *Asvabhāva jumps from the locative of phrase [1] (see fn. 605) to the verb (*ālīya<u>te</u>*) of phrase [2] without commenting on the verb of phrase [1] (*ālīya<u>nte</u>*), and indeed MSgU$_C$ (383b9: 於此攝藏者) quotes locative and verb together, but without the original Sanskrit text we cannot be absolutely sure. If the comment were nonetheless on the verb of phrase [2], we would probably have to assume that *Asvabhāva took phrase [2] to mean that *ālayavijñāna* adheres to the dharmas as [*its*] cause, i.e., as the cause of its repotentialization.

[607] MSgU$_t$ P li 239b5 (D ri 195b4): <u>*sbyor ba*</u> *zhes bya ba ni* | *mngon du khyab par bag chags bsgo zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* ||.

[608] See fn. 605.

[609] MSgU$_C$ 383a21: "'That which collects-and-stores all dharmas' (= Hsüan-tsang's rendering of *ālayaḥ sarvadharmāṇām*, for which see fn. 584): i.e., is impregnated by them; the meaning is: [receives their] imprint (*vāsanā*, i.e., their latent continuance, from which they can re-emerge in the future?)" (能攝藏諸法者，謂 是所熏，是習氣義。). Cf. also CHEN 1999: 99.

[610] Tib. Sa'i rtsa lag, which could as well represent *Vasubandhu. But probably a post-Sthiramati work, and surely not an autocommentary by the author of the PSk himself.

[611] Cf. PSkBh P hi 199a7 (D si 112a3f): *yang na kun gzhi zhes bya ba'i tshig gi don ni 'dre ba'am 'brel pa'am 'jug pa la bya ste* |. For *'jug pa* see fn. 567.

transformed into the statement that *ālayavijñāna* is thus called because *it* is related to all dharmas as *their* effect; i.e., when wholesome and unwholesome dharmas store up imprints (*vāsanā*) in *ālayavijñāna* and thereby modify it, the dharmas are the cause and *ālayavijñāna* is the effect.[612] Phrase [2], on the other hand, preserves its original purport: *ālayavijñāna* is named as it is because it is related to all dharmas as their cause; i.e., when the dharmas arise from the corresponding imprints (*vāsanā*) in *ālayavijñāna*, *ālayavijñāna* plays the part of the cause (**hetusthānīya*) and the dharmas the part of the effect.[613]

116.0. As pointed out in § 113, in the MSgBh and two of the Chinese versions of the MSg, *ālīya(n)te* in MSg I.3 is taken not in the sense of "adhere(s) to" but rather as "lean(s) on", "rest(s) on", and I have argued that such an interpretation would be fully compatible with an interpretation of the first phrase ([1]) in terms of a causal relationship between *ālayavijñāna* as the cause and the dharmas as its effect, but may pose problems in the case of the second ([2]). Still more complications would seem to arise, at least in connection with the phraseology of MSg I.3, if *ālīya(n)te* is understood as "abide(s) *in*" or, as in Hsüan-tsang's[614] translation, as "is/are gathered and stored/hidden in" (於 ... 攝藏) or even, as in Paramārtha's,[615] as "hide(s) in" or "lie(s) hidden in" (於[...]中隱藏).[616]

116.1. In the case of phrase [1], it sounds, to my mind, somewhat far-fetched to interpret it, with Buescher (see § 110) and, perhaps, *Asvabhāva (§ 114.2), in the sense that due to their function of (re)potentializing the *ālayavijñāna* the dharmas may be called to be stored or lie hidden there as *their* own effect in the form of a latent residue or repotentialized Seed,[617] or even as their own future effect still in a state of latency. I consider it more natural to take the

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[612] PSkBh P hi 199a7f (*kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de chos thams cad la 'bras bu'i dngos po'i ngo bor 'dre zhing 'brel pas kun gzhi zhes bya ba* ...) and 199a8–b2 (... *nam dge ba dang mi dge ba la sogs pa'i chos rnams kyis* [D : *kyi* P] *kun gzhi la bag chags sogs pa na ... chos rnams ni* [D : *kyi* P] *rgyu yin la kun gzhi ni 'bras bu yin te* | ...).

[613] PSkBh P hi 199a8 (*kun gzhi de chos thams cad kyi* [199b2: *la*] *rgyu'i dngos por 'dre zhing 'brel pas na kun gzhi zhes bya'o*) and 199b2f (... *nam kun gzhi*⟨*'i*?⟩ *bag chags de las chos rnams byung bas na kun gzhi ni rgyu ltar gnas la chos rnams 'bras bu ltar gnas pas na* ...).

[614] MSg_{Hs} 133b21-23:

Because all dharmas that have origination and are pollutional are comprised and stored/hidden in this [*vijñāna* so as to] be [of] the nature of [its] effects, and because precisely this *vijñāna* is comprised and stored/hidden in them [so as to] be [of] the nature of [their] cause: therefore it is called *ālayavijñāna*.

一切有生雜染品法 於此攝藏 為果性故, 又即此識 於彼攝藏 為因性故, 是故說名阿賴耶識。

For '... 故 是故 ...', see Hsüan-tsang's rendering of subsequent alternative 'etymology'; cf. also KIK (Yuga) 8: 13). For an interpretation of the passage by one of Hsüan-tsang's students, see § 118.2.

[615] MSg_{Pa} 114a7-9:

It is called *ālayavijñāna* because all dharmas that have origination and belong to the category of what is impure are hidden in it as [its future?] effects, and because this *vijñāna* is hidden in [these] dharmas as [their former?] cause.

一切有生不淨品法 於中隱藏為果故, 此識 於諸法中 隱藏為因故, ... 名阿黎耶識。

[616] Paramārtha's and Hsüan-tsang's renderings of *ālīya(n)te* may have been influenced by the translation of *ālayavijñāna* as 藏識 ('storehouse mind'), which is already found in Guṇabhadra's translation of the Laṅk, produced in 443 AD: cf., e.g., T 16.670: 483b1-4, c15 and 484a10, corresponding to Laṅk 38,13–39,1, 42,4f and 43,18f.

[617] Thus, if I understand him correctly, also CHEN 1999: 100,22: 一切雜染諸法作為果性被攝藏在阿賴耶識中, 即是現行熏種子.

phrase to mean that the dharmas are stored or lie hidden in *ālayavijñāna* as *its* [still latent future] effects,[618] viz., in the form of Seeds, and this is precisely how the phrase is reformulated in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* (ASBh).[619] In this way, the meaning of the phrase comes fairly close to Vasubandhu's main 'etymology' of the term *ālayavijñāna* as the place where the Seeds abide or are stored (§ 120.1), and the reformulation in the ASBh may indeed have been influenced by Vasubandhu.

116.2. As regards phrase [2], viz., that *ālayavijñāna* is stored or hidden in the actual dharmas, it has, significantly, no counterpart in the ASBh. A paraphrase in Paramārtha's rendering of MSgBh ad I.3 simply states that *ālayavijñāna* is contained, or abides in a hidden or latent form, in this effect (i.e., in the impure actual dharmas) as the cause.[620] This could evoke the idea that *ālayavijñāna* is present in the actual continuum of a sentient being as its latent causal layer. On the other hand, in his rendering of the *Bhāṣya* on MSg I.27, Paramārtha unambiguously expresses a similar idea in the context of mutual causality:

> When (or: Insofar as?) the 'fundamental mind' (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) functions as the cause of the dharmas and the dharmas are the effect, they necessarily rest on and are stored /hidden in the 'fundamental mind'. When (/Insofar as) the dharmas function as the cause of the 'fundamental mind' and the 'fundamental mind' is the effect, it necessarily rests on and is stored/hidden in the dharmas.[621]

This sounds almost like a kind of mutual *satkāryavāda*, suggesting as it does that just as the actual cognitive states preexist, or are pre-structured, in *ālayavijñāna* in the form of Seeds, so *ālayavijñāna* (or its reproduction in a future existence?) is somehow latently pre-structured in the actual cognitive states. But I must confess that I find this idea rather unusual in a Vijñāna-vāda context, and I am by no means sure that this is what Paramārtha had in mind. It must be left to scholars who are more familiar with his thought to come up with a well-founded explanation. What is however clear from the quotation is that for Paramārtha the idea that the dharmas rest on or are stored in *ālayavijñāna* is clearly associated with their being *its* effect.

117.1. Whatever the solution of the aforementioned problem, it would seem that to understand *ālīya(n)te* not as "adhere(s) to" but as "is/are stored/hidden in" has two consequences. First, it contaminates, so to speak, the perspective of causality with a perspective of localization. Second, it tends to have a passive connotation, with the result that instead of "A adheres to B" we get "A is (kept) stored in B". This, again, is tantamount to "B stores[622] A",

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[618] Thus explicitly Paramārtha, who states in a remark on phrase [2] that the dharmas in which *ālaya-vijñāna* hides or lies hidden are those which are the effect of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., precisely those belonging to the category of what is impure ($MSgBh_{Pa}$ 157b1f: 諸法 謂阿黎耶識果, 即不淨品等), which clearly refers to those mentioned in phrase [1].

[619] ASBh 11,10f: *ālīyante tasmin dharmā bījataḥ ... ity ālayavijñānam* ($ASBh_t$ P shi 11b7: *der chos rnams sa bon du 'du ba*). Cf., in this connection, also the reformulation of the phraseology of phrase [1] of MSg I.3 in Hsüan-tsang's rendering of MSgU ad I.3 (see fn. 599).

[620] $MSgBh_{Pa}$ 157b2f: 阿黎耶識 藏住此果中為因。

[621] $MSgBh_{Pa}$ 167b12-14: 若本識作諸[1]法因, 諸法為果, 必依藏本識中。若諸法作本識因, 本識為果, 必依藏諸法中. Whereas the first statement corresponds to phrase [1] of MSg I.3, the second statement is different: in phrase [2] of MSg I.3, it is *ālayavijñāna* as the *cause* that is hidden in the dharmas, whereas here what is hidden in the dharmas is *ālayavijñāna* as the *effect*.

[1] Thus with the v.l.; text 識.

[622] Used as in the expression "the computer stores information".

i.e., "B contains/preserves A (especially in a hidden, latent form)". For this reason, Hsüan-tsang can, in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論: CWSL),[623] remodel phrase [1] of MSg I.3, ad sensum and irrespective of its original phraseology, into the key-word *neng ts'ang* (能藏) "[*ālayavijñāna* as] that which stores", which he contrasts with *so ts'ang* (所藏) "[*ālaya-vijñāna* as] what (or: where [something]) is stored", which should correspond to phrase [2] of MSg I.3. In addition, the two are supplemented by *chih-ts'ang* (執藏) "[*ālayavijñāna* as the object of] 'storing' [in the sense of] (emotional) clinging", corresponding to the alternative 'etymology', likewise proposed in MSg I.3, of *ālaya(vijñāna)* as that to which sentient beings cling as their self (*ātman*) or ego (cf. § 113.1).

117.2. It may be worth noting that Hsüan-tsang's application of these key-words to an etymologizing justification of the name *ālayavijñāna* is not wholly consistent. When first introducing *ālayavijñāna*, he makes use of all the three key-words, stating that the first two indicate its being related to the pollutional dharmas in terms of *mutual* dependence.[624] In a later passage, however, he alludes only to the first and the third key-word, for in this passage he merely states that *ālayavijñāna* is thus designated because (apart from being clung to as one's self or ego: third key-word) it stores the pollutional dharmas so that they do not get lost,[625] which corresponds to the first key-word (能藏) only, and thus to the dependence of the pollutional factors on *ālayavijñāna*, not to its dependence on them. The reason for this discrepancy could perhaps be that the first passage seems to be aimed at deriving, from the name *ālayavijñāna*, a definition of the main functions of this *vijñāna* in the Vijñānavāda system, whereas the second passage is simply concerned with explaining and justifying the name (as one among others).

118.0. There is no time or need for a detailed investigation into the complex Chinese exegetical literature discussing these three key-words,[626] but a few examples may be interesting.

118.1. Let me start with the comparatively short explanation offered by Hsüan-tsang's pupil Chi (基, 'K'uei-chi' 窺基: 632–682) in his extensive commentary (*Shu-ji* 述記) on the CWSL. According to him,[627] *ālayavijñāna* is "that which stores" (能藏) insofar as it holds and preserves, in a hidden form, the Seeds of the pollutional dharmas; the Seeds are then "that which is stored" (所藏). On the other hand, insofar as *ālayavijñāna* is *impregnated* ('repotentialized') and taken as *support* by the (actual) pollutional dharmas, they are the *neng*

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[623] CWSL 7c20f: ... 名阿賴耶, 此識具有能藏所藏執藏義故。

[624] CWSL 7c21f: 與雜染互為縁故. Similarly MSgU$_c$ 383a24f: "Because the subliminal mind (*ālaya-vijñāna*) and the actual, manifest forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*) function as the conditions of each other, they *store up* each other; therefore [the subliminal mind] is called *ālayavijñāna*" (阿賴耶識 與 諸轉識 互為縁故 展轉攝藏。是故說名阿賴耶識。). One might, however, ask why on the basis of this mutual interdependence only one of the relata is called *ālayavijñāna* but not the other. Actually, the Tibetan version (MSgU$_t$ P li 239b7f) speaks only of mutual adherence (*phan tshun du sbyor te*) in terms of support (*brten pa'i tshul gyis*), with no explicit reference to the etymologizing justification of the name '*ālayavijñāna*'.

[625] CWSL 13c13-15: 或名阿賴耶, 攝藏一切雜染品法 令不失故, 我見愛等 執藏以為自內我故 ("... because [on account of] *ātmadṛṣṭi*, *ātmatṛṣṇā*, etc., [beings] cling to it as their inner self").

[626] For some additional information, cf. CHEN 1999: 104f.

[627] T 43.1830: 300c29–301a2: 能持染種, 種名所藏, 此識是能藏。是雜染法所熏·所依, 染法名能藏, 此識為所藏。

ts'ang (能藏) and *ālayavijñāna* is the *so ts'ang* (所藏). This, however, would seem to imply a shift of meaning of these terms. In the case of *impregnation*, *neng ts'ang* (能藏) cannot mean "that which stores" in the sense of "preserves" but rather has to be understood as that which stores up or hoards ("einspeichern") something in(to) *ālayavijñāna*, or fills *ālayavijñāna* with some content, or confers some impulse upon it, with the additional nuance that this content or impulse remains hidden for the time being. And *ālayavijñāna* is not "that which is (kept) stored" but "that which is filled or replenished" or "that *where* something is stored up" in a hidden form. Similarly, in connection with *ālayavijñāna* being taken as *support* by the actual pollutional dharmas, *neng ts'ang* (能藏) would seem to make sense only if taken to mean that the actual pollutional dharmas *cover up ālayavijñāna*, and *ālayavijñāna* would be *so ts'ang* (所藏) not so much in the sense of "where the pollutional dharmas are stored" as in the sense of what is covered up by, or hidden below,[628] them.

118.2. 1. Somewhat different is the explanation of another student of Hsüan-tsang's, the Korean Wŏn-ch'ŭk (圓測, Ch. Yüan-ts'ê: 613–696). In his commentary on Saṁdh V.3, he writes:

> First, [*ālayavijñāna* as] 'that which stores': This means that the effect — [i.e.,] the dharmas — is stored/hidden in the cause: for [when] the Seeds in [the subliminal] mind generate the manifest seven [kinds of] mind [as their] polluted effect, [this effect] is not separate from the cause that generates [it], [and can thus be regarded as having been kept stored in the subliminal mind in the form of Seeds].[629]
>
> Second, [*ālayavijñāna* as] 'that which is stored': This means that the cause — [i.e.,] the Seeds — is stored/hidden in the effect: for [it is only by] being stored/hidden in (i.e., covered up by?) the manifest seven [kinds of] mind, which impregnate ('repotentialize') [them], [that] the impregnated ('repotentialized') Seeds become [actually] cause-natured.[630]

2. If this (admittedly somewhat difficult) explanation could be interpreted in terms of a mutual causality of Seeds and actual cognitive states (Seeds generating actual cognitive states, which in turn repotentialize the Seeds), there would be no problem, at least from a systematical point of view. But similar to Paramārtha's formulations (§ 116.2), Wŏn-ch'ŭk's phraseology "stored / hidden in" (於...中藏, 藏在...中) suggests a latent presence not only of the effect in the cause (in the form of Seeds, as usual) but also of the cause in the effect, and whereas the idea of the latent presence of the effect in *ālayavijñāna* in the form of Seeds is ubiquitous in Vijñānavāda sources, the idea of a presence of repotentialized Seeds in the actual cognitive states is not, at least to my knowledge, unless taken to mean that *ālaya-vijñāna* as the subliminal layer is latently present in (or 'at the bottom of') the surface layer.[631] Perhaps what Wŏn-ch'ŭk means is that the repotentializing *force* through which

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[628] For this nuance, though in a different argumentative context, cf. also M2: 392,13 (下に潜むもの).

[629] SaṁdhṬ$_c$ 246b12-14 (cf. Tj D ti 232a7; P ti 271b8f): 第一能藏。此即果法於因中藏。謂 識中種生現七識染果不離能生因故。

[630] SaṁdhṬ$_c$ 246b14f (cf. Tj D ti 232a7f; P ti 272a1f): 第二所藏。此即因種於果中藏。謂 所熏種 藏在能熏七現識中 成因性故。

[631] Cf. Fa-tsang's (法藏, 643–712) explanation that [*ālayavijñāna*] stores/hides itself in the dharmas and also stores/hides the dharmas in itself (T 44.1846: 255c10-12: 又能藏自體於諸法中, 又能藏諸法於自體内), which could, however, also be interpreted in terms of the Hua-yen idea of everything being contained in everything.

certain Seeds in *ālayavijñāna* become efficient in the future while others remain dormant lies in the actual cognitive states.

3. At any rate, Wŏn-ch'ŭk expressly distinguishes this idea, based on the *śāstra*s (MSg and CWSL), from the 'etymology' offered by the Saṁdh itself,[632] viz., that *ālayavijñāna* is called as it is because it is 'stored' and hidden in the *body* endowed with sense faculties, which it appropriates (and keeps alive) as its [corporeal] support, sharing welfare and misfortune with it (cf. § 127).[633] This is, according to Wŏn-ch'ŭk, another facet of *ālayavijñāna*'s being "that which is stored" (所藏).[634]

118.3. A simpler interpretation is recorded in the *Tsung-ching lu* (宗鏡錄), compiled by Yen-shou (延壽, ca. 904–976), and in a couple of later works,[635] including commentaries on the CWSL from the beginning of the 17th century.[636] Yen-shou quotes this interpretation as an old explanation (古釋) according to which *neng ts'ang* (能藏, i.e., 'that which stores/hides') refers to *ālayavijñāna* as containing the Seeds of pollutional dharmas. In this perspective, it is comparable to a store-room or treasury *containing* precious things. As against this, *so ts'ang* (所藏) refers to *ālayavijñāna* as that on which the [actual] pollutional dharmas rest or depend (所依(處)), comparable to a store-room or treasure as the place *where* precious things are stored up (cf. § 118.1).[637] This "old explanation" aptly correlates the 'active' and the 'passive' etymology of '*ālaya*' with the two functions by which *ālayavijñāna* is the condition of actual cognitive states according to the 'Pravṛtti Portion' of the analysis of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin, viz., functioning as their Seed and functioning, directly or indirectly, as their simultaneous support.[638] The opposite direction of causality (actual cognitive states as conditioning *ālayavijñāna* through homogeneous or karmic repotentialization)[639] is not taken into account[640] because it would not support the foundational role of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., because it would not explain why only *ālayavijñāna* is called *ālaya*, and not the actual

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632 Cf. CHEN 1999: 93 n. 42.

633 SaṁdhT$_c$ 246b16-18 (cf. Tj D ti 232b1f; P ti 272a2f): 今依此經 不同諸論。謂 由此識 於有根身 能攝受彼 為所依止 於彼藏隱 與所依身同安危故。

634 SaṁdhT$_c$ 246b19: 於所藏中一分之義。

635 Among them the *Fan-i ming-i chi* (翻譯名義集), a collection of Chinese transliterations of Sanskrit terms with explanations, compiled by Fa-yün (法雲) in the twelfth century. See T 54.2131: 1153b25-29 (under the lemma *ālaya*).

636 Viz., the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun chi-chiai* 成唯識論集解.(X 50.821, written by T'ung-jun 通潤 in 1609–11: *BusshoKD* 6: 21b–c), 683c6-10, and the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun cheng-i* 成唯識論證義 (X 50.822, written by Wang k'en-t'ang.王肯堂 in 1613: *BusshoKD* 6:27b–c), 862b2-6.

637 T 48.2016: 692a9-13: 古釋云。一能藏者, 即能含藏義。猶如庫藏 能含藏寶貝 故得藏名。此能含藏雜染種故 名之為藏。... 二所藏者, 即是所依義。猶如庫藏 是寶等所依故。此識是雜染法所依處故。

638 YBh$_t$ P zi 5b3-7 (D zhi 4b7–5a3; YBh$_c$ 580b9-17; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019b23-27; HAKAMAYA 1979: 30f [2001: 394f] # **3**.**b**.A.1–2); WALDRON 2003: 181f.

639 Cf. YBh$_t$ P zi 5b7–6a4 (D zhi 5a3-6; YBh$_c$ 580b17-26; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019b27–c4; HAKAMAYA 1979: 31f [2001: 395f] # **3**.**b**.B.1–2); WALDRON 2003: 182.

640 It is only in the second of the two commentaries mentioned in fn. 636 that the aspect of repotentialization is, perhaps under the influence of the *Shu-chi* (see § 118.1), inorganically connected with the *so-ts'ang* perspective (此約受熏邊說).

cognitive states. In Buescher's terminology: it would not help to establish, in spite of mutual conditioning, only *ālayavijñāna* as the 'home-ground', in contrast to the actual cognitive states.

119. Summing up the results of this somewhat lengthy discussion of the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* in MSg I.3 (as far as it corresponds to Sthiramati's explanation), its original purport is probably in agreement with Sthiramati's understanding (§ 109), i.e., *ālaya* is taken as a nominal derivate of *ā-√lī* "to stick or adhere to", to be resolved either in a passive /objective or in an active /subjective sense: *ālayavijñāna* is designated as it is because it is that to which pollutional dharmas adhere (= are ontologically related) as its effects, or because it adheres (= is ontologically related) to them as their cause. This is supported by one part of the exegetical literature, but there are also sources that introduce mutual conditioning and, for *ā-√lī*, the semantic nuance of "being contained or stored in" and even "hiding, lying hidden in", but never in the sense of abstract latency.

4.1.5. *Karmasiddhi*, *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* and *Pañcaskandhaka*

120.1. The explanation of *ālayavijñāna* in terms of *sarvabījālaya* is found in three works by Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra): the *Karmasiddhi* (KSi),[641] the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (PSVy),[642] and the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk).[643] The natural way of understanding *ālaya* in this case is no doubt to take it to mean "repository" or "store-house", i.e., that where the Seeds stay, are stored, or lie hidden, and this is the way the expression is understood by all commentators.[644] Therefore, I would translate this explanation, in its *Pañcaskandhaka* version, as follows:

[It] is *ālayavijñāna* because it is the repository of all Seeds.

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[641] KSi § 33 (KSi_{Mu} 1985: 39,28f): *chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gzhir gyur pa'i phyir kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya'o* ||.

[642] PSVy P 24b2 (D 22a1; MUROJI 1993: 106,15f): *ci'i phyir 'di kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya zhe na* | *chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gzhi gang yin pa'o* ||.

[643] PSk 17,4f: *ālayavijñānatvaṁ punaḥ sarvabījālayatām ... upādāya*.

[644] **1.** Sthiramati ad PSk 17,4f (PSkV ms. 58a1; cf. fn. 557) explains *ālaya* as *sthāna*, for which see § 106. Similarly *Pṛthivībandhu (PSkBh P hi 199a5; D si 112a2): *kun gzhi* = *gnas* = *rten*; Guṇaprabha (PSkViv P hi 95a8; D si 26b1): *kun nas nyon mongs pa'i* (D : *pa* P) *chos thams cad kyi sa bon gang yin pa de dag de* (D : om. P) *la gnas te*. — **2.** KSiṬ P ku 103a6 (D hi 91a5): "'Because it is the *ālaya* [of the Seeds of all dharmas]': because it is [their] support. As for the expression *ālayavijñāna*, it is *ālaya* because all dharmas stick (**ālīyante*) to it. The compound [*ālayavijñāna* is to be explained] as before (i.e., in the same way as the compound *ādānavijñāna*, viz., as a karmadhāraya: cf. P 103a4)" (*gzhir gyur pa'i phyir zhes bya ba ni rten du gyur pa'i phyir ro* || *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes bya ba ni* | *'dir chos thams cad kun tu sbyor bar byed pas* [D : *pa* P] *kun gzhi ste* | *tshig bsdu ba ni snga ma bzhin no* ||). The phraseology of the second sentence, at least its Tibetan translation, sounds more like that of MSg I.3 (phrase [1]), but may, in view of the polysemy of **ālīyante*, also be taken to mean that *ālayavijñāna* is *ālaya* because all dharmas abide, or lie hidden, in it [in the form of Seeds]. — **3.** PSVyṬ P chi 151b8 (D chi 127a3): "... by way of acting as the support of the Seeds of all dharmas" (*chos thams cad kyi sa bon gyi gzhi byed pa'i sgo nas*). Subsequently, the text states that for the other [*vijñāna*s] it is not possible to function as the support of the Seeds, [for] since these *vijñāna*s do not exist when one has entered *nirodhasamāpatti* the Seeds of all dharmas would be cut off. — **4.** Cf. also T 54.2131: 1153b21f: "Master [Hsüan]-tsang, in accordance with the meaning, translates it as 'storehouse mind', because it contains and stores the Seeds of the dharmas" (奘師 就義 翻為藏識, 能含藏諸法種故。).

Buescher's rendering is quite different:

> [It has] the nature of a 'Latent Consciousness' *qua* assuming ... the state of being the latency consisting in all potentialities. (B: 120; similarly 2010: 353)

120.2. There can be no doubt that *ālayavijñāna* is regarded as subliminal or latent, but in the explanation of its name under discussion I do not perceive any *explicit* statement of this latency, or any indication of '*ālaya*' being regarded here as having this connotation. What is no doubt latent by its very nature, and hence not only stored but hidden in *ālayavijñāna*, are the *Seeds*, but their presence *in* a *vijñāna* does not necessarily imply the latency of the latter, as can easily be gathered from the fact that in those theories where the Seeds are contained in the ordinary mind continuum (*vijñānasantati*) this continuum itself is not normally in a state of latency. Actually, Buescher's translation of the passage contains at least two mistakes. One is the misunderstanding of the quasi-postposition *upādāya* by taking it in the function of a full verb ("*qua* assuming ..."), which seems arbitrary in view of the ubiquitous postpositional use of *upādāya* with the accusative of an abstract in the sense of "taking into account (its) being X", "with reference to (its) being X", or "because of (its) being X".[645] The second mistake is the double rendering of the abstract, which is in fact merely syntactical, as "the *state* of *being* ...". In addition, I doubt that *ālaya* ever means "latency" in an abstract sense (see §§ 103, 118.1–118.2), and I also doubt that Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra) would *equate ālayavijñāna* with the Seeds (as Buescher's translation "... being the latency consisting in all potentialities" suggests!), for Vasubandhu obviously takes *ālayavijñāna* as a real *vijñāna* in the Abhidharmic sense, even though its precise object and mode of apprehending cannot be exactly defined or is subconscious.[646] Thus, all that can, if anything, be gathered from this explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* as regards latency is that it is the repository or 'store-house' of the (latent) Seeds, i.e., the place where *they* lie hidden.

121.0. In contrast to KSi and PSVy, the PSk (17,4f) adds two more explanations of the name *ālayavijñāna*.

121.1.1. The first of these presents difficulties. Even the original wording is uncertain. Sthiramati prefers *ātmabhāvālayanimittatām* (sc. *upādāya*),[647] which is supported by the Tibetan translation of the PSk and by *Pṛthivībandhu's commentary,[648] but Sthiramati also mentions a variant reading[649] *ātmamānālayanimittatām* (Tib. *bdag tu nga rgyal gyi gzhi dang rgyu nyid*), which in its turn is confirmed by the PSk ms. and the Chinese translation. Buescher (B: 121,14-16) regards this reading as an

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645 Cf. *BHSD* s.v. *upādāya* 1a and 1c, *SWTF* s.v. *upādāya* 2; *CPD* II 492b (s.v. *upādāya* 3 [a and b]); *DP* 483a (s.v. *upādāya* 2); Tib. *kyi ... phyir ro* (PSk 81,1f); Chin ...故 (PSk 98,12); cf. also SALVINI 2011: 235–238, quoting, among other things, Spk II 308: *upādāya ti āgamma ārabbha sandhāya paṭicca*. — The fact that my reconstruction of ... *nyid* ... *kyi phyir* as °*tām upādāya* has been confirmed by the publication of the Skt. original takes care of Matsumoto's (M2: 428 n. 40) doubt.

646 Cf. S 1987 # 5.14.1–2. Cf. also § 315 with fn. 1670.

647 Cf. PSkV ms. 58a2-4.

648 PSk 81,1: *lus kyi kun gzhi dang rgyu nyid ... kyi ... phyir ro*; PSkBh P hi 199b3f. Cf. also the Tibetan text of PSk as quoted in Guṇaprabha's commentary (PSkViv P hi 95a8; D si 26b1): *lus kyi kun gzhi dang rgyu nyid*.

649 PSkV ms. 58a4f (PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b4): *anye punar anyathā paṭhanti ... iti*.

> orthographic change ... performed in some corners so as to be able to include the interpretation of *ālayavijñāna* as 'object of attachment' for sentient beings mistaking it as a substantial self.

He does not however produce any evidence or reason for this assessment. He simply seems to discard this reading because, as he rightly indicates, it involves an explanation of *ālaya* in the term *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of (emotional)[650] attachment or clinging — similar to the alternative explanation of the term in MSg I.3 and in ASBh 11,11 [cf. B: 119,3f], where *ālaya-vijñāna* is taken to be thus designated because sentient beings *cling* to it as their self —, and hence does not suit his endeavour to substantiate the meaning "latency" for *ālaya.*[651] Yet, I have serious doubts that resorting to the reading *ātmabhāvālayanimittatām* is more helpful in this regard. Actually, Buescher's translation of the expression as

> the state of being, as latency, the determinant of the individual form of existence (B: 121,1f;[652] similarly 2010: 353)

is, in my opinion, altogether arbitrary, because the meaning of abstract "latency" for '*ālaya*' is simply taken for granted. Nor is, as far as I can see, such a meaning confirmed by Sthiramati's and *Pṛthivībandhu's explanations.

121.1.2. In the interpretation of these two commentators, the compound is resolved into *ātmabhāvālayatā* and *ātmabhāvanimittatā.* The first, viz., *ātmabhāvālayatā*, is understood by Buescher as expressing the idea that "*ālayavijñāna* joins the *ātmabhāva* to be latently present in it" (B: 132,3f).[653] The second, viz., *ātmabhāvanimittatā*, is taken to explain the "designation of *ālayavijñāna* as a potentialized latency" (B: 132,5f) by the fact that "it is by its power, or by its latent potentials, that the *ātmabhāva* (= *nāmarūpa*) is developed" (B: 132,4f).[654] Taken together, the two elements of the compound refer "to a functional unity": to *ālayavijñāna* as "the latent determinant ... of the individual form of existence" (B: 131,27-29).

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650 Sthiramati (PSkV ms. 58a5f; PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b5f), however, seems to take *ālaya* here in the sense of a purely epistemic interrelation: *ālayavijñāna* is so called "because the conception of a self adheres (i.e., is related) to it as the cognitive act (lit.: as that which has [it = *ālayavijñāna* as its] object), or because it (sc. *ālayavijñāna*) adheres (i.e., is related) to the conception of a self as the object [of this conception]" (*ālīyate tasmin viṣayibhāvenâtmamāna(ḥ) ..., ālīyate vā tan nimittabhāvenâtma-mān(e) ...*). For the expression *ātmamāna*, see Tr 6cd and TrBh *14,15f (L. 23,13f): *asmimāna ity arthaḥ.*

651 Buescher's translation of the respective part of the ASBh passage (11,10) as

> ... as the sentient beings are attached to it by apprehending [it] as the self, it is [called] the Latent Consciousness (B: 119,5-7)

doesn't make sense to me. It is obvious that in *this* connection the term *ālayavijñāna* is definitely understood in a different sense, viz., as "mind clung to [as one's self]".

652 In a footnote, Buescher alternatively suggests: "Or: the state of being the latent determinant of ...". I take this as a stylistic variant, for surely *ālaya* is not an adjective.

653 The corresponding statement with regard to *Pṛthivībandhu's PSkBh (B: 131,19f: "As a latency consisting in the potentialities of the five *skandhas* it constitutes the basis.") seems, however, to paraphrase a sentence (P hi 199b6: *phung po lnga'i sa bon kun gzhi la yod pa rtas par gyur pa*: see fn. 657) that actually belongs to the second part of the resolution of the compound, viz., *ātmabhāva-nimittatā*, which is explained from the end of P hi 199b5 (*lus kyi rgyu ...*) onward.

654 Cf. B: 131,22-24 (referring to PSkBh): "... the origination and the accomplishment of the *ātma-bhāva* as a proto-psychophysical formation (*nāmarūpa*) is generated by *ālaya*, the potentialized latency."

I am afraid this interpretation is not supported by the respective texts. The problem is not, of course, the *fact* of *ālayavijñāna* being a latent, or subliminal, entity, but rather the question whether it is this aspect that is expressed by the word *ālaya* according to the explication under discussion, or at least according to one of its two components.

121.1.3. Now, as for Sthiramati's (and *Pṛthivībandhu's) interpretation of the first component, viz., *ātmabhāvālayatā*, it is merely stated that the *ātmabhāva*, i.e., *nāmarūpa* (the supra-liminal psychic factors along with the physical organism of a sentient being), is attached to (*ālīyate*) or based on *ālayavijñāna* in the sense that it continues to exist (*anuvṛtti*, *rgyun ma chad par 'byung*) due to the latter (*tadbalena*).[655] Thus, *ālayavijñāna* is thus designated because it functions as the support (*ālaya* = *gnas*) of the *ātmabhāva*.[656] No reference to latency.

121.1.4. As regards the second component, viz., *ātmabhāvanimittatā*, Sthiramati merely states that due to the full development (*paripoṣa*) of the respective Seeds [in *ālayavijñāna*] a [new] basis of individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) arises at the moment of 'linking up' [a new life] (*pratisandhi*).[657] Though referring to Seeds, Sthiramati does not connect them in any way with the expression *ālaya*, which does not show up at all in his explanation of the second component. It is only *Pṛthivībandhu who expressly states that *ālayavijñāna* is called as it is because it functions as the cause (*nimitta*, Buescher's "determinant") or support (*rten*) of the [new] *ātmabhāva*,[658] thus obviously taking *nimitta* to represent *ālaya* in the sense of "source" or "support".

121.1.5. I must admit that in contrast to Buescher (B: 131 n. 3) I still find Sthiramati's (and *Pṛthivībandhu's) explanation of *ātmabhāvālayanimittatā* rather unnatural (cf. S 1987 n. 140 subn. 1). Vasubandhu's three explanations of the name *ālayavijñāna* in the PSk are obviously etymologizing in the sense that he tries to show how from a semantic point of view the use of the word *ālaya* makes systematical sense in this compound. This works smoothly in the case of the first and the third explanation, and also in the second when read as *ātmamānālaya-nimittatā*. But when it is read as *ātmabhāvālayanimittatā* and split up the way Sthiramati and *Pṛthivībandhu would have it, the etymologizing pattern becomes restricted to the first component (*ātmabhāvālayatā*) but is absent in the second (*ātmabhāvanimittatā*). I therefore conclude that the second explanation, however read, must originally have been conceived as a

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[655] PSkV ms. 58a2f (PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b3): *ātmabhāvo nāmarūpaṁ; ālīyate 'sminn ātmabhāvaḥ tad-balenânuvṛttita ity ālayaḥ*; PSkBh P hi 199b5 (D si 112b1): ... *phung po lnga la lus zhes bya'o ‖ lus de yang kun gzhi la gnas shing kun gzhi la brten la kun gzhi'i mthus rgyun ma chad par 'byung ste* |)

[656] PSkBh P hi 199b5 (D si 112b1f, continued from fn. 655): *lus kyi gnas dang gzhi byed pa'i phyir yang kun gzhi zhes bya'o* ||.

[657] PSkV ms. 58a3f (PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b3f; D shi 283b3f): *ātmabhāvanimittaṁ tadbījaparipoṣāt prati-sandhāv ātmabhāvanirvartanāt*. In view of Tib. *mngon par 'grub pa*, I have taken *nirvartanāt* in an intransitive sense (cf. *AiGr* II,2: 182), but a transitive meaning ("because it = *ālayavijñāna* causes [a new] *ātmabhāva* to arise") would also work. Similarly PSkBh P hi 199b6f (D si 112b2):

> Because, when the Seeds of the five *skandha*s present in the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] have grown stout and when *ālayavijñāna* has linked up [a new life] in the mother's womb, the [new] basis-of-individual-existence, [i.e.,] *nāmarūpa*, is made to arise by *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] ...
>
> *phung po lnga'i sa bon kun gzhi la yod pa (b)rtas par gyur pa dang | ma'i mngal du kun gzhi rnam par shes pas mtshams sbyar nas | lus de ming dang gzugs 'byung zhing 'grub par kun gzhis byed pas na ...*

[658] PSkBh P hi 199b5f (*lus kyi rgyu dang rten byed pas na kun gzhi zhes bya ste* |) and 199b7 (... *lus kyi rgyu byed pa'i phyir yang kun gzhi zhes bya'o*||).

unitary one, i.e., must have explained *ālaya* (in the compound *ālayavijñāna*) as "that due to which (or: with reference to which?)[659] attachment/clinging takes place". In the case of the reading *ātmabhāvā°*, I suggest understanding the expression as "because it is the cause (*nimitta*) of [existential] attachment[660] (or: the [most basic] object (*nimitta*) of [emotional] clinging?) to [the basis of] individual existence", but the issue admittedly requires a more thoroughgoing investigation.

121.2.1. Thus, in the case of the explanations of the literal meaning of the term *ālaya-vijñāna* discussed thus far I cannot follow Buescher's contention that "the notion of 'attachment' remains subordinated to the dominant notion of 'latency'" (B: 118,6f). It is, if anything, the other way round. But the situation may be somewhat different in the case of the third explanation of the PSk (17,5), according to which *ālayavijñāna* is thus designated *kāyālīnatām upādāya*. Buescher translates:

> (It has the nature of a 'Latent Consciousness' *qua* assuming ...) the state of being the latency [present] in the physical organism. (B: 121,3; similarly 2010: 353)

121.2.2. Buescher's hyper-literal rendering of the quasi-postpositional *upādāya* has already been criticized in § 120.2, and just as in the case of his rendering of the first explanation we have, here too, an inflation of abstracts: three of them where the text has only one, which is merely syntactical ("because it *is* ..."). Actually, *ālīna* cannot mean "latency" but, at most, "latent", or "hiding / hidden in" (sc., the body). This is, however, far from certain. It may as well be taken in the sense of "attached to", "sticking to/in" or "dwelling in", and it is in the latter sense that it is understood by the Tibetan translation (... *la gnas pa*) and by the commentators. According to Sthiramati and *Pṛthivībandhu, emphasis is *not* on its hidden or *latent* presence but on its continuous *pervasive* (< *ā*-?) presence in the physical organism (*samantaṁ ... śarīraṁ vyāpya ... vartate*)[661] and its being bound to or connected with the physical organism (*kāyapratibaddhavṛttitvāt tat kāye ālīnam*).[662]

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[659] I.e., depending on whether *nimitta* should be taken in the sense of *nidānanimitta* or in the sense of *ālambananimitta* (cf. ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 160,16ff [ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 280,6ff]; SamBh 165,3f [# 3.2.1.1–2]).

[660] Because at the moment of *pratisandhi ālayavijñāna* takes hold of a new *ātmabhāva* and guarantees its continuation throughout life.

[661] Since *śarīra* glosses *kāya* here, there is no reason to doubt the synonymity (or rather: overlapping) of these two expressions, nor do I see any reason for doing so in the case of the definition of the concept of *attabhāva* as *śarīra* at Asl 308,12f or VisM IX.54 (M2: 248), where Matsumoto (M2: 437 n. 78) suggests taking it in the sense of *āśraya* (as different from *kāya*!), on the basis of an alleged derivation of *śarīra* from √*śri* (but *EWA* II 618: from *ŚAR*[I] [*śṝ*] "to break"?). Actually, the Pāli commentaries simply register the ambiguity of the expression *attabhāva*, one meaning being just "body" (more exactly perhaps: living body?); cf. *CPD* III 404b, quoting Abh vs. 151 (*sarīraṁ vapu gattaṁ câttabhāvo ...*), where *attabhāva* is listed in a set of synonyms for "body", including, among others, also *deha*, *kāya* and *kaḷevara*.[1] MATSUMOTO (loc.cit.) is, however, right in pointing out that *śarīra* may also mean "relics" or "bones", "solid parts of the body", and (in contrast to *kāya*) it often refers to the *dead* body (cf. *CPD* III 404a). This meaning is, however, excluded in the PSkV passage under discussion by the statement that in the present case "body" (*kāya*) means the body endowed with sense faculties (*sendriyaṁ śarīram*, i.e., the living body).

[1] Cf. also *Saddanīti* II. *Dhātumālā* 385 # 488 (vs. 99): *kāyo dehaṁ sarīrañ¯ca ... attabhāvo tath'ūpadhi | samussayo ti c'etāni dehanāmāni honti hi ||*.

[662] PSkV ms. 58b1 (PSkV$_t$ P hi 53b7). Cf. PSkBh P hi 199b7–200a1. For *kāyavyāpanāt* (so to read with AKVy$_t$ P chu 353a6 *lus la khyab pa*; ed. °*dhmāpanāt*) as a gloss of *kāyaspharaṇāt* (the body being permeated by an agreeable wind) see AKVy 674,13.

4.1.6. *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* V.3

122.1. Even so, it would no doubt make good sense to understand Vasubandhu's *kāyālīna* in the aforementioned explanation as having at least the connotation of "lying hidden in the physical organism"; still more so, one could think, since the model of this explanation is surely the explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 (cf. also ch. 4.2.8.3), viz.:

> *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste | 'di ltar de lus 'di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis kun tu sbyor ba dang rab tu sbyor bar byed pa'i phyir ro* ||,[663]

which I tentatively reconstructed as

> **ālayavijñānam ity apy ucyate, yaduta tasyâsmin kāya ālayanapralayanatām upādāya ekayogakṣemārthena* | (S 1987 n. 181).

For **ālayanapralayana°* (or *ālīyanapralīyana°*: S 1987 n. 181 subn.), Buescher suggests **ālīnapralīna°* in view of PSk *kāyālīnatām*. This may also be possible; my preference for an action noun was based on Tib. *sbyor ba...r byed pa*, which emphasizes the action aspect.

122.2. If the reconstruction of *rab tu sbyor bar byed pa* in terms of a derivate of *pra-√lī* is correct, the nuance of "hiding" or even "dissolving" (in the sense of latent pervasion, like salt dissolving in water) would be quite explicit, for the semantic field of *pra-√lī* seems to be limited to "to dissolve, to disappear",[664] or, exceptionally, "to hide".[665] Actually, this nuance is clearly confirmed by the majority of the Chinese versions.[666] Even so, what is expressed would not be latency in an abstract sense but, in view of the locative, hiding or 'dissolving' *in the body*.

122.3. Still, we cannot be sure whether this nuance was indeed unambiguously expressed in the original, for in the earliest Chinese translation, viz., the one by Bodhiruci, the passage is taken to mean that *ālayavijñāna* is called as it is because it dwells and sticks, or settles down, in (住著) the respective body.[667] Still less compatible with an express statement, in the original Sanskrit, of *ālayavijñāna* hiding or lying hidden (or even dissolving) in the physical organism and hence with the assumption of a derivate of *pra-√lī* is the Tibetan rendering *rab tu sbyor bar byed pa*, which can only mean "attaches [itself], or sticks, firmly (*rab tu*) to".

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[663] The Western transmission (S na 18a6) reads *de ltar de'i lus 'di la grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i phyir 'brel pa dang | rab tu 'brel pa⟨s na??⟩ kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya'o* ||; cf. YVy P yi 115b6 (D 'i 95a4): *'di ltar de ni lus de la 'brel cing* (P : *zhing* D) *rab tu 'brel ba⟨s?⟩ na kun gzhi zhes bya'o* ||.

[664] It would thus seem to belong, in the first place, to the root $^{2}lay^{i}$/*lī* "sich auflösen" (GOTŌ 1987: 279).

[665] Cf. *PW* s.v. *lī* + *pra*.

[666] Paramārtha: "because it always lies hidden in the body" (T 31.1595: 157b22f: 於身常藏隱); Dharmagupta: "because it lies hidden in the body and pervades it" (T 31.1596: 273c12: 於身隱藏普遍); Hsüan-tsang: "because it is contained and lies hidden in the body" (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 692b17: 於身攝受藏隱).

[667] Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 669a24f: 以彼身中住著故. For 著 in the sense of "s'attacher, se coller à, se fixer sur, demeurer" see *COUVREUR* 788a; the textual examples adduced by Couvreur clearly show that the use of 著 is not limited to emotional or intellectual clinging but comprises nuances like "settling down" as well (cf. 地著 "s'attacher au sol, avoir une demeure fixe", or 流民占著 "... personnes errantes s'arrêtèrent et s'établirent"). For Matsumoto's interpretation of 住 and 著 as indicating two different functions see § 123. Such a use is of course not impossible, as can be gleaned from the NA passage quoted in fn. 753, but there the translator is Hsüan-tsang, not Bodhiruci.

Perhaps *rab tu* represents some other prefix here (e.g., *saṁ-* or *upa-*), as it sometimes does.[668] To be sure, the Western transmission[669] as represented by the sTog Kanjur has *'brel pa dang rab tu 'brel pa* ("is connected, firmly connected with") instead of Eastern *kun tu sbyor ba dang rab tu sbyor bar byed pa* and thus at first glance confirms *rab tu*, but it uses *rab tu* also in the subsequent 'etymology' of *citta* (*kun nas bsgrubs shing rab tu bsags pa*), where *upacita* is not only supported by the Eastern transmission (*nye bar bsags pa*) but also by a Sanskrit parallel (see § 277). In this connection, it may be worth mentioning that in a series of quasi-synonyms in the *Paryāyasaṁgrahaṇī* of the YBh, *ālīyante* is indeed followed by *upalīyante*.[670]

122.4. From this point of view, it is also possible that the main purport of the whole etymologizing explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 was rather based on an understanding of *ālaya* in the sense of "sticking to/in" or "dwelling in", viz., in the body (implicitly: in the body as a whole, as the commentaries on PSk put it), and this is how I would understand Bodhiruci's rendering.

123. Matsumoto (M2: 223f),[671] however, following Shinjō Suguro, goes even one step further, taking *ālaya* to include, in tune with its use in earlier Buddhist texts, not only the meaning of "dwelling in" but also that of "clinging to", and in the sense of clinging to something as the self (*ātman*) at that. This means that for Matsumoto *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 is the *subject* of clinging to a (substantial) self. He (M2: 382,12-17) finds this understanding supported precisely by Bodhiruci's rendering, presupposing that Bodhiruci's 住著 is not a combination of two quasi-synonyms but indicates "dwelling in" (住) and "clinging to" (著) as two substantially different aspects. The basic presupposition of his interpretation is, however, that he (M2: 233ff) objects to my reconstruction of *lus* (Chin. 身) as **kāya*, proposing **ātmabhāva* instead. One argument he (M2: 238) adduces for this assumption is that Tib. *lus* occurs three times in Saṁdh V.2–3 and that in such a relatively small textual unit the Tibetan translators can, in his opinion, hardly be surmised to have used one and the same word to render different Sanskrit expressions. Since in V.2 *lus* indubitably renders *ātmabhāva* (see § 149), it must hence also do so in the etymologizing explanations of the names *ādāna-* and *ālayavijñāna* in V.3. In addition, Matsumoto (M2: 246) argues that if we assume that *lus* represents *kāya* the two etymologizing explanations would lack comprehensive validity, because they would not be applicable to an existence in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*) since a sentient being reborn in that sphere has no body. If, however, *lus* is taken to represent Skt. *ātmabhāva*, there is no such drawback because this term is used for all forms of individual existence, including existences in the *ārūpyadhātu*.[672] Since the concept of *ātmabhāva* is, for Matsumoto (M2: 247ff), essentially

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[668] Cf., e.g., NEGI 6180a: *rab tu chags pa* = *saṁsakta*, *rab skyes* = *sañjāta*; 6180b: *rab tu drangs* = *samākṛṣta*; 6182ab: *rab tu rgyu ba* = *upacāra*, *rab tu gtses* = *upadruta*, *rab tu skye ba* = *upajāyate*.

[669] Cf. KATŌ (K.) 2006.

[670] See fn. 687. Cf. also Ud-a 339,10: *nissitā allīnā upalīnā upagatā*. In case the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* consisted indeed in a derivate of *ā-√lī* followed by a derivate of *upa-√lī*, the pattern would be the same as in the case of the etymologizing explanation of the name *citta* (see §§ 275 and 277) and, perhaps, of the name *ādānavijñāna* as well (but see § 269).

[671] See also M2: 359f, esp. 360,3-7; 380,11-13; 399,3-7.

[672] For the applicability of the term *ātmabhāva* to an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* see fn. 497. Cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 104,14f + 105,9 and AKBh 74,20 + 75,2 (four kinds of *ātmabhāvapratilambha*, the fourth of

connected with the notion of being conceived as a (substantial) self (*ātman*) and since such kind of spiritually negative mental clinging is typical of the early Buddhist use of *ālaya* and *ā-√lī* in doctrinal contexts,[673] he[674] concludes that the 'etymology' in Saṁdh V.3 characterizes *ālayavijñāna* as having in this text, in contrast to all other (for Matsumoto: later) sources, the function of *ātmagrāha*, i.e., of clinging to the *ātmabhāva* or *nāmarūpa* — in the sense of the whole psycho-physical basis of individual existence — as one's self.

124. In view of the evidence presented by the Sanskrit original of the PSk, which fortunately has become available in the meantime, Matsumoto's arguments against my proposal to understand, in the etymologizing explanations of *ālaya-* as well as of *ādānavijñāna*, Tib. *lus* as rendering Skt. *kāya* (and not *ātmabhāva* as in V.2) turn out to be inconclusive. For in the PSk, where Matsumoto (M2: 238) argues in the same way, we likewise have three times *lus* in Tib., but whereas *lus* corresponds to *ātmabhāva* in the first occurrence (see § 121.1), it nonetheless renders *kāya* in the other two cases, viz., the two etymologizing explanations of the names *ālaya-* and *ādānavijñāna* that correspond to those of Saṁdh V.3.[675] Thus, the axiom that if a Tibetan expression reoccurs in one sentence or a closely connected sequence of sentences it must render the same Sanskrit word in all cases proves invalid.[676] Likewise, the argument that the assumption of Skt. *kāya* for Tib. *lus* would render the explanation (of both *ādāna-* and *ālayavijñāna*) inapplicable to an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu*, although convincing from a purely doctrinal point of view, is contradicted by the incontrovertible evidence of the PSk that confirms *kāya* in both cases. Since an eminent Abhidharma master like Vasu-

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which includes that of beings belonging to the *ārūpyadhātu*); 279,8+11 (attachment in the *rūpa-* and *ārūpya-dhātu* is called attachment referring to *bhava*, and *bhava* means *ātmabhāva*). Cf. also AKVy 63,1f, explaining *ātmabhāva* as "one's own continuum" (*svasaṁtāna*), which of course exists also in the *ārūpyadhātu*, albeit without a physical organism.

[673] Cf. M2: 256,11.

[674] Especially M2: 256,7f + 16f; similarly M2: 361,15f; 381,13–382,1; 398,6-10; 412,16–413,3f. Cf. also 257,12: function of clinging to the five *skandha*s as the self claimed to be indicated also by the term *ādānavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3, though less explicitly (360,8-11), and M2: 483 n. 255, referring to Paramārtha's usual equation of *ādānavijñāna* with the *kliṣṭaṁ manaḥ*, i.e., the form of mind that is associated with a continuous subliminal conception of a self or ego.

[675] See §§ 121.2.1 and 269. Cf. also YAMABE 2012: 217f n. 71.

[676] Cf. the use of *dmigs pa* for *ālambana* and *upalabdhi* in one and the same sentence at MSg II.14.2 (Pt. II §§ 396.4 and 397.4). — In a similar way, Matsumoto's (M2: 233) argument against my reconstruction of °*'i phyir ro* as °*tām upādāya* is hardly convincing. In this case, too, he argues that *upādāya* can hardly have been used as a postposition in Saṁdh V.3 since it is used as an absolutive of the verb *upā-√dā* in its full meaning in V.2. But why should such a different use in successive sentences be impossible? In addition, Matsumoto's (M2: 426 n. 26) assertion that in V.2 *upādāya* is used in its full verbal sense is by no means incontrovertible (see § 227). Nor is his second argument against the quasi-postpositional use of °*tām upādāya* in V.3 conclusive, viz., that such a use is later and not yet found in Saṁdh, for in the fragment from Saṁdh IX edited by K. MATSUDA (1995) precisely this use is attested several times: p. 69 # 4-1: °*prāmodyatām upādāya*, 4-2: *sarvasūkṣmāpattidauṣṭhulyamalaviga⟨ta⟩tām upādāya*, 4-3: ... *sanniśrayatām upādāya*, 4-5: ... *vaśavartanatām upādāya*, etc.; for earlier sources, cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 10,29; 86,16; 102,6ff; ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 429,2 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2012]: 78,9f); BoBh$_{D}$ 97,20; 98,5; 99,1f, etc. In view of the fact that the presumable presence of **upādāya* in Saṁdh V.3 is also confirmed by the parallel phrases in the PSk, I see no reason to retract my reconstruction. The only problem I see is whether in the absence of *nyid* in Tib. the reconstruction of an abstract suffix in Saṁdh V.3 is correct, but in IX.4, too, *nyid* is missing in three out of eight instances of °*tām upādāya*.

bandhu can hardly be charged with having overlooked such a doctrinal shortcoming,[677] we have to search for a justification of the employment of *kāya* in these etymologizing explanations. What suggests itself in my opinion is that the purpose of these explanations is not a comprehensive definition but rather a highlighting of characteristic functions or features, with special reference to our present, human existence. This would seem to be supported by the fact that Saṁdh V.3 adds the demonstrative pronoun *'di* (**asya*, **asmin*), which I take to be intended to characterize the body as this one, i.e., the present body of each member of the audience, chosen in order to instantiate the specific function or feature alluded to by the two names in a way that is immediately applicable to the present existence, to this very life.[678]

125.1. The fact that in view of the PSk as the closest parallel we almost certainly have to take *lus* in Saṁdh V.3 to represent Skt. *kāya* invalidates Matsumoto's argument that the combination with *ātmabhāva* as its object forces us to understand the derivate of *ā-√lī* in the etymologizing explanation of *ālayavijñāna* in its traditional meaning of "(spiritually negative) clinging", viz., clinging to the *ātmabhāva* as one's self (*ātman*), because the concept of *ātmabhāva* is, according to Matsumoto (M2: 248f), inseparable from its being conceived as the self.

125.2. Even if *lus* = *ātmabhāva* were taken for granted, Matsumoto's conclusion is hardly compelling. It is true that the *ātmabhāva*, regardless of whether it is taken as the five *skandha*s or as the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*: see § 88.3), is the favourite objective support of the idea or false view of a (substantial) self,[679] and that the definition of *atta-bhāva* in the *Atthasālinī*[680] obviously alludes to the component *atta(n)-* when it says that the body or the five *skandha*s are called *attabhāva* because ignorant persons take them to be their self.[681] But in the texts the expression *ātmabhāva/attabhāva* is often, if not mostly, used in a neutral way, just denoting a single individual existence or its concrete basis,[682] without any special emphasis on clinging to it as one's self.[683] That the latter aspect is hardly intrinsic to the

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[677] It would surely be still less admissible to charge him with having replaced a comprehensive explanation with one of merely limited applicability by substituting *kāya* for an alleged original *ātmabhāva*.

[678] The use of the pronoun **asmin* would, of course, also work with *ātmabhāva* (cf. *imasmiṁ yeva attabhāve* in passages like Sv I 121,4, 313,20, Ps I 161,17, 165,4, Spk I 202,20 and Mp II 88,4f, though probably merely meaning "in this very life"), but my argument is that if the pronoun is used to point to the present existence of the listeners or readers, the explanation need not take into account existence in the world sphere of incorporeality.

[679] Cf. M2: 251–253, adducing YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,15 (text [34]), 212,18f (text [37]) and AKBh 337,4 (text [40]).

[680] Asl 308,12f (M2: 248 text [28]). For the problem of authorship in the case of Asl, see VON HINÜBER 1996: 151f.

[681] Cf. also the analysis of the compound as "that with regard to which those who do not know things thoroughly form the conceit (/designation and idea) '[this is my] self' " (VisM-mhṭ ad VisM I.2 [My. I 6; Rew. I 6]: *'attā' ti bhavati ettha abhimāno ti attabhāvo*; ad IX.54 [My. 367; Rew. II 658]: *apariññātavatthūnaṁ 'attā' ti bhavati ettha abhidhānaṁ cittañ ca ti attabhāvo*). Yet, to superimpose such a commentarial analysis on the original meaning of the expression would be as risky as deriving, e.g., the word *satta* (in the sense of "sentient being") from *√sañj* "to adhere to" simply because the exegetes do so (VisM IX.53: *rūpādisu khandhesu chandarāgena sattā visattā ti sattā*).

[682] For details cf. S 1987: 558f (n. 1477.E).

[683] [1.] For this reason, I doubt that *ātman/attan* in the compound *ātmabhāva/attabhāva* has, originally, to be understood in a metaphysical sense, and I also doubt that in this expression *bhāva* is simply an abstract suffix (cf. COLLINS 1982: 156f, quoted M2: 248). I would rather tend to take *ātman*

concept itself can also be gleaned from the fact that the expression *ātmabhāva* is also applied to the deliberately assumed body or basis-of-individual-existence of an advanced bodhisattva[684] and even to the body of the Tathāgata.[685]

125.3. Likewise, *ālaya* or *ā-√lī* was, to be sure, in certain contexts understood to mean "clinging [to something as one's self]", as is explicitly stated in MSg I.13[686] with reference to exegetical controversies regarding its usage in the early canon (§ 104.1). Matsumoto could also have adduced the aforementioned passage from the *Paryāyasaṁgrahaṇī* of the YBh, where we read that "all spiritually immature, ordinary people cling (*ālīyante*) to the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*) [by taking it] as their self (*ātman*), and stick (*upalīyante*) to the ['sixfold basis' by taking it] as their own (*ātmīya*)".[687] This passage unambiguously confirms the possibility of taking *ā-√lī*, in connection with the 'sixfold basis' (equivalent to the *ātmabhāva*!) as its object, in the sense of clinging to it as one's self. The passage would seem to be even more significant for the interpretation for the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 if my presumption that in the latter, too, a derivate of *ā-√lī* may have been followed by a derivate of *upa-√lī* were to hit the mark. Still, in view of the wider spectrum of the semantic facets that can be expressed by *ā-√lī*, we cannot be sure that "clinging to the *ātmabhāva* as one's self" is indeed what Saṁdh V.3 was intended to express. Would one not, in view of this ambiguity, expect the text to add some kind of appropriate clarification?

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lattan in this case as a reflexive pronoun and to start from an original meaning "what oneself (or the respective being him- or herself) is, or has become, [for a certain period]" (cf. *DP* I: 72b "existence as an individual"; cf. also HAMILTON 1996: 152). In my opinion, the typical Buddhist use of *attabhāva* /*ātmabhāva* should be neatly distinguished from its use as a normal abstract, as in Pj I 179,15: *suññaṁ attena vā attaniyena vā ti evamādīsu attabhāvena vā attaniyabhāvena vā ti attho*, i.e.: "In passages like [SN IV 54] 'empty of a self or [one's] own, what is meant is: [empty] of *being* [one's] self or *being* [one's] own." — [2.] Worth mentioning are a couple of passages in the *Prasannapadā*, where *ātmabhāva* is applied not to living beings but to items like the subject of a proof (*dharmin*: PrasP 30,1f), conventional truth (*saṁvṛti*: 68,8) or a means of right knowledge (*pramāṇa*: 73,7). In the first two cases, the respective items are stated to have acquired their individual or specific existence (*ātmabhāva*), or their existence (*sattā*) as an individual, specific entity (*ātmabhāva*), through mere mistake (*viparyāsamātrāsāditātmabhāva*, °*ātmabhāvasattāka*). In the third case the means of right knowledge is said to owe its very existence as a specific entity to the fact that it simply reproduces the feature of the object (cf. SEYFORT RUEGG 2002: 128f, where °*samāsāditātmabhāvasattāka* is rendered as "the existence of whose essential nature is acquired through the fact that ..."; slightly different in the other two cases: ibid. 53 and 119).

[684] Cf. the passages in S 1987: 552; $BoBh_D$ 265,6f: *sve câtmabhāve yathākām⟨am⟩*[1] *ādānasthānacyutiṣu* (ms.) *vaśavartitā*; cf. MSABh 186,1 and ASBh 129,6f (ad AS 97,19), the latter with *āśraya* instead of *ātmabhāva*, thus indicating the equivalence of both expressions in this context; cf. also $BoBh_D$ 218,11f.

[1] ms. °*kāmayādāna*°

[685] E.g., Aṣṭ 29,6f, 11, 13 and 16; Ps III 379,21; Mp I 116,4.

[686] MSg I:13 (p. 8,13f): "Others think that *ālaya* [in the passage corresponding to AN II 131,31-35] means *satkāyadṛṣṭi*" (*gzhan dag ni 'jig tshogs la lta ba kun gzhi 'o snyam du sems te*).

[687] MATSUDA 1994: 98,15 (corresp. to YBh_t P yi 49a2, D 'i 41b2 and YBh_C 769b9f): *ṣaḍāyatanaṁ sarvabālapṛthagjanā{nāṁ}*[1] *ātmagrāheṇâlīyante | ātm⟨īy⟩a*[2]*grāheṇôpalīyante |*.

[1] My emendation; *nāṁ* < *nā* + deletion mark?

[2] My emendation; cf. Tib. *bdag gir 'dzin pas ni nye bar chags par 'gyur ro* and Ch. 執我所故名護.

126. Actually, there is such a clarifying addition, viz., the phrase *ekayogakṣemārthena*, but even Matsumoto has to admit that it points in quite another direction, for as I understand him, he (M2: 389f)[688] takes it to indicate *ālayavijñāna*'s lying hidden in the *ātmabhāva*. For Matsumoto, this is a secondary facet of the etymologizing explanation of the term *ālaya-vijñāna*, the primary meaning being, as pointed out before (§ 123), *ālayavijñāna*'s abiding in or resting on the *ātmabhāva* and, above all, its clinging to the *ātmabhāva* as the self. To judge from his translation of the passage (M2: 231), he considers the facet of lying hidden or being submerged to be expressed by the second element of the etymologizing explanation, which I had originally reconstructed as a derivate of *pra-√lī*. This would mean that in Matsumoto's interpretation the two elements of the etymologizing explanation express, as he himself (M2: 381,13ff) seems to admit, completely different, if not inconsistent, aspects of *ālayavijñāna*, and that the clarification belongs (contrary to his own translation) to the second element only. This is, however, quite improbable, since in the case of the other two etymologizing explanations in Saṁdh V.3 (viz., of the names *ādānavijñāna* and *citta*, see ch. 4.2.8.1–2) the two elements are more or less synonymous, indicating, at most, two aspects or nuances of one and the same function or feature. This surely ought to be similar in the case of the etymologizing explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna*, and the clarification added (viz., **eka-yogakṣemārthena*) should therefore refer to both elements of this explanation, as a means to assign the explanation to its proper context in order to avoid misunderstandings; the more so if the original should indeed have contained derivates of *ā-√lī* and *upa-√lī* (and not *pra-√lī*) and if the author was aware of the aforementioned *Paryāyasaṁgrahaṇī* passage (§ 125.3). In any case, the clarifying addition clearly dissociates the explanation from the context of false views like clinging to a (substantial) self, which is anyway not supported by the context (cf. § 127), and is (as Matsumoto himself [M2: 400,1-7] also recognizes) even at variance with Saṁdh V.7,[689] for there we read that the Buddha has not taught the new type of *vijñāna* to spiritually immature people lest they mistake it as their self, i.e., lest it become the *object* of their clinging to a (substantial) self — an *apprehension*[690] which would hardly make sense had *ālayavijñāna* been conceived as subliminally (and hence automatically) functioning, in ordinary persons, as the *subject* of clinging to something as their self.

127. Now, the context to which the clarifying phrase **ekayogakṣemārthena* points is no doubt in the first place the event of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) or, roughly speaking,[691] reincarnation, as is indicated in the text (Saṁdh V.2) itself by the statement that [at the moment of

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[688] Cf., in connection with the discussion of the purport of **ekayogakṣema*, especially, M2: 389,11-13; similarly 390,6f: "It must be regarded as certain that in Saṁdh V.3 *ālayavijñāna* is definitely stated to be also something lying hidden" (『解深密経』[6]–[10]ⓒ[1] において、〝アーラヤ識〞が〝潜むもの〞としても規定されていることは、確実であると見ざるを得ない。).

[1] ⓒ stands for the explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3.

[689] For Matsumoto, this inconsistency is the expression of a development of the new *vijñāna* from being a 'super-locus' towards becoming a 'locus', but since in my opinion there is absolutely no indication of *ālaya-* or *ādānavijñāna* being conceived of as the *subject* of clinging to a self, there is no inconsistency either.

[690] Not a prohibition, as Matsumoto's paraphrase of the purport of the passage — viz., M2: 488,17f: アーダーナ識を我 (ātman) であると誤解してはならない, i.e., "they must not wrongly conceive of the *ādānavijñāna* as an *ātman*" — would seem to suggest. Cf. *BHSG* ## 42.7 and 42.9 (*mā haiva* with opt.!).

[691] I.e., if we disregard rebirth in the world-sphere of incorporeality.

linking up a new existence] the 'All-Seed Mind'[692] (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) merges (**saṁ-√mūrch*, Saṁdh$_{t}$ *'jug*, Saṁdh$_{TH}$ *plhong*)[693] [into or with 'semen-cum-blood' so as to transform it into the proto-embryo (*kalala*)]. For it is, as Matsumoto (M2: 383ff) also points out, this merging of the mind (or mind and mental factors) with proto-embryonic matter that is characterized, in the YBh, by their sharing, from this moment onward, one and the same, or each other's, destiny (*ekayogakṣemārthena*, *anyonyayogakṣematayā*).[694] If the explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* refers to this process, the reconstruction, in Saṁdh V.3, of Tib. *lus* as *kāya* in line with the PSk as its closest parallel makes perfect sense, for in this case *ālayavijñāna* would basically just take over the role of the (yet unspecified) *vijñāna* to which this role had been ascribed in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* conceptual framework. And as regards the etymologizing explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna*, the addition of the phrase *ekayogakṣemārthena* serves to clarify that *ālayavijñāna* is, in the first place and in agreement with the Tibetan renderings, named as it is because it attaches itself to and unites itself with (cf. Tib. *sbyor bar byed pa* and *'brel pa*),[695] i.e., merges into and with (*saṁ-√mūrch*), the physical organism in the sense that the two of them share, from now on, one and the same destiny, i.e., become

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[692] In view of the difference in opinion with regard to the reconstruction of the Sanskrit original of the term and its interpretation (see § 142) I use this somewhat obscure rendering in order to avoid a premature commitment.

[693] For *'jug pa* = *sammūrcchati* (lit. "coagulates") see YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,5f (YBh$_{t}$ P dzi 13b2) and Hsüan-tsang's rendering "merging with each other" (展轉和合: Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 692b11), corresponding to "merges with and depends/relies on" (和合依託) in his translation of YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,5f (YBh$_{c}$ 283a5). On the other hand, *saṁ-√mūrch* is construed with the loc. in YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,4 (read *yatra tat ... ālayavijñānaṁ saṁmūrcchati*: S 1987: 127) and 24,18 (*yatra ca kalaladeśe tad vijñānaṁ saṁmūrcchitam*). Cf. also the remark in fn. 567 and S 1987 # 3.3.1.1 with n. 239.

[694] YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,14-17f (cf. M2: 383f, text [197]):

> "This matter of the *kalala* is, moreover, stated to have merged with the mind and the mental factors in such a way that they share each other's destiny, [for] on the one hand, thanks to the mind the [matter of the *kalala*] does not rot, and on the other hand on account of the latter's being fostered or damaged the mind and the mental [factors], too, are fostered or suffer damage."
>
> *tat punaḥ kalalarūpaṁ taiś cittacaitasikair dharmair anyonyayogakṣematayā sammūrcchitam ity ucyate | cittavaśena ca tan na pariklidyate, tasya cânugrahopaghātāc cittacaittānām* (ms.) *anugrahopaghātaḥ |*

VinSg$_{ms}$ 17b3 (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 41b1f; D zhi 39a4f; YBh$_{c}$ 593c29f):

> Appropriated (*upātta*) matter is what is called 'inhabited by mind', and it is [defined as] the [matter] that [1.] has grown after having fused (Tib. *'dres pa*)[1] with mind in the sense of sharing one and the same destiny and [2.] is the basis of an arising of feelings (i.e., *sentient* physical matter that will *die* as soon as it is abandoned by the mind).
>
> *yad upāttaṁ rūpaṁ tad vijñānasanniviṣṭam ity ucyate | tat punar yad vijñānasaṁmūrcchitam ekayogakṣemārthena saṁvṛddham*[2], *yac ca vedanānām utpattisaṁniśrayabhūtam |*

If *saṁmūrcchati* is understood in the sense of "to fuse with" (cf. also Sv II 502,9f: *sa(m)muccitaṁ*[3] *missībhūtaṁ*), the relation is reciprocal, and a shift of subject from *(nāma)rūpa* (or *kalalarūpa*: YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,15f, *śukraśoṇitarūpa*: 230,8) to *citta/vijñāna*, as in Saṁdh V.2 but also in YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,5 and 24,17–25,1, appears feasible.

[1] Thus also YBh$_{t}$ P dzi 135b7 *'dres par 'gyur* for YBh$_{Bh}$ 230,8 *sammūrcchate*.

[2] Text confirmed by Ch., but Tib. has *'jug pa* for *saṁvṛddhaṁ* which may suggest a v.l. (*saṁvṛttaṁ*? Cf. ASBh 3,9 with n. 2, where Ch. and Tib. suggest *vṛddhi°* for ms. *vṛtti°*).

[3] For *muccati* "curdles, coagulates" (mingling of the roots √*mūrch* and √*muc*) see OBERLIES 2001: 111 (referring to H. LÜDERS, *Philologica Indica*, Göttingen 1940: 184).

[695] See fn.668.

closely united existentially and remain so until death. "Merging into/with" would seem to imply, in the first place, the *vijñāna*'s coming to abide in (*saṁ-ni-√viś*),[696] and pervade, the physical organism, but may easily also convey the *connotation* of its *hiding* and lying hidden there.[697]

128. Whether the two derivates of the root *lī* are meant to refer to two different facets of the process or situation, is, as Buescher (B: 123) rightly remarks, difficult to decide. If the second element was a derivate of *pra-√lī*, it may have brought out the connotation of hiding. If not, the first element might be taken to express the initial act of merging or hiding, and the

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[696] Cf. VinSg$_{ms}$ 17b3 quoted in fn. 694.

[697] It should be clear from a comparison of my analysis of the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 (§§ 123–127) with that of the explanation in MSg I.3 (esp. §§ 110–112) that in my understanding the latter is an entirely innovative attempt, based on *ālayavijñāna*'s function as the basic cause of pollutional existence, and not on its dwelling and hiding in the body. This would seem to be basically compatible with Matsumoto's assumption of a transformation of *ālayavijñāna* from a 'super-locus' into a 'locus', but in detail there is considerable disagreement because our understanding of the respective passages (Saṁdh V.3 and MSg I.3) is fundamentally different. Whereas from my point of view the explanations in MSg I.3 are entirely novel, — especially the first two, while the third one may be a development of Saṁdh V.7 —, for Matsumoto (M2: 395f; cf. 431,8f), they are, as a whole (i.e., including its third element) a reinterpretation or development of Saṁdh V.3.

[**1.**] For Matsumoto, the first two (complementary) explanations of MSg I.3 are a development of the Saṁdh's explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* as dwelling or hiding in the *ātmabhāva*. In MSg I.3, this idea is, according to him (M2: 395,1-7; 19f), split up into two aspects: an intransitive active aspect (...に潜むもの) and a passive one (...によって潜まれるもの), the latter being derived from the nuance of "being concealed below" in the sense of becoming the 'locus'[1] (cf. § 144), and this is taken to be the purport of the MSg's first explanation (M2: 396,11-13), the alleged *ātmabhāva* of Saṁdh V.3 being replaced with 'all pollutional dharmas' (M2: 395,17-19). But apart from doubting the occurrence of *ātmabhāva* in Saṁdh V.3, I definitely fail to perceive how the MSg's statement that "the pollutional dharmas lie hidden in it (= in *ālayavijñāna*) as effect" (as Matsumoto himself translates the first explanation)[2] can be transformed into the statement that *ālayavijñāna* is concealed below them.

[**2.**] Still less convincing is Matsumoto's (M2: 395,8-14) attempt to connect the MSg's third explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* (viz., that it is thus designated because spiritually immature people stick/cling to it as their self) with Saṁdh V.3 by assuming that in the course of *ālayavijñāna*'s transformation from a 'super-locus' into a 'locus' its being characterized as the *action* of clinging to [the *ātmabhāva* as] the self (Saṁdh V.3) was replaced with its becoming the *object* of clinging to a self (Saṁdh V.7; MSg I.3), for in my opinion the assumption of such an active function of *ālaya-vijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 is baseless (see §§ 125–127). On the presupposition of a direct dependence of MSg I.3 on Saṁdh V.3, Matsumoto (M2: 395,9f; 431,9-13)[3] even takes the former as evidence for his contention that Tib. *lus* in the latter must represent *ātmabhāva* (and not *kāya*), going so far as to equate the presumable occurrence of **ātmatvena* in MSg I.3 with the alleged *ātmabhāva* of Saṁdh V.3 on the basis of °*tva*/°*tā* and °*bhāva* being equivalent as abstract-suffixes (M2: 431,2-8). But as I have tried to show (fn. 683), *ātmabhāva* as commonly used in Buddhist texts is not equivalent to a regular abstract formation, quite apart from the fact that in view of the evidence of the PSk it is extremely improbable that *lus* in Saṁdh V.3 represents *ātmabhāva* (§ 124).

[1] M2: 396,1f: ... 〝潜むもの〟という規定が、... 〝下に潜むもの〟という意味で、〝潜まれるもの〟〝基体〟をも意味するようになった...。

[2] See M2: 240,4f: ... 染汚の諸法 (sāṁkleśika-dharma) が、それにおいて (der)、結果 (kārya) として潜み (sbyor, ālīyante)、...。

[3] Matsumoto's (M2: 431,14) remark that **kāya* does not occur in MSg I.3–5 is formally correct, but actually the body is clearly represented by the physical sense faculties in the first explanation of the term *ādāna-vijñāna* in I.5.

second the ensuing situation throughout life. But this remains entirely conjectural as long as long as the problem of the original Sanskrit wording is not settled.

129.0. I cannot, however, conclude the preceding discussion without a few additional remarks on the expression **ekayogakṣemārthena* in Saṁdh V.3, for both Buescher and Matsumoto have objections with regard to my understanding of this concept, which I rendered as "in the sense of sharing one and the same destiny".

129.1. Buescher (B: 123) translates it by "as a single unit in accomplishment and well-being". In connection with a detailed discussion (B: 132f [Ex.22]), he wisely remarks that this rendering is preliminary, and that further investigation may be necessary.

129.1.1. The difference in our rendering of the compound *yogakṣema* is perhaps not so serious. It is true that *yogakṣema* has become a kind of synonym compound meaning "well-being",[698] as is obvious in a passage of the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī*: (VaSg III.1.ii)[699] where we read that an unwise person wishes the well-being or prosperity of the young tree of [future] rebirth and waters it with the moisture of craving (**tṛṣṇāsneha*?). My rendering of *yogakṣema* as "destiny" is, as Buescher rightly points out, based on YBh_{Bh} 24,16f, where in connection with corporeal matter and mind in the early embryonic phase the expression *anyonyayoga-kṣema* is taken to imply that not only benefiting (*anugraha*) but also damaging (*upaghāta*) one of them entails benefiting or damaging the other.[700] That is, sharing each other's welfare is taken to *imply* sharing each other's misfortune. Accordingly, Hsüan-tsang renders *anyonya-yogakṣema* as "safety and danger are common [to both]".[701]

129.1.2. Now, Buescher wants to separate the meaning of *ekayogakṣemārtha* from that of *anyonyayogakṣema(tva)*. But at least as far as the above-mentioned connotation of *yogakṣema* is concerned this is hardly possible, because at YBh_{Bh} 53,4f *ekayogakṣema*, too, is associated with *anugraha* and *upaghāta*,[702] just as *anyonyayogakṣema* at YBh_{Bh} 24,16f. Accordingly, Hsüan-tsang's rendering of *ekayogakṣema*[703] is practically identical with that of *anyonya-*

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[698] Cf. *SWTF* IV: 24: "Wohlergehen". CHEN's (1999: 92,22) rendering "peace-and-happiness obtained through practising *yoga*" (由修瑜伽所得的安樂) is too specific here and at any rate hardly applicable to the embryonic state.

[699] YBh_t P 'i 288a1f (D zi 249a4f; YBh_c 828c17-19): "Because that unwise person wishes the prosperity of that young tree of rebirth in a future life (i.e., wants it to thrive and flourish) and [thus] waters it with the moisture of craving (**tṛṣṇāsneha*, cf. Ch. 貪愛水) ..." (*mi mkhas pa'i gang zag de ni yang srid par skye ba'i shing gzhon nu de'i grub pa dang bde ba 'dod pa yin la | sred pa'i chags pas kyang brlan pas na ...*). Cf. YBh_t P 'i 288b1f (D zi 249b4; YBh_c 829a7f): "In this way, one should understand that this huge tree of suffering persists for a long time and that this person, on his part, wants it to thrive" (*de ltar na sdug bsngal gyi shing de ni yun ring por gnas pa yin la gang zag de yang de'i* (i.e., *sdug bsngal gyi shing gi*) *grub pa dang bde ba 'dod par rig par bya ste ...*). In both passages, Ch. has "flourishing, increase" (滋茂) for *yogakṣema*.

[700] See fn. 694.

[701] YBh_c 283a16: 安危共同.

[702] YBh_{Bh} 53,4f: *katham tat-* (=*mahābhūta-*) *-pratiṣṭhitaṁ bhavati* (sc. *upādāyarūpam*) | *mahābhūtā-nugrahopaghātaikayogakṣematvāt* |

[703] YBh_c 290a11f: 彼同安危.

yogakṣema, not only here but also in other places, including Saṁdh V.3,[704] and the same holds good for Dharmagupta's and Paramārtha's renderings.[705]

129.1.3. What is more, Buescher's proposal to take the compound **ekayogakṣemārthena*[706] to mean "as a single unit in accomplishment and well-being" meets with serious grammatical difficulties, for as he himself indicates (B: 133: "*eka...artha/°tva*") he has to construe *eka* with *artha* (or, in the case of TrBh *8,15 [L. 19,17] *ekayogakṣematvena*, even with *°tva*, which is utterly impossible). Actually, *°arthena* is commonly used in a suffix-like way with the meaning of "in the sense of", not much different from *°tvena* in the meaning of "as". If *artha* were to function as a noun qualified by *eka*, the phrase "*as* a single unit ..." should be *eka...arthatvena*. There can thus hardly be any reasonable doubt that *ekayogakṣemārthena* means "in the sense of having one and same well-being [or misfortune]", i.e. sharing the same destiny. This may well imply the idea of *(ālaya)vijñāna* and physical matter being, for one entire life, "united [so as] to [form] a single structured whole" (一體相應), as Bodhiruci puts it, but this is hardly a *translation* of the expression **ekayogakṣemārthena* but rather a *paraphrase* pointing at what Bodhiruci thought to be implied.

129.2. Similar to Buescher, Matsumoto, too, argues in favour of a difference between the expressions *ekayogakṣema* and *anyonyayogakṣema*, though it seems for different reasons.

129.2.1. For Matsumoto (M2: 387ff), *ekayogakṣema* seems to indicate not a mutual but a unidirectional relation.[707] The main purport of his interpretation of Saṁdh V.2–3 is to show that in this piece of text the fundamental position is that the 'All-Seed Mind', equated with *ālayavijñāna*, is based on the *ātmabhāva* (represented, according to Matsumoto, by *lus* in Saṁdh V.3) as its 'locus' (see §§ 138–140). This seems to imply for him that *ālayavijñāna* shares the *ātmabhāva*'s destiny, but not the other way round.

129.2.2. Hence, in Matsumoto's opinion *ekayogakṣema* in Saṁdh V.3 must not be equated with *anyonyayogakṣema* in YBh_{Bh} 24,15-17. The latter passage clearly refers to the mutual dependence of the mind (and mental factors) (= *nāman*) on the one hand and embryonic matter (= *rūpa*) on the other from 'linking up' a new existence (*pratisandhi*) onward. Against this, Matsumoto takes Saṁdh V.2–3 to be concerned with the relation of *citta* = *ālayavijñāna* to the *ātmabhāva* = *nāma+rūpa* (i.e., taken to comprise, normally, both mental factors and physical matter). In addition, he tends to limit the dependence of the *ātmabhāva* on *ālaya-vijñāna* to the moment of 'linking up' and to reduce their relation in the period from 'linking up' onward (which is the one addressed in the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālaya-*

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[704] E.g., YBh_C 594a1 ($VinSg_{ms}$ 17b3): 安危事同; $Saṁdh_{Hs}$ 692b17 = YBh_C 718a26 (quote of Saṁdh V.3): 同安危義; $MSgU_C$ 383c2 (ad I.5): 安危共同.

[705] Cf. $MSgBh_{Dh}$ 273c12 "sharing decay and prosperity, welfare and misfortune" (同衰利安否) and $MSgBh_{Pa}$ 157b23 "sharing success and ruin" (同成壞), both in the quotation of Saṁdh V.3 in the commentary on MSg I.4.

[706] Skt. *ekayogakṣemārthena* for Tib. *grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i don gyis* (D : *gyi* P) is confirmed in a similar context in $VinSg_{ms}$ 17b3 (see fn. 694).

[707] Cf. M2: 389,14-18, esp. 17f: "The former[1] explains the inseparable unitedness in the sense of a unidirectional relation of *ālayavijñāna* towards the *ātmabhāva*, i.e., *nāmarūpa*"(前者は、"ātma-bhāva"、 つまり「名色」に対する "アーラヤ識" の一方的な関係としての "不離一体性" を説いている...).

[1] I.e., the explanation of the term '*ālayavijñāna*' in Saṁdh V.3.

vijñāna in V.3) to a dependence of *ālayavijñāna* on the *ātmabhāva* in the sense of the latter being the support or 'locus' of the former. This view will be discussed in detail in ch. 4.2.4.3.

129.2.3. For the present purpose, it may suffice to indicate that such a reduction appears unwarranted, since in its *ādānavijñāna* aspect the 'All-Seed Mind' (= *ālayavijñāna*) has, in any case, also the function of appropriating the body (just so or as part of the *ātmabhāva*), a function which doubtless includes that of keeping it appropriated throughout life, thereby preventing it from dying. It is, anyway, precisely this function (which implies the body's sharing the destiny of the mind) that is most naturally taken over by *ālayavijñāna* when it replaces the unspecified *citta* or *vijñāna* of the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials in its function of merging with semen-cum-blood at the moment of reincarnation. As against this, what might appear problematic with the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* is rather the other of the two facets of *anyonyayogakṣematva* as described in YBh_{Bh} 24,16f, viz., the aspect of the mind sharing the destiny of the body, because it is not so easy to see how this steadily flowing latent stratum of the mind might be affected by the body's being fostered or damaged.[708] But since the 'All-Seed Mind' is stated to merge (*saṁ-√mūrch*) [with semen-cum-blood] at reincarnation and to grow[709] on the basis of its appropriation of the physical sense faculties, its settling down and continuity in a specific existence in the material world clearly requires a body, and if the body is deliberately spoilt or destroyed by force, the respective period of maturation of the 'All-Seed Mind' would end prematurely, to the effect that it would have to reincarnate anew. *Ālayavijñāna* thus shares the body's destiny at least in this sense, just as the body shares the *ālayavijñāna*'s destiny because it will suffer premature death if the karmically determined lifetime of the present *ālayavijñāna* has expired.

129.2.4. Even if we follow Matsumoto in defining the common destiny in Saṁdh V.3 as a relation between *ālayavijñāna* and the *ātmabhāva* (= *rūpa* + *nāman*), the dependence of the immaterial factors (*nāman*) on *ālayavijñāna* as their Seed (*bīja*) can hardly be disputed, and Saṁdh V.4–5 is explicit in characterizing *ādānavijñāna* (= *ālayavijñāna*) as the basis underlying the ordinary cognitive processes (which would form part of *nāman*), whereas the opposite influence can hardly consist in anything but the repotentialization of the respective imprints (*vāsanā*) in the *ālayavijñāna* by these cognitive processes.

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[708] Cf. also YAMABE (2012: 204,18–205,6), remarking that since *ālayavijñāna* is, in its systematized form, conceived of as an unchanging equal flow of moments during the entire life, it is hard to see how it could be affected by the body's being fostered or damaged.

[709] I must admit that the precise meaning of "growing" in connection with the 'All-Seed Mind' is not quite clear to me. The most natural explanation would seem to be that the growing and thriving of the 'All-Seed Mind' consists in its remaining firmly settled in the respective existence, in developing its physical basis and in actualizing itself in ever more complex cognitive acts, feelings, etc. (cf., in this connection, also Wŏnch'ŭk's explanation: $SaṁdhṬ_c$ 244b22ff). Alternatively (or in addition), one might think of the 'All-Seed Mind' being repotentialized by cognitive or karmic acts (cf. YBh_t P zi 5b7–6a4; YBh_c 580b17-26; HAKAMAYA 1979: 31 [2001: 395f] # **3.b.B**). In the canonical *Bījasūtra*, the *vijñāna*'s growth and expansion is most probably its development into the *nāmarūpa*, etc., of a new existence, or at least its ongoing karmic activity preparing for such a development; cf. Spk II 271,24f (on the parallel in SN 22.53): *(vuddhiṁ ...) āpajjeyyā ti kammaṁ javāpetvā paṭisandhiṁ ākaḍḍhana-samatthatāya vuddhi-ādīni āpajjeyya*. Cf. also $VinSg_{ms}$ 19a4 (cf. fn. 759), suggesting that *virūḍhi*, *vṛddhi* and *vaipulya* correspond, respectively, to the taking up (*parigṛhṇāti*) a new *ātmabhāva* in the future, developing it fully (*paripūrayati*) and continuing to do so again and again (cf. also 19a5: *pūrva-vad virūḍhivṛddhivaipulyārtho 'nugantavyaḥ*, apparently referring back to the aforementioned statement).

129.2.5. For this reason, I am not convinced that *ekayogakṣemārthena* in Saṁdh V.3 must be understood in terms of a unidirectional relation,[710] and even if it is understood in this way, what suggests itself in the first place is doubtless the body's (or, in Matsumoto's sense, the *ātmabhāva*'s) sharing the destiny of *ālayavijñāna*, in the sense that the former's remaining alive is dependent on the presence of the latter. This dependence of the body (/*ātmabhāva*) on *ālayavijñāna* does not of course contradict its being the dwelling-place ('locus') of *ālaya-vijñāna*; actually, one might adduce as an analogy the fact that to remain alive the body is dependent on the heart even though it is located in the body, or on the blood even though it pervades the body.

130.1. Towards the end of his discussion of the emic etymological explanations of the term '*ālayavijñāna*', Buescher (B: 123f) tries to correlate the explanations of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk) not only with the two elements of its explanation in the Saṁdh but also with explanations offered in the *Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā* (YVy P yi 98b1f)), surmising that Vasubandhu probably also knew this text. This is, however, hardly possible since the YVy quotes not only the *Laṅkāvatāra-* but also the *Ghanavyūhasūtra*,[711] which is nowhere referred to by Vasubandhu and according to HAKAMAYA[712] emerged only in the period between Vasubandhu and Hsüan-tsang.

130.2.0. Apart from this, I find Buescher's correlations anything but convincing.

130.2.1. There can be no doubt that the third explanation of the PSk, according to which *ālayavijñāna* is named as it is because it is attached to or lies hidden in the body (*kāyālīnatām upādāya*), is based on the explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* as given in the Saṁdh (see § 122), but it does not make sense to correlate this with the YVy's explanation of the attribute *upādātṛ* in YBh_{Bh} 11,4f, because this explanation clearly corresponds to the Saṁdh's explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* as that by which the physical organism is appropriated (Saṁdh V.3 *des lus 'di bzung zhing blangs pa'i phyir* ≈ YVy P yi 98b2 *des lus zin pa'i phyir*). That this function is, in the YVy, connected with *ālayavijñāna* (and not with *ādānavijñāna*) is easily explained by the fact that in the YBh passage commented upon *upādātṛ* qualifies *ālaya-vijñāna* and not *ādānavijñāna*, which is not mentioned at all.

130.2.2. What corresponds, in the YVy, to the Saṁdh's explanation of the name *ālaya-vijñāna* and to *kāyālīnatā* in the PSk is rather the third element, which explains the expression *āśrayabhāvasaṁni⟨vi⟩ṣṭa* in YBh_{Bh} 11,4[713] as the fact that *ālayavijñāna* has merged [with

[710] For occurrences of *ekayogakṣema* (in a different argumentative context) with only one direction being envisaged cf. VON ROSPATT 1995: 133–137 (MSABh 151,4-6 with SAVBh; ASBh 52,11-13 on AS 41,9f = AS_{Li} 247,34; NA 534c3-7 [cf. *SHT* VIII [2000]: 85f no. 1900 R 3–4]).

[711] 1. YVy P yi 99a7–b1 and b2-5 (D 'i 82a3f and 5-7) = Laṅk 44,3-8 and 45,3-8.— 2. For YVy P yi 99b5f and 7 (D 'i 82a7f and b1), cf. $GhVy_t$ S 344a4 + 343b4f and 343a5 (D 37b1f + a4 and 36b6f); $GhVy_{c1}$ 738a23f+12f and 738a3f; $GhVy_{c2}$ 765b26f+11f and 765a19f (or a23f).

[712] HAKAMAYA 2008: 179.

[713] For this passage see S 1987: 117ff, esp. 120f. In describing the functions or features of *ālaya-vijñāna* by using the expressions *-upagata* and *-saṁniviṣṭa* (traditional quasi-synonyms of *ālīna*: see § 103), this passage too shows that what was semantically associated with the word *ālaya* was, in the first place, the aspect of clinging, sticking, resorting to (or: what is clung, stuck, resorted to), and not so much that of latency.

semen-cum-blood] so as to form the *kalala* and has thus come to share its destiny (**ekayoga-kṣematva*).[714]

130.2.3. In contradistinction to this, Buescher (B: 124 n. 1) suggests that *āśrayabhāvasaṁni⟨vi⟩ṣṭa* should be correlated only with the second, somewhat problematic (see § 122.3) part of the Saṁdh's 'etymological' explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., **pra(?)lī(ya)natā*, and with the second explanation of the PSk, i.e., *ātmabhāvālayanimittatā*. But apart from the fact that we cannot be sure whether the use of two almost synonymous expressions in the Saṁdh explanation was indeed meant to indicate different functions or aspects of the new type of mind (cf. § 128), the correlation of one of them with *ātmabhāvālayanimittatā*, however it should be interpreted, is problematic. For we should carefully distinguish functions of *ālayavijñāna* (or *ādānavijñāna*, for that matter) with regard to the *ātmabhāva* or basis-of-individual-existence as a *whole* (comprising all the five *skandhas*) from functions with regard to the 'body' (*kāya*) or *physical* organism (comprising only material dharmas), like the one I have called 'biological appropriation' (*upādāna*, Buescher's 'assimilation'), i.e., keeping the physical organism alive (see ch. 4.2.5.5). Another distinction to be made is that between the initial act (e.g., taking hold of a new existence or appropriating a new body) and the ensuing function of preservation (e.g., of securing the development or continuity of the basis-of-individual-existence, or keeping the body alive). Finally, we have to distinguish *functions* of *ālayavijñāna* (like taking hold of a new existence or 'biological appropriation') from what we may perhaps call its *condition* or mode of existence (like merging with or lying hidden in the physical organism). It seems to me that in the perspective of at least the first and the last of these three distinctions *ātmabhāvālayanimittatā*, referring to a *function* of *ālayavijñāna* with regard to the *ātmabhāva* as a *whole*, does *not* correlate with *āśrayabhāvasaṁni⟨vi⟩ṣṭa* as interpreted by the YVy or with any of the possible facets of the Saṁdh's explanation of the term *ālayavijñāna*, which rather point to a *condition* of *ālayavijñāna* in relation to the *physical* organism.

4.1.7. Resumé

131. As a result of the preceding review of the emic etymologizing explanations of the term *ālayavijñāna*, it should have become clear that the component *ālaya* is hardly ever understood in the sense of abstract latency, as Buescher seems to suggest. The dominant meaning is rather "sticking to" in an ontological sense amounting to "being causally related to" (§§ 109; 112; 114.1; 115), or "abiding in", "pervading" (§§ 113; 121.2), and, in a passive /locative sense, "that which is stuck to" (§§ 109; 112) or "that where something abides", "abode", or "that where something is stored", "store-room" (§§ 106; 116.1 with fn. 619; 120). With a passive/locative meaning, the component *ālaya* is sometimes also understood in an emotional or psychological sense, i.e., "that which is clung to [as one's self]" (§§ 113.1 with fn. 591; 121.1.1; 121.1.5), but I do not perceive a justification for postulating that in the compound *ālayavijñāna* the element *ālaya* may also be used in this sense with the active meaning of "clinging to [something as one's self]", as Matsumoto assumes for Saṁdh V.3 (§§ 123; 125–127). The nuance of "lying hidden" or "that where something lies hidden" is explicit in the Chinese tradition at least from Paramārtha onward (§ 116), but (with the possible exception of Saṁdh V.3: see § 128) is rarely brought out in the Indian (and Tibetan)

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[714] YVy P yi 98b1f (D 'i 81b1): *de dang po kho nar mer mer por zhugs pa na grub pa dang bde ba gcig pa'i phyir kun gzhi zhes bya ba.*

explanations. It would nonetheless seem to be, in any case, a palpable nuance in the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* in the Saṁdh (§ 127) and in that of the PSk that is based on it (§ 121.2), and above all in the *IP* (§ 44), but even in these cases *ālaya* does not mean abstract latency but is inseparable from the facet of sticking, abiding or being inherent *in* something.

4.2. The Subliminal Mind in the Vth Chapter of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*

4.2.1 Buescher's Interpretation

132. On the basis of his (as I hope to have shown: unwarranted) contention to have demonstrated the *IP* to be a later interpolation (B: 141) and on the premise (shared by me) that the remaining occurrences of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh already presuppose the introduction of this concept, Buescher (B: 134ff) tries to show that the subliminal mind was established as a new idea in the Vth chapter of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, "receiving the three names *(sarvabījakaṁ) cittam*, *ādānavijñāna* and *ālayavijñāna*" (B: 134).

133. In Saṁdh V.2, the subliminal mind is introduced in the context of rebirth under the name of 'All-Seed Mind'[715] (**sarvabīja(ka)ṁ cittam*, but resumed by "that [aforementioned] *vijñāna*" at the beginning of V.3). According to Buescher,

> "the Early Yogācāra bi-polar *bīja*-model could not yet employ the concept of *sarvabīja-kaṁ vijñānam*" (B: 135),

i.e.,

> the concept of *sarvabījakam vijñānam* ... implies ontological consequences" [that] force us to recognize discrepancies between the ontological implications of *sarvabījakaṁ vi-jñānam* and the Early Yogācāra ontology. (B: 150f n. 3)
>
> These discrepancies, in turn, invite, as I see it, to be interpreted in terms of demonstrating historical stratification. (B: 151 n. 3 cont. from p. 150)

This obviously means that according to Buescher we are logically forced to regard all passages that use the term '*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*' in the MauBh as interpolations (B: 151), more precisely: as post-Saṁdh interpolations, just like the passages containing the term '*ālayavijñāna*'.

134. Buescher does not, however, exclude a connection between the older 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' and the new one of the Saṁdh. According to him,

> the *vijñāna* existing in *ārūpyadhātu* came very close to being a *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* (B: 135)

and is termed by him "a sort of *proto-sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*" (ibid.). The reason seems to be that it is stated to contain the Seeds of matter (*rūpa*). In the Saṁdh, it was transformed it into a "proper *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*" because

> [a]s soon as the phenomenological description, metaphorically speaking, followed the consciousness that happened to descend into *kāmadhātu* and *rūpadhātu*, both of these *dhātu*s had likewise to be described, in accordance with the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*'s general ontology, as arising on the basis of factors located in consciousness. (B: 136)

This means that for Buescher the introduction of the **sarvabīja(ka)ṁ cittam* or *vijñānam* is a consequence of the introduction of *vijñaptimātratā*, and that "containing *all* Seeds" means containing also the Seeds of all material things, with the implication that the latter are not, as

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[715] See fn. 692.

in the opinion of "the naive and sophisticated realist", "always already there" but "*constituted* by consciousness" (cf. B: 137f).

135. In line with his assumption of the *vijñāna* in the *ārūpyadhātu* as a sort of 'proto-*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*', Buescher seems to understand Saṁdh V.2–3 as a kind of successive descent of the new *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* from the *ārūpya* sphere into that of *rūpa* and *kāma*. Especially in the case of Saṁdh V.3, he is quite explicit, because he supplies, in square brackets, the introductory phrase

> Now, as concerns 'linking-up' into *kāmadhātu*: ... (B: 137).

Accordingly, the three names of the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* introduced in V.3 are, for Buescher, not just names shown to be appropriate by quasi-etymologies but rather a means to point out three different functions of the new form of mind (in the *kāmadhātu*):

1. "to appropriate an organic basis" (B: 154,6: *ādānavijñāna*),
2. to preserve "its identity as 'seed'-consciousness, all the while remaining latently present (**ālayana*)", being "absorbed within, or dissolved throughout, the biophysical organism (**pralayana*)" (B: 154,10-13: *ālayavijñāna*), and
3. to assimilate all the cognitive experiences (B: 154,17: *citta*).

From this point of view, Buescher naturally has to reject my assumption that only '*ādānavijñāna*' is the Saṁdh's own, novel term for the subliminal mind, whereas the other two were taken over: '*citta*' as a traditional term in order to fit the new form of mind into the scheme of canonical terminology, and '*ālayavijñāna*' from the MauBh in order to convince those Yogācāras who had introduced this concept that what is taught in Saṁdh V is actually aimed at expressing essentially the same idea, though, to be sure, in a better, advanced form. In Buescher's words (B: 141f), such an assumption would unduly reduce the issue to an "interscholastic conflict" or to "interfractional politics". In addition, it would, of course, be incompatible with Buescher's opinion that the idea of the subliminal mind was introduced by the Saṁdh for the first time and that the *ālayavijñāna* passages in the MauBh are, all of them, later interpolations.

136. As evidence for the originality of the introduction of the subliminal mind in the Saṁdh, Buescher points to the first paragraph of Saṁdh V, according to which the purport of the chapter is to disclose how bodhisattvas are conversant (**kuśala*) with the secret (*guhya*) [meaning of the teaching] of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*. According to Buescher, this is a literary device introducing

> an interpretation of consciousness *unheard of before*. (B: 139)

Likewise, in the verse at the end of the chapter (V.7), where the Buddha declares that he has not revealed the subliminal mind to naive people lest they construct it as a substantial self,

> the *sūtra explicitly documents* itself as the text that marks the historical origin of a new type of consciousness. (B: 139)

4.2.2. Matsumoto's Interpretation

137. Matsumoto's understanding of Saṁdh V agrees with Buescher's in that he, too, is of the opinion that Saṁdh V precedes all the *ālayavijñāna* passages in the YBh, including those in the MauBh, and thus has to be regarded as the oldest evidence for the concept and theory of *ālayavijñāna*. Apart from this, however, his interpretation of Saṁdh V differs considerably not only from my own but also from Buescher's. In particular, as far as I can see Matsumoto

does not (at least not explicitly) connect Saṁdh V with the idea of *vijñaptimātratā*. His main concern is rather with the transformation of *ālayavijñāna* into a 'locus' (基体) or substratum (*dhātu*), which is, for him, a non-Buddhist pattern of thought amounting to an *ātman* doctrine (M2: 418,5-9), hence a deterioration. As Matsumoto sees it, in Saṁdh V.2 the 'All-Seed Mind' (according to him: **sarvabījaṁ cittam/vijñānam*, see § 142) is not yet conceived as a 'locus' (see § 138). The change is, however, in a sense prepared already in Saṁdh V.3 through the introduction of the term *ālayavijñāna* (see § 144) and becomes still more conspicuous in the later paragraphs of Saṁdh V (see § 145), but is completed only in the MauBh (see § 143). In order to substantiate his view, Matsumoto assembles a huge amount of carefully presented and meticulously discussed source material from various periods and strands of the Buddhist tradition. In the following paragraphs, I shall try my best to summarize the main points of his argument. Some more details will be mentioned in connection with my critical response.

138. In his interpretation of Saṁdh V.2, Matsumoto (M2: 422 n. 24) accepts my suggestion that the first part (i.e., the relative clause: see § 149) may be based on a passage of the ManoBh of the MauBh,[716] but what is important for him, and amply argued for (M2: 422,25ff), is that in Saṁdh V.2 the subsequent demonstrative that introduces the main clause, viz., *der* = **tatra* (see § 141), should be understood as referring to *lus* = **ātmabhāva* in the relative clause, thus specifying the *ātmabhāva* as the 'locus' *where* the 'All-Seed Mind' takes root at the moment of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*). Thus, in Saṁdh V.2 (and essentially also in V.3) the 'All-Seed Mind' is not (yet) conceived as a 'locus' but as what Matsumoto (M2: 55) terms a 'super-locus' (超基体), i.e., something supported by or based on the 'locus' or substratum, in this case the *ātmabhāva*.[717]

139. The premise that what functions as the 'locus' of the 'All-Seed Mind' is called *ātmabhāva* is of utmost importance for Matsumoto in view of the canonical background assumed by him for Saṁdh V.2. Matsumoto (M2: 300; cf. 293ff, 355), starting from the fact that Saṁdh, in declaring that the 'All-Seed Mind' grows, increases and expands (**vṛddhiṁ virūḍhiṁ vipulatām āpadyate*),[718] makes use of canonical phraseology, and that it is in the *Bījasūtra* ($SĀ_c$ no 39; SN 22.54) that the subject of this phrase is *vijñāna* compared with the five kinds of seeds[719] (*bīja*),[720] concludes that this sūtra must be regarded as the textual background of Saṁdh V.2, or, in other words, that Saṁdh V.2 (and V.3) is essentially a development of the ideas of the *Bījasūtra*. Now, an important doctrine of this sūtra is the concept of the four *vijñānasthiti*s (M2: 290ff), taken in the sense of four items based on which *vijñāna* persists, grows, increases and expands. Since these four 'supports of *vijñāna*' consist of the remaining *upādānaskandha*s — i.e., body (*rūpa*), feeling (*vedanā*), apperception /conceptualisation (*saṁjñā*), and volitional/emotional impulses (*saṁskāra*)[721] — and thus comprise both physical matter and mental factors, they can, according to Matsumoto (M2:

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716 YBh_{Bh} 30,6 (cf. S 1987: 319 n. 326).

717 Cf., e.g., M2: 257f; 263; 277,6f; 389,1-3; 390,7-13; 392; 411,10-15; 425,25; 433,2 and 10f.

718 Cf. AKVy 522,22f.

719 More precisely: reproductive parts of plants, comprising not only seeds but also reproductive roots, stems, joints, and cuttings (cf. BODHI 2000: I 891): $SĀ_c$ 8c27-29; SN III 54,7-9; cf. Vin IV 34,35–35,13.

720 $SĀ_c$ 9a7-10 and 9a5f; SN III 54,29–55,9 and 54,27f + 12f, etc.

721 For a more nuanced analysis of these terms see, e.g., VETTER 2000: 20–63.

291f, 297, 357,15-17, etc.), be equated with *nāmarūpa* (in a narrower sense, excluding *vijñāna*). *Nāmarūpa*, in its turn, is *de facto* or expressly identified with the *ātmabhāva*, to be taken in its broader meaning comprising not just the living body (*kāya*) but psychic factors as well (M2: 249, 255, 270, etc.) and hence applicable even to an existence in the world-sphere of incorporeality (M2: 246).

140. The pattern of the four *vijñānasthiti*s is understood by Matsumoto (M2: 356; 360) as referring primarily to the idea that *vijñāna* thrives on the *basis* of the other four (*upādāna*)-*skandha*s (= *ātmabhāva* = *nāmarūpa*) in the period after 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*), i.e., in the new life. As against this, the event of 'linking up' itself is constituted by the fact that *vijñāna* functions as the *cause* of the new *ātmabhāva*, or *nāmarūpa*. This is connected by Matsumoto (ibid.) with the concept of *vijñāna* as 'nutriment' (*āhāra*), taken to be the condition of future rebirth (*āyatyāṁ punarbhava*) in the *Phalgunāvavāda*.[722] Since Saṁdh V.2 comprises, according to MATSUMOTO, both phases, it is for him (M2: 361) basically a rephrasing of the canonical idea of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, taken by him (M2: 277ff, esp. 283ff; 356ff; 455 n. 141) to have come to express the causal dependence of *nāmarūpa* (=*ātmabhāva*) on *vijñāna* at the moment of 'linking up' and the dependence of *vijñāna* on *nāmarūpa* (= *ātmabhāva*) as its support or 'locus' in the period after 'linking up' until death.

141.1. Matsumoto's understanding of Saṁdh V.2 as expressing, in its second half, the idea that in the period after 'linking up' *vijñāna* grows and thrives on the basis of the *ātmabhāva* = *nāmarūpa* is closely connected with his interpretation of the twofold *upādāna* that is introduced in this passage, viz.,

> *... der dang por 'di ltar len pa rnam pa gnyis po rten dang bcas pa'i dbang po gzugs can len pa dang | mtshan ma dang ming dang rnam par rtog pa la tha snyad 'dogs pa'i spros pa'i bag chags len pa la brten nas | sa bon thams cad pa'i sems rnam par smin cing 'jug la rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro ||.*[723]

This may provisionally be reconstructed into Sanskrit as follows:

> **... tatra prathamataḥ sarvabīja(ka)ṁ cittaṁ vipacyate saṁmūrcchati vṛddhiṁ virūḍhiṁ vipulatām āpadyate yaduta dvividham upādānam upādāya*[724]*: sādhiṣṭhānarūpīndriyopādānaṁ nimittanāmavikalpavyavahāraprapañcavāsanopādānaṁ ca.*

For Matsumoto (M2: 268ff; 277; 297; 426,1-5), the two kinds of *upādāna* represent, respectively, *rūpa* and *nāman*, i.e., the two components of the *ātmabhāva*. For this reason, he makes every effort to prove that **upādāna* must be understood in a passive (/objective) sense, viz., as "that which is taken (as support)" (取られるもの), or just as "support" ('locus', 基体),[725] and not as an action noun. Accordingly, in Saṁdh V.2 he (M2: 231; 263ff)[726] understands the compounds ending in °*upādāna* not as tatpuruṣas ("taking hold of ...") but

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[722] SĀ$_{C}$ no. 372 (102a19f: 識是食 ... 能招未來有 令相續生), quoted DhSk$_{D}$ 33,15f (⟨*vijñānaṁ*⟩ *Phalguna āhāraṁ yāvad evâyatyāṁ punarbhavābhinirvvṛttaye prādurbhāvāya*) and corresponding to SN 12.12 (II 13,14f: *viññāṇāhāro āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbattiyā paccayo*). Cf. M2: 303–305.

[723].Chinese versions: Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 669a18-21; Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 692b11-13; MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 157b17-19; MSgBh$_{Dh}$ 273c6-9; MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 324c1-3.

[724] For **upādāya*, cf. Saṁdh$_{TH}$ *blangs ba* (HAKAMAYA 2008: 688 [fol. 44b5]: *'di lta ste len pa rnam pa gnyis blangs ba de ///*).

[725] E.g., M2: 264,3f; 357,15f; 426,13f and 22; 443,9f.

[726] Cf. also M2: 426 n. 26; 442f n. 105.

karmadhārayas ("support consisting in ..."), and the absolutive **upādāya* not as a quasi-postposition ("on account of", "based on", etc.) but in its full verbal meaning ("having seized, or taken hold of", or "seizing, taking hold of" [M2: 231,11: を取って]).

141.2. In order to establish the passive meaning of **upādāna*, Matsumoto (M2: 258ff; 349ff) adduces evidence not only from somewhat distant sources like the *Prasannapadā* and the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*, but also from texts directly related to the Saṁdh phrase like the treatise on *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin (M2: 265f). Of special importance for Matsumoto's understanding is, however, the fact (M2: 300ff) that *vijñāna* is qualified as *sopādāna* in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version of the *Bījasūtra*, which according to him constitutes the canonical background of Saṁdh V.2. As a result of an extensive investigation (M2: 318ff, 324ff; 342ff) into the meaning of the expressions *sopādāna* and *sopādānīya*, and especially the term *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* (in the *Bījasūtra* as well as in later sources), Matsumoto feels confirmed in his assumption that *upādāna* in the latter expression has to be taken in a passive sense, probably from the *Bījasūtra* onward, and that this holds good for Saṁdh V.2 as well, since in his opinion the *vijñāna* connected with a twofold *upādāna* in this passage is nothing but a development of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the *Bījasūtra*.

142. The dependence of Saṁdh V.2 on the canonical *Bījasutra* is also decisive for Matsumoto's understanding of the 'All-Seed Mind'. Since in the *Bījasūtra* — as well as in the *Bhavasutta* of the *Aṅguttaranikāya*[727] and in some post-canonical but pre-Yogācāra Sanskrit sūtras like the *Śālistamba-*[728] and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*[729] — *vijñāna* is, by way of comparison or metaphorically, *equated* with seeds or with a seed, Matsumoto (M2: 362ff; 375f; 380) thinks that in Saṁdh V.2, too, the mind (*citta*) must *be* the Seed of all [dharmas] rather than *have* or contain their Seeds. Hence, the Sanskrit original should be reconstructed as **sarvabījaṁ cittam*, not, as LAMOTTE and I rendered it, as **sarvabīja<u>ka</u>ṁ cittam*, and **sarvabījaṁ* should not be understood as a bahuvrīhi but as a tatpuruṣa, not only in this passage but also in the verse Saṁdh V.7.

143. The difference between these two interpretations of the 'All-Seed Mind' is of fundamental importance for Matsumoto; for if the 'All-Seed Mind' is understood as the mind that *is* all Seeds (or: *is* the Seed of all dharmas, or *ātmabhāva*s), mind and Seed(s) are equated, and what supports, carries or contains them is the *ātmabhāva*, just as in some pre-*ālaya-vijñāna* YBh material (see § 146). If, on the other hand, the 'All-Seed Mind' is interpreted as *possessing* or containing all Seeds (or: the Seeds of all [dharmas, or *ātmabhāva*s]), it becomes itself the support or 'locus' of Seeds, which, for Matsumoto, would amount to heterodoxy and has happened only later, viz., in certain passages of the PañcBh and ManoBh of the MauBh, which Matsumoto (M2: 365ff) therefore regards, like the *IP* (see § 33), as being later interpolations, later not only than the Saṁdh but even than the VinSg, because according to Matsumoto (M2: 416) even in the *ālayavijñāna* treatise of the PañcMBhVin *ālayavijñāna* is not yet conceived as the 'locus' of Seeds but still equated with them. Since the heterodoxy that consists in conceiving of a *vijñāna* as the 'locus' of Seeds is, for Matsumoto, already immanent in the concept of 'mind *containing* all Seeds' (*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*), regardless of its being identified with *ālayavijñāna* or not, he (M2: 366ff; 414–416) has to exclude the

727 AN I 223f (no. 3.76); see fn. 903.

728 M2: 345–348 (texts [166]–[169]).

729 M2: 325–328 (texts [144]–[149]).

whole category of *bījāśraya* (as one out of three *āśraya*s) from the original textual material of the analysis of the six *vijñāna*s in the PañcBh and ManoBh of the MauBh, and not only its identification with *ālayavijñāna*, as proposed by me (though, mind you, not in the sense of a post-Saṁdh interpolation).

144. Yet, the transformation of the 'All-Seed Mind' from what is supported ('super-locus') into a support ('locus') is prepared, according to Matsumoto, already in Saṁdh V.3. Whereas the etymologizing explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* as understood by Matsumoto — viz., as the *vijñāna* that takes hold of the *ātmabhāva*, at 'linking up' as well as afterwards (now in sense of being based on it) — is considered by him (e.g., M2: 263,3-5) to be still fully in tune with the doctrinal content of V.2 and hence implies that the *ātmabhāva* is the 'locus' and *ādānavijñāna* a 'super-locus', this is slightly different in the case of the explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna*. In this case, too, the situation would remain unchanged as long as this name is taken to indicate that the 'All-Seed Mind' settles down in the *ātmabhāva* as its 'locus' and clings to it as the self (see § 123). Even the aspect of its lying hidden or being *submersed* in the *ātmabhāva*, which Matsumoto acknowledges to be involved,[730] though only with some hesitation,[731] is considered by him (M2: 390,7-13) to be still in harmony with the conception of the *ātmabhāva* as the 'locus' and the 'All-Seed Mind' as a 'super-locus'. At the same time, however, he (M2: 390,16f; 391,1-4; 398,18–399,3) regards this facet as having paved the way for the idea that the 'All-Seed Mind' is hidden *below* the *ātmabhāva*, or lying at its bottom, an idea which could easily involve a reversal of the relation of support ('locus') and what is supported ('super-locus').

145.1. In a sense, such a shift is to be observed, according to Matsumoto (M2: 391f), already in the subsequent paragraphs of Saṁdh V. In V.4–5, *ādānavijñāna* (i.e., the 'All-Seed Mind', of which *ādānavijñāna* and *ālayavijñāna* are just alternative names) is described as the basis and support (cf. *saṁniśritya pratiṣṭhāya*) of the six traditional forms of mind or cognitive processes, i.e., sensory perceptions and *manovijñāna*, comparable to a stream (*ogha*) and the waves, or to a mirror (*ādarśa*) and the images reflected in it. If this were combined with Matsumoto's interpretation of V.2, the result would be a structure in which the 'All-Seed Mind' is based on the *ātmabhāva* but is itself the basis of the ordinary cognitive processes, although he himself (M2: 392) points out that in the sūtra the two elements of this structure are merely juxtaposed, with no indication of a synthesis.

145.2. Moreover, in Saṁdh V.7 the 'All-Seed Mind' is not the subject of clinging to a self (as, according to Matsumoto, in V.3) but rather envisaged as its (possible) object, which for Matsumoto (M2: 252f; 414; 418f n. 7) amounts to its being the 'locus' of the notion of self instead of being its subject or 'super-locus'.

146. If Saṁdh V.2(ff) is indeed based on, and a *development* of, the canonical *Bījasūtra*, one would like to know precisely what this development consists in. But as far as I can see Matsumoto offers no explicit answer to this question. An obvious difference would seem to be that in the *Bījasūtra* the mind is only *compared* with seeds, whereas in Saṁdh V, in Matsumoto's interpretation (see § 142), the mind *is* the Seed of all dharmas, i.e., the Saṁdh is

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[730] M2: 389f, esp. 390,6f and 19f. Cf· also 392,11f; 394,17f; 399,19.

[731] M2: 381ff, esp. 382,18–383,7, where Matsumoto raises the question whether the Chinese renderings of Paramārtha, Dharmagupta and Hsüan-tsang involving the facet of 'lying hidden' may not just be unwarranted mistranslations.

no longer concerned with real, natural seeds as an element of a comparison but with Seed(s) as a metaphor for causal capacity or potentiality, hence with a theoretical concept. This shift has, however, already taken place in pre-*ālayavijñāna* strata of the YBh. With reference to the concept of *ātmabhāva*, Matsumoto himself (M2: 251f) mentions YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,3-7 and 25,12–27,3, where the *ātmabhāva* is stated to be endowed with all Seeds, or rather the Seeds of all possible *ātmabhāva*s. He (M2: 376f) also points out two stanzas of the *Paramārthagāthāḥ* (PG 28–29) referring to the result-of-maturation [of previous karma] endowed with all Seeds (*sarvabījo vipākaḥ*). Thus, what has happened in Saṁdh V (in Matsumoto's interpretation) is that these Seeds in the *ātmabhāva* have been equated with *citta* = *vijñāna*, or, rather, in view of the new names and the explicit distinction of this *vijñāna* from the ordinary *vijñāna*s, with a new type of *vijñāna*. But as far as I can see Matsumoto does not adduce any *motive* for this innovation. And his (M2: 401–403) suggestion that the two new names *ādāna-* (and not *upādāna-*) and *ālaya-vijñāna* may have been newly introduced in the Saṁdh in order to indicate, by way of the initial letter *ā-*, the new *vijñāna*'s being based on the *ātmabhāva* as its 'locus' is anything but convincing, still less in view of the fact that the occurrence of the expression *ātmabhāva* in the etymologizing explanations of these names is highly improbable (see § 124).

147. Since Matsumoto's position is to a large extent concerned with philological issues that should, if possible, be clarified before entering upon a discussion of the more philosophical problems (on which Buescher's criticism is focused), I shall first deal with Matsumoto's interpretation of Saṁdh V.2, and move on to Buescher's only in the course of my examination of the concept of the 'All-Seed Mind' (ch. 4.2.6).

4.2.3. Syntax of *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* V.2

148. Let me start with Matsumoto's understanding of *der* (**tatra*) at the beginning of the main clause of Saṁdh V.2 (see § 141.1) as referring to **ātmabhāva* in the relative clause (see § 138), since this understanding appears to be crucial for his interpretation of the paragraph in terms of the 'All-Seed Mind' being based on the *ātmabhāva* as its 'locus', still more so since his reconstruction of Tib. *lus* as **ātmabhāva* in V.3 is, in view of the PSk evidence, highly improbable (see § 124).

149. The relative clause runs as follows:

> For whatever sentient beings an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) comes about and emerges in this *saṁsāra* comprising six destinations, in whatever community of beings, be it in [the mode of] egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born or spontaneous generation,[732] there ...[733]

The basic framework of this clause would seem to be identical with YBh$_{Bh}$ 30,6(f):

> *yeṣāṁ ... sattvānāṁ yasmin sattvanikāya ātmabhāvasya prādurbhāvo bhavati, tatra ...*

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[732] My rendering of these terms is adapted from ÑĀṆAMOLI & BODHI 1995: 168f.

[733] Saṁdh V.2 (p. 55,4-8): ... *'gro ba drug gi 'khor ba 'di na sems can gang dang gang dag sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du 'ang sgo nga nas skye ba'i skye gnas sam | yang na mngal nas skye ba'am | yang na drod gsher las skye ba'am | yang na rdzus te skye ba'i skye gnas su lus mngon par 'grub cing 'byung bar 'gyur ba der ...*; in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ (HAKAMAYA 1986a: 608 [= 2008: 688] fol. 44b4), *lus* is represented by *bdagi lus*, which supports **ātmabhāva*. Chinese versions: Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 669a16-18; Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 692b8-1 = MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 324b27–c1; MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 157b15-17; MSgBh$_{Dh}$ 273c4-7 (cf. M2: 229f, texts [7]–[9], part ⓐ).

As Matsumoto (M2: 423) correctly remarks, in the YBh passage the correlative *tatra* (Tib. *der*) can be referred to *yasmin sattvanikāye* in the relative clause, the other relative pronoun, viz., *yeṣāṁ (sattvānāṁ)*, being, in the main clause, resumed by *teṣāṁ (sattvānāṁ)*. In Saṁdh V.2, however, there is only one correlative pronoun, viz., **tatra*, the existence of which Matsumoto (M2: 425,1-4) takes for granted (rightly, in my opinion) although it is confirmed only by Saṁdh$_{\mathrm{t}}$ *der*, Saṁdh$_{\mathrm{TH}}$ *de dag la* and Hsüan-tsang's 於中, whereas in the other Chinese versions (M2: 423f) it is represented by an adverb of time (Dharmagupta and perhaps Paramārtha)[734] or not at all (Bodhiruci). Since the main clause in Saṁdh V.2 is quite different from the one in the YBh and diverges from it even syntactically in that a demonstrative corresponding to *yeṣāṁ (sattvānāṁ)* is lacking in Saṁdh (as against *teṣāṁ sattvānāṁ* in the YBh), Matsumoto feels entitled to interpret the **tatra* in Saṁdh in a way that is different from its presumable function in the YBh. According to Matsumoto (M2: 425,14ff), it does not correspond to **yasmin (sattvanikāye)* in the relative clause but rather refers to **ātmabhāva*. This, however, yields an extremely odd syntactical construction: not only two relative pronouns not resumed by correlatives in the main clause, but on the contrary a correlative referring to a noun in the relative clause that is not marked by a relative pronoun. I consider such an assumption extremely improbable, at any rate as long as there are other solutions.

150. 1. Actually, I find it quite natural to understand **tatra* in the main clause as referring to **yasmin yasmin sattvanikāye* (*sems can gyi ris gang dang gang du*) in the relative clause, just as in the YBh passage, and to presume that the expression *teṣāṁ teṣāṁ sattvānām* that would correspond to the other relative phrase (*sems can gang dang gang* = **yeṣāṁ yeṣāṁ sattvānām*) was seen as dispensable and dropped because the *citta* that is stated to 'ripen' (**vipacyate*, i.e., rearise as the result of previous karma) in the new community of beings, etc., and on which the interest of the text is focused is, of course, the *citta* of the respective sentient beings. Referring **tatra* to the community of beings (*sattvanikāya*) would, in view of the generalization of the relative pronoun (*gang dang gang du*) and the additional explicit enumeration of alternative *gati*s and *yoni*s in the relative clause, also explain the use of the plural (*de dag la*) in Saṁdh$_{\mathrm{TH}}$. We would then have to translate:

> "For whatever sentient beings an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) comes about and emerges ... in whatever community of beings, in that [community of beings] ... at first [their] 'All-Seed Mind' ripens, ..."

2. But there is yet another, perhaps smoother solution, which would also explain the rendering of **tatra* by an adverb of time in Dharmagupta's translation: We may take the relative clause to have a *temporal connotation*, which would perfectly agree with a main clause introduced by **tatra* in the sense of "then":

> When for any sentient beings an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) comes about ... in whatever community of beings ..., *then* first [their] 'All-Seed Mind' ripens, (...).

This solution would, by the way, work perfectly well also in the case of the YBh passage.

151. There is thus no justification for resorting to a syntactically odd interpretation of **tatra* as proposed by Matsumoto, and at any rate **tatra* is not a reliable basis for his assumption that Saṁdh V.2 teaches that the 'All-Seed Mind' has the *ātmabhāva* as its support or 'locus'. One may even ask whether the *ātmabhāva* (in the sense of *nāmarūpa*) is already present as a 'locus' when the *citta* 'ripens' (**vipacyate*) and 'merges' (**saṁmūrcchati*).

[734] In the quotation of the passage in MSgBh$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$ 273c7 (彼時) and MSgBh$_{\mathrm{Pa}}$ 157b17f ([初受生]時, but cf. also b17 此中).

Properly speaking, the *ātmabhāva* may rather be newly constituted as such only in this phase, i.e., by the merging of the *citta* into semen-cum-blood, for it is only through this merger with *citta* that semen-cum-blood comes to be transformed into a *kalala*, i.e., into a living, sentient organism. Apart from this, I hesitate to understand the expression **ātmabhāva* in the relative clause of Saṁdh V.2 primarily in this concrete sense of an individual organism. It rather appears to me to be used here in the sense of a (new) individual existence of a specific quality and duration in the first place, and only secondarily in the sense of the concrete psycho-physical basis of such an existence.

4.2.4. Historical Background of *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* V.2

152. As pointed out in § 139, a cornerstone of Matsumoto's interpretation is his assumption that Saṁdh V.2(–3) is essentially based on, and a development of, the *Bījasūtra* of the *Saṁyuktāgama*. A connection between the two texts is indeed quite plausible, but what may require closer investigation is the question of the extent to which the Saṁdh has adopted and preserved the ideas of the *Bījasūtra* and the extent to which it has developed them or introduced later or even innovative concepts and ideas. Apart from this, some aspects of Matsumoto's interpretation of the terminology and purport of the *Bījasūtra* itself would seem to be disputable. In the present chapter, I shall discuss the conceptual patterns applied by Matsumoto to Saṁdh V.2(–3) on the basis of the latter's dependence on the *Bījasūtra* and related texts. The rather complex issue of the meaning of *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2, connected by Matsumoto with the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the *Bījasūtra*, will be dealt with in ch. 4.2.5, and the concept of the 'All-Seed Mind' in ch. 4.2.6.

153.1. As pointed out in §§ 139–141, in his interpretation of Saṁdh V.2-3 Matsumoto makes use of three canonical conceptual patterns, taken by him to support his view that the text conceives (*ālaya-*, *ādāna-*)*vijñāna* as having the *ātmabhāva* (and not just the body) as its 'locus':

1. the pattern of the four *vijñānasthiti*s,
2. the concept of *vijñāna* as 'nutriment' (*āhāra*), and
3. the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*.

For MATSUMOTO, *nāmarūpa* is basically equivalent to *ātmabhāva* and to the four *vijñāna-sthiti*s. The equation of *nāmarūpa* with the four *vijñānasthiti*s is documented in the *Vibhāṣā*[735] and presupposes an understanding of the *vijñānasthiti*s as "[the four things] where *vijñāna* settles down (or gets established)",[736] i.e., with AK(Bh), as consisting in the other four *skandha*s (insofar as they are contaminated *(sāsrava)* and belong to the same level of existence *(bhūmi)*).[737]

153.2. As has also been pointed out (§ 140), Matsumoto takes the concept of *vijñāna* as 'nourishment' to coincide with the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *vijñāna* at the moment of 'linking up' a new existence (*vijñāna* as the cause of the new *nāmarūpa* or *ātmabhāva*),

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735 Vi 124c8f (識住者即名色). Cf. M2: 291 text [81].

736 Cf. AKBh 117,24: *pratiṣṭhā hi sthitiḥ*; NA 466b15: "*sthiti* means 'where [*vijñāna*] settles'" (住謂所住。). Cf. also AKBh 118,1f: *yāṁś ca dharmān abhiruhya vijñānaṁ vāhayati naunāvikanyāyena, te dharmā vijñānasthitaya uktāḥ*. Cf. M2: 296 texts [87]–[92].

737 AK III.7bc: *catasraḥ sthitayaḥ punaḥ catvāraḥ sāsravāḥ skandhāḥ, svabhūmāv eva* (...).

whereas the pattern of the four *vijñānasthiti*s corresponds to the dependence of *vijñāna* on *nāmarūpa* (= *ātmabhāva*) in the new existence after 'linking up'. This means that the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is taken to be successive, and not simultaneous as the canonical comparison with the two reed bunches suggests. However, such an interpretation of the three patterns is not unanimously supported by the Buddhist tradition.

4.2.4.1. The Four *vijñānasthiti*s

154. To begin with the pattern of the four *vijñānasthiti*s, I am not at all sure that they are, in the canonical texts concerned or even in later sources, conceived of, in the first place, as forming merely the 'locus' of *vijñāna* in the sense of an existential basis in the new existence, i.e., after 'linking up' (*paṭisandhi*) or 'reincarnation'. In the *Bījasutta*, at any rate, the abandonment of passionate attachment (*rāga*) concerning them has the effect that

> the support is cut off, [and] a ground [for coming and going, etc] of *Viññāṇa* is no [longer] given. ... Then *Viññāṇa*, being without ground, without growth ... is released; being released it is steadfast, being steadfast it is content ... [and (one?)] knows: 'birth is destroyed ...' (transl. adapted from VETTER 2000: 198f).[738]

This clearly shows that the statement of *vijñāna*'s being grounded or established (*patiṭṭhita*) in the body (*rūpa*), etc., refers, in the first place, to a *spiritually* negative attitude in this very life,[739] one that leads, to be sure, to the *vijñāna*'s remaining *existentially* settled in them also in the next life, but also one that can be overcome in this life to the effect that one becomes an arhat, whose *vijñāna* is, in this very life, no longer 'grounded' or 'settled' in the *vijñānasthiti*s in the sense of *spiritual* entanglement and hence not subject to future rebirth.[740]

155. This seems to be supported by a parallel phraseology in SN 22.3 (*Hāliddikāni-sutta*),[741] where the four constituents (*dhātu*) *rūpaṁ*, *vedanā*, *saññā* and *saṅkhārā* are called the home or resort (*oka*) of *viññāṇa*, the latter being called "the one who keeps to this resort" (*okasārin*) in the sense that it is bound to them by *passionate attachment* (°*rāga-vinibaddha*).[742] The predominance of the spiritual perspective is still more emphatically expressed in the case of "the one who no longer keeps to this resort" (*anokasārin*), now

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[738] SN III 55,15-27 (= 53,19–54,4): *rūpadhātuyā* (/*vedanādhātuyā*, etc.) *ce ... rāgo pahīno hoti, rāgassa pahānā vocchijjat' ārammaṇaṁ patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti. tad apatiṭṭhitaṁ viññāṇaṁ avirūḷhaṁ* (cf. 53,26) ... *vimuttaṁ, vimuttattā ṭhitaṁ, ṭhitattā santusitaṁ ... 'khīṇā jāti ...' ti pajānāti*; $SĀ_C$ 9a13-25; AKṬU P thu 44a4–b4 (D nyu 11a4–b3); cf. NA 466c3-5.

[739] This is what I tried to express by rendering the term *vijñānasthiti* as "the four [entities attached] to which mind persists [in *saṁsāra*]" (S 1987: 173), rejected by Matsumoto (M2: 458 n. 150) in favour of 'locus' pure and simple. It is true that Vi_2 97c26f (M2: 292 text [84]) attributes to the master Pārśva the view that in the *Nagarasūtra* the Bodhisattva's thought turns back from the member *vijñāna* to *nāmarūpa* because *vijñāna* is settled in *nāmarūpa* as its resting-place or support (識住所依。何等是識所依。所謂 名色。). But in Vi 124c6-9 (M2: 291 text [81]), where a similar view is ascribed to (Bhadanta-)Vasumitra, it is expressly stated that this turning back of the Bodhisattva's thought is because *vijñāna delights in* abiding in the *vijñānasthiti*s (= *nāmarūpa*) and does not want to abandon them (以識樂住識住中故。謂 識不欲捨於識住。), which underlines the importance of attachment.

[740] For these two facets of *patiṭṭhita*, see LANGER 2001: 29–36.

[741] Cf. VETTER 2000: 170f; LANGER 2001: 33..

[742] SN III 9,26–10,5. The passage has no equivalent in $SĀ_C$ no. 551 (cf. VETTER 2000: 171). In Spk II 259,10, the four *dhātu*s are termed *abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇaṭṭhitiyo.*

described as a person (viz., the Tathāgata) by whom desire (*chanda*), passionate attachment (*rāga*), delight (*nandī*), craving (*taṇhā*), being involved and appropriation (*upayupādānā*, pl.), mental fixation (or: claims), clinging and (subconscious, or protracted?) adhering (*cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayā*, pl.)[743] in respect to *rūpa*, etc., have been completely abandoned.[744] In using the expression *upaya*, this sentence even touches on the phraseology of the *Bījasutta*, where the *viññāṇa* is said to persist on account of being involved (*-upaya*, Skt. *-upaga*) in *rūpa*, etc., but this expression will be discussed below in connection with the meaning of *upādāna*.[745]

156. The preceding interpretation of the pattern of the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s is also in consonance with the Theravāda commentarial tradition, for in the commentary on the *Bījasutta* (SN 22.54) the *viññāṇa* compared with a seed is specified as the *kammaviññāṇa*,[746] i.e., mind laden with karma and preparing for 'reincarnation' (*abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇa*),[747] which is distinguished from the mind that is the result of the ripening [of previous karma] (*vipākaviññāṇa*),[748] i.e., the *viññāṇa* comparable to the sprout, produced by the *kammaviññāṇa* at the moment of 'linking up' (*paṭisandhi*).[749]

157.1. The aspect of spiritually negative involvement is also conspicuous in the definition of the *Saṅgītiparyāya*, where *rūpa*, etc., are stated to be *vijñānasthiti*s if they are contaminated (**sāsrava*) and favourable to appropriation (**upādānīya*) and if they — past, future, or present — become the object of desire, passionate attachment, aversion, delusion or any other defilement (*upakleśa*) of the mind.[750] Likewise, among the explanations of the four *vijñānasthiti*s in the *Vibhāṣā*, some explicitly emphasize the aspect of spiritually negative clinging when they take the 'being settled' of *vijñāna* to mean that the *vijñāna* moistened by craving appropriates the other *skandha*s and does not let them go,[751] or that *vijñāna*, contaminated (**sāsrava*) and disposed to appropriation or clinging (**upādānīya*; cf. § 187.1), engenders attachment (執著) to them, establishes itself in them and grows.[752] And Saṅghabhadra takes the expression *vijñānasthiti* to mean that *vijñāna*, due to delight in the respective items (viz.,

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743 For this series of quasi-synonyms, see § 173.4.

744 SN III 10,8-12; paraphrase adapted from VETTER 2000: 170.

745 See § 173.2 and appendix 2 to Pt. I. Cf. also fn. 813.

746 Spk II 272,26f: *viññāṇaṁ sāhāran ti sappaccayaṁ kammaviññāṇaṁ*. The passage is also discussed by Matsumoto (M2: 343 text [163]). *Sappaccayaṁ* is explained by the *Ṭīkā* as *avijjā-ayoniso{na}-manasikārādipaccayehi sappaccayaṁ* (see § 190).

747 Cf. Nidd II (Nāl.) 176,17-19 and Pj II: 601,11 (ad Sn 1114), where the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s are stated to refer to preparing ['linking up'] (*abhisaṅkhāravasena*), in contrast to the seven *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s said to refer to 'linking up' itself (*paṭisandhivasena*).

748 Cf. *CPD* III 258 (s.v. *kamma-viññāṇa*).

749 Spk-pṭ (CSCD: *Khandhavagga-ṭīkā* # 54; My. II 223): *Tathā hi viropitaṁ taṁ kammaviññāṇaṁ paṭisandhi-aṅkuruppādanasamatthaṁ hoti. ... Viruhati vipākasantānuppādanasamattho hutvā.*

750 SaṅgP$_c$ 400c17-20 (STACHE-ROSEN 1968: 105 [IV.23]; M2: 305 text [113]): 云何色識住。答 若色有漏隨順諸取, 於彼諸色 若過去若未來若現在 或生起欲 或貪或瞋或癡 或隨一一心所隨煩惱, 是名色識住。受想行識住 廣說亦爾。This definition of the *vijñānasthiti*s is identical with that of the corresponding *upādānaskandha*s (SaṅgP$_c$ 415a4ff [V.2]).

751 Vi 706b29–c1: 有說。此中 愛所潤識 攝受不離 故名識住。

752 Vi 706c1–3: 有說。此中 諸有漏識 隨順取識 生起執著 安住增長 故名識住。

rūpa, etc.), appropriates them as that where it settles down *and* as that to which it is attached.[753] According to the 'Sthavira' (Śrīlāta) as quoted by Saṅghabhadra, the settling down of *vijñāna* involved (*-*upaga*) in *rūpa* (etc.) means that it arises in such a way that it apprehends *rūpa* (etc.) in terms of one's self (**ātman*) or one's own (**ātmīya*).[754]

157.2. In this connection, it is also worth noting that the *Vibhāṣā* mentions two opinions concerning the understanding of *rūpa*[755] as a *vijñānasthiti*. According to one opinion, *rūpa* as a *vijñānasthiti* is limited to matter reckoned among sentient beings (**sattvasaṅkhyāta*), i.e., to the body.[756] According to another opinion, however, matter not reckoned among sentient beings (**asattvasaṅkhyāta*, i.e., external material things) is also included because it may become an objective support (*ālambana*) of *vijñāna*.[757] As such, it may become the object of the *vijñāna*'s attachment, but hardly part of the basis of individual existence in the next life.

158. The *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* of the YBh points in the same direction when it remarks, with reference to the characterization of the mind as 'dwelling in a cave' (*guhāśaya*: Uv 33.55), that the mind (*citta*), being fixed on the four *vijñānasthiti*s with regard to the future, [hence] possessed of unwholesome propensities (*sānuśaya*), is bound to undergo rebirth and return from there (i.e., to move to and fro in the cycle of rebirths).[758] In these passages, it is the *vijñāna* of the *present* life that is attached to the *vijñānasthiti*s in a way that entails their reproduction in the future. Likewise, in a kind of commentary on what corresponds to the main part of the *Bījasūtra*, the VinSg explains the becoming settled or persisting (*sthiti*) of the *vijñāna* involved in *rūpa*, etc., as its taking hold of and completing a basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*) in the *future*, and as its continuing to do so again and again as long as the status of a worldly person is not abandoned.[759]

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[753] NA 465b3-5: 又此識住其義云何。謂 識於中 由憙愛力 攝為所住 及為所著, 是識住義。Cf. also NA 466b15 (see fn. 736), which continues (b16): "... or *sthiti* means 'that which [*vijñāna*] is attached to' " (住或所著), and 466b22-24. According to AKBh 117,24f (cf. also PSVyṬ D 192b2f), the *skandha*s that belong to different levels of existence are not *vijñānasthiti* because they do not meet this requirement, i.e., because it is not the case that *vijñāna* settles down in them under the influence of craving (*na visabhāgabhūmikeṣu skandheṣu vijñānaṁ tṛṣṇāvaśāt pratitiṣṭhati*).

[754] NA 466a12f: 識隨色住 謂我我所攀緣色生。

[755] The same holds good for the *saṁskāra*s as a *vijñānasthiti* (Vi 706b18f and 21f), the *saṁskāra*s not pertaining to sentient beings being probably part of the *cittaviprayukta-saṁskāra*s (e.g., the *samskṛta-lakṣaṇa*s of external dharmas).

[756] Vi 706b17f. This position is adopted by Saṅghabhadra, who explicitly narrows it down to the physical matter of one's own personal continuum (NA 465a28: 唯有情數 唯自相續 立為識住; cf. also 466b13-20: 故非情數 及他身中色等四蘊 亦非識住 ...).

[757] Vi 706b20-26. This opinion is mentioned by Saṅghabhadra as the teaching of other masters (NA 465a29–b2).

[758] YBh_{ms} 135b3 (YBh_t P dzi 299a7f; D tshi 257a2; YBh_c 386b5f): *taṭ* (= *cittam*) *punar anāgatam adhvānam upādāya catasṛṣu vijñānasthitiṣu pratiṣṭhitaṁ sānuśayaṁ bhavyaṁ bhavati*{|} *punar-janma*{*na*}*gamanapratyāgamanāya*.

[759] $VinSg_{ms}$ 19a4 (YBh_t P zi 45a7f; D zhi 43a1f; YBh_c 595a23-26; cf. also fn. 709): ... *tad-*(=*nandī-*) *-abhiṣyanditaṁ vijñānam āyatyām ātmabhāvaṁ ca parigṛhṇāti, paripūrayati, paunaḥ-punyena ca tatra parigrahaparipūriṁ nigacchati pṛthagjanabhāvam avijahan. tatra ya ātmabhāva-parigrahaḥ paripūriś ca tatra ca prabandhapravṛttiniyama iyaṁ sthitir ity ucyate*.

159.1. The direct aim of the preceding investigation into the pattern of the four *vijñāna-sthiti*s was to show that this pattern is not so much concerned with *vijñāna* being ontologically, or at least existentially, based on the other four *skandha*s in the future life as with its spiritually negative involvement with these *skandha*s in the *present* life as the *cause* of the *vijñāna*'s persistence in *saṁsāra* and their re-emergence in the next life. Otherwise, one would, at any rate, have to explain how, especially in an Abhidharmic context, mental (*caitasika*) dharmas like feeling (*vedanā*) could be the 'locus' of *vijñāna* in a literal sense, for *vijñāna* can hardly rest on them spatially, nor are they more basic in an ontological sense, for mind and mental factors depend on each other, and if any of them could be regarded as the central or basic element it is obviously the mind, not the mental factors.[760]

159.2. What may be still more important is that Matsumoto's concept of 'locus' seems to efface the distinction between different uses of the locative in Sanskrit, for as far as I can see he tends to apply this concept indiscriminately to cases of (local or ontological) support as well as to cases of mere contact or connection or causal dependence[761] and even to objects of mental attitudes or cognitions, as in the present case where the 'locus' is, in the first place, an object of mental attachment or desire, but not necessarily an ontological support. However, the relation of a cognitive act to its objective support or point of reference, even though it may be *compared* to the relation of a thing (the seed) to the substratum on which it rests (soil) (cf. § 190), is essentially a different category (the cognitive act is surely not *located* in its object!), and to equate them in a *theoretical* perspective amounts to equivocation. Likewise, determining the *vyavahāraprapañcavāsanā* of Saṁdh V.2 as the 'locus' of the 'All-Seed Mind' (M2: 264,1-4) hardly serves for clarification, for if in this case anything is the 'locus', it is clearly the mind, since the mind is imbued with[762] and hence the recipient and support of the impregnation (*vāsanā*), and surely not the other way round; the impregnation is merely the *cause* of the mind's remaining entangled in *saṁsāra*.

4.2.4.2. The Four 'Nutriments'

160. Matsumoto's assumption that the idea of *vijñāna* as a 'nutriment' (*āhāra*) is essentially aimed at its functioning as the immediate cause of rebirth in the future, or of the *nāmarūpa* of the next life, is primarily based on the *Phaggunasutta*[763] or *Phalgunāvavāda*.[764]

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[760] Actually, Saṅghabhadra (NA 465b18-20) is quite explicit in this regard when he points out that the *vijñānasthiti*s are so called because they are resorted to *and adhered* to by *vijñāna*, for among the simultaneously arising immaterial *skandha*s — feeling, etc. — there is none that could be the [ontological] support ('locus') of *vijñāna* since on the contrary they (i.e. the mental factors) are based on *vijñāna*. Thus, if *sthiti* were to mean that on which something is [ontologically] based, feeling, etc., could not be called *vijñānasthiti*s because *vijñāna* is not based on them [ontologically] (識所依著 故名識住。非於俱起受等蘊中 有識所依, 彼依識故。住若所依, 識不依彼, 如何可說彼為識住。).

[761] Cf. M2: 473 n. 219, where 'X^{acc} *pratītya*' is, in spite of the use of the accusative, interpreted in terms of X = 'locus' and as indicating a locative relation. Actually, in the passage in question (BoBh$_D$ 35,24-27: see § 178.2), X is the (misconceived) *object* of a conceptualizing cognitive act.

[762] Cf. Saṁdh VI.10 (70,34f): *tha snyad btags pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sems*.

[763] SN no. 12.12, esp. II 13,14f: *viññāṇāhāro āyatiṁ punabbhavābhinibbattiyā paccayo; tasmiṁ bhūte sati saḷāyatanaṁ ...*; cf. M2: 303 text [106].

[764] SĀ$_C$ no. 372, esp. 102a19-21; cf. M2: 303 text [107]; for a Sanskrit version of the passage, see DhSk$_D$ 33,15f (see M2: 305 text [112]): *vijñānaṁ Phalgunâhāraṁ yāvad evâyatyāṁ punarbhavābhinirvṛttaye prādurbhāvāya*.

Still, the basic canonical text for the four 'nutriments', viz., the *Āhārasutta*,[765] is ambiguous in this regard, for it merely states that there are four 'nutriments', be theyt for the maintenance of sentient beings that have already come to be [reborn] (*bhūtānaṁ vā sattānaṁ ṭhitiyā*) or for helping those about to be reborn[766] (*sambhavesinaṁ vā anuggahāya*), not necessarily implying a distribution of these two functions on the four 'nutriments'. In fact, the exegetical tradition is divided.

161.1. According to the Theravāda tradition, physical nutriment (*kabaḷiṁkāro āhāro*) and (sensory or mental) impressions[767] (*phassa*), on the one hand, serve to maintain sentient beings in the present life, the former by supporting the physical organism and the latter by generating feelings (*vedanā*). On the other hand, the 'nutriment' wishful or hopeful thinking (*manosañcetanā*, i.e. mental karma)[768] brings about the 'linking up' (*paṭisandhi*) of a new existence (*bhava*) in one of the three world-spheres, and *viññāṇa* as a 'nutriment' is the mind at the moment of 'linking up' (*paṭisandhi-viññāṇa*,[769] i.e., at the very first moment of a new life), which brings about the *nāmarūpa* at the moment of 'linking up' (*paṭisandhi-nāmarūpa*), i.e., the three other mental *khandha*s associated with it and the constituents of the (embryonic) physical organism that emerge at the same time.[770]

161.2. A similar position is advocated in the *Vibhāṣā*[771] when it is stated that the main function of physical nutriment is to nourish the primary elements of the physical sense faculties[772] (色根大種, **rūpīndriyamahābhūta*), and that of impression (*sparśa*) to nourish the mind and the mental factors (心心所,**cittacaittāḥ*), obviously in this very life, while wishful thinking is mainly responsible for nourishing rebirth (後有, **punarbhava*), and *vijñāna* for nourishing **nāmarūpa*,[773] probably of the next life. This would seem to be supported by a parallel passage in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*,[774] where, however, *vijñāna* as

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[765] SN no. 12.11 (II 11f), corresponding to SĀ$_C$ no. 371 (101c25–102a11). Sanskrit version of the passage under discussion: AKBh 153,6f.

[766] Cf. NORMAN 1992: 177 (ad Sn 147): *sambhavesin* = future participle. The Sanskrit equivalent *saṁbhavaiṣin*, however, was probably no longer understood in this way but as "seeking rebirth" (AKBh$_t$ D ku 120b3 [corresp. to AKBh 126,9][1]): *srid pa tshol ba*; Vi 677a3f: 求有; AKVy 280,12: *saṁbhavaiṣitvād = upapattyabhilāṣitvāt*). In Vi 677a5f and AK(Bh) III.40cd (153,9-14) these beings are identified with beings in the intermediate state, but in AKBh 153,18 they are alternatively taken to comprise all sentient beings that still have desire (*satṛṣṇāḥ*), as against the arhats equated with *bhūta* (cf. also Vi 677a6-8).

[1] Ed.: *saṁbhavaiṣitvātsaṁdhāvagatvā*, probably to be read as *saṁbhavaiṣitvād āśv eva gatvā*. (ms. °*śvova*, but the *ā*-sign of *o* perhaps deleted). For *myur ba kho nar* = *āśv eva* see AKBh 168,17 and 188,11.

[767] See § 61 with fn. 344.

[768] Cf. Spk II 25,31-34 (Ps I 209,26-29): karma that leads to rebirth in one of the three world spheres (*kāmabhavūpagaṁ kammaṁ*, etc.); Spk II 26,4f (Ps I 209,33f): wholesome-but-contaminated and unwholesome volitions (*sāsavakusalākusalacetanā*).

[769] Spk II 26,6f; Ps I 209,34f.

[770] Cf., e.g., Spk II 25,21–26,8; Ps I 209,16–210,2; VisM XI.2.

[771] Vi 675a12-16.

[772] Or: the physical sense faculties [and] the primary elements [of the body]? Cf. fn. 779, but also § 162.2 with fn. 782.

[773] Vi 675a16: 識食 養名色勝故 於諸名色食事偏增.

[774] AKBh 154,8-16 (ad AK III.41).

a 'nutriment' is the seed[-like] mind (*vijñānabīja*) impregnated by karma (*karmaparibhāvita*) from which the new existence that had been projected by wishful thinking (= *manas-karman*)[775] actually comes about (*abhinirvṛtti*), thus suggesting that the *vijñāna* as 'nutriment' is the mind immediately preceding 'reincarnation'.[776] This is confirmed by the *Dharma-skandha*, where the 'nutriment' *vijñāna* that entails the actual coming about of the new life is specified as the last mind-moment of the *gandharva*, i.e., of the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*).[777] These materials thus support Matsumoto's assumption that *vijñāna* functions as a 'nutriment' with respect to the coming about of the *nāmarūpa* of the next life. The same seems to hold good also for the *Saṅgītiparyāya*,[778] for in this text all four 'nutriments' are stated to foster the sense faculties and to augment (or: strengthen) the primary elements (of the body),[779] but whereas the other three nutriments are taken to support, in some way or other, the present body, the supporting function of *vijñāna* is explained by quoting the above-mentioned *Phalgunāvavāda* passage and thus referred to the next life.[780]

162.1. On the other hand, the authoritative Vaibhāṣika position is that, irrespective of predominant functions, basically all four 'nutriments' serve both purposes: keeping alive those sentient beings that have already been born as well as helping those still waiting to be reborn.[781]

162.2. What is more important is that this view is explicitly shared by the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg), and without any reference to predominant functions at that. In its analysis of the *Āhārasūtra*, the VaSg (III.5.i–ii, to be discussed in detail in ch. 4.2.5.6) first describes how the four 'nutriments' cause sentient beings that have already been born to remain alive by nurturing, respectively, four dharmas that strengthen the primary elements of the sense

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775 AKBh 153,4; cf. AKVy 319,2f: *manaḥsaṁcetanayā* (thus AKBh and AKVy$_t$ P cu 357b6 *yid la sems pas ni*; ed. °*cetanāyāḥ*) *punarbhavasyâkṣepaḥ* (= AKBh 154,13), *tasyāḥ karmasvabhāvatvāt*.

776 A similar view is mentioned at Vi 674c15-17 and 675a8f, and in these passages the attribution of a specific function to certain nutriments is not relativized by calling it their *main* function. On the other hand, the *Vibhāṣā* (Vi 674c29–675a2; 675a6-8) also mentions an opinion according to which only *manaḥsaṁcetanā* causes those who have not yet been reborn to be reborn (未生令生), or entails the actualization of future rebirth (牽當有令現在前), whereas the other three, including *vijñāna*, nourish those who have already been reborn (生已長養), or keep the present existence going (持今有令相續住). By way of contrast, there are also advocates of the position that only the physical nutriment (*kavaḍīkārāhāra*) keeps the present life going, whereas the other three have the function of entailing future rebirth (Vi 675a3f and 9-11).

777 DhSk$_D$ 33,17f (commenting on the quotation from the *Phalgunāvavāda* [see fn. 764]): *tat katarad vijñānam | āha | yat tad gandharvasya caramaṁ cittaṁ ... |*.

778 SaṅgP IV.22 (T 26.1536: 400b2–c15; STACHE-ROSEN 1968: 104f).

779 SaṅgP 400b3-6, b26-28, c5-7 and c11-13: 能令諸根長養 大種增益 ..., each followed by explanations; similarly Prak$_H$ 719a16-18, etc.: ... 諸根長養 大種增益 ... (quoted AKBh 155,1f: ... *indriyāṇām upacayo bhavati mahābhūtānāṁ ca vṛddhir* ...; cf. Prak$_G$ 651b17f, etc.), but without explanations.

780 SaṅgP 400c13-15.

781 Vi 675a4f (如是說者, 四食 盡牽當有 令現在前, 盡持今有 令相續住。) and 11f (如是說者, 四食 於有 皆未生令生 生已長養。); cf. also 674c13f; AKBh 153,19: *atha katy āhārāḥ* ⟨*bhūtānāṁ*? [cf. Tib. *byung ba rnams*]⟩ *sattvānāṁ sthitaye kati saṁbhavaiṣiṇām anugrahāya | sarve 'py ubhayathêti Vaibhāṣikāḥ |*.

faculties in this very life,[782] viz., vitality (**ojas*), ease and happiness (**sukhasaumanasya*), hope for pleasant things, and persistence of the elements of the sense faculties along with life-span (**āyus*) and body heat (*uṣman*) as the support of the preceding three items.[783] Subsequently, the text points out that spiritually immature persons (**bāla*) who still care about their body and life will, while striving after the first three kinds of 'nutriment', commit wholesome and unwholesome actions and increase their defilements (**kleśa*), with the effect that their *vijñāna* will, 'approaching' (**-upaga*, i.e., coming under the sway of)[784] these actions and defilements, help (**anu-√grah*) these persons be reborn in the future.[785]

162.3. That all the four 'nutriments' serve the purpose of keeping sentient beings alive in this very life is also confirmed by two passages in the MauBh.[786] In the *Manobhūmi*, we read that the four 'nutriments' are a support (*ādhāra*) because they are the cause of the persistence and maintenance of the body (*kāya*).[787] And according to the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (SavitBh), it is through the four 'nutriments' that sentient beings that have already been born persist as long as their life-span lasts.[788] The latter passage adds that the sentient beings of all three

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[782] This would probably mean that the sense faculties themselves automatically benefit from the strengthening of the primary elements that support them. Or should we, against Tib. *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po*, rather understand "the sense faculties *and* the primary elements [supporting them]" (cf. fn. 779)? This is, at any rate, what Tib. (D ku 140a6: *dbang po dang 'byung ba chen po rnams la*) does at AKBh 152,22 (same context: *āhāro hi nāma ya indriyamahābhūtānām anugrahāya saṁvartate*), strongly supported by the subsequent AKBh sentence that has *svam indriyaṁ tanmahābhūtāni vā nânugṛhṇāti*. Cf. also YBh_t P zi 223a5 (D zhi 212a5f; cf. YBh_c 664b2f): "The nutriments (pl., referring to *zas bzhi po* in D 212a4) make the sense faculties *and* the primary elements [supporting them] grow" (*zas rnams ni dbang po dang | 'byung ba chen po ... rnams 'phel bar byed pa ...*). Still, at ASBh 45,2 *indriyamahābhūtapoṣaṇāt* is, once again in the same context, rendered by the Tibetan translators ($ASBh_t$ P shi 41a5; D li 32b4), just as in the VaSg passage, as *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po rtas* (e.c. : *rtag* P : *brtas* D) *par byed pa'i phyir*. ($ASVy_t$ P shi 206b6f = D li 172a6: *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po gso bar byed pa'i phyir*).

[783] YBh_t P 'i 311a5–b3 (D zi 271a4–b2; YBh_c 838c6-22), concluding with the sentence: "In this way, the four nutriments are what makes sentient beings that have already been born remain [alive]" (*de ltar na sems can {'}byung ba rnams gnas par byed pa ni zas bzhi yin no* [subject and predicate noun reversed; cf. Ch.: 如是四食 能令已生有情安住]). Cf. also YBh_t P 'i 312a5 (D zi 272a2f; YBh_c 389a13): *sems can {'}byung zhing mngon par grub pa rnams gnas par 'gyur ba'i zas bzhi gang yin pa ...* .

[784] For *-upaga*, see fn. 813. Cf. also appendix 2 to Pt. I.

[785] YBh_t P 'i 311b3-7 (D zi 271b2-6; YBh_c 838c22–839a2), concluding with the sentence:

> In this way, these four nutriments procure, take possession of and promote the rebirth of those who aspire to becoming (i.e., further existence), long for rebirth, have not abandoned rebirth.
>
> *de ltar na zas bzhi po 'di dag ni 'byung ba tshol zhing yang srid par skye ba 'dod la* (P : *pa* D) *yang srid par skye ba ma spangs pa rnams kyi yang srid par skye ba sdud pa dang | yongs su 'dzin pa dang | phan 'dogs par byed pa'o ||*

Cf. also YBh_t P 'i 312a6f (D zi 272a4; YBh_c 389a17): *'byung ba tshol ba'i sems can rnams la phan 'dogs pa'i zas bzhi po gang yin pa ...*).

[786] These passages do not of course exclude that the 'nutriments' (or at least part of them) also benefit those about to be reborn, as in the *Āhārasūtra*: cf. SopBh # 3.1.3.

[787] YBh_{Bh} 46,14-16 (YBh_{ms} 14a4): *āhārādhāraḥ ... catvāra āhārāḥ* (cf. Tib.; ms. *°dhā°*)*: kavaḍaṁkāra āhāraḥ sparśa⟨ḥ⟩ manaḥsañcetanā vijñānañ ca. kāyasya sthitaye upastambhāyaîṣa yonis, tasmād ādhāra ity ucyate.*

[788] YBh_{Bh} 99,22f: *jātānāṁ bhūtānāṁ traidhātukāvacarāṇāṁ sattvānāṁ caturbhir āhārair yāvadāyuḥ sthitir bhavati yāpanā* (thus ms.) |.

world-spheres are kept alive by the 'nutriments' impression, mental volition and mind, whereas physical nutriment is required only in the case of sentient beings belonging to the world-sphere of sensual pleasures.[789]

162.4. In some later Yogācāra works too, the description of the function of the four 'nutriments', as in these MauBh passages, remains confined to the present life. In the *Mahāyānasaṁgrahabhāṣya* (on MSg I.37),[790] e.g., all the four 'nutriments' are stated to benefit, each in its own way, the 'basis of existence' (*rten*, **āśraya*): physical nutriment when it is digested, impression (*sparśa*) by the mere perception (**darśanamātra*) of sense objects, wishful or hopeful thinking (*manaḥsaṁcetanā*) through expectation, as in the case of a person tormented by thirst who did not die because he merely came to see water [from afar], and *vijñāna* because it keeps the 'basis of existence' alive, for otherwise the 'basis of existence' would decay like a corpse.[791] It is obvious that the 'basis of existence' is, in the first place, the living body, and definitely that of the present life.[792] Theoretically, existence in the sphere of incorporeality should be included, but the focus is clearly on life in this world.[793]

4.2.4.3. The Mutual Dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*

163. As for the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, Matsumoto takes it to refer to different temporal phases: on the one hand, *nāmarūpa* depends on *vijñāna* in the sense that it is produced by the latter at the moment of 'linking up', whereas *vijñāna* depends on *nāma-*

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789 YBh_{Bh} 99,23–100,2: *tatra tribhir āhāraiḥ sparśena manaḥsañcetanayā vijñānena* (thus ms.) *sarveṣāṁ traidhātukāvacarāṇāṁ sattvānāṁ sthitir bhavati yāpanā* (ms.) | *kavaḍīkāreṇa punaḥ kāmāvacarāṇām eva sattvānāṁ sthitir bhavati yāpanā* (ms.) |.

790 $MSgBh_t$ P li 160a7–b4 (D ri 135b7–136a3; $MSgBh_{Hs}$ 332b10-16; $MSgBh_{Dh}$ 280a9-15; $MSgBh_{Pa}$ 170c14-23). Similarly ASBh 45,1-6.

791 $MSgBh_t$ P li 160b2f (D ri 136a2):

> *Vijñāna* as a 'nutriment' has [the function] of appropriation (**aupādānika*?; cf. the Chin. versions and ASBh 45,4), because the basis-of-existence persists [only] by virtue of having been appropriated by it; otherwise, it would decay like a corpse.
>
> *rnam par shes pa'i zas ni nye bar len pa dang ldan pa* (*pa* D : *pa na* P) *ste* | *gang gis de⟨s?⟩ blangs pa nyid kyis rten gnas pa ste* | *de las gzhan du na shi ba'i ro bzhin du rul bar 'gyur ro* ||

$MSgBh_{Hs}$ 332b14f: 識食者, 是能執受。由執受故 所依久住。若不爾者, 應同死屍 不久爛壞。

$MSgBh_{Dh}$ 280a13f: 識者 攝持為相。由此攝持故身得住。若無此識, 即同死屍臭爛。

$MSgBh_{Pa}$ 170c19-21: 識食者 執持為相。由此識執持身故住不壞。若無識持, 則同死人 身即爛壞。

792 This is indeed confirmed by the fact that the *mūla* text (MSg I.37) refers explicitly to the sentient beings that have already been (re)born: *sems can 'byung po rnams kyi* = *bhūtānāṁ sattvānām*, cf. MSg_{Hs} 136a19 已生有情, MSg_{Dh} 280a7 所有眾生, MSg_{Bu} 99c2 諸大眾生 (*bhūtānām* rendered as if representing *mahābhūtānām*?). Only Paramārtha (MSg_{Pa} 116b24f: 求生已生眾生) supplies an equivalent for *sambhavaiṣiṇām* and quotes, in his translation of the *Bhāṣya* ($MSgBh_{Pa}$ 170c12-14), the respective *sūtra* passage, but apart from this Paramārtha's rendering of the commentary is basically in agreement with $MSgBh_t$.

793 As pointed out in the final sentence of the *Bhāṣya* on MSg I.37, MSg is, up to this point, concerned with rebirth (**pratisandhibandha*) on an unequipoised (**asamāhita*) level of existence ($MSgBh_t$ P li 160b6; *de ltar mnyam par ma bzhag pa'i nying mtshams sbyor ba'i 'brel pa bstan to*; $MSgBh_{Hs}$ 332b25: 如是已說非等引地結生相續).

rūpa as its support or 'locus' in the period after 'linking up'.[794] In order to substantiate his understanding, he quotes passages from the *Vibhāṣā* and from the YBh. Indeed, when discussing the issue of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, the *Vibhāṣā* lists a number of opinions, some of which unambiguously support Matsumoto's view. To quote just one of them:

> The statement that dependent on *vijñāna* [there is] *nāmarūpa* means that at the moment of linking up *vijñāna* generates *nāmarūpa*. The statement that dependent on *nāmarūpa* [there is] *vijñāna* means that after 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*), *vijñāna* continues on the basis of *nāmarūpa*.[795]

The most explicit passage from the YBh (SavitBh) runs as follows:

> Why are *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* established to be mutually dependent? Because in the present life *vijñāna* is dependent on *nāmarūpa*, whereas [in order to come about] in the next life[796] *nāmarūpa* is dependent on *vijñāna*.[797]

164. Even so, the matter would seem to be slightly more complex. To begin with, as Matsumoto himself (M2: 284,14-18) is fully aware, this explanation does not perfectly fit in with the comparison adduced, not only in the *Vibhāṣā*[798] but already in the canon,[799] in connection with the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, viz., the two reed bunches (*naḍakalāpikā*) propping each other up, which strongly suggests simultaneity of mutual dependence. Even the comparisons additionally introduced in the *Vibhāṣā*, viz., the mutual dependence of ship and helmsman or of a riding animal (elephant, horse) and the rider,[800]

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794 This holds good, of course, regardless of whether 'linking up' and 'the period after linking up' is understood as referring to the present life or to the future life, and the sequence may also be reversed, as in the second example (see fn. 797): present life (until death) vs. 'linking up' future life.

795 Vi 120a21-23 (M2: 285 text [78]ⓕ): 復次 識緣名色 說 續生時 識能生名色。名色緣識 說 續生後 識依名色住. Cf. Vi₂ 94c16-19.

796 Matsumoto (M2: 288,2 and 10) renders *samparāye* as "at the time of dying" (死に際して; cf. *MW* 1172b, noting "decease, death" as one meaning), but in Buddhist texts the connotation is no doubt "future state, a life after death" (*BHSD* 575b s.v. *saṁparāya*, *saṁparāyika*; cf. also *PTSD* 691b), as is also confirmed by Chin. (於後法中) and Tib (*tshe phyi ma la*) as pointed out by Matsumoto himself (M2: 288,9f).

797 YBh$_{Bh}$ 230,4-6 (M2: 287, text [79]): *kena kāraṇena nāmarūpavijñānayor anyonyapratyayatvaṁ vyavasthāpyate | vijñānasya dṛṣṭe dharme nāmarūpapratyayatvāt, nāmarūpasya punaḥ samparāye vijñānapratyayatvāt |*. That *nāmarūpapratyaya*° and *vijñānapratyaya*° are to be taken as bahuvrīhis is confirmed by YBh$_c$ 328a6f (識 於現法中 用名色為緣故, etc.), and, indirectly, also by YBh$_t$ (P dzi 135b5f; D tshi 119a1f) because the latter, though rendering the phrases as if there were tatpuruṣa compounds, has transformed them in such a way that the relation between the concepts involved remains unchanged: "because *nāmarūpa* is the condition of *vijñāna* in the present life, and *vijñāna* the condition of *nāmarūpa* in the future life" (*ming dang gzugs ni tshe 'di la rnam par shes pa'i rkyen du 'gyur la rnam par shes pa ni tshe phyi ma la ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen du gyur pa'i phyir te*).

798 Vi 120a16f (M2: 285 text 78ⓒ): 復次 識與名色 更互為緣 如二束蘆(v.l. 蘆束) 相依而住; Vi₂ 94c19f (M2: 284 text [77]ⓑ).

799 SN II 114,17-19 (12.67: *Nalakalāpiyaṁ*; M2: 283 text [76]); SĀ$_c$ 81b5-8 (no. 288: *three* reed bunches; M2: 282 text [75]ⓒ); NidSa 6.13 (with HONJŌ 1982: 401); AKṬU P thu 114b2-4 (D nyu 70a5f; HONJŌ 1982: 404 # 13); cf. also YVy P yi 100a2-4 (D 'i 82b3f) and (slightly different) AKVy 668,2-4 (HONJŌ 1982: 401).

800 Vi 120a17f (M2: 285 text [78]ⓒ, continued from fn. 798): 如象馬船 與乘御者 展轉相依 得有所至; Vi₂ 94c20f (M2: 284 text [77]ⓑ).

presuppose simultaneity of mutual dependence, for the helmsman or the rider would not reach the goal without the ship or the riding animal as their support, nor would the ship or the animal do so without being guided by the helmsman or rider. Such a simultaneous mutual dependence may not be entirely incompatible with the mutual dependence distributed to different temporal phases as described before (§ 166.1),[801] but for this purpose a kind of supplementation of the latter would be required — an aspect that Matsumoto has, in my opinion, not sufficiently taken into account.

165. In this connection, it may be appropriate to have a look at the *Mahānidānasutta* (DN no. 15), one of the canonical sources teaching the mutual dependence of *viññāṇa* and *nāma-rūpa*. To be sure, in this text the specification of the dependence of *viññāṇa* on *nāmarūpa*, viz., that if *viññāṇa* had not become settled in *nāmarūpa*, there would be no possibility of birth, aging and dying in the future,[802] is somewhat cryptic. This statement may refer to *viññāṇa*'s *existential* settling down in a new organism[803] as the presupposition of a new period of individual life which will include birth, aging, suffering and death, provided that *āyatiṁ* refers to what awaits the reincarnated being in this very life. If, however, *āyatiṁ* refers, as is usual in connection with birth, aging and dying, to a future life, the settling down of the *viññāṇa* in *nāmarūpa* should rather be understood as including its getting involved in, or *attached to*, its individual organism or personality, for only *attachment* to *nāmarūpa*[804] (and not mere existential settling down) would entail rebirth in the future, and only attachment to the *nāmarūpa* of the preceding life can have entailed the (then future) present life. For my present purpose, however, the important point is that in demonstrating the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *viññāṇa* the *sūtra* is not content with referring to the moment of reincarnation but stresses that *nāmarūpa* remains essentially dependent on the presence of *viññāṇa* even afterwards, at least during the embryonic and foetal period and during early childhood: If the

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801 Cf. M2: 284,18–285,3.

802 DN II 63,20-23: *viññāṇaṁ ca hi*[1] ... *nāmarūpe patiṭṭhaṁ n'alabhissatha, api nu kho āyatiṁ jātijarāmaraṇadukkhasamudayasambhavo paññāyethā ̄ ti? no h'etaṁ* ...; cf. $M\bar{A}_C$ 579c26-28; $D\bar{A}_C$ 61b15-17; T 1.14: 243b27-29 (An Shih-kao); cf. also the quotation in $DhSk_D$ 36,20-23 *vijñānaṁ ced* ... *nāmarūpe* (e.c.; ed. °*pa-*) *pratiṣṭhāṁ na labheta tathâpratiṣṭhite vijñāne anabhirūḍhe* (ed. *anati°*) ⟨*api nv āyatyāṁ*⟩ ... *jātijarāmaraṇam abhinirvva[rtteta]*.

1 So with B[e] (PTS: *va hi*); cf. DN I 186,15 and Sv II 376,22. I take *ca hi* to be equivalent to *ced* (*ca* + *id*), as found in the DhSk version.

803 For an exhaustive discussion of the meaning of *nāmarūpa* in the Pāli canon and its interpretation by other scholars see OLALDE RICO 2011: 40–97.

804 Corresponding, from a systematical point of view, to the spiritually negative involvement of the *viññāṇa* in the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s (see ch. 4.2.4.1), as is indeed suggested (in the context of an exegesis of the *Mahānidānasūtra*!) at Vi 119c27:

> As for the statement 'dependent on *nāmarūpa* there is *vijñāna*', [its] difference [from the other statements consists in that it] refers to the *vijñānasthiti*s (名色緣識 說識住差別; cf. Vi_2 94c3).

Cf. also Vi 124c6-9 (M2: 291 text [81]; see also fn. 739), where the aspect of spiritually negative involvement as well as the equation of *nāmarūpa* with the four *vijñānasthiti*s is made explicit, albeit in the context of an exegesis not of the *Mahānidāna*- but of the *Nagarasūtra*:

> Why does the [Bodhisattva's] mind, after reaching *vijñāna*, turn back? Because the *vijñāna* takes *pleasure* in settling down in the *vijñānasthiti*s. The *vijñānasthiti*s: this means *nāmarūpa*. Therefore, after having contemplated *vijñāna*, [the Bodhisattva's mind] returns to the contemplation of *nāmarūpa*. 何故齊識心便轉還。以識樂住識住中故。謂 識不欲捨於識住。識住者即名色。故觀識已還觀名色。

viññāṇa were to depart during the phase of pregnancy, the foetus would not emerge [from the womb] into this world but would perish, and if *viññāṇa* were cut off during early childhood the baby would not thrive but would die.[805] As will be pointed out,[806] in Yogācāra sources this function of *vijñāna* of keeping the body alive is denoted by (derivates of) *upā-√dā* ("to appropriate") and expressly taken to hold good throughout life.

166.0. This development is also indicated in the explanations of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* found in the YBh.

166.1. Let me start with the exegesis of the *Mahānidānasūtra* in the VaSg (III.1.ix). Here, *nāmarūpa* is identified with the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*, not mentioned in the *sūtra* itself), divided into two parts. One part, called *nāman*, is the immaterial *mana-āyatana*, along with the other immaterial factors associated with it. The other part, *rūpa*, are the five material *āyatana*s, i.e., the physical sense faculties (most probably in the wider sense, comprising the whole sentient body).[807] Both *nāman* and *rūpa* are, in the present life, conditioned by *vijñāna* because they are entailed[808] (*'phangs pa*, **ākṣipta*) and taken hold of, or appropriated (*zin pa*), by it, and as long as they are not separated from it (i.e., from *vijñāna*) they do not perish.[809] On the other hand, *vijñāna* is dependent on *nāmarūpa* in that from 'linking up' onwards (**pratisandhim upādāya*) it continues on the basis of *nāmarūpa*, occurring simultaneously

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805 DN II 63,7-15; MĀ$_C$ 579c18-21; T 1.14: 243b18-23; AKVy 669,3-6: *vijñānam ced Ānandâvakramya kṣipram evâpakrāmed, api nu* (ed.: *tu*) *tan nāmarūpam itthatvāya prajñāyeta? no, bhadanta. vijñānaṁ ced Ānanda daharasya kumārasya kumārikāyā vā ucchidyeta vinaśyen na bhaved, api nu* (ed.: *tu*) *tan nāmarūpaṁ vṛddhiṁ vipulatām āpadyeta? no, bhadanta*; NA 485b28-c1 and c5-7; partly different: DĀ$_C$ 61b10-12; ŚA 609a7-9; DhSk$_D$ 35,1-6; AKṬU P tu 157a2f.

806 See chapters 4.2.5.5.3–4 and 4.2.5.6.

807 YBh$_t$ P 'i 295a3f (D zi 255b7f; YBh$_C$ 831c5-8): *ming dang gzugs de 'ang skye mched drug po nyid de | cha gnyis su byas nas reg pa'i rkyen du 'gyur te | yid kyi skye mched gzugs med pa de las gzhan pa'i gzugs med pa'i chos rnams dang mtshungs par ldan pa cha gcig tu byas pa ni ming yin no || de ma yin pa'i gzugs can gyi skye mched rnams cha gcig tu byas pa ni gzugs yin no ||*

808 For this rendering, cf. BAYER 2010: 356f n. 172.

809 YBh$_t$ P 'i 295a4f (D zi 256a1f): *ming dang gzugs de 'ang tshe 'di la nying mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par shes pas 'phangs pa dang zin pa'i rkyen las byung ba ste | de dang ma bral na med par mi 'gyur ba'o ||*. The Chinese version (YBh$_C$ 831c8-10: 又此名色 於現法中 由續生識為縁牽引 及能執持 令不散壞。) is less clear. But in Hsüan-tsang's translation of the YBh, in the pattern "由 A 為縁 (能)生 (起/生起/發生/發起, etc.)B", the (at least formally) transitive verb mostly corresponds to an intransitive one in Tib. (*skye (bar 'gyur)*, *'byung (bar 'gyur)*); cf., e.g.,

[1.] YBh$_C$ 405b19 由 A (過去行)為縁生 B (意), represented in YBh$_t$ D dzi 23b1 (P wi 27b6) as "B (*yid*) *ni* A (*'das pa'i 'du byed*) *la*[1] *brten te skye* ...", confirmed by ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 56,18f (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ I 90,15) "A (*atītān saṁskārān*) *pratītyôtpadyate* B (*manaḥ*)"; [1] *la* D : *las* P

[2.] YBh$_C$ 660a1 由此為縁發起 B vs. YBh$_t$ P zi 210b1 *de'i rkyen gyis* ... B *'byung bar 'gyur (zhing)*;

[3.] YBh$_C$ 800b16 由此為縁能招 B vs. YBh$_t$ P 'i 217a8 *rkyen de las* B *'byung ba*;

[4.] YBh$_C$ 849b25 由是為縁能生 B vs. YBh$_t$ P 'i 336b7f *de nyid la brten nas* B *skye ba'o*;

[5.] YBh$_C$ 852a15 = 18f 由彼為縁能生 B (but 24f 由是為縁 ... B 生起) vs. YBh$_t$ P 'i 343b4-6 *(de)'i rkyen gyis* B *skye bar 'gyur ro* (in all the three cases).

Therefore, a literal translation of the Chinese version of the passage under discussion may perhaps run as follows:

And [as for] this *nāmarūpa*, in the present life, because the *pratisandhivijñāna* acts as its condition, [it (sc. *vijñāna*)] entails [it, sc. *nāmarūpa*] and appropriates-and-supports [it], so that it (sc. *nāmarūpa*) does not perish.

and subsequently, [respectively].[810] This clearly means that *rūpa* (i.e., the sense faculties) acts as the simultaneous support (*sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*) of *vijñāna*, and *nāman* (the *mana-āyatana*, i.e., the immediately preceding *vijñāna*) as its *samanantarapratyaya*. Thus, *nāmarūpa* — as far as it is entailed by previous karma (**pūrvakarmākṣipta*) — and *vijñāna* are dependent on each other and are each other's condition.[811] This explanation of the mutual dependence of *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* is basically in agreement with the explanation that assigns this mutual dependence to different phases, with the important addition that *nāmarūpa* remains dependent on *vijñāna* also in the period after 'linking up', though in a different way: not in the sense of being generated anew by *vijñāna* but in the sense of *being kept alive*.

166.2.1. One of the passages adduced by Matsumoto (M2: 279) in favour of the assignment of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* to different temporal phases is found in the SavitBh of the MauBh as well as in the VaSg (III.1.i, first part).[812] In this passage, the *vijñāna* of the previous life is, under the sway of karma (*karmopaga*),[813] the cause (*hetu*) or

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[810] YBh_t P 'i 295a5f (D zi 256a2f; YBh_c 831c10-12): *rnam par shes pa de yang nying mtshams sbyor ba blangs nas ming dang gzugs kho na la gnas te lhan cig 'byung ba dang de ma thag tu skye ba'i tshul gyis 'jug go || de bas na de yang tshe 'di la ming dang gzugs kyi rkyen las byung ba yin te |*

[811] YBh_t P 'i 295a6f (D zi 256a3; YBh_c 831c12f): *sngon gyi las kyis 'phangs pa'i ming dang gzugs dang rnam par shes pa ni gcig la gcig brten pa dang | gcig gi rkyen gcig yin par rig par bya'o ||*

[812] SavitBh: YBh_{Bh} 198,20–199,16 (YBh_t P dzi 115b4–116a7; D tshi 101a4–b5; YBh_c 321a19–b11; cf. also the revised edition of the Sanskrit text [though without consulting the ms.] in HARADA 2004); VaSg III.1.i (YBh_t P 'i 285a4–b6; D zi 246b1–247a3; YBh_c 827c5-26); cf. M2: 278f texts [67]–[71]. — At the beginning of his discussion of this passage, Matsumoto (M2: 277f) asserts that in the introductory phrase of the SavitBh, viz.,

tatra janmanaḥ pravṛttiḥ katamā | yathātmabhāvānāṁ pratītyasamutpādo bhavati, saiṣā[1] *pravṛttiḥ* |(YBh_{Bh} 198,10f),

[1] Sic ms., Ch. (此即) : *saiṣāṁ* ed., Tib. (*de ni de dag gi*)

ātmabhāva functions as the subject of *saṁsāra* (輪廻の主体), but this is misleading, disregarding as it does the plural. Actually, the passage merely says that the going on of (re)birth consists in the dependent origination of *ātmabhāva*s, i.e., of [ever new] individual existences. There is no mention of a subject of *saṁsāra* in the form of an *ātmabhāva* passing through a series of lives. The 'subject of *saṁsāra*' in our text is rather, as Matsumoto himself (M2: 280,12f) has to admit, the (conventional) person (YBh_{Bh} 199,3: *sa*; cf. 200,7: *sa pudgalo*) who dies and brings about a [new] individual existence (*ātmabhāvam abhinirvartayati*), or, on a doctrinally correct level (cf. M2: 280,13ff), the *vijñāna*. Indeed, it is, strictly speaking, the *vijñāna* of the previous existence that, laden with karmic impulses, functions as the cause (*hetu*) of the new individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) beginning with the new *vijñāna* at the moment of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi(phala)vijñāna*), from which *nāmarūpa* develops — by way of the sequence of embryonic states (*kalala*, etc.), and so on, up to its becoming decrepit (*yāvaj jīrṇatvāya*) —, forming the basis of the life-long continuance of *vijñāna* and at the same time being kept alive by the latter (YBh_{Bh} 198,22–199,13; see § 166.2.2-3).

[813] [1.] I have chosen this rendering of *-upaga* (cf. already S 1987: 112,14f and *ZDMG* 137/1987: 153) in order to express the *involuntariness* of the *vijñāna*'s 'approaching' or 'following' previous karma. The meaning 'following', preferred by Matsumoto (M2: 462,6f; cf. also HARADA 2004: 146,6), is supported by Hsüan-tsang's rendering (隨業: YBh_c 321a22; see also 321b27 = YBh_{Bh} 200,13; 288a13 = 44,1) and by the Tibetan rendering of the corresponding expression in VaSg III.1.i (YBh_t P 'i 285a5 = D zi 246b3: *las de'i rjes su 'gro zhing*, which may even represent **tatkarmānugaṁ*). This interpretation presupposes an *active* meaning of *upaga*, which is expressly confirmed by PSVyṬ P 231a4f (see fn. 1056). Cf. also PG vs. 22f, where *cittam upagam* (vs. 23d) seems to have almost the same meaning as *cittam anuvartakam* (vs. 22d), and the fact that in the commentary (WAYMAN 1961: 176,13f) *upaga* (and hence probably also *upagata*: 176,24) is understood in an active sense: *vijñānaṁ puṇyādi-*

condition (*pratyaya*) of the new life starting with the *vijñāna* at the moment of 'linking up' as its effect (*pratisandhi(phala)vijñāna*) and continuing through the successive phases of *nāmarūpa* in the womb (from *kalala* onwards) and beyond up to old age.[814] As soon as 'linking up' has taken place, the karma leading to 'rebirth' (*upapatti*) has borne fruit, and the new *vijñāna*, which is the fruit of the maturation (*vipāka*) of this karma, continues in such a way that it rests (*pratiṣṭhāya vartate*) on precisely this *nāmarūpa*.[815] The text adds that this amounts to its resting on the six bases (*ṣaṭsv āśrayeṣu*, i.e., on the six sense faculties), and this is why *vijñāna* is stated to be conditioned by *nāmarūpa*.[816] This statement is furthermore specified to mean that the six kinds of *vijñāna* proceed, as long as life lasts, on the basis of the simultaneous matter (*rūpa*) of the respective sense faculty and/or on the basis of the immediately preceding *nāman*, according to what is required [in each case][817].[818] The latter basis is, of course, what is usually called the *samanantarapratyaya* or *samanantara āśrayaḥ*, i.e., in the case of the six *vijñāna*s, the immediately preceding *vijñāna* (= *manas*).[819]

166.2.2. However, the text does not stop here but adds one more piece of information:

> "[As for the basis] of the five physical sense faculties: the primary elements of the physical sense faculties [themselves] and the matter engendered by the primary elements that [constitutes] the seat (*adhiṣṭhāna*) of the sense faculties, along with the *nāman* that

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saṁskār<u>opagam</u> ucyate saṁvṛtyā, paramārthatas tu n<u>ôpagacchati</u>. It may be worth noting that in his rendering of PG 22-23 Hsüan-tsang (YBh_c 363c2 and 4) uses 隨轉 (= *anu-vartaka*) for *upaga* as well.

[2.] As against this, the Tibetan rendering as "connected with" (YBh_t P dzi 115b6: *las de dang 'brel cing*) seems to take *upaga* as in a *passive* sense (< "approached by" or even "come upon by"); cf. also Spk II 78,3f (ad SN II 82,10): *puññūpagaṁ = puññena upagataṁ sampayuttaṁ*.

[3.] Yet another possibility would be to understand *tatkarmopaga* as "approaching (or: heading for) [rebirth in accordance with] that [beneficial or detrimental] karma", as in the expression *yathākarmopaga* according to the reasonable suggestion in *SWTF* IV 7b: "je nach den Taten (einer neuen Existenz) entgegengehend" (cf. also *PTSD* 549a). A similar analysis is indicated by the Tibetan rendering of the expression **puṇyopagaṁ vijñānam* (cf. AKBh 137,6f) in a sūtra passage quoted in PSVyṬ P 231a5f (D 192a1) as *bsod nams <u>kyis</u> rnam par shes pa nye bar 'gro ba yin no*. As against this, at PSVy P 53a1 (D 46a5) the same expression is translated as *rnam par shes pa bsod nams <u>su</u> nye bar 'gro ba yin no*, which means that here **puṇyopaga* is understood as an accusative-tatpuruṣa: "heading for a beneficial (/agreeable) [rebirth]". Both possibilities seem to be combined in AKṬT P tho 54a2f, where *puṇyopaga*, said of *vijñāna*, is explained as follows: "[It] is *upaga* in the sense of heading for [re]birth. Due to beneficial [karma] it is heading for a beneficial (/agreeable) [rebirth]" (*skye bar nye bar 'gro bas na nye bar 'gro ba'o || bsod nams kyis ni bsod nams su nye bar 'gro ba'o ||*). Cf. also AKVy 293,12, explaining *upaga* in the phrase *puṇyopagaṁ vijñānam* as *tāṁ tāṁ upapattiṁ gacchatîty upagaṁ*.

[4.] Finally, in expressions like *kāmabhavūpagaṁ kammaṁ* (see fn. 768), *-upaga* obviously means something like "leading to" (cf. *CPD* III 389b), "conducive to".

[814] YBh_{Bh} 198,20–199,5. Read with ms. *tatkarmo<u>pagaṁ</u>* in 198,22 and *hetuvijñāna<u>pratyayaṁ</u>* in 199,4. Thus also HARADA 2004: 144,15 and 19f.

[815] YBh_{Bh} 199,5-7. Read with ms. *<u>saha-</u>pratisandhi°* in 199,5f (cf. *BHSD* 587a; HARADA 2004: 145,1 reads *saha prati°*), *upapatti°* for *utpatti°* in 199,6, and *tac ca vipākavijñānaṁ* (VaSg *rnam par smin pa las byung ba'i rnam par shes pa* presupposes **vipāka<u>jaṁ</u> vi°*!) in 199,7.

[816] YBh_{Bh} 199,7f.

[817] I.e., in the case of the sense perceptions, both kinds of basis are required, whereas the *manovijñāna* is only based on the immediately preceding *nāman*.

[818] YBh_{Bh} 199,8-10. In 199,9, read *samanantara<u>ni</u>ruddhaṁ* with ms. (= HARADA 2004: 145,5)

[819] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 4,6f + 10f. Cf. YBh_t P zi 18b1-3 (D zhi 16a2f; YBh_c 584b29–c2).

> arises continually in the [respective] personal continuum [and] by which the [physical] sense faculties are appropriated (*upādatta*): these two, in sum, function as the basis for the continuity [of the five physical sense faculties]."[820]

It is only after this additional information that the text resumes the issue of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*:

> In this way, you see (*hi*), *nāmarūpa* dependent on *vijñāna* and *vijñāna* dependent on *nāmarūpa* proceed in the present existence [supporting each other] like two reed-bunches as long as life lasts.[821]

166.2.3. If I am not mistaken, this resumé clearly expresses mutual dependence in terms of *mutual* support in *this* life, and from this perspective the sentence preceding the resumé would seem to be crucial because it is only from it that a continuous dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *vijñāna* in this life can be derived, viz., in the form of 'appropriation', as in the *Mahānidāna-sūtra* exegesis of VaSg III.1.ix (see § 166.1). To be sure, the terminology is somewhat confusing, because what is actually taught is a dependence of *rūpa* on *nāman*, not of *nāma-rūpa* on *vijñāna*. But when the members of origination in dependence are explained a few pages later in the SavitBh,[822] *vijñāna* forms part of *nāman*, as was also, implicitly, the case in the VaSg exegesis of the *Mahānidānasūtra*, where *nāman* was stated to consist, in the first place, of the *mana-āyatana*, i.e., *vijñāna*, primarily (but not exclusively) in its function as *samanantarapratyaya*. Likewise, in the present text, too, *nāman* had been identified with the preceding moment of *vijñāna* functioning as *samanantarapratyaya*. As long as the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) are, as in the present text portion, left out of consideration or are tacitly taken to side with *vijñāna*, the relation between *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* can, in the *nāmarūpa* phase and thereafter, come to be replaced by the relation between *nāman* and *rūpa*, *nāman* representing, in the first place, *vijñāna*, and *rūpa* living corporeal matter. Such a perspective may also be understood as an echo of the terminology of the *Mahānidānasūtra* (see § 165), where *nāmarūpa* would seem to mean the (living, potentially sentient) individual organism[823] (distinguished as such, at least in the case of human beings, by a specific *name*).

166.3. Finally, even the passage from the SavitBh quoted in § 163 continues in a way that may be taken to contain a hint of the dependence of *nāmarūpa* on *vijñāna* even after the moment of linking up, for in the subsequent explanation we read:

> For in the mother's womb, at the time of 'linking up', [*nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna*] are dependent on each other: In dependence on *vijñāna*, in the mother's womb the matter consisting of semen and blood, taken hold of by *nāman*, consolidates (or: merges [with

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[820] YBh$_{Bh}$ 199,10-13 (VaSg: YBh$_t$ P 'i 285b3f; D zi 246b7–247a1; YBh$_c$ 827c20-22): *pañcānāṁ rūpi-ṇāṁ indriyāṇām indriyamahābhūtāni indriyādhiṣṭhānaṁ ca mahābhūtajanitaṁ rūpaṁ yac ca nāma yenôpādattānîndriyāṇi saṁtānapatitaṁ pravāheṇa pravartate, tadubhayam abhisamasyâśrayo bhavaty anupravṛttaye.*

[821] YBh$_{Bh}$ 199,13-15: *evaṁ hi vijñānapratyayaṁ nāmarūpaṁ nāmarūpapratyayaṁ ca vijñānaṁ varta-māne 'dhvani naḍakalāpikāyoge⟨na⟩ vartate*[1] *yāvadāyuḥ.*

[1] The ms. reads *naḍakalāpikāyoge varttate*; HARADA 2004: 145,12f: *naḍakalāpikayogena ....*

[822] YBh$_{Bh}$ 207,1-4. That this passage is intended as a definition of the element *nāman* in *nāmarūpa* is evident from the context.

[823] S 2000c: 56,24-28; LANGER 2001: 21f; OLALDE RICO 2011: 56–59; 76; cf. JUREWICZ 2000: 90f (*nāmarūpa* denoting "an organism in which *vijñāna* settles"). Cf. also S 1987: 175,6-11.

it]) so as to become a *kalala* (i.e., living embryo), and in dependence on [this] *nāmarūpa*, the *vijñāna*, in its turn, establishes itself there.[824]

In this passage, the successivity of the two sides of the mutual dependence of *nāmarūpa* and *vijñāna* appears minimal and more of a logical than of a temporal nature: By being taken hold of or appropriated by *nāman*, i.e., in the first place, the (immediately preceding moment of?) *vijñāna*, semen-cum-blood becomes a rudimentary living body and individual (*kalala* = *nāmarūpa*), and for this reason *vijñāna* can establish itself in it. But the fact that *vijñāna* does not create the embryo out of nothing but merely transforms semen-cum-blood into a living organism by taking hold of it would seem to imply (against the background of the *Mahānidāna-sutra*) that it must continue appropriating this living organism in order to keep it alive and capable of acting as a support for further cognitive, especially sensory cognitive processes.

4.2.4.4. The Three Patterns in Relation to *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* V.2

167.0. Since the three conceptual patterns discussed in the preceding sub-chapters had been integral elements of the Buddhist tradition from the canonical period up to early Yogācāra, the author(s) of Saṁdh V must have been familiar with all of them. But the question remains whether, and if so, to what extent and in which way they were demonstrably made use of or are at least presupposed in Saṁdh V.2(–3). In this connection, it is remarkable that most of the key terms associated with these patterns are lacking in Saṁdh V.

167.1. What is most remarkable is not so much the absence of the labels *vijñānasthiti* and *āhāra* as the absence of most of the items subsumed under these labels. In the case of the 'nutriments', this would not be surprising if, as Matsumoto assumes, only the idea of *vijñāna* as 'nutriment' is involved. But the fact that at best one of the *vijñānasthiti*s, viz., *rūpa*, may be taken to be indicated (viz., by the reference to the physical sense faculties along with their seats), whereas the immaterial *skandha*s (*vedanā*, *saṁjñā*, *saṁskāra*s) are not mentioned anywhere,[825] appears more significant.

167.2. Nor does the expression *nāmarūpa* occur. It would be natural to identify the physical sense faculties along with their seats with *rūpa*. But Matsumoto's (M2: 269) attempt to equate the element *nāman* contained in the compound **nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* with the element *nāman* in *nāmarūpa* appears highly problematic; for whereas in the compound *nāmarūpa* the element *nāman*, whatever its original meaning, is, in the exegetical tradition, normally understood to comprise the immaterial constituents of an

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[824] YBh$_{Bh}$ 230,6-9 (M2: 287 text [79]; cf. S 1987 n. 241 and n. 1121): *tathāhi mātuḥ* (ms.) *kukṣau pratisandhikāle anyonyapratyayatvāt — vijñānapratyayaṁ* (ms.[?]; ed. °*yair*) *mātuḥ kukṣau śukra-śoṇitarūpaṁ nāmaparigṛhītaṁ kalalatvāya sammūrcchate, tannāmarūpapratyayañ* (ms.) *ca punas tad vijñānaṁ tatra pratiṣṭhāṁ labhate.*

[825] One could perhaps argue that the three other immaterial *skandha*s are implied in the sūtra's reference to the growth and expansion of the 'All-Seed Mind' (= *vijñāna*) in the new life, because according to the *Bījasūtra*[1] *viññāṇa* does not grow, increase and expand without the other four *khandha*s, but this goes without saying, since the 'All-Seed Mind' will, in the new life, naturally generate actual cognitive processes, accompanied by *caitta*s. Yet this of no concern for the interpretation of the twofold *upādāna*, which is rather the presupposition for this process.

[1] SN III 55,10-14; AKṬU P thu 44a2-4 = D nyu 11a2-4; AKVy 668,10-12; cf. MN II 230,28-33, corresp. to *Pañcatrayasūtra* # 4.8: SKILLING 1994: 322.

individual (the *skandhas vedanā*, *saṁjñā* and *saṁskārāḥ*, and in many cases even *vijñāna*)[826] or at least marks the physical organism as a living, potentially sentient one (cf. § 166.2.3), *nāman* in the compound in Saṁdh V.2 clearly means "names", "words", "verbal designations", and forms part of a Mahāyānist ontological theory (see § 226.3) that comprises all phenomena, including material ones, and is completely different from the traditional analysis of a person, or the world, into the five *skandhas*. Moreover, *nāman* is embedded here in a compound ending in *-vāsanā*, and I am not aware of any interpretation of *nāmarūpa* in which *nāman*, in contrast to *rūpa*, is reduced to impregnations. Thus, even in case an allusion to the term *nāmarūpa* was actually intended by the author(s) of Saṁdh V, the transposition of *nāman* to an entirely different conceptual surrounding would surely indicate a drastic shift of perspective.

167.3. As for the expression **ātmabhāva* in Saṁdh V.2, it makes perfect sense if taken in the meaning of a (new) individual existence of a specific quality and duration (see § 151), whereas the occurrence of this expression in V.3, as assumed by Matsumoto, is highly improbable (see § 124). Even if we presuppose that in V.2 **ātmabhāva* is used in the concrete sense of a *basis* of individual existence, we would still have to find out whether it is employed in a more restricted sense (i.e., the living, sentient body) or in a more comprehensive one, equivalent to the 'sixfold basis' (which would, however, include the mind, especially as far as it is *vipāka*) or even comprising all five *skandhas*.[827]

167.4. On the other hand, there are two concepts in Saṁdh V.2(–3) that are, somehow or other, connected with all three canonical patterns discussed in this chapter or at least with their exegesis and thus justify taking all three of them into consideration: viz., *upādāna* on the one hand and *citta*/*vijñāna* on the other, to be discussed in ch. 4.2.5 and ch. 4.2.6, respectively.

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[826] [1.] Theravāda sources tend to explain *nāman* in a way not including *vijñāna* (see ANĀLAYO 2011: I 70f with n. 220 and n. 221, also for later exceptions like VisM XVIII.8): **a**) SN II 3,34f (no. 12.2) or MN I 53,11f: *nāman* = *vedanā*, *saṁjñā*, *cetanā*, *phasso*, and *manasikāro*; similarly $EĀ_c$ 778c23f and 797b27f; ŚA 608b9f, etc.; **b**) Vibh 136,7-9 or VisM XVII.187: *nāman* = *vedanā*, *saṁjñā*, and *saṅkhārā*. Cf. also Vi 124c8f and Vi_2 97c26f: *nāmarūpa* equated with the four *vijñānasthiti*s, hence not including *vijñāna*. [**2.**] Sarvāstivāda /Mūlasarvāstivāda sources, on the other hand, mostly include *vijñāna* in *nāman*, equating the latter with the four immaterial *skandha*s: e.g., NidSa 16.7 (read *nāma katarat*); $SĀ_c$ 85a28f (no. 298); PrĀVNS 117,24f; $MĀ_c$ 463c25 (四非色陰為名); AKṬU P tu 160b8f (D ju 140a3: see ANĀLAYO 2011: I 70 n. 220); $DhSk_D$ 33,1f (see ibid.); YBh_{Bh} 207,1-4 (see fn. 822); NA 511b14 (名, 即心心所); $MSgBh_t$ P li 160a5 (ad MSg I.36). [**3.**] According to AKBh 133,1 + 3f (cf. Vi 118c19f; Vi_2 94a3f; VijñK 547a4f), in the context of 'dependent origination in one moment' (*kṣaṇikaḥ pratītyasamutpādaḥ*), *nāmarūpa* consists of the *four skandha*s arising together with *vijñāna* (which means that *nāman* comprises only the other *three* immaterial *skandha*s since the fourth must be *rūpa*), whereas in the context of 'dependent origination referring to [successive] states' (*āvasthikaḥ pratītya-samutpādaḥ*: AKBh 133,8f), all members consist of all the *five skandha*s (which means that *nāman* includes *vijñāna* as well). [**4.**] Still, it would seem that the interpretation of *nāman* in terms of specific psychic factors is a secondary concretization. Originally, in the context of dependent origination (as describing the process of rebirth) *nāmarūpa* would seem to mean the living, sentient (or at least virtually sentient) body of an individual (distinguished as such by a specific *name*), from the moment of conception ('descent' of *vijñāna* as the principle of life and sentience) onward (cf. § 166.2.3). Developing, it grows into or may, as in VaSg III.1.ix (see § 166.1), be equated with the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*), where *nāman* is represented by the *mana-āyatana*, which, if *nāmarūpa* is contrasted with *vijñāna*, may be taken as the immediately preceding moment of *vijñāna* functioning as the *sam-anantarapratyaya* of the following one (cf. § 166.2).

[827] Cf. SamBh 168,5f (see fn. 1379): *sarvasyâtmabhāvaparyāpannasya ... pañcaskandhasya*.

4.2.5. *Upādāna*

168.1. As has been pointed out in ch. 4.2.2, Matsumoto is emphatically of the opinion that *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2 should be understood not as an action noun but in a passive-objective sense, viz., as "that which is taken [as support]", or just "support". He hence takes the two compounds describing the twofold *upādāna* not as tatpuruṣas but as karmadhārayas (see § 141). His main motive, if I am not mistaken, is to define the twofold *upādāna* as the 'locus' of *citta*/*vijñāna* in terms of the four *vijñānasthiti*s, i.e., the other four *skandha*s, equivalent to *nāmarūpa*, in the sense of the four things where *vijñāna* settles down or gets established. In addition, Matsumoto (M2: 426 n. 26) insists that **upādāya* should not be understood as a quasi-postposition but rather as a gerund in its full verbal sense, so that the statement as a whole would mean that after (or: in?) appropriating (*upādāya*) a twofold support (*upādāna*) the 'All-Seed Mind' ripens (**vipacyate*), merges (**saṁmūrcchati*, sc. into semen-cum-blood), and grows, thrives and develops (**vṛddhiṁ virūḍhiṁ vipulatām āpadyate*).

168.2. I must admit that I do not quite understand what serious difference with regard to the meaning it would make if we understand X-*upādānam upādāya* as "on account of appropriating X [as its support]" instead of "after/in appropriating the support consisting in X".[828] To me, the crucial problem is rather the precise meaning of the action of *upā-√dā* in this context, regardless of whether the verbal force is contained in the gerund or in an action noun. Matsumoto, if I understand him correctly, basically seems to presuppose, for Saṁdh V.2–3, a homogeneous notion of *upā-√dā*, one that focuses on the aspect of grasping something as support but is also associated with clinging to a self (*ātmagrāha*) (cf. §§ 123 and 125) and is hence *spiritually negative*. In my opinion, however, essentially different specializations of the use of this verb are involved, the most important difference being spiritually negative clinging (which is, indeed, inherent in the concept *sopādāna*) as against what I have called 'biological appropriation'. My main aim is to show that this difference is crucial for understanding Saṁdh V.2. Still, before doing so I have to discuss at least some aspects of Matsumoto's wide-ranging argumentation in favour of a passive-objective meaning of *upādāna* in the case of the qualification of *vijñāna* as *sopādāna* in the *Bījasūtra* and therefore, for Matsumoto, also in the case of *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2.

169. For Matsumoto, the starting-point for ascertaining the meaning of *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2(–3) is the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the Sanskrit version of the *Bījasūtra*, the phraseology of which he (rightly) finds to reverberate in Saṁdh V.2. The legitimateness of taking this concept into consideration is also corroborated by the fact that the respective passage of the *Bījasūtra* is quoted in the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論) as canonical evidence for the idea of *ālayavijñāna*.[829] In order to substantiate his contention that *upādāna* in the expression *sopādāna* of the *Bījasūtra*, and accordingly also *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2, should be understood in a passive-objective sense, Matsumoto adduces and discusses an impressive

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[828] It is probably Matsumoto's fixation on the notion of 'locus' that causes him to interpret the text in a way in which the relation of 'locus' and 'super-locus' stands out as explicitly as possible. In my opinion, Saṁdh V still preserves the idea of *ālayavijñāna* being 'located' in the body, but its emphasis is on the 'All-Seed Mind' as the principle that connects successive existences (V.2–3), i.e., as the principle of the continuity of *saṁsāra*, and as the underlying source ('locus') of the conscious mental processes (V.4–5).

[829] HsienY 480c12-14; see M2: 302,7-12 (referring to SASAKI 1982:189b) and 355,12-14; cf. also 293,7f and 417,9f. Cf. also S 1987: 76 with n. 556.

array of textual evidence concerning *upādāna*, *sopādāna* and related expressions from the canonical texts as well as from various strands of the later tradition (see § 141.2). However, a critical assessment of the evidence adduced by Matsumoto, supplemented by some additional bits of evidence, has led me to a somewhat different conclusion.

4.2.5.1. Madhyamaka Materials

170.0. To begin with, let me briefly comment on Matsumoto's attempt to support his understanding of *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2(–3) by means of the use of this expression in Madhyamaka sources, especially in the *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā*s (MMK) and Candrakīrti's *Prasannapadā* (PrasP).

170.1.1. As Matsumoto (M2: 259 with text [47]) rightly points out, Candrakīrti is, in his commentary on MMK 10.15a–c, quite explicit in taking *upādāna* in a passive sense, explaining it as that which is taken possession of (*upādīyata ity upādānam*) and equating it with the five *upādānaskandha*s.[830] This equation is also found in a few other places in Candrakīrti's commentary[831] and quite common in Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the commentary attributed to Ch'ing-mu (青目).[832] But Candrakīrti and Kumārajīva belong to a different strand of Buddhist thought, and for clarifying the meaning of terms in the Saṁdh their use of these terms is surely much less conclusive than the use of these terms in the texts of the tradition to which the Saṁdh is more closely related, i.e., in those of the Yogācāra tradition, even in those that post-date the Saṁdh, but particularly in those that are more or less contemporaneous with it or even pre-date it (see ch. 4.2.5.4.3).

170.1.2. Apart from this, it would seem to be crucial not to mix up the use of terms in different systematic contexts. As far as I can see, Candrakīrti's interpretation of *upādāna* in a passive sense and as equivalent to the five (*upādāna*)*skandha*s is basically if not exclusively limited to the context of the critical analysis of a substantial person (*pudgala*) or self (*ātman*), or of the Tathāgata, in relation to the five (*upādāna*)*skandha*s,[833] a context which does not reverberate in Saṁdh V.2. In other contexts like the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination,[834] however, Candrakīrti's comment shows no trace of such an understanding.[835]

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[830] PrasP 212,18f. Similarly Buddhapālita ad MMK 22.7 (SAITO 1984: 313,20: *'di la nye bar blangs pa yin pas nye bar len pa zhes bya la ...*).

[831] PrasP 440,1 (*upādānaṁ ... skandhapañcakaṁ*; ad MMK 22.9ab); 574,13 (*upādānasya pañcaskandhalakṣaṇasya*; ad 27.4ab); 576,3 (*pañcopādānaskandhākhyam upādānaṁ*; ad 27.6).

[832] E.g., T 30.1564: 13a28f: "[The object of] appropriation (*upādāna*) means the individual [consisting in] the five *skandha*s; the appropriator (**upādātṛ*) is the person" (受名五陰身, 受者是人; ad MMK 8.13); 21a18 (五陰身 explaining 身 = *upādāna* in vs. 16.6; cf. M2: 352,10); 30b10f (*upādāna* explained as 所受 in vs. 22.7 and as 五陰 in the comm.); 30b6 and 13 (所受五陰 for *upādāna* in vs. 22.9 + comm.). In his translation of the kārikās (cf. M2: 352,1-9), Kumārajīva often renders, in such cases, *upādāna* as 身 ("body"; "individual" or "person" [in the everyday sense]), e.g. 20c22f (MMK 16.3), 21a16f (16.6) or 37a9-15 (ad 27.4–7).

[833] Chapters 16, 22 (cf. M2: 353f) and 27 of the MMK; similarly verse 10.15.

[834] MMK 3.7 (LVP: 3.8): "... since the group of four beginning with *vijñāna* (PrasP 119,6: *vijñāna*, *sparśa*, *vedanā* and *tṛṣṇā*) does not exist, how then can there be appropriation (*upādāna*), etc." (... *vijñānādicatuṣṭayaṁ | nāstîty upādānādīni bhaviṣyanti punaḥ katham*); 18.4: "When [the notions of] 'mine' and 'I' have ceased ..., appropriation stops, and because appropriation has ceased, [re]birth ceases" (*mamêty aham iti kṣīṇe ... | nirudhyate upādānaṁ, tatkṣayāj janmanaḥ kṣayaḥ ||*). For 26.6cd, see § 170.2.

When commenting on MMK 16.6, where *upādāna* is equated with *bandhana* ("bond, fetter"), i.e., with the cause of bondage, Candrakīrti (in contrast to Kumārajīva)[836] explains *upādāna* as "passionate attachment, etc." (*rāgādi*),[837] i.e., as the spiritually negative psychic force that causes bondage. In MMK 8.13, *upādāna* refers, according to Candrakīrti, to the "act of appropriating (or grasping, clinging)" (*upāttikriyā*), and has been used (in the *kārikā*) in order to indicate both the subject of this act (*upādātṛ*) and its object (*upādāna*, now in the sense of *upādeya*).[838]

170.2. From a chronological point of view, the kārikās themselves are, of course, closer to the Saṁdh than the PrasP, but they, too, even if not yet Madhyamaka in the sense of the later

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[835] Commenting on MMK 3.7(/8)cd, Candrakīrti merely remarks (PrasP 119,12): *na santy upādānādīnîty arthaḥ*. In the case of 18.4, he expressly specifies the *upādāna* as the fourfold clinging, viz., clinging to sensual pleasures (*kāma*), to [inadequate] views (*dṛṣṭi*), to [specific modes of] behaviour and observances (*śīlavrata*) and to an *ātman* theory (PrasP 349,12f), which is the common explanation of *upādāna* of the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination. — It should, however, be added that Buddhapālita's comment, though similar to Candrakīrti's in the case of MMK 3.7(/8)cd (D tsa 177b1; SAITO 1984: text 58,1, transl. 57,28f), is somewhat different in the case of 18.4 in that he first derives, from the disappearance of the concepts of 'I' and 'mine', the absence of a subject (or act?) of appropriation and then from this absence the absence of something to be appropriated (**upādeya*), resulting in the cessation of the fourfold *upādāna* (D tsa 241a4; SAITO 1984: text 247,16-18: ... *log par 'dzin pa zad par gyur na nye bar len par byed pa gang yin pa de med cing nye bar blang bar bya ba gang yin pa de yang med pas | nye bar len pa rnam pa bzhi yang 'gag par 'gyur zhing* ...). On the other hand, Bhāviveka's explanation is similar to Candrakīrti's in the case of MMK 18.4 (P tsha 230a6f), but is specific in the case of 3.7(/8)cd in that Bhāviveka not only specifies, in this case too, *upādāna* as fourfold but expressly interprets this fourfold *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense (**upādeya*) and equates it with sensual pleasures (*kāma*), adhering to behaviour and observances (*śīlavrataparāmarśa*), the doctrine of a self (*ātmavāda*), and [wrong] views (*dṛṣṭi*) (P tsha 99b6f: *nye bar len pa zhes bya ba ni | nye bar blang bar bya ba dag ste | 'dod pa dang | tshul khrims dang | brtul zhugs mchog tu 'dzin pa dang | bdag tu smra ba dang | lta ba zhes bya ba dag go*. As far as I can see, there is no indication of a passive meaning in the Chin. version of Bhāviveka's explanation: T 30.1566 68b11f). — Kumārajīva's rendering does not suggest a passive meaning here, having 四取 for *upādāna* in 3.7(/8)cd and 諸受 in 18.4, in the verse as well as in the commentary (T 30.1564: 6b10 + 12 and 23c27 + 24c4, respectively).

[836] T 30.1564: 21a16-18, where the *upādāna* that constitutes the fetter (縛, *bandhana*) is rendered by 身 ("body, person"; cf. fn. 832) and explained in the commentary as "the person [consisting in] the five *skandhas*" (五陰身). See M2: 352.

[837] PrasP 290,14f and 291,6. In view of the absence of a similar explanation in Buddhapālita (D tsa 229a5ff; P tsa 259a8ff; SAITO 1984: text 214; transl. 214, with "objects of clinging" for Tib. *nye bar len pa* = *upādāna*) and Bhāviveka (D tsha 167b1ff; P tsha 208a1ff), Matsumoto (M2: 482) is probably right in regarding it as Candrakīrti's innovation, still more so since the subject under critical discussion is the *pudgala* as the subject of transmigration/bondage and liberation.

[838] PrasP 189,13f. Similar explanation already in Buddhapālita (P tsa 227b2; D tsa 201b2; SAITO 1984: text 130,4-6; transl. 130,5-8) and Bhāviveka (D tsha 118a2f; P tsha 144b5f). The reason is that in the kārikā *upādāna* must indeed, in analogy to the pair *karman* and *kartṛ*, represent, at least implicitly, both subject and object. In Kumārajīva's Chinese translation of the verse (T 30.1564: 13a25), this is achieved by explicitly rendering *upādāna* as 受受者, i.e., by supplementing *upādāna* (受, taken in the passive sense, referring to the five *skandhas*: 13a28f) with an equivalent for the subject (受者, *upādātṛ*). According to the other commentaries, *upādāna* expresses the mere verbal notion (**bhāva*), which involves the *kārakas*, in particular subject and object. For Matsumoto (M2: 480f), this explanation is a later development.

school going by this name (cf. SAITO 2007), would seem to stem from an ambience different from that of early Yogācāra as represented by the YBh materials, and although some influence of the MMK on the Mahāyāna strand of these materials has been pointed out (SAITO 2010), there are also differences in detail and in the use of terms (ibid.). Thus, the use of the expression *upādāna* in the MMK may well be different from that of the Saṁdh. I agree with Matsumoto (M2: 349ff) in that most occurrences of *upādāna* in the MMK are best understood in a passive/objective sense, but I am not convinced that he is right in assuming that this holds good for *all* occurrences.[839] To be sure, in the context of the *pudgala*'s (or *ātman*'s) or the Tathāgata's relation to the (*upādāna*)*skandhas* it is appropriate to follow Candrakīrti and Kumārajīva in understanding *upādāna* in the kārikās in a passive sense, viz., as designating the five *upādānaskandhas*.[840] But in the context of the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination this meaning is hardly what one expects. In MMK 3.7 (LVP: 3.8) and 18.4,[841] at least, *upādāna* conditioned by desire and entailing rebirth is more likely to be taken in the sense of appropriation or grasping as a spiritually negative mental act. Even in kārikā 26.6 (cd: *tṛṣyamāṇa upādānam upādatte caturvidham*), a passive understanding of the fourfold *upādāna*,[842] albeit possible in view of its being the object of the verb *upādatte* expressing the indispensable spiritually negative mental act, is hardly called for unless we can exclude a cognate accusative (figura etymologica),[843] for the assumption of a cognate accusative would

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[839] See M2: 350,13-15 and 352,18f; cf. also 470,15.

[840] For MMK 16.3, 22.7 and 27.6-8, cf. OETKE 2001: 146 (with n. 108), 159 and 178f). — Incidentally, Matsumoto's (M2: 350,16ff) understanding of *sopādāna* and *anupādāna* in MMK 16.6 as, respectively, equivalent to "having something existing (存在するもの) as one's *upādāna*" and "having something non-existent (存在しないもの) as one's *upādāna*", seemingly based on Candrakīrti's explanation of *sopādāna* as *vidyamānopādāna*, appears odd; *vidyamānopādāna* means "one in whom *upādāna* is found/exists" and is merely a paraphrase of the bahuvrīhi *sopādāna*, and *anupādāna* is aptly explained by Candrakīrti as *bandhanarahita*, i.e., just means "without *upādāna*". Though it is reasonable to understand *upādāna* in this context in a passive sense (i.e., as referring to the five *skandhas*), I do not understand how this can be supported by means of the assumption that *avasthā* in 16.6d should have the same meaning as *upādāna* and that since *avasthā* means 'locus' *upādāna*, too, must have this meaning (M2: 351,5-8). Actually, *avasthā* rather means "state" (位, as in Matsumoto's translation on p. 350, 11), and the meaning of MMK 16.6d is clearly that if one cannot be bound when one is (already) connected with the bond = *upādāna* or when one is free from it, it is hard to see in which *state* one may come to be bound.

[841] See fn. 834.

[842] Cf. M2: 470,17ff; cf. also 481 n. 245. It may be worth noting that Bhāviveka (P tsha 315b7f; D tsha 251b3), after explaining *upādāna* in MMK 26.6 in a passive-objective sense (*nye bar blang ba yin pas nye bar len pa'o*; cf. M2: 471,6-12), mentions two alternative explanations, which take *upādāna* as an action noun: "Some say that *upādāna* means nothing but increase of desire (**tṛṣṇāvṛddhir evôpādānam*?). Others say that it is the effort to obtain objects of enjoyment (**bhoga*, pl.)" (*kha cig na re | sred pa 'phel ba nyid nye bar len pa'o zhes zer ro || gzhan dag na re | longs spyod rnams thob par bya ba'i phyir 'bad pa'o zhe'o* ||).

[843] Similar cases: YBh_{Bh} 201,3f (corresp. to YBh_t P 'i 286b3; D zi 247b7; YBh_c 828a26 [VaSg III.1.i]; cf. HARADA 2004: 157): ... *kāmopādānaṁ vôpādadāti dṛṣṭiśīlavratātmavādopādānaṁ* (ms.) *vā, upātte côpādāne* (YBh_t P dzi 117a6f: *len pa blangs nas*) ...; MN I 67,33: *vijjuppādā n'eva kāmupādānaṁ upādiyati*, etc. (cf. ÑĀṆAMOLI & BODHI 1995: 1196 n. 176, clearly opting for a cognate accusative); VisM XIV.226–229: *kāmupādānaṁ na upādiyati*, etc.; cf. also Spk II 318,13-16: *ayaṁ bhikkhu vādī*

allow us to keep to *upādāna* as an action noun and to take the fourfold *upādāna* as a set of unwholesome mental attitudes.[844] Since Saṁdh V.2 is not concerned with the *pudgala* problem but rather with the mechanism of rebirth, it would, if anything, be Nāgārjuna's use of *upādāna* in *this* context that might be relevant here. But even this much is questionable because in the MMK no specific connection of *upādāna* with *vijñāna* is indicated, nor is the traditional fourfold *upādāna* (*kāma-*, *dṛṣṭi-*, *śīlavrata-* and *ātmavāda-upādāna*) particularly helpful in explaining the peculiar characterization of the twofold *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2.

4.2.5.2. *Sopādānaṁ vijñānam* in the *Bījasūtra* and Related Canonical Materials

171. In the *Bījasūtra*, *vijñāna* is compared to the five kinds of undamaged, fertile seeds (more precisely: reproductive parts of plants) that will sprout and grow in the soil (= the four *vijñānasthiti*s) if moistened by water (= delight and passionate attachment: *nandīrāga*), but its qualification as *sopādānaṁ vijñānaṁ* is only found in the Sanskrit version of the text. The Pāli version has *sāhāraṁ* ("furnished with nutriment") instead. Matsumoto (M2: 320f) argues that *sopādāna* is the original reading because *sāhāra* would presuppose the pattern of the four 'nutriments', which Matsumoto considers absurd because it would imply that *vijñāna* feeds on *vijñāna*. But apart from the possibility that there may be two levels of *vijñāna* (a more or less latent principle of sentient life on the one hand and actual cognitive functions on the other)[845] or a temporal sequence,[846] there is no need to take *āhāra* here in its technical sense of the *four* 'nutriments'. It may well be used in a general sense, as in AN V 113 (no. 10.61), where 'ignorance' (*avijjā*, i.e., disorientation)[847] is stated to have a 'nutriment' by which its occurrence is conditioned, viz., the five hindrances (*nīvaraṇa*), which in their turn have the threefold misbehaviour (*duccarita*) as their 'nutriment', etc. Or as in sermons like SN 12.52–

'... ' ti gahanaṁ gaṇheyya. Yet, in a similar formulation (*upādānaseṭṭhaṁ ... upādiyati*) at MN II 265,9-13, *upādāna* is clearly used in a passive-objective sense because the "foremost *upādāna*" is equated with the *nevasaññānāsaññāyatana* (see § 172.2).

[844] This is, as far as I can see, how they are understood in other traditions, for which see § 172.1 with fn. 853 etc.

[845] Cf. VETTER 2000: 66–73.

[846] At NA 465b27, Saṅghabhadra argues: "[Since] different [moments of] *vijñāna* may be one another's support (**pratiṣṭhā*), why can't they be what is meant by 'field' (*kṣetra*)?" (異識相望有所依著, 豈非田義。). Still, his own solution is that in contrast to the other four *skandha*s, which (as far as they form part of one's own personal continuum) can foster the *vijñāna* that carries on becoming (= rebirth) (續有識) not only when they are already past or still in the future (by becoming its object) but also when they are present (e.g., by functioning as sense faculties), *vijñāna* is limited to the former function but lacks the latter (since there is no simultaneous occurrence of two or more *vijñāna*s in one and the same personal continuum) and is hence not reckoned as a *vijñānasthiti* (NA 466b1-13). Entering into further details of Saṅghabhadra's highly sophisticated discussion of the issue would exceed the limits of the present study.

[847] *Avidyā* is equated with *moha* (PSVy P 8a6) and, according to AS 7,5f (AS_G 16,22f), the basis of wrong convictions (*mithyāniścaya*), [unwholesome] doubt (*vicikitsā*) and [all kinds of] pollution (*saṁkleśa*, i.e., passionate attachment, etc.: ASBh 6,2f). According to Vasubandhu (AKBh 140,24–141,8; PSVy P 7b5ff [D 7a4ff], esp. 8b4f [8a2f]; cf. MATILAL 1980, esp. 161f), *avidyā* is not the mere absence of *vidyā* nor merely something different from *vidyā* but a dharma *sui generis* that is opposed to *vidyā*, even though its specific nature is hard to describe (PSVy P 8b5-7; D 8a3-5). Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 204,1–206,9. It is only for want of a better choice that I keep to the customary rendering "ignorance" for *avidyā*.

57, where the growth of craving (*taṇhā*) and the grasping (*upādāna*) and rebirth resulting from it is compared to the continued burning of a fire or to the continued thriving or growth of a tree in dependence on continued supply of *upādāna* (fuel / material support) or nutriment (*āhāra*). I shall come back to these similes later (cf. §§ 172.2, 174.1 and 174.3). For the time being, I merely want to show that the use of the expression *āhāra* is perfectly natural in connection with the imagery of the growth of a plant or seed. But since I am concerned with the Sanskrit tradition and its reading, the question of the original wording (provided that such a question is meaningful at all, up to such details, with regard to the oral period of the tradition) need not be followed here. For the same reason, it is neither necessary nor possible for me to present a comprehensive analysis or historical stratification of the various facets of the use of the expression *upādāna* in the canonical texts. All I shall try is to find out whether the *Bījasūtra* itself may offer some clue for a more precise understanding of the meaning of *sopādāna*, and to discuss, in this connection, some relevant passages from other canonical texts, without claiming exhaustiveness.

172.0. It is indisputable that *upādāna* is one of the words in the early Buddhist canon that may have an active meaning (nomen actionis: "the act of grasping or clinging") as well as a passive-objective one ("what is grasped or clung to"; "fuel", "material support"),[848] although it is not always easy to decide which one, if any, is in focus in a given passage.

172.1. An explicit example for the first use is, e.g., SN no. 22.121 (*Upādānasutta(II)*),[849] where appropriation or grasping (*upādāna*), defined as desire and passionate attachment (*chandarāga*), is contrasted with the five *upādānakkhandha*s as "the things which tempt a person to appropriate them"[850] (*upādāniyā ... dhammā*). Another example is the *Samādhisutta*

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[848] ANĀLAYO 2010b: 5. Cf. also the materials adduced *CPD* and *DP* s.v. *upādāna*, e.g., Ps II 311,18: *gahaṇaṭṭhena upādānaṁ*; Pj II 212,3: *upādātabbaṭṭhena upādānaṁ*; Sadd 394,7: *indhanaṁ upādānam*. Cf. also PrasP 212,18: *upādīyata ity upādānam*.

[849] SN III 167; M2: 318 text [127].

[850] VETTER 2000: 78; cf. 258 ("things that are favourable to appropriation"). Cf. also BODHI 2000: I 887: "that can be clung to". See also § 180.1 with fn. 959 and fn. 960.

For *upādānakkhandha*, BODHI (ibid.) and ANĀLAYO (2010b: 13) have "aggregates subject to clinging", and "aggregates [affected by] clinging", respectively, whereas Vetter (2000: 81) suggests "'branch of appropriation', to be understood as a branch that is appropriated, but sometimes also as a branch that invites appropriation". GOMBRICH (2009: 114) proposes "blazing masses of fuel", on the basis of SN III 71 (22.61), where the five (*upādāna-*)*khandha*s are stated to be ablaze (*āditta*), which in terms of the *Ādittapariyāya* (Vin I 34f; SN 35.28) would mean: ablaze with the fire of attachment, hatred and delusion, as well as with [the fire of] birth, aging, dying and suffering.

A metaphorical interpretation of the expression *upādānakkhandha* and its interpretation in terms of Buddhist spirituality need not be mutually exclusive. But in passages where *upādāna* is defined as *chandarāga*, it cannot refer to the *khandha*s as the fuel, for if the *khandha*s are the fuel, *chandarāga* is rather the fire. Thus, in this case, *upādāna* must, in the first place, be understood in the active-subjective sense of grasping or clinging. It is only implicitly that the expression may suggest that this grasping should be understood as the 'fuel' of rebirth and future suffering.

However this may be, explanations of the term *upādānakkhandha* or °*skandha* in later exegetical literature do not normally refer to the fuel-metaphor, or do so only incidentally, in connection with pointing out analogous *grammatical* formations. Just a few examples:

[1.] Theravāda (taken from *DP* I: 481a): *upādānānaṁ paccayabhūtā khandhā* (Ps II 359,4f); *upādānena janitā upādānajanakā vā khandhā* (Pj I 82,10); *upādānagocarā khandhā ...; upādānasaṁbhūtā*

(SN no. 22.5), where *upādāna* is equated with delight (*nandī*) arising from approving of, welcoming and getting attached to the five *upādānakkhandhas*.[851] Likewise, when *upādāna* in the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination is explained as comprising four kinds of 'appropriation', viz., of sensual pleasures (*kāma*), views (*diṭṭhi*), certain patterns of behaviour and observances (*śīlavrata*), and the doctrine of a [substantial, autonomous] self (*ātmavāda*),[852] the interpretation as an action noun ("attachment to, clinging to") appears more natural and is in fact supported by the systematizing and exegetical tradition of several schools. Thus, in Theravāda Abhidharma, the expression *kāmupādāna* is unambiguously defined as attachment to sensual pleasures,[853] i.e., as a tatpuruṣa with *upādāna* taken as an action noun. The other three *upādānas* are defined as [wrong] views or misapprehensions,[854] which means that *upādāna* is again understood as an action noun, though the analysis of the compound may be different at least in the case of *diṭṭhupādāna*, where the explanation suggests a karmadhāraya ("clinging consisting in [wrong] views").[855] The action noun

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vā ... yathā tiṇaggi, tusaggi; upādānavidheyyā vā ... yathā rājapuriso; upādānappabhavā vā ... yathā puppharukkho, phalarukkho (Paṭis-a 110,10-15);

[2.] Sarvāstivāda: AKBh 5,10-12 (EJ. 7,1-3): *upādānāni kleśāḥ; tatsaṁbhūtatvād upādānaskandhāḥ, tṛṇatuṣāgnivat; tadvidheyatvād vā, rājapuruṣavat; upādānāni vā tebhyaḥ saṁbhavantîty upādāna-skandhāḥ, puṣpaphalavṛkṣavat*; Vi 386c12-28;

[3.] Yogācāra: AS_t P li 51b6f: *nye bar len pa dang ldan pas de'i phyir nye bar len pa'i phung po rnams* ... (AS 2,5f: rec.; AS_{Li} 243,30: *upādānena yuktās tasmād upādānaskandhā ity ucyante*.; cf. ASBh 2,9);

[4.] CSL 365c9f: "All *skandhas* are called *upādānaskandhas*, because they have arisen from appropriation/grasping" (一切諸陰 皆名受陰, 從受生故。); T 32.1647 (*Szŭ-ti lun* 四諦論, **Catuḥ-satyaśāstra*) 386a2-4: "What is the meaning of [the expression] *upādānaskandhāḥ*? Answer: Appropriation/grasping (*upādāna*) means craving, desire. These *skandhas* produce appropriation, are produced by appropriation, are associated with appropriation, are followed by appropriation, can have appropriation: therefore they are called '*skandhas* of appropriation'" (問 取陰何義。答 愛欲是取義。此陰能生取, 為取所生, 與取相應, 取所隨逐, 能有取故, 故名取陰。).

851 VETTER 2000: 74 and 172f.

852 E.g., MN I 50,37–51,2, corresp. to $MĀ_C$ 463a7; SN II 3,13-16 (12.2), corresp. to NidSa 16.12 and $SĀ_C$ 85b9 (no. 298); $EĀ_C$ 797c8f; cf. also MN I 66,1ff ($MĀ_C$ 591a20ff; $EĀ_C$ 644a15ff; ANĀLAYO 2011: 101f). The question of the relative age of this explanation of *upādāna* is irrelevant for the present study, which is not concerned with the original meaning but with the store of concepts and exegetical attempts available to the early Yogācāra masters.

853 Dhs 212,10-13 (# 1214): *kāmupādānaṁ = yo kāmesu kāmacchando kāmarāgo ... kāmanandī kāma-taṇhā ... kāmajjhosānaṁ*; similarly Vibh 375,9-11.

854 Dhs 212,14–213,8 (## 1215–1217): *diṭṭhupādānaṁ = 'natthi dinnaṁ ...' ti yā evarūpā diṭṭhi diṭṭhi-gataṁ ... gāho paṭiggaho abhiniveso parāmāso ... vipariyāsaggāho*; similarly Vibh 375,12-33.

855 The analysis of the compounds in Theravāda exegetical literature is quite sophisticated (cf., e.g., VisM XVII.241; Spk II 14,14–15,14; Asl 385,3-17 [read *upādiyati* for *upādīyati* with *DP* I: 483b]; for additional material, see *CPD* III 403). It oscillates between an analysis as case-tatpuruṣa and karma-dhāraya, but as far as I can see, *upādāna* is nowhere unambiguously interpreted in a passive-objective sense. The expression *kāmupādāna*, e.g., is alternatively analysed [1.] as "[the act consisting in that one] appropriates (i.e., grasps for, clings to) *kāma* reckoned among objects (i.e., *kāma* in the sense of *objects* of sensual desire, cf. VisM-mhṭ *kāmaguṇasaññitaṁ rūpādi-ārammaṇaṁ*)" (*vatthusaṅkhātaṁ kāmaṁ upādiyati*; VisM-mhṭ: *ettha kammasādhano kāmasaddo*), and [2.] as "what is both sensual desire and appropriation (/grasping, clinging)" (*kāmo ca so upādānaṁ ca*; VisM-mhṭ: *ettha kattu-sādhano, kilesakāmassa adhippetattā*). Still, in *both* cases *upādāna* means "grasping firmly" (*daḷha-*

function of *upādāna* in connection with the four kinds of *upādāna* is, in spite of differences in detail, also supported by the explanations found in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts like the *Dharmaskandha*[856] as well as by those of the *Śāriputrābhidharma*.[857] As for early Yogācāra, the SavitBh of the MauBh is unambiguous in defining all four *upādāna*s as forms of desire and passionate attachment (*chandarāga*) and in taking them as case-tatpuruṣas (*yaḥ kāmeṣu cchandarāgaḥ*, etc.).[858]

172.2. The passive-objective meaning, on the other hand, is obvious at MN II 265,12f (*Āṇañjasappāya-sutta*), where the sphere of being neither [fully] conscious nor [entirely] unconscious (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*) is called *upādānaseṭṭha*, which can only mean: the best object of appropriation (/clinging).[859] A special facet of the passive-objective meaning would seem to be the use of *upādāna* in the sense of "fuel" or "material support" (almost equivalent to 'nutriment'), as in a set of sermons beginning with SN no. 12.52 (*Upādāna-sutta(I)*),[860] where a big bonfire (*mahā aggikkhandho*) into which someone throws dry grass, cowdung or wood is stated to burn for a long time with this material as its 'food' and fuel (*tadāhāro tadupādāno*). Exactly the same phrase is then (12.53–54)[861] used with regard to the flame of a lamp supplied with oil and wick, but also with regard to a huge (or full-grown?) tree (*mahārukkha*: 12.55–56)[862] standing for a long time thanks to absorbing nutritive essence

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gahaṇaṁ; cf. also VisM XVII.243: *rūpādisu ... taṇhāya daḷhabhāvo kāmupādānaṁ*), i.e., functions as an action noun.[1]

[1] *CPD* III 403a proposes, beside "grasping sensual pleasures" also the meaning "... substratum which is sensual pleasure", but I cannot find any confirmation for this in the materials adduced.

856 DhSk$_D$ 59,3ff (DhSk$_C$ 512b11ff; cf. SaṅgP IV.39 = SaṅgP$_C$ 399c9-21 [STACHE-ROSEN 1968: 117f]; Prak$_H$ 719b3-13), defining *kāma-* and *ātmavādopādāna* as the fetters (*saṁyojana*), bonds (*bandhana*), evil inclinations (*anuśaya*), defilements (*upakleśa*) and outbursts (*paryavasthāna*) pertaining, respectively, to the sphere of sensuality and to the higher world-spheres, except for those fetters, etc., that are contained in *dṛṣṭi-* and *śīlavratopādāna*. Cf. also AKBh 307,14-17 (see fn. 1045); AKBh 308,21 (*kāmādyupādānād upādānāni*) with AKVy 488,29f: *yaiḥ kāmādayaḥ upādīyante, tāni kāmādy-upādānāni chandarāgātmakāni*.

857 ŚA 611b22–c9: *kāmopādāna* is the increase of craving (**tṛṣṇā*) pertaining to the *kāmadhātu* (欲界愛廣), and *ātm(avād?)opādāna* (我取) the increase of craving pertaining to the *rūpa-* and *ārūpyadhātu*, with the exception, in both cases, of the first impact of craving (除欲界愛初觸, etc.), which would be just *tṛṣṇā*. Alternatively, *kāmopādāna* comprises all defilements (煩惱, **kleśa*) of the *kāmadhātu* except for the first impact of craving and the clinging to views and to certain patterns of behaviour (*dṛṣṭi-* and *śīla(vrata)-upādāna*), and *ātm(avād)opādāna* analogously those of the *rūpa-* and *ārūpya-dhātu*.

858 YBh$_{Bh}$ 208,14-18: see § 196 with fn. 1080. Cf. also AKBh 308,5f (see fn. 1045), indicating according to AKVy 487,29f that in the opinion of the Master, i.e., Vasubandhu himself, *upādāna* consists in this case in attachment only and does not include other defilements (*rāga evâtra ... upādānaṁ ... nânye kleśāḥ*). Cf. also PSVy$_{Tu}$ 246,11f (*tatra chandarāga upādānam*) and 245,25ff, where the question whether the compounds *kāmopādāna*, etc., should be analysed as tatpuruṣas (like *rūpa-darśana*) or as karmadhārayas (like *rūpāyatana*) is answered in favour of the first alternative: *rūpa-darśanavad ayaṁ samāsaḥ* (245,31).

859 Cf. Ps IV 67,3f: *so kira bhikkhu gahetabbaṭṭhānaṁ seṭṭhaṁ uttamaṁ bhavaṁ upādiyati, seṭṭha-bhave paṭisandhiṁ gaṇhātîti attho*.

860 Cf. SĀ$_C$ no. 286.

861 Cf. SĀ$_C$ no. 285.

862 Cf. also SN no. 12.58–60, NidSa no. 2, and SĀ$_C$ no. 284.

(*ojā*) by means of its roots, and with regard to a well-cared for sapling (*taruṇo rukkho*: 12.57).[863]

173.1. According to Matsumoto (M2: 321), in the *Bījasūtra* only three elements play a role in the situation described in this sermon: *vijñāna* (seed), the four *vijñānasthiti*s (soil), and delight and passionate attachment (*nandīrāga*: water). Therefore, he thinks, the *upādāna* the *vijñāna* is stated to be furnished with must be one of these. Since *vijñāna* itself is out of the question, *upādāna* must be either identical with *nandīrāga* or with the four *vijñānasthiti*s. In the first case it would be an action noun ("grasping, clinging"), in the second case it would have to be understood in a passive or objective sense ("that which is clung to", or "that which is taken as support", 'fuel'/nutriment). As has already been indicated (§ 169), Matsumoto emphatically argues in favour of the latter meaning. On my part, I am not convinced, and I am not even sure whether a choice between these two alternatives is indeed imperative. Can we exclude the possibility that *sopādāna* may comprise (or even be intended to comprise) both alternatives? Or couldn't it be that *sopādāna* somehow corresponds to the fertility of the seed, or to its being undamaged? In this case, *sopādāna* may point to some deep-rooted, innate clinging or attachment to mundane existence, manifesting itself in (and having its rebirth-producing force actualized by) actual outbursts of delight in or longing for the constituents of such existence.[864]

173.2. In fact, the subsequent paragraph of the sūtra may be taken to support such an interpretation. The Pāli version runs as follows:

> *rūpupayaṁ*[865] ... *viññāṇaṁ tiṭṭhamānaṁ tiṭṭheyya rūpārammaṇaṁ rūpappatiṭṭhaṁ nandūpasecanaṁ* (B^{e} : °*upasevanaṁ* PTS)[866] *vuddhiṁ virūḷhiṁ vepullaṁ āpajjeyya*
>
> As long as it is involved in the body, *viññāṇa* will persist; having the body as support, having the body as ground and being watered by delight, it will attain increase, growth, expansion,[867]

and analogously for the other three *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s. For Matsumoto (M2: 294,19), *upaya* means "support" (寄り所),[868] but if it corresponds, in this passage, to Skt. *upaga* (see § 173.5), it

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[863] Cf. NidSa no. 1 and SĀ$_{C}$ no. 283.

[864] Cf., in this connection, JP$_{H}$ 1031c11-17 (similarly UvViv II 846,5ff), where the "root in the ground" (*mūlaṁ kṣitau*, of what seems to be a creeper) that is no longer existent in the liberated person according to Uv 29.54 is (with explicit reference to the *Bījasūtra*) equated with the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* established in the four *vijñānasthiti*s, whereas the leaves (*parṇāḥ*) and tendrils (*latāḥ*, cf. HAHN 2007: 115: "Ranken") that do not grow from it any longer are interpreted as the conception or feeling of identity [with the *vijñānasthiti*s?] (*asmimāna*) and as [actualized] craving (*tṛṣṇā*), respectively. Here too it would make excellent sense to understand the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* as 'appetitive mind', i.e., mind under the sway of a constant if latent drive for appropriation.

[865] Ed. °*upāyaṁ*, but see *CPD* II 469b; VETTER 2000: 197 n. 46.

[866] The reading °*upasecanam* appears more meaningful and is, at any rate, confirmed outside the Pāli tradition by SĀ$_{C}$ 9a8 and 9f, where the corresponding expression is rendered as "*moistened* by delight and greed" (喜貪潤澤), by YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 186a8 and by the paraphrase *tadabhiṣyanditaṁ* (*tad-* = *nandī-*) in VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a4 (see fn. 1101). On the other hand, AKṬU D nyu 10b7 and 11a1f *don du gnyer zhing bsten nas* (P thu 44a1 *brten* but *bstan* in 43b7) seems to presuppose **nandyupasevanam*.

[867] SN III 54,29–55,9 (*Bījasutta*) and 53,9-13 (*Upayasutta*). Translation adapted from VETTER 2000: 198. According to the *Vibhāṣā* (see § 157.2), the question whether *rūpa* as a *vijñānasthiti* should be taken to include also *external* matter (i.e., physical *objects*) was controversial.

rather qualifies the subject (viz., *viññāṇa*) as one that approaches (or has approached) body, feelings, etc., in the sense of getting or being involved in them.[869]

173.3. This is clear from the preceding *Upayasutta* (SN 22.53), where the sentence just quoted (in § 173.2) is preceded by another one in which *upaya* (not in a compound) is used to qualify a *person* (nom. sg. masc.) who is, just on account of being involved — the subsequent sentence would suggest: involved in the body, etc. —, stated to be unreleased (*upayo ... avimutto*).[870] That *upaya* is used here as an adjective with the active meaning of "having approached" in the sense of "being involved"[871] is also corroborated by the commentary, where *upayo* is explained as "having approached (i.e., become involved in) the five *khandha*s due to craving, conceit and views",[872] and by a parallel formulation in SN 22.63, where the same idea is expressed by using *upādiyamāno* ("appropriating, clinging") instead of *upayo*.[873]

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[868] For a detailed discussion of MATSUMOTO's interpretation of *upaya/upaga* in this passage and in the *Saṅgītisūtra* (IV.23), see appendix 2 to Pt. I. Cf. also fn. 813.

[869] Cf., in this connection, Vetter's (2000: 199) reference to the *Cetanāsutta*s SN 12.38–40, where what is stated to be "a support (*ārammaṇa*) for the persistence (*ṭhiti*) of *Viññāṇa*" is "that about which one thinks (*yaṁ ca ceteti*), in respect to which one forms [a view] (*yaṁ ca pakappeti*) and to which one [subconsciously?] adheres (*yaṁ ca anuseti*)". Cf. also MN III 31,23ff, where in the case of the six elements the statement of the Buddha that he has abandoned involvement in and clinging to them (*upayupādāna*), etc., is preceded by the statement that he has come to regard them as not [being his] self (*anattato upagacchiṁ*), i.e., has given up identifying himself with them. Cf. also the explanation of *upādāna* (in *upayupādānā*) in Ps-pṭ ad locum (CSCD: *Uparipaṇṇāsa* # 99; My. II 282): *"etaṁ mama, eso me attā" ti upādiyanti ... ti upādānā*, and the explanation of the quasi-synonym *upaya* in Spk II 33,12-14 (see fn. 874).

[870] SN III 53,8: *upayo* (ed.: *upāyo*) ... *avimutto, anupayo* (ed.: *anupāyo*) *vimutto*. As Vetter (2000: 199) points out, this passage may reflect verses 786–787 of the *Aṭṭhakavagga*, also referred to by Matsumoto (M2: 460,2ff) in this connection.

[871] The choice of the formally passive English expression "being involved" has merely idiomatic reasons and does not, of course, imply a passive sense of the Pāli expression *upaya*,[1] which, if possible at all, would certainly not be the most natural assumption in the case of *upaya* being used as an adjective qualifying a person. In German, one can avoid this phraseological disharmony by rendering *upaya* as "einer, der sich [auf Sinnesreize, doktrinäre Positionen o.ä.] einläßt".

[1] Cf. Norman's [1992: 92] rendering of the indisputably active form *upeti* in Sn 787a as "is involved".

[872] Spk II 271,22f: *upayo ti taṇhā-māna-diṭṭhi-vasena pañca-kkhandhe upagato*. This explanation takes X-*upaya* as an accusative-tatpuruṣa, not as governing a locative, as Matsumoto (M2: 461,1) puts it, for *pañcakkhandhe* (or, in view of the overwhelming predominance of uncompounded forms in the unambiguous cases [see below], perhaps rather *pañca˘kkhandhe*)[1] is almost certainly acc.pl., as the *Ṭīkā* (Spk-pṭ [CSCD: *Khandhavagga-ṭīkā* #53; My.-ed. II 222]) confirms: *kiṁ* (acc.!) *upetīti āha: pañcakkhandhe*. With very few (mostly doubtful or late) exceptions, the combination *pañca(˘)-kkhandha* is normally used in the plural, with nom. *pañca(˘)kkhandhā*, just like *pañc' upādāna-kkhandhā*. Accordingly, the regular accusative is *pañca(˘)kkhandhe* (like *pañc' upādānakkhandhe*), e.g., Th 369a (= SN III 83,22) *pañca kkhandhe pariññāya* (= *parijānitvā*: Spk II 282,6); Th 1160c *ye pañca khandhe passanti*; Spk II 269,19f *pañca(˘)kkhandhe samanupassati* (corresponding to SN III 46,12 *pañc' upādānakkhandhe samanupassati*); II 311,2 *ime pañca(˘)kkhandhe saṁpiṇḍetvā* (CSCD; ed.°*itvā*); Paṭis II 238,17ff *pañcakkhandhe aniccato passanto*, etc. Analogously, the normal locative is *pañcasu khandhesu*, abl. *pañcahi khandhehi*, and gen. *pañcannaṁ khandhānaṁ*, with very few occurrences (and mostly only in the Burmese tradition at that) of compound forms like *pañcakkhandesu*.[2] An exceptional loc. sg. *pañcakkhandhe* ("the set of five *khandha*s"?)[3] is, however, found in Kv 421,2ff (X.1): *upapattesiye*[4] *pañcakkhandhe*[5] *aniruddhe* (loc. abs., cf. Kv-a 122,8-11 [corr. in accordance with CSCD]: ... *bahuvacanabhummatthe ekavacanabhummaṁ* "loc. sg. in the sense of a loc. pl."). In AN

173.4. The close semantic relationship between *upaya* and *upādāna* as well as other expressions for clinging is also confirmed by a phrase, found in several places, in which *upaya* is, like *upādāna*, obviously used as an action noun,[874] viz.,

> *rūpe* (etc.) *ye upayupādānā cetaso adhiṭṭhānābhinivesānusayā*
>
> involvement and appropriation, mental fixation (or: claims?),[875] clinging and (subconscious) adhering in respect of the body (etc.).[876]

The quasi-synonymity of these terms becomes still more evident in some *Saṁyuttanikāya* occurrences where this sequence is preceded by and combined with another sequence, consisting of the notions of desire (*chanda*), passionate attachment (*rāga*), delight (*nandī*) and craving (*taṇhā*).[877]

173.5. In what amounts to a Sanskrit version of the second half of the *Bījasūtra*, the phrase

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IV 147,19f, the occurrence of *pañcakkhandhe* (to be construed with *aniccānupassī viharati*) is confined to Burmese manuscripts. — Another question is whether a construction of *upaya* with a locative would be possible at all, as Matsumoto (M2: 460,2-16) assumes also in the case of Sn 787ab (*upayo hi dhammesu upeti vādaṁ*), following the Chinese rendering of the line in MPPU 61a7 (有受法故有諸論 "Because there is grasping at doctrines *(dhamma)*, there are disputes"; cf. LAMOTTE 1949: 41) against the Theravāda exegetical tradition, which construes the locative with *upeti vādaṁ* (cf. the translation in NORMAN 1992: 92). Actually, we cannot even be sure of the precise wording of the original on which the Chinese rendering was based.

[1] I.e., a fixed unit (because of the sandhi) but not yet a compound properly speaking.

[2] E.g., Sn-a I 366,9f; Ps I 31,26f *pañcasu khandhesu*, but CSCD (and quotation in Sadd I 304,31) *pañca-kkhandhesu*. To judge from the few pertinent examples I have collected, Sanskrit śāstras seem to prefer compound forms: *pañcaskandheṣu* AKBh 17,20 (EJ. 27,9); AKVy 49,10; *pañcaskandhānāṁ* $AA\bar{A}_W$ 141,1; *pañcaskandhaiḥ* $AA\bar{A}_W$ 558,20.

[3] Cf. SamBh 168,5f: *pañcaskandhasya* (see fn. 1379).

[4] So to read with B[e]: see *CPD* II 519b s.v. (*uppatt*)°*esiya* and *DP* I: 462b (but *uppatt*° for the present passage at *CPD* II 678b s.v. °-*esiya* and *DP* I 690a s.v. *kiriyā* 3).

[5] Thus CSCD and *DP* I: 690a s.v. *kiriyā* 3; PTS: *pañca khandhe*.

[873] SN III 73: *upādiyamāno kho bhikkhu baddho Mārassa, anupādiyamāno mutto pāpimato*; cf. VETTER 2000: 212.

[874] Cf. Spk II 33,10-16: *tattha upayā* (ed. here and afterwards *upā*°) *ti dve upayā: taṇh'upayo ca diṭṭh'upayo ca. upādānādīsu pi es' eva nayo. taṇhā-diṭṭhiyo hi yasmā ahaṁ-maman-ti-ādīhi ākārehi tebhūmaka-dhamme upenti upagaccanti, tasmā upayā ti vuccanti. yasmā pana te dhamme upādi-yanti ..., tasmā upādānā ti ... vuccanti.*

[875] Cf. the meaning "taking (formal) possession of" (*DP* I: 88b), "in Besitz nehmen" (*SWTF* I 38b) for *adhiṭṭhāna*/*adhiṣṭhāna*, which may suggest, for the present context, a mental claim to be in or come into possession of something.

[876] MN III 30,31f; transl. adapted from VETTER 2000: 142. Cf. also the corresponding verbal sequences *(rūpaṁ) upeti upādiyati adhiṭṭhāti ('attā me' ti)* and *(tass' ime pañc' upādānakkhandhā) upetā upādinnā* (SN III 114,25-29; VETTER 2000: 230; cf. also fn. 1137).

[877] SN III 10,8-10 (22.3); 13,11-13 (22.4); 161,29f (22.112); 191,2f (23.3); 194,7f (23.10), but also MN III 32,24-26 (as against III 30,31f, etc. [see fn. 876], and 31,25f, etc.). Cf. VETTER 2000: 170 and 329 (F XIV). This addition disregards the slight difference between *upaya*/*upādāna* and *nandī(rāga)* assumed in § 173.1, as does also the final part of the *Bījasutta* as well as the end of the *Upayasutta*, where liberation is stated to be due to the elimination of passionate attachment (*rāga*) with regard to the body, etc. Still, what is eliminated must comprise both actual emotional delight (*nandī*) and the deeper, innate involvement (*upādāna*). The texts may have been composed from slightly heterogeneous elements of tradition.

rūpopagaṁ vijñānaṁ tiṣṭhati rūpālambanam ...[878]

is even preceded by, and functions as an explication of, an introductory statement that there are four [acts of] taking possession[879] and appropriation that function as the support for *vijñāna*'s persisting [in *saṁsāra*]:

catvāri imāny upadhyupādānāny ālambanāni bhavanti vijñānasya sthitaye.[880]

In this introductory statement, Pāli *upaya* (in *upayupādāna*) has been sanskritized not as *upaga* (as in the explicatory part) but as *upadhi*, probably in order to do justice to its function as an action noun quasi-synonymous with *upādāna*, a function which *upaga* lacks but which *upadhi* can have in the canonical language.[881]

174.1. In support of a passive-objective meaning of *upādāna* (in the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*), Matsumoto (M2: 344f) adduces the above-mentioned *Upādānasutta(I)* (SN 12.52: see § 172.2), where *upādāna*, equated with *āhāra* ("nutriment"), is used in the sense of "fuel", i.e., for Matsumoto, in the sense of what is seized (or appropriated, assimilated) by the fire, taken by him to imply that it is the 'locus' of the fire because fuel *underlies* the fire (M2: 348). Matsumoto has to admit that the conceptual framework of the *Upādānasutta(I)* is different from that of the *Bījasutta* (SN 22.54) since in the former there is no mention of the pattern of the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s and the special position of *viññāṇa* this pattern implies. Even so, he feels entitled to apply the comparison of the *Upādānasutta(I)* to the conceptual framework of the *Bījasutta* because, in view of the fact that the canonical texts make frequent use of set phrases or stereotyped elements, the comparison can be segregated from its actual context (M2: 347f).

174.2. To begin with, there are plenty of comparisons with fire or fire-metaphors in the canon, but in its specific wording the fire simile of the *Upādānasutta(I)* does not seem to occur anywhere else, nor does it give the impression that it is heterogenous to its context. This would not of course exclude the possibility that it could be hinted at or implicitly presupposed in another text. But in the case of the *Bījasutta* (/-*sūtra*) this would involve a tacit mixing up

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878 VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a1 (see § 200.2 with fn. 1102).

879 This is, in my opinion, the natural way of understanding *upadhi* in this context, but it should be noted that the exegetical interpretation in the VinSg is different in this regard (see § 200.3).

880 See § 200.2 with fn. 1100.

881 Cf. *CPD* II 453b: "... thus [*upadhi*] means, objectively, possessions, belongings ..., subjectively the attachment to, affection for, clinging to these possessions"; *DP* I: 454a: "worldly possessions or belongings, acquisitions (according to cts including the body); attachment to such possessions (forming a basis for rebirth)"; VETTER 2000: 39 n. 72 (*upadhi* meaning either things one possesses or the impulse to take possession of things). It is not always easy to decide which of these two aspects is prevalent. The ambivalence of the expression is still reflected in the Theravāda commentarial distinction of four kinds of *upadhi*: whereas *kāmūpadhi* and *khandhūpadhi* represent the objective aspect (acquisitions consisting in sensual pleasures and in the constituents of a person, respectively), *kilesūpadhi* and *abhisaṅkhārūpadhi* would seem to stand for the subjective aspect (acquisitive mental stimuli consisting in defilements and in karmic impulses, respectively); for an explicit equation of *upadhi* with defilements, especially attachment or appropriation, see, e.g., Nidd I 86,1-3 (ad Sn 789c): *sopadhīko ti sarāgo ... sataṇho ... sakileso sa-upādāno*. Similarly, Vi 168a1f and a24f (Vi$_2$ 126a28f and b19f) contrast the subjective aspect of *upadhi* consisting in defilements (煩惱依 = **kleśopadhi*) with the objective aspect consisting in the body that has been born (生身依 = **janmakāyopadhi*?). In early Yogācāra, the objective aspect seems to prevail (cf. fn. 1105). A comprehensive in-depth study of this interesting term in the different Buddhist traditions is, of course, beyond the limits of the present study.

of two distinct similes/metaphors, viz., that of fire and that of plant growth, which appears improbable.[882] On the other hand, as pointed out in § 172.2, the *Upādānasutta(I)* is only one item in a set of sermons that use either the simile of fire (a bonfire or the flame of a lamp) or that of a tree (a large tree or a sapling), both of which persist and grow as long as they get enough fuel or nutriment, in order to illustrate the fact that craving (*taṇhā*) will grow and entail grasping, reincarnation and suffering as long as, and only as long as, one continues to see enjoyment (*assādānupassin*) in things that invite appropriation (*upādāniyesu dhammesu*) or are favourable to bondage (*saṁyojaniya*). It would therefore, in the case of the *Bījasutta* (/-*sūtra*), appear more appropriate, if evidence for a use of *upādāna* in the sense of 'fuel' or (since we are dealing with plants) rather nutritive substance is sought for, to refer to those sermons of the aforementioned set that use vegetation imagery — all the more so in view of the fact that in two of the aforementioned sermons the conceptual framework is indeed extended[883] so as to include more members of the chain of dependent origination, one of them (SN 12.58) starting with *nāmarūpa* and the other (SN 12.59)[884] with *viññāṇa*, thus, in spite of the absence of the concept of the *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s, coming closer to the conceptual framework of the *Bījasutta* (/-*sūtra*).

174.3. 1. Even so — and this is important for my argument — there is, in the aforementioned sermons, a decisive difference between the similes[885] and the situation they are meant to illustrate. The fire and the tree or sapling automatically 'grasp' and consume the fuel or nutriment as long as it is available or supplied by an external agent. In other words: if the fuel or nutriment is in reach, the fire automatically continues burning, the tree persists and the sapling goes on growing. It is only by way of an external agent who stops the supply of fuel or nutriment that the process is stopped. In the case of a human being, however, the dhammas inviting appropriation or grasping (*upādāniya*) — the 'potential fuel', as GOMBRICH (2009: 115) appropriately calls them — are, by themselves, not sufficient for arousing the fire of craving. Rather, they can do so only if one sees enjoyment (*assāda*) in them. Likewise, they

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[882] Such a mixture is, however, in an *explicit* form found in a passage of the *Śālistambasūtra* that is also referred to by Matsumoto (M2: 345 text [166]), viz.,

yathâgnir upādānapratyaye sati jvalati, upādānavaikalyān na jvalati, evam eva ... karmaklesajanitaṁ vijñānabījaṁ ... mātuḥ kukṣau nāmarūpāṅkuram abhinirvartayati (PrasP 568,13-15).

For Matsumoto, the doctrinal concept corresponding to fire in the fire simile is *vijñāna* (M2: 346,6), and as for fuel he suggests that it should be equated with the four *vijñānasthiti*s, which though not mentioned in the text should be regarded as implied in view of the term *vijñānabīja* that is reminiscent of the *Bījasūtra* (M2: 347,7-13). But if *vijñāna* is taken to correspond to fire, wouldn't it be more natural to take karma and *kleśa*s (as the causes that are stated to produce the seed-like *vijñāna*) to correspond to fuel? Or couldn't even the seed-like *vijñāna* produced by them represent fuel and the *nāmarūpa* engendered by the latter in the womb at the moment of reincarnation fire? As for Matsumoto's (M2: 346,6-8) interpretation of the term *pratyaya* and the locativus absolutus in terms of 'locus', see § 190 (with fn. 1040) and fn. 1320.

[883] The secondary character of this enlargement becomes evident by the fact that we get, in this way, a sequence of two rebirths, which seems superfluous.

[884] Cf. NidSa no. 2; $SĀ_c$ no. 284.

[885] Whether the simile in the *Upādānasutta(I)* was originally not just a simile (GOMBRICH 2009: 115) is a question that need not be decided here. In its transmitted setting, the simile of the big bonfire is just one among others, and the similes of the huge (or full-grown?) tree and the sapling surely lack any relation to fire (at any rate to fire as a metaphor of passion, etc., or suffering). Apart from this, *upādāniya* alternates with *saṁyojaniya*, which can hardly be associated with the fire/fuel imagery.

do not automatically entail rebirth, but do so only if craving has arisen and has entailed grasping (*upādāna*), or (if we keep to the fire metaphor) has converted the 'potential fuel' into 'actual fuel' (*upādāna*) for the fire of suffering in the next life.[886] Thus, the decisive factor (or even the actual 'fuel' in a deeper sense)[887] is not the things that invite grasping as such — regardless of whether these are the sense objects or the *khandha*s — but the person's reaction to them, i.e., whether one sees enjoyment or danger in them and consequently grasps at them or lets them go. This holds, of course, also good in the conceptual framework of the *Bījasūtra*. Here, too, the decisive point is not that *vijñāna* is merely furnished with the *vijñānasthiti*s as its support but that it keeps clinging to or grasping at them. For whereas the fire and the tree will *automatically* grasp the fuel or nutriment as long as it is available or supplied by an external agent, human beings are free to either continue or stop their involvement in the things that invite appropriation, and this also holds good when it is not the conventional person but *viññāṇa* as the centre of the person that is taken to function as the subject of this activity. Therefore, in the conceptual framework of the *Bījasūtra*, too, the decisive point is not that *vijñāna* is merely furnished with the *vijñānasthiti*s as its support; rather, what matters is that it keeps clinging to or grasping at them. In other words, even if the *upādāna* in the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is understood in a passive sense, the active connotation must be included; for even in this case the *vijñāna* would have to be taken to be furnished with [the *vijñānasthiti*s] as the objective support of its *ongoing clinging* to them. From this perspective, it would, however, be less tortuous to take the decisive facet of appropriation in the active sense of clinging or grasping as the primary connotation and to understand *sopādāna* as "connected with clinging".

175.0. There are some more occurrences of *sopādāna* (Pā. *sa-upādāna*) in the early canonical texts. In the passages I have noted, the substantive qualified by this expression is normally a *person*. In one case, it is *nibbāna*, and in a simile it is *fire*. As an attribute of *vijñāna*, I have noted *sopādāna*/*sa-upādāna* only in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version of the *Bījasūtra* and in one more sermon of this tradition, but nowhere in the Pāli canon. There are, however, a couple of sermons where a *monk* is stated to be *sa-upādāna* because his *viññāṇa* is still bent on or attached to something (*tannissitaṁ tadupādānaṁ*).

175.1.1. One of these passages is found in MN no. 106 (*Āneñjasappāya-sutta*)[888] and deals with a monk who has reached disinterestedness (*upekkhā*) with regard to becoming or possessing [anything], but who approves of,[889] welcomes and becomes attached to this very disinterestedness. The consequence is that his *viññāṇa* ends up bent on this disinterestedness (*tannissitaṁ*) and clings to it (*tadupādānam*).[890] Thus, this monk is still endowed with

[886] Cf. Spk II 82,1f.

[887] Cf. also § 175.2.2 (with fn. 912).

[888] MN II 264,29–265,13, corresponding to MĀ$_C$ 543a16-27 (no. 75) and AKṬU P tu 262a4–b1 (D ju 229b2-6). Cf. ANĀLAYO 2011: II 613–617.

[889] Cf. VETTER 2000: 173 with n. 24 (with reference to the same phrase at SN III 14,28f; cf. also MN III 285,6f).

[890] Cf. ÑĀṆAMOLI & BODHI 1995: 872: "As he does so, his consciousness becomes dependent on it and clings to it." Buddhaghosa, too, obviously takes *upādāna* as an action noun here: Ps IV 66,18f: *yaṁ taṁ nikantiviññāṇaṁ* (with B^e) *taṁ tassa upādānaṁ nāma gahaṇaṁ nāma hoti*. Yet, a passive-objective interpretation of *upādāna* in this passage would not appear impossible either: His *viññāṇa*

clinging or grasping (*sa-upādāna*)[891] and hence does not attain *nibbāna*, though what he is still clinging to is the foremost possible object-of-clinging (*upādānaseṭṭhaṁ*), viz., the sphere of being neither [fully] conscious nor [entirely] unconscious (*nevasaññānāsaññāyatana*).[892] In the final part of this passage, *upādāna* is clearly used in the passive-objective sense (see § 172.2), but in the preceding occurrences the spiritually negative act of clinging is essential.[893] Even if we also take *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense in these occurrences, we would have to stress that for this monk disinterestedness (*upekkhā*) is *not* merely a *possible* object of clinging in an abstract sense but one that is *actually* or at least *latently* clung to by him individually, and that he is *sa-upādāna* in the sense that he has something he *actually or latently* still clings to.[894]

175.1.2. The same formula as in the first part of the preceding passage is also used in SN 35.118–119 (*Sakka*, *Pañcasikha*).[895] Here, however, the monk in question is a person who does not guard the doors of his senses, and the objects in which he will take delight are pleasant *objects*: sense objects like pleasant visible things (*rūpa*) or objects of thought or mental contemplation (*dhamma*). In this case, too, taking delight means that the *viññāṇa* becomes dependent on these objects (*tannissita*) and attached to them (*tadupādāna*),[896] with the effect that such a monk remains under the sway of attachment (*sa-upādāna*) and does not attain *nibbāna*. In this case, the pattern of the *vijñānasthiti*s would be applicable only if it is understood to include external objects, as in one of the interpretations reported by the *Vibhāṣā*,[897] and it would definitely only work in the sense of their being the point of reference of spiritually negative clinging, not of being appropriated as part of one's basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*). And just as in the preceding passage, even if *upādāna* were taken in a passive-objective sense designating the objects of clinging, the essential point would be that they are not just possible objects of clinging but are actually or latently clung to by this individual.

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still has that [disinterestedness] as something clung to, or as its 'fuel'. — It is worth noting that this sentence (as well as the corresponding one in MN II 265,17-19) has no equivalent in $MĀ_C$ and AKṬU.

[891] Ps (IV 66,20: *sa-upādāno ti sagahaṇo*) once again takes *upādāna* as an action noun.

[892] In the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version, the situation is less clear. According to the Tibetan version, the *upādāna* by which the *āryaśrāvaka* under discussion is still *sopādāna* is stated to be the highest form of *upādāna*, characterized as/by "a last remainder of [reproductive] impulses (**saṁskārāvaśeṣa*?) [referring to] the summit of mundane existence (*bhavāgra*), i.e., [to] the *naivasaṁjñānāsaṁjñāyatana*" (AKṬU P tu 262a7f [D ju 229b4f]: ... *'phags pa nyan thos de'i dus na nye bar len pa gang gis nye bar len pa dang bcas pa'i nye bar len pa 'di ni mchog |... 'di lta ste | srid pa'i rtse mo ste | 'du shes med 'du shes med min skye mched kyi 'du byed lhag ma'o ||*). It would seem that in this version *upādāna* is, in this situation, understood as a remainder or latent residue of clinging to mundane existence in its most subtle form.

[893] Cf. the question in MN II 265,6f: "Clinging to what ... is that monk still clinging?" (*kahaṁ pana so ... bhikkhu upādiyamāno upādiyati*).

[894] This must be the meaning of the Chinese rendering ($MĀ_C$ 543a21f) of **sopādāna* as 有所受 ("[still] has [something] that he appropriates"), which suggests a passive-objective understanding.

[895] No Chinese parallel is known to me.

[896] Spk II 391,11f: *tadupādānan ti taṁgahaṇaṁ, taṇhāgahaṇena sahagataṁ* (CSCD) *viññāṇaṁ hotîti attho*.

[897] Vi 706b20f (cf. § 157.2).

175.1.3. As indicated above (§ 175.0), the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda canon contains, beside the *Bījasūtra*, yet another occurrence of the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānaṁ*, viz., in $S\bar{A}_c$ no. 1175, corresponding to SN 35.204 (*Kiṁsukā*: IV 194f). In this text, the *body* consisting of the four primary elements is compared to a city in the centre of which the **sopādānaṁ vijñānam* (or perhaps: the **sopādāno vijñānaskandhaḥ*; Pāli only: the *viññāṇa*) resides as the lord of the city.[898] In the $S\bar{A}_c$ version, the city has four gates, representing the four *vijñānasthiti*s, guarded by the four applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) as the gatekeepers.[899] This sounds somewhat odd since the third item of the *vijñānasthiti* pattern, viz., *saṁjñā*, does not exactly correspond to the third *smṛtyupasthāna*, which is rather concerned with the mind (*citta*).[900] Apart from this, the comparison of the four *vijñānasthiti*s with the gates appears rather unnatural, still more so since the body had already been equated with the city as a whole. Actually, in the Pāli version the city has *six* doors corresponding to the six senses and *one* gatekeeper identified with mindfulness.[901] This suggests that the $S\bar{A}_c$ version may have undergone alteration, perhaps with the aim of integrating the four *vijñānasthiti*s. This may also be the reason why in this version *vijñāna* is specified as *sopādāna*, the precise meaning and function of which is, however, hardly illumined by the context.[902] On the other hand, what is noteworthy with regard to Saṁdh V is that the $S\bar{A}_c$ version agrees with the Pāli version in that the *viññāṇa*, or the **sopādānam vijñānam*, resides *in the body*, not in (all) the four *vijñānasthiti*s.

175.1.4. One more sermon may be worth mentioning in this connection, viz., the *Bhava-sutta*,[903] also quoted by Matsumoto,[904] because it is closely related to the *Bījasutta* in that it, too, compares *viññāṇa* to a seed, though without specifying it as *sāhāra* or *sopādāna* and without applying the pattern of the four *vijñānaṭṭhiti*s. Rather, in this text, *karma* is the field where the seed, viz., *viññāṇa*, is planted and moistened by craving (*taṇhā*), with the effect that the *viññāṇa* of sentient beings who are obstructed by ignorance and fettered by craving becomes established (*patiṭṭhita*) in a lower, medium or exquisite world-sphere, so that they will be reborn there in the future. Matsumoto (M2: 329,18f) takes the *viññāṇa*'s being

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[898] $S\bar{A}_c$ 315c29f and 316a3: 所謂城者, 以譬人身麁色。... 城主者, 謂識受陰 (lit. **vijñānopādāna-skandhaḥ*), quoted in Vi 903a11f (如契經說: 言城主者 即有取識 : **sopādānaṁ vijñānam*; likewise Vi_2 16a3f, with 有漏識, suggesting **sāsravaṁ vijñānam*, and Vi_3 428a8f, with 識盛陰, lit. **vijñāno-pādānaskandhaḥ*, as in SĀc) and HsienY 549a6f (又說: ... 言城主者, 即是一切有取識蘊, lit. **sopā-dāno vijñānaskandhaḥ*; cf. von Rospatt 1995: 237). SN IV 194,27f and 195,3f (Bodhi 2000: II 1252f [no. 35.245]): *nagaran ti kho ... imass' etaṁ catumahābhūtikassa kāyassa adhivacanaṁ ...* | *... nagarasāmîti kho ... viññāṇass' etam adhivacanam.*

[899] $S\bar{A}_c$ 316a2f: 四門者, 謂四識住。四守門者, 謂四念處。

[900] Cf., however, the occurrence of the same correspondence at Nett 83,19–84,22, esp. 84,5+11 (*citte cittānupassī viharanto ..., saññupikā c'assa viññāṇaṭṭhiti pariññaṁ gacchati*).

[901] SN IV 194,32-34: *cha dvārā ti kho ... chann' etam ajjattikānaṁ āyatanānaṁ adhivacanaṁ* | *dovā-riko ti kho ... satiyā etam adhivacanam.*

[902] This specification may perhaps be taken to indicate that in the $S\bar{A}_c$ version the person under consideration is not yet free from bondage but, in view of the reference to mindfulness, is striving, or at least advised to strive, for liberation.

[903] AN I 223f (no. 3.76); parallels: T 2.150a: 881c4-21 (transl. by An Shih-kao) and PSVyṬ P chi 147a3-b1 (D chi 123a6–b3).

[904] M2: 329 texts [150] and [151].

established in one of the three world-spheres to be not much different from its being established in the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s, but even if this is accepted it is obvious that the statement that the mind becomes established in them must refer to what happens, on account of ignorance and craving, already in the present life, i.e., it refers, most probably, to an emotional fixation on or involvement in further becoming, directed by the respective karma.[905] This becomes more explicit in a parallel sermon (AN I 224: no. 3.77), where it is not the *viññāṇa* that is stated to become established but intention (or longing?)[906] (*cetanā*)[907] and aspiration (*patthanā*).

175.2.0. From among the passages that use *sa-upādāna* without reference to *viññāṇa*, it may suffice to select just two, because of their special interest for the present discussion.

175.2.1. The first one is MN I 64,31ff (no. 11: *Cūḷasīhanādasutta*),[908] where the final goal (*niṭṭhā*) is stated to be for one who is free from *upādāna*, not *sa-upādāna*. Since this statement concludes a sequence of similar statements according to which the final goal is for one who has rid himself of passionate attachment, hatred, delusion, craving and *upādāna*, not for one who is affected by them, we can be fairly sure that in this series *upādāna* denotes a spiritually harmful attitude, not an object, and that *sa-upādāna* characterizes the person as "not affected by appropriation (i.e., grasping, clinging)",[909] but the connotation 'fuel [for rebirth]' is by no means excluded.

175.2.2. The second passage is from SN no. 44.9 (*Kutūhalasālā*: IV 399f).[910] In this text, the Buddha states, in a dialogue with the wandering mendicant Vacchagotta, that only a person who has *upādāna* will be reborn, not one who is without *upādāna*, just as fire continues to burn only when it has fuel (*sa-upādāna*), not without fuel. The comparison may suggest identifying the *upādāna* that is presupposed for a person's persisting in *saṁsāra* with the five *upādānakkhandha*s or with the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s, but once again the decisive point is that the person still identifies himself with and clings to these items. This becomes clear in the final part of the dialogue; for Vaccha is not satisfied and goes on asking: What is the fuel of a flame that is flung by the wind and may even go a considerable distance? The Buddha answers that in this case its fuel is the wind. Analogously, when one lays down (*nikkhipati*) the present body but has not yet reached another, new body,[911] one is fuelled by craving

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[905] Cf. Mp II 334,27: *viññāṇaṁ patiṭṭhitan ti abhisaṅkhāraviññāṇaṁ patiṭṭhitaṁ*, i.e., the "consciousness that prepares ... (new birth)" (*DP* I: 219a).

[906] Cf. *BHSD* 232b (s.v. 1 *cetayati*).

[907] Cf. PSVyṬ P chi 147a5 (D chi 123a7f): *'dod pa'i srid pa na sems pa dman pa la rnam par shes pa rab tu gnas pa yin no*, etc.

[908] Chin. parallels see ANĀLAYO 2011: 99f.

[909] Cf. Ps II 10,23: *sa-upādānassā ti gahaṇavasena*; 10,29f: *gahaṇaṭṭhena upādānaṁ*.

[910] Cf. SĀ$_c$ no 957 (244a22ff). Cf. ELTSCHINGER & RATIÉ 2013: 75 n. 97 (in connection with a similar idea expressed in MSABh 156,20f).

[911] As Bhikkhu Bodhi (2000 II 1456 n. 382) rightly points out, this passage suggests (in contradiction to Theravāda orthodoxy) the possibility of a temporal gap between the death moment and reconception. In the Chinese version (SĀ$_c$ 244b2-4), the sentient being is stated to mount a 'mind-made' body (**manomayaḥ kāyaḥ*)[1] in order to move from the place of dying to the place of rebirth (乘意生身 往生餘處), which clearly suggests the idea of an intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). The passage is in fact adduced as a scriptural support of *antarābhava* in Vi 357a2f (Vi$_2$ 264b29–c2) and defended against

(*taṇhā*).[912] This statement makes clear that the real force due to which sentient beings (or, for that matter, *viññāṇa* as their centre) persist in *saṁsāra* is *craving*, and that rebirth is, ultimately, not dependent on a person's being endowed with the *vijñānasthiti*s as far as they are just present, but on the subjective act of clinging to them. The initial *sa-upādāna* thus turns out to have, in the case of sentient beings, a double meaning: "fuel" and, in a deeper sense, "clinging".[913]

175.2.3. In addition, it may be worth noting that in the (canonical) *Mahāniddesa*[914] the expression *sa-upādāna* is used as equivalent to *sakilesa* because it occurs, along with the latter, at the end of a series of explanations of *sopadhīka* (Sn 789),[915] said of a person and preceded by a set of adjectives indicating association with more specific unwholesome attitudes. For any unbiased reader, the natural explanation will surely be that *upādāna* is used here in its subjective meaning of "clinging, grasping", in a wider sense practically equivalent to "defilement" (*kilesa*), as is often the case in Abhidharmic literature.[916] The same close association of *sa-upādāna* (again as qualifying a person, but in direct connection with rebirth) with *sakilesa* is also attested in the paracanonical *Milindapañha* (Mil 32,14-18). Here, too, *sa-upādāna* qualifies a person, but in direct connection with rebirth: Only a person who is affected by defilements (*sa(k)kilesa*) will be reborn, and accordingly the monk Nāgasena himself will only be reborn in case he is is still affected by clinging (*sa-upādāna*). The argument does not make sense unless *sa(k)kilesa* and *sa-upādāna* are equivalent, as is explicitly confirmed by the *Ṭīkā* (Mil-ṭ 10,3: *sa-upādāno ti sakileso*). In this case, too, taking *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense would render things unnecessarily complicated.

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the Vibhajyavādin's attempt to refer the 'mind-made' body to an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* (Vi 357c19–358a9; Vi$_2$ 264c28–265a12: *Vātsyasūtra* 婆蹉經). Cf. also CSL 256b16f (and c5-8: *Vātsyasūtra* 和蹉經); SāṁmitNŚ 470b21-24 (*Vātsyāyanasūtra* 跋蹉耶那修多羅).

[1] I.e., a body consisting of subtle matter (*rūpa*), like those deliberately created by the mind of advanced meditators or those of the deities of the *rūpadhātu*: cf. HAMILTON 1996: 148–163, esp. 153,21-23 or 157,34-38.

[912] SN IV 400,5-8: *yasmiṁ kho, Vaccha, samaye imañ ca kāyaṁ nikkhipati, satto ca aññataraṁ kāyaṁ anuppanno hoti, tam ahaṁ taṇhūpādānaṁ vadāmi. taṇhā hi'ssa, Vaccha, tasmiṁ samaye upādānaṁ hotī ti.* My paraphrase basically follows the translation in BODHI 2000: II 1393. The reading *anuppanno* (so also Spk III 114,24-26) is problematic; E^e suggests *anuppatto*, but *CPD* I 195a prefers the B^e reading *anupapanno* (so also Spk and *Ṭīkā* in CSCD), which indeed seems to make better sense. SĀ$_C$ (往生 "going towards being [re]born", see fn. 911) appears to confirm a form of *upa-√pad* (cf. *HIRAKAWA* 442a) but not the negation, obviously taking the statement to refer to the movement taking place in the intermediate existence (*antarābhava*). It is possible that the Theravāda tradition somehow tampered with the text and that this has also resulted in the strange position of *satto* ("sentient being"), which in view of *ca* must formally be construed with the second part of the relative clause.

[913] Cf. SN$_{Bo}$ II 1456 n. 381: "There is a double meaning here, with *upādāna* meaning both 'fuel' and subjective 'clinging' ...".

[914] Nidd I 86,1-3: *sopadhīko ti sarāgo sadoso samoho samāno sataṇho sadiṭṭhi sakileso sa-upādāno.*

[915] Obviously understood, by the *Niddesa*, in a subjective sense (i.e., as "attachment to possessions", see fn. 881). The same holds good for Sn-a (II 526,23: *rāgādīhi upadhīhi sa-upadhiko*).

[916] Cf., e.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 166,24f (*upādānā(ḥ)* [sic ms.] as one of the quasi-synonyms for *kleśāḥ*) and 168,2 (*ātmabhāvaprabandhopādāyakatvād upādānā⟨ḥ⟩*; cf. AHN 2003: 76 # 8.1 and 78 # 8.2.h); AKBh 5,10: *upādānāni kleśāḥ*; NA 333a18: "The term *upādāna* is applied precisely to the *āsrava*s" (即諸漏中立取名想).

176.0. In connection with *sa-upādāna*, mention should, perhaps, also be made of the expression *sa-upādisesa*, mostly used in opposition to *anupādisesa*. Both expressions are used of *nibbāna* or *nibbānadhātu* (corresponding to *sopadhiśeṣa* and *nirupadhiśeṣa* in the Sanskrit tradition), but also of *persons*, and in one text (MN no. 105: *Sunakkhattasutta*), in a simile, of *poison*.[917]

176.1. In connection with *nirvāṇa*(*dhātu*), the meaning of the two terms and their Sanskrit equivalents is normally based on a passive-objective (or locative) interpretation of *upādi* (/*upadhi*). As is well known, the *sa-upādisesaṁ nibbānaṁ* (/*sopadhiśeṣaṁ nirvāṇam*) is the state of an *arhat* as long as he is still alive, whereas the *anupādisesaṁ nibbānaṁ* (/*nirupadhi-śeṣaṁ nirvāṇaṁ*) is the state of such a person after death. In the former state an arhat is, of course, free from all kinds of attachment (i.e., from appropriation in the active sense of grasping or clinging, or, in other terms, from all defilements) but still endowed with a last set of *khandha*s as his 'property' or 'possessions' resulting from his former karma and defilements. In terms of the fire metaphor, we might say that although the fire of attachment has been quenched and thus no further fuel that would ignite the fire of rebirth is collected, there is still a remainder of fuel (*upādisesa*)[918] due to previous accumulation, and some fire in the form of physical suffering, or mundane existence, continues for a while until the remaining fuel is consumed. When this remainder of fuel is exhausted, the fire of suffering, too, goes out and the person attains complete *nibbāna*[919] without any remainder of 'property' or

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[917] See *DP* I: 482.

[918] Cf. GOMBRICH 2009: 116.

[919] It is worth noting that in the earlier canonical texts *nibbāna* in its metaphorical use is, to be sure, occasionally equated or connected with the cessation of craving or spiritually unwholesome factors (e.g., Vin I 5,3 = MN I 167,37, etc.; SN IV 251,19f) or even with the cessation of becoming (*bhava*, i.e., the sequence of mundane existences: SN II 117,10; AN V 9,28f). Still, the actual (grammatical or logical) subject of *nibbāna*(/*nibbā(ya)ti*/*nibbuto*), without and especially with the prefix *pari-*, is almost consistently a *person*, or persons (cf. *PTC* and *DP* II s.v.). If this is basically what Enomoto (2012, e.g. 154,14-16; 155,2f, 15-20 and 22f) wants to say when he states — as an answer to the question of precisely what goes out when saints enter (*pari*)*nibbāna* at the end of their life — that what goes out is the fire consisting in their self (*attan*, 自己) in the sense of the individual 'person' as the subject of the sequence of saṁsāric existences, I have no problem, provided that the ontological status of this 'self' or 'person' is taken to be as yet unreflected, or deliberately left undetermined. But I must confess that I have some difficulty with Enomoto's (2012: 152f) derivation of this thesis from SN 7.1.9 (I 169,16-27; SOM. 363f)[1], for as far as I can see, the fire metaphor is used there in a *positive* sense. In contrast to the *external* ritual fire of the brahmin interlocutor, the Buddha declares, with obvious allusion to Upaniṣadic ideas (ENOMOTO 2012: 153f), one should constantly kindle an *inner* fire, situated in the heart: a fire consisting in a well-tamed self (=personality: *attā sudanto*) and continuously supplied with fuel through his being always composed (*niccasamāhitatto*: double meaning, cf. ibid. 153,4-12); the brahmin's inner fire is indicated to be obscured by the smoke of anger, etc. There is, however, no occurrence of the concept of "going out" (*nibbāna*) is this text, and this is hardly accidental since the 'well-tamed, composed self' is a spiritual *value*, to which the fire-metaphor is applied in the sense of *shining*, and not of burning (causing pain) so that it would require extinction. What requires extinction is the saṁsāric self or individual 'person' as such, and although meditative concentration may indeed have the effect of keeping the body temporarily alive, it hardly does so for the sake of prolonging saṁsāric existence for its own sake, and hence hardly serves as 'fuel' for the saṁsāric 'self' as such. For this reason, I find Enomoto's (152,13-21) suggestion that in the case of the Buddha's *parinibbāna* his entering into meditative concentration amounts to supplying fuel to his *attan*-fire and that emerging from this concentration (immediately before passing away) causes the extinction of this *attan*-fire somewhat problematic.

'possessions' consisting in *khandha*s resulting from former appropriation. This interpretation of the two terms in connection with Nirvana is the standard one in the Theravāda tradition[920] as well as in Yogācāra,[921] and as far as I can see also in the Sarvāstivāda tradition.[922]

176.2. In connection with *persons*, however, some canonical texts at least seem to presuppose a different use of the expressions *sa-upādisesa* and *anupādisesa*. In AN IV 74–79 (no. 7.53: *Tissa*),[923] e.g., certain deities are stated to be able to recognize whether a person is liberated (*vimutta*) but still has a remainder of *upādi* (*sa-upādisesa*) or is completely liberated, without a remainder of *upādi*. This cannot refer to the distinction between arhats who are still alive and arhats after death.[924] The subsequent explanation rather shows that the deities are able to distinguish between, on the one hand, persons who are completely liberated and can be seen by deities and humans as long as they are still alive but will no longer be seen by them after death, and, on the other hand, such persons who have entered the Path but still need training in order to become arhats. Therefore, in this case the decisive difference must consist

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[1] The Chinese versions (SĀ$_C$ 320c29–321a10; T 2.100: 409b12-21) differ in several regards, which would require a separate study.

[920] Cf., e.g., It no. 44 (38,4ff); VisM XVI.73; It-a II 119,9-15: *arahattamaggena asesaṁ rāgaggi-ādiṁ nibbāpetvā sa-upādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā ṭhitā ... carimaka-citta-nirodhena anupādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā asesaṁ parinibbanti*; Dhp-a II 163,6-10: *arahattapattito paṭṭhāya kilesavaṭṭassa khepitattā sa-upādisesena, carimacittanirodhena khandhavaṭṭassa khepitattā anupādisesena ... parinibbutā ..., anupādāno viya padīpo apaṇṇattikabhāvaṁ gatā ....* According to Spk I 21,15-26, '*nibbāna* with a remainder of *upādi*' is characterized by the fact that [those of] the four immaterial *khandha*s (i.e., of mind and mental factors) that are not earned by previous karma (see § 210) do not arise any longer [while those *khandha*s which are earned by karma still continue] (Spk I 21,19-21 with v.l.: *an-upādiṇṇakānaṁ catunnaṁ arūpakkhandhānaṁ appavattivasena sa-upādisesaṁ nibbānaṁ kathitaṁ hoti*), and '*nibbāna* without a remainder of *upādi*' is characterized by the fact that the five *khandha*s that are earned by karma (i.e., the respective part of the immaterial khandhas and the body) also do not arise any longer (Spk I 21,24-26: *upādiṇṇakānaṁ pañcannaṁ khandhānaṁ appavattivasena anupādisesaṁ nibbānaṁ kathitaṁ hoti*). As the *Ṭīkā* on the passage elucidates, the statement that in 'Nirvana with a remainder of *upādi*' immaterial factors not earned [by previous karma] (*anupādiṇṇaka*) do not arise any longer is not intended to exclude the arising of *neutral* mental functions (*kiriyā*) that are not the result of previous karma but only those that are beneficial (*kusala*) or detrimental (*akusala*) (CSCD: *Sagāthakavagga-ṭīkā* # 2; My. I 62: *anupādiṇṇakānan⁻ti kusalākusalānaṁ; na h' ettha kiriyākhandhānaṁ appavatti adhippetā*); for in Theravāda Abhidharma the fact that an arhat is free from all defilements, even from craving for agreeable rebirth, and not in need of further spiritual progress has led to the conclusion that even the category *kusala* is inapplicable to an arhat's mental states. The *Abhinavaṭīkā* on the *Sīlakkhandha* (of DN; cf. VON HINÜBER1996 # 382) is quite explicit in defining '*upādi*' in the term *anupādisesā nibbānadhātu* as follows: "[The expression] '*upādi*' [is used here] in the sense of what is appropriated by karma and defilements; [it consists in] the [immaterial] *khandha*s insofar as they are maturation [of karma] and in matter [that has arisen] because of [karma] having been created" (My. I 38: *upādīyate kammakilesehîti upādi, vipākakkhandhā, kaṭattā ca rūpaṁ*; quoted from CSCD). Thus, *upādi* in this context has obviously come to be interpreted in terms of *upādiṇṇa* as a technical term, which will be discussed in ch. 4.2.5.5(.2).

[921] Cf., e.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,11–203,2 (see fns. 1216–1221).

[922] JP$_H$ 923b12-19 (JP$_S$ 777c14-22); Vi 167b14–168c1 (Vi$_2$ 126a8–c16).

[923] Most of the sūtra is quoted in Vi 208c12–209b25 (with commentarial insertions 209a2-8 and b5-12) and Vi$_2$ 155c24–156b20 (comm. insertions 156a13-17 and b6-9).

[924] In the Chinese version quoted in the *Vibhāṣā*, *both* kinds of persons (certain nuns, just as in the Pāli version) are expressly stated to have died in the meantime (Vi 208c15f; Vi$_2$ 155c27–156a1).

in that the first category of persons is completely free from appropriation in the sense of *clinging* or attachment, i.e., free from defilements, whereas the latter has removed clinging only partially, with a remainder of it still being left. In other words: in this text, *upādi* (equated with *upādāna* in the commentary)[925] is more likely to be taken as an action noun. In the same sense, *sa-upādisesa* is also used in AN IV 378–382 (no. 9.12: *Sa-upādisesa*), which deal with nine kinds of persons who die with a remainder of clinging or attachment (*sa-upādisesa*) but are nevertheless not reborn in evil existences because they have practised morality (*sīla*), cultivated (some) meditative concentration (*samādhi*) and attained some (but not complete) insight (*paññā*). They are quite obviously not yet arhats, i.e., not persons completely free of clinging and thus merely left with the *khandha*s of the present life as a remnant of fuel, so to speak, for in this case they would not be reborn at all but would enter final Nirvana at the very moment of death.[926]

176.3. The use of *sa-upādisesa* and *anupādisesa* with reference to poison in the *Sunakkhattasutta* (MN II 257,1f, etc.) is quite interesting because it would associate the concept of *upādi*/*upādāna* with yet another image (in addition to that of fuel/fire and that of nutriment /vegetation) and because it would suggest an aspect of latency (cf. *DP* 482, rendering *sa-upādisesa* as "with a *trace* or infection remaining, leaving some infection"). However, as far as I can see the (unfortunately scanty) fragments of and quotations from the Sarvāstivāda version of this sūtra (called *Śalyasūtra* in this tradition)[927] do not use the expression *upādi* or *upādāna* in the respective context but merely refer to the presence or absence of a remainder or residue (*sāvaśeṣa*, *niravaśeṣa*). Thus, it is doubtful whether the specific use of *upādi* in the *Sunakkhattasutta* has any significance for development of the semantic content of *upādi* or *upādāna* in the Sarvāstivāda or Yogācāra tradition. At any rate, in view of the textual difficulties involved,[928] this issue must be left to an in-depth study of the materials concerned.

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[925] Mp IV 40,6f: *sa-upādisese vā sa-upādiseso ti sa-upādānasese puggale sa-upānānaseso ayan ti.* Cf. also IV 174,11f (ad AN IV 379,24f): ... *sa-upādisesan ti sa-upādānasesaṁ. anupādisesan ti upādāna-sesa(ka)rahitaṁ niggahaṇaṁ.*

[926] Cf. also Sn 354c (= Th 1274c), where, with regard to a recently deceased master, the question is raised whether he gained quenching or had some grasping remaining (*nibbāyi so ādu sa-upādiseso*; cf. NORMAN 1992: 39; 1969: 116 but also 299; LOVEJOY 1898: 134f). Since the person has already died, *sa-upādisesa* cannot, in this passage, refer to a remainder of *khandha*s but only to the possibility that he may not have been completely free from grasping or attachment (and thus has not gained quenching, i.e., final *nibbāna*, but will be reborn). The commentary (Sn-a I 350,23f; Th-a III 201,33f) is quite explicit in referring "quenching" to the *anupādisesā nibbānadhātu* of a person not in need of further training (*ase(k)kha*, i.e., an arhat) and *sa-upādisesa* to the state of a person in need of further training (*sek(k)ha*). At Sn 140,15 (prose; cf. NORMAN 1992: 82), the phrase *sati vā upādisese* is referred to a person who has merely attained the state of an *anāgāmin* because a remnant of clinging is still left.

[927] For Sanskrit fragments, see ANĀLAYO 2011: II 610 n. 131. In addition, there are important excerpts from this sūtra in Saṅghabhadra's NA: cf. 716c12-14; 717c5–718b4 (partly quotations, partly paraphrases, partly discussion); 719a19-21; 720b1f.

[928] Cf., with regard to simile of the poisoned arrow, ANĀLAYO 2011: II 611 n. 136.

4.2.5.3. Excursus: *sāsrava* and *sopādāna*

177. In S 1987 (# 4.3) I argued that in the expression *sopādāna*, *upādāna* is used in the sense of (spiritually negative) clinging, because *sopādāna* is at times found in juxtaposition with *sāsrava* ("contaminated").[929] To this, Matsumoto (M2: 331ff) rightly objects that in some of the examples pointed out by me what is juxtaposed with *sāsrava* is not *sopādāna* but *sopādānīya*. This expression in its turn he considers, mainly on the basis of earlier Chinese translations, to be, in some cases at least, a secondary distortion or corruption of an original *upādānīya*, which is attested in canonical Sarvāstivāda texts[930] as well as in the Theravāda canon (Pā. *upādāniya*), occasionally also in juxtaposition with *sāsava*.[931] This is important for Matsumoto because his main purpose is to eliminate evidence for a use of *upādāna* as an action noun in favour of its being used in a passive-objective sense, a use he apparently considers to be corroborated if it can be shown that only the juxtaposition of *sās(r)ava* with *upādāniya* is authentic and that the collocation of *sāsrava* with *sopādāna* or *sopādānīya* is due to a later remodelling of the respective passages. However, my own concern was not so much the question whether, in *sopādāna*, *upādāna* should be understood as an action noun or in a passive-objective sense but rather with the question of what *type* of *upādāna* is involved. In this perspective, the juxtaposition with *sāsrava* doubtless points to spiritually negative clinging, regardless of whether we have to do with *sopādāna*, *sopādānīya* or *upādāniya* and regardless of precisely how the relation of the items qualified by these adjectives to spiritually negative clinging must be defined. Nonetheless, a more detailed discussion of some points touched by Matsumoto may not be entirely superfluous.

178.0. Let me start with Matsumoto's doubts concerning the authenticity of most of the occurrences of the forms *sopādāna* and *sopādānīya* in connection with *sāsrava*, particularly of those contained in texts transmitted in the original Sanskrit.

178.1. In *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) 197,13 Vasubandhu has a discussant quote a sūtra where it is stated that all visibles (sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, dharmas, i.e., all possible objects of sensory and non-sensory awareness) that are *sāsrava* and *sopādānīya* are the basis of mental obduracy and disparagement(?)[932] (*cetaḥkhilamrakṣavastu*).[933] Matsumoto

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[929] See fn. 559. Cf. also fn. 898 (**sopādāna* in Vi and HsienY but **sāsrava* in Vi_2)..

[930] NidSa, sūtras 1–4: *upādānīyeṣu dharmeṣu* (reconstructible from more or less fragmentary evidence in ## 1.5, 2.3, 2.5, 2.6, and 2.10).

[931] SN III 47,26ff (*Khandhasutta*: no. 22.48): *yaṁ kiñci rūpaṁ ... sāsavaṁ upādāniyaṁ* ..., and analogously for *vedanā*, etc; DN III 272,20f: *phasso sāsavo upādāniyo*. — Cf., in this connection, also [1.] the distinction between a supranormal accomplishment (*iddhi*) that is noble (*ariya*) and one that is not noble but "connected with contaminants and attachment-to-possessions" (*sāsavā sa-upadhikā*: DN III 112,7ff), [2.] the dichotomy of right view (*sammādiṭṭhi*), etc., into a supramundane one that is free from *āsavas* and another one that is *sāsava* and *upadhivepakka*, i.e., results in [a new set of] 'possessions' (i.e., *khandhas*, viz., in the next life) (MN III 72,4ff), and [3.] the parallelism of *upadhi-sukha* and *sāsavasukha* (after *gihisukha* and *kāmasukha*) at AN I 80f. For *upadhi*, see fn. 881.

[932] This rendering follows SALOMON 2000: 174. The VaSg (II.8.vii) in its exegesis of the same sūtra seems to understand *mrakṣa* in the sense of concealment of [one's own] evil intentions (YBh_t P 'i 281b1 = D zi 243a1: *sdig pa'i bsam pa yang mkhyud par 'gyur zhing 'chab pa bskyed do*; cf. YBh_c 825c24; AHN 2003: 249 with n. 339). Cf. also NORMAN 1992: 6 (Sn 56) and 127 (Sn 1132). In Vibh 357,15-17 and Nidd II (Nāl.) 217,15f, *makkho* is equated with *niṭṭhuriya*, which is understood as "envy" in Nidd I 440,24-28, but could also mean "hardness, roughness", a meaning that would come remarkably close to that of *khila*.

(M2: 334f) points out that in contrast to the Chinese rendering by both Paramārtha and Hsüan-tsang, viz., 有取, which taken by itself would correspond to **sopādāna* (有 = *sa*-, 取 = *upādāna*), the Tibetan translation of the AKBh has *nye bar len par 'gyur ba*,[934] suggesting **upādānīya*, with no element corresponding to *sa*-. This rendering is also found in the subcommentaries, with the noteworthy exception of the full quotation of the sūtra in the *Upāyikā*,[935] where we find *nye bar len pa dang bcas pa*, reflecting **sopādāna*, just like the Chinese versions. Matsumoto (M2: 336f) seems to favour the other Tibetan versions as pointing to an original reading **upādānīya*, and he finds this confirmed by the Chinese translation of the sūtra itself in the Chinese *Saṁyuktāgama*, where the term under discussion is, in contrast to *sāsrava* (有漏), not marked by an element corresponding to *sa*- but translated merely by (是)取,[936] just as in the case of the *Saṁyuktāgama* parallel[937] to the *Khandhasutta* (SN no. 22.48), where the Pāli has *upādānīya*.[938] From this, Matsumoto (M2: 338) concludes that also the Indian text on which the Chinese *Saṁyuktāgama* is based and even the original text of its quotation in the AKBh had *upādānīya*, not *sopādānīya*. But I am not sure to what extent we can rely on the Chinese *Saṁyuktāgama* translation in such subtle questions. To my mind, its rendering is rather non-committal, and for *upādānīya* one would expect 順取, or 所取 as in SĀ$_c$ no. 286 (80b19, corresponding to SN no. 12.52). In any case, the existence of a reading *sopādānīya* in the sūtra under discussion is not only confirmed by the Sanskrit mss. of Yaśomitra's *Abhidharmakośavyākhyā* (355,32f) but also corroborated by the independent evidence of a *Saṁyuktāgama* fragment from the German Turfan Collection.[939] In view of this fact, the divergence between the Chinese and Tibetan renderings of the quotation in the AKBh and its subcommentaries should most probably be explained as attempts at rendering the somewhat puzzling form *sopādānīya* (see § 185) in a meaningful way, giving preference to either *sa*- or to the suffix.

178.2. In the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh$_D$ 35,24-27), the imagination of 'I' and 'mine' (*aham iti mamêti ca vikalpaḥ*) is stated to arise in dependence on things (*vastu*) that are *sāsrava* and *sopādānīya* and have for a long time habitually been clung to and become familiar (*saṁstutam abhiniviṣṭaṁ paricitam*) as one's self or one's own (*ātmato vā*

933 The quote is adduced by "others" (*apare*) according to whom, in contrast to the Vaibhāṣikas, the physical constituents of an arhat and external matter are *anāsrava* because they are not the support of *āsrava*s: an opinion Saṅghabhadra (NA 331a27f) ascribes to the Dārṣṭāntikas.

934 Matsumoto (M2: 336) states that for the gerund *upādānīya* he would rather expect *nye bar len par bya ba* but suggests that *nye bar len par 'gyur ba* may also be acceptable as a paraphrase of the future (*nye bar blang ba*). Actually, the Tibetan rendering rather shows that the translators understood the suffix in the looser sense of "leading to X, inviting X" (cf. § 180.1 with fn. 960).

935 AKṬU P tu 239a3; D ju 209b2. Cf. M2: 335.

936 SĀ$_c$ 92b11f (no. 332).

937 SĀ$_c$ 13b20 (no. 55).

938 Cf., however, the similar definition of the *upādānaskandha*s in MĀ$_c$ 788b20f (若色有漏有受, 覺想行識有漏有受, 是謂陰即是盛陰。), which seems to presuppose *sāsravaṁ sopādān(iy)am*; cf. AKṬU P tu 8a6f (*zag pa dang bcas pa nye bar len pa dang bcas pa*). Cf. ANĀLAYO 2011: I 279.

939 ENOMOTO 1989a: 11 (Catalogue no. 1879: verso 2-3): *ṣaḍ imāni cetakhilaṁ mṛkṣa*[1] /// /// *dharmāḥ sāsravāḥ sopādānīyāḥ cetaḥkhilaṁ mrakṣa*[1]*va*[*s*](*tu*). [1] Ed.: "Read *cetaḥkhilamrakṣa*-(?)".

ātmīyato vā).[940] The form *sopādānīya* is confirmed here by Tib. *nye bar len pa dang mthun par bcas pa.*[941] Hsüan-tsang has only 有取,[942] but just as in the AKBh passage discussed before, this may well be his rendering of *sopādānīya*. Still, in this case, too, Matsumoto (M2: 330–333) infers, from Dharmakṣema's and Guṇavarman's earlier Chinese translations, an original reading *upādānīya* instead of *sopādānīya*. But as Matsumoto himself (M2: 332,8-10) rightly points out, Dharmakṣema's[943] rendering as 受陰 ('*upādānaskandhas*') is ad sensum, and Guṇavarman's translation[944] is, as it often is, still less literal, since he transforms the expression under discussion into a verb construed with the following *ātmato vā ātmīyato vā*: "apprehending ego and mine in what is *sāsrava*" or: "clinging to what is *sāsrava* as ego and mine" (於有漏中 取我我所). According to Matsumoto (M2: 333), this suggests a reading **yad vastu sāsravam upādānīyaṁ ... ātmato ātmīyato vā*. Yet this is by no means certain, and in the transmitted Sanskrit the predicative expression *ātmato vā ātmīyato vā* can anyway hardly be construed with the preceding (regardless of whether we read *sopādānīyaṁ* or *upādānīyaṁ*), but is required as a complement of the subsequent *saṁstutam abhiniviṣṭaṁ paricitam*. In my opinion, the variation of the Chinese renderings is rather due to the problem of the meaning of *sopādānīya* than to textual variants. Since Matsumoto (M2: 332,16ff) takes *sopādānīya* to mean "having something that is (or should/can be) grasped (or clung to)", he understandably has problems with its being predicated of 'things' (*vastu*). But what could have been the motive of a redactor for introducing such an odd reading into not only the text of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* but also of the sūtra discussed in § 178.1, where the situation is similar, *sopādānīya* being predicated of all the five *skandhas* (cf. M2: 338,9-12)?

178.3. In the case of the collocation of *sāsrava* and *sopādāna* at *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh$_{Sh}$) 490,7, Matsumoto (M2: 325,10-17; 474 n. 233) is sceptical because in this case *sāsrava* is found only in the Tibetan and Chinese translations, but is missing in the Skt. manuscript. This is true, but the same collocation also occurs a few lines before, and in this case it is contained in the Skt. manuscript as well.[945] What is specified here in this way are the *skandhas*: those

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[940] For a translation, see S 1987: 362 n. 540. Cf. also TAKAHASHI 2005: 109 and 174 (# 8.3.4) and HsienY 558b25-29, where 有漏有取 confirms *sāsravam sopādān(īy)am*. For *-sthānīya* see fn. 946, for *pratītya* fn. 761. Matsumoto (M2: 473 n. 216) rightly criticizes my rendering of *sopādānīya* as "under the sway of clinging" because *upādānīya* cannot not mean "clinging". Actually, I should not have translated *sopādānīya* in the same way as *sopādāna* but perhaps rather as "liable to be connected with clinging", or the like, but hardly as "connected with what is clung to (i.e., the five *skandhas* as 'locus')", as Matsumoto (M2: 341,14: 「取られるもの」(基体) である四蘊を有する) seems to prefer. Cf. § 187.3.

[941] YBh$_t$ P zhi 34b7; D wi 29a7.

[942] YBh$_c$ 490a15.

[943] T 30.1581: 895c6.

[944] T 30.1582: 970c13f.

[945] ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 489,19f: *ye sukhavedanīyāḥ skandhāḥ sāsravāḥ sopādānās ...* (YBh$_t$ P wi 224b7f: *zag pa dang bcas pa dang nye bar len pa dang bcas pa*; YBh$_c$ 474a20: 有漏有取). I ought to have referred, of course, in S 1987 n. 496, to this latter occurrence. I apologize for my inadvertence. A qualification of the *skandhas* as *sopādāna* (without *sāsrava*) is found at ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 257,12f (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 124,4: *ye skandhā anityā udayavyayayuktāḥ sopādānās ... dauṣṭhulyopagatā ayogakṣemapatitāḥ ...*). In this case, *sāsrava* is not represented in Tib. (YBh$_t$ P wi 117a3f) and Ch. either.

that make for pleasant feeling (*sukhavedanīya*) in the latter passage and those that are liable to give rise to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling (*aduḥkhāsukhasthānīya*)[946] in the former.

178.4. Another occurrence of the collocation of *sāsrava* and *sopādāna* discussed by Matsumoto (M2: 325–330) is in the sixth chapter of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*,[947] where what is qualified thus is the mind [functioning like a] seed (*cittabīja*). Here too Matsumoto (M2: 328) suggests that *sopādāna* may have been absent from the earliest form of the text because it is, to be sure, confirmed by the textual tradition from Kumārajīva onward[948] but not represented in the earliest Chinese translation, viz., Dharmarakṣa's. I must leave it to specialists to decide to what extent Dharmarakṣa's renderings allow conclusions with regard to details of the wording of the Indian original used by him, but in the present case his translation is quite different from the other versions since he speaks of one whose mind is well cultivated, who has *eliminated* the *āsrava*s and attained true fundamental nothingness.[949] Since the passage is clearly based on the canonical *Bhavasūtra* (see § 175.1.4) and, at least indirectly, also akin to the *Bījasūtra*, the qualification of the seed-like mind as *sopādāna* would appear quite natural, and in any case from the time of Kumārajīva onward the collocation of *sāsrava* and *sopādāna* in this passage is indisputably documented.[950]

179. As far as I can see, a collocation of *sāsrava* with *upādānīya* is nowhere attested in the transmitted Sanskrit text of the sources referred to in §§ 178.1–178.4, and the word *upādānīya* itself seems to be quite rare in Yogācāra texts.[951] This appears to be different in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, provided that we are justified in expecting Hsüan-tsang to use 有取 in the case of the forms beginning with *sa-*. If this is so, we may assume that instances where he uses the rendering (隨)順取 correspond to **upādānīya*. Some of these passages are interesting with regard to the relation of **upādānīya* to *sāsrava*, because they do not merely collocate the two terms[952] but expressly point out their functional equivalence[953] or even use one of them in

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[946] For *-sthānīya* (M2: 473 n. 218) see *DP* II s.v. *ṭhānīya* 1.(ii): "being a source or a cause (for)"; *CPD* and *DP* I s.v. *āsavaṭṭhānĭya* (*CPD*: "giving rise to ..."); *SWTF* s. v. *sthānīya* 1; Mp IV 116,8f: *āsavānaṁ kāraṇabhūtehi* (for AN IV 224,28 *āsavaṭṭhānīyehi*); Ps III 155,7-10 (= Sp 191,30ff): *āsavā tiṭṭhanti etesū ti āsavaṭṭhānīyā ..., yasmā nesaṁ* (gen.pl.) *te kāraṇaṁ hontîti attho*. Cf. also AKVy 311,8, glossing *saumanasyasthānīyāni* by *saumanasyajanakāni*.

[947] DBhS$_R$ 6C (48,8-12; DBhS$_K$ 97,3-6; see § 188.3.1). Cf. M2: 325f: text [144].

[948] T 10.286: 514c2-5 (Kumārajīva); T 9.278: 558b17-21 (Buddhabhadra); T 26.1522: 168b9-12 (Bodhiruci); T 10.279: 193c22-25 (Śikṣānanda); T 10.287: 552c16-20 (Śīladharma). Cf. M2: 326f: texts [146]–[149] (not including Bodhiruci).

[949] T 10.285: 476a12f: 心善自修 消除諸漏 至真本無. Cf. M2: 326 text [145]. For 本無, see ZACCHETTI 2005: 308 n. 495.

[950] Even if Matsumoto's view that the passage may originally have contained only *sāsrava* and that *sopādāna* was added later (i.e., after Dharmarakṣa) is accepted, I fail to see how this could be used as an argument against the semantic affinity of the two expressions or against the assumption that in these expressions both *āsrava* and *upādāna* denote spiritually negative attitudes (cf. M2: 330,4-7). All that could be said is that *sāsrava* would have been supplemented by another expression of similar import, perhaps because this expression had already been used, in the same context, in the *Bījasūtra*.

[951] So far, I have noted only YBh$_{Bh}$ 220,10f: *tṛṣṇôpādānasya kathaṁ ... pratyayaḥ? chandarāgasahagatatvāt tadupādānīyeṣu dharmeṣu ruciniveśanapratyayatvāt sahabhāvapratyayaḥ*, and PSVy$_{Tu}$ 246,13f (sūtra quotation!).

[952] Thus SaṅgP 400c17 (IV.23; cf. M2: 305: text [113]; context: definition of the four *vijñānasthiti*s); Vi 706c2 and c14 (see § 187.1). Cf. also M2: 325,5-9.

order to define the other (see § 181.1 and 181.3). On the other hand, there are also cases where the use of 有取 besides 有漏 suggests a juxtaposition of *sāsrava* and **sopādān(īy)a*.[954] In one of these cases, viz., a quotation from the *Vijñānakāya* in the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (Vi 544c13), Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the passage in the *Vijñānakāya* itself[955] clearly suggests a collocation of *sāsrava* and **sopādānīya*.

180.1. As regards the *meaning* of the terms under discussion, in the Pāli canon *sa-upādāna* and *upādānĭya* do not seem to be semantically equivalent. As indicated in § 175, *sa-upādāna* is predicated of fire, persons, the *viññāṇa*, or states (like a spiritual state mistaken for *nibbāna*), in the sense of being with fuel, also as a metaphor, but in this case mostly involving the greedy intake of this 'fuel' or the grasping for further 'fuel' so as to be reborn. As against this, *upādānĭya* qualifies (mundane) dharmas in general,[956] or, more specifically, the *upādānakkhandhas* (*rūpa*, etc.),[957] or the senses and their objects,[958] and it may be taken to qualify them as possible objects of appropriation (i.e., grasping, clinging),[959] or as inviting appropriation,[960] or, to use the fire metaphor, as inviting their being seized as 'fuel'.

180.2. When, as in the *Khandhasutta* (SN no. 22.48), the combination *sāsavaṁ upādānĭyaṁ* is used to distinguish one category (the *upādānakkhandhas*) from another (the *khandhas*) in a dichotomic set, it would seem justified to take the two expressions not, to be sure, as synonyms in a semantic sense but as *coextensive*, i.e., as qualifying the same range of items, and only them.[961] This assumption is confirmed by both Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma texts.

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953 Thus Prak 766b15f; cf. 725c9f (**upādānīya*) with 723c15-17 and 766a29–b2 (**sāsrava*).

954 Thus SaṅgP 434a10 and 13f (VI.23: visibles, sounds, etc.); $Prak_H$ 699b26 (cf. Vi 386a16f; but Vi_2 289b6f 是有漏是取 does not confirm *sa-*) and 723a15 (*(upādāna)skandhas*; however, Guṇabhadra's renderings 有漏盛受 and 有漏從取生 [$Prak_G$ 634c23 and 653c18] do not confirm *sa-*); Vi 543a28f and b7 (conditioned factors; quoted from the *Prajñaptiśāstra*; cf. M2: 324 text [140]). Likewise, even in the Chinese *Saṁyuktāgama*, the qualification of the mundane form of right view (*samyagdṛṣṭi*), etc., as 有漏有取 ($SĀ_C$ no. 785: 203a22, etc.) would seem to correspond to **sāsravā sopādānā* (see § 186.1).

955 VijñK 583c23, etc.: 有漏 隨順有取. Cf. M2: 324f (texts [141] and [142]).

956 SN 12.52; 12.55–56; 12.60 (alternating with *saññojaniya*, i.e., "favourable for the *saññojanas* or 'fetters', leading to bondage", in SN 12.53–54, etc.).

957 SN 22.48; 22.121 (parallel to *saññojaniya* in 22.120).

958 $SĀ_C$ no. 240 (58a3f), corresponding to SN 35.110, where, however, only the senses are listed, not their objects. The same holds good for the parallel $SĀ_C$ no. 239 corresponding to SN 35.109 (with *saññojaniya* instead of *upādāniya*).

959 I.e., if *upādānīya* is taken as a gerund (as, e.g., in Spk II 270,24: *upādātabban ti upādānīyaṁ*). Even in this case, it does not denote the *factual* object (which would have to be expressed by the present passive participle) but rather the *possible* object.

960 Cf. § 172.1 with fn. 850. For the wider range of the suffix *-anīya* see *AiGr* II.2: 208f. But in view of the variant *upādānĭya* it would also seem possible to assume a denominal formation with the suffix *-iya* < *-ika* (cf. also M2: 474 n. 232); for its semantic possibilities cf. *AiGr* II.2: 311 (# 196) referring to # 362 (suffix *-ka*, especially pp. 522ff). Cf. also § 183 with fn. 991.

961 Otherwise, if what is meant were that only such *rūpa*, etc., is comprised in the *upādānakkhandhas* that is *either sāsava or upādānĭya*, we would expect *vā*, as, e.g., in the enumeration of the various kinds of *rūpa* that are comprised in the *rūpakhandha* (cf. *ajjhattaṁ vā bahiddhā vā*, etc.). If what is intended were that in order to be comprised in the *upādānakkhandhas rūpa*, etc., must be *both sāsava*

181.1. In the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*,[962] the dhammas that are *sāsava* are defined as the wholesome, unwholesome and indeterminate (*abyākata*) dhammas of the three mundane spheres, covering all the five *khandhas* or, according to the *Vibhaṅga*, more precisely: the whole *rūpakkhandha* and part of the other four *khandhas*,[963] for there is no *anāsavaṁ rūpaṁ* in Theravāda Abhidhamma.[964] The category *anāsava* is reserved for the dhammas that constitute the four stages of the supramundane path (*magga*) and its fruits (*maggaphala*) as well as for the unconditioned realm (*asaṅkhatā dhātu*) [of *nibbāna*].[965] It thus comprises, as pointed out in the *Vibhaṅga*,[966] a part of four *khandhas*, of two *āyatanas* (viz., *manāyatana* and *dhammāyatana*) and of two *dhātus* (which must be the *dhammadhātu* and the *manoviññāṇadhātu* because the *manodhātu* is, in Theravāda Abhidhamma, merely a special function in cognitive processes involving sensory perception)[967]. Precisely the same definition as for the *sāsavā* and *anāsavā dhammā* is also given for the *upādāniyā* and *anupādāniyā dhammā*, respectively, and the former are, in addition, expressly characterized as *sāsava*, i.e., are identified (or declared to be coextensive) with this category.[968] Moreover, this holds also good for related pairs of concepts like *saññojaniya*/*asaññojaniya*,[969] *saṅkilesika*/*asaṅkilesika*,[970] etc.

181.2. The coextensiveness of the categories *sāsrava*/*anāsrava* and **upādānīya*/**anupādānīya* is also confirmed by the *Śāriputrābhidharma* of the Dharmaguptaka school, provided that the Chinese terms 當取 and 非當取 (i.e., what is suitable for being appropriated/grasped and what is not so) represent the latter pair of concepts, as is fairly sure.[971] However, in contrast to Theravāda Abhidharma, the *Śāriputrābhidharma* admits of *rūpa* that is *anāsrava*

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and *upādānīya* (in the sense of different but overlapping properties), and not merely one of them, we should probably have *ca*.

962 Dhs 196 (# 1103).

963 Cf. Vibh 64,12f: *rūpakkhandho sāsavo | cattāro khandhā siyā sāsavā siyā anāsavā.*

964 Cf., e.g., VisM XIV.215: *ettha ca yathā vedanādayo anāsavā pi atthi, na evaṁ rūpam.*

965 Dhs 196 (# 1104).

966 Cf. fn. 963 and Vibh 76,7f and 93,35f.

967 Cf. VisM XIV.115 and 118; *BW* 123f.

968 Dhs 213 (## 1219–1220). Cf. Vibh 67,29f: *rūpakkhandho upādāniyo | cattāro khandhā siyā upādāniyā siyā anupādāniyā.* Similarly, at Dhs 256 (# 1538) the *upādāniyā dhammā* are, like the *sāsavā dhammā* (246 # 1450), specified as comprising 1. the unwholesome (*akusala*) dhammas (in toto), 2. the dhammas that are wholesome (*kusala*), maturation [of kamma] (*vipāka*) or [karmically] indeterminate [factors consisting in] actions (*kiriyābyākata*) as far as they belong to the three [mundane] levels, and 3. all material factors (*rūpa*). The *anupādāniyā dhammā* (# 1539) are, like the *anāsavā dhammā* (# 1451), specified as comprising the four Paths that do not belong [to any mundane level] (*apariyāpanna*), the four fruits of asceticism (*sāmaññaphala*), and *nibbāna*.

969 Dhs 199 (## 1125–1126); Vibh 64,35f. For the parallelism of *upādāniya* and *saṁyojaniya*, see already SN 35.109–110 (IV 89); cf. also 12.52–59.

970 Dhs 217 (## 1241–1242); Vibh 68,15f.

971 ŚA 527c4f (+ b7ff: 12 *āyatanas*); 536a5f (+ 535c9ff: 18 *dhātus*), 546b14-16 (5 *skandhas*), 554c20-22 (4 *āryasatyas*); 561c11f (22 *indriyas*). In the aforementioned passages, not only **upādānīya*/*anupādānīya* but also **sopādāna*/*anupādāna* (有取無取) is, among other things, declared to be coextensive with *sāsrava*/*anāsrava*.

(and hence also **anupādānīya*).[972] Among the *dhātu*s, three can be *anāsrava*, including the *manodhātu*.[973] Apart from this, the system of the *Śāriputrābhidharma* contains nine unconditioned (**asaṁskṛta*) entities, all of which are regarded to be *anāsrava*.[974]

181.3. Similarly, in the *Prakaraṇa*, the **upādānīyāḥ* and **anupādānīyā dharmāḥ* are expressly stated to consist in the *sāsravāḥ* and *anāsravā dharmāḥ*, respectively,[975] and both pairs are specified in precisely the same terms as regards their extension, their being the object of *jñāna*s and *vijñāna*s, and the *anuśaya*s that stick to them: Like the *sāsravā dharmāḥ*, the **upādānīyā dharmāḥ* comprise the whole of 15 *dhātu*s (viz., the five sense faculties, sense objects and sense perceptions) and 10 *āyatana*s (the five sense faculties and five sense objects) and part of the remaining three *dhātu*s and two *āyatana*s, as well as part of the five *skandha*s, i.e., all dharmas that fall under *duḥkha-* and *samudayasatya*.[976] Accordingly, the **anupādānīyā dharmāḥ* are coextensive with the *anāsravā dharmāḥ* in that they cover the rest, viz., that part of three *dhātu*s (viz., *mano-*, *dharma-*, and *manovijñānadhātu*) and two *āyatana*s (*mana-* and *dharmāyatana*) as well as of the five *skandha*s that constitutes *nirodha-* and *mārgasatya*.[977] Just as in the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the same holds also good for other pairs like **saṁyojanīya*/**asaṁyojanīya* or **sāṁkleśika*/**asāṁkleśika*.[978] That the expressions **upādānīya* and **anupādānīya* denote the *sāsrava* and *anāsrava dharma*s, respectively, is also confirmed by the *Jñānaprasthāna*,[979] and here, too, the same is true of **saṁyojanīya* and **asaṁyojanīya*.[980]

181.4. Two things can be derived from these Abhidharmic treatments of *upādānĭya*: First, the notion of *upādāna* from which it is taken to be derived is that of spiritually negative

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[972] ŚA 545c28–546a9 (云何色陰聖。若色陰無漏, 是名色陰聖。…).

[973] ŚA 535c15-19 (云何意界無漏。若意界無愛, 是名意界無漏…). In the system of the ŚA, the *manodhātu* seems to be the first moment of a non-sensory cognition (ŚA 535a5-7; 545b22f: 云何意界。意知法思惟法 若初心已生今生當生不定, 是名意界; cf. the definition of the *mana-āyatana* at 526a10-12).

[974] ŚA 527b26f and c2-4. Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1995: 114.

[975] $Prak_H$ 715c15-17: 順取法云何。謂 一切有漏法。非順取法云何。謂 一切無漏法。Similarly $Prak_G$ 648b10f: 云何取生法。謂 有漏法。云何非取生法。謂 無漏法。

[976] See $Prak_H$ 725c9f (順取法, 十八界十二處五蘊攝, 八智知, 除滅道智, 六識識, 一切隨眠隨增。) beside 723c15-17 and 766a29–b2 (有漏法, 十八界十二處五蘊攝, 八智知, 除滅道智, 六識識, 一切隨眠隨增。), and 766b2f (唯有漏法, 十五界十處非蘊攝, 二智知, 謂苦集智, 五識識, 一切隨眠隨增。), valid for **upādānīya* as well according to 766b15f (順取非順取法, 如有漏無漏法應知。). Cf. Vi 392b17-19; Vi_2 293b17f; AKBh 21,21–22,1 (EJ. 33,20–34,2).

[977] See $Prak_H$ 725c10-12 (非順取法, 三界二處五蘊攝, 八智知。除苦集智, 一識識, 非隨眠隨增。) beside 723c17f and 766b3-5 (無漏法, 三界二處五蘊攝, 八智知, 除苦集智, 一識識, 非隨眠隨增。), and 766b5f (唯無漏法, 非界非處非蘊攝, 二智知, 謂滅道智, 非識識, 非隨眠隨增。), valid for **anupādānīya* as well according to 766b15f (順取非順取法, ... 如有漏無漏法應知。). Cf. Vi 392b19f; Vi_2 293b18f; AKBh 21,21-23. The part of the *rūpaskandha* that is *anāsrava* must be the *anāsravā avijñaptiḥ* (AKBh 196,10-12); cf· $Prak_H$ 731c2-4 and $Prak_G$ 662a16-18.

[978] $Prak_H$ 715c11f and 20f; 725b28–c2 and c18-21 (with v.l. 雜染 for 染污); 766b15f.

[979] JP_H 988c27-29: 順取是何義。答 此增語所顯有漏法。非順取是何義。答 此增語所顯無漏法。; similarly JP_S 864c19f.

[980] JP_H 988c29–989a2; JP_S 864c20-22.

clinging, more precisely, the fourfold *upādāna* (viz., *kāmopādāna*, etc.).[981] Second, the application of the term *upādānīya* is, like that of *sāsrava*, fairly comprehensive,[982] comprising all mundane dharmas, even the four *upādāna*s themselves.[983]

182. In this perspective, it hardly comes as a surprise that the *definitions* of **upādānīya* assembled in the *Vibhāṣā* when it comments on the *Jñānaprasthāna*'s equation of the **upādānīyā dharmāḥ* with the *sāsravā dharmāḥ* (see § 181.3) include a fairly broad spectrum of nuances. According to one group of definitions, dharmas are called *upādānīya* because they arise from clinging (*upādāna*) and/or produce it,[984] or because they are induced, nurtured or increased by clinging and/or induce, nurture or increase clinging in their turn.[985] In a second group of definitions, no such mutual dependence is expressed. According to the first definition of this group, dharmas are called *upādānīya* because they depend on clinging just as the subjects depend on the king.[986] According to the others, what is emphasized is rather the dependence of clinging on these dharmas: they are called **upādānīya* because all forms of clinging will arise, adhere, stay on, thrive or increase, or have done so, on the basis of these dharmas,[987] because the various forms of clinging firmly stick to these dharmas like dust to a moist, greasy thing,[988] or because they like to dwell in them like fish, shrimps or frogs in water.[989] Or these dharmas are called *upādānīya* because they are the abode, support and foothold of clinging, since on the basis of these dharmas all kinds of [unwholesome] outbursts and [moral] taints [like] craving, arrogance, wrong views, [inappropriate] doubt, ill-will and delusion arise and increase.[990]

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[981] Dhs 212,7ff (## 1213ff). In the *Prakaraṇa*, too, the definition of **upādānīya* is obviously related to **upādāna* in the sense of spiritually negative clinging, which in its turn is explained as the four *upādāna*s ($Prak_H$ 715c12).

[982] Cf., in this connection, the explanation of *upādānīya* in DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN 1931–1932: 115 n. 1: "qui entretient quelque rapport, hormis le rapport de contrariété, avec les upādānas".

[983] Thus expressly Dhs 213,30f (# 1223): ... *tan' eva upādānāni upādānā c'eva upādāniyā ca.* Similarly in the case of the *āsava*s: Dhs 196,26f (# 1107). Cf., in this connection, also AS 18,4 (AS_G 20,23): *kathaṁ sāsravaṁ ...? āsravatadātmato 'pi ...*, with ASBh 23,15: *āsravāṇāṁ sāsravatvaṁ, āsravasvabhāvena yuktatvāt*, and NA 720a8f: "... because all *āsrava*s are also called 'dharmas favourable for (or: liable to give rise to) [other] *āsrava*s' (**āsravasthānīya*?); for since the 'dharmas that are favourable for *āsrava*s' comprise all *sāsrava dharma*s, it is not reasonably possible to say that they do not [also] comprise the *āsrava*s [themselves]" (諸漏亦名順漏法故。謂 順漏法 攝有漏盡 理不應言 不攝諸漏。).

[984] Vi 713a4-6: 有說。此法 從取生 能生取 故名順取。有說。此法 從取轉 能轉取 故名順取。

[985] Vi 713a6-8: 有說。此法 取所引 能引取 故名順取。有說。此法 取所長養 能長養取 故名順取。有說。此法 取所增廣 增廣於取 故名順取。

[986] Vi 713a9f: 有說。此法 繫屬於取 故名順取。如屬王者 名為順王。

[987] Vi 713a11-15: 有說。諸取 於此法中 將生已生 將執已執 將住已住 故名順取。有說。諸取 於此法中 將長養 已長養 故名順取。有說。諸取 於此法中 將增廣 已增廣 故名順取。

[988] Vi 713a15f: 有說。諸取 於此堅著, 如濕膩物 塵垢隨著, 故名順取。

[989] Vi 713a16-18: 有說。諸取 於此樂住, 如魚蝦蟇 樂處水中, 故名順取。

[990] Vi 713a18-20: 有說。此法 為取舍宅安立足處 故名順取。謂 依此法 一切愛慢見疑瞋癡 諸纏垢等 皆生長故。

183. In Theravāda exegetic literature, I have found only sporadic explanations of *upādāniya*, all of which take the term to express the dependence of clinging on the dharmas characterized as *upādāniya*: they are favourable for the [four] forms of clinging because they entail these forms of clinging when they have become the objective support (*ārammaṇa*) [of one's mind].[991] In other words, the *upādāniyā dhammā* are designated as they are because they can function as the condition of the four *upādāna*s in terms of their objective support.[992]

184.0. Of course, like *upādāniya*, so also *sāsrava*, comprising all mundane dharmas, must be defined in such a way that the prefix *sa-* includes a very broad spectrum of relations, not merely association (*saṁprayoga*) in the technical sense, which holds good only for mind and mental factors as far as they are actually accompanied by *ās(r)ava*s, i.e., are unwholesome (*akuśala*) or (in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma) at least defiled (*kliṣṭa*).

184.1. In this sense, Buddhaghosa explains, in *Visuddhimagga* XIV.10, *sāsava* not only as "associated with *āsava*s" (*āsavasaṁpayuttā sāsavā*) but also, and in the first place, as "being the objective support of *āsava*s" (*āsavānaṁ ārammaṇabhūtā sāsavā*).[993] On other occasions, only this latter aspect is mentioned,[994] as in the case of *upādāniya* (see § 183).

184.2.1. The *Vibhāṣā* offers a number of rather flexible definitions of *sāsrava* ("contaminated"), like "dharmas that nourish, favour and support the various forms of mundane existence (*bhava*)",[995] "dharmas that cause the various forms of mundane existence to continue [after death so that] birth, aging, illness and dying go on and do not cease",[996] "dharmas that [become] the basis (**vastu*) of the belief in an substantial ego (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) and are included in *duḥkha*- and *samudayasatya*",[997] or "dharmas that make the *āsrava*s

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[991] Asl 42,21f (# 103): *ārammaṇabhāvaṁ upagantvā upādānasambandhanena upādānānaṁ hitā ti upādāniyā*. Similarly Paṭis-a I 109,9-11. According to *CPD* II 492a, the *Saddanīti* has *upādānasaṁvaḍḍhanena upādānānaṁ hitam tesaṁ vā ārammaṇaṁ ti upādāniyaṁ*, which suggests two different facets of meaning: increasing the *upādāna*s and functioning as their object. — In a note (M2: 468,3f), Matsumoto suggests to interpret the above-quoted explanation of *upādāniyā* (sc. *dhammā*) = *upādānānaṁ hitā* as 諸の取によって置かれるもの, i.e., as 'locus (基体). But this rendering, in which *hita* seems to be taken in the older sense of "put, placed", should surely be rejected, since *hita* is not used in this sense in Pāli (see *DP* II 383). The expression *upādānānaṁ hitā* can hardly mean anything else but "favourable to the various forms of grasping".

[992] Spk II 270,22f: *upādāniyan ti tath'eva* (i.e., *ārammaṇabhāvena*: 270,21) *upādānānaṁ paccayabhūtaṁ*. Cf. Sv III 1056,22f; Asl 42,22f; Spk II 81,28f: *upādāniyesū 'ti catunnaṁ upādānānaṁ paccayesu tebhūmaka-dhammesu*.

[993] For a similar differentiation in connection with the term *anuśaya* see AKBh 308,10f: *anuśerate dvābhyāṁ prakārābhyām: ālambanataḥ saṁprayogataś ca*.

[994] Cf. Spk II 270,21f (ad SN no. 22.48): "*sāsava* means: that which is a condition of the *āsava*s by being their objective support" (*sāsavan ti āsavānaṁ ārammaṇabhāvena paccayabhūtaṁ*), the literal analysis of the compound being: "[That a dhamma is] *sāsava* means [that it is connected] with *āsava*s [in such a way] that [these *āsava*s] have emerged making it (i.e., the respective dhamma) their objective support" (*ārammaṇaṁ katvā pavattehi saha āsavehī ti sāsavaṁ*: Spk II 270,23f; cf· Asl 48,23f).

[995] Vi 392b20f (Vi$_2$ 293b20; cf. Vi$_3$ 464a6f): 若法能長養諸有 攝益諸有 任持諸有，是有漏義。

[996] Vi 392b22f (Vi$_2$ 293b21f; cf. Vi$_3$ 464a8): 復次 若法能令諸有相續 生老病死流轉不絕，是有漏義。

[997] Vi 392b26f (Vi$_2$ 293b22f; cf. Vi$_3$ 464a9-11): 復次 若法是有身見事 苦集諦攝，是有漏義。

increase".[998] According to a definition ascribed to (Bhadanta-)Vasumitra, the relation between the *sāsravā dharmāḥ* and the *āsrava*s is one of mutual dependence, similar to some of the definitions of *upādānīya* (see § 182): "A characteristic of *sāsrava* [dharmas] is that they arise from *āsrava*s, [another] characteristic of *sāsrava* [dharmas] is that they generate *āsrava*s."[999]

184.2.2. In connection with the refutation of the theory, ascribed to the Mahāsāṅghikas and /or Vibhajyavādins, that the Buddha's body is *anāsrava*, the *Vibhāṣā* argues that even the Buddha's physical body must be regarded as *sāsrava* because it was produced by the ignorance and craving (hence *āsrava*s) of his previous existence[1000] and because it is said to have been the object of *āsrava*s of other persons (of Anupamā's[1001] desire, of Aṅgulimāla's hatred, etc.).[1002] This argument presupposes two (complementary) facets of the notion of *sāsrava*: what is generated by *āsrava*s, and what is the (possible) object of (someone's) *āsrava*s.[1003]

185. In view of this coextension of the terms *sās(r)ava* and *upādānīya* in a broad spectrum of Abhidharma materials it would seem that in these expressions the prefix *sa-* and the suffix *-(an)īya* were felt to be functionally equivalent. My hypothesis is that for this reason the original (more or less palpable) difference between *upādānīya* and *sopādana* became effaced or at least blurred, with the effect that under the influence of *sāsrava* the formally similar *sopādāna* could intrude for *upādānīya*, or coalesce with it into the hybrid form *sopādānīya* (as in the sūtra quotation discussed in § 178.1), without any significant change of meaning being intended.[1004] Though Matsumoto (M2: 339,17–340,6) seems to tend towards a similar assumption, his bias for taking both *upādānīya* and *upādāna* exclusively in a passive/objective sense

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998 Vi 392b27f: 復次 若法能令諸漏增長, 是有漏義。

999 Vi 392b29–c1 (Vi_2 293b23-26; Vi_3 464a16-18): 尊者世友 作如是說。有漏相者, 從漏生相 是有漏相, 能生漏相 是有漏相。

1000 Cf. AS 18,5f (AS_G 20,24) *āsravānvayato 'pi* (sc. *sāsravam*), explained in ASBh 24,1 as referring to the *skandha*s of an arhat, *paurvajānmikakleśasaṁbhūtatvāt*. For this reason, arhats are not yet free from a certain inertness of [their basis-of-individual-existence as far as it is] maturation [of previous karma] (*vipākadauṣṭhulya* = *vipākasyâkarmaṇyatā*: ASBh 92,9f; cf. S 1969: 55), but in early Yogācāra this is not valid in the case of the Tathāgata (S 1969: 156–158).

1001 Cf. PANGLUNG 1981: 155.

1002 Vi 391c27f + 392a3-11 (Vi_2 293b10f + 15f; Vi_3 463a24-26 + b2-6), 871c2f + 8-17, and 229a16f + 20-24 (Vi_2 176a25f + b1-5). In Vi_2 and Vi_3 as well as in the last passage from Vi, the Siddhāntin makes use of the second argument only. Cf. also DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1931–1932: 111f.

1003 Such a comprehensive notion of *sāsrava* (and thus perhaps also of *upādānīya*) may not have been shared by all schools. In the AKBh (197,8), a position (ascribed to the Dārṣṭāntikas by Saṅghabhadra: NA 331a27f) is mentioned according to which not only the body of the Buddha but also the body of any arhat as well as all external matter (*bāhyaṁ rūpam*) is *anāsrava*, because both are not a basis (*niśraya*) of *āsrava*s. Thus, for the proponents of this position, to be the (possible or actual) objective support of anybody's *āsrava*s or the result of former *āsrava*s is obviously not sufficient to constitute a dharma as *sāsrava*. The condition would rather seem to be that a dharma is liable to become the basis or source of *āsrava*s in the same personal continuum. Even so, since the proponents of this view are reported (AKBh 197,12-14; NA 331c15-18; DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1931–1932: 122) to adduce, in favour of their position, the sūtra according to which visible things, etc., insofar as they are *sāsrava* and *sopādānīya*, are the basis of mental obduracy and disparagement(?) (*cetaḥkhilamrakṣavastu*: see § 178.1), for them, too, *sāsrava* and *(sa-)upādānīya* would seem to be coextensive.

1004 Cf. the $MĀ_C$ passage referred to in fn. 938.

prevents him from accepting the use of *sopādāna* and, particularly, *sopādānīya* in connection with all five *skandhas* as appropriate. In view of the flexible definitions of *upādānīya* (§§ 182 and 183) as well as *sāsrava* (§ 184), however, it would seem probable that *sopādāna* and *sopādānīya*, too, were used in such a flexible way. Thus, *sopādāna* could, to be sure, qualify the *vijñāna* of an ordinary person as "connected with clinging" or "connected with [*skandhas*] that are [actually] clung to" (cf. §§ 174.3 and 237.2), but could equally, in analogy to *sāsrava* (cf. § 184.1),[1005] be applied to the (*upādāna-*)*skandhas* in the sense of "connected with clinging [as possible objects of the latter]", as in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (§ 178.3). Likewise, *sopādānīya* need not mean "connected with what is, or may be, clung to", as Matsumoto puts it, but may as well, if we start from a *taddhita*-suffix, be understood as "tending, or liable, to be connected with clinging" and thus be used as a qualification of things (*vastu*) that are clung to as one's self or one's own (i.e., once again, the *upādānaskandhas*), as in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (§ 178.2).

186.1. A replacement of *upādānīya* with *sopādāna* (or its transformation into *sopādānīya*) would seem to be still less surprising in a tradition that included sūtras where *sopādāna* had already been used side by side with, or had come to be added to, *sāsrava*, as seems to be the case in a sūtra of the Chinese *Saṁyuktāgama* (SĀ$_c$ no. 785).[1006] In this text, **sāsrava* and **sopādāna* (有漏有取) qualify the eight members of the Path (**samyagdṛṣṭi*, etc.) in their mundane form, contrasted with their supramundane form in which they are **anāsrava* and **anupādāna* (無漏無取, 無漏不取). Since the eight members of the Path are either mental states or actions of body and speech, their qualification as **sāsrava* and **sopādāna* will naturally be understood as their being somehow connected with *āsravas* and clinging.

186.2. This is confirmed by the exegetical remarks on this sūtra in the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg IV.9.iii):

> In this connection, those members of the Path (**mārgāṅga*) that are mundane (**laukika*) are connected with the three *āsravas* and the four [types of] clinging (**upādāna*) and hence are not conducive to the extinction of suffering (**duḥkhakṣaya*). [But] because they are wholesome (**kuśala*), they lead to an agreeable destiny (**sugatigamanīya*).[1007]

The reference to the four types of *upādāna* side by side with the three *āsravas* leaves little doubt that *upādāna* is understood as an action noun, i.e., in the sense of (spiritually negative) clinging.

186.3. Because the mundane members of the Path are wholesome (*kuśala*), it is of course not possible that they are directly associated (*saṁprayukta*) or simultaneous with an actual occurrence of *āsravas* or clinging, which would render them unwholesome (*akuśala*) or at any

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[1005] Cf. also YBh$_t$ P zi 215a1f and 8 (D zhi 205a6f and b4; YBh$_c$ 661b21f and c2-4).

[1006] SĀ$_c$ 203a22, etc. Cf. the corresponding sūtra in AKṬU P tu 234b8ff, esp. 235a4, etc.: *zag pa dang bcas pa nye bar len pa dang bcas pa*. The somehow related sermon MN no. 117 (III 72) has only *sāsava* vs. *anāsava* (cf. also AN V 242 [10.139], where, however, only *micchādiṭṭhi*, etc., are *sāsava* whereas *sammādiṭṭhi*, etc., are exclusively *anāsava*). The parallel to MN no. 117 in MĀ$_c$ (no. 189, esp. 735c19ff) as well as the version quoted by Śamathadeva (AKṬU P thu 83a7ff, esp. 84a1ff) lack both *sāsrava* and *sopādāna*, since they do not distinguish between two forms of *samyagdṛṣṭi*, etc. (cf. ANĀLAYO 2011: 659–661).

[1007] YBh$_t$ P 'i 375a4 (D zi 329a5f; YBh$_c$ 865c6-8): *de la 'jig rten pa'i gang yin pa de ni zag pa gsum dang nye bar len pa bzhi dang 'brel bas na sdug bsngal zad par mi 'gyur ro || dge ba yin pa'i phyir ni bde 'gror 'gro bar 'gyur ro* ||.

rate defiled (*kliṣṭa*). What is meant is rather that the person is still under the sway of these defilements, i.e., has not yet eradicated them. In Yogācāra terms, this means that even the mundane members of the Path are still accompanied by these defilements in a latent form. Actually, according to the definitions of *sāsrava* as found in Yogācāra sources from the VinSg onward one reason for a dharma being *sāsrava* is its being accompanied by the latent disposition (*anuśaya*) or Seeds (*bīja*) of the *āsrava*s, or by the ongoing latent corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*) corresponding to them.[1008] And *sopādāna* qualifying the *skandha*s is associated with "accompanied by corruption" already in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*.[1009]

187.1. In view of the coextension of the terms *sāsrava* and *upādānīya* and the implied equivalence, in their case, of the prefix *sa-* and the suffix *-(an)īya*, it would not come as a big surprise if not only *upādānīya* could come to be replaced by *sopādāna* but also *sopādāna* by *upādānīya*. We may indeed have such a case in the *Vibhāṣā* in connection with the explanation of the expression *vijñānasthiti*.[1010] Three opinions are reported: According to the first, the four *vijñānasthiti*s (i.e., the four *upādānaskandha*s other than *vijñāna*) are designated as they are because the mind thrives and expands on the basis of them as long as it is moistened by delight (*nandī*) [in them].[1011] The second opinion is similar: they are named such because the mind takes hold of them and cannot abandon them as long as it is moistened by craving [for them] (**tṛṣṇā*).[1012] The most interesting one is, however, the third position:

[1008] Cf. YBh_t P zi 78a6f (D zhi 74b5; YBh_c 608a13f): *zag pa dang bcas pa rnams don gang gis yin ... ce na | smras pa | gnas ngan len dang rjes su 'brel pa'i* (D : *ba'i* P) *don ... gyis so ||*; P zi 215a5f (D zhi 205b2f; YBh_c 661b26–c1):

> The Seeds of the defilements (**kleśa*) in pellucid matter (**rūpaprasāda*, i.e., the sense faculties) and in all [kinds of] mind and mental factors as pointed out [before, viz. the wholesome, unwholesome and neutral ones], [provided that they (= these Seeds) have] not [yet been] eradicated and eliminated, are called 'evil dispositions' (**anuśaya*), and they are also [called] 'corruption' (**dauṣṭhulya*). Therefore, as long as these [Seeds] have not been completely eliminated, those [entities] are thereby called *sāsrava*, in the sense of [the continued presence of] evil dispositions (**anuśayataḥ*).
>
> *de la dang ba'i gzugs dang | sems dang sems las byung ba'i chos ji skad bstan pa thams cad la nyon mongs pa'i sa bon yang dag par ma bcom pa dang | ma spangs pa gang yin pa de ni bag la nyal zhes bya ba ste | gnas ngan len kyang de yin no || de'i phyir ji srid*[1] *du de ma lus par ma spangs pa'i bar du des na de dag bag la nyal las zag pa dang bcas pa zhes bya 'o ||*   [1] *srid* em. with Ch. 乃至 : *skad* DP.

A convenient summary of all aspects that may constitute a dharma as *sāsrava* is found in YBh_c 880a12-15 (belonging to a piece of text — dealing with the subject of *mātṛkā* — that is, to be sure, not found in YBh_t but is nonetheless regarded as an integral part of the VaSg by some scholars: cf. DELHEY 2013: 540):

> *sāsrava* are dharmas that are generated by *āsrava*s, are followed or stuck to (**anubaddha*) by the corruption (**dauṣṭhulya*) [corresponding to] the *āsrava*s, are associated with *āsrava*s, are the objective support (**ālambana*) of *āsrava*s, generate *āsrava*s, or are the support of *āsrava*s in the past, present or future.
>
> 言有漏者, 謂 若諸法 諸漏所生, 諸漏麁重之所隨縛, 諸漏相應, 諸漏所緣, 能生諸漏, 於去來今為漏依止。

[1009] ŚrBh 490,7: *skandhāḥ* ⟨*sāsravāḥ*⟩ *sopādānā dauṣṭhulyasahagatāḥ*; 257,12-14: *ye skandhā*(*ḥ*) ... *sopādānās ... dauṣṭhulyopagatāḥ*.

[1010] Cf. M2: 322f text [139].

[1011] Vi 706b28f: 有說。此中 憙所潤識 增長廣大 故名識住。Cf. 706c10f: 若法 憙所潤識 於中增長廣大 立為識住。

[1012] Vi 706b29f: 有說。此中 愛所潤識 攝受不離 故名識住。Cf. 706c12f: 若法 愛所潤識 於中攝受不離 立為識住。

the *vijñānasthiti*s have this name because all states of mind that are contaminated (有漏, **sāsrava*) and disposed to appropriation/clinging (隨順取) generate attachment to them, settle down in them and [thus] thrive.[1013] In view of Hsüan-tsang's apparent tendency to translate *sopādānīya* as "connected with appropriation" (有取)[1014] or, occasionally, "disposed to be connected with appropriation" (隨順有取)[1015] and to reserve "favourable for, or disposed to, appropriation" ((隨)順取) for *upādānīya*[1016], there is a good chance (though, to be sure, no certainty) that in the present passage, too, the original had **upādānīya*.

187.2. Matsumoto (M2: 341) is doubtless right when he points out that in the context of the *vijñānasthiti*s, where *vijñāna* functions as the subject, its qualification as **upādānīya* in the sense of "(possible) object of appropriation" or "inviting appropriation" is hardly suitable. He therefore surmises that the original Sanskrit of 隨順取 was, in this case, **sopādānīya*, which he takes to qualify *vijñāna* as "having [the remaining *skandha*s] as its object of appropriation", i.e., as its 'locus' (M2: 341,13f). Albeit with some reserves (M2: 342,7-13), he takes this to support his position that *sopādāna* in the *Bījasūtra* should be interpreted in the same way, in other words: that *upādāna* in the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* should not be taken as an action noun semantically akin to *āsrava* or *tṛṣṇā* (as Yaśomitra puts it) but in the passive /objective sense of *upādānīya* (M2: 341,14-19).

187.3. However, Matsumoto's argument does not seem to be supported by Hsüan-tsang's terminology as far as we can check it with the help of Sanskrit originals, and moreover presupposes a too narrow interpretation of *upādānīya*. In view of the flexibility of this expression (see § 182), I do not see any difficulty in its being used, in the present context, as referring to the function or attitude of the mind as the subject of clinging, and for this reason I have rendered it as "disposed to clinging". Even if the original Sanskrit had **sopādānīya*, I would, in the present context, prefer to understand this expression as meaning "disposed to be connected with clinging", not in the sense of becoming its object but in the sense of becoming associated with it. At any rate, the Sanskrit underlying the Chinese translation is a matter of conjecture, and if we keep to the Chinese, 隨順取 may as well mean "suitable *for* clinging" as "disposed *to* clinging".[1017]

188.1. Finally, a few additional remarks on the passage from *Daśabhūmikasūtra* 6C,[1018] where in the transmitted Sanskrit version, supported by all translations except Dharmarakṣa's (see § 178.4), the mind, comparable to a seed (*cittabīja*) from which the *nāmarūpa* of the next life arises like a sprout, is qualified as *sāsrava sopādāna*. It is true that the closest canonical parallel to the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (DBhS) passage is the *Bhavasūtra* (see § 175.1.4) and that in the transmitted versions of the latter sūtra *vijñāna* is not qualified as *sāsrava* and/or *sopādāna*. But the author(s) of the DBhS may have used a version of the sūtra where such a

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[1013] Vi 706c1-3: 有說。此中 諸有漏識 隨順取識 生起執著 安住增長 故名識住。Cf. 706c13-15.

[1014] See § 178.1–178.2.

[1015] VijñK 583c23, etc. (see fn. 955).

[1016] Unfortunately, among the occurrences of (隨)順取 in Hsüan-tsang's translations the only passage preserved in the original Sanskrit seems to be YBh_C 326a3 (於隨順取法中) = YBh_{Bh} 220,11 (*upādānīyeṣu dharmeṣu*).

[1017] Cf. the use of 隨順 X to render expressions like X-*anukūla*, X-*nimna*, X-*pravaṇa* (HIRAKAWA 1223b).

[1018] See fn. 947.

qualification had been added,[1019] perhaps under the influence of the *Bījasūtra*, or it was added by the author(s) of the DBhS, or by a redactor, if Dharmarakṣa's rendering of the passage does indeed mirror an earlier stage of textual development and not rather a deviant transmission, individual transformation or even corruption. In any case, I do not see any reason that would prevent us from understanding the qualification in essentially the same way as in SĀ$_{c}$ no. 785 as interpreted in the VaSg (see § 186.2), viz., as qualifying the seed-like *citta* as being still connected with contaminants ('influxes') and clinging, i.e., as belonging to a personal continuum in which *āsrava*s and clinging have not yet been eradicated.[1020]

188.2.1. However, the qualification of the seed-like mind as *sāsrava* and *sopādāna* is not the only problem discussed by Matsumoto in connection with the present DBhS passage. As he rightly points out (M2: 327,8-10), in the following part of the text, where the transmitted Sanskrit (including the earliest mss.) reads

{a} *karmakṣetrālayam avidyāndhakāraṁ tṛṣṇāsneham*,

the earlier Chinese translations add an equivalent of **vijñānabījaṁ* before *avidyāndhakāraṁ*. Although the reading of the Skt. mss. is not only confirmed by both versions of the Tibetan translation[1021] and by the latest Chinese translation, viz., the one by Śīladharma,[1022] but also by Bodhiruci's[1023] (not adduced by Matsumoto), the fact that the addition **vijñānabījaṁ* is not only found in the (closely related) versions by Kumārajīva, Buddhabhadra and Śikṣānanda[1024] but also in Dharmarakṣa[1025] is a strong argument in favour of regarding it, with Matsumoto, as an earlier reading, or at least as an early variant. At the same time, the earlier Chinese translations (including Bodhiruci) lack a separate equivalent for *ālaya* in *karmakṣetrālayam*. From this, Matsumoto (M2: 327,10) concludes that the text available to them must have read

{b} **karmakṣetraṁ vijñānabījam avidyāndhakāraṁ*[1026] *tṛṣṇāsneham*,

and that the word *ālaya* was introduced into the text only later. According to Matsumoto (M2: 327,11-19), what may have happended is that under the influence of the Yogācāra concept of

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[1019] For complications regarding the affiliation of the DBhS with any of the textual traditions of the older schools see S 1987a: 321f.

[1020] As regards the *āsrava*s, there is a parallel in DBhS$_{R}$ 17,30–18,7 (1QQ-RR; DBhS$_{K}$ 23,11–24,1): *bālapṛthagjanāḥ ... kāmabhavāvidyāsravānubaddhaiś cittamanovijñānabījais traidhātuke punarbhavāṅkuram abhinirvartayanti ...*

[1021] DBhS$_{t}$ phal-chen P li 102b3f (S ga 130a7): *las kyi zhing gi gzhi dang | ma rig pa'i mun pa* (S : *pa'i* P) *dang | sred pa'i snum*; mDo S ga 85b4: *lus* (sic; read *las*) *kyi zhing gi gzhi dang | ma rig pa'i mun pa dang | sred pa'i rlan.*

[1022] T 10.287: 552c18f: 業田攝藏 無明闇覆 愛水滋潤.

[1023] T 26.1522: 168b10f: 業為地 無明覆蔽 愛水為潤.

[1024] T 10.286: 514c3f = T 9.278: 558b19f: 所謂 業為地 識為種子 無明覆蔽 愛水為潤 (Kumārajīva, Buddhabhadra); T 10.279: 193c23f 所謂 業為田 識為種 無明闇覆 愛水為潤 (Śikṣānanda).

[1025] T 10.285: 476a14f: 所作是田(/佃), 神識是種, 無明之本 則是闇冥, 愛是潤澤.

[1026] So Skt., Tib. (*mun pa*), Dharmarakṣa (闇冥), Śikṣānanda and Śīladharma (闇覆), but Kumārajīva, Buddhabhadra and Bodhiruci have (無明)覆蔽 ("covered, concealed by *avidyā*"), which in view of the *Śālistambasūtra* (PrasP 566,12: *avidyā vijñānabījaṁ avakirati*; 566,17f: *vijñānabījaṁ ... avidyayā svavakīrṇaṁ*) may represent a variant **avidyāvakāraṁ*. Cf. DBhSVyVy D ji 72b5 (P ji 84b5), suggesting covering the seed with manure (*lud kyis dgab pa*; P wrongly *lus kyi ...*).

ālayavijñāna the expression *vijñānabījam* was replaced with the expression *ālaya*, and the latter connected with the preceding word *karmakṣetra-*. On this presupposition, he translates the transmitted Sanskrit text {a} as follows:

> That is, [the seed consisting in the mind] that has karma as its field, *ālaya*[*vijñāna* as its seed], ignorance as darkness, craving as moisture, (...).[1027]

188.2.2. In my opinion, this suggestion is inacceptable for several reasons:

1. First, Matsumoto's translation of the passage is incompatible with the text, regardless of whether we start from {a} or {b}; it rather would presuppose **karmakṣetram ālaya(vijñāna)-bījam*, which is, however, not supported by any of the transmitted versions. Actually, the expression *karmakṣetrālaya* (as an adjective, i.e., bahuvrīhi) can hardly mean anything but "having karma as its field and *ālaya*" or "having karma as its field = *ālaya*". Since *ālaya* is, in this connection, best understood as "repository" or "basis", in the sense of the ground where the seed is sown and where it rests, I prefer the second alternative: "having karma as the field or ground [where it is sown]". Since *ālaya* does not add much to the inherited expression *karmakṣetra-* except poetical flavour, the absence of an equivalent in the earlier Chinese versions may not be sufficient to prove its absence in their Indian original.

2. Second, even if the suggestion of a Yogācāra revision of a conjectural original reading **karmakṣetraṁ vijñānabījaṁ* ... in terms of the *ālayavijñāna* theory were accepted, the redactor would easily have reached his goal by prefixing *ālaya* to *vijñānabījaṁ*, whereas adding *ālaya* to the compound *karmakṣetra-* and deleting *vijñānabījaṁ* would definitely not have yielded the desired result (see para 1).

3. Third, in a Yogācāra context, the *cittabīja*, i.e., the mind that is planted (*avaropita*) or (according to another reading) impregnated (*paribhāvita*) by the *saṁskāra*s so as to be the seed of the future *nāmarūpa*, can hardly be stated to *have ālayavijñāna* as its Seed; it would rather be *identical* with *ālayavijñāna*.

188.3. 1. One more difficulty I cannot avoid touching on is the problem of the syntax of the DBhS passage under discussion. Cut down to its basic frame and without punctuation, the passage would run like this:

> {c} *teṣāṁ taiḥ saṁskārair avaropitaṁ cittabījaṁ ... āyatyāṁ ...punarbhavābhinirvṛtty-...-upagataṁ bhavati karmakṣetr...aṁ* (**vijñānabījaṁ*: add. Kum. etc.) ... *tṛṣṇāsnehaṁ asmimānapariṣyandanataḥ* (A : °*ṣyanditaṁ* B)[1028] *dṛṣṭikṛtajālapravṛddhyā* <u>*ca*</u> (A : om. B) *nāmarūpāṅkuraḥ prādurbhavati*.

Matsumoto's translation, rendered into English, would run like this:

> {d} Planted by those karmic impulses of those [persons], the seed that is the mind ... becomes endowed with the ... coming about of ... rebirth in the future. Namely, *when* [the seed that is the mind], having karma as its field, ... and craving as moisture, is irrigated by ego-conceit, [then,] due to the increase of the net made by views, the sprout that is *nāmarūpa* emerges.[1029]

[1027] M2: 326,5f: 即ち、〔心という種子(cittabīja)は〕業を田(kṣetra)とし、アーラヤ(ālaya)〔識を種子とし〕、無明(avidyā)を闇(andhakāra)とし、渇愛(tṛṣṇā)を湿潤とし、...。

[1028] See MATSUDA 1996a: 28 (ms. A: 26b2) and 75 (ms. B: 29b1f).

[1029] M2: 326,3-8 (abbreviated): 彼等の、それらの〔諸〕行(saṁskāra)によって ... 植えつけられた(avaropita)、... 心という種子(citta-bīja)は、来世に、... 後有(punar-bhava)の生起(abhinirvṛtti) ... を具えるもの(upagata)となる。即ち、〔心という種子(cittabīja)は〕業を田(kṣetra)とし、... 渇愛

2. The syntactic problem with this understanding of the passage is that there is nothing corresponding to "when" (とき) in the second sentence. Actually, since the prose of the DBhS is in fairly standardized Sanskrit, I find it quite difficult to construe *cittabījaṁ*, or the expressions taken by Matsumoto as predicates referring to it, with the nucleus *nāmarūpāṅkuraḥ prādurbhavati*. As far as I can see, the only way to construe the passage in a satisfactory way is to take the neuter nominatives *karmakṣetr...am*, etc., with the preceding sentence, as appositions of *cittabījaṁ* hanged on after the copula ('nachklappend', 'Schleppe'), as is frequently the case in Buddhist literature.[1030] This would require punctuation only after *tṛṣṇā-sneham* if we follow the reading of ms. A, or after °*pariṣyanditaṁ* in case the reading of ms. B is preferred. My translation of the first alternative would then run like this:

> {e}"Planted by those actions of those [persons], their mind, [comparable to] a seed, ... becomes directed towards[1031] the ... coming about of ... rebirth in the future — with karma as its field, ... and craving moisture. On account of its being irrigated by the conception 'I am [this or that]' and due to the increase of the net of all kinds of [inadequate] views,[1032] *nāmarūpa*, [comparable to] the sprout, emerges."

3. This is, admittedly, not the way the text is construed in the Tibetan and Chinese translations, which all seem to punctuate after *bhavati*. Unless a highly abnormal construction is postulated, the only way that occurs to me to solve the problem is to assume that at least the older Chinese versions may have read *nāmarūpāṅkuraṁ* (neuter).[1033] In this case, it would be possible to construe the adjectives *karmakṣetr(ālay)aṁ*, etc., with *aṅkuram* as the subject of the sentence, and the additional presence of *vijñānabījaṁ*, too, would make excellent sense:[1034]

> {f} [That is,] with karma as the field, *vijñāna* as the seed, ... craving as moisture, irrigated by *asmimāna* and due to the growth of various [inadequate] views,[1035] the *nāmarūpa* [of the new life] emerges as the sprout.

(tṛṣṇā)を湿潤とし、我慢(asmimāna)によって灌漑された(pariṣyandita)とき、見解(dṛṣṭi)によって作られた網(jāla)が成長すること(pravṛddhi)によって、名色という芽(nāmarūpa-aṅkura)が出現する(prādurbhavati)。

1030 THOMMEN 1903: 52f.

1031 In contrast to Matsumoto (M2: 326,5; see fn. 1029), I understand *upagata* in an active sense, like DBhS$_t$ Phal-chen S ga 130a6 *nye bar song ba* and mDo S ga 85b4 *nye bar 'gro ba*. Cf. also fn. 868[I.4].

1032 *dṛṣṭikṛta* = *dṛṣṭigata* (cf. *BHSD* 269b); for the meaning of °*gata* = °*prakāra*, see AKVy 66,29; JñN 496,16f; MIKOGAMI 1978. — The imagery involved is not self-evident. According to DBhSVyVy D ji 72b5 (P ji 84b6), the seed (or the field with the seed?) must be enclosed by a net or the like because damage from outside might turn up (*phyi 'i gnod pa 'byung du 'ong bas rgya la sogs pas bskor dgos pa*).

1033 Cf. *EDS* I 517b; *CPD* and *DP* s.v. *aṅkura*.

1034 Cf. DBhS$_R$ 91 (75,18f; DBhS$_K$ 159,5f): "[The bodhisattva] also [comprehends correctly] that [the sprout of] rebirth grows from *vijñāna* as the seed, with karma as the field, desire as moisture and 'ignorance' as darkness" (*karmakṣetra-tṛṣṇāsnehāvidyāndhakāra-vijñānabīja-punarbhava-prarohaṇa-tām ca* [sc., *yathābhūtaṁ prajānāti*]).

1035 Kumārajīva and, following him, Buddhabhadra and translate: "the various kinds of views make [it = the sprout?] grow" (種種諸見 令得增長); similarly Bodhiruci (T 26.1522: 168b11f: 種種見網 令得增長).

4.2.5.4 *Sopādānaṁ vijñānam* in the Exegetical Tradition

189. In support of his interpretation of *upādāna* in the exegetical tradition of the *Bījasūtra*, Matsumoto (M2: 342f; cf. 294 text [86]) can adduce the Chinese translation of this sūtra in the *Saṁyuktāgama* ($SĀ_C$ no. 39), where the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is rendered as 取陰俱識, to be understood as "the *vijñāna* that is together with the *upādānaskandhas*". This shows that *upādāna* was taken by the translator(s) in a passive-objective sense and equated with the *upādānaskandhas*, which in the context of the sūtra would mean: with the four *vijñānasthitis*. The question for me is how much weight we can ascribe to this evidence, i.e., to what extent the Indian translator to whom the text is officially ascribed, viz., Guṇabhadra, and/or his collaborators, especially Pao-yün (寶雲),[1036] were familiar with the exegetic tradition of the *Saṁyuktāgama*, and whether communication between them was indeed free from problems, since Guṇabhadra had arrived in China only shortly before.[1037] It may, in any case, be worth noting that in the sūtra where the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is compared with the lord of the city equated with the physical body (see § 175.1.3), this expression appears in Guṇabhadra's translation as "the *upādānaskandha* [consisting in] *vijñāna*" (識受陰), which is noncommittal as regards the grammatical analysis of *upādāna*. But even if, in the case of the *Bījasūtra*, Guṇabhadra had actually understood *upādāna* in the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* in a passive-objective sense, we still have to ask whether this somewhat remote evidence is supported by other sources, or whether other sources rather point to a different understanding. I shall start by discussing some pertinent materials from Theravāda (ch. 4.2.5.4.1) as well as post-YBh Northern Buddhist sources (ch 4.2.5.4.2), and then turn to interpretations found in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* layers of the YBh (ch. 4.2.5.4.3), which in my opinion supply the most significant evidence because they are closest to the Saṁdh in time and belong to a tradition the author(s) of Saṁdh V can be assumed to have been familiar with.

4.2.5.4.1. Theravāda Sources

190. To begin with the Theravāda tradition, Matsumoto (M2: 343) thinks that Buddhaghosa's commentary on the *Bījasutta* supports his view that *sāhāra* ("supplied with nutriment"), qualifying the *viññāṇa* that is compared to the five kinds of seeds, and thus corresponding to *sopādāna* in the (Mūla-)Sarvāstivāda version, confirms a passive-objective interpretation of *upādāna*. I have serious doubts about this. Actually, Buddhaghosa first explains the four *viññāṇaṭṭhitis* as the four *khandhas*, viz., *rūpa*, etc., insofar as they are the 'support' (*patiṭṭhā*) of the *kammaviññāṇa* — i.e., the *viññāṇa* of the present existence laden with karma (see § 156) in that they are its *objective* support (*ārammaṇa*)[1038] — and in this sense *comparable* to the soil [supporting the seed], whereas delight and desire are comparable to water in the sense of moistening [the seed]. He then continues:

[1036] For details regarding the translation and the question of the original of $SĀ_C$, see GLASS 2008 (2010); cf. also 2007: 38f.

[1037] See GLASS 2007: 38f; 2008 (2010): 189. On the other hand, Pao-yün had been to India, had "studied the foreign books extensively", i.e., had most likely studied Sanskrit, and had subsequently collaborated with Buddhabhadra and surely acquired considerable experience in translating Indian texts into Chinese (ibid. 192f).

[1038] In the sermons and in old verse texts, etc., *ārammaṇa* may just mean "support, footing" in a wider sense, but on the Abhidharmic level this expression (as well as its Skt. equivalent *ālambana*) would seem to be confined to the technical meaning of "objective support" of mind and mental factors.

> *viññāṇaṁ sāhāran ti sappaccayaṁ kammaviññānaṁ: taṁ hi bījaṁ viya paṭhaviyaṁ ārammaṇapaṭhaviyaṁ virūhati.* (Spk II 272,26-28; M2: 343 text [163])
>
> The *viññāṇa* furnished with nutriment is the *viññāṇa* [laden with] karma furnished with condition(s), for it grows on the ground [consisting in its] objective support just as a seed grows on the soil.

For Matsumoto (M2: 344), the 'condition' (*paccaya*) is equivalent to the objective support (*ārammaṇa*) and hence to 'locus', and therefore must refer to the four *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s as the support of *viññāṇa*. But this is hardly conclusive, for if the term 'locus' is to convey the specific meaning suggested by the very word itself, i.e., that of a spatial (or, at most, ontological) substratum, even the equation of the concept of 'objective support' with that of 'locus' is problematic (see § 159.2). Nor can we be sure that the term 'condition' (*paccaya*) in Buddhaghosa's explanation must refer to the objective support (*ārammaṇa*), let alone to a 'locus',[1039] for the term *paccaya/pratyaya* covers a much wider range, including not only the notion of a simultaneous spatial support, ontological substratum or objective support but more or less all kinds of factors on which something is dependent in some way or other.[1040] Therefore, in the passage under discussion, there is no need to identify the 'condition' with the *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s. Rather, what would seem to be envisaged is some other factor, one that is responsible for the *viññāṇa*'s establishing itself in the *viññāṇaṭṭhiti*s, for its taking root in them and persisting into a further life. This may well be taking delight in and becoming attached to them (i.e., *nandīrāga*), but it could be some more fundamental unwholesome attitude, and this is how the *Ṭīkā* understands the passage, explaining as it does the conditions involved as ignorance, spiritually inappropriate thinking, etc. (*avijjā-ayoniso{na?}manasi-kārādipaccayehi sappaccayaṁ*).[1041]

4.2.5.4.2. Post-*Yogācārabhūmi* Non-Theravāda Exegesis

191.1. Turning now to the non-Theravāda Buddhist sources, there is at least one case where *upādāna* has, in a context closely related to the notion of *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, unambiguously been interpreted in a passive-objective sense, namely in Paramārtha's partial translation of the VinSg, to which I shall come back later (§ 237.2).

191.2. On the other hand, Matsumoto himself (M2: 321f) cannot but admit that Yaśomitra's explanation of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the *Bījasūtra* as mind connected with craving (*satṛṣṇa*) in the form of craving belonging to the same plane-of-existence (*bhūmi*) as the mind itself[1042] is an unambiguous example of an interpretation of *upādāna* as an action noun, i.e., in the subjective sense of "grasping, clinging". Matsumoto also points out that this

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[1039] Cf. also fn. 1329[2.].

[1040] As is well known, Theravāda Abhidhamma distinguishes 24 kinds of *paccaya* (Paṭṭh I 1; VisM XVII.65–100; cf. *BW* 145–152). Therefore, Matsumoto's (M2: 459,23–460,1; cf. also 187 n. 105) sweeping equation of *pratyaya* with 'locus' — based on the mere fact that it is a derivate of *prati-√i* (taken to mean "to be based on", "to depend on", "to approach") in the passive sense of 依られるもの ("that on which [something else] depends") — either unduly narrows down the scope of the term *paccaya/pratyaya* or expands the meaning of the term 'locus' so as to cover all forms of dependence and conditionality, with the effect of depriving it of its specific connotation and thus rendering it useless for the purpose of denoting any distinctive relation.

[1041] Spk-pṭ: *Khandhavagga-ṭīkā* # 54 (My.-ed. II 223).

[1042] AKVy, 264,24f (ad AKBh 118,10f): *vijñānaṁ ... sopādānaṁ svabhūmikayā tṛṣṇayā satṛṣṇam*. Cf. M2: 321 text [132].

explanation is in agreement with Vasubandhu's remark that with regard to the *skandhas* belonging to a different plane-of-existence (*visabhāgabhūmika*) the *vijñāna* does not establish itself (*pratitiṣṭhati*, i.e., become involved) by force of craving (*tṛṣṇāvaśāt*), for which reason such *skandhas* are not called *vijñānasthitis*.[1043] Understood in this way, clinging (*upādāna*) is not essentially different from craving (*tṛṣṇā*) but may, according to a passage of the *Vibhāṣā*, be taken as a particularly strong or virulent form of craving.[1044] In other passages, however, *upādāna* is taken to include all kinds of defilements (*kleśa*),[1045] hence as denoting spiritually negative clinging in the widest sense.

191.3. An interesting passage using the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is found in the ninth chapter of the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, where the mind at the moment of dying (*maraṇacitta*) which is connected with clinging or grasping (*sopādāna*) is stated to be [the immediate cause] of rebirth.[1046] This passage unambiguously confirms that the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is envisaged as exerting its function in the present life, not in the future one, and that in this connection the essential aspect of *upādāna* is spiritually negative clinging entailing rebirth.

191.4. Although Vasubandhu is indeed also familiar with the passive-objective use of *upādāna* in connection with the discussion on the objective basis of speaking of a 'person' (*pudgala*),[1047] in the context of pollution and rebirth he clearly prefers understanding *upādāna* as an action noun.[1048] This does not, however, exclude the possibility that *upādāna* may, at the

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1043 AKBh 117,24f.

1044 Vi 248c4-7 (cf. Vi_2 193c21-23):

Question: If craving (*tṛṣṇā*) is comprised in [the four kinds of *upādāna*, viz.,] grasping for (/clinging to) sensual pleasures (*kāmopādāna*), etc., why then is it taught [in the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination] that *tṛṣṇā* is the condition of *upādāna*? Answer: Just the [same] evil propensity of passionate attachment (*rāgānuśaya*) is called 'craving' (*tṛṣṇā*) when newly arising, and is called 'grasping /clinging' (*upādāna*) later on when it increases. Therefore [the two statements] do not conflict. Or: [In the case of] just the [same] evil propensity of passionate attachment, the lower (i.e., faint) kind is called 'craving', the medium and high (i.e., strong) [kinds] are called 'grasping/clinging'.
問。愛即攝在欲取等中, 何故乃說愛為取緣。答。即貪隨眠初起名愛, 後增名取, 故不相違。復次即貪隨眠下品名愛, 中上名取, 故不相違。

1045 Cf., e.g., AKBh 5,10: *upādānāni kleśāḥ* (in the explanation of the term *upādānaskandha*; cf. M2: 479,20ff); 134,7: *trīṇy aṅgāni kleśasvabhāvāny avidyātṛṣṇopādānāni*; 306,4: *catvāry upādānāni: kāmopādānaṁ*, etc., with 307,14(ff) (cf. Vi 247b29ff): *kāmopādānaṁ ... rāgapratighamānāvidyā(ḥ)*, etc.; 308,5f: *chandarāgaś côpādānam uktaṁ sūtrāntareṣv, ato vijñāyate kāmādyupādānam*[1] *api kāmādiṣu cchandarāga iti* (similarly 140,16). Cf. also T 41.1821: 336c19f (commenting on the *Bījasūtra* quoted in AKBh 333,6): "*Upādāna* means defilements (*kleśa*). Because [this] *vijñāna* has *upādāna*, it is called '*sopādānaṁ vijñānam*', just as one says '*sāsravaṁ vijñānam*' [in the case of the *vijñāna* that has contaminants (*āsrava*)]" (取是煩惱。識有取故 名有取識。如言有漏識。); similarly T 41.1822: 727b28f.

[1] Cf. Tib. and ODANI & HONJŌ 2007: 182 n. 8; ed.: *kāmā hy u°*.

1046 AKBh 477,17f (cf. LEE 2005: 160; LO.SA. IV 2577; cf. also the quotation at NA 541c17f):

thought at death, when it is associated with grasping, [is such a culmination and thus capable of producing] a new existence.

sa punar yo 'nantaraṁ phalotpādanasamarthaḥ, so 'nyapariṇāmaviśiṣṭatvāt pariṇāmaviśeṣaḥ | tadyathā sopādānaṁ maraṇacittaṁ punarbhavasya.

1047 AKBh 463,5.

1048 Thus explicitly AKBh 308,16: *upagṛhṇantîty upādānāni*; cf. also 468,17: *skandhāntaropādānāt*; 471,1: *skandhāntaratyāgopādānāt*.

same time, also be understood as "fuel" in a metaphorical sense, for craving itself, or the defilements in general, can be taken as the "fuel" that keeps *saṁsāra*, or karma entailing rebirth, going.[1049]

192.1. In his *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā*, Vasubandhu offers a detailed treatment of the member *upādāna* of the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination. In this function, *upādāna* is traditionally defined as fourfold, viz., grasping for sensual pleasures (*kāmopādāna*), etc., and Vasubandhu expressly states that these compounds should be taken as tatpuruṣas, not as karmadhārayas,[1050] which means that *upādāna* has to be understood as an action noun. This is confirmed by his repeated equation of *upādāna* with desire and passionate attachment (*chandarāga*),[1051] in accordance with the canonical *Upādānasutta(II)* (SN 22.121).[1052] The function of *upādāna* is to transform, at the moment of dying at the latest, the imprints (*vāsanā*) of former karma in the mind series (*cittasantāna*) into *bhava*, i.e., into an actualized karmic force definitively bound to produce the next rebirth:[1053]

> In which phase, then, does, [in the case] of [a person who is] under the sway of grasping, karma according to its [relative] force (i.e., that karma that is most forceful) necessarily become *bhava* (i.e., become actualized so as to produce rebirth)? Necessarily at the time of dying [at the latest], [but in certain cases] already before, [namely] such karma [the result of which] is definitely to be experienced upon rebirth (i.e., in the very next life),

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[1049] Cf. AKBh 472,2f (LEE.2005: 116,8): *sattvākhyaḥ skandhasamudāyas tṛṣṇopādānaḥ saṁsaratîty ucyate*. Here, it makes excellent sense to understand the expression *tṛṣṇopādāna* as "having craving as fuel", especially since the sentence is preceded by a comparison with fire (cf. also § 175.2.2). According to the *Vibhāṣā*, *upādāna* may be taken to mean "fuel", because just as fire bursts into flames on account of fuel, so in the case of sentient beings karmic actions flare up on account of defilements (*kleśa*):

> 問。取是何義。答。薪義 是取義。如緣薪故 火得熾然, 有情亦爾 煩惱為緣 業得熾盛。
> (Vi 247c11-13; cf. Vi_2 193a11f).

[1050] $PSVy_{Tu}$ 245,25f+31 (PSVy P 43a6f+b1f; D 38a2+4f): "Should this compound be understood like 'perceiving visibles' or like 'the *āyatana* [consisting in the] visibles'? ... This compound is like 'perceiving visibles'" (*a{n}yaṁ samāsaḥ kiṁ rūpadarśanavad veditavyaḥ, āhosvid rūpāyatanavat* | ... *rūpadarśanavad ayaṁ samāsaḥ* |).

[1051] $PSVy_{Tu}$ 246,11f: *yato* (ed. *vato*) *bhūmer avītarāgas tatra chandarāga upādānam*; cf. 248,16ff.

[1052] $PSVy_{Tu}$ 246,14f: *upādānaṁ katamat* | *yo 'tra chandarāga idam atrôpādānam iti* |.

[1053] According to the PSVy, what is called karma is not only the act itself but also the specific trace or imprint (*vāsanāviśeṣa*) it leaves in the mind continuum (*cittasantāna*) ($PSVy_{Tu}$ 248,1f). In the twelve-membered formula of dependent origination, the term *saṁskāra* (as the condition of *vijñāna*) refers to the karmic acts themselves as the condition of the mind continuum as endowed with specific capacities (*śaktiviśeṣa⟨va⟩to vijñānasrotasaḥ tatpratyayatvāt*)[1] (248,4-6). It is, however, only the karmic imprint that has been actualized so as to produce a corresponding rebirth that is called *bhava*, not the unactualized imprint (248,6-9), and it is only due to *upādāna* consisting in a corresponding passionate desire (*chandarāga*) that this actualization comes about (248,16-20: *sa*[2] *ca saty upādāne bhavāvasthāṁ gacchati nâsatîty upādānapratyayo bhava ity ucyate* | *tathā saty apy avidyāpratyaye saṁskāre yatra ⟨chanda⟩rāgas tadākṣipta⟨sya* [L.S.]⟩ *⟨punarbhava⟩syânukūlo na bhavati, na tatra punarbhavo 'bhinirvartate*; cf. also 248,22-24).

> [1] Cf. PSVy P 49a2 (D 42b7f): *nus pa'i bye brag dang ldan pa'i rnam par shes pa'i rgyun ni de'i rkyen gyis yin pa'i phyir ro.*
>
> [2] *sa* = *saṁskāraḥ* (cf. PSVyṬ D 185a7), i.e., the *karmavāsanā*.

like the [five] '[evil actions] that bring immediate retribution' (i.e., killing one's mother or father, etc.).[1054]

192.2. Now, Vasubandhu is explicit in interpreting the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* in terms of precisely this *upādāna* (i.e., grasping, clinging) that actualizes certain karmic imprints so as to produce rebirth. When interpreting the *Bhavasūtra* (see § 175.1.4), according to which karma is the field, *vijñāna* the seed, and craving (*tṛṣṇā*) the moisture, he takes karma to be karma in the status of *bhava* (i.e., actualized karma) and *vijñāna* as the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, characterized as **tadupaga*.[1055] Since the pronoun *tad-* in this expression can only refer to the immediately preceding word **karman* (Tib. *las*), it appears reasonable to follow the commentary in understanding **tadupaga* as "approaching (i.e., following) that [actualized karma]", in the sense that the *vijñāna* will undergo rebirth in accordance with that karma that has reached the status of *bhava*.[1056] What is, however, most important in the context of the present discussion is that Vasubandhu expressly equates moisture, i.e., craving, with *upādāna*,[1057] which makes sense only if *upādāna* is understood as an action noun in the sense of a specified or intensified form of craving. In this connection, it is also worth noting that in another passage Vasubandhu has the sprout of rebirth arise from *vijñāna* furnished with craving (*sred pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa* = **satṛṣṇaṁ vijñānam*?),[1058] which is quite obviously almost a phraseological variant of *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*.

193.1. Even so, from yet another passage it becomes evident that this interpretation reveals only the surface, and that Vasubandhu's view on the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is indeed more complex. The respective passage, as I understand it, runs as follows:

> Well then, [in the case] of a [a person dying in?] a wholesome [state of] mind,[1059] how can the karma that at the time of dying should turn into *bhava* be conditioned by *upādāna*?

[1054] PSVy$_{Tu}$ 248,29-31 (PSVy P 49b6f; D 43b2f): *kasyāṁ punar avasthāyāṁ sopādānasyâvaśyaṁ karma yathābalaṁ bhavo bhavati? maraṇakāle 'vaśyam | pūrvakāle 'pi: yan niyataṁ karmôpapadyavedanīyam ānantaryādikam* |; cf. PSVy P 50b7: *las gang dag 'chi ba'i tshe srid pa yin par 'gyur ba.*

[1055] PSVy P 52b1 (D 45b6): *srid pa'i gnas skabs kyi las ni zhing yin no || der nye bar 'gro ba'i len pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa ni sa bon yin no ||.*

[1056] PSVyṬ P 231a4f (D 192a1): "Because it approaches (*upagacchatīti*) it is [*upa*]*ga*; [the *vijñāna*] that approaches that karma is [*tad*]*upaga*" (*nye bar 'gro bas na 'gro ba ste las de 'gro ba ni nye bar 'gro ba yin te*). On *upaya*/*upaga*, see fn. 813 and appendix 2 to Pt. I.

[1057] PSVy P 52b1 (D 45b6): *len pa nyid* (D : *ni* P) *rlan yin no* ||. PSVyṬ P 231a6 (D 192a2) explains: "The *upādāna* due to which the [aforementioned] *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is [like a] seed: precisely this *upādāna* is the moisture" (*len pa gang gis len pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa de sa bon yin no || len pa de nyid ni rlan yin no* ||; since *len pa de* should correspond to *len pa gang* in the first sentence, I disregard the final particle *no* after *sa bon yin*).

[1058] PSVy P 53a6f (D 46b1f):

> And just as the imprint of a seal (**pratimudrā*) comes about in (lit.: from) clay that is moistened by water, but not in dry [clay], and is in conformity with the [seal] that has been impressed [on the clay], so rebirth comes about from *vijñāna* that is under the sway of craving (**satṛṣṇa*), not from [*vijñāna*] that is free from craving, and conforms to the karma [of which it is the retribution].
>
> *yang dper na chus brlan pa'i 'jim pa las rgya'i 'bur 'byung gi skam po las ni ma yin no || de yang brkos* [D : *bskos* P] *pa dang rjes su mthun pa yin no || de bzhin du sred pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa las yang srid 'byung ba yin gyi sred pa med pa las ma yin no || de yang las dang rjes su mthun pa ...*

[1059] For the syntactical construction of this genitive, cf. PSVyṬ P 228a1f (D 189a7): *rnam pa 'dis ni dge ba'i sems kyi yang 'chi kar len pa'i rkyen nyid kyis srid pa yin no zhes bya'o* ||

But if in this situation the *vijñāna* were devoid of *upādāna*, the karma of that [person] could not be *bhava*, just as in the case of an arhat! If it were so, this would also conflict with the [*Bīja*]*sūtra* where it is stated: "O monks, the five kinds of seeds represent the mind connected with grasping (*sopādānaṁ vijñānam*)."

[But] how [can] a wholesome state of mind be connected with [the unwholesome mental factor(s) called] grasping (*sopādāna*)?

[This state of mind] is *sopādāna* [not in the sense of being associated (*saṁprayukta*) with *upādāna* but rather] in the sense of producing its effect while being helped by *upādāna*. However, the intended meaning is not that the [wholesome state of mind] is the 'seed' [of rebirth]. The 'seed' is the *ālayavijñāna*; for of what [kind of] grasping (*upādāna*)[1060] *imprints* have been abundantly nourished in it (= in the *ālayavijñāna*),[1061] by that [kind of grasping] it (= *ālayavijñāna*)[1062] is furnished with *upādāna*, and [thus it = *ālaya-vijñāna*] is the 'seed' of the coming about of the sprout of rebirth in the next life.[1063]

193.2. This passage, if I understand it correctly, starts from the problem that in the case of a person who dies in a wholesome (*kuśala*) state of mind, *upādāna*, taken in the subjective sense of grasping for sensual pleasures, etc.,[1064] cannot be present because as a defiled (*kliṣṭa*) mental factor it cannot be associated (*saṁprayukta*) with a wholesome state of mind.[1065] Not being present at the moment of dying, *upādāna* would not be able to transform apposite karma into *bhava*, i.e., actualize favourable karma so as to engender a favourable rebirth, nor would the *vijñāna* at the moment of dying be connected with grasping (*sopādāna*) so as to

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[1060] Cf. PSVyṬ P 227b5f (D 189a4): "Of what kind of grasping, i.e., of grasping for sensual pleasures up to clinging to the doctrinal position of a self (*ātmavāda*), imprints have been ..." (*len pa gang yin pa zhes bya ba 'dod pa nye bar len pa nas bdag tu smra ba nye bar len pa'i bar gyi bag chags* ...).

[1061] Cf. PSVyṬ P 227b5 (D 189a4): *de la zhes bya ba ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la'o* ||.

[1062] Cf. PSVyṬ P 227b6f (D 189a5): *len pa des ... kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de* ...

[1063] PSVy P 50b7–51a3 (D 44a7–b3): *'o na dge ba'i sems kyi* (D : *kyis* P) *las gang dag 'chi ba'i tshe srid pa yin par 'gyur ba de dag ji ltar nye bar len pa'i rkyen gyis yin zhe na | gal te de'i tshe rnam par shes pa la len pa med par yang gyur na | de'i las dag srid pa yin par mi 'gyur te | ji ltar dgra bcom pa bzhin no || de lta yin na dge slong dag sa bon gyi rigs lnga ni len pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa'i tshig bla dags yin no zhes 'byung ba'i mdo sde 'di dang 'gal bar 'gyur ro || ji ltar na dge ba'i rnam par shes pa len pa dang bcas pa yin zhe na | len pas grogs byas te 'bras bu sbyin pa'i phyir de len pa dang bcas pa yin gyi | de sa bon yin par dgongs pa ni ma yin no || kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni sa bon yin te* ⟨|⟩ *de la len pa gang yin pa'i bag chags yongs su shin tu brtas* (D : *rtas* P) *par gyur na | des ni de len pa dang bcas pa yin te | ma 'ongs pa na yang srid pa'i myu gu mngon par 'grub pa'i sa bon yin no* ||.

[1064] Cf. fn. 1060.

[1065] Cf. PSVyṬ P 227a4 (D 188b4f): *de'i tshe de'i sems dang sems las byung ba dge ba kun du 'byung ba dang mi mthun pa'i phyir 'dun pa dang 'dod chags mngon du 'byung ba'i dngos po ni yod pa ma yin no*. — It appears that according to the ManoBh of the MauBh (YBh$_{Bh}$ 16,1-10; 18,1-3; 18,21; 19,6f) a wholesome or unwholesome state of mind is, in ordinary persons, possible only as long as apperceptive/conceptualizing consciousness (*saṁjñā*) is strong (*audārika*), i.e., as long as one has not yet fallen into a state of dim consciousness (18,1: *avispaṣṭasaṁjñāvasthām asaṁprāptasya*, so ms.). In the end, however, it gives way to, or is interspersed with, attachment to oneself (*ātmasneha*) and delight in or desire for (continued) individual existence (*ātmabhāvābhinandanā*, °*abhilāṣa*). ASBh 39,10-18 is unambiguous is assigning this desire for (continued) individual existence (*ātmabhāvatṛṣṇā*) — characterized as innate (*sahaja*), as not distinctly delineating its object (*a*⟨*na*⟩*bhi*(?)*nirūpitā-lambana*) and as obscured [by defilements] but morally neutral (*nivṛtāvyākṛta*) — to the mind at the moment of dying (*maraṇacitta*).

function as the 'seed' of the 'sprout' of rebirth, as required by the *Bījasūtra.* Vasubandhu solves the problem by taking recourse to the concept of *ālayavijñāna* (which he had introduced in the second chapter of his treatise): according to him, the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* is, properly speaking, the subliminal *ālayavijñāna*, and *upādāna* is, on this level, no longer the actual mental factor of grasping but rather its *imprint* (*vāsanā*) that is stored in the *ālaya-vijñāna* and has reached a state of maturity bound to actualize the dominant karma[1066] and to produce a new life. The supraliminal *vijñāna* is, at any rate in case it is wholesome, *sopādāna* only in the secondary sense of being accompanied or helped by the subliminal *upādāna*-imprint.

194. The association of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* with the member *upādāna* ("grasping") of the twelve-membered chain of origination in dependence is already found in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (AS), and since this text, in agreement with earlier sources like the *Daśabhūmikasūtra,*[1067] includes the member *upādāna* in the category of defilements (*kleśa*),[1068] we can be fairly sure that the *Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya* (ASBh) is right in understanding the member *upādāna* as "desire and passionate attachment" (*chandarāga*),[1069] a definition found in the AS itself in connection with the explanation of the term '*upādānaskandha*'.[1070] In the context of origination in dependence, the member *upādāna* is stated to render the *vijñāna* of sentient beings *sopādāna,*[1071] i.e., connected with *upādāna*, so that [they] take hold[1072] of rebirth (*punarbhavādānāya*). Still, this formulation may suggest that *upādāna* in *sopādāna* does not have exactly the same connotation as in the case of the member *upādāna*[1073] but is already somehow focused on the effect, i.e., taking hold (*ādāna*) of rebirth. In

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[1066] For a gradation of karma with regard to its prospective immediate actualization, see AKBh 477,20f (LEE 2005: 162,3f). At the end of the first line of this Āryā, ms. and PRADHAN have *kṛtaṁ ca yat*, which is defective; I suggest reading *kṛtaṁ ca yat purvam* (⏑–⏑|– –|–) with Tib. and Chin.; Lee's emendation *pūrvakṛtaṁ ca tasya* (–⏑⏑|–⏑–|⏑) is, at any rate, unmetrical; in the second line I prefer, in spite of Tib. *las kyi 'khor ba*, to follow the Chinese translations in reading *karma saṁsāre* as two words, *karma* being required as the subject qualified by *guru*, etc.

[1067] DBhS$_R$ 6I (50,27; DBhS$_K$ 101,2f); Vi 122b12f (Vi$_2$ 96b7f; cf. AHN 2003: 46); AHṛd$_2$ 860c1 (無明愛取 是煩惱; cf. AHṛd$_1$ 826c25; MiśAHṛd 935c5f); implicitly YBh$_{Bh}$ 218,10-12 (SavitBh). Cf. also AK(Bh) 134,6f and 25; 150,17.

[1068] AS 27,14f (AS$_G$ 26,22f), to be emended in accordance with AS$_t$ (P li 77b4) and AS$_c$ 671a17f: *yā câvidyā yā ca tṛṣṇā yac côpādānam ity ayaṁ* ⟨*kleśa*⟩*saṁkleśasaṁgrahaḥ* (cf. KRITZER 1999: 53; *kleśa°* is in fact missing in the ms., but the following two sentences, missing in AS$_G$, are there).

[1069] ASBh 33,7: craving (*tṛṣṇā*) is the condition of grasping (*upādāna*) "because through longing for enjoyment, desire for and passionate attachment to sensual pleasures, etc., arise" (*āsvādaprārthanāmukhena kāmādiṣu chandarāgapravṛtteḥ*).

[1070] AS 2,6 (reconstr.; original now in AS$_{Li}$ 243,31: *upādānaṁ katamat?* | *yo 'tra chandarāgaḥ*; cf. ASBh 2,5: *upādānaṁ chando rāgaś ca*). Cf. also § 237.3.

[1071] AS 27,9f (AS$_G$ 26,18f): *upādānaṁ kiṁkarmakam? punarbhavādānāya*[1] *sopādānaṁ ca sattvānāṁ vijñānaṁ karoti,* (*pratyayaś ca bhavati bhavasya*).

[1] Thus M2: 315 with ASBh; AS$_G$ has *°dānāc ca*, which is definitely odd; PRADHAN suggests *°dānārthaṁ*, accepted by KRITZER (1999: 44). My photo of the ms. is too blurred to be of help, but in any case there is no anusvāra.

[1072] Or: "so that [it, i.e., the *vijñāna*] takes hold ...".

[1073] Cf. KRITZER 1999: 44 (with n. 90), deliberately using different renderings.

fact, the ASBh explains that grasping (*upādāna*, i.e., desire and attachment)[1074] makes the *vijñāna* of sentient beings *sopādāna* "because it fixes the imprints of [their] karma upon 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) in [a form of] rebirth specified as [a particular] destiny, such as hell, etc."[1075] It would thus seem that rendering the *vijñāna* of a sentient being *sopādāna* rather refers to a transformation of the *vijñāna*'s latent layer, to a specific actualization of the latent karmic imprints it contains.[1076] Though no use is made of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, at least in the ASBh the *vijñāna*'s being *sopādāna* would thus seem to be conceived in a way that is similar to that of the PSVy insofar as it refers to a specific development on the level of imprints (*vāsanā*).

4.2.5.4.3. *Yogācārabhūmi*

195. The sources discussed in the preceding sub-chapter are, of course, post-Saṁdh but may *reflect* an earlier, pre-*ālayavijñāna* tradition, with which the Saṁdh, too, might then be assumed to have been familiar. Such a tradition is indeed traceable in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* layers of the YBh, especially in the VaSg, and particularly in contexts that are precisely those from which Matsumoto derives his interpretation of Saṁdh V.2(-3). The most important of these passages have already been adduced and made use of by him, but my interpretation and evaluation of them differs considerably and leads me to quite different conclusions, as will become clear in the course of the subsequent chapters (cf. ch. 4.2.5.6 and ch. 4.2.6.1 [esp. § 252]).

196. It is hardly surprising that the earlier layers of the YBh, too, contain a sufficient number of passages that confirm the traditional use of the term *upādāna* in the sense of "desire and passionate attachment" (*chandarāga*),[1077] or its division into four kinds of clinging, viz., clinging to sensual pleasures (*kāma*), to views (*dṛṣṭi*), to [external] behaviour and observances (*śīlavrata*),[1078] and to the assertion of or belief in a [substantial, autonomous] self (*ātmavāda*)[1079].[1080] *Upādāna* may also mean clinging to any conditioned things as one's

[1074] Cf. ASBh 31,17f: *kāmādiṣu sucaritaduścaritaprakārābhiratipūrvakeṇa chandarāgeṇa sopādāne vijñāne sati*. Cf. KRITZER 1999: 29 (though I would prefer to take *kāmādiṣu* as referring to the objects of the four types of *upādāna*, viz., sensual pleasures *(kāma)*, views *(dṛṣṭi)*, etc.).

[1075] ASBh 33,9: *narakādigativiśiṣṭapunarbhavapratisandhaye karmavāsanāniyamāt*; cf. KRITZER 1999: 44, who, however, takes *karmavāsanā* not as the object but as the subject of the act of fixing or determining (*niyama*): "because the imprints of actions determine ...". However, Tib. ($ASBh_t$ P shi 30b7: ... *las kyi bag chags nges par byed pa'i phyir ro*) would seem to support taking *vāsanā* as the object. This is also confirmed by Ch. ($ASBh_c$ 712a23) 令業習氣得決定故, i.e., "because [it = *upādāna*] causes the *karmavāsanā* to become determined".

[1076] Cf. also the explanation of the second function of *upādāna*, viz., that due to it the imprint of [the respective] karmic impulses becomes actualized (ASBh 33,10: *tadvaśena saṁskāravāsanāyā* (ed. °*nayor*) *vṛttilābhāt*; cf. KRITZER 1999: 45).

[1077] See fn. 1080.

[1078] This would, in the first place, refer to false or pointless theoretical positions or patterns of behaviour, but it may also include improper fixation on basically correct views and patterns of conduct as being, by themselves, sufficient for liberation (cf. ANĀLAYO 2010b: 7–10).

[1079] YBh_t P 'i 225b2f (D zi 196a7; YBh_c 803c18f: VaSg II.1.vii) defines *ātmavāda* as the assertion that a self exists really and permanently (*bdag ni bden pa dang gnas pa'i sgo nas yod do zhes smra ba gang yin pa de ni bdag tu smra ba zhes bya'o* ||; cf. MN I 8,17). According to YBh_{Bh} 208,16f, what is meant by *ātmavādopādāna*[1] is fondness of and attachment (*chandarāga*) to *satkāyadṛṣṭi*, i.e., to a view

self (*ātman*) or as one's own (*ātmīya*).[1081] Occasionally, the fuel metaphor is still clearly discernible,[1082] and even where this is not the case it may be involved as an overtone. In one place, the expression *upādāna* it is explicitly stated to be applicable in a passive, an active and even a final sense, i.e., 1. in the sense of the objects appropriated or clung to (viz., sensual pleasures, views, etc.), 2. in the sense of the act of desire and attachment (*chandarāga*) as [the action] that (or: by which one?) clings to them, and 3. in the sense of taking possession of sensual pleasures and enjoying them, as the aim.[1083] Yet in another passage, where a similar distinction is made, the use of *upādāna* is confined to the action of clinging.[1084]

197.1. As regards the concept of *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, we may start with the VaSg exegesis of the *Āhārasūtra* (III.5.i), where this concept occurs in connection with the discus-

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that takes the five *upādānaskandhas* as one's self or one's own (YBh_{Bh} 162,11-13). Cf. also AKBh 140,13, quoting an opinion according to which *ātmavāda* means *ātmadṛṣṭi* and *asmimāna*.

[1] YBh_{Bh} 208,16 has *ātmopādāna*, as in NidSa # 16.12 (for additional Chinese evidence see ANĀLAYO 2010b: 10), but both Tib. *bdag tu smra ba'i len pa* (YBh_t P dzi 122a8) and Ch. 我語取 (YBh_c 323b23) presuppose the usual *ātmavādopādāna*; cf. also YBh_{Bh} 208,17, equating what is *clung to* with *satkāyadṛṣṭi*.

[1080] E.g., YBh_t P 'i 185b6f (D zi 163a6f; YBh_c 788c16f: VaSg I.5.vi): *nye bar len pa ni bzhi ste | 'dod pa dang | lta ba dang | tshul khrims dang | brtul zhugs dang | bdag tu smra ba rnams* <u>*la*</u> *'dun pa'i 'dod chags so* || 224b7 (see fn. 1083); 286b3 (D 247b7; YBh_c 828a26); YBh_{Bh} 201,3f (see fn. 843); 208,14-18 (cf. M2: 468,20ff): *kāmopādānaṁ katamat | yaḥ kām*<u>*esu*</u> *cchandarāgaḥ | dṛṣṭyupādānaṁ katamat | satkāyadṛṣṭiṁ sthāpayitvā tadanyāsu dṛṣṭiṣu cchandarāgaḥ* |, etc.

[1081] See § 200.4.1 with fn. 1111 and fn. 1112. Cf. YBh_t P 'i 183a1f (D zi 161a2f; YBh_c 787c17f: VaSg I.5.iii), stating that already before attaining arhatship, on the level of a *śaikṣa*, clinging (**upādāna*) to any conditioned factor (*saṁskāra*) as one's self or one's own does not exist anymore (*dgra bcom pa nyid ma thob pa'i snga rol slob pa'i sa la ni 'du byed thams cad la bdag gam bdag gir nye bar len pa med de* ...). Cf. also Vasubandhu's (AKBh 140,12f) interpretation of *ātmavādopādāna* as "clinging to the basis-of-individual-existence (i.e., to the five *upādānaskandhas*) [as one's self or one's own]" by means of analysing *ātmavāda* as "that to which the assertion '[this is my] self' refers" (*ātmêti vādo 'smin*) and thus taking it to denote the *ātmabhāva*.

[1082] Cf., e.g., YBh_c 815b15-17 (YBh_t P 'i 255a3; D zi 220b6f: VaSg II.5.iv): The sixfold basis [of sensory/cognitive awareness] (*ṣaḍāyatana*) is comparable to grass and wood because it is [the fuel on] the basis of [which] the fire of passion, ill-will and delusion starts to burn (二者 六處為所依止 貪瞋癡火 乃得燒然 與世所見草木相似; Tib.: *'dod chags dang zhe sdang dang gti mug gi mes bsreg par bya ba'i phyir skye mched drug po rtsva dang shing dang 'dra ba 'di nye bar len pa'o*).

[1083] YBh_t P 'i 224b5-8 (D zi 195b5-7; YBh_c 803b23-27: VaSg II.1.vii): *de la gang nye bar len pa dang | gang gis nye bar len pa dang | gang gi phyir nye bar len pa de dag thams cad ni nye bar len pa zhes bya'o || de la ci nye bar len zhe na | 'dod pa rnams dang | lta ba dang | tshul khrims dang | brtul zhugs dang | bdag tu smra ba nye bar len to || gang gis nye bar len zhe na* (Ch.: 何能取) | *'dun pa dang 'dod chags rnam pa bzhis so || gang gi phyir nye bar len zhe na | 'dod pa rnams thob par bya ba'i phyir dang longs spyod pa'i phyir* ... ||.

[1084] YBh_t P 'i 164a6-8 (D zi 144b7f; YBh_c 780b25-29: VaSg I.3.x, ad $SĀ_c$ no. 262, corresponding to SN 22.90: *Channasutta*; for the passage concerned, see the parallel in NidSa # 19.5a), distinguishing between 1. what is clung to or appropriated (*gang len pa*, 若所取), i.e., the five *skandhas*, 2. the action that (or: by which one?) clings to them (*gang gis len pa*, 若能取), i.e., the four kinds of clinging (viz., *kāmopādāna*, etc.), and 3. how one appropriates them (*ji ltar len pa*, 若如是取), defined as the four *vijñānasthitis*. These three items are then equated with the concepts of "possession(s)" (*upadhi*), appropriation (*upādāna*) and mental fixation (*cetaso 'dhiṣṭhānam*) of the sūtra text. As far as I can see, this explanation is hardly intelligible if *sthiti* in the term '*vijñānasthiti*' is taken as that on which the *vijñāna* rests or is fixed, but it makes good sense if *sthiti* is understood as an action noun (cf. AKVy 263,22), i.e., as four *modes* of the *vijñāna*'s coming to be settled or fixed.

sion of the four 'nutriments' (*āhāra*) as helping sentient beings who seek (re)birth (*saṁbhavaiṣin*)[1085] to attain their aim:[1086] While hunting for material food, which is the source of strength or vitality (*ojas*) resulting in the growth of the primary elements of the body, ordinary sentient beings concerned with their bodies and lives commit wholesome or unwholesome deeds and increase or revive their defilements (*kleśa*), which entails rebirth. The same happens in connection with their greed for pleasant sensations and with their striving after agreeable things desired in the future. In this way, they cause, in this life, their *vijñāna* to approach (i.e., become involved in or come under the sway of) karma and defilements (**karmakleśopaga*),[1087] [to become] *sopādāna* and to promote (**anu-√grah*) rebirth in the future.[1088]

197.2. Almost the same formulation occurs again when the VaSg (III.5.ii) comments on the second part of the sūtra, according to which all the four 'nutriments' arise from craving (*tṛṣṇā*): For the sake of their body and for food, sentient beings affected by craving increase, in the present life, karma and defilements in a threefold manner,[1089] and thus cause their *vijñāna* to come under the sway of karma and defilements and to become *sopādāna*, with the effect that in this [very] life it promotes rebirth in the future.[1090]

197.3. The problem is, of course, what precisely is meant by *sopādāna* here. Its characterization as "approaching (/becoming involved in) karma and defilements" on the one hand and as "promoting rebirth in the future" on the other suggests that *sopādāna* should be understood as qualifying the *vijñāna* as being laden with the actualized potential, or readiness, to take hold of a new existence. That is, the *vijñāna*'s being *sopādāna* would seem to be understood as an implication of, and as being substantially identical with, its being under the sway of karma and defilements (*karmakleśopaga*) in such a way that future rebirth is imminent.

198.0. There are a few other passages which seem to support such a conclusion.

198.1. In VaSg I.4.iii, the comparison of *vijñāna* with magic or conjury (*māyā*) in $SĀ_c$ no. 265 (the equivalent of SN 22.95, the *Phenapiṇḍūpamasutta*) is stated to be based on the analogy that the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, established in or fixed on the four *vijñānasthiti*s, produces all kinds of individual existences (**ātmabhāva*).[1091] In the *Paryāyasaṁgrahaṇī* (ParySg), the same comparison is explained in a similar way, but in this text the *vijñāna* that

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[1085] See fn. 766.

[1086] YBh_t P 'i 311b3-7 (D zi 271b2-6; YBh_c 838c22-839a2). Cf. § 222.3.

[1087] For *upaga*, see § 166.2.1 with fn. 813 and appendix 2 to Pt. I.

[1088] YBh_t P 'i 311b6 (see fn. 1238).

[1089] I.e., through searching for material food, pleasant sensation and future happiness.

[1090] YBh_t P 'i 312a5f (D zi 272a3f; YBh_c 839a14-16): see § 223.2 with fn. 1245.

[1091] YBh_c 781c12-14: "He understands *vijñāna* to be comparable to magic (or conjury) because it is similar to it in that the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, established in the four *vijñānasthiti*s, continues (**anuvartate*) to produce all kinds of individual existences (**ātmabhāva*)" (有取之識 依四識住 發起種種自體隨轉 相似法故 覺了諸識 方於幻事). The Tibetan version simply coordinates the three key concepts: *rnam par shes pa la ni len pa dang bcas pa'i rnam par shes pa dang | rnam par shes pa'i gnas bzhi dang lus sna tshogs kyi rjes su 'jug pa'i sgo nas sgyu ma lta bur rtogs pa* ... (YBh_t P 'i 167b3f; D zi 147b5; HAKAMAYA 2006: 620,11-13).

entails rebirth is described as "being under the sway of favourable, unfavourable or 'motionless' karma" (*puṇyāpuṇyāniṁjopaga*)[1092] instead of being called *sopādāna*.[1093]

198.2. While these two passages support, for *sopādāna*, the aspect of *vijñāna* being charged with previous karma, in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh the mind (*citta*) that has established itself in the *vijñānasthiti*s and is destined to be reborn is characterized as "furnished with evil propensities" (*sānuśaya*), i.e., with defilements or rather their latent presence.[1094]

198.3. In VaSg II.1.viii, one of the conditions for the conception of a child is — besides the presence of semen-cum-blood and empty space in the mother's womb — that the *vijñāna* [of the sentient being expected to] 'link up' the new existence is beset with karma and defilements (**karmakleśaparigṛhīta*), and the Chinese version is indeed explicit in specifying this *vijñāna* as *sopādāna*.[1095]

199.0. The most important statement in this connection is, however, found in the VaSg exegesis of the *Bījasūtra* (VaSg I.9.ii).

199.1. Here, the decisive paragraph of the sūtra is explained to mean that

> there are one cause (**hetu*) and two conditions (**pratyaya*) for the arising of the sprout of rebirth. The cause is *vijñāna* that is endowed with the Seeds of the defilements (**kleśabījopagata*?) with regard to the five kinds of conditioned things (**saṁskāra*). The conditions are [1.] the four *vijñānasthiti*s comparable to the field, and [2.] delight and passionate attachment (**nandīrāga*) [comparable to] watering because due to them the *vijñāna* (= seed) 'links up' (i.e. continues after death) in one or the other [new] life.[1096]

There can be hardly any doubt that "endowed with the Seeds of defilements" is a deliberate explanation of the term *sopādāna* that qualifies *vijñāna* in the sūtra. This means that for the author(s) of this exegesis *upādāna* means, in this context, the *latent* presence, in the *vijñāna*, of defilements, which especially towards the end of one's life actualize the dominant karma,

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1092 For *vijñāna* characterized as *(tat)karmopaga* (cf. fns. 813 and 814) in its function as the cause of rebirth, cf. also YBh_{Bh} 198,22f, corresponding to YBh_t P 'i 285a5f (D zi 246b2f: VaSg III.1.i) *rnam par shes pa yang las de'i rjes su 'gro zhing* (**(tat)karmānuga*?).

1093 MATSUDA 1994: 97,5f (cf. YBh_t P yi 48a5f; D 'i 40b5f; HAKAMAYA 2006: 618,18-20): *evaṁ tad vijñānam puṇyāpuṇyāniṁjyopagaṁ caturvijñānasthitipratiṣṭhitaṁ n⟨ā?⟩rakādikam ātmabhāvam upadarśayati*; YBh_c 769a4-8 differs considerably and appears to have read **kārakādikam ātmabhāvam*, interpreted as "(although) it may be perceived to have features of a self like being the subject of acting, experiencing, etc." (雖有作者及受者等我相可見 ...).

1094 YBh_{ms} 135b3 (see § 158 with fn. 758).

1095 YBh_t P 'i 229b2f (D zi 199b6): *de la ma'i lto na 'dug pa'i khu chu dang khrag gi 'byung ba chen po bzhi la brten pa dang | nying mtshams sbyor ba'i rnam par shes pa las dang nyon mongs pas bsdus pa dang ma'i lto na khong stong yod pa ni bu 'chags par 'gyur ba yin no* ||; YBh_c 805b16-19: 於母胎中 四種差別 謂 依精血大種所造, 諸業煩惱之所攝受 結生相續 有取之識, 及母腹中所有孔穴, 由如是故 得入母胎。For the six elements as the presupposition of reincarnation, see AN I 176,30f corresponding to MA_c 435c23f.

1096 YBh_t P 'i 201a2f (D zi 176a5f; YBh_c 794b6-10): *yang srid par skye ba'i myu gu 'byung ba la ni rgyu gcig dang rkyen gnyis yod de | 'du byed rnam pa lnga po dag la nyon mongs pa'i* (D : *pa* P) *sa bon dang ldan pa'i rnam par shes pa* (煩惱種子所隨逐識: -*upagata* or -*anugata*, see fn. 1385) *ni rgyu'o* || *rnam par shes pa'i gnas bzhi* (P : *gzhi* D) *zhing dang 'dra ba dang | dga' ba dang 'dod chags des rnam par shes pa skye ba de dang der nying mtshams sbyar* (P : *sbyor* D) *ba'i phyir rlan par byed pa ni rkyen yin no* ||. Cf. M2: 378f, text [195]/[196].

or karmic imprints, so as to engender a specific rebirth. Matsumoto's (M2: 379,16ff) contention that this passage is interpolated or tampered with is not supported by any formal inconsistency and is based on questionable presuppositions, to be discussed and discarded in ch. 4.2.6.1.

199.2. As for the literal meaning of *upādāna* in this context, it is, as far as I can see, not easy to pin it down. The *vijñāna* could be taken to be *sopādāna* because it is beset with or under the sway of (*sa-*) clinging (*upādāna*), i.e., defilements, being laden with them at least in a latent form. Or it could be so because it has the character of appropriating (*upādāna*, active sense), or keeping appropriated, karmic imprints and *anuśaya*s or *kleśabīja*s, or is furnished with them as its 'appropriation' (*upādāna*, passive sense) or 'fuel'. But what is important for my argument is that in this exegetic tradition the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* refers, in some way or other, to the *vijñāna*'s being associated, at any rate in a latent form, with a spiritually negative kind of appropriation or clinging.

200.1. In this connection, it is worthwhile to have a look at the exegesis of a pericope that constitutes the second part of the *Bījasūtra* as well as of a few other sūtras. This exegesis is found in the VaSg (I.5.vi)[1097] with reference to SĀ$_{c}$ no. 64 (corresponding to the *Udānasutta*: SN 22.55), and in similar (but not identical) terms in a passage of the VinSg which is, apart from lacunas at the beginning of each line, even preserved in a Sanskrit manuscript.[1098] Neither version shows any trace of *ālayavijñāna* or other innovative ('Vijñānavāda') ideas. On the contrary, in VaSg I.5.vi the *vijñāna* in question is expressly equated with the ordinary six: visual awareness, etc.[1099]

200.2. In its Sanskrit version, the pericope starts with the sentence

catvārīmāny upadhyupādānāny ālambanāni bhavanti vijñānasya sthitaye,[1100]

which is then followed by a specification virtually identical with what we find in the Pāli canon:

[1097] YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 184b3 (esp. 185b2) –188a1; D zi 162a6(/163a3)–165a6; YBh$_{c}$ 788b11(/c10)–789b24.

[1098] VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a1–b5; YBh$_{t}$ P zi 44b8–46b7; D zhi 42b2–44a7; YBh$_{c}$ 595a10–c12; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1030b27–1031a20. — I once more take the opportunity to express my heartfelt thanks to Prof. Kazunobu MATSUDA for his kind permission to use the still unpublished VinSg ms. and his transcription.

[1099] YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 185b7 (D zi 163a7; YBh$_{c}$ 788c18): *rnam par shes pa ni drug ste | mig gi rnam par shes pa la sogs pa'o ||*.

[1100] VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a1. The natural way would be to take *catvārīmāny upadhyupādānāni* as the subject and *ālambanāni bhavanti vijñānasya sthitaye* as the predicate. This would seem to be what Hsüan-tsang does: "There are four support-appropriations which, by functioning as *ālambana*, cause *vijñāna* to persist" (YBh$_{c}$ 595a10f: 有四依取 以為所緣 令識安住。). The same seems to hold good for Paramārtha: "The *skandha*s [which are?] the basis, [functioning as] object (*ālambana*) (?), are the abiding-place of the mind" (VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1030b28: 陰依境界為心住處。). Tib., however, construes *upadhyupādānāni* with the predicate: "These four are the cause, appropriation and *ālambana* for the persistence of *vijñāna*" (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 44b8f: *bzhi po 'di dag ni rnam par shes pa gnas pa'i rgyu dang len pa dang dmigs pa yin te |*). — For this sentence, cf. also NA 466b21 (有四依取所緣識住). For *upadhyupādāna* (依取), Saṅghabhadra gives two explanations: "The four [*vijñānasthiti*s, viz.,] *rūpa*, etc., function as the basis (**upadhi*) of *saṁsāra* and are clung to (**upādāna*) by the defilements (**kleśa*). Alternatively: precisely [by] functioning as the basis (**upadhi*) [of *saṁsāra*?], they attract/incur (**upādāna*) all [kinds of] suffering" (NA 466b29–c2: 言依取者, 謂 色等四 為生死依, 煩惱所取。或即為依 攝取眾苦。). Here, *upadhi* is clearly understood in the sense of "basis", whereas it appears that *upādāna* is first interpreted in a passive sense and then in an active one.

rūpogaṁ vijñānaṁ tiṣṭhati rūpālambanaṁ rūpapratiṣṭhaṁ nandyu(pasec)anaṁ[1101] *vṛddhi(ṁ) virūḍhi(ṁ) vaipulya(m āpadyate),*[1102]

and similarly for *vedanā*, *saṁjñā* and *saṁskāras*.

200.3. In the subsequent exegesis, *upadhyupādāna* (sg.) is explained as the thing or item to which a defilement is attached (*nyon mongs pa'i gzhi* = **kleśavastu*, i.e., *upadhi*) on the one hand, and the defilement attached to it (*tatpratibaddhaḥ kleśaḥ*, i.e., *upādāna*) on the other.[1103] We may therefore take *upadhyupādāna* as a dvandva meaning "possession and [the act of] appropriation/clinging".[1104] This is supported by VaSg I.5.vi, specifying *upadhi* as the *skandhas* except *vijñāna* (i.e., as the four *vijñānasthitis*), and *upādāna* as *chandarāga* for sensual pleasures, views, etc.[1105] Both *upadhi* and *upādāna* are stated to be called *ālambana*: a 'possession' is *ālambana* in the passive sense in that it is seized or held on to (*ālambyate*)[1106] by the act of appropriation, and the act of appropriation itself is *ālambana* in an active sense (action noun) in that it seizes the 'possession' or holds on to it (*ālambate*)[1107]. In this way, both of them contribute to the persistence (*sthiti*) of *vijñāna* in *saṁsāra*, i.e., to the

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1101 Cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 186a8 (D zi 163b7: VaSg I.5.vi): *dga' bas nye bar brlan pa* (YBh$_c$ 789a5: 喜愛滋潤; cf. also NA 465a25: 喜愛潤) and the equivalent *tad-* (=*nandy-*) *-abhiṣyanditaṁ* in VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a4. SĀ(VP) 7.1 in *SWTF* III 8a has *nandy-u(pase)y̱anaṁ vṛddhi///*. Cf. also fn. 866.

1102 VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a1 (YBh$_t$ P zi 45a1; D zhi 42b3; YBh$_c$ 595a11f; stops after *rūpālambanam*); SamBh 168,15f (# 3.2.2.2.7; stops after *tiṣṭhati*); AKVy 668,9f (up to °*pratiṣṭhaṁ*). VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a5 confirms the terms *virūḍhi*, *vṛddhi* and *vaipulya* (in this sequence, which is, however, contrary to the law of waxing syllables; but cf. also AKBh 223,19 (read *abhavyo virūḍhiṁ vṛddhiṁ vipulatām ā⟨pa⟩ttum*). For the Pāli parallel, see § 173.2.

1103 VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a3 (YBh$_t$ P zi 45a4; D zhi 42b5f; YBh$_c$ 595a17f).

1104 The only version which appears to contradict such an understanding is Paramārtha's (see fn. 1100), for he seems to understand both elements of the compound in a passive-objective sense (which he also prefers on other occasions: cf. § 237.2). But in the subsequent exegetical text portion, his translation, though not fully clear to me in detail, seems to presuppose essentially the same text as the other versions; cf. his translation of *ālambyate ālambate cêti kṛtvā* (see fn. 1107) as "1. the object, 2. that which apprehends/seizes the object" (1030c6: 一者是境。二者取境者。 [punctuation with Ui 1965: 662b4]), or his rendering of *vastūpagamana* (see fn. 1110) and *vastvālambana* (see fn. 1113) by a verb+object phrase.

1105 YBh$_t$ P 'i 185b5-7 (D zi 163a6f; YBh$_c$ 788c15-17): *gzhi* (**upadhi*) *ni bzhi ste* (D : *bzhis te* P) | *gzugs dang* | *tshor ba dang* | *'du shes dang* | *'du byed rnams so* || *nye bar len pa* (**upādāna*) *ni bzhi ste* | *'dod pa dang* | *lta ba dang* | *tshul khrims dang* | *brtul zhugs dang* | *bdag tu smra ba rnams la 'dun pa'i 'dod chags so* || — In VaSg I.3.x (see fn. 1084), too, **upādāna* is identified with the *action* that (or: by which one) appropriates, defined as the four kinds of clinging, viz., to sensual pleasures, views, etc., and **upadhi* is taken in the passive-objective sense of "what is appropriated", but in this case it is equated not with the four *vijñānasthitis* but with all the five *skandhas*. Cf. also YBh$_t$ P yi 38b3f (D 'i 32b2f; YBh$_c$ 765a1-3: ParySg; cf. also ASBh 143,5f), explaining **upadhi* (*rdzas*, 依) as the five *upādānaskandhas* and the seven *parigrahavastūni* (see YBh$_{Bh}$ 47,1-4), and **upādāna* as either, briefly, *chandarāga* or, in detail, the four kinds of clinging (viz., to sensual pleasures, views, etc.). For a comprehensive list of the types of *upadhi* recognized in early Yogācāra, see SopBh ## 3.1.0–3.1.8.

1106 Cf. *PW* s.v. *lamb* + *ā*: "2) sich klammern –, sich hängen an ...".

1107 VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a3 (YBh$_t$ P zi 45a4f; D zhi 42b6; YBh$_c$ 595a18f): *tac côbhayam ālambanam apy ucyate: ālambyate ālambate cêti kṛtvā*. Cf. VaSg I.5.vi (YBh$_t$ D zi 163a7; P 'i 185b7; YBh$_c$ 788c17f): *dmigs pa ni gnyis te* | *gang la dmigs pa dang* | *gang gis dmigs pa'o* || (復有二緣。謂 若所緣 及若能緣。).

vijñāna's taking hold of and completing a new individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) in the future, and to its continuing to do so as long as the driving force, i.e., appropriation/clinging = defilements, is not cut off.[1108] In VaSg I.5.vi, the *sthiti* of *vijñāna* is said to be twofold: persistence (or: being settled) [in *saṁsāra*] in the form of [being accompanied by] actual outbreaks (*paryavasthāna*) of defilements (*kleśa*), and persistence [in *saṁsāra*] in the form of [being beset with] their latent dispositions (*anuśaya*).[1109]

200.4.1. The emphasis on spiritually negative attitudes continues in the explanation of the following sūtra sentence (viz., *rūpopagaṁ* ...). Here, °*upaga* (see § 173.2) is taken to mean that due to craving (*tṛṣṇā*), which is the cause of [all kinds of] defilements (i.e., of *upādāna*: § 200.3), [the *vijñāna*] 'approaches' the item (*vastu*) [in question] (i.e., the body *(rūpa)* and the other three *skandha*s) in that it grasps or clutches at them (*adhyavasānataḥ*).[1110] According to one of several explanations in the VaSg, appropriation/clinging (**upādāna*) involves a misinterpretation of these items as one's self (*ātman*) or one's own (*ātmīya*),[1111] and the same idea is also implied in a later remark of the VinSg where this aspect of appropriation is said to have ceased in a liberated person.[1112] The subsequent phrase of the sūtra, viz., that *vijñāna* is *rūpālambana*, etc., is taken to mean that by means of the four knots or fetters (*grantha*, viz., greed, malevolence, addiction to outward behaviour and observances, and obsession with the exclusive truth of one's own beliefs), which are the cause of karmic

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1108 VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a4 (YBh$_t$ P zi 45a6-8; D zhi 42b7–43a2; YBh$_c$ 595a22-26). The three phases of *ātmabhāvaparigraha*, *paripūri* and *prabandhapravṛttiniyama* are probably meant to explain, respectively, the expressions *virūḍhi*, *vṛddhi* and *vaipulya* of the sūtra (cf. ms. 19a5: *pūrvavad virūḍhivṛddhivaipulyārtho 'vagantavyaḥ*, with *pūrvavad* obviously referring to the passage under discussion). The original sequence (*vṛddhi*, *virūḍhi*, *vaipulya*: AKVy 522,22f) seems to have been deliberately changed because *virūḍhi*, taken in the sense of "taking roots", lent itself to being applied to the initial stage.

1109 YBh$_t$ P 'i 185b7f (D zi 163a7f; YBh$_c$ 788c18f): *rnam par shes pa la gnas pa ni gnyis te | nyon mongs pa'i kun nas dkris pa'i* (D : om. P) *gnas pa dang | de'i bag la nyal gyi gnas pa'o ||*.

1110 VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a3: *tatra tṛṣṇayā kleśanidānayā*[1] *⟨'⟩dhyavasānato vastūpagamanam ucyate*; Tib. and Chin.: YBh$_t$ P zi 45a5 (D zhi 42b6f): "In this [connection], one should understand that by means of craving, which is the cause of [all the other] defilements, [it = *vijñāna*?] 'approaches the [respective] item' in terms of becoming addicted [to it]" (*de la nyon mongs pa'i rgyu sred pas lhag par chags pa las ni dngos po la nye bar song ba yin par rig par bya'o ||*; YBh$_c$ 595a19f: "Because craving is the condition of defilements, [it = *vijñāna*] is called 'hastening towards the item to be grasped' (corresp. to *adhyavasānato vastūpagamanam*)" (由彼貪愛 為煩惱緣 名趣所執事); VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1030c6f: "Craving, the condition of [the other] defilements, saying 'this is my real self': just [this] is [meant by] 'grasping the [respective] object' (*vastūpagamana*)" (煩惱緣愛 言是我物 即是執境). — In the Sanskrit sentence, *upagamana* can hardly be anything but an action noun or, perhaps, an adjectival agent noun, with *vastu* its logical object. Since the sentence is meant to explain *rūpopagaṁ* (*vijñānam*), etc., the logical subject should in any case be *vijñāna*. At any rate, Tib. and Ch. confirm an active meaning.

1 Formally, *kleśanidānayā* (repeated in the ms. by mistake) should be an adjective, hence a bahuvrīhi, but this is hardly meaningful here (cf. the parallel case of the *grantha*s as the condition of karma: see fn. 1113) and obviously not the way it is understood in Tib. and by Hsüan-tsang (Paramārtha's rendering seems ambiguous).

1111 YBh$_t$ P 'i 185b8–186a2 (D zi 163b1f; YBh$_c$ 788c19-22): *de la nye bar len pa'i dbang du byas nas ... bdag dang bdag gir dmigs pa la log par 'dzin pa...s rnam par shes pa de 'jug cing kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur ro ||*.

1112 YBh$_t$ P zi 46a8 (D zhi 44a1; YBh$_c$ 595b26): *bdag dang bdag gir cung zad kyang mi 'dzin to*, aptly reconstructed by MATSUDA to *⟨na kiṁcid ātmata ātmīya⟩to vôpādatte* (VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b3). Cf. the sūtra text in AKṬU P thu 44b1 (D nyu 11b1): ... *'jig rten ⟨na?⟩ cung zad kyang nye bar mi len to.*

actions, the *vijñāna* holds on (*ālambana*) to the respective item (*vastu*, i.e., body, etc.).[1113] And when the sūtra finally says that *vijñāna* takes the body, etc., as its support (*rūpapratiṣṭha*), this means that the respective item constitutes its foothold or dwelling-place (as something to which *vijñāna* remains attached) as long as the respective item is followed or pursued (*anugata*) by ⟨the latent dispositions (*anuśaya*) of⟩ both of these [appropriative attitudes of *vijñāna*].[1114]

200.4.2. In VaSg I.5.vi, several alternatives are offered for a differentiating explanation of the sūtra statement that the *vijñāna* persists (i.e., continues to arise and to be polluted) because it is (*rūpa*-, etc.) *-upaga*, *-ālambana* and *-pratiṣṭha*. To give just one example: *vijñāna* proceeds and is polluted[1115] because it 'approaches' (~ °*upaga*) — i.e., hastens towards or grasps at[1116] — rebirth due to craving for rebirth (**paunarbhavikī tṛṣṇā*); it thinks of (/clutches at) (°*ālambana*) future objects due to welcoming (**abhinandana*), or longing for, all kinds of things (**tatra tatra*); and it is fixed on (°*pratiṣṭha*) the present objects that have already been obtained because it is associated with delight and passionate attachment (**nandīrāga*) [for them].[1117]

200.5. Somewhat later, when commenting on the latter part of the pericope, which deals with the process of liberation, the VinSg states that due to the repeated practice of the *pratipakṣa* (i.e., supramundane insight) the latent disposition (*anuśaya*) of both attachment (*rāga*) and fetters (*grantha*) is eliminated,[1118] and due to its elimination the act of holding on

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[1113] $VinSg_{ms}$ 19a3: *caturbhiḥ punar abhidhyādibhir granthaiḥ karmanidānair vastvālambana(m u)cyate*; Tib. and Chin.: YBh_t P zi 45a5f (D zhi 42b7): "By means of the four 'fetters' – covetousness, etc. –, which are the cause of karma, [it = *vijñāna*?] apprehends the [respective] item (*vastu*)" (*brnab sems la sogs pa las kyi rgyu'i mdud pa bzhis ni dngos po la dmigs par byed do* ||); YBh_c 595a20f: "Because the four kinds of 'fetters of the body' (**kāyagrantha*), sc., covetousness, etc., are the condition that gives rise to karma, [it = *vijñāna*?] is called apprehending (/holding on to)[1] the thing to be apprehended (/held on to)" (由貪欲等四種身繫 為發業緣 名緣所緣事); $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1030c7f: "Moreover, there are four 'fetters of the body', sc. covetousness, etc., which are the cause of karma: just [this] is [meant by] 'holding on to the [respective] item (*vastvālambana*)" (又有四種貪等身結 是業因緣 即是取境). For the four *(kāya)grantha*s, cf. ms. 19a7f (YBh_t P zi 45b6–46a2; YBh_c 595b7-13) and the VaSg exegesis (YBh_t P 'i 186a6-8; D zi 163b5-7; YBh_c 788c29–789a3), where they are, however, distributed on °*upaga*, °*ālambana* and °*pratiṣṭha*; cf. also YBh_t P 'i 187a2-8 (D zi 164a7–b6; YBh_c 789a24–b6).

[1] Cf. *COUVREUR* 711a s.v. 緣: "grimper"; "s'attacher à quelque chose comme une plante grimpante", a meaning coming quite close to that of *ā-√lamb*.

[1114] $VinSg_{ms}$ 19a3f: *tadubhayā⟨nuśayā⟩nugataṁ punar vastu pratiṣṭhā ⟨veditavyā⟩*. The addition of *anuśaya* (in accordance with K. Matsuda) is based on Tib. and Hsüan-tsang; see YBh_t P zi 45a6 (D zhi 42b7): *de gnyis ka'i* (P : *gnyi ga'i* D) *bag la nyal* (P adds *ba*) *dang ldan pa'i dngos po ni gnas yin par rig par bya'o* ||; YBh_c 595a21f: 彼二隨眠所隨逐故 名建立事. I cannot, however, detect any trace of *anuśaya* in Paramārtha's rendering of the passage (cf. $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1030c8-10), which deviates considerably from the other versions.

[1115] Cf. YBh_t P 'i 186a1f (D zi 163b2; YBh_c 788c22): ... *rgyu 'di gsum gyis rnam par shes pa de 'jug cing kun nas nyon mongs par 'gyur ro.*

[1116] Cf. Hsüan-tsang 趣 and Tib. *'dzin pa* (cf. YBh_t P dzi 31b1f, where the *upagata* of YBh_{Bh} 56,5f is rendered as *zin par gyur pa*).

[1117] YBh_t P 'i 186a5f (D zi 163b4f; YBh_c 788c27-29). The three qualifications of craving are, of course, taken from the formula of the four Truths (cf., e.g., SN V 421,26f).

[1118] $VinSg_{ms}$ 19a8: *pratipakṣabahulīkārāt tadubhayor anuśayaḥ prahīyate rāgagranthayoḥ* |

(*ālambana*), by which any defilement (and thus the *vijñāna* infested by it) may hold on to the *vijñānasthiti*s (body, feelings, etc.), is cut off in terms of definitive dissociation (i.e., once and for all).[1119] On account of this holding-on being cut off, the *vijñāna* insofar as it is accompanied by latent evil dispositions (*sānuśaya*) ceases to exist.[1120] Thus, *vijñāna* is no longer emotionally dependent on the remaining *skandha*s, i.e., on the *vijñānasthiti*s, since the *vijñāna* that continues to be present, i.e., the one that is opposed to the one accompanied by latent dispositions, is pure[1121] (and hence free from appropriation/clinging). Since the cause

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[1119] YBh$_t$ P zi 46a3 (D zhi 43b3f): *de spangs pa'i phyir nyon mongs pa gang gis gzugs dang tshor ba la sogs pa la dmigs par byed pa'i dmigs pa de gtan du bral bas rgyun chad par 'gyur ro* ||. I am not sure if my understanding of the passage is correct. Unfortunately, the corresponding sentence in VinSg$_{ms}$ 19a8–b1 is lacunary, all that has been left in the ms. being *asya* (sc., *rāgagranthayor anuśayasya*) *ca prahāṇā ––––––– mucchidyate atyantavisaṁyogataḥ* |. Since the sūtra commented upon contained the words *(u)cchidyata ālambanam* (see fragment SĀ(VP) 7.4 quoted in *SWTF* III: 184b s.v. [2]*prati-ṣṭhā*; cf. SN III 55,21: *vocchijjat' ārammaṇaṁ*), at the end of the lacuna we are entitled to restore the text to *(– – – tad ālambana)m ucchidyate* or *(°naṁ sa)mucchidyate* (Matsuda). As regards the rest, I am unsure, but since the correlative (*de* = **tad*) goes with *ālambana*, I have tentatively taken the relative (*gang gis* = **yena*?) to refer to *ālambana* as well, and *nyon mongs pa* = **kleśa* as the subject of the relative clause. This may not be the only possible solution.[1]

[1] One alternative might be: "The defilement that holds on to the body, etc.: this [act of] holding on is cut off" (cf. 19a3, where *kleśa* = *upādāna* is stated to be *ālambana* in the subjective sense of holding on [to its object]: see § 200.3 with fn. 1107).

But what is important for my argument is that *ālambana* appears to be used in an *active* sense here. It is true that such an interpretation is not supported by Hsüan-tsang's rendering:

> Because these [latent dispositions] have been cut off, the objects, viz., body, feelings, etc., that are apprehended by the defilements, likewise do not continue, on account of definitive dissociation.
> 由此斷故 煩惱所緣色受等境 亦不相續, 以究竟離繫故。(YBh$_c$ 595b15f)

But the corresponding passage in VaSg I.5.vi, though equally problematic in its first half, is unambiguous in excluding that what is cut off is the object itself:

> Due to the elimination of those [fetters], [(1]the act of holding on by which the defilements hold on [to the *vijñānasthiti*s] is cut off[1)], but *not the apprehended [object itself]*, for it (= the object) is [now merely] understood correctly, not in a mistaken way.
> *de rnams spangs pas ni* (D : om. P) *nyon mongs pa gang gis dmigs pa'i* (D : om. P) *dmigs par byed pa de chad par 'gyur gyi gang la dmigs pa de ni ma yin te* | *de phyin ci ma log par yang dag par rtogs pa'i phyir ro* || (YBh$_t$ 'i 187a8f; D zi 164b6)
> [(1...1)] With v.l. P: the defilements that hold on [to the *vijñānasthiti*s] are cut off.

In this case, Hsüan-tsang's rendering agrees:

> Moreover: as regards their elimination: the defilements that apprehend those objects are cut off, not however those objects [themselves], ...
> 又彼斷者, 謂 緣彼境諸煩惱斷, 非彼所緣, 即於彼境無倒解故。(YBh$_c$ 789b6f)

[1120] VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b1 (YBh$_t$ P zi 46a3f; D zhi 43b4f; YBh$_c$ 595b16-18; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1030c28–1031a1): *tasyôcchedāt sānuśayasya vijñānasya niruddhasya* ... (continued in fn. 1121).

[1121] VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b1 (continued from fn. 1120): ... *tāsu rūpavedanādiṣu vijñānasthitiṣv apratiṣṭhā, viśuddhatvāt tatprātipakṣikasya vijñānasy(a)*. Cf. also 19b2 (YBh$_t$ P zi 46a6; YBh$_c$ 595b21): ... *viśuddhaṁ vijñānaṁ ... apratiṣṭhitam ity ucyate*. I fail to see why this statement should imply that the *vijñāna* now becomes itself a 'foundation' (場所), as Hakamaya (2008: 148,1) seems to suggest. The arhat's *vijñāna* is simply no longer based on, i.e., spiritually fixed on or attached to, anything. Nor can I detect any specifically Vijñānavāda (唯識) idea in the final section of the text (VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b4f; YBh$_t$ P zi 46b4-7; YBh$_c$ 595c6-11), which is dedicated to the *exegetical* problem of why *vijñāna* itself is not reckoned as a *vijñānasthiti* (cf. also, e.g., AKBh 117,25–118,3; Vi 706c17–707a2; NA 465b3ff). The reason is that *vijñāna* is not inherently polluted (like the *kleśa*s = *upādāna*) and that *vijñāna alone* is not the object of anybody's craving (like *rūpa*, etc., = *upadhi*) (*na hi kaścid vijñāna eva kevalaṁ*

for persisting in *saṁsāra* has vanished, there will be no taking hold of a new individual existence after death.[1122] Rather, at the time of death the *vijñāna* will cease spontaneously, without requiring any other cause.[1123] The same is, as the VaSg makes clear, also true of the other *skandha*s of the present life, which will also cease by themselves and not reappear, because the cause for their reproduction in a future life has been cut off.[1124]

200.6. It should have become clear from the preceding summary that in this exegetical tradition the *vijñāna* that is characterized as *rūpopaga*, etc., and corresponds to the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the *Bījasūtra* is, to be sure, regarded as having the other four *skandha*s as its support (or rather: its focus of attachment) and that they are called its 'possessions' (*upadhi*) and in this sense may even be called its object-of-appropriation, i.e., *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense.[1125] But emphasis is unambiguously on *upādāna* as the *act* of appropriation or clinging, and on *vijñāna*'s being fraught with defilements and fetters and, above all, with the latent dispositions or evil propensities (*anuśaya*), from which these defilements and fetters may emerge on any occasion. Thus, when the text speaks of the *vijñāna* that had been established in the *vijñānasthiti*s as the "mind bound up with evil propensities" (*sānuśayaṁ vijñānam*),[1126] this sounds like a quasi-synonym of "mind bound up with appropriation/clinging" (*sopādānaṁ vijñānam*), and so does its designation as *sāsrava* ("bound up with contaminants") a few lines later.[1127] This is still more evident in VaSg I.5.vi,

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tṛṣyati tadyathā rūpādiṣu). Therefore, *vijñāna* (YBh$_C$: 唯識, i.e., *vijñāna* alone) is not something by which, or on the basis of = attached to which, *vijñāna* persists (*tasmād vijñānaṁ na vijñānasthitiḥ*). Cf. also YBh$_t$ P 'i 187b8–188a1 (D zi 165a5f; YBh$_c$ 789b22-24; = VaSg I.5.vi): for three reasons there is no **vijñānopagā vijñānasthitiḥ*, the third reason being that there is no other *vijñāna* accompanying *vijñāna* (*de las gzhan pa'i rnam par shes pa'i grogs med pa'i phyir ro*; 三, 由餘識助伴無故); the text belongs to the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials of the YBh (cf. § 200.1 with fn. 1099) and hence presupposes the principle of the non-simultaneity of two or more *vijñāna*s in one and the same *santāna* (cf. § 288.2 with fn. 1568).

[1122] YBh$_t$ P zi 46a5 (D zhi 43b5f; YBh$_C$ 595b19f): *rgyu 'gags pa'i phyir phyi ma la lus yongs su 'dzin pa dang | yongs su rdzogs par byed pa dang | rgyun 'jug pa rnams 'byung bar mi 'gyur te |*; in the Skt. ms., the end of the sentence is missing (restoration: K. MATSUDA): VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b1f: *āyatyāṁ ca nidānanirodhād ātmabhāvaparigrahaparipūripra⟨bandhapravṛttayo na bhaviṣyanti⟩*. Cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 187b2 (D zi 164b7; YBh$_C$ 789b9f): "One should understand that since the [seed-like *vijñāna*] does not exist any more, [its] taking roots, growing and expanding (cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 186b3f and fn. 1108) in the future will stop" (*de med pas phyi ma la ... skye ba dang | 'phel ba dang rgyas pa 'gag par rig par bya'o ||*).

[1123] VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b3 (YBh$_t$ P zi 46b1; D zhi 44a2; YBh$_C$ 595b28f): *tac ca vijñānaṁ viśuddhatvād eva svarasenaîva nirudhyate svayaṁ, na punar anyaṁ hetum apekṣate*.

[1124] YBh$_t$ P 'i 187b5f (D zi 165a3; YBh$_C$ 789b17f):

> The already obtained *skandha*s cease automatically [when the life-span of the liberated person is exhausted], and others will not arise because their cause has been completely cut off.
>
> *phung po thob par gyur pa rnams rang gi ngang gis 'gag la gzhan dag gi yang rgyu yang dag par chad pas skye ba med do ||*

[1125] Cf. fn. 1104 and § 237.2.

[1126] See § 200.5 with fn. 1120.

[1127] VinSg$_{ms}$ 19b4 (YBh$_t$ P zi 46b3; D zhi 44a3f; YBh$_C$ 595c3f): *yat* (sc. *vijñānaṁ*) *sāsravaṁ, tad dṛṣṭe dharme nirvṛtam*. Pāramārtha (VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1031a12) renders the expression as "mundane mind" (世心).

where the *vijñāna* is characterized as the 'seed' of rebirth [because it is] controlled (*°parigṛhīta*) by karma and defilements (*kleśa*) generating rebirth".[1128]

4.2.5.5. *Upā(da)tta/upādiṇṇa*

201. In the preceding chapter, my main aim was to show that in connection with the expression *sopādāna*, especially as an attribute of *vijñāna*, *upādāna* means spiritually negative appropriation (i.e., grasping for and/or clinging to), with special emphasis on its function to actualize karma so as to produce a corresponding rebirth. I also hope to have shown that in this connection *upādāna* is, at any rate in the Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) tradition, not necessarily to be taken in a passive-objective sense, but is, on the contrary, normally understood as an action noun, sometimes even in the sense of a latent disposition. In the present chapter, however, my aim is to show that the terminological use of *upādāna*, or *upā-√dā* and its derivates, is not confined to the meaning of spiritually negative clinging but includes other applications as well, among which one is, as I shall try to demonstrate later, crucial for the interpretation of Saṁdh V.2.

202. There are plenty of passages where *upādāna*, or *ādāna*, or corresponding verb forms, denote the taking hold of a new body or of a new individual existence or set of *skandha*s at the moment of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) a new life.[1129] In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, e.g., an arhat is said to enter into final Nirvana because the present *skandha*s that had been projected by previous karma and defilements cease by themselves and because new ones are not taken hold of (*anupādānāt*) so that there is no further 'linking up'.[1130] In the VaSg (I.2.iii), it is stated that when a person who has not attained self-control (**adānta*) and whose conditioned constituents[1131] (**saṁskāra*) are laden with evil propensities (**sānuśaya*) dies, a new individual

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[1128] YBh_t P 'i 187b1f (D zi 164b6f):

> As regards the *vijñāna* that had been the 'seed' of rebirth [because it was] controlled (*-parigṛhīta*) by karma and *kleśa*s generating rebirth, it should be understood to be no longer established in this basis (i.e., the four *vijñānasthiti*s). Since that [state of its being established in the *vijñānasthiti*s?] does not exist [anymore], ...
>
> *yang srid pa skye bar byed pa'i las dang nyon mongs pas yongs su zin pa'i yang srid par skye ba'i sa bon rnam par shes pa ni gnas der mi gnas par rig par bya'o || de med pas ...*

YBh_c (789b7-9) lacks the first negation:

> As for the *vijñāna* that is controlled by karma and defilements [leading to] rebirth and is [therefore] the 'seed' of rebirth, one must know that it had been established in this basis. Since [however] that [kind of *vijñāna*?] does not exist [anymore], ...
>
> 又由後有諸業煩惱之所攝持後有種識當知於此依止建立。彼無有故, ...

Since the passage must be a comment on what corresponds to Pāli *patiṭṭhā viññāṇassa na hoti* (AKṬU P thu 44a8: *rnam par shes pa gnas pa...r mi 'gyur te*; NA 466c5: 識無復住著; cf. $VinSg_{ms}$ 19b1 [see fn. 1121]: *vijñānasya ... apratiṣṭhā*), the Tibetan version appears preferable.

[1129] Cf. S 1987 # 3.9.2.5. For textual examples see ibid. ns. 336–340.

[1130] S 1982b: 468 # 10.b ($ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 509,16-18); the facsimile of the ms. published by the Taishō University in 1993 is not much clearer than my photos; it seems to read (fol. 128b3): *pūrvvakarmakleśāviddhānāṁ (xx) skandhānāṁ svarasani[ruddhatvād anye]ṣāṁ [cânu]pādānāt apratisandher nirupadhiśeṣe nirvāṇadhātau (parinirvāti).*[1]

[1] Illegible portions in round brackets, very indistinct portions in square brackets.

[1131] Tentative rendering; "karmic impulses" would not appear impossible either, but according to the sūtra of which VaSg I.2.iii is an exegesis (viz. $SĀ_c$ no. 15, corresponding to SN 22.36, for which see VETTER 2000: 187f), *anuśaya* (in the case of the sūtra rather: adherence) refers to the five *skandha*s.

existence will come about (**abhinirvṛtti*) after death, and the respective person will take hold (**upādāna*) of another set of conditioned constituents laden with evil propensities, entailing his/her being enmeshed in suffering and ensnared by spiritual fetters like passionate attachment (**rāga*). On the other hand, such coming about of a new individual existence and taking hold of new constituents laden with evil propensities will not happen when a person dies after having attained self-control and freedom from evil propensities.[1132] In VaSg I.5.iii (ad SĀ_C no. 61), **upādāna* seems to be related to the first moment of a new life (**upapatti-bhava*).[1133] This meaning of taking hold of rebirth is sometimes connected with that of spiritually negative clinging in that the defilements are stated to be called *upādāna* because they take hold of rebirth or further individual existences,[1134] i.e., because they not only cling to present sensual pleasures, etc., but also to their perpetuation, and are thus the real driving force for taking hold of rebirth.

203. More important for my argument is, however, an essentially different application of the expression *upādāna*, one that Matsumoto tends to disregard, perhaps because it is mostly, though not exclusively, associated with the participle *upātta*/*upādatta* in Sanskrit and *upādiṇṇa(ka)* / *upādinna(ka)* in Pāli.

4.2.5.5.1. Sarvāstivāda Sources

204. The use of the participle *upā(da)tta*/*upādiṇṇa(ka)* is, to be sure, not confined to the specific technical meaning I am going to focus on. In the *Vibhāṣā*,[1135] we find a detailed discussion distinguishing various applications, among them the use of **upā(da)tta* in the sense of "taken hold of" with regard to the five *skandha*s constituting a sentient being when one 'links up' (i.e., is reborn) in a certain homogeneous class of beings (*nikāyasabhāga*)[1136] and in the sense of "clung to" with regard to the five *skandha*s as the object of the conception

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[1132] YBh_t P 'i 154a3–b2 (D zi 136b5–137a2; YBh_C 776c17-28).

[1133] YBh_t P 'i 182b4f (D zi 160b6; YBh_C 787c8-10): *bar ma do'i srid pa dang | skye ba'i srid pa dang | de phyin chad kyi srid pa mngon par mi 'grub pa'i phyir gzhan dag gi go rims bzhin du nying mtshams sbyor ba med pa dang | nye bar len pa med pa dang | 'byung ba med pa*[1] *yin par rig par bya'o* ||.

[1] Cf. SĀ_C 15c20 (不相續、不起、不出) and *SWTF* I 107a (s.v. *a-pratisandhi*): "BrSK 162b … ///(apra)tisandhir anupādānam aprādu///", corroborating *nye bar len pa med pa* = **anupādāna* as the second word of the VaSg phrase (against SĀ_C 不起 = **anutpāda*?).

[1134] AHN 2003: 200 (h) with n. 111. Cf. also Pūrṇavardhana (Tj P no. 5594: nyu 162a4f; D no. 4093: chu 129a7), commenting on AKBh 308,16 (*upagṛhṇantîty upādānāni*): "What do they grasp? Rebirth (*punarbhava*). Because they take hold of an individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) in this or that [destiny], they are [acts of] appropriation" (*ci zhig nye bar 'dzin ce na | yang srid pa ste | de dang der lus 'dzin pas na nye bar len pa dag go* |); similarly AKṬT P tho 302b5 and NA 642a12f (執取彼彼自體名取); somewhat differently (obviously under the influence of the alternative explanation proposed in AKBh 308,21: see fn. 856) AKVy 488,16f (P chu 147a2): "[The *anuśaya*s = *kleśa*s] are called *upādāna*s because they take, i.e., involve the mind continuum in rebirth or in sensual pleasures, etc." (*upādadata upagṛhṇanti punarbhave kāmādiṣu vā cittasantatim ity upādānāni*). The parallel in AVinSūN 130,13f has, however, *punarbhavaṁ* and looks like a compromise: "... because they appropriate rebirth or because they involve the mind continuum in sensual pleasures, etc."

[1135] Vi 712b8–713a2. For 有執受 representing *upātta*, cf. *AKBh-I* pt. 2: 35a–b.

[1136] Vi 712b18f: 初契經說: 續衆同分有情數五蘊 名有執受. In the verse referred to (quoted Vi 712b12f) it is said that the [essentially] unsatisfactory or disappointing (**duḥkha*) *skandha*s taken hold of [at the beginning of a new existence] entail various forms of suffering: the suffering of birth, of old age, of disease and of dying.

as ego or mine (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*) from eternity (i.e., in the long run of *saṁsāra*),[1137] or with regard to one's body as the object of craving (*tṛṣṇā*).[1138]

205. For the authors of the *Vibhāṣā*, the opportunity to discuss the meaning of *upā(da)tta* arose on account of a paragraph in the *Jñānaprasthāna* where this term is explained as applying to dharmas that belong to [the basis of] individual existence (**ātmabhāvaparyāpanna*),[1139] without any reference to craving or to the conception of a self or ego. As the *Vibhāṣā* explains, this definition of *upātta* comprises all the five *skandha*s as far as they form part of a

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[1137] Vi 712b19f: 次契經說: 無始時來身見事五蘊 名有執受. The sūtra passage referred to (quoted Vi 712b14: 無聞異生 長夜修治 有執受我) resembles NidSa # 7.4 ($SĀ_C$ no. 289): *dīrgharātram eta(d) bālenâśrutavatā pṛthagjanena ... mamāyitam upagatam upādattam ... eṣa me ātmêti*, though in this passage the pronoun *etad* refers to *citta* = *manas* = *vijñāna* only. Although a similar formulation (though containing only *upagata* but not *upātta*) is subsequently used with regard to the body (# 7.5: *varaṁ ... ayam eva caturmahābhau(t)i(kaḥ kā)yaḥ ātmata u(paga)to* ...), there is no reference to the remaining *skandha*s. Thus, what the *Vibhāṣā* had in mind may rather have been a passage like SN III 114,25-29 ($SĀ_C$ no. 104: 31c4-6 but also c9f; cf. fn. 876): *so* (sc. *asutavā puthujjano*) *rūpam upeti upādiyati adhiṭṭhāti 'attā me' ti. vedanaṁ* (etc.) ... *ti. tass' ime pañc' upādānakkhandhā upetā upādinnā dīgharattaṁ (ahitāya ... saṁvattanti).*

[1138] Vi 712b20f "According to the last sūtra, the *skandha rūpa* that forms part of [a sentient being's] individual existence (**ātmabhāva*?)[1] is called *upātta*" (後契經說: 內身所攝色蘊 名有執受). The sūtra passage referred to (quoted Vi 712b15: 況於此身暫停住中 有愛[2]執受) corresponds to $MĀ_C$ 464c14 (no. 30): "[Since even the external element earth is ultimately impermanent,] how much more this body that subsists only for a while and is [yet] clung to by craving, (to the effect that ordinary persons regard it as their self or their own)"(況復此身 暫住 為愛所受), a parallel of MN I 185,32f (no. 28): *kiṁ pan' imassa mattaṭṭhakassa kāyassa taṇhupādiṇṇassa*.

[1] For 內身 = *ātmabhāva* cf. $AKBh_{Hs}$ 51b13 = AKBh 140,13.

[2] 愛 added with the v.l.

[1139] JP_H 988c26 = Vi 712b8: "What is the meaning of *upātta*? Answer: The dharmas that belong to [the basis of] individual existence insofar as they are indicated by this designation" (有執受是何義。答 此增語所顯墮自體法。). Gautama Saṅghadeva (JP_S 864c18) renders **upātta* as "internal" (內, i.e., in oneself): "Which dharmas are *upātta*? Answer: It is a term for what is reckoned as oneself" (內為何法。答曰。自己數名。). Cf. also AAvat 981a1 (VAN VELTHEM 1977: 4,27–5,2 and 82,32-34 [Tib.]): "Those [primary elements] that belong to [the basis of] individual existence (or body: **ātmabhāva*) are *upātta*; this means: endowed with sentience (**sacetana*)" (墮自體者, 名有執受。是有覺義。; Tib.: *de la lus su gtogs pa rnams ni zin pa dag ste sems pa dang bcas pa'i don gang yin pa'o*). For 墮自體 in JP_H, I would have suggested the reconstruction **atmabhāvaparyāpanna*, which would seem to be confirmed by PSkV ms. 9b4: *tatrôpāttāny ātmabhāvaparyāpannāni* ...; cf. also ADīVṛ 24,17: *anātmabhāvaparyāpanna⟨tvā⟩t* as a reason for being *anupātta*.[1] However, the JP passage is quoted in NA 352b6f as "In the basic treatise (i.e., JP) it is stated: 'What forms part of one's own body/personality is called *upātta*'" (本論中說: 己身所攝名有執受), which means, according to Saṅghabhadra: "appropriated (**svīkṛta*)[2] by the mind and the mental factors" (心心所執為己有; cf. § 207). This passage, in its turn, seems to have been taken over in AKṬT P to 116b3f: *bstan bcos las ni bdag gi lus su gtogs pa'i* (sic) *zhes 'byung ngo* || *de yang ci zhig ce na* ⟨|⟩ *sems dang sems las byung ba rnams kyi⟨s?⟩ bdag gir byas pa gang yin pa'o* ||, and here the ms.[3] (fol. 34a8) reads: *ātmabhāvapratyāpannam iti śāstre* ⟨|⟩ *kim punas ṯaṯ* (ms.: *tad-*) ⟨|⟩ *ya⟨c⟩ cittacaittaiḥ svīkṛtam* | (*svīkṛta⟨ṁ⟩ nāma ya⟨c⟩ cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenôpagṛhītaṁ* ⟨|⟩).

[1] Cf. also the definition of the sense faculties as ... *pasādo attabhāvapariyāpanno* ... in Dhs 134,9ff.

[2] For 執為己有 = *svī-√kṛ* cf. *YBh-I* 443b.

[3] I should like to express my heartfelt thanks to Prof. Nobuchiyo Odani for kindly letting me know the original Sanskrit wording of the passage.

person's individual existence.[1140] A similar view seems to be presupposed by the *Vijñānakāya* when the objective support (**ālambana*) of benevolence (**maitrī*) is stated to consist in (sequences of) *skandhas* that are *upātta*.[1141] In any case, it is obvious that in the *Vijñānakāya* **upātta* is not intended to designate merely those *skandhas* that form part of one's own personal existence but rather refers to those that form part of the individual existence of *any* sentient being, and it is this perspective that is normally presupposed in the specific Abhidharmic use of the term *upātta*. There is, however, disagreement among exegetes whether the use of *upātta* in the *Vijñānakāya* should be understood as referring to (part of) all the five *skandhas* of sentient beings[1142] or rather to their physical constituents only.[1143]

206.1. Such a restriction is unambiguously expressed in the *Prakaraṇa*. In this text, too, the term *upātta* is stated to apply to one's [basis of] individual existence (**ātmabhāva*),[1144] but not to all of its constituents. Rather, it is only the physical components of a sentient being that are *upātta*, or, more precisely, a certain part of them:

> What is called *upātta*? A part of nine *āyatanas*, [viz.,] that which is *upātta*; [of nine *āyatanas*: i.e.,] with the exception of the *āyatanas* sound, *manas* and *dharmāḥ*.[1145]

The term *upātta* applies thus only to a part of the *skandha rūpa*.[1146] Since only constituents of sentient beings are called *upātta*, in the case of the objective *āyatanas* not only the *āyatana* sound (**śabda*) as a whole[1147] but also the others insofar as they belong to the external world

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[1140] Vi 712b17f: 此中 說内身所攝五蘊 名有執受; similarly c5f. Cf., in this connection, Divy 33,4-6, 82,7-9, 88,3-5, etc.: *na ... karmāṇi kṛtāny upacitāni bāhye pṛthivīdhātau vipacyante, nâbdhātau, na tejodhātau, na vāyudhātau, api tûpātteṣv eva skandhadhātvāyataneṣu karmāṇi kṛtāny upacitāni vipacyante śubhāny aśubhāni ca.*

[1141] Vi 712b16f: 識身論說: 有執受蘊 是慈所緣. Cf. VijñK 543c10: 慈緣執受諸蘊相續.

[1142] Vi 712b22f: 識身論說: 一剎那五蘊少分 名有執受. Cf. also b28.: "When [benevolence] is fully developed, it has[all] the five *skandhas* [of sentient beings] as its objective support" (成時 緣五蘊。).

[1143] Vi 712b23f: "Some [masters] say that both the *Prakaraṇapāda*- and the *Vijñānakāyaśāstra* teach that part of nine *āyatanas* [insofar as they] are counted as [forming part of] sentient beings (**sattvasaṁkhyāta*) is, for one moment (*kṣaṇa*: see § 206.2 with fn. 1149), called *upātta*" (有說。品類足 識身論 說: 一剎那 有情數 九處少分 名有執受。). Other masters (712b24-27) specify the part of the nine *āyatanas* that is called *upātta* by replacing **sattvasaṁkhyāta* with "comprised in what has sense faculties" (有根所攝) or by "comprised in what is maturation (**vipāka*) [of previous karma]" (異熟所攝). Cf. also Vi 712b27f: "When [benevolence] is cultivated for the first time, it has [only] *rūpa* (i.e., the body of sentient beings) as its objective support" (初修時 緣色).

[1144] $Prak_H$ 697a2f: 云何有執受。謂 自體所攝 ...; $Prak_G$ 632b7: 云何受。謂 自性受。Still, in this passage, too, *upātta* applies only to nine of the twelve *āyatanas*.

[1145] $Prak_H$ 715c13f (cf. Vi 712b15f): 有執受法云何。謂有執受九處少分。除聲意法處。In this case, the corresponding passage in $Prak_G$ (648b9: 云何受法。謂 若法自性所攝。) has the less specific definition of *upātta* as **ātmabhāvaparyāpanna* (see fn. 1144), but the more specific one is also found (see fn. 1146).

[1146] $Prak_H$ 760b3 + b10-13; $Prak_G$ 685c8 + c13-15: 陰, ... 四不受。一分別。色陰。或受 或不受。云何受。若自性受。云何不受。若非自性受。Cf. $Prak_H$ 725c5f ($Prak_G$ 656b7): 有執受法, 九界九處一蘊攝。

[1147] For this reason, its enumeration in $Prak_H$ 697a4 must be a mistake; cf. $Prak_G$ 632b8 and the parallel passages $Prak_H$ 757a21 ($Prak_G$ 683b19) and 763a22 (687c3f).

are excluded, and the part to be called *upātta* are those that are inseparably mixed up with the physical sense faculties.[1148]

206.2. But what about the physical sense faculties themselves? What is the part that is not included in the category *upātta*? I have not been able to find an answer in the text itself, but later Sarvāstivāda sources are unambiguous in stating that what is excluded are *past* and *future* sense faculties (and of course also the past and future sense objects inseparable from them), the category *upātta* being reserved for physical entities forming part of individual existence (or: of a living body) in this very moment, i.e., reserved for its *present* (*pratyut-panna*) physical components.[1149]

207. Still, we may ask what, precisely, is the quality that distinguishes 'appropriated' (*upātta*) matter, in the sense under discussion, from non-appropriated, external matter. As has already been pointed out, 'appropriated' matter forms part of a living being. According to one opinion mentioned in the *Vibhāṣā*, being 'appropriated' means being mixed up with blood, flesh, sinews and bones,[1150] which looks like an attempt to narrow the concept down to living matter in the sense of the bodies of humans and animals. According to another opinion, 'appropriated' matter is such matter as produces a painful feeling when cut, pierced, broken or torn,[1151] — a definition that emphasizes the connection with sentience: *upātta* in this sense is

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[1148] Vi 712b24f; AHṛd$_1$ 810a24 and a28f (cf. WILLEMEN 1975: 9f; ARMELIN 1978: 58f); AHṛd$_2$ 836a22f and 29f; AAmṛt 969c26 (VAN DEN BROECK 1977: 121): "nine *dhātu*s, [i.e., the sense faculties and the sense objects except sound] as far as they are united with the sense faculties ... are *upātta*" (九持 情根合 ... 是受。); AKBh 23,14 (*indriyāvinirbhāgiṇaḥ*); NA 352b3 and, especially, b10f: "The visibles, etc., that are inseparable from the sense faculties are, to be sure, not [in a strict sense] the seat [of the respective form of mind and the mental factors associated with it], but they are that on which the mind and [the mental factors] closely depend" (色等 若不離根 雖非所依 而是心等之所親附。).

[1149] Cf. the addition of the qualification "[for] one moment" (一剎那) in the definitions of Vi 712b21ff (see fn. 1143). The definition ascribed to Ghoṣaka (Vi 712c11-13) is quite explicit: "If a dharma *has already arisen but not yet disappeared*, belongs to a sentient being, offers resistance [i.e., is physical], and cannot be heard, it is called *upātta*" (若法 已生未滅 有情數 是有對 非所聞, 名有執受。). Cf. also the definition of *Vāmala(ka?)[1] (Vi 712c15-17), and, with special reference to the primary elements, Vi 709b1-5 (see fn. 1153). Other sources expressly restricting the application of *upātta* to the present moment are: AHṛd$_1$ 810a26-29; AHṛd$_2$ 836a26; a28–b3; MiśAHṛd 875c27-29 (DESSEIN 1999: I 51); AAmṛt 969c26f; AKBh 23,13f (... *pratyutpannā upāttāḥ*); NA 352b1-4; ADīVṛ 24,16f (MITOMO 2007: 284).

[1] 左取, in other places (e.g., Vi 247b2; 253a10; 367c13) 左受, for which Vi$_2$ (192b27; 196c28; 279c6) has 婆摩勒. Cf. X 53.836: 4c15f: (an arhat thus named because he had the habit of accepting robes, food, etc. with the left hand).

[1150] Vi 712c8: 有說。若與血肉筋骨相雜住者 名有執受。

[1151] Vi 712c9f:

> There are [masters] who declare: That which, when one cuts, pierces, breaks or tears it, causes a painful feeling ...,[1] is called 'appropriated' (**upātta*).
> 有說。於彼斫刺破裂時 生苦痛捨擔 名有執受。
>
> [1] 捨擔, which normally means "to abandon or throw off a burden", is not clear to me in the present context.

Cf. AHṛd$_2$ 836a22-24 (tentative translation):

> 'Appropriated' means: such matter (**rūpa*) as is reckoned among the sense faculties or is inseparable from the sense faculties, and when it is cut or injured, the mind and the mental factors experience [pain] there (or: appropriate this [injury as if inflicted on themselves](?)), because they abide in it.
> 受名 若色在根數 及不離根, 若割截殘壞 心心數法 於中受, 在中住故。

'sentient matter', so to speak.[1152] The deeper reason for this and also the rationale for the employment of the expression 'appropriated' (*upātta*) is supplied by the explanation of *upātta* as what is adopted, by the mind (*citta*) and the mental factors (*caitta*), as their physical support (*adhiṣṭhāna*),[1153] to the effect that 'appropriated' matter and psychic factors participate in each other's being benefited or damaged.[1154] Used in this way, *upātta* may indeed meaningfully be rendered as "assimilated",[1155] viz., in the sense of corporeal matter being 'assimilated' by the mind in the sense of being transformed into and preserved as a living, sentient organism, which will die and putrefy as soon as the mind leaves it (see § 215). It is obvious that such a definition does not cover all parts of a living body: hair, nails and teeth, apart from their roots, are not *upātta* in this sense, nor are excrements, phlegm, mucus, or blood (at least when leaking out).[1156]

208. It is also worth noting that this meaning of *upātta* (to which I refer when speaking of 'biological' appropriation) is explicitly distinguished from its employment in a spiritually negative sense by Saṅghabhadra:

> 'Appropriated' dharmas are, in short, of two kinds: First, one calls *upātta* what is made one's own (**svīkṛta*) by craving for becoming (**bhavatṛṣṇā*) and belief in an ego (*satkāyadṛṣṭi*). Second, one calls *upātta* that which functions as a cause capable of generating [in itself feelings of] pain or pleasure. What one calls [*upātta* in] the second [sense] is the series of [successive] states (i.e., *kalala*, etc.?) of the result of the maturation of previous karma, etc. Among these [two kinds of dharmas called *upātta*],

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Similarly MiśAHṛd 875c24-26 (somewhat differently: DESSEIN 1999 I 51). NA 352b12f supplements this definition with a positive counterpart, stating that the respective physical dharmas not only cause pain when damaged but also cause pleasure in the opposite case.

[1152] Cf. AKBh 23,17 (EJ. 36,12): *yal loke sacetanam ity ucyate*; AAvat 981a1 (see fn. 1139).

[1153] AHṛd₁ 810a24f: (cf. WILLEMEN 1975: 9f; ARMELIN 1978: 58f):

> Called '*upātta*' are [physical dharmas] that are reckoned among the physical sense faculties as well as [physical dharmas] that are not separated from [these] sense faculties, insofar as [these dharmas] are the domain of the mind and mental factors because these abide in them.
>
> 受名謂 若色根數 亦不離根 是心心數法所行 於中止住故。

Cf. also AHṛd₁ 810a27f (五內界 若現在 是受。於中心心數法止住。) and a28–b1 (色香味細滑 若不離根 及現在 是受。如心心數法根中止住，彼中亦爾，不離根故。); AHṛd₂ 836a22-24; a29–b1; MiśAHṛd 875c25f and 29f (DESSEIN 1999: I 51); AAmṛt 969c26 (VAN DEN BROECK 1977: 121); AKBh 23,16 (EJ. 36,11): *upāttam iti ko 'rthaḥ | yac cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenôpagṛhītam ...*; NA 352b7f. With special reference to the primary elements (*mahābhūta*), Vi 709b1-3 states that those which in the present moment form part of a sentient being and are appropriated by the mind and the mental factors are *upātta* (此中 有執受大種者，謂 現在剎那 有情數攝 心心所法所執受大種。).

[1154] AKBh 23,16 (... *anyonyānugrahopaghātābhyām anyonyānuvidhānāt*) ≈ NA 352b8f; cf. also b12f (see fn. 1151). According to AKṬT P to 116b5f, it is precisely this interdependence on which the concept of *upātta* is based, for since mind and mental factors, being immaterial, are not localizable, it is hard to believe that they can take the sense faculties as their seat in a literal sense (*sems dang sems las byung ba gzugs can ma yin pa yul na mi gnas pa rnams kyis rten gyi dngos po⟨r⟩ nye bar bzung ba ni mos par dka'o zhe na | de'i phyir phan pa dang gnod pa dag gi⟨s⟩ phan tshun mthun par byed pa'i phyir nye bar bzung ba yin gyi de la gnas pa'i phyir ni ma yin no ||*). Earlier thinkers, however, may not have had such a clear-cut concept of the non-spatial nature of mind (cf. fn. 1153).

[1155] As Buescher (B 95,6) suggests.

[1156] Vi 712c26–713a2; AKBh 23,15. Breath (*ānāpāna*, i.e., inhalation and exhalation) is, although belonging to a sentient being, also *anupātta* because it is separable from the sense faculties (*indriya-vinirbhāgin*): AKBh 340,23f.

> [since] craving for becoming and belief in an ego are cut off when correct insight arises, [there is then no longer anything that is *upātta* in the first sense]. The series [of successive states] of the [result of] maturation [of previous karma, however,] is not yet cut off even in [persons in] whom [all] contaminants (*āsrava*) have ceased (i.e., in persons who have attained arhatship). Therefore, if a dharma, after having been appropriated, continues and is not abandoned up to final Nirvana, such a dharma is called exclusively *upātta* [in the second sense].[1157]

4.2.5.5.2. Theravāda and *Śāriputrābhidharma*

209. A comparable distinction of different employments of the expression *upādiṇṇa* (corresponding to Skt. *upātta* and Buddhist Skt. *upādatta*) is also found in Theravāda Abhidhamma. In an exegetical remark on the *Mahāhatthipadūpama-sutta* (MN no. 28), where the elements comprised in one's body are distinguished from those in the external world as 'internal' (*ajjhattika*) and 'appropriated' (*upādiṇṇa*),[1158] Buddhaghosa in his *Visuddhimagga* explains *upādiṇṇa* as "firmly grasped, [i.e.,] firmly grasped, seized and clung to as ego or mine".[1159] When commenting on the same passage in his commentary on the *Majjhima-nikāya*,[1160] he expressly states that this employment of *upādiṇṇa*, which indiscriminately applies to all the elements that are located in (i.e., form part of) the body (*sarīraṭṭhaka*), is to be distinguished from the technical meaning *upādiṇṇa* has assumed in Theravāda Abhidhamma.

210. In its technical meaning, *upādiṇṇa* in Theravāda Abhidhamma, just as *upā(da)tta* in its technical meaning in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, applies indeed only to *certain components*

[1157] NA 352b18-24: 有執受法 略有二種。一者 有愛及有身見 執為己有 名有執受。二者 為因能生苦樂 名有執受。宿業所引異熟果等分位相續, 是名第二。此中 有愛及有身見 若正智生 即便斷滅。異熟相續 諸漏盡者 亦未斷滅。是故 若法 既執受已 至般涅槃 隨轉不捨, 此法一向名有執受。

[1158] MN I 185,14-22, etc.; cf. also I 421,27-33, etc. (no. 62: *Mahārāhulovāda-sutta*), and III 240,19-27, etc. (no. 140: *Dhātuvibhaṅga-sutta*). — The corresponding passages in the Sarvāstivāda canon ($MĀ_C$ 464c5-11, etc.; $MĀ_C$ 690c12-16, etc.; cf. also AKṬU P tu 40a5-8, etc. [D ju 36b7–37a3, etc.])[1] may perhaps have been the canonical starting-point for the Sarvāstivāda use of *upā(da)tta* in its technical sense, provided that its meaning was taken to be different from the one it clearly has a few lines later in **tṛṣṇopā(da)tta* ($MĀ_C$ 464c14: 為愛所受; cf. MN I 185,33 *taṇhopādinnassa*). Cf. also Divy 33,4-6 (see fn. 1140).

> [1] Cf. ANĀLAYO 2011: 193ff, 347ff (esp. 348) and 797ff (esp. 799). Cf. also $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 211,4–216,19 ($ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II 72,7–78,4). In this text, the internal elements are stated to be *upagata* + *upādatta* (thus also YBh_{Bh} 56,4-9; $Śikṣ_B$ 246,17; 248,3; 249,4 [from the *Pitṛputrasamāgama*]: *upagata* + *upātta*; cf. also AKṬU P tu 40a6, etc.: *drung du gyur pa zin pa*). See also HsienY 483b1–c8 (internal elements characterized as 有執受性 (483b3, etc.), probably representing **upātta*.

[1159] VisM XI.33: *upādiṇṇan¯ti daḷhaṁ ādiṇṇaṁ; ahaṁ maman¯ti evaṁ daḷhaṁ ādiṇṇaṁ gahitaṁ parāmaṭṭhan¯ti attho*. In Buddhaghosa's interpretation, the *upādiṇṇa* in MN I 185,16 (etc.) is obviously taken to correspond to *taṇhupādiṇṇa* in 185,33 (etc.) and to imply the opposite of what one should do according to 185,23-25 (etc.), viz., not regard the elements, especially the internal ones (cf. VETTER 2000: 112 with n. 26), as one's self or one's own.

[1160] Ps II 222,28-32: *upādiṇṇan¯ti na kammasamuṭṭhānam eva, avisesena pana sarīraṭṭhakass' etaṁ gahaṇaṁ. sarīraṭṭhakaṁ hi upādiṇṇaṁ vā hotu anupādiṇṇaṁ vā, ādiṇṇa-gahita-parāmaṭṭha-vasena sabbaṁ upādiṇṇam eva nāma* (Ps-pṭ Mūl. # 302 [My. 2.166]: *tattha ādiṇṇan¯ti abhiniviṭṭhaṁ, maman¯ti gahitaṁ, ahan¯ti parāmaṭṭhaṁ*). Cf. also Ps III 139,4f: *upādiṇṇan¯ti ādiṇṇaṁ gahitaṁ parāmaṭṭham, sarīraṭṭhakan¯ti attho* (Ps-pṭ Majjh. # 118 [My. 2.63]: *ādiṇṇan¯ti iman¯ti* [read *maman¯ti* ?] *taṇhā-diṭṭhīhi ādiṇṇaṁ* ...).

of sentient beings. But the selection criterion is quite different here.[1161] According to the *Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, the term *upādiṇṇa* applies to all contaminated (*sāsava*) dhammas that are the [result of] maturation (*vipāka*) of wholesome or unwholesome dhammas. The term thus covers the corresponding parts of the four immaterial *khandha*s (i.e., mind and mental factors) as well as all those material dhammas [that have originated] because one has performed karmic actions (*kammassa katattā*).[1162] Thus, in Theravāda, the technical meaning of *upādiṇṇa* is, on the one hand, not limited to material components of sentient beings but includes certain mental components. On the other, it does not include all components of the (living, sentient) physical body but only those that, although not classified as *vipāka*,[1163] are nonetheless the effect of one's karma, including, among other things,[1164] the physical sense faculties and that part of the sense objects (except sound) that results from one's karma.[1165] What makes a constituent of a sentient being *upādiṇṇa* is thus its being caused or conditioned by that sentient being's karma,[1166] and we may thus render the term in Theravāda Abhidhamma as "earned by [one's] karma".

211. In spite of differences in detail (sound, e.g., may be *upātta* or *anupātta*), the employment of **upātta* (受) and **anupātta* (非受) in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* is based on a similar principle, for here too **upātta* seems to be coextensive with being the result of one's karma (**vipāka* 報, used here in a wider sense, applicable to physical dharmas as well),[1167] or, more precisely, with being the result of one's defiled karma.[1168] *Upātta* is thus applicable, as in Theravāda, not only to the physical sense faculties (regarded in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* to be exclusively *vipāka*)[1169] and to a part of the sense objects[1170] but also to a part of mind and

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[1161] Cf., in this connection, the lucid discussion of the meaning of *upādiṇṇa/upātta* in Theravāda and Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma as well as in the pertinent canonical texts in KARUNADASA ²1989: 104–107.

[1162] Dhs 211,33-37 (# 1211); cf. also Dhs 181,10-14 (# 990) and Vibh 433f.

[1163] This term is, in Theravāda Abhidhamma, restricted to mental components: cf. Dhs 180,35-38 (# 987); Vibh 432,40, stating that *rūpa* is neither *vipāka* nor a factor bound to entail *vipāka* (*rūpakkhandho nevavipākanavipākadhammadhammo*).

[1164] I.e., certain material components typical of Theravāda Abhidhamma, like the space-element (*ākāsadhātu*), insofar as they result from one's karma (see fn. 1165).

[1165] Dhs 146,4-10 (#653): *katamaṁ taṁ rūpaṁ upādiṇṇaṁ? cakkhāyatanaṁ sotāyatanaṁ ghāṇāyatanaṁ jivhāyatanaṁ kāyāyatanaṁ ... yaṁ vā pan' aññaṁ pi atthi rūpaṁ kammassa katattā rūpāyatanaṁ gandhāyatanaṁ rasāyatanaṁ phoṭṭabbāyatanaṁ* (*ākāsadhātu ... kabaḷīkāro āhāro*): *idaṁ taṁ rūpaṁ upādiṇṇaṁ*. The items from *rūpāyatana* onward may also be *anupādiṇṇa*, namely, if they do not result from one's karma (Dhs # 654). Cf. also Vibh 13,2f, 18,20f, 30,10f, 44,3f and 56,7f: all the five *khandha*s may be *upādinna* or *anupādinna*; 73,25-29: five *āyatana*s (i.e., the physical sense faculties) are exclusively *upādinna*, one (i.e., sound) is exclusively *anupādinna*, the rest (i.e., the other four sense objects as well as the immaterial *āyatana*s) may be either; 91,5-8: ten *dhātu*s (the physical sense faculties and the five kinds of sensory awareness) are exclusively *upādinna*, one *dhātu* (sound) is exclusively *anupādinna*, the other *dhātu*s may be either.

[1166] VisM XIV.73: *Yaṁ kammajan ti parato* (cf. XIV.75) *vakkhāma, taṁ kammena upādiṇṇattā upādiṇṇaṁ*.

[1167] ŚA 531b13-20, etc.

[1168] Cf. ŚA 527c11, etc.: 業法煩惱所生報; *mārgasatya* may be *vipāka* (558a17f) but not *upātta* (554c24).

[1169] ŚA 527c7; 536a8; 546b18f.

mental factors.[1171] Yet, expanding on further details would take me too far afield, as would also going into the subtleties of the Theravāda concept of *upādiṇṇa*.

212. The rationale of the technical use of *upādiṇṇa/upātta* in Theravāda Abhidhamma and in the *Śāriputrābhidharma* is thus quite different from that of the Sarvāstivāda use of the term, where *upātta* in the technical sense means appropriated, or assimilated, by the mind and the mental factors so as to become *sentient* organic matter. Therefore, in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma the application of the term *upātta* is not normally[1172] restricted to physical components that are maturation of karma, but must also include those arisen by accumulation (*aupacayika*) due to nutrition and other causes as well,[1173] but the term is not applicable to any form of mind or mental factors. In spite of this basic difference, the use of *upādiṇṇa /upātta* in their technical sense in all these traditions coincides in that the dharmas that are 'appropriated' in this sense continue beyond the attainment of arhatship until final nirvāna.[1174] This kind of 'appropriation' is thus essentially different from the spiritually negative one. It is merely an *automatic* effect of spiritual clinging and karma, an effect that normally continues for some time even after the complete eradication of the main cause of bondage, viz., spiritually negative clinging.

4.2.5.5.3. Later Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) Sources

213. In Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources, too, the use of *upā(da)tta* in a technical sense different from that of spiritually negative clinging is well attested, and its employment is basically in agreement with its use in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma. The main difference is the fact that in the Yogācāra sources past and future entities are not taken into account since they are regarded as non-existent.[1175] Another difference is that after the introduction of *ālaya-vijñāna* it is, properly speaking, by this subliminal form of mind that the physical organism is

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[1170] ŚA 527c8; 536a9f; 546b19–c4.

[1171] ŚA 527c8f; 536a10-12; 546c4-27.

[1172] Still, Vi 712b25-27 (cf. fn. 1143) mentions an opinion according to which only those of the present five sense faculties and four sense objects that fall under the category of *vipāka*, i.e., are the result of the maturation of karma, are *upātta*.

[1173] Cf., for the sense faculties, Vi 62c6–63a6; AK(Bh) 25,7-15 (I.37ab); ADī 38ab; see PREISENDANZ 1994: 477. The idea of an accumulation or increase of the sense faculties due to food is also attested in Prak_H 719a16ff.

[1174] Mp IV 64,17-22:

> The arhat whose fetters have vanished will stay on as long as his life-span lasts; [thereafter] ..., when the person whose contaminants have vanished has entered the state of Nirvana where no remainder of 'fuel' is left because the karma-earned *khandha*s have come to an end, he becomes non-designatable.
> *khīṇasaṁyojanassa arahato ... yāvatāyukaṁ ṭhānaṁ, ... khīṇāsavassa upādinnakkhandhabhedena an-upādisesāya nibbānadhātuyā parinibbutassa apaṇṇattikabhāvūpagamo.*

[1175] Cf. PSkV ms. 72a4f (PSkV_t P 66a5f): "These (i.e., the physical sense faculties) are exclusively ['biologically'] appropriated. But haven't they elsewhere (cf. AK I.34d) been declared to be of both kinds? True, they have been declared to be so, for in that [text] the past and future [sense faculties] have been taught to be unappropriated (cf. AKBh 23,13f). But [in our system here] these do not exist at all, and what does not exist cannot reasonably be appropriated or unappropriated" (*ete ... upāttā eva. nanu cânyatraîte dvidhā nirdiṣṭāḥ. satyaṁ nirdiṣṭāḥ, tatra hy atītānāgatā anupāttā uktās; te ca na santy eva. na câsata upāttatvam anupāttatvaṁ vā yujyate*).

considered to be 'appropriated',[1176] but even among the later texts some stick to the earlier formulation, or at least lack an explicit reference to *ālayavijñāna*.

214.1. As an example of the latter type, one could adduce the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, where *upātta* is stated to cover a part of the *skandha* 'matter' (*rūpa*), five of the material *āyatana*s and *dhātu*s [completely], and a part of four of them,[1177] i.e., as the *Bhāṣya* explains, the physical sense faculties [completely], and sense objects (except sound) insofar as they are inseparable from the sense faculties; in other words: the physical sense faculties along with their seats (*adhiṣṭhāna*).[1178] The same delimitation is found in the *Pañcaskandhaka*,[1179] though in terms of *dhātu*s only, and, in the form of "the physical sense faculties and the matter where they abide", in the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論).[1180] This delimitation corresponds exactly to the one offered by the *Prakaraṇa* if past and future entities are disregarded.

214.2. As for the *meaning* of *upātta*, the *Pañcaskandhaka* is silent. The *Abhidharmasamuccaya* merely indicates the *effect* of 'appropriation' or 'assimilation', viz., that this kind of matter is the basis for an arising of feelings,[1181] i.e., is sentient, but does not expressly specify the agent of this appropriation. Still, the statement that the purpose of the concept *upātta* is to remove clinging to a (substantial) self [conceived as] having control over the body[1182] suggests that this appropriation is rather the function of (some form of) mind, or mind and mental factors. The *Hsien-yang*, indeed, explicitly bases the sentience of the physical sense faculties and their seats on the fact that they are 'inhabited' by the mind and the mental factors, without any further specification, and takes *upātta* to mean that [the physical organism and the psychic factors] share each other's benefit and damage.[1183] Even Sthiramati in his commentary on the PSk confines himself to a similar explanation[1184] (which is actually identical with that in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*),[1185] without any mention of *ālayavijñāna*.[1186]

[1176] Cf., e.g., MSg I.5 and I.35; CWSL 16b20-24. Cf. also VinSg, 'Proof portion' # i(c-d) (see § 233).

[1177] AS 29,23f (AS$_G$ 28,3f): see bold text in fn. 1178.

[1178] ASBh 43,16f: ***rūpaskandhaikadeśaḥ*** *sādhiṣṭhānendriyasaṁgṛhītaḥ* | ***pañca rūpīṇi dhātvāyatanāni*** *cakṣurādīni* | ***caturṇāṁ caîkadeśaḥ*** *rūpagandharasaspraṣṭavyānām indriyāvinirbhāgī* |

[1179] PSk 23,2f: *katy upāttāḥ* | *pañcâdhyātmikāś caturṇāṁ ca pradeśo rūparasagandhaspraṣṭavyānāṁ dhātūnām.*

[1180] HsienY 503c27f (see fn. 1183).

[1181] AS 29,23f (AS$_G$ 28,3; cf. ASBh 43,15): *vedanotpattyāśraya⟨rūpa⟩ta upāttaṁ draṣṭavyam* |

[1182] AS 30,1 (AS$_G$ 28,4f): *dehavaśavartyātmābhiniveśatyājanārtham.*

[1183] HsienY 503c27-29:

> Appropriated matter means that which is the basis of the arising of feelings, just as the physical sense faculties and the matter where these reside, because [these two kinds of matter] are inhabited by the mind and the mental factors. The meaning of 'appropriated' is that [this matter and the psychic factors] share damage and benefit.
>
> 執受色, 謂受起所依 如諸色根 及根所居處色, 心及心法所居處故。同一損益 是執受義。

[1184] PSkV ms. 72b2f: *upāttam iti ko 'rthaḥ? yac cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenôpagṛhītam, anugrahopaghātābhyām anyonyānuvidhānāt.*

[1185] AKBh 23,16 (see fn. 1153 + fn. 1154).

[1186] Similarly PSk h P hi 229b1-3 (D si 138a1-3), stating that *upātta* means that [the physical organism] is appropriated by the mind and the mental factors in that they think "This is our dwelling

215. A logical consequence of the idea that the physical organism owes its sentience to its being 'appropriated' by the mind (and the mental factors) is that it will become insentient and even decay or putrefy when this 'appropriation' ceases. This consequence is explicitly stated in connection with the concept of *ālayavijñāna*,[1187] but it is also found in the conservative framework of 'biological' appropriation being described as the function of mind and mental factors without further specification.[1188] This is also the case in a passage of the final portion of the VaSg (the one that deals with the subject of *mātṛkā*):

> 'Appropriated' dharmas are material dharmas insofar as they are taken hold of and maintained by mind and mental factors, [with the effect that] mind and mental factors [in their turn can] proceed [only] due to settling down[1189] in those [appropriated material dharmas, so that both] share [each other's] welfare and danger. Sharing welfare and danger means: Thanks to being sustained by mind and mental factors, those material [dharmas] are not cut off, are not destroyed, do not putrefy; [on the other hand,] due to those appropriated material [dharmas] being sometimes damaged and sometimes benefited, mind and mental dharmas, too, are accordingly damaged or benefited.[1190]

216. The difference of this 'biological' appropriation from spiritually negative clinging is indicated by Vasubandhu in his PSVy when he justifies the sequence of members in the compound *nāmarūpa* by way of the fact that *nāman* (i.e., mind and the mental factors) deserves precedence because *rūpa* (i.e. the physical organism) is 'seized' by it in two ways: first, *rūpa* is appropriated (**svīkṛta*) by *nāman* as ego or mine, and second *rūpa* will rot away when abandoned by *nāman*.[1191] This distinction basically corresponds to Saṅghabhadra's (see § 208), which in its turn is expressly adopted by Wŏn-ch'ŭk (圓測, Ch. Yüan-ts'ê) in his commentary on Saṁdh V.2.[1192] As for the technical use of **upātta*, Wŏn-ch'ŭk distinguishes various nuances,[1193] which, as far as Mahāyāna (i.e., Yogācāra[-Vijñānavāda]) sources are

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place" (*sems dang sems las byung bas 'di ni bdag gi yul sa yin no zhes bya ba'i tshul du bzung la* ...), and expressly formulating the *reciprocity* of body and mind sharing each other's damage and benefit.

[1187] ASBh 45,6: *tad-* (i.e., *ālayavijñāna-*) *-viyukta āśrayaḥ pūtībhavati*. Cf. also § 53.1.4 with fn. 271.

[1188] Cf. ASBh 52,11-13: ... *cittena kāya upāttaḥ* | ... *tathāhi kāyaḥ savijñānaka eva samudāgacchati, vijñānāpakrāntyā ca pūtībhavati*; NA 534c5f (以身有識 續住多時。識若離身 即便爛壞; cf. *SHT* VIII [2000]: 86 [no. 1900 R4]: *///(kā)yaḥ samudāgacchati vijñānāvakrāntyā ///* [supplementation mine]). For the argumentative context of these passages, see VON ROSPATT 1995: 134f n. 293 and n. 294.

[1189] At YBh$_C$ 593c29 (see fn. 694), 託 is used to render Skt. *saṁ-√mūrch*.

[1190] YBh$_C$ 880a1-5: 執受法者, 謂 諸色法 為心心所之所執持。由託彼故 心心所轉, 安危事同。同安危者, 心心所任持力故 其色不斷不壞不爛。即由如是所執受色 或時衰損 或時攝益 其心心所 亦隨損益。On the problem of the authenticity of this part of the VaSg see fn. 1008.

[1191] PSVy P chi 28b2f (D chi 25a7): *ming* (D : *ming dang* P) *sngar smos pa ni des gzugs bzung ba yin pa'i phyir ro* || *'di ltar de la ni des bdag dang bdag gi'o zhes bdag gir byed do* || *des btang na yang rul* (P and PSVyṬ D 139b1 : *btul* D) *bar 'gyur ro* ||.

[1192] SaṁdhṬ$_C$ 245c7-12 (abbreviated quotation of NA 352b14-24).

[1193] From Saṅghabhadra's text, Wŏn-ch'ŭk (SaṁdhṬ$_C$ 245c13-15) derives three views concerning the technical meaning of *upātta*: 1. (coinciding with the position of the AKBh: SaṁdhṬ$_C$ 245b22+24) what is appropriated [by mind and mental factors] as their seat (執為依處), 2. [matter that] gives rise to pain and pleasure (能生苦樂), and 3. what is appropriated as [the physical(?) basis of] individual existence (執為自體).

concerned, amount to three: 1. what produces pain or pleasure (i.e., sentience); 2. what forms part of [the physical basis of] individual existence, and 3. the combination of (1) and (2).[1194]

4.2.5.5.4. *Yogācārabhūmi*

217.0. The technical meaning of *upātta* is by no means confined to post-Saṁdh Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources but is also documented in various layers of the YBh, hence in partly more or less contemporary, partly even somewhat earlier textual material. Let me start with the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*, confining myself for the time being to those occurrences that do not make use of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

217.1. The most explicit treatment is found in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg.[1195] First, it confirms the restriction of *upātta* in the technical sense to material entities, excluding mind and mental factors. Second, *upātta* is applicable only to 'internal' matter: to the physical sense faculties and the matter connected with them, not to external matter. Third, *upātta* is only such matter as has been adopted as support by the mind and the mental factors and has not yet been abandoned by them, so that hair, nails and teeth as well as dead corpses are excluded. Appropriated matter in the technical sense is thus confined to the sentient constituents of a living body. This is furthermore indicated by the enumeration of four causes due to which appropriated matter may undergo modification, i.e., damage or benefit entailing, respectively, pain or well-being: 1. harmful or beneficial contact with external matter; 2. disorder or balance of the internal elements (or 'humours', *dhātu*); 3. outbreak of psychic defilements like greed or hatred; 4. fixing the mind on an object in an inappropriate or appropriate way.[1196]

217.2. The limitation of the category *upātta* (in the technical sense) to a living physical organism is also confirmed by a passage from the PañcMBhVin, the first chapter of the VinSg, where we read that five *dhātus* are exclusively *upātta*, whereas five are partly *upātta* and partly *anupātta*, the remaining [eight] *dhātus* being exclusively *anupātta*.[1197] This distribution is, apart from the disregard of past and future entities, basically in agreement with that of the Sarvāstivādins, with one exception, viz., that *all* the five sense objects, *including sound* (*śabda*), are presupposed to be of both kinds. The existence of such a position is confirmed by Saṅghabhadra.[1198] The VinSg text adds that in the case of the eight *dhātus* that are exclusively *anupātta*, i.e., in the case of those *dhātus* that consist of mind and mental factors, the reason

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[1194] SaṁdhṬ$_{C}$ 245c19–246a8.

[1195] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 228a3–b5 (D zhi 216b5–217a7; YBh$_{C}$ 666a11–b2; cf. also CHEN 1998: 130f).

[1196] The Chinese version (YBh$_{C}$ 666a27: 或正審慮所緣境故 便起輕安 ...) indicates that fixing the mind appropriately leads to ease (**praśrabdhi*, Tib. *sin tu sbyangs pa*), which may also be a physical quality, or at any rate may be sensed in the body. The opposite would be a state of physical unwellness (*dauṣṭhulya*). Cf., e.g., ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 283,6-9 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 166,5-7; SAKUMA 1990 II: 17 and 116f [# C.1.1]).

[1197] YBh$_{t}$ P zi 82b3f (D zhi 79a1f; YBh$_{C}$ 609c20-22): ... *lnga ni zin pa'o* || *lnga ni zin pa dang ma zin pa yin no* || *lhag ma rnams ni ma zin pa yin no* ||*de ci'i phyir zhe na* | *de las gzhan pa gang* (D : *gang dag* P) *de dag 'dzin par 'gyur ba'i 'dzin par byed pa mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro* ||.

[1198] NA 352a29. Cf. also AKṬT P to 115a4 and, on the present VinSg passage, T 42.1828: 656a24-26: because at the moment of its arising [in the body], sound is not separated from the sense faculties, it is stated to be *upātta*, but since its presence [in the body] is unstable it is not reckoned as *upātta* in the AS (see § 214.1), and b3-5 (= T 43.1829: 206b16f): the VinSg passage talks about *dhātus*, i.e., potentialities, and as such sound inseparable from the sense faculties is constantly present, whereas its presence [in the body] as an [actual] *āyatana* is unstable.

for their exclusion from the category *upātta* is that apart from them no 'agent' of appropriation that might appropriate those [*dhātu*s that are *upātta*] can be found[1199] — a remark which may be meant to exclude the existence of a substantial, autonomous self as appropriator but which also shows that the concept of *ālayavijñāna* was yet unknown or was, at any rate, not taken into account.[1200]

217.3. Another passage that may be mentioned in this connection is found in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the VinSg (BoBhVin),[1201] where the category *upātta* is stated to apply only to a part of the category *nimitta* (i.e., objective or objectified appearances, which is the only one to include material factors), but not to names (*nāman*) or to mind and mental entities (comprised in the categories *vikalpa* and *samyagjñāna*).

217.4. Most interesting is, however, another passage from the PañcMBhVin, where 'appropriated' matter is defined as matter that is inhabited or permeated by the mind (*vijñānasanniviṣṭa*), and is further explained as "what has coagulated (or: merged) with the mind (*vijñānasaṁmūrcchita*) and has grown up [with the mind](?) in the sense of having one and the same destiny" (*ekayogakṣemārthena*), and as being the basis of an arising of feelings.[1202] By using the expression "coagulated/merged" (*saṁmūrcchita*), this passage seems to allude to the moment of conception, when the *vijñāna* descends into the mother's womb and coalesces with semen-cum-blood, transforming it into a living, sentient organism and keeping it alive during the embryonic phase and throughout life. It would seem to be in tune with this perspective that the focus has shifted from the complex of mind (*citta*) and mental (*caitasa*, *caitta*) factors to the mind (now: *vijñāna*) as the central element of this complex.

218. Since none of these passages makes use of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, they would all seem to belong either to pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials incorporated into the VinSg, or at any rate to materials either unfamiliar with this concept or deliberately keeping to a more conventional position. Still, a sceptic might suspect them of having undergone some less conspicuous influence from the new paradigm. Therefore, it is necessary to search for occurrences of *upātta* (or other derivates of *upā-√dā*) in the terminological sense of 'biological' appropriation in the early layers of the YBh, especially those that can, according to our present state of knowledge, safely be taken to be earlier than the Saṁdh. In the following paragraphs, I shall therefore discuss some evidence from the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (§ 219) and the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (§ 220 and ch. 4.2.5.6),[1203] with a few non-*ālayavijñāna* materials from other parts of the MauBh being interspersed as supplementary evidence.

219.1. In accordance with canonical texts like the *Mahāhatthipadūpamasutta*,[1204] the *Śrāvakabhūmi*[1205] divides the primary elements into 'internal' and 'external', and in the case

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[1199] See fn. 1197.

[1200] Cf. also T 43.1829: 206b13-16.

[1201] YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 7a2f (D zi 6b3f; YBh$_{C}$ 698b1f); see KRAMER 2005: 79 and 128 (# 10.2.10).

[1202] VinSg$_{ms}$ 17b3 (see fn. 694); Paramārtha (VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1029c13-15) renders *upātta* as 眾生數 ("reckoned as [part of] a sentient being"), which literally would correspond to *sattvasaṁkhyāta*. Similar to this VinSg passage, though embedded in a different argumentative context, is MSABh 151,4f, for which see VON ROSPATT 1993: 132–136.

[1203] As for the BoBh, I have not noted anything that would contribute to the issue.

[1204] MN no. 28 (see § 209 with fn. 1158).

of the element earth, e.g., this means: on the one hand, into whatever is hard and solid (*khakkhaṭaṁ kharagatam*) in this body individually, 'approached' (*upagata*, i.e., taken possession of)[1206] and 'appropriated' (*upādatta*), and, on the other, whatever is hard and solid in the external world, 'unapproached' and 'unappropriated'. But since, just as in the canonical sūtras, hair, nails and teeth (*keśā romāṇi nakhā dantā(ḥ)*), tears, sweat, phlegm and snot (*aśru svedaḥ kheṭaḥ śiṁghāṇakaḥ*) and even faeces (*purīṣa*) and urine (*prasrāva*) are included in the enumeration of what belongs to the 'appropriated' elements, 'appropriated' is hardly used here in the strict sense implying sentience, but only in the more general sense of forming part of, or being included in, one's body, or even merely in the sense of being regarded so, and one of the main aims is obviously to underscore the impurity of the body.

219.2. Similarly, in another *Śrāvakabhūmi* passage,[1207] where what is 'approached' (*upagata*) and 'appropriated' (*upātta*) includes [not only the sense faculties but also] matter that is not comprised in the sense faculties, it is hard to say whether this refers to the sense objects inseparable from the sense faculties, to the elements forming their seats, or to insentient parts of the body (like hair, finger-nails or teeth) that are nevertheless regarded as forming part of it.

219.3. Even in a somewhat later text, the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論), where 'appropriated' (**upātta*) is expressly confined to the primary elements supporting the sense faculties and their seats,[1208] the list of the parts of the body that fall under this category is still the canonical one that includes such (mainly) insentient parts as hair, nails and teeth, and completely insentient substances like mucus, tears, etc. (though faeces and urine at least are no longer explicitly enumerated).

219.4. Alternative explanations of the meaning of the expressions 'approached' (*upagata*) and 'appropriated' (*upātta*) in connection with the primary elements are given in the *Mano-bhūmi* (ManoBh) of the MauBh. According to this text, one possibility is to take them as quasi-synonyms, both meaning 'internal' or 'belonging to oneself' (*ādhyātmika*),[1209] i.e., forming part of one's body or basis-of-individual-existence. Another possibility is to understand both as referring to the primary elements as appropriated or assimilated by the mind and the mental factors but to distinguish them in such a way that *upagata* refers to the

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[1205] ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 211,4–216,19 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 72,8–78,4): *tatra pṛthivīdhātur dvividhaḥ: ādhyātmiko bāhyaś ca. tatrâdhyātmiko yad asmin kāye 'dhyātmaṁ pratyātmaṁ khakkhaṭaṁ kharagata⟨m upagata⟩m upādattam*, etc.

[1206] Here obviously in a passive sense.

[1207] ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 300,15-21 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 190,5-9), contrasting *indriyasaṁgṛhītaṁ rūpam* (sc., *adhyātmam*), *an-indriyasaṁgṛhītaṁ rūpa⟨m anupa⟩gatam anupādattam* (sc., *bahirdhā*), and *anindriyasaṁgṛhītam eva rūpam adhyātmam upagatam upādattam* (sc., *adhyātmabahirdhā*).

[1208] HsienY 483b1–483c8, esp. b1-3 and 5f:

Earth is twofold: internal and external. 'Internal' means: that which is comprised in what is hard and solid, [as far as it is] the support of the five sense faculties – faculty of sight, etc. – and their seats in each [person's own] body, and has the nature of being appropriated (**upātta*). ... 'External' means: that which is comprised in what is hard and solid, [as far as it is] the support of the five sense objects – visibles, etc. – outside each [person's own] body, and is not of the nature of being appropriated.

地有二種。一內 二外。內 謂 各別身內 眼等五根 及彼居處之所依止 堅鞕所攝 有執受性。... 外 謂 各別身外 色等五境之所依止 堅鞕所攝 非執受性。...

[1209] YBh$_{Bh}$ 56,5f: *upagataṁ* (sc., *khakkhaṭatvaṁ kharagataṁ*) *katamat? yad upāttam ādhyātmikam. anupagataṁ* (ms.) *katamat? yad anupātta⟨ṁ⟩ bāhyam*.

Seed (*bīja*) of the elements and *upātta* to their [actualized] characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*).[1210] Finally, in contrast to *upātta* to be understood as before (i.e., in the sense of being appropriated or assimilated by the mind and the mental factors as part of a sentient organism), *upagata* may be understood in the sense of being 'approached', i.e., regarded and clung to, as one's self (*ātmataḥ*).[1211] In this latter interpretation, the special, terminological meaning of *upātta* is thus clearly distinguished from the idea of spiritually negative clinging, which is in this case connected with *upagata*.

219.5. The distinction between primary elements that are 'appropriated' (*upātta*) in that they form part of the body on the one hand and those that are not 'appropriated' (i.e., form part of the external world) on the other also occurs in connection with the subdivision of sound (*śabda*) into sound caused by the 'appropriated' primary elements (like clapping one's hands, or speech), sound caused by the 'unappropriated' primary elements (like the sound of the wind, of trees or of a river), and sound caused by both of them (like that of a drum being beaten with the fingers).[1212] It seems quite certain that *upātta* is used here in the terminological sense[1213] or at least in the sense of *ātmabhāvaparyāpanna*, without any reference to spiritually negative clinging or to the concept of a self of ego, for even an arhat may clap his hands and speak.

220.0. As regards the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg), the most important sections have indeed been made use of by Matsumoto (cf. also ch. 4.2.5.6), but in such a way that the use of *upātta* or derivates of *upā-√dā* in the sense of what I have called 'biological' appropriation is either disregarded or discarded.

220.1. In the case of the treatment of the twelve-membered chain of origination in dependence in VaSg III.1.i, practically identical with part of the treatment of this subject in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* (SavitBh) of the MauBh (YBh_{Bh} 198,17–203,5), Matsumoto's perspective with regard to the interdependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is entirely focused on demonstrating that the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* is not simultaneous but assigned to different temporal phases (see § 166.2.1). But as has already been pointed out (§ 166.2.2), the text also mentions, as one of the supports due to which the physical sense faculties continue (*anupravṛtti*), the *nāman* by which they are 'appropriated' (*upātta*),[1214] which cannot but refer to their being kept alive by the mind (or the mind and the mental factors).

220.2. This seems to be corroborated by the (admittedly somewhat cryptic) statement of VaSg III.1.ix (see § 166.1) that *nāmarūpa* in the present life is not only dependent [on the

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[1210] YBh_{Bh} 56,6f: *punaś cittacaitasair bījam upagataṁ, lakṣaṇam upāttam.*

[1211] YBh_{Bh} 56,7f: *punar upagatam ātmata* (ed. °*na*) *upagamanāt* (cf. YBh_t P dzi 31b3: *bdag tu khas len pa'i phyir ro*), *upāttaṁ pūrvavat.*

[1212] YBh_{Bh} 6,14-16; 66,5f; YBh_t D zhi 57a5f (YBh_c 601a7f); AS 4,3, confirmed by ASBh 3,19f; PSk 2,13f; PSkV ms. 9b4-6 ($PSkV_t$ P hi 9a5-8). The examples are from ASBh and PSkV; cf. also AKBh 6,23f. The subdivision goes back to $Prak_H$ 692c19f ($Prak_G$ 627b3f), where, however, the third category is missing; likewise Vi 64b20f (cf. Vi_2 52b17); cf. also AKBh 6,22–7,1 (EJ. 9,9-18), where the third category is expressly discarded (6,25f; cf. NA 334b11-19).

[1213] Cf. the explanation of *upāttānupāttobhayamahābhūtahetuka* (PSk 2,13f) in PSkV ms. 9b4f ($PSkV_t$ P hi 9a6): *tatrôpāttāny ātmabhāvaparyāpannāni cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenôpagṛhītāni.*

[1214] YBh_{Bh} 199,10-13 (see fn. 820).

mind] because it is entailed (*ākṣipta*) by the *pratisandhivijñāna* but also because it — and this would seem to refer, in particular, to the physical sense faculties of the present life — is kept 'appropriated' (**upā(da)tta*) [by the mind], since [only] as long as it is not separated from the mind it does not perish.[1215]

220.3. In any case, the difference between *upādāna* in the sense of spiritually negative clinging and *upātta* in the sense of the body being appropriated by the mind in the sense of just being kept alive and sentient becomes evident towards the end of VaSg III.1.i and its SavitBh parallel, namely in the context of describing how the mechanism of dependent origination entailing rebirth can be stopped. There we read that due to the cessation of ignorance in this life, craving (*tṛṣṇā*) ceases, and due to the cessation of craving, spiritually negative clinging (*upādāna*) and the process of future rebirth it entails also cease in the sense that they cannot arise anymore.[1216] But this is only the attainment of Nirvana in this life, where a remainder of 'possessions' persists (*sopadhiśeṣa*),[1217] for at this stage *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa*, albeit in a purified form, still remain,[1218] which means that the body endowed with mind (i.e., sentience) still continues as long as the life-span projected by previous karma is not exhausted,[1219] so that one still experiences feelings, though without any involvement or attachment.[1220] It is only after the exhaustion of the life-span that the mind (*vijñāna*) of the liberated person abandons the *appropriated* body (*upāttaṁ kāyaṁ vijahāti*) and becomes extinguished once for all.[1221] This clearly shows that just as Saṅghabhadra had put it (§ 208),

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[1215] See fn. 807 and fn. 809.

[1216] YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,11-14 (= VaSg III.1.i: YBh$_t$ P 'i 287a6-8; D zi 248b2-4; YBh$_C$ 828b21-26; HARADA 2004: 162): *dṛṣṭe dharme 'vidyānirodhād avidyāsaṁsparśanirodhaḥ | avidyāsaṁsparśanirodhād avidyāsaṁsparśajaveditanirodhaḥ |*[1] *avidyāsaṁsparśajaveditanirodhād tṛṣṇānirodhaḥ | tṛṣṇāniro-dhāt ... anutpattidharmatayôpādānādaya upāyāsaparyavasānāḥ saṁskārā niruddhā ity ucyante | evam eṣāṁ dṛṣṭe* (ms. [second hand]) *dharme saṁskārāṇām apravṛttir bhavati* | (continued in fn. 1217).

[1] Thus HARADA 2004: 162,6 and ms. (though twice with °*ja*° infelicitously changed to °*jā* by a second hand).

[1217] YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,15 (VaSg: YBh$_t$ P 'i 287a8f; continued from fn. 1216): *apravṛtteś ca dṛṣṭe dharme sopadhiśeṣe nirvāṇadhātau dṛṣṭe dharme* (ms., YBh$_t$ P dzi 118a4) *nirvāṇaprāptir bhavati.*

[1218] YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,15-17 (VaSg: YBh$_t$ P 'i 287b1): *tasya tasmin samaye vijñānapratyayaṁ ca nāmarūpaṁ nāmarūpapratyayaṁ ca vijñānaṁ pariśiṣṭaṁ bhavati pariśuddhaṁ paryavadātaṁ* (ms.).

[1219] YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,19f (VaSg: YBh$_t$ P 'i 287b2): *sa câsya savijñānakaḥ kāyo yāvat pūrvakarmākṣiptam āyus tāvad avatiṣṭhate.*

[1220] YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,17f (VaSg: YBh$_t$ P 'i 287b1f): *tasya yāvat savijñānakaḥ kāyo 'vatiṣṭhate, tavad visaṁyukto vedanāṁ vedayati, na saṁyuktaḥ.*

[1221] YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,19–203,2 (VaSg: YBh$_t$ P 'i 287b2-5; D zi 248b6–249a1; YBh$_C$ 828c3-9; HARADA 2004: 162f):

> When, however, *the mind abandons the body* (cf. fn. 174) because the life-span of this [person] is exhausted, then, on the one hand (*ca*), his life-force completely expires after the present life-force [has come to an end] and does not ripen [anew] in a further [existence], and, on the other hand (*ca*), the *vijñāna* [of that person] has [now] completely ceased because, on the one hand (*ca*), here (in this life) it has spontaneously ceased along with all feelings, and because, on the other hand (*ca*), it does not 'link up' in another [life] since the cause [for further rebirth] already ceased earlier. This is the state of Nirvana without any remainder of 'possessions', the entirely peaceful abode, for the sake of which the ascetic life leading to Nirvana, ending up in Nirvana, is lived in the presence of the Exalted/Fortunate One (cf. fn. 2151).
>
> *yadā câsyâyuṣaḥ kṣayād vijñānam upāttaṁ kāyaṁ vijahāti, tasya jīvitendriyaṁ côrdhvam asmāj jīvite-ndriyād aśeṣaṁ paryādīyate nôttaratra vipacyate, tac ca vijñānaṁ saha sarvaveditair iha ca svarasa-*

also in early Yogācāra the 'biological' appropriation of the body (or of the sense faculties along with their seats) by the mind, in the sense of keeping corporeal matter alive and sentient, continues even after the cessation of spiritually negative clinging (= attainment of arhatship), and that it comes to an end only at the moment of Nirvana without any remainder of 'possessions' (*nirupadhiśeṣa*). Thus, here, too, *upādāna* in the sense of the 'biological' appropriation of the body has to be strictly distinguished from the *upādāna* in the sense of spiritually negative clinging.

220.4. Abandoning the body at death is, of course, not specific to the arhat but happens also when ordinary persons die, with the difference that in their case the *vijñāna*, or mind-series, will continue in another existence, which normally involves the appropriation of a new body. In any case, in other passages of the MauBh, too, dying is stated to consist in the departure (*apakrānti*) of *vijñāna* (as the principle of sentience) from the body (*kāya*, *āśraya*),[1222] or in the fact that *vijñāna* lets the body go (*vijñānam āśrayaṁ muñcati*).[1223] In the latter formulation, 'letting the body go' stands out as a perfect antonym of 'appropriating the body' or 'keeping the body appropriated', which, as shown be the evidence presented, is widely recognized to be the function of the mind (*vijñāna*, *citta*), or the mind and the mental factors, expressed by *upātta* in its 'technical' use[1224] and then, innovatively, ascribed to *ālayavijñāna* in the the respective passages of the *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* (PañcBh) and the ManoBh of the MauBh (*āśrayopādātṛ*)[1225] and in the 'Proof Portion' of the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin (# i: *āśrayopādāna*, # viii: *dehopādāyakasya*),[1226] or in the *Pañcaskandhaka* (*kāyopādāna(tā)*)[1227] and the *Pañcaskandhakavibhāṣā* (*kāyam upādatte*).[1228]

4.2.5.6. Two types of *upādāna* in *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* III.5.i-ii

221.1.Of special importance for the interpretation of the twofold *upādāna* in the Saṁdh is, however, VaSg III.5.i–ii, a text that has already been referred to above (§§ 162.2 and 197). It consists of two parts:

1. an exegesis of the formula of the four 'nutriments' that forms the first part of a set of *Saṁyuktāgama* sūtras beginning with $SĀ_c$ no. 371, which corresponds to the *Āhārasutta* of the *Saṁyuttanikāya* (no. 12.11),[1229] and

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nirodhād (ms., HARADA) *anyatra ca pūrvam eva hetunirodhād apratisandhito 'pariśeṣaṁ niruddhaṁ bhavati* | *ayaṁ ca nirupadhiśeṣo nirvāṇadhātur atyantaśāntaṁ padaṁ, yasyârthe nirvāṇopagaṁ nirvāṇaparyavasānaṁ Bhagavato 'ntike uṣyate* (ms.) *brahmacaryam* ||

1222 YBh_{Bh} 211,11 (see § 40 with fn. 174; cf. also the negative formulation in the *IP* (§ 25)).

1223 YBh_{Bh} 18,16 and 20 (see fn. 174).

1224 Cf. PSkV ms. 58b4 ($PSkV_t$ P 54a2): *cittena kāyasyôpādānam ... iti prasiddham.*

1225 YBh_{Bh} 4,7 and 24,5 (ms.): *āśrayopādātṛ.*

1226 See § 231 and fn. 1232.

1227 PSk 17,5f: *ādānavijñānam api tat* (sc., *ālayavijnānaṁ*), *kāyopādānam upādāya.* (see § 269 with fn. 1505). This passage clears up Matsumoto's (M2: 245,1f) doubt about whether the expression *kāyopādāna* is allowed to occur at all in Yogācāra texts.

1228 PSkV ms 59a4 ($PSkV_t$ P hi 54a8f): *ālayavijñānam eva pratisandhau kāyam upādatte*; 59a4f: *tad eva pratisandhibandhāt prabhṛty ā maraṇāt kāyam upādatte* ($PSkV_t$ P 54b1 [for *lus 'byung bas* read *lus 'dzin pas* with D shi 239a7]).

1229 VaSg III.5.i: YBh_t P 'i 311a5–312a4; D zi 271a4–272a2; YBh_c 838c6–839a10.

2. an exegesis of the subsequent, specific part of the *Āhārasūtra*.[1230]

This text has also been made use of by Matsumoto,[1231] but since my understanding of its purport is basically different from his I have to discuss the text again in some detail.

221.2. As pointed out in § 162.2, VaSg III.5.i–ii belongs to an exegetic tradition in which all four nutriments serve both the purpose of keeping alive those sentient beings that have already been born and the purpose of helping those that are still awaiting rebirth.

222.1. VaSg III.5.i starts with an enumeration of four factors that strengthen or increase the primary elements of the (physical) sense faculties (**indriyamahābhūta*). These four factors are, in their turn, nourished by the four nutriments, respectively:

(a) The nutriment 'material food' nourishes nutritive essence (or bodily vigour: **ojas*);

(b) agreeable impression (*sparśa*), as far as it is contaminated (**sāsrava*), nourishes physical well-being and mental happiness (**sukhasaumanasya*);

(c) wishful thinking (**manaḥsaṁcetanā*) nourishes expectation for agreeable things (*sdug pa'i dngos po la re ba*);

(d) *vijñāna* insofar as it 'appropriates' the primary elements of the sense faculties (**indriya-mahābhūtopādāyaka* or °*dātṛ*)[1232] functions as a nutriment in that due to it the basis of the other three factors, viz., the primary elements of the sense faculties endowed with life-span (*āyus*) and body-heat (*uṣman*), persists and does not perish.[1233]

222.2. The text then points out how the four nutriments fulfil their nourishing function in the present life (**dṛṣṭe dharme*). In the case of *vijñāna*, this means that

> The *vijñāna* insofar as it 'appropriates' the primary elements of the sense faculties is the cause of the persistence of the primary elements of the sense faculties [in such a way that they remain] endowed with life-span (*āyus*) and [body-]heat (*uṣman*). This persistence is the cause of *vijñāna*'s not departing from the body.[1234] And [it is only] on the basis of this [persistence of the primary elements of the sense faculties due to their being

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[1230] VaSg III.5.ii: YBh_t P 'i 312a4–b5; D zi 272a2–b2; YBh_c 839a11–b4.

[1231] M2: 312–317: text [120]/[121]; cf. also p.342.

[1232] YBh_t P 'i 311a7 (D zi 271b6): *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po len par byed pa'i rnam par shes pa* (YBh_c 838c12: 能執諸根大種識); for °*upādāyaka* see 'Proof Portion' # viii (ASBh 13,19) *dehopādā-yakasya* (so to read with ASBh ms.; for the form cf. *DP* s.v. *ādāyaka*). One might note that whereas this expression, used in the context of *vijñāna* abandoning the body at death so as to leave it as a corpse, is doubtless concerned with 'biological appropriation', the expression *ātmaprabandhopādā-yaka* at YBh_{Bh} 168,2 (cf. M2: 437 n. 73) refers to the *upādāna*s = *kleśa*s as the spiritually negative forces that work as the 'agents' which take hold of one individual existence after the other (cf. AHN 2003: 200).

[1233] YBh_t P 'i 311a5f (D zi 271a4f): (*stobs dang bde ba dang yid bde ba dang re ba rnams kyi rten du gyur pa'i*) *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po tshe dang bcas drod dang bcas pa rnams gnas shing 'jig par mi 'gyur ba'o* (YBh_c 838c8f: 氣力喜樂專注希望之所依止 諸根大種 并壽并煖 安住不壞).

[1234] YBh_c 838c18-20 is slightly different: "On account of the *vijñāna* insofar as it 'appropriates' the primary elements of the sense faculties, those primary elements of the sense faculties, along with life-[-span] and [body-]heat, are made to persist as the cause of the *vijñāna*'s not departing from the body" (由能執受諸根大種識故 令彼諸根大種 并壽并煖 與識不離身 為因而住。).[1]

[1] For the construction 由 A 故 令 B Vb(intrans.) = $A^{abl./instr}$ B^{nom} Vb(intrans.) cf., e.g., YBh_c 285a6-8 (由...風故 令...髮...變異而生) = YBh_{Bh} 28,9f (... *vāyubhiḥ keśavaikṛtyaṁ ... jāyate*), or YBh_c 343c7f (由正思惟所餘相故 令彼尋思不復現行) = SamBh # 4.2.9.1.1 (*anyanimittamanasikārāt tadvitarkāsamudācāro bhavati*).

> appropriated by the *vijñāna*] that nutritive essence (**ojas*), pleasure-and-satisfaction and expectation can proceed (**pra-√vṛt*?).[1235]

In this way, all four nutriments serve to maintain sentient beings that have already been born, i.e., in the *present* life.

222.3. The next section of VaSg III.5.i[1236] deals with the four nutriments as promoting the *rebirth* of sentient beings that still want to be reborn. Since material food as well as agreeable impressions and wishful thinking serve, by means of their effects (nutritive essence, etc.), to strengthen the primary elements of the sense faculties, spiritually immature persons (**bāla*), who care for (*-*apekṣa*) their body and life, strive after these things (i.e., material food, etc.), and in doing so they commit and accumulate wholesome and unwholesome karma and reinforce their defilements (**kleśa*). Having thus, by means of [their striving after] these three [nutriments], accomplished actions and actualized defilements that lead to rebirth,

> [such persons] cause, in this life, [the nutriment] *vijñāna* to approach[1237] (i.e., become laden with or come under the sway of) karma and defilements (**karmakleśopaga*), to be *sopādāna*, and to promote (*anu-√grah*) rebirth in the future.[1238]

222.4. In a last paragraph,[1239] VaSg III.5.i explains the sūtra's division of material food into coarse (*audārika*) and subtle (*sūkṣma*), and extends this division to the other three kinds of nutriment. In their case, one explanation refers subtleness to the world-sphere of incorporeality, and coarseness to the two lower world-spheres. Material food is, of course, limited to the world-sphere of sensuality, and its subtle form is attributed to the intermediate existence and to the embryonic state.

223.0. VaSg III.5.ii contains the exegesis of the second part of the *Āhārasūtra*,[1240] where the four nutriments are stated to have craving (*tṛṣṇā*, *taṇhā*) as their origin. The VaSg refers this to the four nutriments in both functions.

223.1. The four nutriments insofar as they serve to maintain sentient beings that have already been born are explained to have their origin in craving because one searches for them in order to strengthen the primary elements of the sense faculties, and these in their turn have

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[1235] YBh_t P 'i 311b2f (D zi 271b1f; YBh_c 838c18-21): *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po len par byed pa'i rnam par shes pa ni dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po tshe dang bcas pa dang drod dang bcas pa de rnams kyi gnas pa'i rgyu ste | gnas pa de ni rnam par shes pa lus dang mi 'bral ba'i rgyu yin no || stobs dang bde ba dang yid bde ba dang re ba de rnams* (D adds: *kyi gnas*) *kyang de la brten nas 'jug par 'gyur te* |. It may be worth noting that this passage is also unambiguous evidence for the *mutual* dependence of *vijñāna* and the physical organism throughout the *present* life (see § 166).

[1236] YBh_t P 'i 311b3-7 (D zi 271b2-6; YBh_c 838c22–839a2).

[1237] Or, with YBh_c (838c28: 業煩惱所隨逐): "be followed/pursued by ...". Cf. fn. 813.

[1238] YBh_t P 'i 311b6 (D zi 271b4f): *tshe 'di la rnam par shes pa ni* (P : *de* D) *las dang nyon mongs par nye bar 'gro ba dang | len pa dang bcas pa dang | phyi ma la yang srid par skye ba la phan 'dogs par byed do* ||. I am not sure whether I am right in taking (in analogy to § 223.2) the person as the subject and °*r byed do* as the main verb. The Chinese version (YBh_c 838c28f) is different in that it construes *vijñāna* with the preceding phrase and is not quite clear to me syntactically; perhaps: "Since this [*vijñāna*] is [thus] in the present life followed by karma and defilements, [this] renders it *sopādāna*, with the effect that it takes hold of (/promotes) rebirth in the future" (此於現法 由業煩惱所隨逐故成其有取, 便能攝受當來後有。).

[1239] YBh_t P 'i 311b7–312a3; D zi 271b6–272a1; YBh_c 839a2-9.

[1240] $SĀ_c$ 101c28–102a10; SN II 11,28–12,32. For VaSg III.5.ii, see fn. 1230.

been generated by previous craving (i.e., craving in the previous life), which falls under the 'truth of origin'[1241] (**samudayasatya*)[1242] [of which the 'truth of suffering' constituted by the present existence is the effect]. It is thus, one may add, not so much the nutriments themselves that are rooted in craving but rather the living, sentient body, for the maintenance of which one needs them and searches for them.

223.2. In their function of favouring rebirth, on the other hand, the nutriments are more directly dependent on craving:

> [Persons (or sentient beings) who are still] possessed of (i.e., dominated by) craving (**satṛṣṇa*),[1243] [will], in this [present] life, by means of [their striving after] the threefold [nutriment] (i.e., the first three nutriments) for the sake of their bodies and food, increase karma and defilements (*kleśa*), and [as a consequence] they cause [their] *vijñāna* to approach (i.e., come under the control of)[1244] karma and defilements and make it *sopādāna*, so that it becomes, [still] in this life, favourable for rebirth [in the future].[1245]

223.3. In the next paragraph,[1246] VaSg III.5.ii proceeds to an exegesis of the chain of conditions that underlie craving, which in the Sanskrit version on which the VaSg is based ends with the 'sixfold basis' (**ṣaḍāyatana*), i.e., the six senses or, according to the VaSg, more precisely: "the six senses connected with a disposition to ignorance or delusion (**avidyādhātu*)[1247] due to previous habit" (*sngon goms pas ma rig pa'i khams dang ldan pa'i skye mched drug*). The text then continues:

> Therefore, in this life, there is no cause beyond the six senses, [for] precisely these six senses just depend on each other: The mind (*vijñāna* = *mana-indriya*) depends on the

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1241 Used here, as so often, in the *concrete* sense of the dharmas falling under it.

1242 YBh$_t$ P 'i 312a4f (D zi 272a2f; YBh$_c$ 839a11-14): *dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po de dag ni sngon gyi sred pa kun 'byung ba'i bden pas bsdus pas bskyed pa ste | de dag 'phel bar bya ba'i phyir zas bzhi yongs su tshol bar byed do ‖ ...*

1243 YBh$_c$ 839a14: "because [one] has craving, one ... (有愛故 ...)." Cf. also Matsumoto (M2: 315,18ff), who after some reflection rightly takes **satṛṣṇa* to refer to a sentient being as the subject of the sentence.

1244 Or, with YBh$_c$ (839a15f): "(continuously) be followed/pursued by karma and defilements (業惑常所隨逐)". Cf. fn. 1237.

1245 YBh$_t$ P 'i 312a5f (D zi 272a3f; cf. M2: 313 text [121]ⓑ): *sred pa dang bcas pas tshe 'di la lus dang zas rnams la rnam pa gsum gyi* (D : *gyis* P) *sgo nas las dang nyon mongs pa rgyas par byas nas tshe 'di la yang srid par skye ba la phan 'dogs pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa las dang nyon mongs par nye bar 'gro ba dang | len pa dang bcas par byed do ‖* (D : *de |* P). Cf. AS 27,9f (AS$_G$ 26,19): *punar-bhavādānāya* (see fn. 1071) *sopādānaṁ ca sattvānāṁ vijñānaṁ karoti.* — The Chinese version (YBh$_c$ 839a14-16; cf. M2: 312 text [120]ⓑ), followed by Matsumoto (M2: 314,1f: 有取...である識...を作る), differs from the Tibetan in taking *sopādāna* not in a predicative sense but as an attribute: "brings about a *vijñāna* that is continuously followed by karma and defilements and [hence?] *sopādāna*" (...能辦業惑常所隨逐有取之識...). I prefer the predicative construction since what is brought about by the person's behaviour is not *vijñāna* as such but only its becoming *sopādāna*; cf. also KRITZER 1999: 44; SASAKI 1982: 185a11f (... 衆生の識を有取にする).

1246 YBh$_t$ P 'i 312a7f (D zi 272a4-6; YBh$_c$ 839a18-21).

1247 Cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 184a2f (D zi 161b7–162a1; YBh$_c$ 788a23-25: VaSg I.5.v): "The *avidyādhātu* is the presence of the Seed of ignorance in this [state of] mind (*manas*) that entails rebirth (**paunarbhavika*), come about by its being imbued with the former cause (= the twofold delusion: YBh$_t$ P 'i 183b4)" (*de sngon gyi rgyus yongs su bsgoms pas yongs su grub pa yang srid par skye bar byed pa'i yid de nyid la ma rig pa'i sa bon yod pa ni ma rig pa'i khams so*).

physical sense faculties, [and] the physical sense faculties, appropriated by the mind (**vijñānopā(da)tta*), depend, in their turn, on *nāman* (i.e., the *mana-indriya* = *vijñāna*). Therefore, there is [in this life] no [condition] beyond the six senses.[1248]

In the Chinese version of the crucial sentence, the sequence of the phrases is reversed, and the attribute **vijñānopātta* goes with the physical sense faculties as the *basis of* the mind, and *not*, as in Tibetan, with the physical sense faculties insofar as they are *based on* the mind:

The physical sense faculties are based on *vijñāna*, [and] *vijñāna* in its turn is based on the physical sense faculties appropriated by *vijñāna*.[1249]

It is not easy to explain such a divergence, but it would become intelligible if we presuppose an abstract construction similar to that of YBh_{Bh} 230,5f,[1250] of the pattern

$A^{gen.}$ B-*āśrayatvaṁ*, $B^{gen.}$ *ca* A-*āśrayatvam* |,

where X-*āśraya* may be taken either as a bahuvrīhi or as a tatpuruṣa. On this presupposition, the present passage might tentatively be reconstructed as follows:

**vijñānasya* (*hi*?) *rūpīndriyāśrayatvaṁ*,[1251] *vijñānopāttānām ca rūpīndriyāṇāṁ nāmāśrayatvam* |

The Tibetan would have taken the compounds X-*āśraya* as bahuvrīhis ("*vijñāna* has the physical sense faculties as its basis", etc.), whereas the Chinese translation would be the result of understanding them as tatpuruṣas ("*vijñāna* is the basis of the physical sense faculties", etc., being equivalent to "the physical sense faculties are based on *vijñāna*", etc.).

223.4. The final paragraph of VaSg III.5.ii[1252] is aimed at explaining the last part of the *Āhārasūtra*, according to which (in the Chinese version) the cessation of suffering in the future results from the cessation of the six senses up to the cessation of craving and nutriment,[1253] which sounds somewhat strange as it stands. The VaSg renders the matter plausible by starting with the removal of ignorance (*avidyā*) and the generation of comprehension (*vidyā*). Thereby, the six senses that are marred by a disposition to ignorance (**avidyādhātu*) come to be replaced by six senses connected with a disposition to comprehension (**vidyādhātu*), and with the cessation of the former also craving and, in consequence, the nutriments insofar as they favour rebirth (*yang srid par skye ba la phan 'dogs pa'i zas rnams*) disappear.

224.1. In his interpretation of VaSg III.5.i-ii, Matsumoto (M2: 312,6-10) starts from the presumption that if one thinks in terms of the twelve-membered chain of origination in dependence, it follows that in the canonical text of which this VaSg section is an explanation, viz., the *Āhārasūtra*, the four nutriments can, in view of the statement that they originate from craving (*taṇhā*, *tṛṣṇā*), be equated with *upādāna*, and this equation he finds confirmed by the

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1248 YBh_t P 'i 312b1f (D zi 272a6f; YBh_c 839a21-25): *de bas na tshe 'di la skye mched drug las gud na rgyu gzhan med de | skye mched drug po de nyid gcig la gcig brten* (D : *rten* P) *par zad de | rnam par shes pa ni gzugs can gyi dbang po la brten to ||rnam par shes pas zin pa'i gzugs can gyi dbang po rnams kyang ming la brten te |de bas na skye mched drug las gud na med ces bya'o ||*.

1249 YBh_c 839a23f: 有色諸根 依止於識。識亦依止 識所執受 有色諸根。

1250 See fn. 797.

1251 That in the first sentence *rūpīndriya-* is part of a compound would seem to be indicated by the lack of a plural particle in this case, in contrast to the second sentence where we have *rnams*.

1252 YBh_t P 'i 312b2-5; D zi 272a7–b2; YBh_c 839a25–b4.

1253 $SĀ_c$ 102a9f: 六入處滅則觸滅, ..., 愛滅則食滅, 食滅故 於未來世 生、老、病、死、憂、悲、惱、苦 滅。

quasi-synonymous use of the two terms *āhāra* and *upādāna* in the *Upādānasutta(I)* (see § 174.1). This equation would seem to imply a passive-objective meaning of *upādāna*, at least as far as material food and impression (*phassa/sparśa*) are concerned.

224.2. In a similar way, Matsumoto (M2: 314,10–315,4) argues also with regard to the exegesis of the *Āhārasūtra* in the VaSg, starting from the fact that in VaSg III.5.ii what is declared to originate from craving is, in the first place, the primary elements of the sense faculties (see § 223.1). From this he concludes that in this text it is the primary elements of the sense faculties that are equated with *upādāna*, once again in a passive-objective sense (=*upādeya*). This is, for him, confirmed by the fact that in III.5.i *vijñāna* is twice stated to 'appropriate' (*upā-√dā*) them (cf. §§ 222.1–222.2).

224.3. As for the statement in III.5.ii that a person who is dominated by craving acts in such a way that his *vijñāna* becomes *sopādāna* (§ 223.2; cf. § 222.3), Matsumoto (M2: 317,16-18) first leaves it in suspense whether *upādāna* should, in this case, too, be understood in a passive-objective sense, but later on[1254] he answers this question in the affirmative and takes *upādāna*, here too, to denote the physical sense faculties 'appropriated' by *vijñāna.*

224.4. Finally, in connection with the mutual dependence of the physical sense faculties and the mind (§ 223.3), Matsumoto (M2: 316,13–317,14) regards the Chinese version as representing the authentic meaning of the passage, because this enables him to reduce the statement that contains the expression **upātta* to a unidirectional ontological dependence of the mind on the sense faculties by taking **upātta* as equivalent to *upādāna* in the sense of "(taken as) support": *vijñāna* has as its 'locus' the physical sense faculties, which are that which is appropriated by the mind (i.e., are its 'locus').[1255] Yet, this interpretation is hardly satisfactory because it reduces the attribute **vijñānopātta* to a practically redundant element. And as Matsumoto himself (M2: 317,11f) cannot but admit, even in the Chinese version the opposite relation, viz., that also the physical sense faculties are, in their turn, based on *vijñāna*, is likewise expressed (有色諸根 依止於識). But since in the Chinese version of this statement the relation obtaining between the physical sense faculties and *vijñāna* in terms of 'taking [as support]' (*upā-√dā*), i.e., the relation that *vijñāna* 'takes' the physical sense faculties [as its support], is not mentioned, he thinks that in this regard this statement is of little importance.[1256] Still, the statement is there, after all, and cannot be disregarded. I am afraid that Matsumoto's assessment of the passage is determined by his tendency (see § 163) to reduce the relation between *vijñāna* and the physical sense faculties to

1. a causal dependence of the physical sense faculties on *vijñāna* at the moment of 'linking up', and
2. a dependence of *vijñāna* on the physical sense faculties in terms of 'super-locus' and 'locus' from 'linking up' onward.

[1254] M2: 342,3f: 「摂事分」〔120〕〔121〕ⓐに説かれる「有取識」の「取」も、…「識によって取られた有色根」であるということになり、....

[1255] M2: 317,8: 「識」は、「識」によって「取られるもの」（基体）である「有色根」を基体とする。

[1256] M2: 317,12-14: しかしすくなくとも、漢訳による限り、この「有色諸根依止於識」という表現には、「有色根」と「識」との間に存する「取る」"upā-√dā"という関係、つまり、「識」が「有色根」を「取る」という関係は述べられておらず、その点では、重要性が低いものと考えられる。

225.1. As for Matsumoto's interpretation of the *Āhārasūtra* itself, it is indeed tempting to associate the four nutriments (*āhāra*) in the *Āhārasūtra* with the concept of *upādāna* in the twelve-membered chain of origination in dependence because they are stated to arise from craving. It also stands to reason to take the concept of 'nutriment' as equivalent to *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense, i.e., in the sense of 'fuel', as in the *Upādānasutta(I)* (SN no. 12.52). Taken together, the four nutriments may indeed be regarded as 'fuel' for the persistence of sentient beings in the present life as well as for their rebirth. But problems arise when one tries to understand the dependence of *upādāna*, taken as the four nutriments, on craving more precisely. Why is material food stated to be dependent on craving? The same question may arise with regard to impression (*sparśa*), still more so in view of the fact that impression appears again as one of the elements of the chain of conditions due to which the four nutriments are stated to originate from craving.[1257] In these cases, the dependence on craving would seem to make better sense if what is actually intended is not the nutriments as such but rather grasping for or *greedy intake* of them,[1258] or grasping for *more* 'fuel'. But my concern here is not with the *Āhārasūtra* itself but rather with its exegesis in the VaSg.

225.2. As regards this exegesis, my understanding is essentially different from Matsumoto's. It is true that VaSg III.5.i–ii introduces, in its exegesis, derivates of *upā-√dā*, but there is no equation of the nutriments with *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense. Rather, as Matsumoto himself is aware of (see § 224.2), it is, in this text, the physical sense faculties (§ 223.3) or their primary elements (§§ 222.1 and 222.2) that are stated to be the object of the act of appropriation (*upā-√dā*), but they are, in this connection, not called *upādāna* but rather characterized as *upātta* (§ 223.3). One of the nutriments, viz., *vijñāna*, is even expressly stated to be the *subject* of this appropriative function (§§ 222.1, 222.2 and 223.3), and also in another context the nutriment *vijñāna*, at least, cannot itself *be upādāna* in an objective (or any other) sense because it is said to be rendered '*connected with upādāna*' (*sopādāna*: §§ 222.3 and 223.2).

225.3. This, however, is not the crucial point. The crucial point is rather whether *vijñāna*'s action of *upā-√dā* that is directed towards the physical sense faculties or their primary elements and the action of *upā-√dā* that is implied in *vijñāna*'s being characterized as *sopādāna* are the same or different, and it is in this regard that I definitely disagree with Matsumoto, for whereas he seems to believe that they are the same,[1259] I understand them to be essentially different.

225.4. Actually, the text is unambiguous in taking all four nutriments to serve both the purpose of keeping sentient beings alive and the purpose of promoting rebirth (see § 162.2). This means that all of them, including *vijñāna*, serve two different purposes, and in these two functions their connection with craving (*tṛṣṇā*) is also conspicuously different.

225.5. Keeping sentient beings alive is a function confined to this very life, and in this function the nutriments lead, by means of their effects, to a strengthening of the primary

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[1257] It is obvious that this double occurrence of *phassa/sparśa* is the result of a secondary combination of two heterogeneous schemes (cf. GOMBRICH 2009: 122, with regard to the parallel in MN I 261).

[1258] Cf. BODHI 2000: I 732 (last paragraph of n. 19), suggesting, as a simpler alternative to the commentarial explanation in the Spk (see fn. 1260 and fn. 1261), "that it is craving which impels beings into the perpetual struggle to obtain physical and mental nutriment, both in the present life and in future lives."

[1259] See § 224.3 with fn. 1254.

elements of the physical sense faculties (§ 222.1). These, in their turn, are stated to be the result of *previous* craving (§ 223.1), i.e., of the craving of the previous existence (as the decisive factor of the *samudayasatya*).[1260] The function of *vijñāna* as a nutriment is, in the context of the nutriments as that which maintains sentient beings here and now, to 'appropriate' (*upā-√dā*) the primary elements of the sense faculties, or rather to keep them appropriated, so that they remain alive ("endowed with life-span and body-heat") (§ 222.2). This function is obviously essentially identical with the function ascribed to *vijñāna*, or to the mind and the mental factors, in the context of the definition of living, sentient matter (physical sense faculties and their seats) as 'appropriated' or 'assimilated' (*upātta*) in the Sarvāstivāda and Yogācāra sources discussed in chapters 4.2.5.5.1 and 4.2.5.5.3–4. It is what I have called 'biological appropriation': an automatic, unreflected function of *vijñāna* that continues, until death, even in the case of an arhat, i.e., of a person whose spiritually negative clinging has already been eradicated.

225.6. In contradistinction to this, craving in the *present* life causes spiritually immature sentient beings to greedily strive after material food and pleasant impressions and to cherish thoughts of agreeable things.[1261] This involves karmic actions and an increase of defilements (*kleśa*), due to which *vijñāna* becomes *sopādāna* so as to entail rebirth (§ 223.2; cf. § 222.3). There can be little doubt that *upādāna* here refers to spiritually negative clinging or its latent imprints, including the urge to perpetuate saṁsāric life in one form or another. The object of this kind of *upādāna* is not just the physical sense faculties or their primary elements but individual existence as a whole, i.e., the four *vijñānasthiti*s or the whole set of *upādāna-skandha*s (or at least the immaterial ones, in case one has overcome desire for the lower world-spheres).

225.7. Finally, in the statement of the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and the physical sense faculties at the end of the exegesis of the chain of conditions that underlie craving (§ 223.3), the fact that in *both* versions *upātta* qualifies the *physical sense faculties* as the object of an act of 'appropriation' performed by the *vijñāna* points, once again, unambiguously to 'biological' appropriation. This is also supported by the fact that the paragraph is concerned with the chain of the conditions of craving in this very life (*dṛṣṭa eva dharme*) and that this chain is expressly stated to stop at the mutual dependence of the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*), i.e., the physical sense faculties and *manas* = *vijñāna*, because *in this life* there is no further cause. This would seem to imply that what is described is the *ongoing* mutual dependence of

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1260 In Theravāda exegesis, too, one aspect of the nutriments' originating from craving (*taṇhā*) consists in the fact that at the very moment of 'linking up' (*paṭisandhikkhaṇa*, i.e., the first moment of a new life) there arises, in the sentient organism (*attabhāva*), nutritive essence (*ojā*) which is earned [by previous karma] (*upādiṇṇaka*) and has come about by way of previous craving (i.e., craving in the previous life). The same holds good for the *viññāṇa* at the moment of 'linking up' and for the impression (*phassa*) and the wishful thinking (*cetanā*) associated with it, which are likewise karma-earned (*upādiṇṇaka*), as well as for the karma-earned nutriments arising at the subsequent *bhavaṅga-citta* moment, etc. (Spk II 28,9-21; Ps I 214,9-18; BODHI 2000: I 731f n. 19). Cf. also Spk II 28,28f: *taṇhā ti imass' attabhāvassa janakakammaṁ*.

1261 This aspect may be compared with the assumption, in Theravāda exegesis, that the nutritive essence (*ojā*) in organic material aggregates that arise from a state of mind accompanied by greed (*lobhasahagatacittasamuṭṭhita*) and hence are not karma-earned (*anupādiṇṇa*) is brought about by the very craving accompanying them, and the same holds good for the respective state of mind (*citta* = *viññāna*) itself and for the impression (*phassa*) and the wishful thinking (*cetanā* = *manosañcetanā*) associated with it (Ps I 214,18-25).

physical sense faculties (= *rūpa*) and *vijñāna* (= *nāman*) in this very life: On the one hand, *vijñāna* is dependent on the physical sense faculties, not only in its form of actual sense perception, but also because in the corporeal world-spheres it is dependent on a basically intact physical organism and would depart from the body if the latter were seriously damaged (cf. § 222.2). On the other hand, the physical sense faculties are dependent on the *vijñāna* throughout life, because without being 'biologically appropriated' or 'assimilated' by the mind they would rot away (cf. §§ 53.1.4 and 215). From this perspective, the Tibetan version of the passage[1262] deserves preference and could even be taken to mean that

> the mind (*vijñāna* = *mana-indriya*) depends on the physical sense faculties, [and] the physical sense faculties depend on *nāman* (= *mana-indriya* = *vijñāna*) [because as living, sentient matter the physical sense faculties continue only as long as they are biologically] appropriated (and in *this* sense taken as a kind of seat or support) by the *vijñāna*.

This alternative is also supported by a parallel in the SavitBh (see § 166.2.2), where one support for the continuation of the physical sense faculties is the *nāman* (i.e., *vijñāna*, or mind and mental factors) that continuously arises in the same personal continuum and by which the sense faculties are kept ['biologically'] appropriated (*upātta*).

225.8. Summing up, I hope to have shown that VaSg III.5.i-ii presupposes two different concepts of *upādāna*: 'biological appropriation' in the sense of *vijñāna*'s settling down in the physical organism so as to transform it into a living one and keep it alive and sentient on the one hand, and, on the other, 'spiritually negative appropriation' in the sense of clinging to the four *vijñānasthiti*s or to the basis of individual existence (*ātmabhāva*), preferably in terms of one's self or one's own, or to sensual pleasures, a function accompanying the *vijñāna* either in the form of an actual outbreak or in the form of a latent disposition (*anuśaya*) or Seed (*bīja*: cf. § 199.1).[1263]

4.2.5.7. The Twofold *upādāna* in *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* V.2

226.1. If we take for granted (as Matsumoto seems to do) that the author of Saṁdh V.2 was not only inspired by the canonical *Bījasūtra* and related texts but also thoroughly familiar with the exegesis of these texts in early Yogācāra, especially in the VaSg, it stands to reason that the twofold *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2 (see § 141.1) should be understood as a deliberate adoption and development or modification of the two types of *upādāna* met with in the VaSg materials, particularly in the exegesis of the *Āhārasūtra*.

226.2. Viewed from this perspective,[1264] it should be obvious that the association of *upādāna* with the physical sense faculties and their seats can only refer to what I have called

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[1262] See § 223.3 with fn. 1248.

[1263] Cf., in this connection, also the passage from the *Śrutamayī Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh quoted S 1987: 486 n. 1294 (YBh_{ms} 89a7; YBh_{t} P dzi 197b4-6; YBh_{c} 350a24-27), where the ('biological') appropriation (*upādāna*) of the body (*kāya*) by the mind (*citta*) is clearly distinguished from the mind's spiritually negative clinging (here: *abhiniveśa*) to the body and to the other *skandha*s (*kāyādiṣu*) due to defilements (*kleśopakleśa*).

[1264] Even the sequence of the enumeration of the two kinds of *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2 may be explained as mirroring the sequence in which they appear in the *Āhārasūtra* exegesis of the VaSg. From a systematic point of view, in a context that enumerates the factors due to which the mind is reproduced in a new existence in accordance with previous karma (**vipacyate*), settles down there and thrives, what one would expect to be enumerated first is not the biological appropriation of the new physical organism but rather the decisive presupposition that is responsible for this reproduction, viz.,

'biological appropriation', i.e., to the fact that the mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*) settles down in and merges with proto-embryonic matter at the moment of conception so as to turn it into a living, sentient organism, and keeps this organism alive and sentient throughout life.

226.3. Against this, the association of *upādāna* with the "imprint(s) (*vāsanā*) of the multifarious conventional dealing (*vyavahāraprapañca*) with phenomena (*nimitta*), names (*nāman*) and imagination (*vikalpa*)" clearly represents the aspect of spiritually negative clinging, i.e., the concept of *upādāna* as presupposed in the notion of *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*. With the term 'imprint(s)' (*vāsanā*) this aspect is expressly and deliberately confined to its *latent* presence in the mind. What is equally important is the replacement of the evil propensities (*anuśaya*) or Seeds of defilements (*kleśa*) (see §§ 199 and 200.6) with the imprints of the whole multifarious conventional dealing with the saṁsāric world. The categories *nimitta*, *nāman* and *vikalpa* form part of a Mahāyānist ontological pattern developed in detail in the BoBhVin (see § 290.2). This means that this modification, too, is deliberate and that it is motivated by the Mahāyānist orientation of the Saṁdh. The spiritually negative clinging that keeps sentient beings entangled in *saṁsāra* is, on deeper analysis, not just clinging to certain things as one's self or one's own but rather the involvement in dealing with the phenomenal world as if it were ultimately real.[1265]

227. Another problem is Matsumoto's view that in the presumable Sanskrit original (**dvividham upādānam upādāya*) the expression **upādāna* is to be taken in the passive-objective sense (and thus, in the compounds **sādhiṣṭhānarūpīndriyopādāna*, etc., as the second member of a karmadhāraya), and that **upādāya* has full verbal force (cf. §§ 141.1 and 168). The alternative is to understand **upādāna* as an action noun and the compounds as tatpuruṣas with an objective genitive as their first member, and to take **upādāya* in its quasi-postpositional function, as suggested by all versions except TH:[1266]

> ... on account of a twofold appropriation: the ['biological'] appropriation of the physical sense faculties along with their seats and the [spiritually negative] appropriation (i.e., intake and storing)[1267] of the imprint(s) (...).

Theoretically, in this case, too, a figura etymologica with **upādāya* in full verbal force may not be impossible either,[1268] just as the passive-objective interpretation of **upādāna* does not

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spiritually negative clinging represented by the *prapañcavāsanā* as its continuous latent presence, which, though continuing in the present life, was already there in the previous one.

[1265] The ultimate unreality of phenomena (*nimitta*) is evident from the statement of the VinSg (YBh$_t$ 'i 15b8–16a5; D zi 15a1-5; YBh$_c$ 701c4-14; KRAMER 2005: 93f and 165f [## 3.5.2.4.1–3.5.3.2]) that they disappear with the manifestation of true reality, just as what is perceived in a dream disappears when the person wakes up, or just as the illusory tufts of hair perceived by a person afflicted with the *timira* disease disappear when the disease is cured. For a comparison of mundane conditioned things (i.e., the *paratantralakṣaṇa*) with the illusory phenomena appearing on account of the *timira* disease (equated with the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*), cf. also Saṁdh VI.7 (61,13-18).

[1266] See fn. 724. For Tib. (*la brten nas*), see § 141.1. Bodhiruci (Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 669a19f), Paramārtha (MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 157b18) and Hsüan-tsang (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 692b12) have 依 X for X$^{acc.}$ *upādāya*, and Dharmagupta (MSgBh$_{Dh}$ 273c8f) has X 故.

[1267] In the case of °*vāsanopādāna*, an analysis as a karmadhāraya would also make sense: "appropriation (i.e., spiritually negative clinging) [in a latent form] consisting in the impregnation of ...". Cf. S 1987 # 4.4.2.2 and # 4.4.3. Buescher (B: 148,2: "keeping the impregnated propensities") opts for the tatpuruṣa analysis.

[1268] Cf. § 170.2.

eo ipso exclude taking **upādāya* in its quasi-postpositional function,[1269] which may even be preferable because this use is so common. As regards **upādāna*, I must confess that I consider taking it as an action noun more natural, but I have no serious problems with a passive-objective understanding either. It would make perfect sense to take the passage to mean that the mind is reproduced and develops in the new existence on the basis of the physical sense faculties along with their seats as something it appropriates as its support and at the same time 'assimilates' by rendering it sentient, and on the basis of the imprint of the **vyavahāraprapañca* as something taken in and stored, or even as its 'fuel' by which it is kept 'burning' in *saṁsāra*.

228. What appears much more problematic is Matsumoto's connection of the twofold **upādāna* (taken in a passive-objective sense) with *nāmarūpa* (see § 141.1). To be sure, there is no difficulty in associating the physical sense faculties along with their seats with the element *rūpa*, but as pointed out before (§ 167.2) the equation of the **nimitta-nāma-vikalpa-vyavahāra-prapañca-vāsanā* with the element *nāman* is hardly convincing. If anything might be equated with *nāmarūpa* in this passage, it is rather the sense faculties and their seats insofar as they are generated and kept alive and sentient by the mind, and function, in their turn, as its support (cf. §§ 166.1–166.3]).

229.1. As regards the concept of 'locus', it appears to be in full agreement with early Yogācāra thought to consider the mind (*citta*, *vijñāna*), as a principle of life and sentience, and hence also *ālaya*- or *ādānavijñāna*, to *abide in* the (living, sentient) body,[1270] which may thus justly be called its abode, support, or 'locus'. But in the case of the imprints (*vāsanā*), the situation is quite different. The mind may be dependent on them with regard to its being subject to rebirth, i.e., they are the condition of its remaining involved in the process of *saṁsāra*. But I cannot see any meaning in calling the imprints a 'locus' of the mind (cf. § 159.2). The very notion of 'imprints' (*vāsanā*) implies that they are imprinted *on*, or impregnated into, something, i.e., it is the imprints that need a 'locus', and the most probable candidate in the context of Saṁdh V is no doubt the mind,[1271] more precisely: the subliminal layer of the mind.[1272] Nor would it make sense to me to conceive the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) as a support or 'locus' of the mind if they were included in the *nāmarūpa* or *ātmabhāva* Matsumoto considers to be the *upādāna* or support of the *citta* in Saṁdh V.2, i.e., of the *ādānavijñāna*. They may be the object, or 'fuel', of grasping, i.e., of *upādāna* in the spiritually negative sense, but mixing up such a relation with the relation that exists between a

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[1269] For the occurrence of *upādāya* as a (quasi-)postposition in Saṁdh see fn. 676. For this reason, I do not see why an understanding of **dvividham upādānam upādāya* as "on account of a twofold support" should be impossible.

[1270] Cf. §§ 76.7; 118.2.3; 121.2; 122; 127.

[1271] Cf. Saṁdh VII.10, which declares that the mind (*sems*, **citta*) is imbued (**paribhāvita*) with the conventional dealing (**vyavahāra*) [with dharmas in terms of their fictitious nature], and VI.9 (62,19f), speaking of the imprint (**vāsanā*) of conventional dealing (**vyavahāra*) with the fictitious character [of dharmas] (cf. YAMABE 1989: 50–52). Taken together, the two statements can hardly mean anything other than that the mind is impregnated with (and thus the 'locus' of) the imprint of conventional dealing with the fictitious nature.

[1272] Cf. YBh_t P zi 30a5f (D zhi 27b2; YBh_c 589a10f): *chos thams cad kyi kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa la yod pa*. Cf. also the passage quoted from SAVBh in § 243 [2.b] with fn. 1348: "*ālayavijñāna* is called 'foundation' because it is the support of the imprint(s) (*bag chags kyi gnas su gyur pa*) of wholesome and unwholesome actions".

substratum/support and what is supported by it in a spatial or ontological sense hardly serves to clarify.

229.2. As Matsumoto himself (M2: 391f) points out, in Saṁdh V.4–5 even the traditional, supra-liminal mind processes are unambiguously stated to arise on the basis of the (subliminal) *ādānavijñāna*. In view of the similes of water and waves and of mirror and reflected images, which suggest a relation of spatial support, it may not be wrong to understand the relation between *ādānavijñāna* and the supraliminal forms of mind in terms of support or 'locus' in an ontological sense. If this relation, represented by Matsumoto as

ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāya ⊣ *ādānavijñāna*,

is combined with the representation of his interpretation of the position of V.2–3, viz.,

ādānavijñāna ⊣ *ātmabhāva* (/*nāmarūpa*),

the result would be the following composite pattern:

ṣaḍ-vijñāna-kāya ⊣ *ādānavijñāna* ⊣ *ātmabhāva* (/*nāmarūpa*).

My problem with this composite pattern is that what holds good for the supra-liminal mind processes must *a fortiori* hold good for the mental factors associated with them as well, i.e., according to V.3, they, too, must be based on the *ādānavijñāna* as their support or 'locus'. This, however, is incompatible with Matsumoto's interpretation of V.2, according to which the *ādānavijñāna* is in its turn based on the *ātmabhāva* as its 'locus' if the *ātmabhāva* is identified with the four *vijñānasthiti*s, i.e., taken to comprise not only the (living) body but also the mental factors (*vedanā*, etc.):

V.4–5: mental factors ⊣ *ādānavijñāna* ↔ V.2–3: *ādānavijñāna* ⊣ mental factors.

Matsumoto (M2: 392) rightly remarks that the aforementioned composite pattern is not spelled out in the text because V.2–3 does not touch the question of the relation between the subliminal and supraliminal strata of the mind and because V.4–5 does not refer to the *ātma-bhāva*. But the composite pattern along with its incompatibility is an inevitable consequence of his interpretation unless we disintegrate V.4-5 and V.2–3 by declaring them to represent two successive historical strata (which may indeed be what Matsumoto thinks). However, in my opinion there is no need to do so, because the incompatibility is unnecessarily created by Matsumoto's hypothesis that according to V.2–3 the 'locus' of *ādānavijñāna* is the *ātma-bhāva* in the sense of *nāmarūpa* comprising both the physical organism and the immaterial *skandha*s (or at least those except *vijñāna*). If, however, V.2–3 merely takes *ādānavijñāna* to abide in the *body*, i.e., to have, in this sense, the body as its 'locus', this position is fully compatible with the teaching of V.4–5 that *ādānavijñāna* is, in its turn, the 'locus', or basic layer, of the ordinary cognitive functions and of course, implicitly, also of the mental factors associated with them.

4.2.5.8. Explanations of the Twofold *upādāna* of Saṁdh V.2 in Later Sources

230. The earliest source to reflect the twofold *upādāna* of Saṁdh V.2 is the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin (and its more succinct parallel in the SacBhVin)[1273]. Although the *twofold upādāna* is mentioned only in the second part of this text ('Pravṛtti Portion'), some form of *upādāna* is treated in the first part ('Proof Portion') and in the third part

[1273] YBh$_t$ P zi 189b4f (D zhi 182a5f; YBh$_c$ 651b21), where it is stated that *ālayavijñāna* always has the *upādāna* as its objective support (*de yang dus rtag par len* (P : *len pa'i* D) *rgyu la dmigs pa ... yin no*; 於一切時緣執受境), without further specification. Cf. S 1987 # 5.6.4.1.

('Nivṛtti Portion') as well. Therefore, I shall discuss all of them, beginning with the 'Proof Portion' (ch. 4.2.5.8.1), continuing with the 'Nivṛtti Portion' (ch. 4.2.5.8.2), and finally dealing with the more complex 'Pravṛtti Portion' (ch. 4.2.5.8.3).

4.2.5.8.1. The 'Proof Portion'

231. The 'Proof Portion'[1274] consists of a set of eight proofs for the existence of *ālaya-vijñāna*. The first[1275] and most elaborate of them argues that without *ālayavijñāna* the 'appropriation of the basis' (*āśrayopādāna*) would not be possible, for five reasons. According to the first reason, this cannot be achieved by the six *pravṛttivijñāna*s – visual awareness, etc. – because they originate from present conditions, viz., from a sense faculty, an object, and an act of attention (*manaskāra*).[1276] This would seem to mean that they pre-suppose the 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) of the new life and hence the 'appropriation' of its basis as having already taken place.[1277] The 'appropriation' can thus be performed only by a

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[1274] YBh_t P zi 2b1–4a4 (D zhi 2a1–3b4; YBh_C 579a17–c22; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1018c9–1019a24); Sanskrit original preserved in ASBh 11,16–13,20; synoptic edition and Japanese transl. of the text and of Bu-ston's commentary in HAKAMAYA 1978a = 2001: 321–361 (with update); English translation in GRIFFITHS 1986: 129–138 (cf. also ibid. 96ff, and the important critical remarks in YAMABE 2012: 185–192). English translation in the context of Tsong-kha-pa's Yid-kun in SPARHAM 1993: 124–133. Cf. also S 1987: 194–196 (# 9.1–2).

[1275] HAKAMAYA 1978a: 8 (2001: 328) # i (ASBh 12,1-13). Cf. CHEN 1998: 130f.

[1276] Somewhat surprisingly, Matsumoto (M2: 489 n. 303), referring to MAV(Bh) I.9, suggests that these "present conditions" should be connected with *ālayavijñāna*, but in the context of the argument this would clearly amount to a *petitio principii*.

[1277] Yamabe (2012: 187,10-16 and 214 n. 26) rejects a connection of this reason with the moment of 'linking up' and suggests a different interpretation. According to him, this first reason is intended to point out that in contrast to *ālayavijñāna*, which, being determined by karma of former lives, does not change much in the present life, the six traditional kinds of *vijñāna* are, in view of their dependence on present conditions, constantly changing and hence not able to continuously support the body during one whole life. This may be true, but is hardly the whole truth.

[1.] It is obvious that the main thrust of the elaborate first argument of the 'Proof Portion' is to prove that the 'biological' appropriation of the body cannot be the function of the six traditional *vijñāna*s but requires the assumption of *ālayavijñāna*, and that *ālayavijñāna* alone is capable of keeping the body as a whole alive throughout life. This fact is additionally supported by seventh argument (vii), and is supplemented by the eighth argument (viii) which shows that this 'appropriation' comes to an end when *ālayavijñāna* departs from the body in the process of dying. It therefore stands to reason that analogously the beginning of the 'biological appropriation' of the body (in its pre-embryonic form of semen-cum-blood), implying its transformation into a proto-embryonic sentient body, must likewise be the function of *ālayavijñāna*, performed at the moment when it merges into pre-embryonic matter at the moment of conception. I would find it quite unnatural if this important aspect were not also taken into account, and the place where it would naturally be expected is surely at the very beginning, just as the death argument is placed at the very end. Actually, the very first reason of the first proof (i(a)) is perfectly appropriate for this purpose: the traditional set of *vijñāna*s results from present conditions, among which at least one, the sense faculty, is lacking at the moment of 'linking up', because it exists only in a living, sentient organism and hence presupposes that 'biological appropriation' has already taken place.

[2.] It is, at any rate, in this way that the argument is understood by Sthiramati in his PSkV (ms. 58b4f; $PSkV_t$ P hi 54a2-4):

> It is precisely [the mind] which, being caused by previous karmic impulses, appropriates a [new] existence when it has merged with semen and blood that is [also] assumed to keep the body

vijñāna that originates from previous karmic impulses (*pūrvasaṁskāra*), which implies that it is the result of karmic maturation (*vipāka*) and hence morally neutral (and remains so throughout life in order to keep the 'basis' appropriated). However, none of the six kinds of [*pravṛtti*]*vijñāna*s is of such a kind, at least not consistently, because they can be wholesome or unwholesome (= reasons two and three). Consequently, for the 'appropriation of the basis', one has to assume the existence of another kind of *vijñāna*, i.e., *ālayavijñāna*.

232. From the statement that the 'appropriation of the basis' is the function of the *vijñāna* that is conditioned by the previous *saṁskāra*s, Matsumoto (M2: 490f n. 304) concludes that the 'basis' must correspond to the member *nāmarūpa*, i.e., the *ātmabhāva*, and from this he further concludes that the passage must be based on Saṁdh V.2(–3), and not on the passages at the beginning of the MauBh where *ālayavijñāna* is also qualified as "appropriating the basis" (*āśrayopādātṛ*). Rather, according to him the MauBh passages are interpolations based on the 'Proof Portion'.

233. If *nāmarūpa*, or *ātmabhāva*, is taken to be equivalent to the four *vijñānasthiti*s, i.e., to include the mental factors, I definitely disagree. Actually, the meaning of 'basis' (*āśraya*) in this passage becomes clear from the fourth and the fifth reason. According to the fourth reason, the six traditional *vijñāna*s (i.e., the *pravṛttivijñāna*s) cannot be accepted as the *vijñāna* that appropriates the 'basis' because each of them has its own, limited basis (i.e., the respective sense organ), to the effect that only that 'basis' based (= sense organ) on which a certain *vijñāna* arises would be appropriated (*upātta*) by it; the rest would remain

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appropriated until dying, not the sense perceptions or the subsequent mental cognition, because these are dependent on present conditions like the sense of sight [and thus can arise only] after the [initial act of 'appropriation' has already taken place].

... *yat pūrvasaṁskārahetukaṁ śukraśoṇitasaṁmūrchitāvasthāyāṁ bhavam upādatte, tad evâ maraṇāt kāyopātt⟨r⟩tvenêṣyate, na cakṣurādivijñānāni tatpṛṣṭhalabdhaṁ vā manovijñānaṁ, teṣāṁ tata ūrdhvaṁ vartamānacakṣurādipratyayanimittatvāt.*

Cf. also PSkV (ms. 59a4: *tasmād ālayavijñānam eva pratisandhau kāyam upādatte* ...) and PSkBh P hi 200a5–b3 (D si 113a1-5), esp. 200a6 (*ma'i mngal du khu ba dang khrag gi nang du kun gzhi rnam par shes pa brgyal ba'i dus na sems des lus blangs te*).

[3.] Similarly Tsong-kha-pa, YidKun 66,1-3 (KELSANG & ODANI 1986: 173 fol. 40b4f; transl. 89,27–90,5; SPARHAM 1993: 217,8-11; transl. 125,19-26):

The *ālayavijñāna* is suitable for appropriating the body because, being the maturation (*vipāka*) of previous karma, it arises by the [mere] power of karma and therefore exists (= is present) already at the moment of 'linking up'. The six groups (i.e., the traditional *vijñāna*s) [cannot appropriate the body] ..., because as regards (= at the moment of)[1] 'linking up' they do not [yet] exist, since they arise from present conditions belonging to this life, [i.e., only] after the [new] body has already come into being (...).

kun gzhi ni tshe snga ma'i las kyi rnam smin yin pas na las kyi mthus 'jug pas nying mtshams sbyor ba na yang yod pas lus len par rung yang tshogs drug ni | ... lus grub zin tshe 'di'i da lta ba'i rkyen las 'byung bas nying mtshams sbyor ba ⟨na??⟩ med pa'i phyir (...).

[1] Thus also SPARHAM ("does not ... exist at link-up") and KELSANG & ODANI (生を受ける時に存在しない).

Cf. also Ke'u tshang's commentary (KELSANG & ODANI 1986: 206 fol. 30a3):

... because they arise from present conditions being at hand [only] after the basis has already come about, but do not exist at [the very moment of] 'linking up' (...).

... *lus grub zin pa'i 'og tu da lta ba'i rkyen nye bar gnas pa las 'byung gi nying mtshams sbyor ba na med pa'i phyir* (...).

unappropriated (*anupātta*) because devoid of *vijñāna*.[1278] According to the fifth reason, all these *vijñāna*s, since they arise only discontinuously, would have to appropriate their respective 'basis' again and again.[1279] As is also suggested by the use of the participle *upātta* (here and also in the *uddāna*[1280]), what is at stake here is hence not the taking hold of a new existence or basis-of-existence (*ātmabhāva*) in the sense of the whole psycho-physical personality but the 'biological' appropriation and 'assimilation' of the physical sense faculties along with their seats, i.e., of the body as a living, sentient organism, both at the moment of conception and throughout life, until death.

234. This is beyond doubt confirmed by Sthiramati's commentary on the *Pañcaskandhaka*, where the same set of reasons is used to prove that only the *ālayavijñāna* can be conceived as appropriating the *body* (*kāya*) at the moment of 'linking up' and as keeping it appropriated until death in that it arises-and-proceeds continuously with the whole body as its basis,[1281] for in contrast to the sense perceptions the *ālayavijñāna* continuously pervades or suffuses (*vy-√āp*) the entire body.[1282] Similarly, in *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* I.35 it is argued that without a

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1278 HAKAMAYA 1978a: 8 (2001: 328) # i(d) = ASBh 12,7-10: *api ca pratiniyatāśrayāḥ pañca vijñāna-kāyāḥ pravartante | tatra yena yenâśrayeṇa yad vijñānaṁ pravartate tad eva tenôpāttaṁ syād ava-śiṣṭasyânupāttatêti na yujyate | upāttatâpi na yujyate vijñānavirahitatayā | idaṁ caturthaṁ kāraṇam |*

1279 HAKAMAYA 1978a: 8 (2001: 328) # i(e) = ASBh 12,10-12: *api ca punaḥ punar āśrayasyôpādāna-doṣaḥ prasajyate | tathāhi cakṣurvijñānam ekadā pravartate ekadā na pravartate | evam avaśiṣṭāni | idaṁ pañcamaṁ kāraṇam |*

1280 HAKAMAYA 1978a: 7 (2001: 326) = ASBh 11,16.

1281 PSkV ms. 59a4f (PSkV$_t$ P 54a8f): *ālayavijñānam eva pratisandhau kāyam upādatte ā maraṇāc ca samastakāyāśrayeṇa pravartata iti tad eva pratisandhibandhāt prabhṛty ā maraṇāt kāyam upādatte.*

1282 [I.] PSk ms. 58b1 (see § 121.2.2). Cf. also PSVy P 25a6 (MUROJI 1993: 114,4f) with PSVyṬ P 155a1–b1; KSi # 34(a) (KSi$_{Mu}$ 41,2-4) with KSiṬ P ku 103b2-5 (D hi 91b1-3), clearly showing that *lus* must mean "body" because if it would be separated from the *vipākavijñāna* it would rot away like a corpse (*shi ba'i ro bzhin du rul bar 'gyur ba zhig na*), but it does not do so due to its being appropriated by *vijñāna* until death (*rnam par shes pas zin pa'i phyir ma shi'i bar du rul bar mi 'gyur ro*). See also CWSL 20b27f (cf. fn. 466): "If the *vipākavijñāna* were not *pervasively* based on the physical sense faculties, it would not be that which appropriates them, like the six [ordinary] *vijñāna*s" (若異熟識不遍依止有色諸根, 應如六識非能執受).

[II.] The idea of pervading (*khyab pa*, *vy-√āp*) in the spatial sense of filling, permeating or suffusing would seem to make sense only with regard to the body or (living, sentient) physical organism (cf. also § 121.2.2), not with regard to the mental factors. The difficult and controversial (cf. M2: 456f n. 143 against S 1987: 216 and 218f) passage in MSgU ad MSg I.36 is hardly compelling counter-evidence. Actually, the disputed sentence (*des lus la khyab pa'i phyir ro*) occurs only in the Tibetan version (MSgU$_t$ P li 259b6 = D ri 211b7, essentially different from the Chinese). Besides, its purport is not unambiguous.

[1.] One possibility is to take the passage as meaning that *ālayavijñāna* continuously functions as the support (*gnas*) of individual existence (*lus*, **ātmabhāva*) and hence as the condition of *nāmarūpa* because it pervades individual existence, i.e., is continuously, from the very beginning to the end, present in all forms of individual existence (**ātmabhāva*) without exception. This would also seem to be the meaning of "pervasion" in another passage of the MSgU, where the statement of MSg I.21 that *ālaya-vijñāna* comprises all forms of mundane individual existence (**ātmabhāva*) and all destinies (**gati*) is taken to mean that it assumes (or takes on) all of them, because it pervades (= is present in) [all of them] (MSgU$_t$ P li 251a6: *khyab pa'i phyir thams cad 'dzin par byed pa'o*; cf. S 1987: 505 n. 1374).

[2.] Even if "pervasion" in the MSgU sentence under discussion (i.e., *des lus la khyab pa'i phyir ro*) is taken in a spatial sense, this would not entail serious conceptual problems as long as *lus*, even if

vipākavijñāna that is different from the ordinary *vijñāna*s the appropriation of the physical sense faculties (*dbang po gzug can*, **rūpīndriya*) after conception (i.e., throughout life) would not be possible because the ordinary *vijñāna*s are each confined to their own basis (**prati-niyatāśraya*) and discontinuous. Likewise, in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論: CWSL), what is, by means of these reasons, shown to require the assumption of the existence of the *ālayavijñāna* is the appropriation of the *body* endowed with the physical sense faculties (有色根身), or of the five physical sense faculties along with their seats (五色根及彼依處).[1283] The same is also true of Chi's (基) and To-ryun's (道倫) commentaries on the VinSg passage under discussion, especially when they comment on the fourth reason, which according to them is meant to prove that when, e.g., a visual awareness arises, the other sense faculties (like the sense of hearing), being devoid of mind (i.e., sentience), should disintegrate,[1284] just as in a corpse, because they have no *vijñāna* that could keep them alive (since in the doctrine of the Lesser Vehicle *vijñāna*s cannot arise simultaneously).[1285]

235. Thus, this argument of the 'Proof Portion' is concerned with 'biological' appropriation only, i.e., corresponds to the first *upādāna* of Saṁdh V.2. If we want to relate it to the concept of *nāmarūpa* (*not* used in the text of the 'Proof Portion'), this would be possible only in the less strict sense of "living, sentient body".[1286] Moreover, since the connection of *ālaya-vijñāna* with *upādāna* in the sense of 'biological' appropriation is in no way specific to the Saṁdh, Matsumoto's assertion that this proof presupposes Saṁdh V.2(–3) appears arbitrary,[1287] just as his assumption that the characterization of *ālayavijñāna* as *āśrayopādātṛ*

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representing **ātmabhāva*, is taken to refer, in the first place, to the (living, sentient) body; for the idea that *ālayavijñāna* pervades the whole body is well documented and would also work well in the line of the argument:

a) If the fact that *ālayavijñāna* pervades the body is envisaged as causing the latter's being alive and *sentient* (and thus also indirectly enabling the actual mind processes), it can serve as an argument for the statement of the Tibetan version that *ālayavijñāna* proceeds without interruption as the basis of the *ātmabhāva* ($MSgU_t$ P li 259b5f: *de ni lus kyi gnas nyid du rgyun mi 'chad par 'jug go*).

b) If, on the other hand, pervading the (living, sentient) body is taken in the sense of *dwelling in* the body, it may serve — if the sentient body as the basic layer is tacitly equated with the whole — as an argument for *ālayavijñāna* being based on the *ātmabhāva* or *nāmarūpa*, as required by the Chinese version ($MSgU_c$ 393b5f: ... 阿賴耶識。自體為依 無間轉故。是故說此名色為緣。).

[3.] If, however, one insists on taking *ātmabhāva* in the strict sense, explicitly comprising the immaterial *skandha*s, one would have to explain in which way *ālayavijñāna* might meaningfully be stated to *pervade* the latter (cf. also fn. 1520), or to be based on them in a sense that is more than mere causal interaction (like depositing imprints) and would justify calling them its 'locus'.

1283 CWSL 16b20–c5.

1284 Cf. also $MSgBh_t$ P li 160a2 (D ri 135b3f; cf. fn. 271); VGPVy P li 420b5-7 (D ri 350a6f).

1285 T 43 1829: 170c26-28; T 42.1828: 594a9-11: 如眼識起時 餘耳等無識之根 便應爛壞 (宗)。無能持識故 (因), 以小乘宗諸識不並生故。猶如死屍 (喻)。

1286 The only source to make use of the concept of *nāmarūpa* in this connection that I have noted is PSkBh P hi 200a7 (D si 113a1f; cf. P 201b6f = D 114a5f: *ming dang gzugs kyi mtshan nyid kyi lus*), but since this is a comment on PSk 17,6 *kāyopādāna* and in view of the lack of any explicit reference to mental factors, *nāmarūpa* would indeed seem to be used here for the living, sentient body.

1287 Cf., in this connection, the fact that in the 'Proof Portion' *upādāna* is clearly an action noun, i.e., not used in a passive-objective sense. This fact hardly favours Matsumoto's assumption of a dependence of this part of the text on Saṁdh V.2 from the perspective of his own claim that such a use is characteristic of Saṁdh V.2.

(and *vipākasaṁgṛhīta*)[1288] at the beginning of the MauBh is based on this paragraph of the 'Proof Portion' and not the other way round. Even if the Saṁdh were to be regarded as the starting point of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*, I do not perceive any cogent reason for taking its introduction into the MauBh to be later than its fully developed theoretical elaboration in the *ālayavijñāna* treatise incorporated into the VinSg, though I cannot definitely exclude this possibility either. Everything hinges on the question of the origin of the concept of *ālaya-vijñāna*, a question with regard to which no agreement appears possible for the time being, and on a fully substantiated, definitive clarification, if possible at all, of the composition or compilation process of the YBh and the Saṁdh and of the precise text-historical relation of these two texts and their different parts to each other (cf. § 7.2).

4.2.5.8.2. The 'Nivṛtti Portion'

236. In the 'Nivṛtti Portion'[1289], *ālayavijñāna* is, on the one hand, *identified* with the Truth of Suffering (**duḥkhasatya*, in the concrete sense of an intrinsically unsatisfactory subliminal layer of individual existence) in the *present* life. On the other hand, *ālayavijñāna* is stated to be the *source* of the Truth of the Origin [of Suffering] (**samudayasatya*, i.e., defilements and karma) in the *present* life and the *source* of the Truth of Suffering in the *future*.[1290] As soon as the practitioner has achieved the 'Renewal of the basis[-of-existence]' (*āśrayaparivṛtti*), i.e., has attained arhatship, *ālayavijñāna* has ceased.[1291] In this text, *ālayavijñāna* is thus consistently conceived as the root of pollution (**saṁkleśamūla*)[1292] or principle of bondage, incompatible with the state in which the basis-of-existence has been completely transmuted (**āśrayaparivṛtti*). In contrast to this state, *ālayavijñāna* is stated to be **sopādāna* and fraught with corruption (**dauṣṭhulya*).[1293] Thus, there cannot be any doubt that in this text, too, **sopādāna* points to a connection with spiritually negative clinging.

237.1. Its precise meaning becomes clearer in the last but one paragraph of the 'Nivṛtti Portion', where we read that as soon as *ālayavijñāna* has been removed two kinds of *upādāna* cease: 1. grasping (*upādāna*) that makes one be reborn in the future ceases, because the cause that makes suffering re-emerge in the future (or: the cause of suffering connected with rebirth

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[1288] In the 'Proof Portion', there is no express statement that *ālayavijñāna* is *vipāka*(*saṁgṛhīta*), but its being so follows from the fact that otherwise just like the six ordinary kinds of *vijñāna* it could not be the subject of ('biological') appropriation, and seems to be *presupposed* by the author(s) of the Proof Portion as inherent in the concept and hence already well established.

[1289] YBh_t P zi 8a4–10a6 (D zhi 7a1–8b4; YBh_c 581a25–582a3; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020a13–c3); synoptic ed. with annotated Japanese transl.: HAKAMAYA 1979: 37–42 and 62–67 (2001: 402–408 and 428–433): # **5**; annotated English transl.: WALDRON 2003:185–189. Cf. S 1987: 208–213.

[1290] YBh_t P zi 8b1f (YBh_c 581b4-6; HAKAMAYA 1979: 38 [2001: 402f] # **5.b**.A.4).

[1291] YBh_t P zi 9b2f (HAKAMAYA 1979: 41,4f [2001: 406,3] # **5.b**.C.1): see fn. 108.

[1292] YBh_t P zi 8b4 and 9a3 (YBh_c 581b8f and 22; HAKAMAYA 1979: 38,12-14 and 39,19f [2001: 403,3f and 404,11f]: # **5.b**.A.5 and # **5.b**.B.1 end]).

[1293] YBh_t P zi 9b4f (YBh_c 581c9-12; HAKAMAYA 1979: 41 [2001: 406] # **5.b**.C.2): (a) *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni ... len pa dang bcas pa yin la | gnas gyur pa ni ... len pa med pa yin te | ...* (b) *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas ngan len dang ldan pa yin la gnas gyur pa ni gnas ngan len thams cad dang gtan bral ba yin no ||*. Cf. also YBh_t P zi 9a7f (YBh_c 581b28–c2; HAKAMAYA 1979: 40,16-19 [2001: 405,9-11] # **5.b**.B.2).

in the future: **āyatipaunarbhavikaduḥkhahetu*?)[1294] has been removed, and 2. clinging (*upādāna*) to the polluted basis-of-existence (**āśraya*)[1295] in this life ceases completely, because in this life all causes of pollution have been removed.[1296]

237.2. It is worth noting that in contrast to the Tibetan translation (and probably also to Hsüan-tsang), where *upādāna* is taken as an action noun, Paramārtha has understood it, in both cases, in a passive-objective sense, equating it as he does with the *upādānaskandha*s. In other words: whereas in Tibetan (and probably also in Hsüan-tsang's version) the *upādāna* that is stated to cease refers to grasping for or taking hold of rebirth in the future and to clinging to the polluted basis-of-existence in the present life, respectively, for Paramārtha it consists in the five *upādānaskandha*s (五盛陰) of a future life and in the *skandha*s of one's existence as an ordinary person (凡夫陰) in this life, respectively.[1297]

237.3. In any case, however, the 'Nivṛtti Portion' is concerned with *upādāna* as the act or object of spiritually negative clinging, both in the sense of grasping for, or taking hold of, a new individual existence[1298] and in the sense of clinging to the present basis-of-individual-existence. This would exactly correspond to the explanation given by the *Abhidharma-samuccaya-bhāṣya* for desire (*chanda*) and passionate attachment (*rāga*), respectively, in

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[1294] Cf. YBh$_c$ 581c19 當來後有苦因, where 當來後有苦 corresponds to YBh$_c$ 576c11 當來後有眾苦, for which Skt. has *āyatipaunarbhavikaṁ duḥkhaṁ* (SopBh # 2.1.1; Tib. *phyi ma la yang srid pa 'byung bar byed pa'i sdug bsngal* [!]).

[1295] Or: "the clinging (*upādāna*) that is the basis of pollution" (cf. S 1987: 695)? For the other alternative, one could perhaps adduce YBh$_t$ P zi 243a3f (D zhi 230a5f; YBh$_c$ 671b17-20):

> What is the basis of pollution ...? This material, coarse body, arisen from the primary elements, etc., as described in detail in the sutra; for (...*ste* |) this [body] is, [in the case] of naive, unwise, ignorant persons, the basis of pollution.
>
> *de la kun nas nyon mongs pa... 'i gnas gang zhe na | lus 'di ni gzugs can rags pa 'byung ba chen po'i rgyu las byung ba zhes rgyas par mdo las gsungs pa gang yin pa ste | de ni byis pa mi mkhas pa ma rig pa dang ldan pa rnams kyi ni kun nas nyon mongs pa'i gnas yin no ||*

[1296] YBh$_t$ P zi 9b8–10a2 (D zhi 8a7f; YBh$_c$ 581c17-21; HAKAMAYA 1979: 42,10-15 [2001: 407,6-9] # **5.b**.C.3): *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de'i spangs pa'i mtshan nyid ni de spangs ma thag tu len pa rnam pa gnyis spong ba ... ste* | [1] *phyi ma la sdug bsngal yang 'byung bar byed pa'i rgyu spangs pa'i phyir* | *phyi ma la yang 'byung bar byed pa'i len pa spong ba* (便捨當來後有之取) *dang* | [2] *tshe 'di la kun nas nyon mongs pa'i*[1] *rgyu thams cad spangs pa'i phyir* | *tshe 'di'i kun nas nyon mongs pa'i gnas len pa*[2] *thams cad spong ba* (便捨現法一切雜染所依之取) [...]. Cf. SAKUMA 1990: II 159–161; WALDRON 2003: 188.

[1] Instead of *kun nas nyon mongs pa* (*saṁkleśa*), Hsüan-tsang has 煩惱 (*kleśa*).

[2] *gnas len pa* em. with YBh$_c$ 雜染所依之取 : *gnas ngan len* DP; cf. S 1987: 366 n. 555 subn. 3.

[1297] VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020b20-22 (cf. SAKUMA 1990: II 160f n. 851):

> As for the future, the cause, [i.e.,] the unwholesome [factors consisting in the] defilements, has ceased; because the cause has ceased, suffering consisting in the five *upādānaskandha*s will not [re]arise in the future. In the present, because all causes, [i.e., all] evil [factors consisting in the] defilements, have ceased, the *skandha*s of (i.e., as far as they constitute?) a worldly person have ceased.
>
> 來世煩惱不善因滅, 以因滅故 則於來世 五盛陰苦 不復得生。現在世中 一切煩惱惡因滅故 則凡夫陰滅。

[1298] According to the explanation given by the master [Hui-]Ching (惠景: cf. DELEANU 2006: 252), this refers to *upādāna* as the tenth member of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* formula (T 42.1828: 604c19-21).

connection with the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*'s definition of *upādāna*[1299] (in the term *upādāna-skandha*): due to *chanda*, one grasps for a future basis-of-individual-existence in that one longs for it (and thereby causes the coming about of new *skandha*s in the future), and due to *rāga* one clings to the present basis-of-individual-existence in that one is attached to it (with the effect that one does not abandon or neglect the present *skandhas*).[1300] The same twofold detrimental effect is attributed to (albeit not distributed on) delight (*nandī*)[1301] and passionate attachment (*rāga*) in VaSg III.5.v[1302] (on SĀ$_c$ no. 374/375, corresponding to SN 12.64: *Atthi-*

[1299] See § 194 with fn. 1070.

[1300] ASBh 2,5-8 (cf. AS$_{Li}$ 243,31-33). Cf. also AKVy 219,34: *chando 'nāgate 'rthe prārthanā, rāgas tu prāpte 'rthe 'dhyavasānam.*

[1301] Explained in VaSg III.5.v as defiled happiness (**kliṣṭaṁ saumanasyam*) accompanied by specific expectations (**ākāṅkṣā?*) (YBh$_c$ 840a15: 專注希望俱行喜染名喜; cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 314b3 [D zi 274b5]: *re ba dogs pa dang bcas pa'i yid bde ba nyon mongs pa can ni dga' ba yin no* ||); cf. AKVy 264,11: *nandī saumanasyaṁ.*

[1302] YBh$_t$ P 'i 314b1-8 (D zi 274a4–b2; YBh$_c$ 840a12-24). The passage has been translated and discussed by Matsumoto (M2: 308–311, texts [116] and [117]) in connection with his interpretation of the *Atthirāgasutta* (see fn. 1303). His main aim is, however, to point out that the VaSg is inconsistent in that it on the one hand replaces the four nutriments as the 'locus' of *vijñāna* with the four *vijñāna-sthiti*s (see fn. 1305) but on the other preserves the idea of the sūtra that its 'locus' consists in the four nutriments. Still, as far as I can see there is no need to construe, in the respective passage, i.e.,

{A} *de yang de ltar zas bzhi po rnams la dga' ba dang 'dod chags gnyis kyis kun nas nyon mongs pa can du gnas pas tshe 'di la rdul dang bcas par 'gyur ro* || (YBh$_t$ P 'i 314b6 [D zi 274a7f] = section ⓓ in Matsumoto's text),

the locative as denoting the 'locus' of *vijñāna*. This depends on what the pronoun *de* (Ch. 彼) refers to, an issue which is hard to decide in a definitive way as long as the Sanskrit original of the passage is not available. According to Matsumoto, the pronoun resumes *vijñāna*, but as he himself (M2: 466 n. 182) admits, it may as well refer to the person who is, at the beginning of VaSg III.5.v, said to become polluted by *nandī* and *rāga* due to not perceiving the four nutriments as they actually are. To my mind, it is more likely that the pronoun refers to this person, for it does so almost certainly in the next sentence, with which the one under discussion is closely connected, insofar as both sentences form part of the description of the second function of *nandī* and *rāga*, viz., their entailing disagreeable consequences (**ādīnava*) in this very life:

{B} *de de ltar rdul dang bcas par gyur pas zas de rnam par 'gyur zhing gzhan du gyur pas mya ngan byed cing ngal la yid mi bde bar gnas te* | *tshe 'di la mya ngan dang bcas par 'gyur ba 'di ni dga' ba dang 'dod chags las gyur pa'i tshe 'di'i nyes dmigs yin par rig par bya'o* || (YBh$_t$ P 'i 314b6-8 [D zi 274b1f])

On account of having, in this way, become sullied, that [person] is permanently (**viharati*) suffering, weary and disgusted because those nutriments deteriorate and become spoilt. One should know that this getting struck with suffering in this [very] life is the disagreeable consequence that results from delight and attachment [already] in this life.

As the expression "sullied" (*rdul dang bcas pa*) indicates, this part of VaSg III.5.v is the exegesis of SĀ$_c$ no. 375, where the subject, stated to incur suffering and pollution, is not *vijñāna* but surely the person in whom *nandī* and *rāga* have arisen. Apart from this, there is no need to construe the presumable locative in {A} with *gnas pa*. It would seem more natural to construe it with the immediately following expression *dga' ba dang 'dod chags*, i.e., *nandī* and *rāga*, as in the definition of *rāga* as *zas rnams la lhag par zhen pa* ("attachment to the nutriments"). I would therefore prefer to translate section {A} as follows:

On the other hand, because the [person under discussion] remains (*gnas*) in this way polluted by delight in and attachment to the four nutriments, he/she becomes sullied in this very life.

rāgasutta).[1303] Although this text does not mention *upādāna*, it alludes to the *Bījasūtra* by stating that due to these two factors the *vijñāna* becomes polluted (**saṁkliṣṭa*) so as to be established in the *vijñānasthiti*s and come to grow or sprout[1304] in the way of a seed of rebirth in the future, entailing new suffering.[1305] In view of the canonical equation of *upādāna* with *chandarāga* and a certain semantic vicinity of *nandī* and *chanda* it would seem most natural to assume that the VaSg has understood *vijñāna* to be *sopādāna* insofar as it is polluted (**saṁkliṣṭa*) by *nandī* and *rāga* (with regard to the four nutriments), which involve in fact a twofold grasping or clinging. In the 'Nivṛtti Portion', these two facets of spiritually negative clinging are presupposed to be rooted in the *ālayavijñāna* as their cause, i.e., their Seed, or as the subliminal layer of the mind that is imbued with their imprints (*vāsanā*), and therefore they are definitively abandoned when the *ālayavijñāna* has ceased.

238. It may be noteworthy that the 'Nivṛtti Portion' does not seem to refer to 'biological appropriation'. Rather, according to the 'Nivṛtti Portion' *ālayavijñāna*, essentially fraught with corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*), definitively ceases at the moment when arhatship is attained, and therefore cannot serve as a principle of life and sentience for the rest of the arhat's life. According to this text, the arhat's body merely continues [for some time] like a *nirmāṇa* (i.e., like a supranormally produced being or apparition),[1306] free from all corruptions (**dauṣṭhulya*) and merely as a condition for [exhausting the remaining period of] life (**jīvitapratyaya-mātra*).[1307] This view is confirmed by a kind of appendix to the text, according to which four

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The Chinese version (YBh$_c$ 840a21f: 彼由如是於四食中安住憙貪二種煩惱 便於現法有諸塵染) is syntactically slightly different. Contrary to Matsumoto (M2: 309,2), who punctuates after 安住, I understand it as follows (which is, as I notice, in agreement with KIK(Yuga) 6: 1945,10):

> Because that [person] is in this way, with regard to the four nutriments, established in the twofold defilement of delight and attachment, he/she is affected with all [kinds of] dirt in this life.

[1303] For a partial quotation see AKBh 118,3f; for a set of fragments *SHT* V (1985) no. 1089. According to Matsumoto (M2: 306–308: texts [114] and [115]), by replacing the four *vijñānasthiti*s — as that where *vijñāna* becomes established and comes to grow on account of delight and craving — with the four nutriments, the message of the sūtra amounts to an absurdity (M2: 308,4f: 不合理), because this replacement would imply that the *vijñāna* becomes its own 'locus'. Yet, the absurdity may as well result from Matsumoto's fixation on a spatial or ontological meaning of the *vijñāna*'s being established in something. If its becoming established is, however, understood as its becoming emotionally involved or attached, it may not be absurd to conceive of *vijñāna* as being involved, e.g., in its own individual continuance in the future.

[1304] M2: 465 n. 180 suggests a derivate of *vi-√ruh* (acc. to Pā. *virūḷhaṁ*), which appears plausible in spite of *adhirūḍham* (AKBh$_t$ ku 114b3: *gnas*; AKBh$_{Hs}$ 43c2f: 所乘御) in the corresponding sūtra passage in AKBh 118,3f.

[1305] YBh$_t$ P 'i 314b4f (D zi 274a6f; YBh$_c$ 840a17-19):

> Due to this two[fold] pollution (**saṁkleśa*), the *vijñāna* becomes polluted (**saṁkliṣṭa*) in this life,[1] and establishing itself in the *vijñānasthiti*s it comes to grow in the manner of a seed of rebirth in the future.
>
> *kun nas nyon mongs pa 'di gnyis kyi⟨s⟩ tshe 'di la rnam par shes pa kun nas nyon mongs pa can du 'gyur te | rnam par shes pa'i gnas rnams la gnas nas phyi ma la yang srid par skye ba'i sa bon gyi tshul gyis skye bar 'gyur ro ||*
>
> [1] Ch.: "These two defilements (**kleśa*) pollute the *vijñāna* in this life" (此二煩惱 於現法中 能染於識).

[1306] YBh$_t$ P zi 10a1 (YBh$_c$ 581c18; HAKAMAYA 1979: 42,11f [2001: 407,7] # **5.b**.C.3): *sprul pa lta bu'i lus kun tu gnas pa ste |*. For a similar characterization of the arising of mind processes (*citta*) in a Tathāgata as being like apparitions, cf. Saṁdh X.9 (see Pt. III § 517).

[1307] YBh$_t$ P zi 10a2f (YBh$_c$ 581c21f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 42,15f [2001: 407,9f] # **5.b**.C.3): *gnas ngan len thams cad dang bral zhing srog gi rkyen du gyur pa tsam kun tu gnas so ||*. Cf. S 1987: 365.

kinds of persons, viz., arhats, pratyekabuddhas, bodhisattvas no longer liable to relapse and Tathāgatas, have *pravṛttivijñānas* but no *ālayavijñāna*, and in the state of *nirodhasamāpatti* even lack both.[1308] The problems involved in such a position from a more conventional perspective are completely disregarded, for whatever reason. Perhaps, for the author(s) of this part of the text those saintly persons were no longer regarded as living beings on a 'biological' level.

4.2.5.8.3. The 'Pravṛtti Portion'

239. Unambiguously connected with Saṁdh V.2 is the reference to the twofold *upādāna* in the 'Pravṛtti portion',[1309] where this concept has been integrated into the analysis of the continued arising (*pravṛtti*) of *ālayavijñāna* from the point of view of its objective support (*ālambana*):[1310]

> Briefly stated, *ālayavijñāna* arises-and-continues by means of a twofold objective support:[1311] as a cognition (*vijñapti*) of the *upādāna* within, and as a cognition of the surrounding [world] outside in a form that is uninterrupted (/not clearly delimitated / not clearly discerned) (*aparicchinnākāra*)[1312]. The *upādāna* within is
>
> [1.] the imprint (*vāsanā*) of clinging (*abhiniveśa*) to the fictitious (*parikalpita*) nature [of dharmas], and
>
> [2.] the matter of the sense faculties along with their seats.
>
> It must be added (*yang*) that this [*upādāna* is complete only] in the [two] world-sphere[s] where there is (corporeal) matter; in the world-sphere which is without (corporeal) matter there is only the *upādāna* [consisting in] the imprint.[1313]

[1308] YBh$_t$ P zi 10b3f and 5f (YBh$_c$ 582a8f and 10-12; HAKAMAYA 1979: 44 [2001: 409f] ## **II.2**.b and d).

[1309] YBh$_t$ P zi 4a8–8a4 (D zhi 3b7–7a1; YBh$_c$ 580a2–581a24; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019a25–1020a13) synoptic edition with annotated Japanese transl. in HAKAMAYA 1979: 26–37 and 53–62 (2001: 390–402 and 419–428) ## **1–4**; annotated English transl. in WALDRON 2003:178–185.

[1310] In view of the decidedly Abhidharmic character of the whole 'Pravṛtti portion', Matsumoto's (M2: 265,17f) suggestion that *ālambana* may, in this text, not have the technical meaning "objective support (of a cognitive act)" sounds extremely improbable.

[1311] Tib. *dmigs pa rnam pa gnyis kyis* corresponds exactly to PSkV (see fn. 1313) *dvābhyām ālambanābhyāṁ* (instr., and not locative, as PSkV$_t$ P hi 46b4 [D shi 232b5] *dmigs pa gnyis la* (< *las* [abl.]?) might suggest (M2: 444,22-25)).

[1312] See S 1987: 90 (# 5.6.3.1) with n. 634.

[1313] YBh$_t$ P zi 4b1-3 (D zhi 3b7f; YBh$_c$ 580a2-7; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1019a29–b4; HAKAMAYA 1979: 26 [2001: 390f] # **1.b**.A):

> *mdor bsdu na kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni dmigs pa rnam pa gnyis kyis 'jug ste | nang gi len pa rnam par rig pa dang | phyi rol gyi snod rnam pa yongs su ma chad pa rnam par rig pas so || de la nang gi len pa ni kun brtags pa'i ngo bo nyid la mngon par zhen pa'i bag chags dang rten dang* ⟨*bcas pa'i*?⟩ *dbang po'i gzugs so || de yang gzugs can gyi khams na'o || gzugs can ma yin pa na ni bag chags len pa kho nar zad do ||*

Cf. the quasi-quotation in PSkV ms. 50b2f:

> *ālayavijñānaṁ dvābhyām ākārābhyāṁ pravartate: adhyātmam upādānavijñaptitaḥ, bahirdhâparicchinnākārabhājanavijñaptitaś ca. tatrâdhyātmam upādānaṁ parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā sādhiṣṭhānaṁ cêndriyarūpam.*

Similarly TrBh *8,1-5 (L. 19,5-8), but with *dvidhā* for *dvābhyām ālambanābhyāṁ* and with *sādhiṣṭhānam indriyarūpam nāma ca* at the end (cf. § 240.3.1).

The idea of *ālayavijñāna* as a cognition of the surrounding world corresponds, of course, to Saṁdh VIII.37.1.1, where *ādānavijñāna* is characterized as a stable but unconscious cognition (or rather: representation) of the surrounding world.[1314] In the 'Pravṛtti portion', this has been supplemented by taking the twofold *upādāna* of Saṁdh V.2 as involving yet another cognitive function of *ālayavijñāna*.

240.0. In connection with the present discussion, three points are noteworthy: 1. the two kinds of *upādāna* in the 'Pravṛtti portion' correspond exactly to those of Saṁdh V.2 (§ 240.1); 2. The 'Pravṛtti portion' supports a passive-objective understanding of the expression *upādāna*, but the later tradition is not unanimous in this regard (§ 240.2); 3. In the explanation of the twofold *upādāna* in the 'Pravṛtti portion', no mention at all is made of *nāman* or mental factors (§ 240.3).

240.1. The close correspondence of the two kinds of of *upādāna* in the 'Pravṛtti portion' and the types of 'appropriation' involved with those of Saṁdh V.2 is obvious: the matter of (i.e., consisting in) the [physical] sense faculties and their seats (i.e., roughly speaking, the living, sentient body) is the object of 'biological' appropriation, and the imprint of clinging to the fictitious nature [of things/dharmas] (*parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā*) represents the latent presence of spiritually negative clinging. The only difference from Saṁdh V.2 is that in the latter case the 'Pravṛtti portion' has replaced the 'five *vastu*' phraseology with 'three *svabhāva*' terminology. 'Biological' appropriation is also referred to in another passage of the 'Pravṛtti portion' where we read that sensory awareness arises on the basis of the physical sense faculties only as long as these are kept appropriated (**upātta*) by the *ālayavijñāna*.[1315]

240.2.1. In the 'Pravṛtti portion' the expression *upādāna* is unambiguously used in a passive-objective sense, because the *upādāna* is explained by, and equated with, the appropriated items. The same holds good for the (albeit less explicit) corresponding statement in the *ālayavijñāna* treatise of the SacBhVin,[1316] and probably also for the original of a parallel at the beginning of the *Hsien-yang*, although in this case Hsüan-tsang seems to have understood *upādāna* as an action noun because he takes the passage to mean:

> This [*ālaya*]*vijñāna* appropriates and cognizes [1.] the physical sense faculties along with their seats and [2.] the *prapañcavāsanā*.[1317]

But in his CWSL Hsüan-tsang, too, when interpreting the related passage of the *Triṁśikā* (Tr 3ab: *asaṁviditakopādisthānavijñaptikaṁ ca tat*), equates *upādi* (= *upādāna*) with the body possessing sense faculties and with the imprint (*vāsanā*) and, as Matsumoto (M2: 273) correctly remarks, expressly characterizes these as "that which is appropriated by [*ālaya*]-

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[1314] See Pt. IV § 581.3.

[1315] YBh_t P zi 5b5f (D zhi 5a1f; YBh_c 580b13f; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1019b26f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 30 [2001: 394f] # **3**.**b**.A.2; WALDRON 2003: 181): *kun gzhi rnam par shes pas zin pa'i dbang po gzugs can rnams la brten nas | rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga po dag 'byung bar 'gyur gyi ma zin pa dag las ni ma yin no ||*.

[1316] YBh_t P zi 189b4f (YBh_c 651b21f): *de* (= *ālayavijñāna*) *yang dus rtag par len rgyu* (**upādāna*) *la dmigs pa dang ... snod la dmigs pa yin no ||* (cf. fn. 1273).

[1317] HsienY 480c5f: 此識 能執受了別 色根根所依處 及戲論熏習. If this is based on an original **sādhiṣṭhānarūpīndriya-prapañcavāsanā-upādāna-vijñaptiḥ*, this might as well be taken to mean "a cognition of the physical sense faculties ... and of the imprint ... as [the two things] that are appropriated (sc., by the *ālayavijñāna* itself)."

vijñāna" (識所執受).[1318] It would thus seem that in focussing on the twofold *upādāna* in connection with establishing *ālayavijñāna* as an actual cognition of some object, it was convenient (though, as Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the *Hsien-yang* passage shows, not altogether inevitable) to take *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense.

240.2.2. Significantly, however, in Sthiramati's commentary on the aforementioned *Triṁśikā* line (vs. 3ab) the situation is different. Though quoting the pertinent passage of the 'Pravṛtti portion' in his introduction to the *Triṁśikā* line, in his commentary on it Sthiramati somewhat surprisingly construes only *sthāna* with *vijñapti* but not *upādi*, i.e., he analyzes the compound as

> *asaṁviditaka upādir yasmin asaṁviditakā ca sthānavijñaptir yasmin, tad* ... (TrBh *8,7; L 19,10).

This seems to mean that for Sthiramati the (subliminal) cognitive function of *ālayavijñāna* is only directed at the surrounding world, and that the twofold *upādāna* is not, at least not explicitly, connected by him with this cognitive function. Rather, Sthiramati's explanation basically corresponds to the situation met with in the Saṁdh itself in that here too the cognitive function of the subliminal layer of the mind (here: *ādānavijñāna*) is confined to the surrounding world (VIII.37.1.1), whereas the twofold *upādāna* is taught (in V.2) in connection with what we may call the appropriative functions of the subliminal mind, without any reference to a cognitive function. In view of this fact it is remarkable that Sthiramati does *not* explain *upādāna* in a passive-objective sense. Rather, in the case of the basis-of-existence comprising the physical sense faculties and their seats (for the addition of *nāman* see § 240.3) Sthiramati, as Matsumoto (p.269,1-3) admits, unambiguously takes *upādi* = *upādāna* as an action noun, glossed with *upagamanam ekayogakṣematvena*, i.e., "approaching (or adopting) it so as to share one and the same destiny".[1319] And in the case of the imprint (*vāsanā*) he says that it is called *upādi* because on account of its presence[1320] conceptual imagination (*vikalpa*) of a self, etc., and of dharmas are 'appropriated' or acquired (*upātta*) by *ālayavijñāna* as effects (*kāryatvena*).[1321] In other words, in this case Sthiramati takes *upādi* (= *upādāna*) as

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[1318] CWSL 10a14-16.

[1319] TrBh *8,14-16 (L. 19,16f): *āśrayopādānaṁ copādiḥ | āśraya ātmābhāvaḥ sādhiṣṭhānaṁ indriyarūpaṁ nāma ca | tasya punar yad upādānaṁ upagamanam ekayogakṣematvena, tad upādiḥ |*.

[1320] Matsumoto's (M2: 451f n. 124, esp. 451,25–452,6) attempt to detect, even in this case, a 'locus' relation on the basis of the fact that Vinītadeva (TrṬ P ku 18a8) paraphrases the expression *tatsadbhāvāt* with *de yod na* (**tasmin sati*, locative absolute) is hardly convincing, for the locative absolute merely characterizes the presence of the imprint as a condition or presupposition of the effect, and an equation of the concept of 'locus' with that of condition in general would deprive the former of its specificity (cf. § 159.2). The same holds, by the way, also good in the case of SN I 135,20 (*evaṁ khandhesu santesu hoti satto ti sammuti*), where *khandhesu santesu* is, of course, a locative absolute (cf. VETTER 2000: 157) and not, as Matsumoto (M2: 260,13f), translating the expression as "in the existing [five] *skandhas*" (M2: 260,10: 存在している〔五〕蘊において), suggests, a locative proper = 'locus' (基体).

[1321] TrBh *8,10-12 (L. 19,12-14): *tatsadbhāvād ālayavijñānenâtmādivikalpo rūpādivikalpaś ca karyatvenôpātta iti tadvāsanâtmādivikalpānāṁ rūpādivikalpānāṁ côpādir ity ucyate*. Cf. S 1987: 358 n. 517. Buescher reads *tad vāsanā* Tib. *bag chags de ni*, but this should be **sā vāsanā*, *tadvāsanā* in the sense of "the [aforementioned] imprint" (i.e., as a karmadhāraya) being odd if not impossible except as a member of a larger compound. I take *tad-* to stand for *ātmādivikalpa-* and *rūpādivikalpa-* (cf. TrBh *8,9f): "... therefore their imprint is called the *upādi* of the imagination (*vikalpa*) of a self,

"that due to which a certain appropriation takes place". This explanation of *upādi* = *upādāna* may, it is true, sound somewhat artificial, but the first one (as an action noun) sounds quite natural and cannot be lightly brushed away, still less so in view of the structural closeness, pointed out also by Matsumoto himself (M2: 268), of Sthiramati's commentary to the situation in the Saṁdh.

240.3.1. It is noteworthy that in the adaptation of the twofold *upādāna* of Saṁdh V.2 by the 'Pravṛtti portion' no mention at all is made of *nāman* or mental factors. They are, to be sure, dealt with in the 'Pravṛtti portion' later on, in connection with the analysis of *ālayavijñāna* in terms of its association (**saṁprayoga*) [with mental factors] and its simultaneous occurrence (**sahabhāva*) [with other forms of mind and their mental companions], but they are *not* included in the *upādāna* that is the objective support of *ālayavijñāna*. In the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論), the possibility that other forms of mind or any mental factors might be the objective support of *ālayavijñāna* is explicitly rejected.[1322] However, Sthiramati, at first glance, seems to disagree, for in his reference to the 'Pravṛtti portion' before commenting on Tr 3ab, he takes the "*upādāna* within" to comprise not only the physical sense faculties along with their seats and the imprint of clinging to the purely imagined, fictitious nature of things but also *nāman*,[1323] explained by Vinītadeva[1324] as the four immaterial *skandha*s, and this addition of *nāman* is in fact repeated in Sthiramati's subsequent explanation of the *Triṁśikā* line itself (TrBh *8,14f; L. 19,16f). In the context of the quasi-quotation from the 'Pravṛtti portion' the addition of *nāman* would indeed seem to imply that *ālayavijñāna*'s cognition of the *upādāna* includes a cognition of mental factors and even of [the other] *vijñāna*s. Yet since in his own explanation of the *Triṁśikā* line Sthiramati does not construe *upādāna* with *vijñapti*, i.e., does not take the *upādāna* as an objective support of *ālayavijñāna*, the addition of *nāman* in the introductory lines would seem to have been made somewhat mechanically, and we should rather concentrate on his explanation of the *Triṁśikā* line proper.

240.3.2. According to Matsumoto (M2: 267; 271f), the addition of *nāman* by Sthiramati has the purpose of restoring the completeness of the *upādāna* (in a passive-objective sense) of Saṁdh V.2, which according to him comprises the whole *ātmabhāva*, in the sense of *nāma-rūpa*, *rūpa* being represented by the physical sense faculties along with their seats, and *nāman* by the imprint (*vāsanā*) of dealing with phenomena, names (*nāman*) and imagination (*vikalpa*). In the 'Pravṛtti portion', this imprint was replaced with the imprint of clinging to the fictitious nature of things, with the effect that the connection with *nāman* was lost, and *rūpa* became isolated. Since Sthiramati in his commentary on Tr 3ab goes back to the Saṁdh, he had to restore the object of appropriation so as to comprise both *nāman* and *rūpa*, and therefore he added *nāman*. However, as I hope to have shown (§ 228), the twofold *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2 has little to do with *nāmarūpa* in the sense of *ātmabhāva*, since the *nāman* mentioned in connection with the imprint (*vāsanā*) means "names" and is completely different from the *nāman* in *nāmarūpa*, which in its traditional interpretation is taken to refer to the immaterial *skandha*s (with or without *vijñāna*). Therefore, even though Sthiramati's introduction of the concept of *nāman* is obviously inspired by the traditional concept of *nāma-*

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etc., and of dharmas like matter/visibles", i.e., that due to which these *vikalpa*s are 'appropriated' by *ālayavijñāna* as its effects or products (*kāryatvena*).

[1322] CWSL 11a20-27.

[1323] See fn. 1313.

[1324] TrṬ P ku 17b6f: *ming zhes bya ba ni tshor ba la sogs pa phung po bzhi po rnams so* ||.

rūpa (and its dependence on *vijñāna*, reinterpreted in terms of *ālayavijñāna*), the *motive* for its introduction must be something different from the mere concept of *upādāna* as such, or as used in the Saṁdh.

240.3.3. For this reason, I still consider my former suggestion (see S 1987: # 5.12.2) more probable: Sthiramati, as has been pointed out before (§ 240.2.2), understands the imprint (*vāsanā*) of clinging to the fictitious nature not as an object of *ālayavijñāna* but as that due to which *ālayavijñāna* 'appropriates' *vikalpa*s as its effect (*kārya*). The imprint is therefore no longer part of the object of the act of appropriation (*upādāna*). Thus, only one of the two objects of appropriation of Saṁdh V.2 and of the 'Pravṛtti portion' is left, viz., the physical sense faculties along with their seats. This, however, would entail the consequence that in the case of a rebirth in the world-sphere of incorporeality there would be nothing to be appropriated, which may mean that there would be no appropriation, i.e., taking hold, of a specific actualized individual existence at all.[1325] In my opinion, it is for this reason that Sthiramati has added *nāman*, i.e., the immaterial constituents of a sentient being. For as he himself expressly adds, in the sphere of incorporeality there is only appropriation of *nāman*, because (corporeal) matter as a result of karmic maturation does not come about there, since those who are reborn there have lost attachment to corporeal things.[1326]

240.3.4. It should, however, be noted that Sthiramati's addition of *nāman* implies a basic change of the concept of *upādāna* or 'appropriation' involved. It is no longer 'biological' appropriation, which has only the physical organism as its object and consists in rendering and keeping it alive and sentient. Rather, 'appropriation' is now a function that is conceived as comprising the whole supra-liminal individual existence, and, in view of the *ekayoga-kṣematva*, obviously not only its appropriation at the moment of 'linking up' but throughout life. My impression is that *upādāna* is, in this passage, not confined to the function of the 'biological' appropriation of the physical organism but also comprises the (somewhat different) 'appropriation' of the supraliminal forms of mind and mental factors that originate from the imprints in the *ālayavijñāna* and are, as its effects, part and parcel of the same personal continuum, and in this sense 'appropriated' (which, of course, holds good for the physical organism as well). If this is correct, *upādāna* would here mean something like encompassing or integrating all these factors so as to constitute, or belong to, one and the same personal continuum.

241.0. There are two more points with regard to which Matsumoto signalizes disagreement in connection with the passage from the 'Pravṛtti portion' under discussion and related passages. One of them is the meaning of the term *ālambana* (§ 241.1), the other the meaning of the term *vijñapti* (§ 241.2).

241.1.1. As for the meaning of the term *ālambana*, Matsumoto (M2: 265f) suggests that the primary meaning may not be "object" (of a cognitive act) but rather "support", 'locus'. As evidence he (M2: 265,17f) refers to a passage of Candrakīrti's *Madhyamakāvatāra*[1327] where

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[1325] Cf. also § 274.

[1326] TrBh *8,17-19 (L. 19,18-20): *ārūpyadhātau tu rūpavītarāgatvād rūpavipākānabhinirvṛtter nāmo-pādānam eva | kiṁ tu vāsanāvastham eva tatra rūpaṁ, na vipākāvastham |*

[1327] MAvat 244,10 (VI.126cd) and 244,14, quoted in M2: 260f: texts [50] and [51]. Actually, the Skt. original of the verse MAvat VI.126cd has *niśraya* for Tib. *rten* (courtesy of Dr. Anne MacDonald):
skandhān pañcāpy eka icchanti, kecic

dmigs pa (**ālambana*) in the *Bhāṣya* corresponds to *rten* ("basis, support") in the verse text, and (M2: 446 n. 114) to the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[1328] where *ālambana* is juxtaposed and obviously quasi-synonymous with *adhiṣṭhāna*.

241.1.2. It is no matter of dispute that in the early Buddhist canon *ārammaṇa*, or *ālamba* (in *an*°), is used in the sense of "footing, hold, support",[1329] but not necessarily one that lies below, as in the case of the deep current described as "with no footing and no hold" (*appatiṭṭhe anālambe*: SN I 53,17 [no. 2.2.5]), which is commented upon in Spk I 110 as "with no footing below (*heṭṭhā appatiṭṭhe*) and no hold above (*upari anālambane*)", i.e., nothing to take hold of so as to get out of the current. Actually, *ā-√lamb/ramb* in the first place means "to cling to" ("sich klammern an"), "to hang on to" ("sich hängen an"), and then, less specifically, "to lean or rest upon" or "to take hold of, to seize".[1330] Thus, in its technical Abhidharmic use, *ālambana* may be rendered as "objective support", but this hardly implies the idea of a 'locus' as something *underlying* the mind or mental factors in terms of a spatial or ontological substratum. Such a notion would be more appropriate with regard to the physical sense faculties. From this point of view, Buescher's rendering of *ālambana* as "objective ... reference point" (B: 92) may be more appropriate.

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cittaṁ tv ekaṁ niśrayāyâtmadṛṣṭeḥ ||.

[1328] BoBh$_D$ 35,1-4: *ime trayo vikalpā vikalpaprapañcādhiṣṭhānaṁ vikalpaprapañcālambanaṁ vastu janayanti rūpādisaṁjñakam, yad vastv adhiṣṭhāya sa nāmasaṁjñābhilāpaparigṛhīto ... vikalpaḥ prapañcayan tasminn eva vastuni vicarati ...*

[1329] [1.] Commenting on Sn 474, Matsumoto (M2: 475 n. 235) states that *ārammaṇā* (pl.) in pāda c (*ārammaṇā yassa na santi keci*), in view of *āsaṁ anissāya* in pāda a (NORMAN 1992: 50: "not dependent on desire"), might not mean "object of cognition" (認識の対象) but rather 'locus', and he finds this supported by the fact that *ārammaṇā* is glossed with *paccayā* in Sn-a (II 410,3). But the commentary (Buddhaghosa's authorship is doubtful: see VON HINÜBER 1996 # 259) expressly adds that what is meant is that for the Tathāgata there are no more causes for rebirth (*punabbhavakāraṇāni*). It is therefore more likely that *ārammaṇa* = *paccaya* should be understood here in the sense of things for which one grasps and to which one clings, emotionally or conceptually.

[2.] Matsumoto (M2: 475,22ff) also traces the idea of 'locus' in the commentator's exegesis of the subsequent verse Sn 475, where the Tathāgata is characterized as *upādānakkhaye vimutto* (NORMAN 1992: 51: "completely released in the destruction of grasping"), explained in the commentary as *nibbāne nibbānārammaṇato vimutto*. Matsumoto (M2: 476,5) is fully aware of the fact that *nibbāne* is the commentator's gloss for *upādānakkhaye*, but somewhat surprisingly he construes *nibbānārammaṇato* with *vimutto* (M2: 476,3 and 9: 涅槃の所縁から解脱したもの) and suggests that *ārammaṇa* may correspond to *upādāna*, taken by the commentator in a passive-objective sense, i.e., as a 'locus', probably denoting the five *skandha*s (M1: 476,10-12). I must confess that this explanation does not make sense to me. Actually, *-ārammaṇato* merely explains how the commentator wants to understand the locative in *upādānakkhaye* = *nibbāne*, viz. as "by way of *nibbāna* as objective support", for there can hardly be any doubt that he interpreted the passage in terms of the later Theravāda doctrinal system, according to which liberating insight (*maggañāṇa*) has the unconditioned *nibbāna* as its objective support (*ārammaṇa*) (cf. VisM VIII.236; XXI.71 and 124; XXII.13 and 127). — In the verse itself, which deals with the Tathāgata while he is still alive (for he is stated to "deserve the sacrificial cake"), the expression *upādānakkhaye vimutto* most probably means that he is a liberated person in view of the fact that in him [all] clinging [to mundane existence] has come to an end, as would seem to be supported by the parallel expression *taṇhakkhaye vimutto* in Dhp 353c, etc. (cf. also Sn 211c). But I admit that it may also be meaningful to take *upādānakkhaye vimutto* to mean that the Tathāgata will be [finally] liberated, i.e., enter into *parinibbāna*, when, at the moment of death, the remaining 'fuel' (i.e., the five *khandha*s of his last life) is exhausted.

[1330] Cf. *PW* s.v. *lamb* + *ā*.

241.1.3. While in traditional Abhidharma (if we disregard epistemological problems emerging in a later period) the *ālambana* is, basically, the object cognized, there are cases where a cognitive act is mistaken, i.e., superimposes wrong notions on its object. If in such a case the expression '*ālambana*' is used to denote the object as such, as it really is, it may indeed be regarded as referring to the thing that *underlies* the mistaken cognition, though only in an epistemic sense, not in a spatial or ontological one. In this sense, cognitive acts to which *nothing* corresponds in reality may even be said to be without an *ālambana* (MSg II.14.2: see Pt. II § 397.4.1). In the case of the *Madhyamakāvatāra* passage adduced by Matsumoto, all the five *skandha*s or the mind (*citta*) only may, in this sense, be said to to serve as support (*rten*) for the *satkāyadṛṣṭi* that misinterprets this support as an ego, still more so since in this line metrical constraints of the verse would seem to have prevented the author from using the technical term *ālambana* itself. In the case of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* passage, too, the *vikalpa*s are basically mistaken, yet due to their own perverse creativity they produce an ultimately illusory but somehow objective phenomenal world of things corresponding to their content, which supplies them with a certain support (*adhiṣṭhāna*) (cf. § 303.2).

241.1.4. In the case of the 'Pravṛtti portion', the main intent is, in my opinion, to establish *ālayavijñāna* as an actual *vijñāna*, coming up to the Abhidharmic definition of a *vijñāna*, according to which it must be the cognition of some object (i.e., have an *ālambana*) and must be associated with a minimum of mental factors, and to clarify the relation of this new *vijñāna* to the traditional forms of *vijñāna*. In view of this intent, I do not perceive any reason for the assumption that the use of the term *ālambana* in the 'Pravṛtti portion' is different from its regular use in Abhidharmic sources.[1331]

241.2.1 As regards the meaning of *vijñāpti* in the 'Pravṛtti portion', Matsumoto (M2: 445, n 110), though leaving the matter undecided, tends to understand it in an objective sense, i.e., as "representation" in the sense of an objective image in the mind, and to take the compounds *upādānavijñapti* and *°bhājanavijñapti* as *bahuvrīhis*, in the sense of "having/containing a representation in the form of *upādāna/bhājana*". I must admit that in this case I find an interpretation of the compounds as bahuvrīhis rather far-fetched,[1332] but the main point is that Matsumoto's interpretation presupposes that the 'Pravṛtti portion' was written from the position of *vijñaptimātratā*.

241.2.2. In S 1987 (chapter 10) I tried to show that the whole *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin does not contain any explicit statement of *vijñaptimātratā*. Some of its formulations might be open to such an interpretation, but if the author had such a position in mind he was careful to formulate his text in such a way that it could be understood by 'mainstream' readers in terms of their traditional ontology, the innovation explicitly proposed being limited to a radical transformation of the traditional six *vijñāna* theory into the system of the eight *vijñāna*s. From this perspective, there is no reason to swerve from the traditional Abhidharmic use of *vijñapti* as designating the cognitive function of *vijñāna*, i.e., the act of cognition or perception (cf. Pt. II §§ 355.1.1, 355.1.2 and 357.2), with the twofold *upādāna* and the surrounding world as its objective support (*ālambana*).

1331 Cf. Tsong-kha-pa's use of the expression *dmigs yul* in this connection: YidKun 13,3 (KELSANG & ODANI 1986: 151 fol. 7a5; SPARHAM 1993: 169,22).

1332 In contrast to Tr 3ab, where the compound is marked by the suffix *-ka* and to be construed with *vijñānam* in vs. 2c. Cf. also the analysis of the compound in TrBh *8,7f (L. 19,10f).

241.2.3. However, since the author was obviously familiar not only with the V^th but also with the VIII^th chapter of the Saṁdh and hence with the idea of *vijñaptimātratā*, it would seem possible that from his own point of view the text could also be read in a *vijñaptimātratā* perspective. In this perspective, it would then be legitimate to understand *vijñapti* as "representation", either in the sense of an action noun with *upādāna* and *bhājana* as its (effected) object, or in an intransitive or objective sense ("appearance of, or consisting in, *upādāna/bhājana*"), which is how Vinītadeva explains the phrase, equating *vijñāpti* with the appearance or image (*snang ba*, **pratibhāsa*) and the mental form (*rnam pa*, **ākāra*) of the object.[1333]

241.2.4. Even in the *Triṁśikā*, the reader could still, before arriving at vs. 17 of the text, manage with the traditional meaning, the more so since the characterization of the traditional six *vijñāna*s as *vijñaptir viṣayasya* in vs. 2b looks entirely traditional, and especially because of its repetition in vs. 8c in the form of *viṣayasyôpalabdhiḥ*. It is only the systematic framework of the text as a whole (indicated, it is true, already in the very beginning: vs. 1a-c) that ultimately forces the reader to understand *vijñapti* in vs. 2b[1334] and in vs. 3ab as "representation". The question whether *vijñapti* in the sense of "representation" should then be understood in an intransitive or objective sense or rather as a transitive action noun need not be discussed here. Suffice it to say that Vinītadeva, equating *vijñapti* here too with the mental form (*rnam pa*, **ākāra*) and the appearance or image (*snang ba*, **pratibhāsa*) of the object,[1335] seems to favour, once again, the former alternative. Hsüan-tsang, on the other hand, is unambiguous in taking *vijñapti* as the cognitive function (了別用) or mode [of intentionality] (行相,**ākāra*)[1336] of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., its "perception-part" (見分),[1337] with images or (objective) representations of the sense faculties, etc., and of the surrounding world as its objective support (*ālambana*).[1338]

4.2.5.9. Excursus: The Surrounding World as an *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*

242. In connection with his claim that *ālambana* has, in the first place, the meaning of 'locus', and not that of "object" (or "objective support", "reference point") of cognition or mental factors, Matsumoto (M2: 446ff n. 115) asserts that this holds good even for the statement that the surrounding world (*bhājanaloka*) is the *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*. He (correctly) points out that the surrounding world is often designated as "foundation" or

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[1333] TrṬ P ku 17b4 (commenting on *vijñapti* in the quasi-quotation from the VinSg at TrBh 19,5f): *rnam par rig pa zhes bya ba ni snang ba dang rnam pa zhes bya ba'i bar du'o* || (**vijñaptir iti pratibhāsa ākāra iti yāvat*).

[1334] Cf. Sthiramati's explanation (TrBh *7,7f; L 18,17-19): *rūpādiviṣayapratyavabhāsatvāt cakṣurādivijñānam ... viṣayavijñaptiḥ*). In the case of vs. 8c, however, even Sthiramati's (TrBh *17,7f; L 25,2f) explanation remains traditional: *viṣayasya ... upalabdhir grahaṇam, pratipattir ity arthaḥ*.

[1335] TrṬ P ku 18a2f (commenting on *sthānavijñaptir* in the paraphrase of Tr 3ab in TrBh *8,7 [L. 19,10]): *gnas kyi rnam par rig pa ni gnas kyi rnam pa dang* | *gnas su snang ba zhes bya ba'i bar du'o* || (**sthānavijñaptiḥ sthānākāraḥ sthānapratibhāsa iti yāvat*).

[1336] For this use of *ākāra* (in contrast to its being used for the image of the object), see CWSL 10b6 (見分名行相) and b9f (心與心所 ... 行相各別, 了別領納等作用各異故。) as against b2f (相分名行相).

[1337] CWSL 10a12f (了別 即是行相, 識以了別為行相故。); a20f (異熟識 於自所緣 有了別用。此了別用 見分所攝。); c12 (故識行相 即是了別。了別即是識之見分。).

[1338] CWSL 10a13-20.

"ground" (*pratiṣṭhā*), "footing" (*pada*) or "place" (*sthāna*). He then adduces passages from *Asvabhāva's and Sthiramati's subcommentaries on the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA) in order to prove that in Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) the use of these designations is accounted for by the fact that the surrounding world is the *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*. This, he concludes, is possible only if the primary meaning of *ālambana* is "support" in the sense of foundation or 'locus', and not "objective support" in an epistemic sense.

243. However, with one (to my mind doubtful) exception, the passages adduced by Matsumoto do not seem to serve the purpose. The first set of passages is from the subcommentaries on MSA XIX.49, especially on the phrase *pratiṣṭhā ... nimittaṁ* in the verse text, transformed into a compound and equated with the surrounding world in the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkārabhāṣya* (MSABh 169,5: *pratiṣṭhānimittaṁ bhājanalokaḥ*). The second set of passages comments on the phrase *pratiṣṭhāyāḥ* (MSABh: *pratiṣṭhā-*) *parāvṛttau* in MSA IX.45.

> [1.a] 'The *nimitta* consisting in the foundation is the surrounding world': This means: the [foundation, i.e., surrounding world] is the *nimitta* of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., its *ālambana*; for [in Tr 3b] *ālayavijñāna* is stated[1339] [to be] a cognition (/representation) of the place (**sthānavijñapti*).[1340]
>
> *de la rten rgyu mtshan ni | snod kyi 'jig rten no zhes bya ba ni de ni kun gzhi* (D : *zhig* P) *rnam par shes pa'i rgyu mtshan dmigs pa yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste* (D : *te* P) | *'di ltar kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas rnam par rig pa 'byung ba yin no* ||[1341]
>
> [1.b] The *nimitta* consisting in the foundation is the surrounding world. *Nimitta* means the same as 'object' (**viṣaya*). Thus, because the surrounding world is the object (**viṣaya*) that is taken as objective support (**ālambya*) by the *ālayavijñāna*, one calls the surrounding world '*nimitta* consisting in the foundation' (*pratiṣṭhānimitta*). Therefore, also in the *Triṁśikā* treatise and other [texts] the *ālayavijñāna* is stated to be a cognition (/representation) of the place (**sthānavijñapti*)[1342].
>
> *de la gnas kyi mtshan ma ni snod kyi 'jig rten te | mtshan ma dang yul zhes bya ba dag don gcig pas snod kyi 'jig rten ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pas dmigs par bya ba'i yul yin pa'i phyir* (D) *snod kyi 'jig rten la gnas kyi mtshan ma zhes bya'o || de'i phyir sum cu pa'i bstan bcos la sogs pa las kyang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni gnas rnam par rig par bshad do* ||[1343]
>
> [1.c] In [the statement of MSABh 169,5 that] 'the *nimitta* consisting in the foundation is the surrounding world', 'foundation' means the surrounding world. Because precisely

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[1339] For *'byung ba* rendering Skt. *ucya(n)te* cf., e.g., AKBh 391,2, 443,1 and 451,8 (AKBh$_t$ P ngu 48b8, 83a8 and 88b3; D khu 42b6, 72b4 and 77a5).

[1340] In accordance with Tr 3b (*°sthānavijñaptikaṁ ca tat*), Matsumoto (M2: 447,9) prefers a bahuvrīhi reconstruction and takes the phrase to mean that *ālayavijñāna* is stated to be one that *has* or holds a representation of the place (処の表識をもつもの). There is, however, no bahuvrīhi marker in the present passage, which is not a quotation but merely a reference. Still, we cannot be sure, since there is no bahuvrīhi marker in the Tibetan translation of the *Triṁśikā* (TrBh **8,8f) either. In case the original Sanskrit of the present text had a bahuvrīhi, I should translate the passage either as "... is stated to have [the function of] cognizing (/representing) the place" or as "is stated to contain a representation of the place", depending on whether *vijñapti* is taken in an active or in a passive-objective sense.

[1341] SAṬ P bi 180a1f (D bi 160b4f). Cf. M2: 447,8f.

[1342] Matsumoto (M2: 447,14) again prefers a bahuvrīhi reconstruction. See fn. 1340.

[1343] SAVBh P tsi 242a2-4 (D tsi 208b2f), commenting on MSA XIX.49. Cf. M2: 447,12-15.

this [foundation = surrounding world] is the [objective?] support of *ālayavijñāna*, it can be called '*nimitta* consisting in the foundation'.

de la gnas kyi (D : *pa'i* P) *mtshan ma ni snod kyi 'jig rten to zhes bya ba la gnas ni snod kyi 'jig rten la bya ste | de dag nyid kun gzhi'i gnas yin pas na gnas kyi mtshan ma zhes bya'o ||*[1344]

[2.a] As regards the statement 'When the foundation has been transmuted' (MSA IX.45), that which is the foundation (**pratiṣṭhābhūta*) is the earth. ... This [transmutation] is the transmutation of the *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*, for it is stated that *ālayavijñāna* 'is (/has)[1345] an unconscious cognition (/representation) of the [twofold] *upādāna* and the place' (Tr 3ab).

rten ni gzhan du gyur pa na zhes bya ba la rten du gyur pa ni sa ste (D : *te* P) | ... || *'di ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa gzhan du gyur pa yin te | 'di ltar | kun gzhi* (D : *gzhi'i* P) *rnam par shes pa ni | de ni len pa dag dang gnas || rnam par rig pa mi rig pa || zhes bya ba 'byung ba yin no ||*[1346]

[2.b] In the statement 'When the foundation is transmuted ...', the word 'foundation' (*pratiṣṭhā*) means the *ālayavijñāna* and the object (**viṣaya*) taken [by it] as its objective support (**ālambya*), [viz.,] the surrounding world (**bhājanaloka*), the great earth (**mahāpṛthivī*). For on the one hand, *ālayavijñāna* is called 'foundation' because it is the support of the imprint(s) of wholesome and unwholesome actions and because it is precisely the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] that appears as the [surrounding world which is the] foundation of(?) the body and of the [objects-of-]enjoyment (**deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhā°*).[1347] On the other hand, the surrounding world (**bhājanaloka*), the great earth, is called 'foundation' because it is the support of the world of sentient beings (**sattvaloka*) and the basis of the arising (or: growth) of all kinds of plants. How do we know that the surrounding world is the **ālambana*, [i.e.,] object (**viṣaya*), of the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*]? Because it has been said in the *Triṁśikā-prakaraṇa*: '...' (Tr 2c–3b). When the *ālayavijñāna* along with its objective support has been transmuted, (...).

rten kyang gzhan du 'gyur na ni ... zhes bya ba la | rten gyi sgras ni kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dang | de'i dmigs par (e.c. : *pa'i* DP) *bya ba'i yul snod kyi 'jig rten sa gzhi chen po la bya ste | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yang las dge ba dang mi dge ba'i bag chags kyi gnas su gyur pa dang | lus dang longs spyod dang | gnas lta bur yang kun gzhi nyid de ltar snang bas na kun gzhi la rten* (P : *brten te* D) *zhes bya'o || snod kyi 'jig rten sa gzhi chen po yang sems can gyi 'jig rten gyi gnas su gyur pa dang | rtsva shing rnam pa sna tshogs skye ba'i rten du gyur pas na rten ces bya ste | snod kyi 'jig rten kun gzhi'i dmigs pa'i yul yin par ci mngon zhe na | sum cu pa'i rab tu byed pa* (e.c. : *dbye ba* PD) *las | "..." zhes gsungs pa'i phyir te | kun gzhi rnam par shes pa dmigs pa'i yul dang bcas te | gnas gzhan du gyur na ... ||*[1348]

1344 SAVBh P tsi 242b4f (D tsi 209a3), commenting on MSABh ad XIX.49. Cf. M2: 449,22f.

1345 Since this is a literal quotation, from the perspective of the original a bahuvrīhi interpretation is preferable; cf. fn. 1340.

1346 SAṬ P bi 80a4f (D bi 71 b4f). Cf. M2: 447,23-25.

1347 Cf. S 1987 n. 758. In Tib., the presumable compound **deha-bhoga-pratiṣṭhā-* has been rendered as a three-membered dvandva, which would be in agreement with MAVṬ 161,12f, where *nimitta* (MAV III.22e) is taken to refer to *ālayavijñāna* insofar as it is comprised of [the representation of] *pratiṣṭhā*, *deha* and *bhoga*. Thus, the passage in question may alternatively perhaps be translated thus: "... the *ālaya*[*vijñāna*] that appears [not only] as the body and the [objects-of-]enjoyment [but also as] the [surrounding world that is their] foundation".

1348 SAVBh P mi 143b4–144a1 (D mi 128a3-6). Cf. M2: 448,2-12.

244. From these passages Matsumoto (M2: 448,13-16) concludes that from the point of view of these two commentators the surrounding world is a foundation ('locus') for two reasons:

1. because it is the *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*, and
2. because it is the support of sentient beings and vegetation.

The second reason is given only in text [2.b], but as Matsumoto himself (M2: 448,16-25) points out, it is also met with in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論)[1349] and may in fact be the older explanation.[1350] Actually, it is in addition found in other sources as well, and not only in a later text like the *Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā*[1351] but already in the Saṁdh.[1352] The first reason, however, appears problematic, both from the point of view of textual evidence (§ 245) and from that of doctrinal plausibility (§ 246).

245.1. In text [1.a], what is explained by *ālambana* is clearly not *pratiṣṭhā* but *nimitta*, i.e., it is not the surrounding world's being a foundation but rather its being called a *nimitta* that is justified by pointing out that the surrounding world is the *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*. And in [1.b] we have 'object' (**viṣaya*) and 'object taken as objective support' (**ālambyo viṣayaḥ*) instead of '*ālambana*', which unambiguously shows that what is meant is 'objective support' or 'object' in the *epistemic* sense, in full accordance with the terminological Abhidharmic usage of the expression *ālambana*.

245.2. In text [2.a], the foundation (*pratiṣṭhā*) is merely identified with the earth and stated to be the *ālambana* of *ālayavijñāna*, without any logical connection of this fact with the notion of *pratiṣṭhā* being indicated. The same holds good for text [2.b], where the surrounding world is expressly stated to be a 'foundation' because it is the support of sentient beings and vegetation (= reason 2), with no hint that it may also be called thus because of its being *ālaya-vijñāna*'s *ālambana*. On the contrary, here too *ālambana* is explicitly stated to mean "object" (*viṣaya*). What is more: far from having the surrounding world as its foundation, *ālayavijñāna* is, according to this text, itself a foundation or support, not only of the karmic imprints (*vāsanā*), but also because the phenomenal 'foundation', i.e., the surrounding world, is actually nothing but a representation appearing in the *ālayavijñāna*, which means that the *ālayavijñāna* is the foundation of the surrounding world, and not the other way round.

245.3. The only passage that, at first glance at least, supports Matsumoto's first reason is text [1.c]. However, in this case too I have my doubts. The passage comments on the MSABh phrase *tatra pratiṣṭhānimittaṁ bhājanalokaḥ*, which is exactly parallel to the part of the verse

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[1349] CWSL 10a13f: The *bhājanaloka* has been called *sthāna* in Tr 3ab because it is the support of sentient beings (處謂處所。即器世間, 是諸有情所依處故。).

[1350] Cf. MN I 230,12-15 (no. 35): *seyyathā pi ... ye kec' ime bījagāmabhūtagāmā ..., sabbe te paṭhaviṁ nissāya paṭhaviyaṁ patiṭṭhāya ... vuddhiṁ virūḷhiṁ vepullaṁ āpajjanti.*

[1351] MAVṬ 54,1f: "That which is the support is the surrounding world, because it is known (or designated?) as that which is ... the support of sentient beings" (*pratiṣṭhāvastu bhājanalokaḥ* [MAVBh 25,5], ⟨... *sattvānāṁ pratiṣṭhāvastutv*(*en*?)*a*⟩ *prajñā*⟨*pa*?⟩*nāt*; cf. MAVṬ$_t$ P tshi 51a2 [D bi 215b3]: ... *sems can rnams kyi gnas kyi gzhi*⟨*r*?⟩ *rab tu 'dogs pas*).

[1352] Saṁdh VIII.20.5: "In this context, 'support' means the [surrounding] world, on which sentient beings are observed (**dṛśyante*?)[1] to settle (i.e., because one can observe sentient beings to dwell *on* it)" (*de la gnas kyi don ni 'jig rten gyi khams gang yin pa ste | gang la gnas na sems can gyi khams snang ba'o* ||; S na 44a2f: ... *sems can gyi khams gang la gnas par snang ba'o* ||).

[1] Cf. Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 676c2: 可見; Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 700a5: 可得.

commented upon in text [1.b]. Text [1.c] can therefore be justly expected to contain not only an elucidation of the concept of *pratiṣṭhā* (which is in fact already given by the *Bhāṣya* and thus merely repeated in the *Ṭīkā*) but also an explication of the meaning of the expression *nimitta* (not offered by the *Bhāṣya*!). Therefore, the main purport of second sentence of [1.c] should be to explain the meaning or contextual function of *nimitta*, and in view of the parallel situation in [1.b] one expects a statement to the effect that the surrounding world is a *nimitta* because it is the *object*, or objective support, of the *ālayavijñāna*, and not its support in the sense of 'locus', which runs counter to the information gleaned from [1.b] and, still more blatantly, [2.b]. My suspicion is that "support" (*gnas* [in *kun gzhi'i gnas*]) is a mistake for, or an infelicitous rendering of, an expression signifying "object".

246. In addition, I fail to see in which sense the surrounding world might be the 'locus' of *ālayavijñāna* unless in the sense of an *objective* support or point of reference. In a pre- or non-*vijñaptimātra* systematic context or phraseology, *ālayavijñāna* may be taken to reside in and pervade the physical organism (the sense faculties and their seats), rendering and keeping it alive and sentient. Thus, the living physical organism is, in a sense, the support or 'locus' of *ālayavijñāna*. The surrounding world is, in a literal, spatial sense, the support of physically organized sentient beings, but hardly of *ālayavijñāna*, unless in an indirect (but hardly significant) sense due to the latter's dwelling in the body. In a *vijñaptimātra* systematic context, such kind of residence in the body or in the surrounding world cannot but be a mere appearance, since body and surrounding world are mere representations developed by, or emerging from, *ālayavijñāna*. It is in this sense that in text [2.b] *ālayavijñāna* is, so to speak, the 'foundation' (*pratiṣṭhā*) of the 'foundation' (*pratiṣṭhā* = *bhājanaloka*).[1353]

4.2.6. The 'All-Seed Mind'

4.2.6.1. Critique of Matsumoto's View

247. Matsumoto's assumption that Saṁdh V.2 is essentially based on the canonical *Bīja-sūtra* (SĀ_c no. 39; SN 22.54) has decisive consequences also for his understanding and even reconstruction of the expression rendered by *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems* in the Tibetan translation as found in the Kanjur. Matsumoto's (M2: 362) starting point is that in the *Bīja-sūtra* the *vijñāna* that is stated to grow is compared and thus, in a sense, *equated* with a *seed* (more precisely: with the five kinds of reproductive parts of plants), and *not* with a carrier or *container* of seeds. Therefore, he argues, the *citta* or *vijñāna* in Saṁdh V.2–3 must not, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, be understood as containing Seeds or as being endowed with them, but rather as *being* a Seed. This means that for him the Sanskrit equivalent of *sa bon thams cad pa'i sems* should not be reconstructed as **sarvabījakaṁ cittam* but as **sarva-bījaṁ cittam*, with the attribute to be understood as a tatpuruṣa compound ("the mind that *is* the Seed of all [dharmas]"), not as a bahuvrīhi. Matsumoto (M2: 363) finds his reconstruction confirmed by Saṁdh V.7, i.e., the concluding verse, the Sanskrit original of which has been preserved and has indeed *sarvabīja*:

ādānavijñāna gabhīrasūkṣmo oghoyathā vartati sarvabījo |

1353 Cf. HsienY 480c7: *ālayavijñāna* supports and cognizes the 'receptacle-world' (*bhājanaloka*) outside (能執持了別外器世界).

According to Matsumoto (M2: 364), the reconstruction of the Skt. original in V.2 as **sarva-bījakaṁ cittam* is thus an error, induced by the characterization of *ālayavijñāna* as *sarva-bījaka* in Tr 2cd.

248.1. Let me start my comments with the textual evidence. No doubt *sarvabījo* in Saṁdh V.7 shows that a reading **sarvabīja-* in V.2 is possible, but unless we can exclude a bahuvrīhi interpretation in V.7 we cannot exclude it for V.2 either, nor is, in this case, the reading *sarva-bījo* in V.7 as such sufficient evidence for excluding the possibility that in V.2 the bahuvrīhi had explicitly been marked as such by the suffix *-ka*. Now, *sarvabīja-* may, to be sure, be taken as a tatpuruṣa ("Seed of all [dharmas, or *ātmabhāvas*]"), but it may equally well be an unmarked bahuvrīhi, equivalent to *sarvabījaka-*, as is confirmed by several occurrences of *sarvabīja-* in Yogācāra sources preserved in the original Sanskrit.[1354] I do not see how such an interpretation could, from a formal point of view, be excluded for V.7. Since the *ādāna-vijñāna* of V.7a is taken up in V.7c by the masc. form *eṣo* — which may be explained by the influence of its being equated with a stream (*ogho*, m.) and is hardly a problem in view of the liberty Buddhist Sanskrit takes with regard to gender distinction —, *sarvabījo*, like *gabhīra-sūkṣmo*, surely has to be construed as an attribute not only of the stream (*ogha*) but also, and in the first place, of *ādānavijñāna*. The most n tural interpretation would then seem to be to take it as an adjective, i.e., a bahuvrīhi.

248.2. Still, the possibility of taking *sarvabījo* in Saṁdh V.7 as an appositional tatpuruṣa (with its gender being assimilated to that of *ogho*) can hardly be excluded either. In favour of this alternative, Matsumoto (M2: 363,5f) argues that if a bahuvrīhi had been intended, one could expect that the author(s) would have avoided a possible misunderstanding by adding the suffix *-ka*. One might object that this would not fit in with the metre (Triṣṭubh) because it would result in a Jagatī pāda, but a mixture of these two metres is quite common.[1355] My answer to Matsumoto's argument is rather that it presupposes that the difference was of some

[1354] PG vs. 28–29 (M2: 376f text [193]): *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* and *sarvabīje vipāke* (S 1987: 228), respectively; Tr 18a: *sarvabījaṁ*, m.c., as against *sarvabījakam* in 2d; Laṅk X.84d: *sarvabījaṁ*, resuming *sarvabījakam* of vs. X.83c. For YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,7f see § 254. Theoretically speaking, *sarvabījaṁ* in Tr 18a may be taken to characterize (*ālaya*)*vijñāna* as being the Seed of all [dharmas]. This is how Paramārtha appears to have understood the passage (T 31.1587: 62b29–c3), and even Sthiramati's comment (TrBh *37,17; L. 36,7: *sarvadharmotpādanaśaktyanugamāt sarvabījaṁ vijñānam*) may not be incompatible with such an understanding. But if this interpretation is accepted, it will only support my contention that the difference between saying that (*ālaya*)*vijñāna is* a Seed and saying that it carries or *contains* Seeds is only one of phraseology (see §§ 250.3 and 251). As for PG 28–29, the choice of *sarvabījaṁ* (without the suffix *-ka*) is explicable as due to the constraint of the metre and hence inconclusive with regard to Matsumoto's (M2: 378) contention that the use of the form *sarva-bījaka* is a later development, even less since MATSUMOTO himself (M2: 372–374) accepts *sarva-bījaka* as old in connection with the *ātmabhāva* (YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,12 with 25,3 and 26,10) and since he (M2: 377,8-10) considers the *sarvabījo vipākaḥ* of PG 28–29 to correspond to the *ātmabhāva* and not to *vijñāna*.

[1355] Cf., e.g., NORMAN 1969: xxxiv ("Mixed metres: *Triṣṭubh/Jagatī* ..."). For this reason, Buescher's (TrBh *34 n. 2) emendation of *prakāśito* (ms.; thus also PSkV ms. 51b1; PPU # III.5.4.3.8 ms.; *prakāsito* MAvat 196,6, ms. [courtesy of Dr. Anne MacDonald]) to *prakāśi* (so also in LAMOTTE's ed. of Saṁdh) in pāda c of the quotation of Saṁdh V.7 in TrBh *34,3 appears unnecessary. In any case, Buescher's reference to *BHSG* ## 32.47ff ('Descendants of Skt. *s* and *siṣ* aorists ...') for the form *pra-kāśi* does not seem to be to the point, since *prakāśi*, in case it were confirmed by some textual witness, should be an augmentless *passive* aorist (3rd person sg.) of the caus. *prakāśayati* (in line with KIELHORN 1965 [[1]1888] # 438), with *mayi* [for instr.] as the agent (cf. Tib. *ngas (...) ma bstan*).

importance to the author(s) of the verse, a presupposition I find doubtful (see § 251). Therefore, the use of *sarvabīja-* (and not *sarvabījaka-*) in V.7 does not exclude a bahuvrīhi meaning either here or in V.2, nor does it exclude the possibility that V.2 had **sarvabījakam* instead.

248.3. The Chinese versions do not seem to be helpful in this regard either, and the same holds good for the Tibetan version of V.2 in the Kanjur, for although representing a bahuvrīhi interpretation it does not necessarily presuppose an original **sarvabījakam* but may as well be based on the ambiguous **sarvabījam*. The only version which may be taken to support **sarvabījam* and even a tatpuruṣa interpretation is $Saṁdh_{TH}$ (*thams shad kyi sa bond sems*), but though valuable for the reconstruction of the wording $Saṁdh_{TH}$ is not necessarily reliable as regards interpretation (see Pt. II § 367.2), which means that we should probably follow it in reconstructing **sarvabījaṁ* but not necessarily in taking this compound as a tatpuruṣa. Thus, what remains as the main argument for Matsumoto's assumption of a tatpuruṣa compound is the connection of Saṁdh V.2 with the *Bījasūtra*.

249. Yet does the mere fact that the phraseology of Saṁdh V.2 seems to echo that of the *Bījasūtra* justify such a conclusion? Actually, in the *Bījasūtra vijñāna* is merely *compared* to a seed (or to the reproductive parts of plants), and this also appears to be the case in the *Bhavasutta* (see § 175.1.4) as well as in the passages of the *Śālistambasūtra*[1356] and the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*[1357] that speak of the *citta-* or *vijñānabīja*, i.e., "mind [comparable to] a seed", from which the *nāmarūpāṅkura*, the psycho-physical complex of the next life, comparable to a sprout, develops.[1358] In Saṁdh V.2, however, there is no indication of a comparison, nor do we find any further element of the seed imagery. Unless we want to return to a chronology that places the Saṁdh before the whole of the YBh, even before its earliest parts (which is, however, neither Matsumoto's nor Buescher's position), we would rather have to presuppose the use of the word *bīja* as a metaphor transformed into a *theoretical* concept, i.e., its use as a doctrinal *term*, a use that is current already in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* layers of the YBh, from early strata (ŚrBh, BoBh and VaSg) onward. Such a shift may also be indicated by the fact that Saṁdh V.2 no longer uses the expression *citta-* or *vijñānabīja* but introduces the quantifier "all": **sarvabījaṁ cittam*. If this expression is taken as a tatpuruṣa, it should therefore be understood to have, above all, the theoretical purport of characterizing the mind (more precisely: the mind that takes hold of a new existence and establishes itself in it) as *being* the Seed (*bīja*), i.e., cause (*hetu*) or source (*dhātu*), of all dharmas, or of all those dharmas that are under consideration (I shall come back to this issue in § 263). If *sarvabījaṁ* is taken as a bahuvrīhi, it would rather suggest that this mind is *endowed* with the Seeds of all

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[1356] Quoted, e.g., PrasP 568,13-15 and 566,9-12 (cf. M2: 345–348, texts [166]–[169]; SCHOENING 1995: II 730 # 34 and 724 # 28). In the second passage, *vijñāna* is stated to be "seed-natured" (*bījasvabhāva*), which is ambiguous, for the characterization of *avidyā* and *tṛṣṇā* as "defilement-natured" (*kleśasvabhāva*) would seem to refer to their real nature, whereas karma being called "field-natured" (*kṣetrasvabhāva*) can only be understood as a mere metaphor.

[1357] $DBhS_R$ 6C (48,8-12; $DBhS_K$ 97,3-6; see M2: 325–328). Cf. §§ 178.4 and 188.1–188.3.

[1358] Even in a passage like AKBh 154,14 (*ākṣiptasya* [sc., *punarbhavasya*] *punaḥ karmaparibhāvitād vijñānabījād abhinirvṛtti*[*ḥ*]), the expression *vijñānabīja* would still admit of being understood as a mere metaphor, as is clear from the fact that the same phraseology is also found in Saṅghabhadra (NA 511b18, 26 and 28), and from Yaśomitra who confines himself to transforming the metaphor into a comparison: *bījād ivâṅkurasya punarbhavasyôtpāda ity arthaḥ* (AKVy 319,5f); cf. also AKṬT P tho 91b5).

dharmas (or all the dharmas under consideration), i.e., carries or contains potentialities or capacities from which they can arise under certain conditions.

250.0. As has already been pointed out (§ 143), for Matsumoto the alternative of taking **sarvabīja* either as a tatpuruṣa or as a bahuvrīhi is of fundamental importance, because he considers only the tatpuruṣa alternative to be compatible with his assumption of the 'All-Seed Mind' as being merely 'super-locus', with the *ātmabhāva* as its 'locus'. Against this, he regards the bahuvrīhi alternative as involving a transformation of this mind (= *ālayavijñāna*) into a 'locus' of Seeds, which is, for him, a later (post-VinSg) development amounting to a non-Buddhist pattern of thought ('*dhātuvāda*'). I must confess that I have a number of difficulties with this view and its presuppositions.

250.1. First, I fail to see why conceiving of the 'All-Seed Mind', i.e. *ādāna-/ālayavijñāna*, as the container or carrier of Seeds, i.e., of potentialities and causal capacities, should be more serious or far-reaching, with respect to converting it into an underlying principle ('locus'), than declaring it the basis or support (cf. *saṁniśritya pratiṣṭhāya*) of the ordinary forms of mind, as is done already in Saṁdh V.4–5, and in view of the imagery of the text seemingly in the strict sense of 'locus' as a spatial metaphor for an *ontological* substratum. To be sure, for Matsumoto (see § 145), this too is already a first alienation, a movement towards transforming the 'All-Seed Mind' into a 'locus', but for him, strangely enough, a less serious one, seemingly still compatible with the conception of the 'All-Seed Mind' as being, in its turn, based on the 'basis of individual existence' (*ātmabhāva*). But what could be the *ātmabhāva* in this case? Surely not the other mental factors (*vedanā*, etc.), for if even the six *vijñāna*s are grounded on the 'All-Seed Mind', the feelings, etc., associated with them must be even more, and cannot form part of the layer on which the 'All-Seed Mind' in its turn rests (cf. § 229.2).[1359] Thus, what would remain as the spatio-ontological 'locus' of the 'All-Seed Mind' is the body, or the physical sense faculties along with their seats,[1360] and this would indeed seem compatible with what I consider to be the primary purport of the etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3: the 'All-Seed-Mind' is thus designated because it sticks to or abides *in* the body. This would, it is true, imply that in the world-sphere of incorporeality the 'All-Seed Mind' is without a 'locus' in the strict sense. But precisely this would seem to be implied in the statement of Saṁdh V.2 that in this sphere the *upādāna* is non-dual, i.e., as I understand it, reduced to the latent imprint (*vāsanā*) of the troublesome diversity (*prapañca*) of the conventional world, with no body or physical sense faculties taking shape. This imprint is, however, only the main *cause* of the 'All-Seed Mind' remaining entangled in *saṁsāra*, but it is surely not the 'locus' of the 'All-Seed Mind' in the strict sense of a spatial or ontological substratum (cf. § 229.1). It can, on the contrary, only be the other way round: the imprint requires something that is imbued, something that receives the imprint and carries it on, thus something that is, in a sense, its 'locus', and this is clearly the 'All-Seed Mind', i.e., *ādāna-/ālayavijñāna*. But since the imprint is not a separate entity, being its 'locus' or recipient does not convert the 'All-Seed Mind' into an ontological substratum of

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1359 Nor would mental factors associated with *ālayavijñāna* itself serve the purpose, apart from the fact that no mention is made of them in the Saṁdh.

1360 To avoid misunderstandings: This does not of course exclude that the body is, in its turn, 'appropriated' by the 'All-Seed Mind', i.e., kept alive and thus supported by it, but this would hardly suffice for calling the 'All-Seed Mind' the 'locus' of the body in the specific sense of a spatial metaphor for an ontological substratum.

something else, nor does it conflict with its abiding in the body. And precisely the same would, in my opinion, also hold good for the 'All-Seed Mind' being conceived as containing, or being furnished with, Seeds.

250.2. Second, a bahuvrīhi **sarvabīja(ka)* may, to be sure, be understood in the rigid sense of "being endowed with, or containing, all Seeds (or: the Seeds of all [dharmas, etc.])", as when Sthiramati states that the *ālayavijñāna* is *sarvabījaka* because it is the support ('locus') of the Seeds of all dharmas (*sarvadharmabījāśrayatvāt*).[1361] But bahuvrīhis are sometimes used in a looser sense, as can be gleaned from the examples collected in *AiGr* II.1f: 273 (# 107b),[1362] or from instances in *MW* (1185ff) like *sarvasūtra* "made of all-coloured threads", *sarvagandhika* "consisting of all perfumes", or *sarvauṣadha* "consisting of various herbs", provided that this interpretation is correct.

250.3.0. Third, the assumption that the difference of phraseology (*ālayavijñāna being* the Seed of X vs. *ālayavijñāna possessing*, carrying or containing the Seeds of X) indicates a fundamental theoretical difference in the conception of *ālayavijñāna*, appears questionable. To be sure, in some sources *ālayavijñāna* seems to be hardly more than the continuum of Seeds hypostatized into a latent form of mind, whereas in others it is explicitly conceived as having a cognitive function and even mental associates (*caitta*) of its own.[1363] But this difference does not coincide with the aforementioned difference in phraseology, just as the conception of *ālayavijñāna* as a 'locus' of other (or all) dharmas does not exclude a phraseology according to which *ālayavijñāna is* the Seed of dharmas.

250.3.1. As observed by Matsumoto himself,[1364] in the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin, where *ālayavijñāna* is stated to function, directly or mediately,[1365] as the basis (*rten*) of the forthcoming forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*)[1366] and is explicitly described as endowed with a cognitive function[1367] and with mental associates (*caitta*, *caitasika*),[1368] it is nonetheless still declared to *be* the Seed of other dharmas.[1369] But at the same time it is also stated to *receive* or take in Seeds (**bījaparigraha*) or to have its Seeds reinforced (**bījapari-*

[1361] TrBh *7,18 (L. 19,1f; cf. M2: 364 text [183]); cf. also KSi § 33 (see fn. 641) and PSVy P 24b2 (see fn. 642).

[1362] Cf. also *AiGr* II.1: 280 (# 109d).

[1363] See S 1987, chapter 5.

[1364] M2: 416,3-11; 492 n.315.

[1365] Mediately: in the case of the sense perceptions because *ālayavijñāna* keeps their support proper, viz., the physical sense faculties, appropriated (= alive); directly: in the case of *manas* (seventh *vijñāna*) and *manovijñāna*, by functioning itself as their [simultaneous] support like a sense faculty.

[1366] YBh_t P zi 5b5-7 (YBh_c 580b12-17; HAKAMAYA 1979: 30 [2001: 394f] # **3**.**b**.A.2). For my understanding of the term *pravṛttivijñāna*, see § 44.3–44.4.

[1367] YBh_t P zi 4a8–5a5 (YBh_c 580a2-28; HAKAMAYA 1979: 26–28 [2001: 390–392] # **1**).

[1368] YBh_t P zi 5a5–b3 (YBh_c 580a29–b8; HAKAMAYA 1979: 28–30 [2001: 393f] # **2**).

[1369] YBh_t P zi 5b4f (YBh_c 580b9-12; HAKAMAYA 1979: 30 [2001: 394f] # **3**.**b**.A(1) and A.1) where *ālayavijñāna* is characterized as functioning as a condition for the *pravṛttivijñāna*s by *being* their Seed (30,10f: *sa bon gyi dngos po...s* = **bījabhāvena*), and the *pravṛttivijñāna*s as having *ālayavijñāna* as their Seed (30,14: *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i sa bon dang ldan pa* = **ālayavijñānabīj(ak)a*).

poṣaṇa) through being impregnated by the forthcoming forms of mind.[1370] In the *Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg, it is stated, doubtless in the wake of Saṁdh V.3 (see ch. 4.2.8.2), that properly speaking it is [only] *ālayavijñāna* that is [to be called] '*citta*' because it is accumulated and increased by (or: laden and studded with) all Seeds (**sarvabījācitopacita*).[1371] Regardless of precisely how **ācitopacita* is to be interpreted here, the formulation implies, in any case, a certain distinction between *ālayavijñāna* as a unit and the Seeds as a plurality. Finally, when *ālayavijñāna* is introduced at the end of a section on Seeds in the first Bhūmi of the VinSg, the Seeds of all dharmas are expressly stated to exist *in* or *on* it (*de la*, 依...).[1372]

250.3.2. Likewise, in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg), where *ālayavijñāna* is programmatically termed the "basis of what[ever] may be cognized" (*jñeyāśraya*), it is, as has also been noted by Matsumoto (M2: 416,12f), sometimes, actually quite frequently, described as *being* the Seed of dharmas,[1373] or dharmas are stated to have *ālayavijñāna* as their Seed,[1374] but here, too, *ālayavijñāna* is also said to receive (**parigraha*) Seeds through impregnation (I.14.1), or to be piled up or studded (**ācita*) with Seeds (I.9).

250.3.3. Similarly, in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*, *ālayavijñāna* is, on the one hand, defined as *sarvabījaka*.[1375] On the other hand, it is also *equated* with Seeds. This is clearly the case

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1370 YBh$_t$ P zi 5b7–6a5 (YBh$_c$ 580b17-29; HAKAMAYA 1979: 30f [2001: 395f] # **3**.**b**.B and **3**.**c**).

1371 YBh$_t$ P zi 189b4 (D zhi 182a5): *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni dngos su na sems yin te | 'di ltar de ni sa bon thams cad kyis kun tu bsags shing nye bar bsags pa yin no ||*; YBh$_c$ 651b19-21: "If [the term is used] according to predominance, it is the *ālayavijñāna* that is called '*citta*'. Why? Because this *vijñāna* accumulates the Seeds of all dharmas" (若就最勝, 阿頼耶識名心。何以故。由此識能集聚一切法種子故。).

1372 YBh$_t$ P zi 17b6 (D zhi 15a7): *de la chos thams cad kyi sa bon yod par rig par bya ste*; YBh$_c$ 584a29f: 諸法種子 一切皆依阿頼耶識. The corresponding sentence in VinSg$_{Pa}$ (1022a16) is somewhat ambiguous: "As regards conventional dharmas, [for] all [of them], *ālayavijñāna* is (/functions as) the root" (諸世俗法 阿羅耶識 悉為根本).

1373 Matsumoto (M2: 496f n. 335, referring to HAKAMAYA 2001: 582, corresponding to 1978b: 234) discusses in detail MSg I.8, where the Tibetan version says that *manas* and [the six traditional] *vijñāna*[s] arise from the [*ālayavijñāna*], which *contains* all Seeds (**tasmāt sarvabījakāt*)[1], whereas the Chinese versions seem to preserve an older wording according to which they merely arise from it *as* [their] Seed (**tasmād bījāt*). There are indeed several passages in the MSg where the *vipākavijñāna* (i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) or some other *vijñāna* or *citta* is denied the capacity of *being* the Seed for something else, as when at MSg I.43.1-2 a state of mind belonging to the *kāmadhātu* or a past state of mind belonging to the *rūpadhātu* is stated to be unsuitable for *being* the Seed of a present state of mind belonging to the *rūpadhātu*. Or when in I.45 the question of how the *vipākavijñāna*, if it is (essentially) the cause of pollution (**saṁkleśahetu*), could *be* the Seed of a supramundane state of mind is raised. Cf. also III.1 (text with NAGAO 1987: 59 [lr]; cf. S 1987 n. 582), where the basis-of-existence (**āśraya*) imbued with frequent hearing of the Buddhist doctrine is stated to *be* the Seed of a special [salvific] verbalized thought process (**manojalpa*).

1 Or perhaps rather **sarvabījāt*, taken as a bahuvrīhi by the Tibetan translators (cf. § 248.1).

1374 MSg II.2: *gang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa'i sa bon can yang dag pa ma yin pa kun rtog pas bsdus pa'i rnam par rig pa'o*, which may be reconstructed as **yâlayavijñānabīj(ak)âbhūtaparikalpasaṁgr̥hītā vijñaptiḥ*; the Chinese versions except Buddhaśānta suggest plural (cf. NAGAO 1982: 59[lr]).

1375 AS 12,1 (AS$_G$ 19,13): *skandhadhātvāyatanavāsanāparibhāvitaṁ sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam*.

when *cakṣurdhātu*, i.e., a (reproductive)[1376] element consisting in, or a mine/source of, [the faculty of] sight, is defined as 1. the [sense of] sight by which one has seen or sees visibles, as well as 2. the *ālayavijñāna* insofar as it *is* the stored-up or mature Seed of the [faculty of sight].[1377] A similar case seems to occur in the chapter on inclusion (*saṁgraha*),[1378] where it is stated that *ālayavijñāna*, insofar as it *is* the Seed of *skandhas*, *dhātus* and *āyatanas*, comprises all of them in terms of 'source' or 'potentiality' (*dhātu*). This kind of formulation suggests a concept according to which *ālayavijñāna* was conceived, in the first place, in terms of the continuum of Seeds in the mind established as a latent layer of the mind in its own right, underlying the processes of sensory and cognitive awareness and uninterrupted even in 'mindless' states.

250.3.4. One thus gets the impression that the difference in phraseology is not necessarily due to a difference in the theoretical conception of *ālayavijñāna* but rather an expression of different perspectives of looking at it. In a sense, *ālayavijñāna* itself *is* the Seed or cause of its effects, but if the focus is on the variety of effects, it may also be envisaged as *possessing* a plurality of Seeds, i.e., potentialities or causal capacities, and the latter aspect is naturally prominent in contexts dealing with the strengthening of certain capacities or with the implantation of new ones.

251. As a matter of fact, the phraseological fluctuation under discussion is not limited to sources dealing with *ālayavijñāna*, but can also be found in textual materials of the YBh in which this concept is (still) missing. It may be sufficient here to substantiate this assertion

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[1376] Not only the Seed as the source of the future faculties of sight is a *dhātu*, but also the present sense of sight insofar as it will reproduce itself, and the past moments are *dhātus* because they actually did. Against this, the last [moment of the] sense of sight of an arhat, which does not reproduce itself, is *cakṣus* but not *cakṣurdhātu*: AS_t P li 63a5 (AS 13,19); cf. ASBh 18,6f: ***arhataś caramaṁ cakṣuḥ*** *pari-nirvāṇakāle paścimam | tan na dhātuḥ, cakṣurantarasyâhetutvāt*. Cf. AKBh 13,17-19.

[1377] AS 3,3f: *yena cakṣuṣā rūpāṇi dṛṣṭavān paśyati (ca?), yac ca tasya bījam upacitaṁ vaipākyaṁ câlayavijñānam* (not *ālayavijñāne*, as one might expect!). PRADHAN's text (quoted in B: 67 n. 3) is defective. I have supplemented it in accordance with AS_t P li 52b3, AS_c 663b11f and the paraphrase in ASBh 2,22f (cf. S 1987 n. 445). As for the position of *vaipākyaṁ ca*, I have followed AS_t[1] and AS_c[2]. The stored up (*upacita*) Seed is the one from which a faculty of sight will arise in the future, whereas the mature (*vaipākya*) Seed is the one from which the present faculty of sight has arisen (ASBh 2,22f; cf. $ASBh_c$ 695c21f). The faculty of sight (*cakṣus*) itself is doubtless conceived as an actual dharma distinct from its Seed, in precisely the same way as this holds good in the case of visual awareness (*cakṣurvijñāna*), etc., for in this regard the explanation of the *cakṣurdhātu* and that of the *cakṣur-vijñānadhātu*[3] follow exactly the same pattern. This is also pointed out by Chi (基) when he remarks on this passage:

> If the five physical sense faculties [themselves] were just Seeds, how can the text add the words '*as well as* [...] its [...] Seed'? [The pattern is the same throughout] up to the [six] *vijñānadhātus*: [here,] too, [the text] mentions actual dharmas and Seeds [side by side].
>
> 若五色根即是種子,何容更言及此種子。乃至識界亦言現種。(T 43.1830: 382b15-19)

[1] AS_t P li 52b3: *...dang de 'i sa bon bsags pa dang | rnam par smin pa 'i kun gzhi rnam par shes pa gang yin pa.*

[2] AS_c 663b11f: ... 及此種子 積集異熟 阿賴耶識.

[3] AS_t P li 52b6-8; the reconstruction in AS 3,8f is not quite correct and should be **yac ca tasya bījam upa-citaṁ vaipākyaṁ câlayavijñānaṁ*.

[1378] AS 32,8f, corresponding to AS_t D ri 70b1 (P li 82b8) *phung po dang khams dang skye mched kyi* (D, $ASVy_t$ P li 209a3 : *kyis* P) *sa bon kun gzhi rnam par shes pa gang yin pa*, which I reconstructed as **skandhadhātvāyatanānāṁ yad bījam ālayavijñānam*, now confirmed by AS_{Li} 244,23. — For similar cases in the MSABh, see S 1987 n. 719(a).

with reference to the mind (*vijñāna*).[1379] In the analysis of the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the MauBh (which seems to presuppose the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model')[1380], the *vijñāna* that is the cause of sensory and cognitive functions in the next life, which are the effect (*phalabhūta*), is on several occasions called "the *vijñāna* that *is* [their] Seed (*bījabhūta*)",[1381] [activated by] having been imbued (*paribhāvita*) with previous karmic factors.[1382] At the same time, a potential form of *nāmarūpa* that *is* the Seed (*bījabhūta*) of the *nāmarūpa* of the next life is said to be taken along by or *comprised* in (*parigṛhīta*) this Seed of the future *vijñāna*,[1383] and this *nāmarupa*-Seed in its turn comprises the future 'sixfold basis' in Seed-form, and so on up to feelings (*vedanā*).[1384] In an earlier portion of the text (the one that is also found in the VaSg), the

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1379 As for the *ātmabhāva*, on the one hand all *ātmabhāva*s are stated to be *endowed* with the Seeds of all *ātmabhāva*s (YBh$_{Bh}$ 26,10; cf. 25,3 and 25,12; cf. also BoBh$_D$ 218,11f: *bījāny ātmabhāvagatāny āśrayagatāni vidyante*; SamBh 168,5f [# 3.2.2.2.3]: *ātmabhāvaparyāpannasya sabījakasya pañca-skandhasya*), whereas on the other hand expressions like *satkāya* are listed among the equivalents (*paryāya*) of the term *bīja* (YBh$_{Bh}$ 26,18f), which means that the *ātmabhāva itself* is the Seed.

1380 See § 39 with fn. 165 and fn. 166.

1381 YBh$_{Bh}$ 206,15, etc. (see fn. 1382); 222,13: *yat paunarbhavikaṁ bījabhūtaṁ phalabhūtaṁ vā vijñānaṁ* (ms.); 224,19f: *bījabhūte vijñāne 'sati phalabhūtaṁ vijñānaṁ na bhavati*. Cf. also 219,13 and 221,4.

The *bījabhūtaṁ vijñānam* in these passages is probably just the (unspecified) *vijñāna*-continuum of the present existence insofar as it *is* the Seed of the *vijñāna* of the future life. This would seem to be supported by the fact that instead of the expression *bījabhūtaṁ vijñānam* or *vijñānabīja* (see fn. 1384) we also find, in the same context, simply *vijñāna* as the subject, and its being a cause, or furnished with Seeds, as the predicate noun: cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 200,16f: *tac ca vijñānam* (viz., the *vijñāna* of the present life: 200,14f) *āyatipaunarbhavikanāmarūpabījopagataṁ* (see fn. 1386). According to ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III (2009): 32,9-13 (ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 384,11-18; cf. also MATSUDA 1983: 31; HARADA 2004: 153,41–154,8),

> the 'projecting cause' consists (a) in delusion with regard to the twofold effect (viz., the basis-of-individual-existence and the enjoyment of sense objects), (b) in the ... karmic impulses that presuppose this delusion, (c) in [the present *vijñāna* that is(?)] the Seed of the [future(?) *vijñāna*], [because] being 'seized' by (or under the control of) the [aforementioned] karmic impulses [it will lead] to the emergence of the sprout consisting in the *vijñāna* of the next life, and (d) in the Seeds of the *nāmarūpa*, the 'sixfold basis', impressions and feelings of the next life, [these Seeds being] comprised in (or: taken along by) the *vijñāna* [of the present life that functions as the Seed of the future *vijñāna*].
>
> *tatrâkṣepako hetur dvividhe phale saṁmoha⟨ḥ,⟩ saṁmohapūrvakāś ca ... saṁskārāḥ, saṁskārapari-gṛhītaṁ ca punarbhavavijñānāṅkuraprādurbhāvāya tadbījaṁ, vijñānaparigṛhītaṁ paunarbhavika-nāmarūpabījaṁ ṣaḍāyatanabījaṁ sparśavedanābījam.*

1382 YBh$_{Bh}$ 206,14f: *āyatyāṁ cakṣurindriyāśrayāyā rūpaprativijñapter* (ms., confirmed by YBh$_C$ 323a4f) *yat puṇyāpuṇyāneñjyaparibhāvita-bījabhūtaṁ vijñānaṁ*, as opposed to *tadbījasamudbhavaṁ phalabhūtaṁ* (sc. *vijñānam*; text corrected with ms.). In the portion of the text which is also found in the VaSg, the *vijñāna* of a person who performs karmic acts is stated to become *karmopaga* (198,22 [cf. fn. 814]; 200,13). This probably means that the *vijñāna* comes under the influence of this karma (cf. fn. 813), which would be equivalent to its becoming imbued by it or by its imprint, but this part of the text does not use the concept of *vāsanā* (cf. YAMABE 1989: 47).

1383 Cf. YBh$_t$ P dzi 121a8: *rnam par shes pa'i sa bon gyis yongs su zin pa*; YBh$_C$ 323a16f: 識種子所攝受.

1384 Cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 207,9: *tad* (= *nāmarūpam*) *api dvividhaṁ: vijñānabījaparigṛhītabījabhūtaṁ ca tad-a⟨bhi⟩nirvarttitaphalabhūtaṁ ca*; 207,13f: *tad* (= *ṣaḍāyatanam*) *api dvividhaṁ: nāmarūpabījapari-gṛhītabījabhūtaṁ* (corr. acc. to ms.) *ca tadabhinirvarttitaphalabhūtaṁ ca*; analogously 207,17f and 208,6f. Cf. also 219,13: *vijñānādīni vedanāvasānāni bījabhūtāni*.

present *vijñāna* that *is* the cause (i.e., Seed) of the *vijñāna* of the next life is stated to be *furnished* or studded (*upagata*) *with*[1385] the Seed(s) of the *nāmarūpa* of the future existence, and this Seed in its turn is studded with the Seed(s) of the future 'sixfold basis', etc.[1386] Similarly, according to a passage of the VaSg the mind (*manas*) is accompanied by or studded with the Seeds of ignorance (*avidyā*) and wrong views (*dṛṣṭi*),[1387] and according to the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg not only physical matter but also the mind (*vijñāna*) is said to be accompanied by or furnished with Seeds.[1388] In the ManoBh of the MauBh, Seeds are stated to be located or stored (*sanniviṣṭa*) *in* the mind series.[1389] This fluctuation of the phraseology would seem to have its theoretical root in the very concept of Seeds, for they are expressly stated not to be anything beyond the dharmas; rather, they are nothing but the dharmas themselves arisen in such a form,[1390] which means: in such a form that they have, by their very nature, specific causal capacities.

252. In view of the preceding observations, Matsumoto's (M2: 379f) assessment of the VaSg's interpretation of the seed-like *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the *Bījasūtra* appears arbitrary. As mentioned above (§ 199), in the VaSg (I.9.ii) this *vijñāna* is explained, in terms of the use

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[1385] YBh$_{t}$ P dzi 117a2 *dang 'brel pa*, ("connected with") but *dang ldan no* ("is furnished with") at P 'i 286a7 (D zi 247b4: VaSg III.1.i); YBh$_{c}$ in both cases (321c2 and 828a18) 之所隨逐 ("followed /accompanied by"), which looks like representing *-anugata* but seems to be Hsüan-tsang's regular rendering of *-upagata* in the meaning of ("approached by" =) "furnished with" as well: cf., e.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 11,4 *sarvabījopagata* (YBh$_{c}$ 280b6f 一切種子所隨); 25,3 *ātmabhāvo ... sarvātmabhāvabījopagato* (284b2f 自體之中 餘體種子 皆悉隨逐); 26,16 *dauṣṭhulyopagata* (284c9 麁重所隨; cf. also 435b9f 麁重之所隨逐 = ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 124,5).

[1386] YBh$_{Bh}$ 200,16-19: *tac ca vijñānam āyatipaunarbhavikanāmarūpabījopagataṁ* (with ms.; ed.: *āyatyāṁ pau°*) | *tad api nāmarūpabījam āyatipaunarbhavikaṣaḍāyatanabījopagataṁ* | *tac ca ṣaḍāyatanabījam āyatipaunarbhavikasparśabījopagataṁ* | *tac ca sparśabījam āyatipaunarbhavikaveditabījopagataṁ* |.

[1387] YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 184a2f (D zi 161b7f: VaSg I.5.v): *lta ba'i sa bon dang ldan pa'i yid* and *sa bon rnam pa gnyis dang ldan pa'i yid*; YBh$_{c}$ 788a23 見種子所隨逐意 and 25f 二種子所隨逐意. Alternatively, the Seeds of ignorance are said to be *on* or *in* the mind (P 'i 184a3: *yid de nyid* <u>*la*</u> *ma rig pa'i sa bon yod pa*; YBh$_{c}$ 788a24f: 意中有無明種).

[1388] The Tibetan version (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 15b5–16a6; D zhi 13b1–14a2) is consistent in describing both the physical sense faculties (along with their seats) and the mind (*vijñāna*) as possessing all Seeds (P 15b6: *sa bon thams cad pa* = **sarvabīja(ka)*, bahuv.) or as being furnished with Seeds (*sa bon dang ldan pa*), or the Seeds as accompanying them (see fn. 432). Similarly, Hsüan-tsang (YBh$_{c}$ 583b21–c10) characterizes the physical sense faculties and their seats as well as the mind as "holding the Seeds of all dharmas" (b22: 能持一切諸法種子) or as being accompanied by Seeds (種子[之]所隨逐), or the Seeds as accompanying them (see fn. 432). Paramārtha's translation (VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c4-14) is less easy to assess, for in his rendering the two kinds of dharmas may (also?) be understood to *be* the Seed of all [dharmas] (c5: 此二種法 為一切種), and later on he simply says that the physical sense faculties are the cause of mind and mental factors (c11: 色根心心法因) and the *vijñāna*s the root of the physical sense faculties (c14: 諸識是色根本). On the other hand, he also declares the Seeds to be *based on* the physical sense faculties and on *vijñāna* (c5-7: 一切...法種 悉依色根 亦依於識).

[1389] YBh$_{Bh}$ 52,16: *cittasantatau bījāni sanniviṣṭāni*; 55,14: *cittasanniviṣṭasya ... rūpasamudāyabījasya*; 61,8: *vijñānasantāne ... bījasantānaḥ*.

[1390] YBh$_{Bh}$ 61,3f: *bījānāṁ ... dharmāvyatirekatvāt*; YBh$_{t}$ P zi 29b1f (D zhi 26b5; YBh$_{c}$ 588c10-12): *sa bon ni 'du byed rnams las logs shig na rdzas gzhan med de* | *'du byed de ltar gyur pa dang* | *de ltar byung ba dang* | *de ltar gnas pa de dag nyid la sa bon zhes bya bar zad de* |. Cf. YAMABE 1990a; 2000: 135(4);139(4); 141,7ff.

of *bīja* as a theoretical concept, as the *vijñāna* that is furnished with, or accompanied by, the Seeds of the defilements (**kleśabījopagata*?).[1391] For Matsumoto, such a phraseology implies a conception of *vijñāna* as the 'locus' of Seeds and must therefore be an interpolation or reworking postdating the Saṁdh and even the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin. But as has been pointed out in the preceding paragraph, this phraseology is not uncommon in pre-*ālayavijñāna* YBh materials, nor would its occurrence side by side with a formulation according to which *vijñāna* itself *is* a Seed[1392] be sufficient to arouse suspicion. Instead of arbitrarily discarding all such passages as later insertions, without any additional evidence or formal inconsistency, we rather have to accept the phraseology as a legitimate way of expression in the context of the pre-*ālayavijñāna* theory of Seeds. The VaSg is, to the best of my knowledge, unacquainted with the Saṁdh and its innovative concepts and represents an (at least conceptually, but almost certainly also chronologically) earlier stage of development. It is hence highly probable that the author(s) of Saṁdh V were familiar with the VaSg and its exegesis of the *Bījasūtra* and related texts (cf. ch. 4.2.5.6). Therefore, the assumption of a bahuvrīhi interpretation of **sarvabīja* in Saṁdh V.2 (and V.7) would by no means be anachronistic.

253.0. Similarly, I also consider Matsumoto's (M2: 365–367) arguments in favour of a post-Saṁdh interpolation of the concept of *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* in the *Pañcavijñānakāya-saṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* (PañcBh) of the MauBh to be inconclusive.

253.1.1. As Matsumoto points out, I myself have argued that in the scheme of defining the three *āśraya*s of visual awareness the original definition of the *bījāśraya* as *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* has been enlarged by the compiler(s) or by a redactor to *sarvabījakam āśrayopādātṛ vipākasaṁgṛhītam ālayavijñānam* (and to *sarvabījakam ālayavijñānam* in the case of the remaining sense perceptions).[1393] The reason for this assumption is the fact that in the subsequent explication of this definition the explanandum is not, as in the case of the other *āśraya*s, the complete definiens of the definition or at least its key term, viz., *ālayavijñānam*, but only *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*, and that the explication (*pūrvakaṁ prapañcaratihetum upādāya yaḥ sarvabījako vipāko nirvṛttaḥ*) is hardly more informative than the definition to be explicated, and even partly redundant (*vipākaḥ* merely rephrases *vipākasaṁgṛhītam*).

253.1.2. It may be difficult to determine precisely when the enlargement of the definition took place, but at least the introduction of the term *ālayavijñāna* cannot post-date the compilation of the VinSg because its occurrence at the beginning of the MauBh is referred to in the introduction of the analysis of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin.[1394] One might argue

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[1391] Or *-*anugata*: see fn. 1096, but also fn. 1385.

[1392] In the second paragraph of the text, we read that having attained arhatship one causes the *vijñāna* along with its Seeds (**vijñānaṁ sabījam*?) to rot and disappear (YBh$_t$ P 'i 201a4f [D zi 176a7]: *dgra bcom pa thob nas rnam par shes pa sa bon dang bcas pa de rul bar byed cing med par byed de*). But the Chinese version seems to presuppose **vijñānabījam*(?): "When later on one becomes an arhat, one causes the [polluted] *vijñāna* [that is the] Seed [for rebirth] to rot and decay, [so that] the sprout [consisting in] all [kinds of future] existences cannot grow any more" (YBh$_c$ 794b12f: 彼於後時成阿羅漢, 令**識種子**悉皆腐敗, 一切有芽 永不得生。).

[1393] S 1987 ## 6.1.1–4 (esp. pp. 114–117).

[1394] YBh$_t$ P zi 2a3f (D zhi 1b3f):

[a] *sa bon gyi gnas kun gzhi rnam par shes pa zhes gang smos pa'o* || *de'i yod pa nyid dang rab tu dbye ba ni ma bstan te* |

that it was only the compiler(s) of the VinSg who introduced the concept of *ālayavijñāna* into the PañcBh passage under discussion, precisely for the purpose of having a point of contact that legitimized the incorporation of the analysis of *ālayavijñāna* into the VinSg right at the beginning, but to my mind this seems rather unlikely, and in any case such an assumption does not explain the sporadic references to *ālayavijñāna* in later sections of the MauBh, some of which (like the *IP*, see §§ 31–38) do not show any trace of interpolation. From my point of view, there is no cogent reason to exclude the possibility that the *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* in the PañcBh was transformed into *ālayavijñāna* already in the course of the compilatory process of the MauBh, perhaps in the wake of an analogous reworking applied to the description of 'linking up' in the ManoBh (see § 254).

253.2. But Matsumoto not only disagrees with this assumption but goes even farther in that he[1395] regards the whole concept of *bījāśraya* as interpolated because he takes this concept as well as the bahuvrīhi *sarvabījaka* to imply the conception of *vijñāna* as the 'locus' of Seeds, a conception which according to him post-dates not only the Saṁdh but also the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin (M2: 416,1ff). Yet in view of the material presented in § 251 the phraseology according to which *vijñāna* is furnished with Seeds or contains Seeds is by no means alien to the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials of the YBh, alternating with a phraseology according to which *vijñāna* is itself a Seed. For this reason, the characterization of *vijñāna* as *sarvabījaka*, i.e., as furnished with or containing all Seeds (in the sense of being endowed with all kinds of productive capacities) does not conflict with its being itself the Seed (i.e., primary cause) of visual awareness, etc. Thus, there is no need to understand, with MATSUMOTO (M2: 366,19–367,3), *bījāśraya* in the MauBh as a case-tatpuruṣa. The mere fact that the expression is used in a later text like the *Triṁśikābhāṣya* as a case-tatpuruṣa because in this

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In his rendering of this passage, MATSUMOTO (M2: 415) construes the first part of this sentence with the preceding phrase (P zi 2a2f), viz.,

[b] *rnam par shes pa'i tshogs lnga dang ldan pa dang yid kyi sa'i rnam par gtan la dbab pa ni,*

but in my opinion this phrase is just the heading for the whole chapter (**Pañcavijñānakāyasaṁprayuktamanobhūmi-viniścayaḥ*); cf. the analogous beginning of the following chapters (YBh_t P zi 111b2f; 174a2; 188b1; etc.). We should therefore translate phrase [b] thus:

> As regards the clarifying investigation of the level(s) of sense perceptions and *manas*, [it is as follows (or: we may start with the following problem):] ...,

and understand the subsequent passage [a] as (belonging to) the introduction of just the first issue among many others to be dealt with in this chapter. Unfortunately, in the Tibetan version the syntax of passage [a] is somewhat disconcerting, since the relative pronoun is cut off from what looks like its correlative (*de'i*) by the final particle (*'o* ||). Even on the assumption that the relative pronoun might refer to the statement (**bījāśraya ālayavijñānam iti*) and the demonstrative to *ālayavijñāna* itself, the final particle (*'o* ||) in between the two sentences remains odd. Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the passage [a], though enlarged by some explications, sounds much smoother:

> At the beginning [of the PañcBh of the MauBh], it has been taught that *bījāśraya* means the *ālayavijñāna*; but the existence [of the latter] — [i.e.,] the reason(s) for [its] existence — and [its] detailed analysis have not been taught.
>
> 問。前說種子依, 謂 阿賴耶識, 而未說有有之因緣廣分別義。(YBh_C 579a10f)

A reconstruction of the Sanskrit original of passage [a] remains highly speculative, but if a guess is allowed, it might have been something like

> **bījāśraya ālayavijñānam ity yad uktam, nâsyâstitā pravibhāgaś ca nirdiṣṭaḥ* |
>
> As regards the statement [of the MauBh] 'The *bījāśraya* is the *ālayavijñāna*', [we cannot but notice that a proof for] its (= the *ālayavijñāna*'s) existence and a detailed analysis have not been presented.

1395 M2: 367,3-8; 414,19ff–415,7. Cf. also M2: 484 n. 268, apparently indicating some reservations.

text *ālayavijñāna* is clearly conceived as the 'locus' of Seeds[1396] does not of course mean that the same must hold good for an early source like the MauBh (otherwise we could, with equal right, argue that **sarvabīja* in Saṁdh V must be a bahuvrīhi because it is used in this way in Tr 18a or in Laṅk X.84).[1397] The replacement of *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* by the simple word *bīja* in the paragraphs on auditory awareness, etc.,[1398] rather suggests that in the MauBh material under discussion *bījāśraya* is used as a karmadhāraya ("the basis that consists in the Seed"), semantically parallel to the other two *āśraya*s (viz., *sahabhūr āśrayaḥ* and *samanantara āśrayaḥ*).[1399] There is thus no clear-cut conception, in contrast to what Matsumoto assumes for Saṁdh V and even for the VinSg, of *vijñāna* as the 'locus' of Seeds (with the Seeds being conceived as somehow distinct entities), and hence no justification to regard the passages dealing with the *bījāśraya* as later interpolations, still less so in the absence of any formal inconsistency. To be sure, in earlier Abhidharmic treatises like those of the Sarvāstivādins,[1400] the definitions of the six *vijñāna*s naturally lack a reference to Seeds, but in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* theories of causality and rebirth in the YBh the concept of Seed(s) (*bīja*) is of fundamental importance, and it would therefore seem quite natural that it was integrated into a comprehensive analysis of the six types of sensory and cognitive awareness (*vijñāna*) as we find it in the PañcBh and the ManoBh. It is, conceptually and structurally, an entirely homogeneous element of this analysis, independent of the secondary introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*.

254. If there is no reason to question the concept of *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* in the analysis of the six *vijñāna*s in the PañcBh (and hence also at the beginning of the ManoBh)[1401] of the

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[1396] MATSUMOTO (M2: 367,1-3; cf. 415,4-7) adduces TrBh *7,18 (L. 19,1f) *sarvadharmabījāśrayatvāt sarvabījakam* and, for the interpretation of *bījāśraya* in this expression as a case-tatpuruṣa, TrBh *7,14 (L. 18,23f) *sarva...dharmabījasthānatvād ālayaḥ*.

[1397] See fn. 1354.

[1398] YBh_{Bh} 6,8, 7,10, etc.: *manobījayoḥ pūrvavad vibhāgaḥ*. Matsumoto's (M2: 484 n. 267) remark that if *bīja* represented *bījāśraya* we should expect *samanantara-bījayoḥ* instead of *mano-bījayoḥ* is off the mark, for the passage is *not* part of the *definition* of the three *āśraya*s but rather part of the *explication* of these definitions. Hence, *mano-* is correct, corresponding as it does to *manaḥ* in 4,10 (the definiens of 4,6f that is now the explicandum), and *bīja* does not replace *bījāśraya* (the definiendum of 4,7) but rather the *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* of 4,11 (the definiens of 4,7 that is now the explicandum). The text thus takes *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* (bahuvrīhi phraseology) to be exchangeable with *bīja* (phraseology of equation, which would correspond to characterizing *vijñāna* as *sarvabīja* [tatpuruṣa], and to an analysis of *bījāśraya* as a karmadhāraya).

[1399] The fact that in contrast to these two expressions *bījāśraya* is a compound is explicable by the fact that its first member is a substantive.

[1400] E.g., SaṅgP 429a14-19 (VI.3); $Prak_H$ 693a5-9; *Pañcavastuka* (T 28.1556) 996a18-23; *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* (T 28.1555) 993b16-18.

[1401] YBh_{Bh} 11,9f: *bījāśrayaḥ pūrvavad eva sarvabījakam ... vijñānam*. — Cf. in this connection also YBh_{Bh} 11,13, listing *sarvabījāni* (surely "all Seeds", like *sarvadharmāḥ* "all dharmas", not "the Seeds of all [dharmas]" or "everything derived from mental seeds" (LUSTHAUS 2013: 586); cf. YBh_t P dzi 6b5 *sa bon thams cad* and YBh_c 280b13 一切種子) among what is exclusively (*niṣkevalam*, ms.) the object of the level of *manas*, i.e., in what must have been the original setting (cf. S 1987: 125), of the *manovijñāna*. It is, however, hard to decide whether this refers to the *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* (as a possible object of thought or mental contemplation) or stems from a layer in which the Seeds were still considered to inhere in the *ātmabhāva* or in the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*, which is in fact listed as an object of *mano*[*vijñāna*] immediately before *sarvabījāni*).

MauBh as a homogeneous element of the pre-*ālayavijñāna* Yogācāra theory of Seeds, the same will equally hold good for its occurrence in the description of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) in the ManoBh (YBh_{Bh} 24,4f). Here, we meet with practically the same expanded phrase as in the definition of the *bījāśraya* of visual awareness (§ 253.1.1), and this phrase is likewise not, as one would expect, resumed by its crucial term, viz., *ālayavijñāna*, but by the phrase *tasyaiva sarvabījasya vijñānasya* (YBh_{Bh} 24,7f). This would seem to imply that here too the extension is secondary, although in view of the context of 'linking up' perfectly well-suited. For this reason, I suggested (S 1987: # 6.3.4) that it may have been in this context that the transformation of the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* into *ālayavijñānam* was carried out first, and I do not perceive any reason why this could not have happened in the course of the compilation process, i.e., in connection with the integration of a pre-*ālayavijñāna* description of the process of 'linking up', as part of the materials available, into the ManoBh. For Matsumoto, this is, of course, impossible because for him not only the concept of *ālayavijñāna* but even the concept of *sarvabīja<u>kaṁ</u> vijñānam* itself points to a later period (see § 253.2). Even so, he (M2: 371) seems to agree with me in considering the unexpanded description of 'linking up' in the ManoBh to be pre-Saṁdh, but for him (M2: 369f) this is only possible because in referring back to the *vijñāna* that merges into semen-cum-blood the text uses the expression *tasyaiva sarvabīj<u>a</u>sya vijñānasya*. Because *sarvabīja-* can be understood as a tatpuruṣa, just as, according to Matsumoto, in Saṁdh V.2, it does not necessarily imply the idea of *vijñāna* as the 'locus' of Seeds. Since it is, for him, only in this sense that the concept can be accepted to be pre-Saṁdh, this form of the concept must also be postulated for its occurrence in the preceding sentence (viz., the one in which it was, by means of a secondary expansion, transformed into *ālayavijñāna*). This sentence, in its original form, must therefore have read *yatra tat sarvabījaṁ* (and not: *sarvabījakaṁ*) *vijñānaṁ sammūrcchati*. But in view of the evidence adduced in § 251, such an assumption is unnecessary. Since the idea of *vijñāna* being furnished with Seeds, or containing Seeds, is by no means alien to the pre-*ālayavijñāna* Yogācāra materials, its characterization by a bahuvrīhi *sarvabījaka* presents no problem,[1402] at least not from this point of view, and since *sarvabīja-* may be understood as a bahuvrīhi as well, I do not perceive any cogent reason to take it in a different sense here.

255. Even if Matsumoto's conclusions were accepted, it would seem to me that a number of crucial questions remain. What, precisely, is the *citta* or *vijñāna* that is the Seed of all [dharmas] in Saṁdh V.2? Is it different from the *sarvabījaṁ vijñānam* of the description of 'reincarnation' in the ManoBh? If yes, in what, precisely, does the difference consist, and what was the motive for the change? Why is it given a new name in Saṁdh V.3, or rather even two of them? Indeed, introducing a new name for it would hardly be understandable unless it was conceived as being essentially different from the six traditional forms of mind, as is doubtless confirmed by Saṁdh V.4–5 and V.7, where it appears to be understood as a continuous subtle flow of mind underlying the ordinary perceptions and cognitions as their support and source. But Matsumoto seems to regard this as an internal development going

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1402 For the same reason, also Matsumoto's (M2: 370 text [187]) suggestion that because of the occurrence of the expression *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* YBh_{Bh} 25,1-2, too, must be a later interpolation is questionable. It is true the content of this sentence has no organic connection with the preceding section and is only very loosely related to the next one, but this could also be due to the compilation process, especially in the ManoBh, where the heterogeneity of the materials compiled and fitted into each other is quite conspicuous. Yet, a final judgement would, if possible at all, require a meticulous analysis of the composition of this Bhūmi.

already beyond the ideas of Saṁdh V.2–3. What then is the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* of V.2? How is it related to the ordinary forms of mind? Is it merely the mind series as a whole envisaged under the aspect of its capacity of unfolding into a full individual existence, or is it a hypostatization of this aspect into a new, Seed-like form of mind hidden in the observable constituents of an individual? In the first case, what would be the innovative contribution justifying new names? And what was the true motive for the momentous shift in Saṁdh V.4–5, which can hardly be satisfactorily explained as a kind of side effect of a certain ambiguity of the name *ālayavijñāna* (M2: 391f; see § 144)? In the second case, the question for a sufficiently strong motive will pose itself already with regard to this hypostatization. Finally, precisely what is meant, or implied, by the word *sarva* in the expression *sarvabīja*? According to Matsumoto, this attribute means that the *citta*, i.e., the *ādāna-* or *ālayavijñāna*, is the Seed of all dharmas. But as far as I remember he does not explain the precise import of this statement. Does it mean that all dharmas are nothing but appearances in the mind, or does it admit of a different interpretation?

4.2.6.2. Critique of Buescher's View

256. The last question inspires me to switch over to my response to Buescher (see ch. 4.2.1) since his answer is unambiguous, his central thesis being that the expression "mind containing all Seeds" (**sarvabīja(ka) ṁ vijñānam*) implies the new ontology of the Saṁdh (i.e., *vijñapti-mātratā*) and *ergo* cannot not have been employed in the pre-Vijñānavāda setting of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', and that the occurrences of this term in the MauBh must hence all be post-Saṁdh interpolations. The problem with this assumption is that *vijñāna*, like the physical sense faculties along with their seats, is indeed expressly characterized as * *sarvabīja(ka)*[1403] in precisely the VinSg passage where the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is most explicitly presented, i.e., in an expressly (see § 39) pre- or at least non-*ālayavijñāna* and clearly non-Vijñānavāda setting. Buescher must have been aware of this fact, but he seems to restrict this characterization of *vijñāna* as containing all Seeds to existences in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*), and it appears to be only the *vijñāna* in this specific condition that he is ready to regard as a 'proto-*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*'. But this restriction is problematic (see §§ 257–261), and at any rate the characterization of *vijñāna* as * *sarvabīja-(ka)* in this passage shows that this expression alone cannot guarantee a *vijñaptimātra* background (see § 263).[1404]

257. The description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg does not contain any statement restricting the presence of the Seeds of material factors in the mind to existences in the *ārūpyadhātu*. It is only argued that if the mind were merely provided with its own Seeds and not also with the Seeds of material factors (*rūpa*), it would follow that in the case of worldly persons (*pṛthagjana*) born in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*), when their life-span expires and karmic merit is exhausted — to the effect that they die and should be reborn in a lower world-sphere —, there would be no Seed of [corporeal] matter so that they could not be reborn there. But actually they are reborn [there], and therefore one has to

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[1403] See fn. 1388.

[1404] Cf. also the reservation expressed, in this regard, in YAMABE 2012: 218,3-6 (n. 71).

accept that the mind is provided with Seeds of matter, so that the new physical organism of such a person can arise in dependence on the mind.[1405]

258.1. It is true that this argument makes excellent sense if taken to be directed against a view according to which mind and matter *normally* continue by themselves, i.e., contain (or: are) their own Seed, each — a view that indeed corresponds to an interpretation of the set of 18 *dhātu*s found in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*[1406] and some other texts.[1407] In the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論), the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' is indeed introduced (and criticized)[1408] as a kind of refinement of a theory according to which the immediately preceding moment of matter (*rūpa*) is the Seed of the subsequent moment of matter, and likewise the preceding moment of mind (*citta*) the Seed of the subsequent moment of mind.[1409] This theory had already been criticized in *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* I.55.

258.2. It is obvious that this theory resembles, somehow, the Vaibhāṣika concept of the 'homogeneous cause' (*sabhāgahetu*),[1410] according to which both immaterial and material factors[1411] are the cause of similar factors arising from them as their 'outflow' (*niṣyanda-phala*).[1412] As regards material factors, what is — complicated and partly controversial details apart[1413] — important in the present context is that this type of causality was, at least by a representative part of the Vaibhāṣikas, taken to function not only within the limits of one and the same life but also beyond: just as the former states in the development of a living body, from the early foetal state of *kalala* onward, are the *sabhāgahetu* of all the following states, so

1405 YBh$_t$ P zi 16a4-6 (D zhi 13b7–14a2; YBh$_C$ 583c7-10; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1021c11-14): *gal te rnam par shes pa gzugs kyi sa bon dang ldan pa ma yin du zin na | so so'i skye bo gzugs med pa rnams su skyes pa tshe zad cing las zad nas de nas 'chi 'pho zhing yang 'og tu skye ba'i gzugs kyi sa bon med pas 'byung bar mi 'gyur ba zhig na 'byung ste | de lta bas na gzugs kyi sa bon dang ldan pa'i rnam par shes pa de la brten nas de'i gzugs 'byung bar rig par bya'o ||*.

1406 ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 244,12–245,11; ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 110,14-23; YAMABE 1997: 212 with 455 n. 21.

1407 See YAMABE 1997: 212f.

1408 CWSL 15c28–16a1: "Nor should one hold [the view] that *rūpa* and *citta* [re]arise [in such a way that they] alternately function as each other's Seed ..." (亦不應執 色心展轉互為種生。...).

1409 CWSL 15c24f: "There are [some] who hold [the view] that in the case of both *rūpa* and *citta*, [of two] successive homogeneous [moments], the previous [moment] is the Seed of the subsequent one" (有執 色心 自類無間 前為後種 ...).

1410 Cf. YAMABE 1997:212 with 455 n. 23, quoting AKBh 13,17-20 (EJ. 21,5-10), where it is stated that the 18 *dhātu*s in a basis of individual existence (*āśraya*) or personal continuum (*santāna*) are thus designated in the sense that they are the origin (*gotra*) or mine (*ākara*) of [further elements of] their own kind (*svasyā jāteḥ*) because they are their *sabhāgahetu*.

1411 According to the Dārṣṭāntikas (Vi 87c20: the Outsiders *(Bahirdeśaka)*: cf. Cox in WILLEMEN et al. 1998: 150,4), material dharmas have no *sabhāgahetu* (Vi 87c20-25; 682c12f; Vi$_2$ 72c10-14); cf. also AKBh 85,13 (*ye tu rūpaṁ rūpasya nêcchanti sabhāgahetuṁ* ...) and NA 422a25 (譬喩者說: 諸色決定無同類因). For the opposite view, maintained by the Vaibhāṣikas, see Vi 88a1-6 (Vi$_2$ 72c20-25); 682c13f; AKBh 85,13f.

1412 Cf. NA 422a12f: "What nourishes or engenders, at distance or directly, *niṣyandaphala*s, is called *sabhāgahetu*" (能養能生 或遠或近 諸等流果 名同類因。).

1413 See, esp., Vi 88a16–b29 (Vi$_2$ 72c25–73a22). Cf. also Vi 681a17-19, etc.; 750a4f, etc.

also are these states the *sabhāgahetu* of the respective (or also the following, or even all) states of the living body of the future life (or lives).[1414]

258.3. This view must have admitted of being interpreted in such a way that the reappearance of corporeal matter after an existence in the world-sphere of incorporeality was, among other things, based on previous corporeal matter as its homogeneous cause. In this sense, Saṅghabhadra states that corporeal matter after an existence in the sphere of incorporeality does not only arise, as Vasubandhu puts it,[1415] from the mind (*citta*, i.e., from the mind alone, apt to reproduce corporeal matter because it has been impregnated by a corresponding cause of karmic maturation and has now reached the state where this energy actualizes itself). Rather, states Saṅghabhadra, due to the mind series that had in the past been accompanied by corporeal matter, this corporeal matter, though extinguished long ago, acts as the 'seed'[1416] of its own [reproduction], with the effect that corporeal matter now re-emerges, for according to the Vaibhāṣika system the *sabhāgahetu* may be either present or past.[1417]

[1414] AKBh 85,11f. This view basically corresponds to the position described Vi 88b5-14, substantially compatible with 88b14-24 (Vi_2 73a11-20).

[1415] AKBh 435,18-20: ... *rūpasya cittād evôtpattis tadvipākahetuparibhāvitāl labdhavṛttitaḥ*; similarly 72,18f (in the context of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model').

[1416] I use 'seed' (in inverted commas) in order to indicate that the expression *bīja* is used in a metaphorical sense, not as a doctrinal concept (Seed), but I admit that there are instances where it is not easy to draw the line.

[1417] NA 757c22-25:

> Therefore, when [one] is about [to depart] from [the sphere of] incorporeality [and] to be reborn in a lower [sphere], a sequence of mind[-moments] favourable to [re]birth in [a sphere where there is] corporeal matter continues [for some time]. Through its impact, one is led to be born below, in [a sphere where there is] corporeal matter. But one cannot say that it is only through that [state of mind that corporeal matter] comes about. It is also in dependence on [the fact that] the mind series had formerly been accompanied by corporeal matter [and] with [this] long vanished corporeal matter as its 'seed' (= *sabhāgahetu*) that now corporeal matter arises [again]; for we assume that the *sabhāgahetu* comprises both past and present [dharmas].
>
> 故從無色將生下時 順色生心相續而住。由彼勢力 引下色生。然不可言 唯從彼起。亦以先世色俱行心相續為緣, 久已滅色 為自種子 今色方起, 許同類因通過現故。

AKṬT P tho 519b8–520a4 (with a dittography in 520a2-4, viz., *gzugs med pa dag nas .... las gzugs skye ste* |) seems to be more or less a quotation of this passage. Cf. also ADīVṛ 413,9-13 (text appears partly corrupt; perhaps to be read as something like *uktas t⟨āvad ārūpyeṣu rūpābhāvaḥ | kathaṁ t⟩arhy ārūpyebhyo rūpiṣûpapadyamānānāṁ rūpam utpadyate* ⟨|⟩ *hetupratyayādhipatipratyayabalāt ... | tatra sabhāgavipākahetvor ev⟨âtī⟩tayor apy astitvāt kāraṇatvaṁ, ...*). Saṅghabhadra rejects, however, the view that the body of a person reborn from the *ārūpyadhātu* arises in precisely the place where the last body before the *ārūpya* existence had died (NA 474c28–475a5).

Cf., in this connection, also NA 511a7-10:

> Thereby it has been explained how 'morsel food' (**kavaḍīkāra āhāraḥ*) functions as a cause for the following existence. Namely: When the nutriment consisting in impression (*sparśa*) and the other [two nutriments] entail the following existence, they also entail the internal[1] (**ādhyātmika*) smells, etc., of the following existence. The present internal smells, etc., by assisting the causes [consisting in the other nutriments, viz.,] impression, etc., make these [other nutriments] entail the next existence, but they themselves, too, take hold of the smells, etc., of the next existence as their *niṣyandaphala* (i.e., by acting as their *sabhāgahetu*).
>
> 由此已釋 段食為因 招後有義。謂 觸等食 牽後有時 亦牽當來內法香等。現內香等 資觸等因 令牽當有, 亦能自取 當來香等 為等流果。
>
> [1] I.e., such as belong to one's own body.

Saṅghabhadra thus assumes corporeal matter of an existence in the far-off past to function as the 'seed' (*bīja*), i.e., homogeneous cause (*sabhāgahetu*), of the re-emergence of corporeal matter after an existence in the sphere of incorporeality.

258.4. This solution works, of course, only as long as the theory of the existence of the past, i.e., the *sarvāstivāda*, is taken for granted. With the Yogācāras, this is no longer the case. Thus, one of the arguments raised in MSg I.55 against the aforementioned similar theory of Seeds is that this theory would not work in the case of an interruption of either the mind continuum (in *nirodhasamāpatti*, etc.) or the continuum of corporeal matter (in the *ārūpya-dhātu*). And according to the *Vibhāṣā*, one of the reasons given by the Vibhajyavādin[1418] for his thesis that there must be corporeal matter (*rūpa*) even in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*) is that otherwise the re-emergence of corporeal matter at the moment of return to the lower world-spheres would not be explicable.[1419] This argument no doubt resembles that of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model', where the problem is, however, solved by the assumption of the *Seeds* of *rūpa* in *vijñāna*.[1420]

259. Still, this assumption does not necessarily mean that according to the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' mind and (corporeal) matter are furnished with each other's Seeds merely during the gaps (i.e., in *ārūpyadhātu* and *nirodhasamāpatti*, respectively), and not rather as a matter of principle. The issue may not be easily decided (cf. § 88), but it may well be that, in spite of temporary gaps, the physical organism of a sentient being (as long as it is *upātta* in the sense of 'biological appropriation') was *eo ipso* considered to be virtually sentient, and that the mind of a sentient being still enmeshed in the saṁsāric world was *eo ipso* regarded as liable to be embodied. Apart from this, it may be worthwhile trying to determine, albeit in an admittedly tentative and preliminary way, in what, precisely, the problem of the reconstitution of matter after an existence in the sphere of incorporeality consists, and whether its continuation in the case of a rebirth process taking place *within* the spheres of corporeal existence is indeed free from difficulties.

260.0. Roughly speaking, we may distinguish, in the traditional Buddhist perspective, three complexes of matter: the external world, the gross body and the sense faculties.[1421]

For 'internal food', cf. NA 511a12f: "The external smells, etc., arouse the internal smells, tastes and tangibles within the body and make them fulfil the task of nutriment" (由外香等 覺發身中內香味觸令成食事); similarly Vi 65a23 and 675a23f. Cf. also the concept of *ojas* (see § 162.2 and, e.g., Spk II 25,21f and 24-27).

[1418] The very name indicates that he rejects the wholesale acceptance of the existence of past dharmas: cf. AKBh 296,4-6 (read *kiṁcid* for *kecid* with ODANI & HONJŌ 2007: 142 n. 7).

[1419] Vi 431b6f and 8-20, especially 15-20 (Vi_2 324c28–325a13, especially 325a7-13).

[1420] The problem is also mentioned in CSL 262b10-15, but here (to judge from the context) the solution is that the re-emergence of corporeal matter is due to karma only (cf. YAMABE 2000: 133,20–134,9).

[1421] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 57,5-7:

> Material aggregate[s] occur, briefly, at six places (or: in six items): the [external world as the] foundation, dwelli g places, implements, the seats of the sense faculties, the sense faculties, and [special] objects of meditative concentration.
>
> *sa ca rūpasamudāyo 'bhisamasya ṣaṭ sthānāni niśritya pravartate: pratiṣṭhāsthānaṁ nilayasthānam upakaraṇasthānam indriyādhiṣṭhānasthānam indriyasthānaṁ samādhigocarasthānaṁ* ||

260.1. As for the external world, an absence of this form of matter in the sphere of incorporeality can hardly cause specific problems when a being departs from that sphere and is reborn in the corporeal world, for in a pre-Vijñānavāda context the external material world is, at least up to the third *dhyāna*,[1422] common to all, hence already existent at the moment of that being's return from the *ārūpyadhātu*; during a period of cosmic dissolution a return to that sphere would anyway be impossible.[1423]

260.2. It is thus rather only the body and the physical sense faculties of the preceding life that might be conceived as a precondition of the new physical individuality — as seems indeed to have been the case in the context of the Vaibhāṣika theory of the 'homogeneous cause' (*sabhāgahetu*: see §§ 258.2–258.3) — but is lacking in the case of a return from the sphere of incorporeality if the theory of the existence of the past is rejected. But this kind of causal relation cannot be taken for granted even in the case of rebirth taking place *within* the realm of corporeal matter. Actually, in the *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* (AKBh) the aforementioned functioning of the phases of development of the present body as *sabhāgahetu* of the phases of development of future bodies is restricted to rebirth in a similar community of beings[1424] (e.g., when a human existence is followed by rebirth as a human being),[1425] which would mean that if past entities are non-existent, such a *sabhāgahetu* is also lacking when, e.g., a human being is reborn as an animal. Some masters mentioned in the *Vibhāṣā* even expressly restrict the functioning of this kind of *sabhāgahetu* to one and the same life.[1426]

260.3. The *Vibhāṣā* does not indicate any motive for this restriction, but in the (somewhat different) context of the discussion of rebirth some of the difficulties involved become discernible. To begin, it is hard to deny that when one dies the body of the present existence does not transmigrate but is left behind as a corpse, and it is not easy to see how it could, at the same time, be the homogeneous cause of a new body in a (normally) quite distant place.[1427] This is especially so if, as some schools[1428] assume, rebirth ('linking up') follows

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In our context, the first three items may be taken together as the external world, and the last item need not concern us here.

[1422] In the case of the fourth *dhyāna*, there is no periodical complete dissolution, but the palaces of the respective deities are stated to arise and disappear [individually] together with these deities (YBh_{Bh} 31,11-13). It is thus only in the case of rebirth in the fourth *dhyāna* that the lack of material entities in the *ārūpyadhātu* might perhaps cause a problem also for the environment of these deities if material dharmas could only arise from material dharmas and if past dharmas are considered to be no longer existent.

[1423] On might argue that at the very beginning of a period of world-evolution our external world cannot arise from Seeds in matter (because there is none) but only from Seeds in the mind of sentient beings to be reborn there, but this argument would be different from the one set forth by the VinSg passage under discussion.

[1424] AKBh 85,12: *anyeṣu tu samānajātīyeṣu* (sc. *nikāyasabhāgeṣu*: AKVy) *daśâpy avasthā daśānām* (sc. *sabhāgahetuḥ*).

[1425] AKVy 199,3f: *yadā manuṣyajanmano manuṣyajanmaîvôtpadyate* ($AKVy_t$ P cu 206a7f: *gang gi tshe m⟨i⟩ 'i skye ba nas mi 'i skye ba kho nar skye ba*).

[1426] Vi 88a16-21 and a21-29 (cf. Vi_2 72c25–73a5).

[1427] NA 473b23f:

> It is also not possible to assume that the very physical organism of the previous existence (**pūrvakāla-bhava*) transmigrates to the place of the next existence, for one directly perceives that the body decays where it has died (亦不可計 前本有色 即能相續往後生處, 現見死處身喪滅故。).

immediately upon the moment of dying, without an interval. Though this position, illustrated by various similes, is sometimes formulated in terms of the *skandha*s at the moment of death directly producing the *skandha*s at the moment of rebirth,[1429] it is, in other passages, only the *vijñāna* that is stated to be instantaneously reproduced in another body, or in proto-embryonic matter in the mother's womb.[1430] Other schools however, notably the Sarvāstivādins,[1431] rejected an instantaneous transition from one life to another. In the case of all persons who have not yet abandoned desire for corporeal existence, the *vijñāna* cannot subsist, and hence cannot 'transmigrate', without a body,[1432] and the body is unable to reproduce itself in a distant place without going there, which in terms of the doctrine of momentariness means: without continuous rearising in such a way that the spatial location of each following moment is slightly shifted in the direction of the destination.[1433] In this way, not only is the *vijñāna* conveyed to the place of 'linking up', but there is also a physical connection between the organism of the previous life and the organism of the new one.

260.4. But there are still problems if the process is examined in detail. Since the old body remains as a corpse, we may ask whether, and in which way, the subtle physical organism of the intermediate existence (comprising, to be sure, both primary elements and secondary matter) is indeed a homogeneous effect of the (at least partly) coarse physical organism of the previous life.[1434] And in view of the fact that the physical organism of the new life is traditionally believed to arise from the parents' semen-cum-blood (*śukraśoṇita*), we may also ask in which way the new physical organism is nonetheless connected with the physical organism of the intermediate existence.

[1428] E.g., Theravādins, Dharmaguptakas (ŚA), CSL: see KRITZER 2000: 235 and 237–239; cf. also BAREAU 1955: 283.

[1429] MiśAHṛd 963a14-16; see KRITZER 2000: 237 with n. 8.

[1430] Thus ŚA 608a17-21 (KRITZER 2000: 237 with n. 7); CSL 257a9-14 (ibid. 238 with ns. 14 and 15).

[1431] Similarly the Sāṁmitīyas, at any rate according to the SāṁmitNŚ (KRITZER 2000: 238). Cf. Kv VIII.2 with Kv-a 106,1-6; BAREAU 1955: 124 (10°).

[1432] NA 473b15-18: 若謂 唯識相續流轉連續死生 其義已立 ..., 此不應理。諸有於色未得離貪 離色唯心相續流轉 理不成故 (cf. also c3); SāṁmitNŚ 470c3: 識無身不至彼 (see KRITZER 2000: 241 with n. 29).

[1433] AKBh 120,15-17, especially as interpreted in AKVy 267,13-25, translated in KRITZER 2000: 242f. In the inference formulated by Yaśomitra, viz.,

> *yato 'paiti yatra côtpadyate, tadantarālasaṁtānavartirūpapūrvakam upapattibhavarūpaṁ, svopādāna-rūpasaṁtānarūpasvabhāvatvāt, vrīhisaṁtānapaścāttararūpavat*),

I should prefer to understand the reason (*hetu*) as

> because it (= the corporeal matter of the *upapattibhava*) has the nature of matter [occurring in] in a continuum of matter that is its (= the *upapattibhava-rūpa*'s) material cause,

for the *hetu* must of course also hold good for the example (*dṛṣṭānta*), i.e., for the last moment of the rice continuum. This, however, appears hardly conceivable if *svopādāna-* is taken to mean "appropriated by oneself" (KRITZER), for the last moment of the rice continuum is surely not "appropriated by oneself" in a way comparable to the appropriation of the first moment of a new body at the moment of conception, and still less would "appropriated by oneself" make sense in the case of the reflected image functioning as *dṛṣṭānta* in the opponent's counter-inference using the same *hetu* (AKVy 267,32–268,1).

[1434] YBh$_{Bh}$ 19,1 has the intermediate existence (as a sentient physical organism) arise "from its Seed" (*svabījāt*), without offering further details.

260.5. The latter question is, as R. KRITZER has pointed out,[1435] addressed by Vasubandhu when he asks, in the AKBh,[1436] whether it is precisely the primary elements of semen-cum-blood (*śukraśoṇitamahābhūtāny eva*) that become, by the force of karma, the basis of the sense faculties of the new life, or whether the karmic forces generate, for this purpose, an entirely new set of primary elements (*bhūtāntarāṇy eva*). According to Vasubandhu, both views had their advocates.[1437] In P'u-kuang's explanation,[1438] the first position means that the primary elements of the semen-cum-blood that is simultaneous with the last phase of the intermediate existence are the *sabhāgahetu* of the primary elements that are the basis of the sense faculty [of touch][1439] of the first moment of the new existence.[1440] According to the second position, what acts as their *sabhāgahetu* are rather the primary elements of the faculty of touch of the last moment of intermediate existence.[1441] The second position is emphatically advocated by Saṅghabhadra,[1442] with the argument that something insentient (viz., semen-cum-blood) cannot be the 'seed' (= *sabhāgahetu*?) for something sentient (viz., the *kalala*).[1443]

260.6. The former position, which does not derive the primary elements of the sense faculties of the new existence from those of the intermediate existence, is connected by KRITZER (2000: 255ff) with the description of 'linking up' in the ManoBh of the MauBh. Here we read that simultaneously with the cessation of the intermediate existence a lump of semen-cum-blood arises that is similar (*sabhāga*!) to the preceding one but mixed with another set of primary elements, subtle ones endowed with a sense faculty (viz., touch).[1444] This development is, however, not caused by the primary elements of the intermediate existence but is stated to occur due to the *sarvabījaṁ vijñānam* when it merges with (and 'appropriates') the lump of semen-cum-blood.[1445] If I am not mistaken, this clearly means that

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1435 KRITZER 2000: 248ff.

1436 AKBh 127,3-5: *kim asya śukraśoṇitamahābhūtāny evêndriyāśrayabhāvam āpadyante karmavaśād, āhosvid bhūtāntarāṇy eva karmabhir jāyante tāny upaśritya*. If I am not mistaken, the first position is discarded at AKBh 121,14f: *na ca yuktam uktaṁ: bāhyam evâcetanaṁ* (ms.; *AKBh-I* pt. 1: 429) *śukraśoṇitaṁ pradhānakāraṇam iti*. Cf. AKVy 270,1f (*bāhyaṁ śukraśoṇitaṁ pradhānakāraṇam iti cen, na, acetanatvāt*); NA 473b13f; cf. also NA 475a11f and 20f.

1437 AKBh 127,5-9.

1438 T 41.1821: 162b4–c13, translated in KRITZER 2000: 252 and 253f.

1439 T 41.1821: 162b6f: 根謂身根, 以初生時唯身根故。

1440 T 41.1821: 162b22f: 彼計: 生有初念根依大種 用中有後位精血大種 為同類因 無間引起。

1441 T 41.1821: 162c1f: 是中有末身根大種 為同類因 引起生有初念根依大種。

1442 NA 477c23–478a8 (transl. in KRITZER 2000: 252f), esp. 477c26-28 (my translation):

The primary elements of the *antarābhava* in the very last phase of [its] cessation, relying on that (i.e., the *kalala*, here = semen-cum-blood) as a condition (*pratyaya*), act as the main cause (*hetu*) that brings about primary elements that are different from the previous ones, and these different primary elements are able to function as the basis of the sense faculties (or: the sense faculty [of touch]).
最後滅位中有大種 藉彼為緣 為因引生異前大種。彼異大種 能作根依。

1443 NA 478a5f: 無情與情 為種引起 不應道理, 相續異故。

1444 YBh_{Bh} 24,7-9 (cf. § 319).

1445 *tasyaiva sarvabījasya vijñānasya* (ms.) *sāmarthyāt* (cf. also §§ 83.1 and 254).

even in the case of a rebirth from one existence *within* the corporeal world to another[1446] the gross body is, so to speak, inherited from the parents, whereas the material factors (sense faculties plus their subtle primary elements) by which it becomes a sentient physical organism arise, at least in the first place,[1447] from the *vijñāna* comprising their Seeds, or functioning as their Seed.[1448] It is, of course, not certain that the view of this passage (which in its essence seems to be pre-*ālayavijñāna*)[1449] was indeed shared by the author(s) of the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg, but all I want to show is that a limitation of the Seeds of matter in mind to existences in the *ārūpyadhātu* may not be justified.

261.0. The idea that the reproduction of a sentient physical organism in the next life is primarily a function of the mind and that for this purpose the mind must be equipped with Seeds of (corporeal) matter, especially of the sense faculties, not only during an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* but in ordinary existences as well, is clearly articulated in the detailed pre-*ālayavijñāna* analysis of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*) in the *Savitarkādibhūmi* of the MauBh, partly identical with a section of the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg III.1.i).[1450] This analysis is mainly concerned with ordinary rebirth, i.e., from an existence in the corporeal world[1451] into that of a womb-born being. It describes — without, by the way, any reference to an intermediate existence[1452] — how the *vijñāna* of the previous existence, under the sway

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[1446] The ManoBh clearly deals with the process of dying in *this* world and being reborn in *this* world in the first place, not with the special case of returning to this world from an existence in the sphere of incorporeality.

[1447] It would require closer investigation, beyond the limits of this study, to decide whether at all and, if so, in which way the remarks on the potentialities ascribed to material dharmas (*rūpa*), especially organic matter, with regard to other material dharmas in the VinSg description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' or in other places of the YBh (e.g., YBh_{Bh} 54,6-9) are relevant for the passage under discussion. At any rate, it would seem most likely that after having arisen due to the *sarvabījaṁ vijñānam* organic matter continues by itself as long as it is kept appropriated by the mind.

[1448] Cf., in this connection, also PSVy P 28b3f (D 25b1f):

> Moreover, in the absence of that (sc., of *nāman*, i.e., mind and mental factors), it (sc., corporeal matter) would not come about [at the time of 'linking up'] in another community [of sentient beings] (**nikāya-sabhāgāntara*). ... On the basis of the [ongoing] continuum of mind and mental factors (*nāman*) one appropriates, [at the moment of 'linking up'] in another community [of sentient beings] (**nikāya-sabhāgāntara*), a *fresh* (**apūrva*) continuum of corporeal matter.
>
> *de med par yang ris mthun pa gzhan du mngon par 'grub pa ma yin gi* | ... *ming gi rgyun la brten nas ris mthun pa gzhan dag tu sngon ma byung ba'i gzugs kyi rgyun len par byed kyi* | ... (for the first sentence, cf. PSVyṬ P 168a1f [D 139b4]: *ming de dag med par ni ris mthun pa gzhan du gzugs mngon par 'grub pa ma yin no*).

The appropriative activity of the mind is, of course, also required in the Vaibhāṣika system: cf. NA 504a4f: "The mind takes hold of semen-cum-blood so that it becomes a *kalala*, a sentient being" (識持精血 成羯剌藍 成有情身).

[1449] See S 1987 ## 6.3.1-4.

[1450] YBh_{Bh} 198,17–203,5 is practically identical with YBh_t P 'i 285a3–287b6 (D zi 246a7–249a2; YBh_c 827c3–828c12).

[1451] Cf. the reference to karmic acts of *body*, *speech* and mind (YBh_{Bh} 198,21f; VaSg: YBh_t P 'i 285a5).

[1452] Intermediate existence is, however, three times referred to in the definition of *bhava* at YBh_{Bh} 208,19–209,5 (for *upādhibhavo* in 208,20, read *upapattibhavo* with ms.), which, however, does not

of (*°upaga*)[1453] or imbued with (*°paribhāvita*)[1454] karmic acts of body, speech and mind, is the cause (*hetu*)[1455] or Seed (*bīja*)[1456] of the *vijñāna* at the moment of 'linking-up' (*pratisandhi*) as its result (*phala*) or [effect-of-]maturation (*vipāka*). And insofar as the causal *vijñāna* is the Seed of the *vijñāna*(s) in the next life, it is also said to encapsulate the Seed of the future *nāmarūpa* and, indirectly, that of the future 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*), of the impressions[1457] (*sparśa*) and of the feelings (*vedanā*) resulting from them, i.e., of the future sentient organism as a whole.[1458]

262.1. As has already been pointed out (§ 39), this analysis of dependent origination seems to presuppose the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' (or at least the pattern of thought underlying it).[1459] One of the proofs for this is a passage where the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*) is explained on the basis of the assumption that even in that world-sphere *rūpa* continues in the form of *Seeds* based on the mind (*vijñānāśrita*)[1460] — an assumption which is also stated to explain how corporeal matter can rearise when the existence in that world-sphere comes to an end. Buescher (B: 151f) refers to this passage in order to demonstrate that although "we would expect to find the concept of a '*vijñāna* consisting in *sarvabīja*-' applied",[1461] the passage "is not yet using the technical phrase *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*."

262.2. However, if we turn to the parallel passage in the VaSg, this phrase, or at least an equivalent formulation, does occur in the subsequent section (III.1.ii), which is likewise

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belong to the text portion that is also found in the VaSg. For another non-*ālayavijñāna* piece of text (from the VinSg) lacking reference to *antarābhava* where it could be expected, see S 1987 n. 259(a).

1453 YBh$_{Bh}$ 198,22 (see fn. 814); 200,13: *tasya tad vijñānam abhinavaṁ karma kurvatas tatkarmopagaṁ bhavati dṛṣṭa eva dharme*. For my rendering of *°upaga*, see fn. 813.

1454 YBh$_{Bh}$ 206,15 (see fn. 1382).

1455 YBh$_{Bh}$ 199,1 and 4 (see fn. 814); 200,15: *tac ca vijñānaṁ dṛṣṭe dharme hetubhūtam āyatyām abhinirvṛttivijñānaphalaparigrahāt.*

1456 YBh$_{Bh}$ 206,15 (see fn. 1382). Cf. also 222,13; 224,19.

1457 I.e., apprehensions of the perceived objects as something agreeable, [disagreeable or neutral]; see YBh$_{Bh}$ 207,16f (reading of the ms.; cf. YBh$_t$ P dzi 121b3-5): *cakṣuḥsaṁsparśaḥ katamaḥ | trikasamavāyajā viṣayaṁ śubhādyarthataḥ udgrahaṇatā*[1] ⟨|⟩ *evam avaśiṣṭānāṁ sparśānāṁ prativiṣayaṁ lakṣaṇanirdeśo 'vagantavyaḥ* |. For action nouns construed with an acc. see *BHSG* # 7.16; RENOU 1975 # 174; VON HINÜBER 1968 #41; for °*ana*-stems enlarged by °*tā* see *BHSG* # 22.42.

1 °*ṇa*° e.c.; ms. °*ṇā*°.

1458 YBh$_{Bh}$ 200,16-19 (see fn. 1386); 207,9, etc. (see fn. 1384). Cf. ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 384,13f (see fn. 1381) and YBh$_t$ P zi 87a4-6 (D zhi 83b2-4; YBh$_C$ 611c10-12).

1459 Cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 227,4-7 (see fn. 165).

1460 YBh$_{Bh}$ 200,1-3. Buescher's understanding of the passage, pretending to improve on my own, is untenable: see § 321. Cf. also YAMABE 2000: 136(8).

1461 I do not understand why Buescher says "consisting in". It is true that the phraseology of the YBh is not uniform (see § 251) and that *vijñāna* may not only be said to be accompanied by or furnished with (all) Seeds, but also to *be* a Seed (e.g., the Seed of *vijñāna* in the next life), as, e.g., at YBh$_{Bh}$ 206,15 (see fn. 1382). But the expression '*sarvabījaka*' is clearly a bahuvrīhi compound, and in the passage discussed by Buescher *vijñāna* and the Seeds of *rūpa* in the *ārūpyadhātu* are stated to stand in a relation of mutual support.

concerned with the analysis of dependent origination (*pratītyasamutpāda*)[1462] and where it is stated that on account of previous karma and defilements (*kleśa*) the *vijñāna furnished with all Seeds* will, in the future at the time of 'linking-up' (*pratisandhi*), establish itself in the *nāma-rūpa* [of a new existence].[1463]

262.3. Buescher, who mentions this passage, already pointed out by me in S 1987: 179, belittles its importance, because to take it seriously would definitively overthrow his thesis that the concept of *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* is inextricably linked to the new model comprising *ālayavijñāna* and *vijñaptimātratā*. He consequently does away with it with the remark that

> ... the passage does not indicate that it introduces the concept, but simply employs an already given terminology. (B: 151)

In the context of Buescher's whole argumentation, this would seem to amount to the assertion that this passage, too, must be a post-Saṁdh interpolation.

262.4. However, Buescher's argument is anything but conclusive. The VaSg, at least the *Saṁyuktāgama* commentary portion, belongs, to judge from its conceptual equipment, to the older parts of the YBh, and does not, as far as I know, show any traces of more recent developments as documented in the later strata of the YBh or in the Saṁdh (cf. § 252). To discard a passage of this text as a post-Saṁdh interpolation would thus require particularly strong reasons. Buescher's argument, however, is patently insufficient, for it is hard to see why the employment of an expression without an express statement of its novelty should imply that the expression must have been taken over from elsewhere, still less so if the expression is made up of elements from the current vocabulary of the tradition (*sarva*, *bīja*). The real background of his argumentation is rather his presupposition that the expression *sarvabīja-(ka)ṁ vijñānam* has to be taken in the sense of "mind containing the Seeds of everything", implying the idea that all dharmas are constituted by the mind in the sense of being mere representations (*vijñaptimātra*) or, in Buescher's (B: 164) terminology, "manifested by a purely noetic constitution", and the concept of *ālayavijñāna* as the latent source of this constitution.

263.0. However, this presupposition is contestable for at least two reasons. One is a certain ambiguity of the expression itself, another the question of its implications.

263.1. If we start, in Saṁdh V.2, from a reading **sarvabījaṁ cittam* and take **sarvabījaṁ* (with Matsumoto: see § 247) as a tatpuruṣa, it can hardly mean anything but "the mind which is (or: insofar as it is) the Seed of everything, or of all [dharmas, etc.]". If we take **sarva-bījam* as a bahuvrīhi or start from the form **sarvabījakam*, as in YBh_{Bh} 4,7, etc., we may analyse it either as "possessing/containing/comprising all Seeds"[1464] or as "possessing (/etc.)

[1462] The section is a commentary on or rather exegesis of a sūtra corresponding to NidSa sūtra 1 and/or sūtra 2 ($SĀ_c$ no. 283 and no. 284, corresp. to SN 12.57–58), dealing with dependent origination (/rebirth) in general, with no reference at all to the *ārūpyadhātu*.

[1463] YBh_t P 'i 287b6–288b2, esp. 288a8f (D zi 249b3f; YBh_c 829a5f): *de'i rgyu las byung ba las dang nyon mongs pa de dang ldan pa sa bon thams cad dang ldan pa'i rnam par shes pas ni phyi ma la nying mtshams sbyor ba'i tshe ming dang gzugs la gnas thod par 'gyur ro* ||. Tibetan represents a bahuvrīhi interpretation, whereas Hsüan-tang has, as usual, 一切種子識, which is ambiguous and may render **sarvabījaka* as well as **sarvabīja*. I do not perceive any reason for calling the testimony of the Tibetan translation into question, but as I see it **sarvabīja* taken as a tatpuruṣa would not make a big difference (see § 251).

[1464] Cf. Tib. *sa bon thams cad pa*, as in YBh_t P dzi 2b6 or TrBh **7,15 and 25.

the Seeds of everything, or of all [dharmas, etc.]"[1465]. The first alternative is clearly the weaker one, since it would only seem to imply that the entity characterized as *sarvabīja(ka)* contains the Seeds of all dharmas that arise from Seeds, but does not necessarily imply that all dharmas do arise from Seeds. Against this, the latter alternative, like the analysis as a tat-puruṣa, sounds more comprehensive, at least if we take *sarva* to refer to everything, or to all dharmas, in a strong sense.

263.2. Yet in Buddhist exegetical literature we can find explicit statements of an exegetic maxim that *sarva* may be used in two meanings: in the sense of absolutely everything (*thams cad kyi thams cad*, 一切一切), or in the sense of everything out of a limited sector (*phyogs gcig gi thams cad*, 少分一切).[1466] This means that we have to take into account the possibility that an expression using the quantifier "all" is not aiming at the totality of absolutely all things or dharmas but merely at the totality of those contextually involved.

263.3. In this sense, the purport of the characterization of the mind (*vijñāna*) as *sarvabījaka* in the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg is not necessarily that the mind contains the Seeds of all mental and material entities in the world; rather, it may merely mean that the mind contains Seeds of all *categories* of entities (that arise from Seeds), i.e., not only (as one may expect) the Seeds of mind and mental factors but also Seeds of matter, especially of the physical sense faculties. Even if we follow the Chinese versions, according to which the mind also contains the Seeds of the other material entities,[1467] this would seem to refer, in the first place, to the Seeds of the physical organism[1468] (which after all consists not only of sense faculties but also of the primary elements and of visibles, etc.).[1469] It need not, as far as

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[1465] Thus TrBh *7,18 = L. 19,1f: *sarvadharmabījāśrayatvāt sarvabījakam*.

[1466] E.g., Vi 37a22f; 45a16f; 423c20f (Vi_2 33b23f; 317c15f); YBh_c 801a3-5 = YBh_t P 'i 218a8: *thams cad ni rnam pa gnyis te phyogs gcig gi thams cad dang thams cad kyi thams cad do* || (VaSg). Cf. also YOSHIMURA 2013: 1236f and 1239.

[1467] In the Tibetan version of the description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg it is, in the beginning (YBh_t P zi 15b7f; D zhi 13b3), only the Seeds of the sense faculties (**rūpīndriyabīja*) that the mind is stated to be equipped with:

> Those accompanying the mind are: [1.] the Seeds of all [forms of] mind, [2.] [the Seeds of] the remaining immaterial dharmas, and [3.] the Seeds of the physical sense faculties.
>
> *rnam par shes pa dang ldan pa ni rnam par shes pa thams cad po de'i sa bon yang yin la* | *de las gzhan pa'i chos gzugs can ma yin pa rnams dang* | *dbang po gzugs can rnams kyi kyi sa bon yang yin no* ||

However, in Hsüan-tsang's translation (YBh_c 583b24-26) the Seeds of the five sense faculties are supplemented by the "Seeds of the remaining material dharmas" (所餘色法種子), which is also what Paramārtha's rendering ($VinSg_{Pa}$ 1021c5-7) amounts to. For this reason, the Tibetan translation may be incomplete here (YAMABE 2000: 132 and 144 n. 21). YBh_t P zi 16a4f (see fn. 1405) is unspecific:

> "If mind were not equipped with the Seeds of matter (*rūpa*)..."
>
> (*gal te rnam par shes pa gzugs kyi sa bon dang ldan pa ma yin du zin na ...*),

but the Chinese versions are confirmed by YBh_t P zi 228b7 (see fn. 162).

[1468] This is, at any rate, what the formulation of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in AKBh 72,20 would suggest, for according to it the mind contains the Seeds of the *body* endowed with sense faculties (and vice versa), with no mention of the mind containing also the Seeds of external matter.

[1469] Cf. the fact that in the complementary thesis it is only the physical sense faculties along with their support (*rten dang bcas pa*: see fn. 438), or along with their *own* primary elements (YBh_t P zi 16a2 = D zhi 13b5: *rang gi byung ba chen po dang bcas pa*; YBh_c 583c2: 及自大種), that are stated to be also equipped with the Seeds of mind and mental factors.

I can see, imply that the mind even contains Seeds of external matter, though this possibility cannot be excluded either (see § 263.6).

263.4. Similarly, to judge from the context, in VaSg III.1.ii the characterization of the mind at the moment of 'linking up' as "furnished with all Seeds" need not mean that it was taken to contain or comprise the Seeds of absolutely everything. To judge from the context and related textual materials, the purport was rather to point out that the *ordinary*, traditional mind continuum[1470] that is about to take hold of a new reincarnation is furnished with all Seeds required for the development of the psycho-physical factors in the future life (or lives) in accordance with the karma that has come to ripen.[1471] This is corroborated by the section of the ManoBh of the MauBh (see § 88.3) where it is the psycho-physical basis of individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) that is stated to be reborn, under the influence of karma and desire, in such a way that it contains all Seeds (*sarvabījaka*), for these Seeds with which the *ātmabhāva* is equipped are at the same time specified as the Seeds of all possible *ātmabhāva*s. Actually, a similar restriction would also strongly suggest itself in the case of Saṁdh V.2 — dealing as it does with the coming about of a new individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) in one or another of the various *gati*s or *yoni*s —, were there not the reference to the imprints of the multifarious conventional dealing with phenomena, names and imagination (see § 290).

263.5. It should thus be clear that the characterization of *vijñāna* as *sarvabīja(ka)* need not necessarily imply that it also contains the Seeds of external things. But even if such an implication were taken for granted, this would not *eo ipso* justify the assumption of a *vijñapti-mātra* position, at least not in the case of early materials as contained in the YBh. In the

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[1470] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 200,15f (VaSg: YBh_t P 'i 286a7; D zi 247b3f; YBh_c 828a16f): "With reference to the mind(-series) [as a whole], [the *aṅga* '*vijñāna*'] is [in canonical texts like NidSa 16.6] defined as the six groups of perception/cognition" (*sarvaṁ ca vijñānam* [VaSg: *rgyud*, 相續, **santānam*/*santatim*] *adhikṛtya ṣaḍ vijñānakāyā ity ucyante*). Cf. also 199,9f (VaSg: YBh_t P 'i 285b2f; D zi 246b6f; YBh_c 827c17-20); 61,8 (*sarvatra vijñānasantāne sarvo bījasantānaḥ*: see fn. 220). — Cf., in this connection, also the theory, found in a section of the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg (YBh_t P zi 224a3–226a1, esp. 224b3ff; D zhi 213a2–214b5, esp. 213b2ff; YBh_c 664c5–665b4, esp. 664c19ff; cf. S 1987 # 3.12.2.1), according to which the last moment of mind at death and the moment of mind immediately following upon 'linking up' (but *not* the state of mind at the very moment of 'linking up') as well as all subsequent moments of mind as long as they are in the original state (*prakṛtistha*), i.e., neither wholesome nor unwholesome nor active-neutral states of mind, are "[effect of karmic] maturation" and, as such, characterized as "containing all Seeds" (**sarvabījako vipākaḥ*). This theory does not presuppose a continuous subliminal *vipāka*-mind, for the *vipāka* states of mind are stated to be interrupted not only at the very moment of 'linking up' but also later on, e.g., when, in the case of beings reborn in hell, the neutral [primary] *vipāka*-states are *followed* by a continuous flow of states of mind with painful feelings arising from the [primary] *vipāka* (**vipākaja*, i.e., mediate results of previous karma) (YBh_t P zi 225a3; D zhi 214a1: *de la sems can dmyal bar skyes pa'i* (D : *skye ba'i* P) *sems can rnams kyi rnam par smin pa'i mjug thogs su ni rnam par smin pa las skyes pa'i sdug bsngal dang | yid mi bde ba'i rgyun 'brel par 'byung ngo ||*). Nor does this theory, in spite of the expression *sarvabījaka*, show any trace of *vijñaptimātratā*.

[1471] Buescher's (B: 151) criticism of the respective remarks in S 1987: 179 as "rather speculative and without sufficient weight" merely shows that he is unaware of the contextual embedding of the passage. What appears speculative is, on the contrary, his arbitrary assumption of interpolations on the basis of his unwarranted apodictic determination of the semantic and theoretical implications of the expression '*sarvabījaka*'. I have to admit, however, that I should not have spoken of "(karmic imprints turning into ...) Seeds", but at that time YAMABE's path-breaking articles (especially YAMABE 1989) had not yet appeared.

description of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' in the VinSg, the characterization of *vijñāna* as **sarvabījaka* is indubitably embedded in a position in which mind and matter, being equipped with each other's Seeds, are of equal ontological rank. If we were to derive, for this text, a *vijñaptimātra* position from the characterization of *vijñāna* as **sarvabījaka*, we could, with the same right, derive a materialist position from the fact that the physical sense faculties and their support (or primary elements) are likewise stated to be **sarvabījaka*.

263.6. In a section of the ManoBh of the MauBh,[1472] it is indeed all material aggregates, those forming the organism of sentient beings as well as those belonging to the external world, that are stated to arise from their Seeds in the mind continuum (*cittasantati*),[1473] yet there is not any mention of *ālayavijñāna* or indication of *vijñaptimātratā*. As far as I can see material entities are treated here as indisputably material, invested with their own causal potentialities (in this text called *dhātu*,[1474] not *bīja* as in the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'[1475]). The statement that even the external material aggregates arise from their Seeds contained in the mind continuum may be understood as an expression of the idea that the arising of external things is caused or occasioned by, and for the sake of, sentient beings,[1476] i.e., as a presupposition for their corporeal existence and physical experiences. This dependence of the external world on sentient beings is sometimes expressed in terms of its dependence on the sense faculties[1477] or on the karma of sentient beings,[1478] but also as its dependence on the mind.[1479] At any rate,

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[1472] YBh_{Bh} 52,12–57,4.

[1473] YBh_{Bh} 52,15f: *sarveṣāṁ ādhyātmikabāhyānāṁ bhūtānām upādāyarūpāṇāṁ câdhyātmaṁ citta-santatau bījāni sanniviṣṭāni* (see Addenda!); 55,14: *cittasanniviṣṭasya ... rūpasamudāyabījasya*. Cf. also 56,6f: *cittacaitasair bījam* (sc., the Seed of what is solid = earth, etc.) *upagatam*.

[1474] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 56,10-14: all material aggregates, irrespective of what is actually perceived, contain all primary elements as *dhātu*s, i.e., as constituents that may be latent but may become manifest under certain conditions. According to YBh_{Bh} 54,6-9, this holds good for the sense objects as well, and in organic matter also for the sense faculties.

[1475] Cf. § 76.3.1 with fns. 438–440; YBh_t P zi 16a1 (D zhi 13b4f; YBh_c 583b27f):

> Matter consisting in the primary elements is accompanied by two [kinds of] Seeds: by the Seeds of the primary elements and by the Seeds of derivative matter.
>
> *'byung ba chen po'i gzugs ni sa bon gnyis* (D : *nyid* P) *dang ldan pa yin te | 'byung ba chen po'i sa bon dang | rgyur byas pa'i gzugs kyi sa bon dang ngo ||*

$VinSg_{Pa}$ 1021c7f expressly specifies the second group as consisting of eleven [kinds of] Seeds (十一種, viz., those of the five sense faculties, those of the five sense objects and those of matter belonging to the *dharmāyatana*).

[1476] YBh_{Bh} 141,16f:

> If they do not arise for the sake of sentient beings, the emergence of external things would be purposeless.
>
> *sacen na sattvanaimittikī* [sc. *bāhyānāṁ bhāvānām utpattiḥ*: 141,14], *tena niṣprayojano bāhyānāṁ bhāvānāṁ prādurbhāvo ... |*

[1477] $VinSg_{ms}$ 22b7 (YBh_t P zi 54a7f; D zhi 51b3f; YBh_c 598c5f; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1033b10f): The stationary external things come about through the power or influence of the physical sense faculties (*rūpiṇām indriyāṇām ādhipatyena*). Similarly ASBh 2,24f: *yac cakṣurdhātoḥ rūpe ādhipatyam* (AS 3,5f) *iti rūpī-ndriyādhipatyena bāhyaviṣayanirvartanāt*; cf. also ASBh 42,26f: *tad-* (= *indriya-*) *-ādhipatyena rūpādyabhinirvṛtteḥ*.

[1478] YBh_{Bh} 36,19f; cf. 30,21f; AS 55,11 (BAYER 2010: 183); ASBh 42,22: *āvedhādhipatitaḥ sarva-sattvasādhāraṇaṁ karma bhājanalokasya* (*adhipatipratyayo draṣṭavyaḥ*: AS 29,18); AKBh 94,22: *aṅgībhāvaḥ ... bhājanaloke ... karmaṇām*. Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 184,6-9.

the passage under discussion implies that the external things are not merely influenced or controlled by the karma of sentient beings but rather constituted as such, in their respective intrinsic nature, by Seeds (*bīja*, apparently not used in the older layers of the YBh for karmic imprints!)[1480] in the mind. Yet, as has been stated before, their origination from Seeds in the mind is obviously not at variance with their being external material entities. It would thus seem that we indeed have to understand this theory in the wider context of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. Actually, it may have been only in this way that the principle that dharmas arise from a homogenous cause (= Seed) as an essential condition could be applied to the re-emergence of the external world after a period of dissolution if the existence of the past as well as of eternal atoms is denied. It hardly needs to be said that such a view may have *prepared* a *vijñaptimātratā* position and could easily be *interpreted* in this sense by *later* exegetes, but as it stands it does not yet show significant features of such a development and should therefore be understood in the context of pre-Vijñānavāda Yogācāra. For as long as we want to understand the original meaning of these texts, it would seem inadmissible to superimpose later developments on them[1481] unless we have very strong and unambiguous clues or cannot get sense out of them otherwise.

264. There is thus no compelling reason to regard the expression *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ cittam /vijñānam* as an innovation of the Saṁdh, let alone as implying, *eo ipso*, a *vijñaptimātra* ontology. Therefore, the occurrence of this expression in the MauBh (not to mention the VaSg) does not justify the assumption of what would actually amount to an inflation of interpolations, an assumption that remains altogether arbitrary unless additional clues (like compositional incoherence, etc.) are pointed out, but Buescher does not point out any. Actually, in contrast to its (presumably secondary) equation with *ālayavijñāna* (see § 83.1), the notion of *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* in the PañcBh appears as an integral part of the presentation and, in addition, is basically in line with a passage of the pre-*ālayavijñāna* analysis of dependent origination in the *Savitarkādibhūmi*.[1482] A post-Saṁdh origin of the whole PañcBh, however, is quite improbable in view of the fact that this Bhūmi still follows the principle of the non-simultaneity of actual *vijñāna*s (YBh_{Bh} 10,2-7).[1483] Nor does it seem possible to eliminate the ManoBh passage on 'reincarnation' (YBh_{Bh} 24,1ff) from its context, where the occurrence of the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* is anyway, in view of the subject and its treatment in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* analysis of *pratītyasamutpāda* in the YBh (see §§ 261–262), quite natural. On the other hand, the fact that the *(*sarvabījaṁ)* <u>*cittam*</u> of Saṁdh V.2 is, at the beginning of V.3,

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[1479] ASBh 52,20f: *cittasyâdhipatyasaṁbhūtatām upādāya* (cf. AS 41,11; AS_{Li} 248,2): *sarvaṁ hy ādhyātmikabāhyaṁ rūpaṁ cittasyâdhipatyena saṁbhavati.*

[1480] YAMABE 1989: 47 (# 3); cf. also 49f. Even in the passage $BoBh_W$ 100,18f ($BoBh_D$ 71,8f), the *saṁskārabīja*s implied in the sentence *svakasvakaṁ bījam avidyādīnāṁ nirvṛttihetuḥ* cannot mean karmic imprints but must mean the homogeneous Seeds from which karmic actions arise (provided that *saṁskāra* is used in this sense).

[1481] We should even distinguish the original purport of a piece of text in a compilation from the meaning the compiler(s) or redactor(s) may have attributed to it, still more so, needless to say, from systematizing interpretations provided by later exegetes, though this does not exclude that their remarks may often be helpful.

[1482] YBh_{Bh} 206,14ff (see § 251 with fn. 1382 and fn. 1384). In YBh_{Bh} 206,17, read *caîṣāṁ* with the ms. instead of ed. *caîṣa*.

[1483] See fn. 1568.

tacitly referred to by the phrase "this [aforesaid] *vijñāna*" (*rnam par shes pa de*)[1484] may perhaps be taken as indicating that the Saṁdh was familiar with the expression *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* but had modified it to **sarvabījaṁ cittam* in V.2, perhaps with the intention to establish a specific connection of its own, revised concept of the 'All-Seed Mind' with the term '*citta*', as in V.3, deliberately contrasting it with the ordinary *vijñāna*s.

4.2.7. 'Descent' from the Sphere of Incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*)

265. In view of the preceding comments, I can agree with Buescher to the extent that there was indeed a concept that deserves, from the perspective of Saṁdh V.2, to be called "proto-*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*", but I disagree with him as regards its location. For me, what may be thus designated is rather the *vijñāna* figuring in the context of the description of dependent origination (in the sense of rebirth, primarily in our world-sphere) in certain pre-*ālayavijñāna* strata of the YBh, a *vijñāna* which seems to be closely related to the *vijñāna* containing all Seeds of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model'. For Buescher (see § 134), on the other hand, it is only the special case of the *vijñāna* of the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' during an existence in the *ārūpyadhātu* that may be thus designated. The reason seems to be that it exists in a condition where there are no real material things and at the same time contains Seeds from which matter (re)emerges when the respective being returns to the corporeal world. According to Buescher, almost the same can indeed be said of the "proper *sarvabījakam vijñānam*" of the Saṁdh, with the decisive difference that in its case, because he takes *vijñaptimātratā* to be presupposed, this situation holds good for the other two world-spheres as well. Now, if I understand Buescher correctly, he does not mean that the "proper *sarvabījakam vijñānam*" was developed from the "proto-*sarvabījakam vijñānam*" in the *ārūpyadhātu* because of systematic or exegetical problems comparable to the one raised in the *IP* in connection with *nirodhasamāpatti*.[1485] The "proper *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*" is for him rather an indispensable component of the introduction of the *vijñaptimātra*-paradigm (cf. § 296), and the "proto-*sarvabījakam vijñānam*" in the *ārūpyadhātu* rather a kind of model along which the introduction of the "proper *sarvabījakam vijñānam*" in Saṁdh V.2–3 was structured. Not, of course, the "proto-*sarvabījakam vijñānam*" in the *ārūpyadhātu* as such (where experiences of material objects are absent[1486]),[1487] but rather its *descent* from *ārūpyadhātu* into the two lower *dhātu*s where

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[1484] I apologize for having, by inadvertence, dropped *vijñānam* in my reconstruction of the beginning of Saṁdh V.3 in S 1987: 324 (n. 352), as Buescher (B: 145 n. 2) rightly notes.

[1485] Such problems are, to be sure, raised in MSg I.39–41 or KSi § 34 (KSi_{Mu} 41,8-16; cf. ibid. 42,5-10) but do not seem to have bothered the early Yogācāras or the Vaibhāṣikas. The problem that entering into *nirodhasamāpatti* in the *ārūpyadhātu* would leave a person without both mind and body can be avoided by confining this *samāpatti* to the *kāma*- and *rūpadhātu*, and this is indeed the position of the early Yogācāras (YBh_t P zi 76b4; YBh_c 607b7f), the Vaibhāṣikas (Vi 778c1 and 779b13-19; AK[Bh] 71,16ff; NA 402c8-10; possible exception: ADīVṛ 98,5f, cf. B: 57 n. 1) and the Theravādins (VisM XXIII.29 with VisM-mhṭ (Rew.) III 1673 [ad XXIII.25]; cf. COLLINS 1982: 246 and 305 n. 34; cf. also *Vimuttimagga* [T 32.1648] 461a28f and b2f; EHARA 1977: 323,7f and 10f); cf., in this connection, also AN III 192–194 and the Skt. version in AKVy 164f. But with the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* the occurrence of *nirodhasamāpatti* even in the *ārūpyadhātu* is no longer problematic and can be admitted (YBh_c 607b8-10). Cf. KRITZER 2003b: 378 with n. 149.

[1486] For a special exception admitted in the VinSg see fn. 218.

[1487] The suggestion that the idea of an existence of exclusively mental sentient beings (i.e., sentient beings without a body, living in an immaterial sphere) may have served as a model for an 'idealist'

material things (re)emerge. Accordingly, he refers Saṁdh V.2, at any rate its last sentence, to the *rūpa-* and *ārūpyadhātu*, and V.3 to 'linking-up' in the *kāmadhātu* (see § 135).

266. However, this is hardly convincing. First, it is not clear whether in the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' the mind was considered to also contain the Seeds of external matter (see § 263.3). Second, the first part of Saṁdh V.2 is, to be sure, clearly aimed at re-designing the process of rebirth ('linking up' and subsequent growth) — in terms of the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* and a twofold *upādāna* — in a *comprehensive* perspective. But actually this redesigning is carried out in such a way that it is *ordinary* rebirth in the world-sphere of sensual pleasures (*kāmadhātu*) as a *human* being (or, at most, a mammal) that determines the phraseology ("merges [into semen-cum-blood],[1488] grows, increases and expands")[1489] — a phraseology which, as rightly pointed out by Matsumoto (M2: 357,10-13; 362,5f), is essentially canonical.[1490] The comprehensiveness of the perspective is confirmed by the final sentence of Saṁdh V.2 (55,13-15), where the preceding description of rebirth is expressly stated to be valid for all the three *dhātu*s, with the qualification that the distinction of a twofold *upādāna* holds good only in the case of rebirth in a sphere where there is corporeal matter (*gzugs can gyi khams na* = **rūpiṇi dhātau*, i.e., in the *kāma-* and/or *rūpadhātu*, not, as Buescher [B: 137,3] puts it, "in the *rūpadhātu*"!), whereas in the *ārūpyadhātu* the *upādāna* does not exist as two (*gnyis su med*).[1491] This comprehensiveness is also clear from the initial enumeration of the six *gati*s and four *yoni*s, but since most of them are peculiar to the *kāmadhātu* this enumeration at the same time confirms the emphasis on rebirth in just this world-sphere. Thus, the description of the function of the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* in Saṁdh V.2 is, to be sure, meant to be, *yathāyogam*, comprehensive, but is nonetheless in the first place concerned with rebirth in the *kāmadhātu*. Therefore, Buescher's assumption of a *shift* of focus to the *kāmadhātu* in V.3 is problematic. What one could note in V.3 is a *narrowing down* or further concentration of focus, insofar as in the etymologizing explanations of the terms '*ādānavijñāna*' and '*ālaya-vijñāna*' the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* of V.2[1492] is envisaged particularly in its relation to "this

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philosophy by extending the situation in the *ārūpyadhātu* to the other two world spheres is also found in KAJIYAMA 2000: 84 (= 2011: 346,9-13).

[1488] Skt. **saṁmūrcchati* (see § 127 with fns. 693–694); Tib. *'jug*, lit. "enters [the mother's womb?]".

[1489] In the heavenly worlds, one would have to understand "enters (or fuses with) a new body", but "grows, increases and expands" may not work there.

[1490] For *rgyas shing 'phel ba dang yangs par 'gyur ro* = **vṛddhiṁ virūḍhiṁ vipulatām āpadyate* cf. [1.] DN II 63,13f ≈ DhSk$_D$ 34,5f ≈ AKVy 669,6: preceded by *saṁ-√mūrch*, but the subject is *nāma-rūpa*; [2.] with *viññāṇa* as the subject but not preceded by *saṁ-√mūrch*: SN III 53,9-13 (no. 22.53: *Upayasutta*, ≈ SĀ$_C$ no. 40); 54,29–55,5 (no. 22.54: *Bījasutta*, ≈ SĀ$_C$ no. 39); DN III 228,7-13; [3.] with subject *bījāni* or *bījajātāni*: SN III 54,12f, etc.; AN I 135,6f; DN II 353,10f; [4.] with subject *rukkho*: SN II 89,22f. Cf. also *SWTF* s.v. *vipulatā*. Buescher (B: 136,21-23) tentatively refers the three quasi-synonyms to different stages of development. For a (somewhat different) traditional attempt at differentiation, see fn. 1108.

[1491] This is intelligible to me only if what is meant is that in the *ārūpyadhātu* there is, in the absence of corporeal matter, only the second *upādāna*, viz., that of the *prapañcavāsanā*. This is in fact also the interpretation given by the SaṁdhVy (P co 81b1f). Perhaps, the formulation of the text may be explained as presupposing that in the *ārūpyadhātu* corporeal matter as well exists only in the form of a residue, taken to be included in the *nimitta...vāsanā*; cf. TrBh *8,19 (L. 19,19f; see fn. 1326).

[1492] On p. 142, Buescher criticizes me for having misleadingly taken the sūtra to state that *ādāna-vijñāna* (instead of the mind containing all Seeds) is also called *ālayavijñāna*, basing himself on an incomplete quotation from S 1987 # 1.6.4, viz., (B: 141):

body", i.e., to our present, human existence (cf. § 124). All we can thus say is that these two names are explained with a focus on functions or features that characterize the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* in the kind of existence that is of immediate concern for the presumable audience of the text, and this may hold good for the explanation of the name '*citta*' as well, insofar as it refers to *all* sense objects.[1493]

4.2.8. The Three Names of the 'All-Seed Mind'

267. As for Buescher's thesis (see § 135) that giving three names to the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* and accounting for these names by supplying etymologizing explanations in Saṁdh V.3 has the purpose of pointing out three different functions (with, perhaps, two facets each) of the subliminal mind, it is admittedly ingenious but highly speculative. To my mind, these etymologizing explanations are far too laconic for the purpose of imparting substantial additional information on the subliminal mind. Since the attempt to demonstrate that the *IP* is a later interpolation has been shown to be inconclusive (ch. 3), I still consider my former solution, viz., that the reference to *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 is aimed at equating the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* of V.2 with the *ālayavijñāna* that had emerged in later layers of the MauBh (or their oral background: cf. § 8), the most probable one. But let us have a closer look at the text of Saṁdh V.3, where it is stated that the *vijñāna* described in V.2 (i.e., the **sarvabījaṁ cittam*) is named '*ādānavijñāna*' as well as '*ālayavijñāna*' and '*citta*'.

> ... in one passage it is stated to be also called 'ālayavijñāna'.

It is, however, only in the context of Buescher's text, where the quotation is preceded by Buescher's sentence

> According to Ālayav. § 1.6.4, *ādānavijñāna* has been coined in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*,

that the pronoun "it" can only refer to "*ādānavijñāna*". In the original, the context runs thus:

> Usually, the new kind of *vijñāna* ... is, in those chapters of the Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra where it occurs, called '*ādānavijñāna*'. But in one passage, it is stated to be also called 'ālayavijñāna'.

Every philologically trained reader will naturally understand "it" in the last sentence to take up the "it" that is the subject of the immediately preceding relative clause and recognize that it refers not to "'*ādānavijñāna*'" but to the main subject of the preceding clause, viz., "the new kind of *vijñāna*", i.e., *sarvabījakaṁ cittam* in V.2 (= *rnam par shes pa de* in V.3), as Buescher himself takes it, not contrary to my assertion but contrary to his distorting misinterpretation of my assertion. By the way, this misinterpretation could have been avoided if Buescher had taken a look at S 1987 # 2.8, where it is stated quite explicitly that what is called '*ālayavijñāna*' in Saṁdh V.3 is "the *vijñāna* taught in the preceding paragraph of the text, viz. Mind-containing all-Seeds".

Another case of misrepresentation is Buescher's remark on p. 146 n. 2, where he mixes up two different aspects of what I regard as facets of the early development of the concept of *ālayavijñāna*: on the one hand its becoming — as the successor of the earlier *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* that is also present in the *ārūpyadhātu* — in principle independent of an actually existing physical organism, and, on the other, its being conceived of as a proper *vijñāna* cognizing an object. In the 'Proof Portion', only the former facet is lacking (perhaps, I admit, not "shunned" but simply not addressed), but the latter is clearly expressed in one of its proofs (S 1987 # 5.6.2 and # 9).

[1493] In the *rūpadhātu*, odours (*gandha*) and tastes (*rasa*) do not exist [as actual dharmas] but are present only in the form of potentialities (*dhātu*): cf., e.g., VinSg$_{ms}$ 21a8 (YBh$_{t}$ P zi 51a5f; D zhi 48b2f; YBh$_{c}$ 597b1): *tatra rūpadhātau gandho rasaś ca nāsti, taddhātur asti.*

4.2.8.1. *Ādānavijñāna*

268. The name '*ādānavijñāna*' is the one that is consistently used in the Saṁdh from V.4 onward, i.e., in the rest of ch. V (apart from V.6 where all the three terms reappear: cf. § 291) as well as, albeit only once, in ch. VIII,[1494] and this may give the impression that this name was newly coined in the Saṁdh. However, as has been pointed out by K. MATSUDA,[1495] the *Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā* (YVy) quotes two otherwise unknown Mahāyāna sūtras, named *'Dul ba sgrogs pa zhes bya ba'i mdo*[1496] and *Rin po che bkod pa* (**Ratnavyūha*),[1497] that also use the name *ādānavijñāna*, and the quotation from the latter is practically identical with the Western transmission of Saṁdh V.3 (with the etymologizing explanations of the names *ādāna-* and *ālayavijñāna*) and the beginning of Saṁdh V.4,[1498] apart from the fact that the etymologizing explanation of *citta* and the specification of the six *vijñānakāya*s (Saṁdh p. 56,2-4) are missing. In his earlier paper, MATSUDA (1982b: 667b8-10) suggests that if being more concise is taken as evidence for being older, we might have to acknowledge the **Ratna-vyūhasūtra* as a direct precursor of the Saṁdh. This would, of course, not only challenge the assumption that the name *ādānavijñāna* was newly coined by the Saṁdh but also demolish Buescher's thesis of the originality of the Saṁdh as regards the idea of a subliminal *vijñāna* as a new type of *vijñāna* clearly distinguished from the ordinary set of six. But in my opinion conciseness alone is not a sufficient argument for chronological priority, and we cannot even exclude the possibility that the quotation was abbreviated by the author of the YVy through omitting any phrases he considered redundant, or irrelevant for his purpose. In view of the fact that in contrast to the Saṁdh, which has been included in the VinSg, a **Ratnavyūhasūtra* is not mentioned in any of the 'classical' Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) texts but only in the comparatively late (cf. § 130.1) YVy, it is possible, and perhaps even more likely, that this sūtra is a later product, in which parts of or phrases from the Saṁdh were incorporated. But this is by no means certain, and alternatively Matsuda's hypothesis, especially in its more cautious form that

> there were a number of similar sūtras produced around the same period of time, among which one came to be adopted as chapter 5 of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*,[1499]

should not be lost sight of. This would mean that '**Ratnavyūhasūtra*' was the name of this chapter (or a less developed version) before its integration into the Saṁdh, and that this text even survived under this name for some time. Still, we should keep in mind that this name does not appear in early Yogācāra sources. All we can say is that in some of them[1500] the name *ādānavijñāna* is introduced by way of or in connection with a quotation of the verse (that is now) Saṁdh V.7, and, apart from the full quotation of the Saṁdh in the VinSg, already in MSg I.4 with an explicit indication of the Saṁdh as the source. In contrast to this, the name *ālayavijñāna* is, in the YBh, nowhere connected with a sūtra, and in the MSg (I.2)

[1494] Saṁdh VIII.37.1.1 (116,29f): see § 309.2 and especially Pt. IV §§ 581.3 and 582.3.

[1495] MATSUDA 1982b: 667; cf. 2013: 943f.

[1496] YVy P yi 98b5-7 (D 'i 81b3-5).

[1497] YVy P yi 99a1-4 (D 'i 81b6–82a1).

[1498] Saṁdh$_t$ S na 18a5ff.

[1499] MATSUDA 2013: 944.

[1500] YBh$_t$ P zi 2a6f = YBh$_c$ 579a14-16; HsienY 480c14-16; KSi # 32 (KSi$_{Mu}$ 39,19-25; with explicit reference to Saṁdh as the source).

only with the *Abhidharmasūtra*. Even Vasubandhu, in his *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* (PSVy),[1501] traces the term *ālayavijñāna* back to the *Yogācārabhūmi* in the first place, and only secondly to both the Saṁdh and the "*Abhidharma-dharmaparyāya* of the Mahīśāsakas".

269. In S 1987 (n. 352), I reconstructed the quasi-etymological explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 as **anenâsya kāyasyâttopāttatām upādāya*, adding two question-marks. This reconstruction would no doubt make sense.[1502] Nonetheless, I am afraid the question marks are justified, because instead of *bzung zhing blangs pa'i phyir* in the Eastern transmission,[1503] the Western transmission has *nye bar bzung zhing blangs pas na*,[1504] which suggests the prefix **upa-* (also?) for the *first* element. Unfortunately, in the Tun-huang version the respective folio is lost. The statement of the *Pañcaskandhaka* (PSk) that *ādāna-vijñāna* is named as it is because it appropriates the body[1505] (PSk 17,6: *kāyopādānam upādāya*; PSkV 58b3: °*dānatām upā*°), which, like the PSk's etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna* (see § 121.2), is obviously based on Saṁdh V.3, likewise appears to confirm a derivate of *upā-√dā*[1506] as the main explanatory element, and the same seems to also hold good for MSg I.5 (see § 273).

[1501] PSVy P chi 25b4f (D chi 22b7f); MUROJI 1993: 116 and 196 (# 14).

[1502] Cf. also fn. 668.

[1503] Cf. KATŌ (K.) 2006.

[1504] Saṁdh$_t$ S na 18a5.

[1505] In BUESCHER 2010: 353, the PSk's explanation of *ādānavijñāna* is rendered as

> It is also the 'appropriating consciousness' ... qua assuming the assimilation of its physical organism (*tatkāyopādānam upādāya*).

Apart from the odd rendering of the quasi-postposition *upādāya* (see § 120.2), the construction of *tat* with *kāya-* in the sense of "its body" is hardly possible; for if "its body" means "*ālayavijñāna*'s body", it should, probably, be *svakāya-*, and it is hard to see to what else *tat-* in the function of a possessive genitive could meaningfully refer in the context (one might think of "the body of the [respective person], but such a specification appears superfluous and is in fact absent in the case of the immediately preceding *kāyālīnatā*). Theoretically, one could, perhaps, understand *tatkāya-* as a karmadhāraya in the sense of "the [aforementioned] body", referring to *kāya* in the preceding *kāyālīnatām upādāya*, but it surely makes much better sense to follow the Tibetan translation (*len pa'i rnam par shes pa yang de yin te | lus len pa'i phyir ro ||*) in construing *tat* as an anaphoric pronoun taking up *ālayavijñāna* as the subject of the sentence:

> The [aforementioned *ālayavijñāna*] is also [called] 'appropriating mind', because it appropriates the body.

We thus have to transcribe the passage as:

> *ādānavijñānam api tat, kāyopādāna(tā)m upādāya.*

See also the explanation of the phrase in PSkBh P 200a2: *kun gzhi de la ming du len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya'o || zhes bya ba'i don to ||*), and the parallel phraseology in AS 12,2 (*ādānavijñānam api tat*) and MSg I.4 (*de ni len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes kyang bya ste*), where there is definitely no alternative possibility of construing the pronoun. Cf. also KSi # 33 (KSi$_{Mu}$ 39,26-28: *de yang ... len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya'o*) and PSVy P chi 24b2f (*len pa'i rnam par shes pa yang de yin te*; cf. fn. 1514).

[1506] Instead of **upātta*, the non-standard form **upādatta* (cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 199,12; ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 300,17 and 19 = ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 190,7f) may be preferable (M2: 428 n. 35). But *upātta* is also found: cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 202,20 (= ms.); VinSg$_{ms}$ 17b3.

270. For Matsumoto (M2: 233ff), the main problem with my reconstruction is, however, my assumption that Tib. *lus* represents, just as in the quasi-etymological explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna*, Skt. *kāya*, and not, as he himself thinks, *ātmabhāva*. His arguments have already (§ 124) been shown to be inconclusive because in the exactly parallel case of the PSk, where Matsumoto (M2: 236–238) argues in the same way, the original Skt. text, published in the meantime, has in fact *kāya* in both cases (PSk 17,5f). In view of the doctrinal difficulty pointed out by Matsumoto, viz., that this explanation does not hold good for an existence in the world-sphere of incorporeality (cf. § 123), the use of *kāya* (and not *ātmabhāva*) in a systematical text like the PSk is hard to explain as a deliberate change but easily understandable if taken over from the Saṁdh, where the quasi-etymological explanations are obviously not intended to be comprehensive definitions (cf. § 124).

271.1. It is important to note that the name *ādānavijñāna*, even though explained in Saṁdh V.3 in terms of the specific function of appropriating[1507] the body, is, after all, given to the **sarvabījaṁ cittam/vijñānam* as such.[1508] Since the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* is expressly taken to be present in the *ārūpyadhātu* as well (and necessarily has to be so), it would surely be misleading to exclude *ādānavijñāna* from that sphere. It merely does not function there in the same way as it does in the other world-spheres, i.e., as appropriating a body, which is, to be sure, the characteristic function to which it owes its name '*ādānavijñāna*' according to the explanation of the sūtra, but this does not mean that it has to perform this function everywhere and that it does not exist or cannot keep its name where this function is not actually performed. And when Buescher (B: 145f), if I understand him correctly, charges me with positively assuming a "functional competence" of *ādānavijñāna* in the *ārūpyadhātu*, he distorts my assumption by taking it to mean that even in the *ārūpyadhātu* there is appropriation of a body.[1509]

[1507] Buescher (B: 143 with n. 2) prefers "assimilating", starting from the use of *upādāna* in the sense of "fuel". I am not sure to what extent this analogy is suitable in the case of the physical organism being *upātta* by the mind, since the physical organism is rather kept alive by the mind instead of being reduced to ashes. But if what is meant is that matter is 'assimilated' by the mind in the sense that it is rendered sentient, it makes sense.

[1508] By the way, the verse adduced by Buescher (B: 145) as quoted by Sthiramati (TrBh *52,18f; L. 44,15f) is not from the lost *Abhidharmasūtra* (as Buescher [B: 145 n. 3] speculates) but from the *Liu men chiao shou hsi ting lun* (六門教授習定論: T 31.1607: 774b4f), a text translated by I-ching 義淨 and ascribed, as far as the verses are concerned, to Asaṅga; cf. Ui 1963 (^{2}1979): 584f.

[1509] This is the impression one gets from B: 146 n. 1, where Buescher states that the only reference adduced by me to substantiate my view is

> to the late subcommentary on MSgr(Bh) I.5. *Asvabhāva does indeed explicitly say that *ādānavijñāna ... gzugs med par yang lus mngon par 'grub pa ste* (MSgrU 240a7f),

which he renders as

> ... [yes,] also in *ārūpya-dhātu* the appropriating consciousness produces a *kāya*.

But *lus* does not render *kāya* here and rather, as MSgU$_C$ 383c6 自體 confirms, *ātmabhāva*, i.e., the subliminal mind is called *ādānavijñāna* not only because it appropriates the five physical sense faculties throughout life but also because it takes hold of a new basis of individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) when the latter comes into being (*mngon par 'grub pa*, intrans.!) at the moment of 'linking-up' (see § 273.2), also in the *ārūpyadhātu* (where the *ātmabhāva* does not, of course, include a physical organism but only mental factors). Buescher's additional remark that the word 'also' (*yang*) "may point to a previously open exegetical question that has here been addressed" is surely off the mark; *yang* rather means: the function of *upādāna* includes the taking hold of a new *ātmabhāva*, and in

271.2. On the other hand, Buescher (B: 147) maintains that

> *ādānavijñāna* has been defined so as to be actually more restricted regarding its functional circumstances than *ālayavijñāna*,

which

> as an all-embracing 'potentialized latency'... is not restricted to, but rather the prerequisite for, any 'cognitive realm' ... (*dhātu*).

I shall come back to *ālayavijñāna* later (ch. 4.2.8.3); for the moment suffice it to note that in the etymological explanation in Saṁdh V.3 the designation of the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* /*vijñānam* as *ālayavijñāna* is, just like that of its designation as *ādānavijñāna*, expressly linked with "this body" (*lus 'di*: cf. § 124), hence explicated in terms of a function it fulfils in our *human* existence (which takes place in the *corporeal* world). In this regard, there is not the slightest difference between the two designations.[1510]

272.1. The etymological explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in terms of appropriating the body would seem to continue the traditional function of *vijñāna* as appropriating physical matter, or the body (see ch. 4.2.5.5), i.e., the function due to which the body is rendered and kept appropriated (*upātta*) in the sense of being alive and (at least virtually) sentient as long as *vijñāna* does not abandon (*muñcati*, *vijahāti*) it or depart (*apa-√kram*) from it at death.[1511]

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contrast to the function of appropriating the physical organism this function takes place not only in the spheres of corporeal existence but *also* in the *ārūpyadhātu*. Finally, the MSgU is not a "late sub-commentary on MSgr(Bh)", but a commentary on the MSg itself, surely later than the MSgBh but probably not too late because it was already an authoritative text at the time of Hsüan-tsang. Cf. also SAKUMA 2013a.

[1510] Buescher (B: 147) declares that

> the functional aspect of *ādānavijñāna* stands always in relation to *something* that is appropriated by it (cf. also MSgr I.5), whereas in *ārūpyadhātu* there is *per definitionem* hardly any possibility to fulfil this function.

A closer look at the MSg passage referred to (sc., I.5) shows that both *ādāna* (in the name '*ādāna-vijñāna*') and *upādāna* (in its second explanation) admit of being extended so as to include the function of taking hold of a new basis-of-existence (and keeping it going), a function which would work in the *ārūpyadhātu* as well (see fn. 672), and it is in this sense that Sthiramati (TrBh *8,5 and *8,14-18; L. 19,7f and 19,16-19) refers *upādāna* to the *ātmabhāva* as a whole, including not only the physical organism but also the immaterial constituents (*nāman*), present also in the *ārūpyadhātu* (see § 240.3.3). I do not think that *upādāna*, at least in this connection, has anything to do with 'repotentialization' (B: 147 n. 3). As has already been pointed out (§ 240.3.4), I rather take it to refer to the fact that the immaterial factors as a whole emerge from the subliminal mind as elements 'appropriated' in the sense of being integrated in the same *santāna* or sentient being, as is supported by the contextual definition of *upādāna* as *upagamanam ekayogakṣematvena* in TrBh *8,15 (L. 19,17). Besides, the 'appropriation' or 'assimilation' of the *prapañcavāsanā* introduced in Saṁdh V.2 can hardly be missing in the *ārūpyadhātu* (cf. § 266 with fn. 1491), and this *vāsanā* is, in a slightly different terminology (cf. § 22.3), actually stated to function as the objective support (*ālambana*, see § 241.1) of the subliminal mind in the *ārūpyadhātu* in the 'Pravṛtti Portion' (see § 239 with fn. 1313; for Sthiramati's different understanding see § 240.2.2). Of course, if we start from the etymologizing explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3, the function to which this explanation refers cannot but be lacking in the *ārūpyadhātu*, but precisely the same would (against Buescher) also hold good for the function indicated by the explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna*, which has nothing to do with "keeping the impregnated propensities" (*vāsanopādāna*: B: 148,2f) but rather refers, exclusively, to the subliminal *vijñāna*'s merging with the *body* (see §§ 127 and 279).

[1511] Cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 18,16-20; 202,19f; 211,11: see fn. 174.

According to my theory, this function is implicitly associated with *ālayavijñāna* from the very outset (*IP*: see § 40) and explicitly ascribed to it in the PañcBh and the ManoBh of the MauBh by characterizing it as "appropriating the [physical] basis" (*āśrayopādātṛ*). The expression *āśrayopādātṛ* is interpreted in this sense even in a late text like the YVy, where it is explained as characterizing *ālayavijñāna* as the cause of persistence or continued existence (*gnas pa*, **sthiti*?), because due to being appropriated by it (sc., by *ālayavijñāna*) the body does not decay or putrefy.[1512]

272.2. The function of appropriating the *body* and keeping it appropriated in the sense of keeping it alive and sentient is also at the basis of the first argument of the 'Proof Portion' of the *ālayavijñāna* treatise at the beginning of the PañcMBhVin, for one of its arguments is that the traditional *vijñāna*s cannot fulfil this function because they emerge only on a specific, limited basis (i.e., their respective sense faculty or sense organ) and do so only intermittently, and hence cannot appropriate the whole physical basis throughout life (see §§ 233–235).[1513]

272.3. The same idea would, pace Matsumoto (M2: 242–244), also seem to underlie also the explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in the *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* (PSVy), viz., that the *ālayavijñāna* is thus designated because the body (*lus*) is appropriated by it from the moment of 'linking up' (**pratisandhi*) [a new existence] in another community of sentient beings (**nikāyasabhāgāntara*) onward up to death.[1514] This function must be ascribed to the *ālayavijñāna* because the other *vijñāna*s do not pervade the whole body [without interruption] until death.[1515] That what is pervaded is the body (and not the *ātmabhāva* if distinguished from the living body by comprising also the mental *skandha*s as such) is confirmed by the *Ṭīkā* (PSVyṬ),[1516] where the parts of the body occupied by the ordinary *vijñāna*s are specified as the respective sense faculties (or organs), and although the sense of touch is coextensive with the body, tactile awareness and the corresponding feeling arise only in that part of the sense of touch that is in contact with a tangible object, which means that tactile awareness, too, does not pervade, and hence cannot appropriate, the whole body.[1517] Nor does the *mano-*

[1512] YVy P yi 88a2 (D 'i 73a7f): "[*Ālayavijñāna*'s] being the cause of staying on is indicated by the expression '*āśrayopādātṛ*', for [it is only] when (i.e., as long as) appropriated by it (= *ālayavijñāna*) that the body does not rot" (*gnas pa'i rgyu nyid ni | lus len par byed pa zhes gang smos pa ste | 'di ltar des zin na lus rul bar mi 'gyur ba'i phyir ro ||*).

[1513] As for Matsumoto's view (see § 232) that the characterization of *ālayavijñāna* as *āśrayopādātṛ* in the MauBh is based on this paragraph of the 'Proof Portion', see § 235.

[1514] PSVy P chi 24b2f (D chi 22a1f; MUROJI 1993: 106,18-20 and 187): *len pa'i rnam par shes pa yang de yin te | ris mthun pa gzhan du nying mtshams sbyor ba nas brtsams te | nam ma shi'i* (P : *shi ba'i* D) *bar du des lus bzung ba'i phyir ro ||*.

[1515] PSVy P 25a6 (D chi 22b2f; MUROJI 1993: 114,4f and 191): *lus zin pa nyid kyang*[1] *de las gzhan pa'i rnam par shes pa ni nam ma shi'i bar du lus mtha' dag khyab par gnas pa ma yin no ||*.

[1] PSVyṬ D 129b1 supplements to: *lus zin pa nyid kyang kun gzhi rnam par shes pa med par gzhag par mi nus so ||ji lta zhe na | ...*

[1516] PSVyṬ P chi 155a1-b1 (D chi 129b1-6).

[1517] PSVyṬ P 155a2-4 (D 129b2f): *lus kyi rnam par shes pa yang lus mtha' dag la khyab pa ma yin te | reg bya'i yul dang 'brel pa'i phyogs la brten te skye ba'i phyir te | lus kyi dbang po'i phyogs ci tsam la lus kyi rnam par shes pa skye ba de tsam nyid la tshor ba yongs su gcod pa yin no || de bas na de nyid des zin pa yin par grub pa yin no ||*.

vijñāna, which according to the PSVyṬ is based on the heart (**hṛdaya*).[1518] The *ālayavijñāna*, on the other hand, is not confined to a specific area (*yul*) of the body but pervades it in a way of complete and constant mutual connectedness, not like the wind that pervades the body while [alternately] contracting and expanding.[1519] Nowhere do these texts mention, in this connection, the mental factors as being pervaded by *vijñāna* (or *ālayavijñāna*), and this would indeed hardly be meaningful, for sentience is their very nature.[1520] Accordingly, they are, in the traditional context of 'biological' appropriation, rather regarded as belonging, along with *vijñāna*, to the appropriating part.[1521]

272.4. For this reason, I do not see any difficulty in understanding the Saṁdh's etymologizing explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* as referring to the 'biological' appropriation of the body as its typical (though, in view of its absence in the *ārūpyadhātu*, not omnipresent) function. This is, in fact, precisely how Wŏn-ch'ŭk (圓測, Ch. Yüan-ts'ê) explains the passage, explicitly distinguishing its purport from the more complex etymologizing explanations of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (I.5) and the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論) and thus demonstrating, once again (see § 118.2), a remarkable 'historical sense':

> Because this mind appropriates the physical sense faculties throughout the body so that they do not decay, one calls this mind the appropriating-and-maintaining [mind] (i.e., *ādānavijñāna*).[1522]

273.0. Even so, the non-applicability of the Saṁdh's etymological explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* to the sphere of incorporeality could, later on, easily have been felt to be unsatisfactory. At any rate, in the next ancient source, the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg), the original explanation is supplemented or, perhaps, developed[1523] in such a way that a comprehensive application was involved or at least possible.

[1518] PSVyṬ P 155a4f: *yid kyi rnam par shes pa yang ... snying kha kho nar gnas pas lus thams cad la khyab pa ma yin no* ||. Cf. fn. 391.

[1519] PSVyṬ P 155a6-b1: *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni ... lus kun la khyab pa yin ... no* || *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa yul na mi gnas par ji ltar 'grub ce na* | *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa rlung gi khams bzhin du zhum pa'am* | *rgyas shing lus mtha' dag la khyab pa ma yin no zhes brjod par bya'o* || *'on kyang lus mtha' dag dang* | *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa gnyis phan tshun 'brel cing 'jug pa yin pa'i phyir lus mtha' dag la khyab pa yin no zhes brjod par bya'o* ||.

[1520] If they, too, were dependent on a pervasion by *vijñāna* for their sentience, they (or the series they constitute) should, similar to the body, continue in an insentient form when abandoned by *vijñāna*, which sounds absurd. Cf. also fn. 1282 [II].

[1521] Thus, e.g., AKBh 23,16 (see § 207 with fn. 1153).

[1522] SaṁdhṬ$_C$ 246a20f: 由此識 隨逐於身 執受色根 令不失壞，故說此識 名為執持。

[1523] It is hard to decide whether the two expressions juxtaposed in the etymological explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 were from the outset aimed at different facets of the function of appropriating the body, e.g., appropriation of a new body at the moment of 'linking up' and keeping it appropriated afterwards throughout life. At any rate, such a distinction could easily have been read into the text, and this may indeed be what Sthiramati has done when he distinguishes, in his commentary on the explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in the PSk, between *ādāna-/ālayavijñāna*'s appropriating the body at the moment of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) and its keeping it appropriated (i.e., alive and sentient) until death by continuing to function with the *whole* body as its basis (*samasta-kāyāśrayeṇa*!) (PSkV ms. 58b4f and 59a4f; PSkV$_t$ P hi 54a2f and 8f). It should, however, be noted that the distinction made in the MSg is quite different.

273.1. The first explanation of the MSg (I.5) is practically identical with Wŏn-ch'ŭk's (and my own) interpretation of that of the Saṁdh:

> Why is it (= *ālayavijñāna*) called *ādānavijñāna*? [1.1] Because it appropriates all the physical sense faculties, ... To be more precise: [2.1.] [due to being] appropriated by it, the [five] physical sense faculties continue throughout life undestroyed (/without dying, i.e., without putrefying).[1524]

That in this explanation the body (*kāya*) of Saṁdh V.3 has been replaced with the physical sense faculties (*rūpīndriya*) is worth noting but not likely to constitute a fundamental difference (cf. § 76.6). Perhaps the intention is merely to make sure that appropriation is limited to the *sentient* body, i.e., does not include hair, finger-nails, etc. (except for their roots).[1525] In fact, the *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* explicitly states that the physical sense faculties are meant to include, in this passage, also the primary elements of their seats and those sense objects (visibles, etc.) that are inseparable from them (see § 76.6.4).

[1524] My translation of the explication follows the quasi-quotation in Guṇaprabha's PSk commentary (PSkViv P hi 95b3f; D si 26b4):

> [1.1] *dbang po gzugs can thams cad len pa... 'i phyir te | 'di ltar* [2.1] *des dbang po gzugs can dag zin na ji srid 'tsho'i bar du mi 'chi bar gnas so ||*.

This rendering agrees fairly well with Hsüan-tsang's translation (MSg$_{Hs}$ 133b29–c2), and basically also with Buddhaśānta's (apart from the fact that the latter has "bases itself on" (依) and "taken as a basis by it" (彼依) instead of "appropriates" and "appropriated by it": MSg$_{Bu}$ 97c6-8). The Skt. original may be reconstructed as

> [1.1] **sarvarūpīndriyopādānatām upādāya ...; tathā hi* [2.1] **tenopagṛhītāni rūpīndriyāṇy avinaṣṭāni (/avināśīni?) yāvadāyur anuvartante* (cf. S 1987: 563).

The Tib. translation of MSg (and MSgU) must have read **yāvad āyur anuvartate* and has *kyi rgyu yin pa* ("is the [material] cause *(upādāna)* of ...") instead of *len pa* (and VGPVy P li 376a2 *nye bar len par byed pa*) in [1.1], and it has *nye bar bzung* (D : *gzung* ed.) *ba* for *zin pa* and *ma zhig par* for *mi 'chi bar* in [2.1]. As for the reconstruction, Matsumoto (M2: 431 n. 45) objects to °*tām upādāya*, but the abstract suffix is confirmed by VGPVy P li 376a2 (D ri 313a1f) *nye bar len par byed pa nyid* (P : *pa de nyid* D) and 376a4 (D 313a3) *gnas su gyur pa nyid*. Moreover, he rejects **upagṛhīta* in favour of **upātta* (M2: 241,1 and 431f n. 46) because examples of Tib. *nye bar gzung ba* rendering *upādāna* can be found in PrasP (20,5 and 452,1 = D 'a 7a3 and 147b5) and because otherwise the explanation would not be an etymology of the name *ādāna(vijñāna)*. Actually, **upātta* would not create any problem for me. But Matsumoto's arguments are hardly convincing. For it may not be helpful to adduce, for the equation *nye bar gzung ba* = *upādāna*, instances where *upādāna* is used in a completely different sense (viz., "employment" of a certain kind of example, and "use" of certain terms in a text), and from a work by a different team of translators at that (PrasP was translated by Pa tshab Nyi ma grags with Mahāsumati and then revised by him with Kanakavarman, MSg was translated by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye shes sde). And what is concerned is not the etymologizing explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* (viz., 1.1, which does use **upādāna*), but its *explication* (2.1), which may justly be expected to replace the etymological expression by a synonym. Actually, *upagṛhīta* is indeed attested as an explicative equivalent of *upātta* in precisely the same context at AKBh 23,16 (EJ. 36,11): *upāttam iti ko 'rthaḥ? yac cittacaittair adhiṣṭhānabhāvenôpagṛhītam* ..., and here too Tib. has *nye bar gzung ba* (AKBh$_t$ D ku 43a6) or ~ *bzung ba* (AKVy$_t$ P cu 70a1); as for its meaning, see AKVy 66,3f: *upagṛhītā(ḥ) ... svīkṛtā ity arthaḥ*. Incidentally: although the sense faculties are the seats and physical support of mind and mental factors, they are, in their turn, dependent on the latter for their remaining part of a living, sentient organism that does not putrify (cf. AKBh 23,16: *anyonyānuvidhānāt*; see § 166[1–3]).

[1525] Cf. AKBh 23,14f (EJ. 36,9f).

273.2. To this explanation, however, the author of MSg I.5 has added a second one, which according to my — admittedly debatable — understanding[1526] may be translated as follows:

> ... and [1.2] because it is the basis of taking hold (**upādāna*) of the whole individual existence (**ātmabhāva*). To be more precise: ... [2.2] due to its (**tad-*, i.e., *ālaya-vijñāna*'s)[1527] coming about (*abhinirvṛtti*, i.e., entrance into a new existence) being taken hold of[1528] at [the moment of] 'linking up' [a new existence] (**pratisandhibandha*), the

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[1526] Cf. S 1987: 560–564.

[1527] Cf. S 1987: 562.

[1528] In S 1987: 554f (⑬ⓑ), I suggested **tadabhinirvṛttyupagrahaṇena* as a reconstruction of Tib. *de mngon par 'grub pa nye bar 'dzin pa'i phyir*. Matsumoto prefers the ablative instead of the instrumental (M2: 434,20f) and emphatically argues for **upādāna* instead of **upagrahaṇa*, understanding *upā-√dā* in the special sense of "taking something as support" (M2: 433,15: あるものを„基体“として「取る」こと), with *ālayavijñāna* as the object, i.e., he takes the passage to mean that "due to taking hold of *ālayavijñāna*, i.e., making it a 'locus', the *ātmabhāva* is taken hold of" (433,17f: アーラヤ識を「取ること」... 、つまり、アーラヤ識を„基体“とすることによって、ātmabhāva が取られる; cf. 435,5). I have no problem with the ablative instead of the instrumental (which I had chosen in view of the instrumental in PSkViv P hi 95b4: ... *len pas*), nor would **upādāna* instead of **upagrahaṇa* constitute a fundamental difference from my point of view. But if Matsumoto argues, in other contexts, that the repeated use of one and the same Tibetan equivalent in one and the same sentence or closely connected set of sentences suggests the identity of the respective Sanskrit words, why does he not accept the reverse principle, viz., that the choice of different equivalents suggests different Sanskrit expressions? Actually, as the first principle has been demonstrated to be unreliable (see § 124), the reverse principle will not be infallible either. But when, as in the present case, a statement (1.1, 1.2) is followed by an *explication* (2.1, 2.2), a variation of phraseology may not be improbable (cf. fn. 1524). For this reason, I tend to regard the change of phraseology in the explicative part of the Tibetan version of MSg I.5 to indicate a corresponding change of phraseology in the original. However, as far as the phrase under discussion (viz., **tad-abhi*°) is concerned, such a change is not confirmed by the PSkViv (P hi 95b3f; D si 26b4f), for it has *len pa* here, just as in [1.1] and in [1.2]. Moreover, the explication in [2.2] of *lus ... nye bar len pa* in [1.2] is not the *nye bar 'dzin pa* in the expression under discussion but rather *lus bzung ba* (PSkViv P hi 95b5: *lus zin pa*) at the end of [2.2]. Thus, a final decision on the matter may not be possible.

As for the *Chinese* versions (cf. M2: 434,5ff), they seem to follow, on the whole, a completely different strategy, for on the one hand all of them differentiate, in their renderings, the **upādāna* of the first etymology [1.1] from that of the second one [1.2], but on the other hand they tend to retain their respective renderings in the explications ([2.1] and [2.2]). Thus, Buddhaśānta (MSg$_{Bu}$ 97c6-9) employs 依 ("to depend on") in [1.1] and [2.1] but 取 ("to take [hold of]") in [2.1] and [2.2]. In [1.1] and [2.1] Hsüan-tsang (MSg$_{Hs}$ 133b29–c3) has 執受 ("to appropriate") and Dharmagupta (MSg$_{Dh}$ 274a12-15) uses 攝持 ("to adopt and support"), but both prefer 取 in [1.2] as well as in [2.2], though only in the passage under discussion (**tadabhi*°), but not at the end, viz., in the statement that the *ātmabhāva* has been taken hold of, where Hsüan-tsang chooses 執受(!) and Dharmagupta 得 ("obtained").

Paramārtha (MSg$_{Pa}$ 114a13-17), too, has 執持 ("to appropriate and support") in [1.1] and [2.1], against 取 in [1.2] and [2.2], but in the passage under discussion, his rendering 能生取陰 ("bringing about the *upādānaskandhas*"), adduced by Matsumoto (M2: 434,11f) as particularly supporting **upādāna*, appears problematic because it would at any rate presuppose **upādānābhinirvṛtti* (or even °*nirvartana*) instead of *(*tad*)*abhinirvṛttyupādāna*. Actually, in Paramārtha's translation with *Bhāṣya* (MSgBh$_{Pa}$) there is a variant indicating that the 'three editions' and the old Sung edition read 能取生陰 in both the mūla text (158a4) and in the commentary (158a13),[1] which would correspond exactly to *(*tad*)*abhinirvṛttyupādāna* (or -*upagrahaṇa*), suggesting that Paramārtha took *(*tad*)*abhinirvṛtti* to refer not to *ālayavijñāna* but to the *skandhas* (陰), i.e., the *ātmabhāva*, at the moment of their first emergence in the new existence (生 = *abhinirvṛtti*, in the sense of *upapattibhava*, i.e., at the moment of 'linking up'

[new] individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) [as a whole] has [automatically] been taken hold of.

[1.2] *lus thams cad nye bar len pa'i gnas su gyur pa'i phyir te | 'di ltar ...* [2.2] *nying mtshams sbyor ba sbrel ba na yang de mngon par 'grub pa nye bar 'dzin pa'i phyir lus bzung* [D : *gzung* ed.] *ba yin te |*

I take this somewhat difficult explanation to be an adaptation of what in pre- or non-*ālaya-vijñāna* phraseology is indicated by the statement that by the formation of a new proto-embryonic psycho-physical complex (*nāmarūpa*) at the moment of 'linking up', a new individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) is taken hold of,[1529] also in the sense that its initial stage (=*nāmarūpa*), though still incomplete, is already established (or 'programmed') as the *cause* of the *complete* individual existence until death.[1530] In the 'Pravṛtti Portion' of the *ālaya-vijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin, a new individual existence is initiated by the coming about or entering into existence (**abhinirvṛtti*) of a 're-programmed' *ālayavijñāna* due to its embracing (**parigraha*) the maturation (**vipāka*) of previous karmic imprints,[1531] and this new *ālayavijñāna* is the root (**mūla*) or Seed (*bīja*) of all physical and mental factors that constitute the new individual existence.[1532] It is, essentially, in this sense that I, provisionally,

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[cf. AKBh 124,20]). By taking hold of them, *ālayavijñāna* automatically takes hold of the whole *ātma-bhāva*, in whichever destiny, because the Seeds of all of them are completely present in it (158a15f).

I am not sure whether the Chinese evidence justifies any conclusions regarding the phraseology of the Sanskrit original. If anything, one might suspect that the two etymologies made use of different expressions, e.g., *upādāna* in [1.1] vs. *ādāna* in [1.2], but this would hardly be compatible with the Tibetan evidence supporting *upādāna* precisely for [1.2] but also for [1.1] (cf. VGPVy P li 376a2 and 4; D ri 313a1f and a3) unless we imagine a later revision of the text. It is perhaps more likely that the Chinese translators chose their equivalents ad sensum, i.e., used different expressions for different applications of the term *upādāna*.

[1] For the commentary, the Taishō ed. (p. 158 n. 4) notes yet another v.l. (siglum 【聖】, referring to old mss. pre-dating the printed editions), with 之取 instead of the 取陰 of the Taishō ed., hence obviously with no reference to the *skandhas*.

[1529] Cf. MAV I.10b with MAVBh 21,14f: *saṁparigrahān nāmarūpeṇâtmabhāvasya*; AS 27,3f (AS_G 26,14; cf. KRITZER 1999: 37): *nāmarūpaṁ ... ātmabhāvaṁ ... sattvān grāhayati*, on which ASBh 32,19f remarks: *tannirvṛttyā sattvānāṁ nikāyasabhāgāntarabhajanāt*.

[1530] MAVṬ 37,23-25: *ā maraṇāt sarvam evâtmabhāvaṁ parigṛhṇāti, tatprathamataḥ sarvasya hetu-bhāvena vyavasthānād iti.*

[1531] YBh_t P zi 6a3f (D zhi 5a6; YBh_c 580b24-26; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1019b3f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 31f # **3.b**.B.2; WALDRON 2003: 182 [slightly different]; cf. S 1987 n. 417):

Another kind of imprint (*vāsanā*) of the [*pravṛttivijñānas*, more precisely: of those that have karmic force] leads to the acquisition (**parigraha*), in the future (= next life), of [a new] *ālayavijñāna* as the [result-of-]maturation (**vipāka*) of precisely those [karmically forceful *pravṛttivijñānas*] (?).

de'i bag chags kyi rigs gzhan ni phyi ma la kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de dag [P : om. D] *nyid kyi rnam par smin pa yongs su 'dzin pa'i phyir 'jug par 'gyur ro ||*

Cf. the introductory formulation in YBh_t P zi 5b8: the *pravṛttivijñānas* function as the condition of *ālayavijñāna* "by generating an acquisition of (i.e., making it acquire or absorb) Seeds of its (own) coming about [as the *ālayavijñāna* of a new existence] in the future" (*tshe phyi ma la de mngon par 'grub pa'i sa bon yongs su 'dzin pa skyed par byed pas so*, representing something like **āyatyāṁ tad-abhinirvṛttibījaparigrahajananataḥ*).

[1532] YBh_t P zi 8a5f and 8b1 (D zhi 7a2f and 7a5; YBh_c 581a26-28 and b4; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020a14f and 18f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 37f # **5.b**.A.1 and 4): *de (= ālayavijñāna) ni sems can gyi 'jig rten 'grub pa'i rtsa ba yin te | dbang po rten dang bcas pa rnams dang | 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa rnams skyed par byed pa yin pa'i phyir ro || ... kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de nyid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir ....*

understand the second etymological explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* in MSg I.5. I therefore agree with Matsumoto in that in this explanation *ālayavijñāna* is, in a sense, conceived of as the basis of the *ātmabhāva* (and not the other way round). But I am not sure I would equate this function of basis with his concept of 'locus', because what is addressed in the first place seems to be the function of a *source* from which the *ātmabhāva* develops, though, to be sure, a source that remains continuously present throughout the respective individual existence, but its precise ontological relation to the physical organism would still seem to be left in suspense.[1533]

274. However this may be, by interpreting the function indicated by the name *ādāna-vijñāna* not only in terms of the 'biological' appropriation of the physical sense faculties (i.e., the body) but also in terms of taking hold of the individual existence (*ātmabhāva*) as a whole, MSg I.5 points the way towards a more comprehensive interpretation of this name. This is made explicit by *Asvabhāva, who states that the taking hold of the new *ātmabhāva* at the moment of 'linking up' holds good not only for reincarnations where the sense faculties are not yet complete at this stage but also for a rebirth in the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*),[1534] i.e., for an individual existence that consists of immaterial constituents only, hence for any individual existence whatsoever. It would seem to be for this reason, i.e., for the sake of comprehensiveness, that in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* the name *ādāna-vijñāna* is explained, at least in part of the textual tradition,[1535] as referring to the fact that time and again, at the moment of 'linking up', this *vijñāna* takes hold of [a new basis of] individual existence (*ātmabhāvopādāna*).[1536] The same may also hold good for another

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[1533] As far as I can see (cf. § 15.3), the first chapter of the MSg tries, on the whole, to argue without explicitly presupposing *vijñaptimātratā* (which is introduced only in the second chapter).

[1534] $MSgU_t$ P li 240a7f (D ri 196a4f; $MSgU_c$ 383c5f; cf. also fn. 1509).

[1535] ASBh 11,12f (quoted in B: 142f): *punaḥ punaḥ pratisaṁdhibandhe ātmabhāvopādānād ādāna-vijñānam*. This sounds reasonable and is essentially confirmed by $ASVy_t$ P shi 163a2 = D li 134a3 (*yang dang yang nying mtshams sbyor ba'i lus len pa'i phyir* ...; read *sbyor ba'i* ⟨*tshe*⟩?; or <°*bandhā-tmabhāvo*°?), but the Skt. ms. seems to read °*bandhedādānavijñānam*, with °*ātmabhāvopādānā*° added in the top margin, and $ASBh_t$ P shi 11b8f = D li 9b6 has ... *sbyor bar byed pas len pa'i rnam par shes pa'o*, which may presuppose °*bandhād ādānavijñānam*. Suspicion is confirmed by the Chinese translation ($ASVy_C$: 701b1f), which has "It is [called] *ādānavijñāna* because time and again it causes a [new] life to be 'linked up' [and] supports the sense faculties, etc., so that they do not decay" (阿陀那識者，謂 能數數令生相續 持諸根等令不壞故). The second half of this translation obviously corresponds to the first explanation of MSg I.5 ('biological appropriation') and hence substantially to the etymology of Saṁdh V.3. I am unable to decide whether this is Hsüan-tsang's personal interpretation of *ātmabhāvopādānād* or whether he had a somewhat different wording before him.

[1536] As Matsumoto (M2: 235) points out, this explanation (in its longer version) is quite close to that of the *Karmasiddhi*, viz.,

> *de yang yang srid par nying mtshams sbyor bar byed pa dag na lus nye bar len pa'i phyir len pa'i rnam par shes pa zhes bya'o* || (KSi # 33; KSi_{Mu} 39,26-28), i.e.,
>
> And because it appropriates the body (/basis-of-individual-existence) when a new existence is 'linked up' (**punarbhavapratisandhibandhe(ṣu?)*), it is called *ādānavijñāna*.

Whether this parallelism justifies Matsumoto's conclusion that in the KSi, too, *lus* must therefore represent *ātmabhāva* (and not *kāya*) must be left undecided. After all, Vasubandhu's PSk has *kāyopā-dāna* (§ 269 and fn. 1505), and in my opinion the same holds probably good for his PSVy as well (see § 272.3). Nor do the two Chinese translations of the KSi offer decisive evidence because both of them (T 31.1608: 780a12; T 31.1609: 784c27) have 身, which suggests *kāya* but may stand for *ātmabhāva*

passage of this text according to which it is due to being appropriated by *ālayavijñāna* that the *ātmabhāva* becomes and remains present (*upasthāna*),[1537] although in this case the subsequent explication that if separated from *vijñāna* the *āśraya* starts rotting shows that emphasis is still on the physical organism.[1538] But to interpret *ālayavijñāna*'s function of appropriation as comprising all forms of existence would in any case seem to be the background against which Sthiramati in his *Triṁśikābhāṣya* (see § 240.3.3-4) felt motivated to redefine, albeit without explicit reference to the name *ādānavijñāna*, *ālayavijñāna*'s function of *upādāna* in a broader sense comprising not only the 'biological' appropriation of the physical sense faculties and their seats but also an 'appropriation' of the immaterial constituents (*nāman*), in the sense of 'approaching', or holding on to, the *ātmabhāva* as a whole so as to share a common destiny (*upagamanam ekayogakṣematvena*).[1539]

4.2.8.2. *Citta*

275. As regards the third name, viz., '*citta*', it is indisputably a canonical term, interpreted, however, in Saṁdh V in the specific meaning of the **sarvabījaṁ cittam/vijñānam* as a continuous subliminal form or layer of the mind.[1540] The etymologizing explanation[1541] in Saṁdh V.3 may be reconstructed as

> **cittam ity apy ucyate, ... tasya rūpaśabdarasagandhaspraṣṭavyadharmācitopacitatām upādāya.*

A literal translation would run thus:

> It (= the **sarvabījaṁ vijñānam*) is also called *citta*, because (or: taking into account that) it has been accumulated and heaped up by (or: filled/overspread and covered over with)

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as well. By the way, it may be worth noting that Hsüan-tsang's version, just as in the case of ASVy$_{C}$ (see fn. 1535), seems to divide the argument into two (perhaps on the basis of reading a cpd. °*pratisandhibandha*° instead of a locative?):

> It 'links up' the next existence [and] it appropriates-and-supports the body: therefore this [*vijñāna*] is called *ādānavijñāna* (T 31.1609: 784c27: 能續後有 能執持身 故說此名阿陀那識。).

I have rendered 身 by 'body' because it is obvious that Hsüan-tsang thinks of 'biological' appropriation in contrast to the taking hold of a new existence expressed by his first argument.

1537 ASBh 45,5 (explaining the definition of *vijñāna* as the *aupādānika āhāraḥ*): *ālayavijñānopādānavaśenâtmabhāvopasthānāt*. That *upasthāna* should be understood here as at least including the nuance of *remaining* present (and basically intact) is supported by Tib. and Chin., where *ātmabhāvopasthānāt* is rendered as *lus gnas pa'i phyir* (ASBh$_{t}$ P shi 41a8) and 身得住故 (ASBh$_{C}$ 716c12), respectively. The use of *ātmabhāva* (and not *kāya*) may indeed be deliberate in order to guarantee the applicability of the definition to the *ārūpyadhātu* as well (cf. ASBh 45,9f: *śuddhāśuddhāśrayasthitikaḥ* [sc. *āhāraḥ*]) *śaikṣāṇāṁ rūpārūpyāvacarāṇāṁ ca pṛthagjanānām*).

1538 ASBh 45,6: *tathāhi tadviyukta āśrayaḥ pūtībhavati* (see fn. 1187). Cf. 52,12f (see fn. 1188), where in a similar statement the subject is *kāyaḥ*.

1539 TrBh *8,14-19 (L. 19,16-20).

1540 In S 1987: 123 (discussed in B: 149f), I have called this identification "isolated" because in Saṁdh V no explicit attempt is made to expressly correlate the other two concepts of the triad *citta/manas/vijñāna* (Saṁdh V.1) with other forms or aspects of the mind, as later sources do.

1541 *sems zhes kyang bya ste | 'di ltar de ni gzugs dang sgra dang dri dang ro dang reg bya dang chos rnams kyis*[1] *kun tu bsags pa dang nye bar bsags pa yin pa'i phyir ro* ||; S na 18a6f differs slightly: *de ltar de ni .... rnams kyis kun tu bsgrubs shing rab tu bsags pas na sems zhes kyang bya ste* |.

1 Lamotte's addition of *rnams kyis* is confirmed by YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 58a8 (*chos rnams kyis kyang*).

visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, objects of touch and dharmas (i.e., objects of non-sensory cognition).

276. I still have to admit that I find this explanation, as it stands, somewhat puzzling and in need of some supplementation. In fact, even Buescher cannot manage without adding an allusion to impregnation by previous experiences when he translates (B: 149):

> ...with reference to the fact that it is present as[1542] assembled (*ācita*) and accumulated (*upacita*) by [previous experiences of] sensory forms, sounds ...,

and in the Yogācāra tradition too the subliminal mind is usually considered to be called *citta* because it is accumulated by or filled with the Seeds (*bīja*) or impregnations (*vāsanā*) of all dharmas (in a comprehensive sense).[1543] But as far as the formulation in Saṁdh V.3 is concerned, I do not understand how Buescher (B: 150,4-6) can assert that it

> is clearly contrary to the facts if the presence of *bīja* in this explanation is denied.

The *explanation* definitely does *not* contain the words *bīja* or *vāsanā*, and the fact that the word *bīja* is contained in the definiendum **sarvabījaṁ vijñānam* is not equivalent to its presence in the quasi-etymological explanation itself, because otherwise the same could be maintained for the other two explanations as well, and at least in the case of the explanation of the name *ādānavijñāna* this would hardly be acceptable to Buescher. Had the author of Saṁdh V.3 indeed, by designating the **sarvabījaṁ vijñānam* as '*citta*', intended to point out that

> by assimilating all the cognitive experience, it is ... the constantly assembled (*ācita*) and accumulated (*upacita*) cognitive foundation [from which, in turn, its intentional functions (*caitta*)[1544] originate to assemble new experiences ...] (B: 154,16ff),

wouldn't one expect him to have employed, in order to introduce this new aspect, a somewhat more explicit formulation?

277. Actually, the somewhat enigmatic form of the etymologizing explanation of the name *citta* in Saṁdh V.3 becomes fully understandable as soon as one is aware of the fact that it has almost[1545] literally been taken over from another source, viz., the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, where it fits in perfectly well. Here, we are told that the yogi who has understood the virtual endlessness (*aparyantatā*) of suffering and its causes tries to deter himself from *saṁsāra* and to turn towards Nirvana, but does not succeed because

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[1542] I do not see any equivalent for "is present as" in the text, neither in the reconstructed Sanskrit nor in the Tibetan translation (which has only *yin pa*, i.e., a simple copula, not to be confounded with *yod pa* "to exist").

[1543] Cf., e.g., YBh$_t$ P zi 189b4 (**sarvabījācitopacita*: see § 250.3.1 with fn. 1371); MSg I.9 (*chos kyi bag chags kyi sa bon sna tshogs rnams kyis kun tu bsags pa'i phyir*); AS 12,1f (AS$_G$ 19,12-14): *cittaṁ ...ālayavijñānam ... tadvāsanācitatām upādāya* (*tad-* = *skandhadhātvāyatana-*, cf. 12,1; ASBh 11,14 ad sensum: *sarvadharma-*); PSk 16,9f (*citaṁ sarvasaṁskārabījaiḥ*).

[1544] I fail to understand why Buescher confines the 'intentional functions' of the subliminal *citta* to the *caitta*s (i.e., *vedanā*, etc.) when they should surely include actual cognitions, i.e., sense perceptions and non-sensory cognitions, called *citta* or *vijñāna* in traditional terms, but by no means to be subsumed under the *caitta*s. Or is he speaking of the *caitta*s with which the subliminal mind itself came (in the course of systematization) to be regarded as associated (*saṁprayukta*)? But these are considered to continue without any change throughout one's life and do not "originate to assemble new experiences".

[1545] As for the addition of the dharmas — the objects of non-sensory cognitive awareness (*manovijñāna*) — to the list of sense objects, see § 278.

for a long time his mind has been addicted to visibles, addicted to sounds, smells, tastes and objects of touch, laden and covered over with visibles, sounds, smells, tastes and objects of touch.
tasya dīrgharātraṁ tac cittaṁ[1546] *rūparataṁ śabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyarataṁ ācitam upacitaṁ rūpaśabdagandharasaspraṣṭavyaiḥ* | (ŚrBh 496,18-21)

There can hardly be any doubt that this passage uses, implicitly, an etymologizing description of *citta* in order to express the idea that the mundane mind is — one is tempted to say: in its uncontrolled, subconscious layers — full of, i.e., imbued with and deeply attached to, sense objects,[1547] and hence not easily turned away from them and directed towards Nirvana.

278. If the author of Saṁdh V does indeed draw on this passage — and in view of the overall relationship of the two texts[1548] I have little doubt that he does —, his message is, in my opinion, fairly obvious: Addressing himself to fellow Yogācāras who still follow the Śrāvakayāna in a fairly traditional form as codified in the ŚrBh, the author of the V^th^ chapter of the Saṁdh wants to convince them that even in their own line of thought they have, though unreflectedly, already accepted a subliminal layer of the mind which is actually nothing else but the **sarvabījaṁ cittaṁ* propounded in the Saṁdh. From *this* point of view, it would then appear possible to interpret the phrase, in the context of the Saṁdh, as pointing to the fact that the **sarvabījaṁ cittam/vijñānam* is laden with the *Seeds* or imprints of sense objects, or of involvement with them, continually recharged by indulging in the corresponding experiences. In the light of the ŚrBh context and also of passages like YBh_{Bh} 19,7f, where desire for the multifarious sense objects (*viṣayaprapañcābhilāṣa*) is one of the basic roots of rebirth, the subliminal **sarvabījaṁ vijñānam* would thus be characterized as the fundamental cause of involvement in *saṁsāra*. At the same time, the seemingly minor addition of the *dharma*s — the objects of non-sensory cognitive awareness (*manovijñāna*) — to the list of the sense objects may well be deliberate. It may be intended to indicate that the Saṁdh, as a Mahāyāna text, is not so much concerned with entanglement in sensuality as with entanglement in the troublesome manifoldness or disparity (*prapañca*) of mundane existence as such and its constitution. I shall come back to this issue later (§ 290).

4.2.8.3. *Ālayavijñāna*

279. Turning now to the second name, i.e., '*ālayavijñāna*', textual evidence is, as far as I can see, incompatible with an understanding of the element *ālaya* in this name in terms of an abstract state of latency. At most, it could be interpreted to mean that the 'All-Seed Mind' is called *ālayavijñāna* in the sense of hiding, or lying hidden, *in the body* (*kāya*) or physical organism,[1549] as Buescher himself seems to accept in the case of Saṁdh V.3.[1550] As pointed

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[1546] SHUKLA's emendation, confirmed by YBh_t P wi 228b1 *sems* and YBh_c 475a24 心; ms. *citraṁ*.

[1547] Cf., in this connection, perhaps also $DhSk_D$ 33,17-19: *yat tad gandharvasya caramaṁ cittaṁ ... ācitam upacitaṁ pratiṣṭhitam a[pra]ha-- -- -- -- --tam* (DIETZ suggests completing *a[pra]ha°... °tam* as *aprahatam aparijñātam*, but *aprah⟨īṇam aparijñā⟩tam* may be preferable).

[1548] Cf. Pt. II § 458.5.1 with fn. 2108.

[1549] Cf. also CHEN 1999: 92f and 95,11-13, summing up the meaning of the term *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3 as "mind hidden in the physical body" (隱藏在肉體中的識) or "mind sticking to the physical body" (附著於肉體上的識).

[1550] B: 137,10-12:

out above (ch. 4.1), this aspect is, however, only a secondary connotation of *ā-√lī*, and my reconstruction of the second element of the quasi-etymological explanation as deriving from *pra-√lī* is somewhat problematic (see § 122.3). The primary meaning of *ā-√lī* is, at any rate, "to stick to", "attach oneself to", "embrace", "resort to", "dwell in". In view of the additional explanatory element **ekayogakṣemārthena* (see §§ 127 and 129[1–2]), it is obvious that the main connotation here is not latency but rather the property of the 'All-Seed Mind' to attach itself to or merge into the body so that they share one and the same destiny (see § 129). This means that in Saṁdh V.3 the name *ālayavijñāna* is apparently taken to point to the same process that is, in Saṁdh V.2, denoted by the verb *'jug pa* = **saṁ-√mūrch* (see § 127), in the sense of "to merge into", "to fuse with",[1551] which in other texts is indeed, just as *ā-√lī* in Saṁdh V.3, elucidated by the expression "sharing each other's welfare/destiny" (*anyonya-yogakṣema*), or "sharing the same destiny" (*ekayogakṣema*).[1552]

280. However, this idea of *vijñāna* merging with embryonic matter (or vice versa) presupposes a 'realist' concept of rebirth (cf. the canonical 'descent' *(okkanti, avakrānti)* of *viññāṇa* into the mother's womb)[1553]. It is thus perfectly consistent with a traditional, 'realist' setting like that of the ManoBh of the YBh, where the process of 'linking-up' is described in detail.[1554] On the other hand, this idea, just as the idea of the subsequent life-long 'biological appropriation' (*upādāna*) of the physical organism by the mind, would surely appear somewhat heterogeneous in a text presupposing a *vijñāptimātra* ontology, as Saṁdh V is assumed to do by Buescher. Wouldn't it be somewhat surprising, and in need of explanation, that such a text emphasizes precisely these two decidedly traditional functions in the novel terminology introduced in order to distinguish its new type of *vijñāna* from the traditional set?

281. Moreover, even if we interpret (as I would do) Saṁdh V's theory of the 'All-Seed Mind' of as starting from a 'realistic' Śrāvakayāna level (though not stopping there: see § 289–291) and take the idea of *vijñāna*'s merging with the physical organism to belong to this level, this may not really solve the whole problem. I for my part would still find it hard to believe that the author(s) of Saṁdh V may have found it necessary to further emphasize the feature of the 'All-Seed Mind' merging with the body, barely indicated in V.2, to the extent that he(they) introduce, in addition to the apposite innovative term *ādānavijñāna*, yet another entirely new name, and one the choice of which for this purpose would, in view of the polysemy of the word *ālaya* and its lack of being traditionally associated with 'linking up', be

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It is also called 'Latent Consciousness' (*ālayavijñāna*) with reference to the fact of its being latently present and getting absorbed within this [biophysical] organism ...

Similarly B: 154,12f.

[1551] See fn. 1490. Cf. also Hsüan-tsang's rendering of **saṁ-√mūrch* in Saṁdh V.2 as "merging with each other" (展轉和合: see fn. 693).

[1552] YBh_{Bh} 24,15f (see fn. 694); $VinSg_{ms}$ 17b3 (see fn. 1490).

[1553] Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1953: 204f; VETTER 1988: 48–51; 2000: 68f (with further references); 73; LANGER 2001, esp. 21–25; WALDRON 2003: 14. The expression is taken in a merely figurative sense by HAMILTON (1996: 84f), but from a Yogācāra perspective there is no need to do so, and in cases where the subject of *mātu kucchiṁ okkam-* is the Bodhisatta (CPD II 690 s.v. *okkanta* 1.b, 692 s.v. *okkamati* 1.b), a figurative meaning may anyway not have been the current understanding (cf., e.g., SCHLINGLOFF 1987: 16: "... the Bodhisatva entered the womb of Queen Māyā in the form of an elephant", with pictorial illustrations from Ajanta).

[1554] YBh_{Bh} 24,1–25,1.

anything but obvious,[1555] and one also that is evidently also not required by the specific context of the subsequent paragraphs where only the name *ādānavijñāna* is used.[1556] I therefore still find it much more plausible to understand the reference to the name *ālaya-vijñāna*, like that to '*citta*', as a deliberate attempt to connect the sūtra's revised concept of the 'All-Seed Mind' with an expression that had come to be used by the (basically Śrāvakayānist) addressees of Saṁdh V, the most probable point of reference being, to my mind, the description of 'linking up' in the ManoBh of the MauBh.

282. At any rate, I do not see any cogent reason why the introduction of *ālayavijñāna*, let alone of the **sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* (see ch. 4.2.6), into the materials of the PañcBh and the ManoBh of the MauBh should be post-Saṁdh interpolations. In my opinion, they had (apart from YBh_{Bh} 11,4f: see S 1987 # 6.2.1–4) probably already been introduced in the course of the compilation of the respective Bhūmis, for at the beginning of the PañcMBhVin[1557] the occurrence of *ālayavijñāna* as the *bījāśraya* in the MauBh is explicitly referred to (see § 253.1.2).[1558] Of course, this does not prove that the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* into the description of 'linking up' in the ManoBh (or into the PañcBh) was carried out before the appearance of Saṁdh V (or some similar text), which must also have taken place before the compilation of the VinSg. But even on the assumption that Saṁdh V was produced before the integration of *ālayavijñāna* into the ManoBh's description of 'linking up', I fail to see why (even if we leave the possible existence of unrecorded oral materials out of consideration) Saṁdh V.3 should not even allude to the *IP*. The difference of context is hardly an argument against this, for in the case of the name '*citta*' the context of the passage alluded to is likewise different (see § 277). Apart from this, in the case of the *IP* there is sufficient common ground for such a reference (see § 35) and also for an explication of the expression *ālayavijñāna* in terms of sticking or lying hidden in the body (cf. § 76.7), and if the redactor(s) of the MauBh could (according to my hypothesis) find it natural to apply the idea of *ālayavijñāna* to the context of 'linking up', there is no reason why the author(s) of Saṁdh V would not equally have found it so.

283. I do not want to say that the aspect of latency or potentiality is missing in Saṁdh V; potentiality is clearly expressed by the attribute **sarvabīja*, and latency by stating that *ādāna-vijñāna* is "deep and subtle" (*gabhīrasūkṣma*: V.7).[1559] But in the description of 'linking up' in the MauBh and in Saṁdh V, as well as in the Saṁdh's etymologizing explanation of the name *ālayavijñāna*, the connotation of its *hiding* in the physical organism, and, in this sense,[1560] of its latency, is, at any rate, not emphasized, and not even made explicit unless the second element of the quasi-etymology was indeed a derivate of *pra*-√*lī*. In the *IP*, however, which deals with *nirodhasamāpatti*, this connotation is contextually implied and essential,

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[1555] This means that to my mind Saṁdh V, in contrast to the *IP*, does not satisfactorily meet the second criterion of S 1987 # 1.7(2).

[1556] For the reoccurrence of the term *ālayavijñāna* in Saṁdh V.6, see § 291.

[1557] YBh_t P zi 2a3f (see fn. 1394).

[1558] For a refutation of Matsumoto's thesis that even the concept of *bījāśraya* in the PañcBh of the MauBh is a post-VinSg interpolation see § 253.2.

[1559] Cf. also **asaṁvidita(ka)* in Saṁdh VIII.37.1.1.

[1560] But surely *not* in the sense of *potentiality*, which is, no doubt, expressed by the term **sarvabīja*, but not by the term *ālayavijñāna* as explained in Saṁdh V.3.

and it is, if I am right, also underlined by the opposition *ālayavijñāna* vs. *pravṛttivijñāna*, which, as Buescher (B: 154) himself admits, is missing not only in Saṁdh V but in the whole sūtra. It is possible that the faintness of the mind after entering the mother's womb favoured the *application* of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in this context, but even more, apparently, did the idea of the *vijñāna*'s amalgamation (*saṁ-√mūrch*) with (proto-)embryonic matter (cf. § 89.2), which corresponds to *ālayavijñāna*'s 'sticking' or hiding in the physical organism, or, as the *IP* puts it, in the physical sense faculties.

4.2.9. The Message of Saṁdh V

284. Supposing that the preceding assumptions are basically correct, what then is the message of the V^th^ chapter of the Saṁdh? As Buescher (B: 138–140: # 72) rightly points out, in Saṁdh V.1 the Buddha announces that he is going to elucidate the secret meaning (*guhya*) of the concepts *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* (traditionally mostly understood as quasi-synonyms), and in V.7 the Buddha concludes the chapter by stating that the continuously flowing, subtle *ādānavijñāna* had not been disclosed by him before lest naive persons imagine it to be a substantial self. But I doubt that these statements can be taken as explicitly documenting the historical origin of a new type of mind (B: 139). Strictly speaking, they merely say that the Buddha introduces a new concept of mind that is not found in his earlier teachings, i.e., in earlier sūtras. This does not exclude the possibility that (in a historical perspective) there had already been reflections in this direction — orally transmitted or even recorded in a doctrinal or exegetical context — that were taken up by the sūtra, i.e., legitimized and at the same time innovatively developed, and this is precisely what I assume to have actually happened.

285. As I understand it, the message of the sūtra has, indeed, two strata or levels. One level (§§ 286–288) is the introduction, or, in my opinion, rather the legitimization of a subliminal form or layer of mind and the development of this concept into the corner-stone of a new model of mind processes. The other level (§§ 289–291) includes an indication of a Mahāyānist remodelling of this layer of the mind and, in the end, an outright relativization of the new theory.

286. Most of what is said in Saṁdh V.2 is, indeed, a kind of synthesis of ideas already found in the pre-*ālayavijñāna* layers of the YBh. As has already been pointed out (§ 149), the first part of Saṁdh V.2 seems to be a rephrasing of a passage of the ManoBh of the MauBh. As for the second part, the notion of the 'All-Seed mind' (**sarvabījaṁ cittam*, referred to as "the [aforementioned] *vijñāna*" in V.3) is not only found in the ManoBh but also in the VaSg (III.1.ii), in precisely the same context as in Saṁdh V.2, viz., in the description of 'linking up' (*pratisandhi*) a new life (see § 262). The twofold *upādāna* is prefigured in the exegesis of the *Āhārasūtra* in VaSg III.5.i–ii (see ch. 4.2.5.6–7). The first *upādāna* has remained basically unchanged: 'biological appropriation' of the physical sense faculties and their seats. The characterization of the second *upādāna* would seem to be a Mahāyānist reinterpretation (see § 290) of the concept of *upādāna* as found in the paraphrase of the expression *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* in the exegesis of the *Bījasūtra* in VaSg I.9.ii (see § 199).

287. In the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials of the YBh, the aforementioned functions are just functions of the mind (*vijñāna*), i.e., obviously, of the mind continuum as such, as a whole. The ManoBh, e.g., speaks of a beginningless continuum of Seeds in the (unspecified) mind

continuum (*vijñānasantāne bījasantānaḥ*),[1561] or even in the basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*) as a whole[1562] (cf. §§ 87–89). Against this, the 'All-Seed Mind' of Saṁdh V is clearly conceived of as a specific form or layer of mind in its own right. This is already indicated by the fact that specific names are assigned to it in Saṁdh V.3: *ādānavijñāna*, *ālayavijñāna*, and *citta* (in a peculiar sense), and is unmistakably articulated in the subsequent sections (V.4–5 and V.7).

288.0. As pointed out before, I consider the name *ādānavijñāna* to have been newly coined in (what became) the V[th] chapter of the Saṁdh or in some closely related precursor or oral tradition (§ 268), whereas I take the other two names and their explanations to allude to different strata of the YBh tradition (§§ 277 and 281–282). If this is correct, the choice of the term *ādānavijñāna* as the primary designation of the 'All-Seed Mind', instead of simply taking over the (according to my hypothesis) already existing term *ālayavijñāna*, was probably deliberate. The most probable reason is, to my mind, a considerable shift of emphasis and conceptual development in the Saṁdh.

288.1. On the one hand, emphasis is no longer on the problem of the presence of some (subliminal) form of mind in unconscious states. Emphasis is now rather on *vijñāna* as the principle of *upādāna*, and not only of *upādāna* in the sense of keeping the body alive throughout life, i.e., on 'biological appropriation' (which is crucial for the *ālayavijñāna* of the MauBh as well), but *also* of *upādāna* in the sense of *spiritually negative clinging*, i.e., on *vijñāna* in its function as *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, now understood as its taking in and storing the imprints of conventional diversity, as the 'fuel' for remaining entangled in saṁsāric existence — an aspect which appears to have not yet become thematic in connection with the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the MauBh. If this is correct, the main purpose of Saṁdh V was not so much to legitimatize the recently introduced concept of *ālayavijñāna* (though this, too, is, incidentally, achieved) as to develop or even remodel it, and precisely this would seem to be indicated by the introduction of the name *ādānavijñāna* as its primary designation. It may even be that this name, and not '*upādānavijñāna*', as one might expect in view of the description in V.2, was deliberately chosen in view of its assonance with the name *ālaya-vijñāna* and was, in a sense, intended to supersede the latter.[1563]

288.2. The shift of emphasis to a *twofold* function of *upādāna* is, however, not the only point. To judge from the space allotted to it, another (if not *the*) major concern of Saṁdh V was, if I am not mistaken, to draw an important consequence from the establishment of the 'All-Seed Mind' as a specific layer of mind in its own right: the invalidation of the principle of the non-simultaneity of several *vijñānas*/*cittas* in one and the same sentient being. This principle was, to be sure, not acknowledged by all traditional schools[1564] but seems to have

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[1561] YBh$_{Bh}$ 61,8 (see fn. 220).

[1562] Cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 25,20 (*sa ca bījasantānaprabandho 'nādikālikaḥ*), in an (admittedly rather discontinuous) context where it is the *ātmabhāva* (as a whole) that is characterized as equipped with all Seeds, or the Seeds of all (possible, or future) *ātmabhāvas* (see fn. 503).

[1563] For Matsumoto's suggestion that *ā-* (instead of *upā-*) was chosen to indicate the *ātmabhāva* as the 'locus' see § 146.

[1564] Simultaneous occurrence of two (or more?) *cittas* was admitted especially by the Mahāsāṅghikas: see Vi 47b1f, etc.; CSL 280b11-22. Cf. S 1987: 317 n. 314 and, in detail, HARADA 1996: 169–177. According to Frauwallner (1953: 393), this view was also accepted by the Sāṅkhyas.

been taken for granted by most of them.[1565] It was expressly stated and defended in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma[1566] and by Harivarman (Dārṣṭāntikas?),[1567] and it is also clearly expressed or presupposed in older layers of the YBh.[1568] The assumption of a continuous layer of the mind in addition to the ordinary cognitive functions was, however, bound to come into conflict with this principle when emphasis shifted from the *bīja*-like, latent nature of this *vijñāna* to its functionality (viz., *upādāna*).[1569] In Saṁdh V.4–5, the principle of the non-simultaneity of *vijñāna*s is radically rejected to the extent that even the six traditional kinds of *vijñāna* (the five kinds of sensory awareness and non-sensory cognition) are now admitted to occur simultaneously. Whether there was some additional motive for this innovation, I am unable to say. But in any case in this perspective Saṁdh V looks very much like a revision of crucial sections of the PañcBh and the ManoBh of the MauBh,[1570] just as Saṁdh VI–VII may be taken as a revision of the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh (cf. § 303), and Saṁdh VIII as a revision of parts of the ŚrBh (see Pt. IV § 583).

288.3. In Saṁdh V, the continuous flow of Seeds in the Mind continuum or in the basis-of-individual-existence as a whole (§ 287) has thus come to be distinctly conceived as a subliminal stratum of the mind in its own right, containing the Seeds, or functioning as the Seed, of future rebirths and experiences, merging with the body at the moment of reincarnation in the spheres of corporeal existence and keeping it appropriated throughout life, and forming the fundamental layer of all conscious cognitive processes. As a continuous flow (V.7), it is thus a kind of ongoing 'subject' of *saṁsāra*, easily misunderstood as a permanent

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1565 For the fully developed Theravāda system, cf. VisM XIV.110–124, describing a sequence of mind processes without indicating any simultaneity. Cf. also Vibh 87–90.

1566 JP_H 919b13-15 and 21-23 (JP_S 773a27-29 and b5-7); Vi 49b8ff (Vi_2 37a14ff); 47b1-3 (cf. Vi_2 35b8); 563a8f; 764b10f. Cf. HARADA 1996: 168–173; cf. also ibid. 186f. According to HARADA (190f; 192 n. 89 [end]), the absence of an express statement in favour of the non-simultaneity or against the simultaneity of several *vijñāna*s in one *santāna* in Vasubandhu's AKBh is deliberate and motivated by his Yogācāra affiliation (see § 13 with fn. 58).

1567 CSL 280b23–c25. Cf. HARADA 1996: 177–180. According to CSL 280c13-15, the simultaneous arising of more than one *citta* in one and the same personal continuum would involve a split of this continuum into several persons.

1568 Explicit statements (cf. S 1987: 316f n. 303): YBh_t P 'i 312b8f (D zi 272b5; YBh_c 839b14: VaSg III.5.iii): *rgyud gcig la rnam par shes pa gnyis cig car gnas pa yang med pa'i phyir ro*; YBh_{ms} 135b1f (YBh_t P dzi 299a3; D tshi 256b5f; YBh_c 386a25f: *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ*): *tat* (= *cittaṁ*) *punar ... ekaikaśaḥ pravarttate, dvitīyacittasahāyavirahitatvāt, sahaiva sarvacittāpravartanāc ca*. Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 58,13-18, expressly stating that two sense perceptions never arise simultaneously (nor even immediately after one another) and that sense perception is immediately *followed* by a *manovijñāna*., which in its turn may be *followed* by another sense perception. This pattern is also presupposed at YBh_{Bh} 10,2-7. It seems to be only in the VinSg that a simultaneous occurrence of more than one cognitive act (in the traditional sense) comes to be admitted. This is the case not only in the two *ālayavijñāna* treatises but occasionally also in other places: cf. $VinSg_{ms}$ 21a8 (YBh_t P zi 51a4f; YBh_c 597a27f): *sarve caite rūpādayaḥ spraṣṭavyāvasānāḥ dvivijñānavijñeyāḥ: svavijñānavijñeyāś ca manovijñānavijñeyāś ca, sakṛt kramaśo vā*. Cf. also YBh_t P zi 91a7f (D zhi 87b7; YBh_c 613b17f), quoted in HARADA 1996: 177 n. 69.

1569 Cf. the argument in § 20.

1570 Cf. S 1987: 318f (ns. 324 and 327). The crucial question is, of course, whether Saṁdh V presupposes the text in (essentially) its present form (i.e., containing the equation of the *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* with *ālayavijñāna*) or rather a version (or even merely raw materials) where *ālayavijñāna* was still missing. I still consider the former alternative more probable (see § 282).

self by immature persons. But in its function of *sopādānaṁ vijñānam*, it is also the root or source of *entanglement* in *saṁsāra*.

289. The *ālayavijñāna* passages in the MauBh do not show any specific affinity with Mahāyāna (unless one declares them, with Buescher, to *imply*, as a matter of principle, a *vijñaptimātra* ontology even though there is not the slightest textual hint). The Saṁdh, however, is a Mahāyāna sūtra. It is therefore not surprising that this text does not stop at the (basically Abhidharmic) development of the theory of mind indicated before (§ 286–288) but goes beyond that by introducing Mahāyānist concepts (§ 290) and, still further, by relegating the whole theory to a lower level of truth (§ 291).

290.1. By way of the second *upādāna*, on account of which rebirth takes place according to Saṁdh V.2, the 'All-Seed Mind' is invested with the function of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* (§ 286) and is thus not so much a mere 'subject' of *saṁsāra* but rather the latent *source* of saṁsāric existence (§ 288.1). This kind of *upādāna* is specified as referring to or consisting in (cf. § 227) the "imprints (*vāsanā*) of the multifarious conventional dealing (*vyavahāra-prapañca*) with phenomena (*nimitta*), names (*nāman*) and imagination (*vikalpa*)" (cf. §§ 141.1 and 226.3).

290.2. The terms *nimitta*, etc., are well known from the so-called five-*vastu* theory, described in detail in a Mahāyānist part of the YBh (viz., the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the VinSg [BoBhVin])[1571] and expressing an ontology according to which phenomenal appearances and mental activities (including all mundane psychic factors) condition each other in such a way that neither is ultimately real, so that they disappear when one becomes aware of True Reality or Suchness (*tathatā*), just as dreams as well as dream objects disappear on awakening.[1572] This is, as far as I can see, not yet *vijñaptimātratā* but looks more like wh t one may call a theory of 'objective illusions'.[1573]

290.3. In the Saṁdh, this theory is, however, connected with the concept of imprints or impregnations (*vāsanā*), applied here in a way that is fundamentally at variance with the use of this term in the older layers of the YBh (see § 23). By having the whole phenomenal world of things, names and mental activities be rooted in their own imprints in the 'All-Seed Mind', the Saṁdh makes clear that the Seeds are not natural dispositions but merely the result of erroneous habits of the individual. N. YAMABE[1574] is doubtless right in terming this change a Mahāyānist reinterpretation of the **sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* and in considering it to come still closer to the position of *vijñaptimātratā*. The explicit declaration of this principle, according to which all phenomena are not just illusory products *of* the mind but images *in* the mind, is, however, only found in the VIIIth chapter of the Saṁdh (see § 309), and it is only here that *ādānavijñāna* is expressly stated to be a veritable (though subconscious) *vijñāna* cognizing an object, and that it is, contextually, also assimilated to the *vijñaptimātra* principle (see §§ 296 and 309.2).

[1571] See KRAMER 2005; TAKAHASHI 2005: 34–49; 121–139; 181–202; S 2007a: 233.

[1572] Cf. S 2007a: 233f.

[1573] The concept of 'objective illusion' has been borrowed from Paul HACKER, who has coined this term ("objektiver Schein", "objektive Existenz des Scheins") in connection with the ontology and epistemology of Advaita Vedānta (cf. HACKER 1953, esp. 195; 204; 213; 221f).

[1574] YAMABE 1989: 52f.

291. In Saṁdh V.6, the Buddha returns to his initial promise to point out what qualifies a bodhisattva for being called an expert with regard to the secret points of *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*. Contrary to what one might expect, he declares that even if a bodhisattva is familiar with the secret points of *citta*, etc., on the basis of a [correct] understanding of the invariable principle [of origination in dependence] (**dharmasthitijñāna*) in accordance with the Buddha's teaching[1575] (as set forth in the in the preceding paragraphs of the sūtra), this is *not* yet complete expertness.[1576] In order to be conversant with the ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) concerning *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*, a bodhisattva must, in his personal experience (**adhyātmaṁ pratyātmam*),[1577] no longer perceive such entities as *ādāna* or *ādānavijñāna*, *ālaya* or

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1575 Cf. YBh_{Bh} 229,4-7: *katibhir jñānaiḥ pratītyasamutpādo jñātavyaḥ* | *dvābhyāṁ* 〈|〉 *dharmasthitijñānena tattvajñānena* (ms. *anvaya*°) *ca* | *kathaṁ dharmasthitijñānena* | *yathā Bhagavatā prajñaptaḥ prakāśitas tathā jñātavyaḥ* | *kathaṁ tattvajñānena* (= ms.) | *yathā śaikṣā dṛṣṭapadāḥ paśyanti gambhīrārthena* |. Cf. YBh_{Bh} 13,10-12 (read *dharmasthitijñānena vā punar vastûpalakṣayate* with ms.), where the *dharmasthitijñāna* is contrasted with the *suviśuddhaṁ lokottaraṁ jñānam*, and YBh_t P 'i 304b2–305a2 (D zi 264b6–265a6; YBh_C 835c19–836a8: VaSg III.3.vi, exegesis of $SĀ_C$ no. 347, corresp. to SN 12.70), where the counterpart is **nirvāṇajñāna* and where it is expressly stated that the *dharmasthitijñāna* is attained while one is still a mundane person (**pṛthagjana*). Cf. also Wŏn-ch'ŭk (Yüan-ts'ê 圓測) ad Saṁdh V.6 ($SaṁdhṬ_C$ 249c16–250a10, esp. 250a7-9), pointing out that by means of the *dharmasthitijñāna* the bodhisattva understands merely a particular (= higher level of?) conventional truth (**saṁvṛti*) but not yet ultimate truth (**paramārtha*).

1576 Saṁdh V.6 (57,20-25; S na 19a7–b2).

1577 Saṁdh V.6 (57,25-27): ... *gang gi phyir byang chub sems dpa' nang gi so so rang gi len pa mi mthong* | *len pa'i rnam par shes pa'ang mi mthong la* | *de'ang yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du yin pa ... de ni* | *byang chub sems dpa' don dam pa la mkhas pa zhes bya ste* | ...; cf. S na 19b2-7 (slightly different). As Matsumoto (M2: 487 n. 297) points out, the earlier Chinese versions by Bodhiruci ($Saṁdh_{Bo}$ 669b15), Paramārtha ($MSgBh_{Pa}$ 157c12) and Dharmagupta ($MSgBh_{Dh}$ 274a2) have 於內(於)外, probably presupposing a reading **adhyātmaṁ bahirdhā*, which would mean that the bodhisattva does not perceive any such entity, neither inside (/in himself) nor outside, i.e., nowhere (cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 5,10f, etc.). The Tibetan Kanjur version (*nang gi so so rang gi*) as well as the Tun-huang version (HAKAMAYA 1986a: 606,24 = 2008: 684,3f: *nang dang bdag rang*) and Hsüan-tsang (T 16.678: 692c12: 於內各別, = $MSgBh_{Hs}$ 325a2) suggest **adhyātmaṁ pratyātmam*, as Matsumoto (M2: 487,21–488,4) rightly proposes (against Lamotte's reconstruction of the latter as **pratyekam*). However, his understanding of this expression as "with reference to an ego/self, with regard to an ego/self" (488,24: 我について...、我に関して), in the sense that a bodhisattva who deserves to be called an expert with regard to *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* does not regard *ādāna* or *ādānavijñāna*, *ālaya* or *ālayavijñāna*, etc., as the self (*ātman*) (488,16: アーダナ〔識〕やアーラヤ〔識〕を我 (ātman) であると見ない), appears inacceptable. This can hardly be the meaning of the sentence, which (in view of the word order in $Saṁdh_{TH}$) may be reconstructed as something like

> **yataś ca ... bodhisattva ādānam na paśyaty ādānavijñānam ca na paśyaty adhyātmaṁ pratyātmaṁ, tac ca yathābhūtam ...,*

nor would this be in harmony with the normal use of the expressions *adhyātmam* and *pratyātmam*. *Adhyātmam* (Pā. *ajjhattaṁ*) is normally used in the sense of "concerning oneself", "in oneself", "personally", in contrast to *bahirdhā* "outside" (i.e., in other persons, as, e.g., Vibh 2,3-7, or in the external world, as, e.g., $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 212,10-213,1 [$ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II 72,18-20)], etc.) and in terms of everyday language, without any reference to a metaphysical self. In this sense, it may even be accompanied by *pratyātmam*, as, e.g., in $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 212,1f ($ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II 72,9f), where the internal element earth (in contrast to the external one) is defined as what is solid in this body [here], in oneself individually, [and] has been appropriated (*yad asmin kāye 'dhyātmaṁ pratyātmaṁ khakkhaṭaṁ ... upāttam* ...; cf. also YBh_{Bh} 55,2f). On the other hand, *pratyātmaṁ* is frequently used in connection with direct, immediate personal insight or experience, as in $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 376,20 ($ŚrBh_{Tai}$ III [2008]: 76,15) or 442,23f (*pratyātmam*

ālayavijñāna, **cita* (LAMOTTE: **caya*) or *citta*, *rūpa*, *cakṣus* or *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., *dharmas*, *manas* or *manovijñāna*. This means that on the level of ultimate truth or Suchness (*tathatā*), or (as the commentary ascribed to Asaṅga puts it)[1578] in nonconceptual insight (*nirvikalpakaṁ jñānam*), all mundane concepts and concept-bound phenomena must be transcended.[1579] This stands in sharp contrast to the SacAcBh of the MauBh, where ultimate truth (*paramārtha*) with regard to the mind is defined in terms of *ālayavijñāna* being, in contrast to the manifest forms of mind (*pravṛttivijñāna*), present throughout mundane existence, including the so-called unconscious states, ceasing only in Nirvana without remainder.[1580] In this text, the new model of the mind in which the subliminal *ālayavijñāna* has been added to the traditional six kinds of mind[1581] is thus accepted as the *paramārtha* level and not, in a further step, relativized in its turn, as is done in Saṁdh V.6.

292. In view of this relativization of the subliminal mind, or *ālayavijñāna*, in Saṁdh V.6, I myself find it hard to think that it was in precisely this chapter that this notion was introduced for the very first time. Rather, it seems to me that Saṁdh V documents an attempt, on the part of Mahāyānist Yogācāras, to win over Śrāvaka Yogācāras, especially such as had come to adopt *ālayavijñāna*, by accepting and developing their position on the conventional level but at the same time encouraging them to transcend it on the ultimate level. This may be

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api me jñānadarśanaṁ pravartate ...; cf. DELEANU 2006: 323,2f and 449,29f). But *adhyātmam*, too, can be used in connection with the mind (cf. *adhyātmaṁ cetaḥśamathaḥ*, as in SamBh # 4.2.1) and even with reference to personal comprehension or experience, as in YBh_{Bh} 50,15f, where communication [based on what one has] comprehended (*vijñāto vyavahāraḥ*) is explained as being based on personal experience (*yad anenâdhyātmaṁ prativeditaṁ bhavaty adhigataṁ sparśitaṁ sākṣātkṛtam ca bhavati, tad upādāya yat pareṣāṁ vyavaharati, ayam ucyate vijñāto vyavahāraḥ*). In the ASBh (2,18) the definition of the same term uses *pratyātmam* instead (*yat pratyātmam anubhūtam*). In view of this usage, I am fairly sure that in the passage under discussion **adhyātmaṁ pratyātmam* qualifies the non-perception of *ādāna*(*vijñāna*), etc., as the bodhisattva's personal experience. Therefore, I should translate the above-quoted passage as follows:

> As soon as a bodhisattva, personally and by himself, no [longer] perceives an *ādāna* or *ādānavijñāna* — and does so (or: and [knows that?] this is) in accordance with the truth —, (...).

[1578] Saṁdh (ed. LAMOTTE) 59,11-14. Cf. also the commentary ascribed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul (P co 104a8f; 106a3f; 106a7–b3). Wŏn-ch'ŭk (Yüan-ts'ê 圓測) ad Saṁdh V.6 ($SaṁdhṬ_C$ 250a18–b10) quotes three interpretations, the first two of which seem to point to the experience of the *nirvikalpaṁ jñānam*, whereas the third seems to focus on the *pṛṣṭhalabdhaṁ jñānam* (後得) as a direct perception (現量,**pratyakṣa*) of the individual character (自相, **svalakṣaṇa*) of *ādāna*, etc., which may be called "not seeing" because it, too, is free from conceptualization (離諸分別 故名不見).

[1579] Buescher's (B: 172) contention that the introduction of the term *ādānavijñāna* in Saṁdh V was intended to counter (B.: "squarely encounter") an exclusive emphasis on notions like *anutpanna* as advocated by the Mādhyamikas appears to me rather far-fetched and, at any rate, not obvious from the contents of this chapter itself.

[1580] See S 1987 # 6.6.1–3 and p. 222 # 5. A similar view is expressed in the detailed treatments of *ālayavijñāna* in the VinSg: YBh_t P zi 10a6-8 (D zhi 8b4-6; YBh_C 581c28–582a3; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020b28–c3; HAKAMAYA 1979: 43 # 6) and 189a8–b2 (D zhi 182a1f; YBh_C 651b11-15; cf. KRITZER 2003b: 377).

[1581] SacAcBh # 5 uses the term *pravṛttivijñāna*, but reference is clearly to the six traditional *vijñānas* only, for it is stated that *pravṛttivijñāna* has ceased in all states that are called 'mindless' (*acittaka*) on the conventional level (i.e., 'mindless' sleep, etc.: # 4). Since the *kliṣṭaṁ manas* is considered to continue in all these states (except, of course, in Nirvana without remainder and, at least from MSg I.7 onward, in *nirodhasamāpatti*), it has not been taken into account and is obviously still unknown to the SacAcBh (of the MauBh).

somewhat different from "interscholastic conflict" (Buescher: see § 135), though even 'interscholastic conflict' would hardly be something unprecedented in the Buddhist tradition.

293.1. If, on the other hand, we suppose that the idea of the subliminal layer of the mind as a form of mind in its own right was introduced into the Yogācāra tradition for the first time in chapter V of the Saṁdh, we cannot avoid asking for the motive(s). Unfortunately, the sūtra simply propounds the new kind of mind but does not present any argument or proof, so that all we can do is to infer possible motives from the context. In order to get an idea of the problems involved that may have necessitated the innovation, we may then try to locate these motives among the arguments adduced in somewhat later sources (beginning with the 'Proof Portion' of the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin)[1582] as proofs for the indispensability of *ālayavijñāna*, but we have to take into account that such proofs are often established and elaborated *post festum*.[1583]

293.2. To begin, since there is, in Saṁdh V, no explicit reference to the concept of *vijñaptimātratā* and, as far as I can see, also no trace unambiguously presupposing it, I consider it arbitrary to postulate that this concept was the reason for establishing the Seed layer of the mind as a subliminal form of mind in its own right, not to speak of the choice of '*ādānavijñāna*' for its main name, which anyway points in a different direction. Actually, *vijñaptimātratā* is not adduced as an argument for the indispensability of *ālayavijñāna* in the 'Proof Portion', in spite of the close relation of this text with the Saṁdh, and not even in the extensive collection of arguments in systematic Vijñānavāda texts like the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*[1584] or the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論),[1585] nor, of course, in Vasubandhu's *Karmasiddhi*, *Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā* or *Pañcaskandhaka*,[1586] where the tenet of *vijñaptimātratā* is lacking anyway).

293.3. If we start from the issues that are actually addressed in Saṁdh V.(2–5 and 7), three topics would seem to stand out:

1. the (subliminal, continuous flow of) mind functioning as or containing all Seeds (required for a new life) (**sarvabījaṁ cittam/vijñānam*);
2. the twofold *upādāna*, i.e.,

2A. the (subliminal) mind as the principle of 'biological' appropriation, including

a) *vijñāna*'s appropriating the new body and keeping it alive throughout life, and

b) *vijñāna*'s merging [into semen-cum-blood] and abiding in the new body so as to share its destiny;

2B. the (subliminal) mind in the function of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* by receiving and storing the impregnation of mundane diversity as the driving force ('fuel') of rebirth, an aspect which would seem to overlap with its Seed function;

3. the simultaneous occurrence of two or more *vijñāna*s, viz., the subliminal mind and one up to six forms of actual awareness.

[1582] See fn. 1274.

[1583] Cf. FRAUWALLNER 1953: 385.

[1584] MSg I.29–44 and 50–56.

[1585] CWSL 15b19–19a29.

[1586] KSi # 34 (KSi_{Mu} 41); PSVy P 25a5–b4 (MUROJI 1993: *39f and 191–195 [# 13]); PSk 16,10–17,4.

293.4. Among these three topics, the last one (3.) is not a motive for but rather a consequence of the introduction of the subliminal mind, and the three paragraphs of the 'Proof Portion' that deal with this topic (## ii, iii and v) are not positive proofs for *ālaya-vijñāna*, but are merely aimed at defending and justifying the simultaneity of *vijñāna*s its assumption involves.

293.5. Contrary to this, the issue of Seeds (1.) is developed in the 'Proof Portion' (# iv) into a positive proof for the indispensability of *ālayavijñāna*: the traditional six kinds of *vijñāna* cannot be each other's Seed because one moment is often followed by one of opposite character (as, e.g., a wholesome one by an unwholesome one, a mundane one by a supra-mundane one, or the other way round), and this is taken to exclude their being each other's Seed. Another argument against regarding the traditional six kinds of *vijñāna* as their own or each other's Seed is the fact that their series sometimes continues only after a long period of complete interruption (*dīrghakālasamucchinnâpi ca saṁtatiś cireṇa kālena pravartate*, as in the case of *nirodhasamāpatti* or of an existence among the unconscious heavenly beings). As for the first argument, its conclusiveness depends on the fact that on the one hand the traditional *vijñāna* model is strictly reduced to a succession of single cognitive acts essentially characterized, respectively, by specific, mutually exclusive qualities, and that on the other hand the concept of 'Seed' is strictly understood in terms of the causally effective *actual* dharma itself *being* the Seed of its effect. In contrast to this, the authors of the pre-*ālaya-vijñāna* strata of the YBh do not seem to have had problems with regarding the unspecified *vijñāna*, or the mind-continuum, as being, or being endowed with or accompanied by, the Seeds of future mind processes or even other factors (see §§ 286 and 287). There is no doubt a tension between the tendency to *disintegrate* the mind by reducing it to a sequence of differently specified cognitive moments on the one hand and the requirement of *continuity* accounting for the intermittent *rearising* of moments of different quality on the other. But whether this tension came to be felt in such an acute way that this led, *without any specific cause*, to the introduction of a new, subliminal kind of *vijñāna* in order to ensure the aspect of continuity is another question, and to start from this assumption would anyway not explain the specific names given to this subliminal *vijñāna* in Saṁdh V.3, viz., '*ādānavijñāna*' and '*ālayavijñāna*'. It may thus well be that it was only *after* the introduction of *ālayavijñāna* that a radically actualistic treatment of the traditional *vijñāna* concept as in the 'Proof Portion' was deliberately applied for the sake of construing a proof. The situation is surely different in the case of the second argument (viz., the complete interruption of the traditional forms of *vijñāna* in certain states), but even for this problem an alternative solution had been offered by the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' (§ 39) or the idea that the basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*) as a whole contained all Seeds (§ 88.3).

293.6. The most important clue for demonstrating the existence of *ālayavijñāna* in the 'Proof Portion' is doubtless 'biological' appropriation (§ 293.3: 2A.), which is at the basis of three arguments. The main argument (# i), distinguished by its initial position and also the most elaborate one, says that without *ālayavijñāna* 'biological appropriation' (*āśrayopādāna*) would be impossible because, among other things, the six traditional forms of mind do not pervade the body and are intermittent (see § 233). In this case, too, the pre-*ālayavijñāna* materials do not seem to have had any problem in taking the unspecified *vijñāna*, i.e., the mind-continuum as a whole, as the 'subject' of the appropriation of the whole body, without taking exception to the specific connection of the different sense perceptions with different sense organs (cf. ch. 4.2.5.6). Even the gradual withdrawal of the mind from parts of the body in the process of dying does not seem to have bothered the earlier masters (cf. § 220.4). But

clearly such 'somatic' functions of *vijñāna* are not easily explained on the basis of a purely actualist theory, and could easily come to be attributed to *ālayavijñāna* and to be used as proofs for its existence (cf. 'Proof Portion' # viii) after it had been introduced. A more serious problem in connection with 'biological' appropriation was, just as in the case of Seeds, the interruption of the traditional kinds of *vijñāna* in states like *nirodhasamāpatti*. If my thesis (ch. 3) is correct, in this case the canonical statement that the *vijñāna* has not departed from the body (*IP*, 'Proof Portion' # vii) may have been the reason for not being satisfied with the mere presence of Seeds of *vijñāna* in the body and may thus have triggered the introduction of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* by 'upgrading' them to a latent presence of *vijñāna* in the body. Since the Saṁdh is (apart from a short reference in X.9 [161,34–162,2]) not concerned with states like *nirodhasamāpatti*, this cannot, however, have been the motive for the introduction of a subliminal form of mind in this text. Nor do I see any reference in Saṁdh V to the idea of a direct experience of a subliminal mind in the body, as presupposed in proof vi of the 'Proof Portion' and presumed to be the origin of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* by N. Yamabe (see § 8).

293.7. As regards the function of the subliminal mind to store the impregnation (*vāsanā*) of spiritually negative appropriation or clinging (§ 293.3: 2B.), it is not referred to in any of the arguments listed in the 'Proof Portion'. It is rather only in the MSg (I.30–32) that the process of impregnating and the continuity of the impregnation are shown to be impossible without the existence of *ālayavijñāna*. Still, I am not sure whether this is not rather a *post festum* argumentation and whether the *prapañcavāsanā* of Saṁdh V.2 would be logically impossible without the assumption of a subliminal stratum of the mind by which it is received and stored. Even if this should be the case, this would not exclude that the author(s) of the text adapted an already existing concept to their purpose. At any rate, it is worth noting that the characteristic designation of the subliminal mind in Saṁdh V, viz., '*ādānavijñāna*', although it could easily have been explained as expressing (also) the taking in and storing (*upādāna*) of the *prapañcavāsanā*, is actually, in the etymologizing explanation of the text, only referred to the appropriation of the *body*, and it is also of import that the other specific name, viz., '*ālayavijñāna*', is not connected with the storing of impregnations either. From my point of view, this fact strongly suggests that the concept of the subliminal mind emerged in a different context and that its connection with the taking in and storing of the *prapañcavāsanā* is a deliberate step with the aim of explicitly integrating the function of the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* (reinterpreted, besides, in Mahāyānist terms: see § 290) into the concept.

4.3. The Problem of the Interrelatedness of the New Concepts in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*

294. In the last part of his study (B: 158 ff), Buescher presents his thesis concerning the situation that necessitated the introduction of a subliminal form of mind, i.e., *ālaya-* or *ādāna-vijñāna*, in the Saṁdh. For Buescher, this introduction is basically part and parcel of "a *paradigm shift* starting to emphasize the 'transparent' constitution of reality" (B: 170 # 85), as an answer to the fundamental philosophical question "once expressed by LEIBNIZ ... in the simple words: 'Pourquoi il y a plutôt quelque chose que rien?'" (B: 165,10; 171,1).

295. The starting-point is the sūtra's criticism of a negativistic interpretation of the statements of the *Prajñāpāramitā* and related sūtras that all dharmas are without intrinsic nature, non-originated and hence not subject to cessation, at peace from the very beginning and nirvanized by their very nature. As Buescher rightly points out, a similar criticism had also been formulated in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* (TattvP) and some other places of the *Bodhisattva-bhūmi* (BoBh), where it is stated that two extreme views must be avoided: taking dharmas to have an intrinsic nature corresponding to verbal designations on the one hand, and, on the other, denying even the inexpressible (*nirabhilāpya*) pure reality (*vastumātra*; B: 174,6: the 'pure ens' = something being present) that underlies these designations (*prajñaptivādāśraya*). According to Buescher, this *vastumātra* involves, like Kant's "Ding an sich" to which he (like FRAUWALLNER)[1587] considers it to be comparable, philosophical aporias (B: 170, 191ff), and it is in the first place as a solution to these aporias that the Saṁdh developed an entirely new model.

296. This new model, characterized by Buescher (B: 163 # 78) as

> a fundamental 'relocation' of this ground of Being ... redefined as being something immanent in noetic processes constituting the empirical world that is experienced (*tathatā* = *vijñaptimātratā*),

comprises a whole set of new concepts, which are closely interrelated, to the extent that they logically necessite each other:[1588]

> Saṁdh VII's reinterpretation of the Mahāyāna theory of an original non-originatedness of the *dharma*s in terms of its own model of *trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā* is closely connected to the other phenomenological neologisms introduced in Saṁdh. (B: 161 # 76)
>
> As the positive correlate of the threefold *niḥsvabhāvatā*, the three intrinsic natures (*lakṣaṇa/svabhāva*) form an integral theoretical structure with the notion of *vijñapti-mātra(tā)*: e.g., *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* = *tathatā* (VIII.27) and *tathatā* = *vijñaptimātratā* (VIII.20.2.3). *Vijñaptimātratā* as *vijñaptitathatā* (VIII.37.2) has been contextually related to *ādānavijñāna* (VIII.37.1.1). (B: 162,1-5)
>
> "[T]he position expressed in Saṁdh VIII.8" — i.e., "appearances ... being *de facto* a purely noetic constitution (**vijñaptimātram eva*)" (B: 164,11f) — "essentially presup-

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[1587] Thus B: 194 n. 3.

[1588] Cf. B: 172f [Ex. 30], where Buescher criticizes a position that "does not relate the *svabhāvatraya* /*trividhā niḥsvabhāvatā*-model of Saṁdh to its *vijñaptimātra(tā)* ontology (which, in its turn, necessitates a *sarvabījakaṁ cittam* foundation)."

> poses the notion of a *sarvabījakaṁ cittam*, just as sarvabījakaṁ cittam logically implies the notion of *vijñaptimātra* (cf. also Saṁdh V.4)." (B: 164 # 80)

On this basis, the Saṁdh, or at any rate the chapters involved (i.e., V–VIII), presuppose each other and must be regarded as a compositional unit:

> In view of these structural interrelationships, we may assume that, synchronically speaking, the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra's* individual chapters, inasmuch as these are featured by those novel concepts, necessitate each other complementarily. (B162,5-8)

297. As regards parallels in Western philosophy, I prefer to leave an evaluation of Buescher's thesis to scholars with adequate competence in this field. The only remark I should like to make in this connection is that I have some doubts with regard to a fundamentally theoretical concern ('Why is there something and not rather nothing?') as the basic motive of the rejection of a negativistic interpretation of the statements in earlier Mahāyāna sūtras that all dharmas are devoid of intrinsic nature, unoriginated, etc. At any rate, textual support would be welcome.[1589] It is true that in the TattvP[1590] the view that the [negative statement] that all dharmas are nothing but denominations (*prajñaptimātra*)[1591] is the whole truth (*etac ca tattvam*) is rejected because through negating the *vastumātra*, which serves as the support of denomination, the denomination itself would automatically also be negated. But the following sentences[1592] show that such a position is rejected not so much for purely theoretical reasons as for its moral and spiritual consequences: in propounding such a position one is a negativist (*nāstika*), who brings disaster upon himself as well as upon others who follow him,[1593] because his denial of everything would include denial of the law of karma and hence of moral responsibility,[1594] and also the denial of the need for spiritual training.[1595] According to another passage, such a negativist understanding of the aforementioned statements might deter beings from striving for Nirvana (appearing to them as mere annihilation).[1596]

298. As for Buescher's central thesis, it would seem to comprise three assumptions:

1. The three key concepts, viz.,
   a) a subliminal form of mind containing the Seeds of all [dharmas] (called **sarvabīja(ka)ṁ cittam/vijñānam*, *ālayavijñāna* and *ādānavijñāna*),

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[1589] According to Buescher (p. 166), "the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* continued BoBh's reaction and asked: given this original lack of an ontological fundament, why is it then that there is something at all, rather than nothing?", but he does not point out textual evidence.

[1590] $BoBh_D$ 31,10-17; TAKAHASHI 2005: 99 # 5.3.4.

[1591] Cf. $Pañcav_D$ 99,11–101,6; $Pañcav_K$ II–III: 22,9-28; Śat 325,7ff.

[1592] $BoBh_D$ 31,17–32,4; TAKAHASHI 2005: 100 # 5.3.5.

[1593] For $BoBh_D$ 31,19f (B: 174 n. 2) *loko 'pi yo 'sya dṛṣṭyanumata āpadyate* read (with TAKAHASHI 2005: 100,4 and the mss.) *lokam api* (sc. *vipādayati*) *yo 'sya dṛṣṭyanumatam āpadyate*.

[1594] This is implied in $BoBh_D$ 32,2f: *apy apavadeta jñeyaṁ sarvam, tannidānaṁ cāpāyeṣûpapadyate* (v.l. *°dyeta*: TAKAHASHI 2005: 100 n. 18).

[1595] Cf. $BoBh_D$ 32,3f: *śaithilikaś ca syāc chikṣāpadeṣu*.

[1596] $BoBh_D$ 27,17-21 (one effect of the correct conviction regarding emptiness is that it prevents one from shrinking back from Nirvana; read *yathāpi tad ... tadgataguṇādarśinaḥ pra°* with TAKAHASHI 2005: 91 # 4.4); cf. also 180,16-20.

b) *vijñaptimātratā*, and

c) the three *lakṣaṇa*s or *svabhāva*s and the three *niḥsvabhāvatā*s,

necessitate each other logically.

2. All the three key concepts are, consequently, innovative contributions of the Saṁdh, introduced in this text for the very first time.
3. Although the three key concepts are introduced in different chapters of the Saṁdh, the logical interrelatedness of the key concepts implies that these chapters presuppose each other, i.e., the Saṁdh is, at any rate as far as the respective chapters are concerned, essentially a synchronous literary creation.[1597]

299. The *first* issue (§ 298.1) has already been dealt with in ch. 2, and in addition the contention that the concept of *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* by necessity implies *vijñaptimātratā* has been rejected in § 263. On the other hand, the complementary implication, viz., that *vijñaptimātratā* presupposes a *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam*, is hard to deny as long as it is taken to mean that all Seeds, i.e., even the Seeds of objects appearing as external things but not existing as such, must be present in the mind. But this need not necessarily imply that the Seeds, instead of being just the facet of latent potentiality of the ordinary mind continuum, had to be distinguished from it as a form of mind *sui generis*, as another, subliminal continuum of mind underlying the continuum of the surface functions. This, it is true, holds good only on the condition that certain exceptional situations like *nirodhasamāpatti* are either not taken into account or are (against mainstream Abhidharma)[1598] regarded as characterized by a subtle continuation or temporary reduction to subconsciousness (and not complete interruption) of the *ordinary* mind continuum (cf. § 42.2). To be sure, the advocates of *ālaya-vijñāna* produced, from the VinSg onward, various arguments in favour of a continuous subliminal mind *sui generis*, but these do not appear to have been regarded as decisive by those authors who established an 'idealist' (*vijñaptimātra*) position without taking recourse to *ālayavijñāna* (see § 14), and none of the arguments derives *ālayavijñāna* from the principle of *vijñaptimātratā* (see § 293.2).

[1597] This position is also adopted by N. Aramaki (2013: 411), who remarks with regard to chapters V-VIII: "There can be no doubt that these four original chapters of the SandhN were formed simultaneously in mutual dependence upon each other." He nonetheless thinks that "a logical order of their formation is to be recognized here", the most original being however, according to him, chapter VIII, whereas he takes chapter VII and chapter VI (in this sequence) to "redefine … *vijñaptimātratā* as the truth of the three non-essences (*triniḥsvabhāvatā*), which, in fact, is a definition of the supreme truth (*paramārthasatya*)" (2013: 413) and "as the truly ontological principle of conversion to be converted from the old defiled being-here-and-now to the new purified being-here-and-now" (2013: 412f; 417). I am not competent enough to assess the philosophical aspect of this interpretation (cf. fn. 43), but as a historian and philologist I cannot but have serious reserves, my main problem being that the assumed definiendum, *vijñaptimātratā*, or anything coming close to it, does not occur anywhere in these two chapters, and is not applied to the central concepts of these two chapters in chapter VIII either (see §§ 309.1 and 310).

[1598] [**1**.] Sarvāstivāda-Abhidharma and Vaibhāṣikas: e.g., Prak_G 628c15-17 ≈ Prak_H 694a20-22; Vi 774a22-24; b13-18; cf. 775a21; AKBh 70,1f; 73,3f. [**2**.] Theravāda: VisM XXIII.18; 30; 43; Ps II 351,17-28 (cf. GRIFFITHS 1986: 6f). [**3**.] CSL: 345a2f; cf. also b29f and c17-20. [**4**.] early Yogācāras: ŚrBh 460,11-18 (DELEANU 2006: I 344 [# 3,28.4.3]; II 461 and 561f ns. 248 and 249); traditional definition subsequently relativized from the perspective of *ālayavijñāna*: SamBh 206,8f (# 4.1.3.4.1) and 207,6-9 (# 4.1.3.4.3.3 [= *IP*]); YBh_t P zi 39a3-6 (D zhi 36b6–37a1; YBh_c 593a1-5; VinSg_{ms} 16b3f).

300. As for the *second* issue (§ 298.2), Buescher is, as far as I can see, correct in assuming that at least in the chapters concerned (and also in chapter X)[1599] the Saṁdh introduces novel ideas marked by a new terminology. Still, this does not exclude the existence of preliminary or preparatory stages, like the ontology of the TattvP, which Buescher himself regards as a kind of stepping-stone to the three-*lakṣaṇa* theory and to *vijñaptimātratā* (see § 295). Similarly, there is no *a priori* reason why the idea of a subliminal form of mind must have cropped up from nothing, without some prefiguration in an earlier context. As I have tried to show above (§§ 285–291), there remains a sufficient amount of innovativeness for the Saṁdh even if we understand its V[th] chapter as a revision of the *ālayavijñāna* theory and the *vijñāna-santāna* concept of the MauBh of the YBh, and this innovative dimension is sufficiently indicated by the new term *ādānavijñāna*, with no need to introduce yet another, subsidiary new term.[1600]

301.0. The *third* issue (§ 298.3) requires a more detailed investigation.

301.1. If the Saṁdh (or at least the part relevant to the present discussion) could be regarded as produced in one casting, so to speak, and not as a collection (and perhaps supplementation) of preexisting smaller units, it would make sense to understand the message of its various chapters as facets of an integral systematic whole, each facet being meant to presuppose or imply the others, as Buescher assumes. This would, no doubt, be the way the text would in any case be interpreted by a systematizing reader or commentator. But if the text had from the outset been written with such an integral systematic structure in mind, wouldn't one expect this structure to be more clearly expressed? To be sure, the text would reasonably begin with introducing one key concept first and then proceed to the next, and so on, and it would make sense, from a didactic point of view, not to anticipate concepts to be introduced only later. But why not make use of a concept already introduced when dealing with the next one if they are intrinsically interrelated? And would one not expect that at the end the interrelatedness of the new concepts, the systematic structure as a whole, is explicitly elaborated? As far as I can see, this is not really the case in the Saṁdh; if it were, there would hardly be any scholarly debate on the issue. All that can be said is that the VIII[th] chapter as it stands is indeed acquainted with the concept of *ādānavijñāna* and with that of the three *lakṣaṇa*s, but actually the reference to them looks somewhat marginal (see § 310).

301.2. On the other hand, if the composition of the Saṁdh was a more complicated process, i.e., if it consists of several parts that originated separately and were collected, and perhaps supplemented, only afterwards, the new ideas propounded in the various chapters need not necessarily presuppose each other. They may rather be, so to speak, loose ends that came to be connected only in a second step. In this case, one would like to find traces of a text-historical process or indications of heterogeneity. Indeed, although on the whole the chapters of the Saṁdh are similar in that they are in prose followed by a concluding verse or set of verses, there are also differences. That the bodhisattva acting as the interlocutor of the Buddha varies from chapter to chapter need not signalize heterogeneity.[1601] What is more important is

[1599] Contrasting the *dharmakāya* of Buddhas with the novel concept of *vimuktikāya* obtained by Śrāvaka arhats.

[1600] Actually, all the other chapters of the Saṁdh do well without such a duplication of novel terms.

[1601] The only abnormality is found in the first chapter, where the Buddha does not (yet) enter the stage and the conversation is between two bodhisattvas.

the fact, already pointed out by LAMOTTE[1602] but of no effect on Buescher, that at the end of chapter VII we find a concluding formula (VII.33) preceded by a *śravaṇaphala* (VII.31–32), which suggests the end of the text, although the sūtra continues. Similar paragraphs are also found at the end of chapters VIII, IX and X, but not in the chapters before chapter VII. Moreover, the dialogic structure of chapters I–VII is different from that of the later chapters: while in the former group the respective bodhisattva only formulates a question or request which is then answered in detail by the Buddha, in the latter group real dialogues take place (though chapter VIII and chapter X also each include one longer monologue). Another interesting issue is that in chapter VII an additional prose portion follows after the verses that normally indicate the end of the disquisition of the subject dealt with in the respective chapter. Yet the first part of this additional prose portion (VII.25–30) continues the discussion of the subject under discussion (cf. § 304.2) and thus cannot be regarded as belonging to the concluding formula (see above) but looks like a supplement[1603], formally distinguished from the main part of the chapter also by the fact that it is not spoken by the Buddha but, apart from a brief confirmation (VII.29), put into the mouth of his interlocutor.

301.3. However these features are evaluated, it may be worthwhile to take a closer look at the chapters concerned in order to find out whether and, if so, to what extent they explicitly refer to the key concepts of the other chapters, or at least show some affinity to or tendency towards them even if we desist from an arbitrary 'eisegesis' of ideas belonging to different contexts or possibly later strata.

4.3.1. *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* Chapter V

302. Chapter V, on the subliminal mind, has already been discussed above (ch. 4.2, esp. 4.2.9). That the key terms of the later chapters are missing here, may be explained by didactic reasons (see § 301.1). That V.2 contains a reference to the categories *nimitta*, *nāman* and *vikalpa*, i.e., the exclusively mundane part of the so-called 'five *vastu*s', does not necessarily imply *vijñāptimātratā* because the (ordinary)[1604] *nimitta* of the 'five-*vastu* pattern' is, to be sure, dependent on *vikalpa* but not just an image in the mind (see § 290). Nor is *vijñapti-mātratā* presupposed by the fact that *citta/vijñāna* is qualified as **sarvabīja(ka)* (see §§ 263–264) or by the quasi-etymology of *citta* in V.3, which is borrowed from the ŚrBh (see § 277). If anything, it is the fact that the **sarvabījaṁ cittam* is stated to appropriate or take in the *vāsanā*s not only of *nāman* and *vikalpa* but also of the *nimitta*s that may be taken to suggest that the latter were, or could easily come to be, conceived as being merely mental phenomena (cf. § 290.3), but the text is simply not sufficiently explicit to decide this issue.

[1602] In the preface (p. 19f) of his edition of the Saṁdh, where he also points out that in Paramārtha's partial translation of the sūtra this concluding formula occurs at the end of chapter IV, where it indeed appears to belong originally. This would seem to mean that a text originally consisting of chapters I–IV was later on enlarged by chapters V–VII. This need not have happened in a single step (nor does it automatically preclude an independent preexistence of the included chapters), and it is even possible (though, of course, hardly demonstrable) that chapters VI–VII were included first and chapter V was inserted in a second step only, which would explain why there is no trace of it in chapters VI–VII (see ch. 4.3.2).

[1603] This possibility is admitted also by Buescher (138 n. 5).

[1604] I.e., the natural (**prakṛti-*) or everyday *nimitta*, in contrast to the *pratibimbanimitta* produced by a deliberate act of contemplation (*adhimokṣa*): YBh$_t$ P 'i 4b2f (YBh$_c$ 697b8-11); see KRAMER 2005: 75f and 114f (## 9.1.1.4(1–2)); TAKAHASHI 2005: 130 and 191 (# 1.9.1.1.4).

4.3.2. *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* Chapters VI and VII

303.0. Buescher is doubtless right in considering the pattern of the three 'characteristics' (*lakṣaṇa*) or 'natures' (*svabhāva*) in Saṁdh VI and the corresponding pattern of the three forms of 'lack of own-being' (*niḥsvabhāvatā*), i.e., of individual essence and inherent existence,[1605] in Saṁdh VII to have, essentially, developed from the *Tattvārthapaṭala* (TattvP) and some other passages of the BoBh[1606] as their starting point.[1607] Still, in my (admittedly provisional) understanding of these BoBh passages, the situation there is somewhat more complicated than Buescher seems to assume.

303.1. On the one hand,[1608] it is stated in the TattvP and the related text portions that the designations expressing a specific nature or character of things (*vastu*) like those normally called (or conceived as) body/matter (*rūpa*), feelings (*vedanā*), etc., are mere designations (*prajñaptimātra*), and that there is no intrinsic nature of things that would correspond to these denominations.[1609] This does not, however, mean that things have no nature or existence at all, but that the true, ultimate (*pāramārthika*) nature of things, the 'bare real' (*vastumātra*), devoid of superimposed qualifications or conceptualizations, is inexpressible (*nirabhilāpya*).[1610] Actually, it is equated with True Reality or 'Suchness' (*tathatā*), in which all dharmas are completely alike (*samasama*)[1611] and which is fully accessible only to the nonconceptual (*nirvikalpa*) insight of advanced bodhisattvas[1612] and Buddhas,[1613] but not to everyday experience.

[1605] Cf. fn. 51.

[1606] Especially BoBh$_D$ 180,16–181,21.

[1607] Thus already ARAMAKI 1976 (2); cf. YAMABE 1989: 57 n. 22. Cf. also ARAMAKI 2000: 39 n.2 (BoBh precedes the VIIIth chapter of Saṁdh).

[1608] In spite of some disagreement concerning the interpretation of specific passages, this part of my analysis seems to be basically in harmony with the one proposed in MOTOMURA 2011: 62–65.

[1609] BoBh$_D$ 30,2-5 (TAKAHASHI 2005: 96 # 5.1), etc.

[1610] BoBh$_D$ 30,5-7; cf. 28,10 (*nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatāṁ sarvadharmāṇāṁ*); 28,11 and 31,4ff (*vastumātram*); 31,1 (*nirabhilāpyātmakatayā paramārthasadbhūtaṁ vastu*); 34,14 (*vastumātraparamārtha*).

[1611] BoBh$_D$ 28,9-14 (TAKAHASHI 2005: 92 and 160, # 4.7):

> The aforementioned bodhisattva ... no longer imagines (or: conceptualizes) anything (v.l.: any dharma in any form). Rather (*nânyatra*), he apprehends nothing but the Real ('the bare Real'), nothing but True Reality ('bare Suchness'). ... Living (lit.: moving about) in the ultimate reality, he correctly perceives, by insight, all dharmas as completely equal in terms of this true reality.
>
> *sa khalu bodhisattvaḥ ... na kiñcid* [v.l.: *na kaṁcid dharmaṁ kathaṁcid*] *vikalpayati* | *nânyatra vastumātraṁ gṛhṇāti tathatāmātraṁ* | ... *arthe parame caran sarvadharmāṁs tayā tathatayā samasamān yathābhūtaṁ prajñayā paśyati* |

For a somewhat different interpretation of *arthe carati*, see DELEANU 2013: 891f, but cf. also Aṣṭ 176,13f (*carati ... paramārthe*) with AAĀ$_V$ 490,32f (*paramārthe iti ... dharmadhātau carati*).

[1612] According to the description of the twelve stages of abiding (*vihāra*) of a bodhisattva in the BoBh, non-conceptual awareness of Suchness is attained only in the ninth or tenth *vihāra* (= seventh or eighth *bhūmi*): BoBh$_D$ 219,23; 239,3-12 (though somehow prepared in the eighth *vihāra*: BoBh$_D$ 235,7f < DBhS$_R$ 47,16f). Cf. CHOONG 2013: 83f; 98; DELEANU 2013: 909.

[1613] BoBh$_D$ 30,7f: *sa punaḥ pāramārthikaḥ svabhāvaḥ sarvadharmāṇāṁ nirvikalpasyaîva jñānasya gocaro veditavyaḥ*; cf. also 26,11-14 (TAKAHASHI 2005: 87 and 155f, # 2.2.4.2), defining the "reality that is the domain of comprehension [characterized by] being purified from the obstacle [that veils] what should [ultimately] be comprehended" (*jñeyāvaraṇaviśuddhijñānagocaras tattvam*) as

In this picture, only two kinds of 'nature' (*svabhāva*) of things emerge: the fictional nature ascribed to them on the basis of denominations, and their inexpressible true nature in which they seem to have disappeared as individual entities.[1614] The denominations themselves are somewhere in between.

303.2. On the other hand, the TattvP in its second half[1615] presents a somewhat different picture. In this picture, Suchness (True Reality, *tathatā*) is contrasted with a set of imaginative conceptual constructions (*vikalpa*) producing a set of things (*vastu*)[1616] that function as the basis (*adhiṣṭhāna*) and objective support (*ālambana*) of all kinds of names and designations. These things in their turn generate the conceptual constructions. Thus, there is, from beginningless time, a mutual conditioning[1617] of conceptual constructions and things, in such a way that the previous conceptual constructions entail the objective things of the present. These again become the cause of corresponding conceptual constructions in the present, which again, unless fully comprehended as deceptive, will generate the corresponding objective things in the future (i.e., in the next life probably), which in their turn entail, once more, the corresponding conceptual constructions.[1618] In this picture, individual things still seem to have a kind of objective reality of their own, precarious because they are generated by conceptual constructions[1619] but apparently not yet reduced to a status of mere images in the mind.

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that which is the object and domain of the bodhisattvas and the exalted (/fortunate/venerable) Buddhas by means of a comprehension that is, with reference to the fact that [in reality] all dharmas have an inexpressible nature, free from imagination or conceptualization [superimposing] the nature of denominations [and is thus] equal [for all dharmas, or: adequate to its object?] — [a comprehension that comprises the stages[1] of being still] conducive to penetrating into the lack of own-being of the dharmas, [of] having penetrated [into it] and [of being] perfectly pure. This [reality] is the highest, supreme 'Suchness', at the summit of what can/should be comprehended, from which all [attempts at a] correct analysis of dharmas turn back (since they have reached their final goal) and do not go beyond.
bodhisattvānāṃ buddhānāṁ ca bhagavatāṁ dharmanairātmyapraveśāya praviṣṭena suviśuddhena ca sarvadharmāṇāṁ nirabhilāpyasvabhāvatām ārabhya prajñaptivādasvabhāvanirvikalpa(jñeya)samena jñānena yo gocaraviṣayaḥ | sâsau paramā tathatā niruttarā jñeyaparyantagatā, yasyāḥ sarv⟨e?⟩ samyakdharmapravicayā[2] nivartante nātivartante |

[1] Tentative interpretation, in analogy to the three stages of comprehension distinguished in the definition of the *kleśāvaraṇaviśuddhijñānagocaras tattvaṁ* of the śrāvakas (BoBh$_D$ 25,22f and 26,4).

[2] With mss. NKR and YBh$_C$ 486c22.

[1614] Cf. also BoBh$_D$ 181,6f, where the inexpressible *vastumātra* is stated to be like empty space (*ākāśasthānīya*).

[1615] BoBh$_D$ 34,21–36,10 (TAKAHASHI 2005: 107–110); cf. also 37,20–38,4 (ibid. 114f # 10.1–10.2). It is worth noting that the aspect of mutual conditioning is not represented in Guṇavarman's translation of the BoBh (see fn. 2252[3]).

[1616] As the text expressly states (BoBh$_D$ 34,22), these 'things' comprise both sentient beings (*sattva-loka*) and the surrounding world (*bhājanaloka*). According to the subsequent explanation given in the text, the 'things' even include derivative elements of the psyche (cf. 35,5-8), but this is not relevant for my present argument.

[1617] Buescher's (p. 175,14) rendering of *anyonyahetuka* (BoBh$_D$ 36,6) as "mutually *motivating* each other" (my emphasis) appears misleading. Rather, they are the *cause* (YBh$_t$ P zhi 35a4: *rgyu*; YBh$_C$ 490a25 and T 30.1581: 895c14: 因) for each other's emerging or arising (*prādurbhāva*, Tib. *'byung ba*, Ch. 生), contrasted with their 'cessation' (BoBh$_D$ 38,2f: *savastukasya vikalpasya nirodho ...*).

[1618] BoBh$_D$ 36,4-10; cf. also 239,14-18.

[1619] If this is what Buescher (B: 192,15f) calls "the strong idealist notions that characterize the *Tattvārtha* chapter in the *Yogācārabhūmi*'s *Bodhisattvabhūmi*", I have never denied them, as Buescher

303.3. In my (admittedly provisional) opinion, it is not least this tension between the two pictures that may have triggered the pattern of the five *vastu*s (set forth in the VinSg)[1620] as well as that of the three natures or aspects and the corresponding differentiation of *niḥsvabhāvatā* into three modes as found in Saṁdh VI and VII (and also in the VinSg)[1621].

304.1. As regards the characterization of the three *lakṣaṇa*s in the Saṁdh, the 'fictive character' (*parikalpita-lakṣaṇa*)[1622] of things is associated with linguistic conventions[1623] and the 'perfect character' (*pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*: cf. §§ 306.1–306.4) with *tathatā*, quite in agreement with the first picture of the TattvP (§ 303.1). The initial definition of the 'dependent character' (*paratantra-lakṣaṇa*: Saṁdh VI.5) and also of the corresponding *niḥsvabhāvatā* (VII.5) is, however, entirely traditional, viz., in terms of the origination of dharmas not by themselves but in dependence on other factors as conditions (*utpatti-niḥsvabhāvatā*). Yet, in their dependent nature, dharmas are also stated to be devoid of 'own-being' from the point of view of highest Truth (*paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*: VII.6: first part), in the soteriological sense of not being the object of the highest, ultimate comprehension,[1624] because they are not the objective support of purification (**viśuddhyālambana*: see § 306.5). In similes, they are, moreover, compared to illusory phenomena like the hair-tufts, etc., as they appear to persons suffering from the *timira* visual disorder (VI.7: 61,13-18), or to illusions produced by magic (**māyākṛta*: VII.7: 69,11-14).[1625]

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accuses me of doing. I simply have reserved the term 'idealist' for the more specific position of conceiving of objects as mere images in the mind, which I indeed cannot find to be expressed or at least implied anywhere in the *Tattvārtha* chapter.

[1620] *Vikalpa* and *nimitta* in this pattern obviously correspond to the *vikalpa* and the *vikalpa*-generated *vastu* of the second picture of the *Tattvārtha* chapter, whereas the *vastumātra* of the first picture figures as *tathatā*.

[1621] YBh_t P 'i 19b6–29a5 (D zi 18b1–27a1; YBh_c 703a23–706b26); crit. ed. of (part of) the Tibetan version in TAKAHASHI 2005: 140–149.

[1622] For the three terms, see MVy 1663–1665 (MVy_{Ish} 1669–1671).

[1623] Saṁdh VI.4: *ming dang brdar rnam par bzhag pa* (sTog 20b4: *ming gi brdas*), for which LAMOTTE suggests **nāmasaṁketavyavasthāpanam*. As TAKAHASHI (2006: 1201) points out, the Tun-huang version[1] has *ming dang mtshan ma btags pa* instead.[2] TAKAHASHI takes this to represent **nāmanimitta*° instead of **nāmasaṁketa*°, and he finds this supported by Bodhiruci's rendering 名相所說 ($Saṁdh_{Bo}$ 669c18).[3] But *nimitta* should rather correspond to the *paratantralakṣaṇa* (cf. Saṁdh VII.25–27 [81,11-13; 82,16-18; 83,13-16]). It would thus seem more probable that Tun-huang and Bodhiruci, too, presuppose **saṁketa* but have understood it not as "agreement, convention" but in its equally current meaning "intimation, hint, sign" (*MW*).

[1] HAKAMAYA 1986a: 604 (fol. 64a4) = 2008: 682.

[2] Similarly also in VII.4 [68,1f], 25 [81,4f] and 27 [83,10f]: see HAKAMAYA 1987a: 350 (37b4f: *mying dang mtshan ma'i phyir btags pa*), 340 (35b2: *ming dang mtshan mas rnam par btags pa*) and 338 (33a2: id.) = 2008: 672, 664 and 660.

[3] Cf. also 670c12 (VII.4), but 名字所說 in 673b12f (VII.27) and 於名字中說 in 673a15 (VII 25).

[1624] Cf. MAVBh 23,22f (ad MAV I.15b): *āryajñānagocaratvāt paramārthaḥ*.

[1625] Cf., in this connection, also the description of the *paratantra-svabhāva* as comparable to illusory or deceptive phenomena, including those adduced in the *Pheṇapiṇḍūpama-sutta* (SN 22.95; see fn. 2575), in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the VinSg (YBh_t P 'i 27b7 + 28b2f; D zi 25b4 + 26a6f; YBh_c 706a21 + b5-7; cf. HAKAMAYA 2006: 630).

304.2. In Saṁdh VII.10 (71,4-7) it is stated that on account of clinging (**abhiniveśa*) to the 'dependent nature' (*paratantrasvabhāva*)[1626] in terms of the 'fictive nature' (*parikalpitasvabhāva*), the *future* 'dependent nature' is generated, which comes close to the second picture of the TattvP (§ 303.2), now expressed in *svabhāvatraya* terminology.[1627] Still more explicit is Saṁdh VII.25–27 (the section which seems to be an appendix: see § 301.2), where the 'dependent character' (*paratantralakṣaṇa*) is defined as "the conditioned phenomena (**saṁskāranimitta*),[1628] which are the object of imagination or conceptual constructions (**vikalpagocara*) and the substratum (*gnas*, 所依) of the 'fictive character' (*parikalpitalakṣaṇa*)".[1629] A similar view is also expressed in Saṁdh I.5,[1630] where correct understanding is stated to consist in regarding the *saṁskāranimitta* as existing, albeit merely as a product of imaginative mental activity (*vikalpa*), thus comparable to an illusory appearance (**māyopama*).

304.3. In the context of these parts of the Saṁdh, I do not see any need to understand these statements in the sense of *vijñaptimātratā*. They make perfect sense in terms of the ontology suggested by the second picture of the TattvP and by the five-*vastu*-pattern, i.e., in terms of a mutual conditioning of *vikalpa*s and *nimitta*s, the *nimitta*s being a kind of objectively existing illusory entities (cf. § 290.2). These views may be taken to have prepared the transition to an 'idealist' position, but they are only half-way.

305. In some places, Buescher seems to find *vijñaptimātratā* presupposed in formulations that express, according to his understanding, a "'transparent' constitution of reality", a "phenomenological" awareness of Being's transparent presence (Saṁdh VI.9)" (B: 170f # 85). The passage adduced is, however, only the application of a simile, in which the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is *compared* to a translucent crystal that may appear as various kinds of coloured jewels or as gold if it is associated with (i.e., placed before or upon) a coloured object. Likewise, the *paratantralakṣaṇa* is mistakenly apprehended as having a nature corresponding to designations under the influence of the imprints of linguistic usage. All that I can gather from this comparison is that dependent things as such are free from the linguistic properties superimposed on them; the adventitious colours and the transparency of the crystal are just elements of the comparison.

[1626] For the sake of convenience, I use the compound forms (karmadhāraya; cf., e.g., MAVBh 38,3, etc.; Laṅk 67,3f, etc.), although the non-compound forms (*parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ*, etc.) are much more common (cf. KIMURA 2005: (4)f). I likewise use the compound forms in the case of *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*, etc.(cf., e.g., MSA IX.38f and 41). In this case, the only instance of a non-compounded use noted by Kimura (2005: (5)) is *parantrasya lakṣaṇaṁ* (MSA[Bh] IX.40), suggesting a genitive-tatpuruṣa analysis for the compound. In the Saṁdh, however, such an analysis appears contextually improbable, since we have *chos rnams kyi kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid*, etc. (Saṁdh VI 4–6; VII.5), which rather suggests "fictitious character of the dharmas" (**dharmāṇāṁ parikalpita(ṁ) lakṣaṇam*), etc. Whether and, if so, in which way the use of *svabhāva* (VII.10, etc.) side by side with *lakṣaṇa* (VII.4–6, etc.) in Saṁdh VII makes a difference, is not relevant for the present investigation.

[1627] Cf. YAMABE 1989: 51.

[1628] Cf. TAKAHASHI 2006.

[1629] Saṁdh 81,11-13: *rnam par rtog pa'i spyod yul kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid kyi gnas 'du byed kyi mtshan ma gang lags pa de ni gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid lags te* |; similarly 82,16-18 and 83,13-16.

[1630] Saṁdh 38,7f: *rnam par rtog pa las byung ba 'du byed kyi mtshan ma sgyu ma lta bu 'di ni yod* |. Cf. TAKAHASHI 2006: 1198,18ff.

306.0. Equally problematic is Buescher's attempt to derive a

> transparent insubstantiality (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) in, and of, purely noetic processes constituting the empirical (B 171 # 86)

from the terms *pariniṣpanna*(*lakṣaṇa*) and *rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa* (taken by Buescher to render Skt. **viśuddhālambana*)[1631], equated by him with *tathatā* specified as *vijñaptitathatā* = *vijñaptimātratā*:

> ... on the level of non-dual awareness, the perfectly manifest characteristic (*pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*) — being the diaphanously clear noematic reference point (*viśuddhālambana*; VII.6 & 25ff.) ... — corresponds to Being-as-such (*tathatā*; VII.25ff. = *vijñaptitathatā*; VIII.37.2 = *vijñaptimātratā*; VIII.20.2.3). (B: 189,14-17)

This attempt is doubtful for several reasons:

306.1. While the equation of the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* with *tathatā* is justified by its very definition in Saṁdh VI.6, the specification of *tathatā* as *vijñaptitathatā* presupposes Buescher's doubtful assumption of a composition of Saṁdh (at least V–VIII) in one casting, but is arbitrary within the context of the block VI/VII if taken by itself. Actually, in VII.6 (second part) and VII.7 (69,17f) the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*, identified with the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* and hence with *tathatā*, is expressly equated with *dharmanairātmya*,[1632] which corresponds, in the pattern of the seven *tathatā*s of Saṁdh VIII.20.2, not to *vijñaptitathatā* but, reasonably, to (one aspect of) *lakṣaṇatathatā*.[1633]

306.2. As evidence supporting an interpretation of *pariniṣpanna* as "perfectly manifested" and *pariniṣpatti* as "perfect manifestation" (and *niṣpatti* as "manifestation"), Buescher (B: 186f: Ex. 35) adduces a quotation from Haribhadra's *Abhisamayālaṅkārālokā*,[1634] where *bhūtakoṭiprabhāvitaḥ* is explained as *dharmakāyapariniṣpattyā niṣpannaḥ*. From this, Buescher, taking *prabhāvita* to mean "manifested", concludes that *niṣpanna* must also mean "manifested". But as far as I can see no corresponding meaning is attested for *niṣ-√pad* or *pari-niṣ-√pad*.[1635] The meaning of *niṣ-√pad* is rather "to come forth" in the sense of "to arise" or "to become complete", and for *pariniṣpadyate* EDGERTON (*BHSD* 325b) gives the meanings "becomes perfected" and "turns into" (< "develops into").[1636] On the other hand, *prabhāvita* may, to be sure, mean "manifested", but it may also mean "brought forth, pro-

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[1631] Thus already LAMOTTE (Saṁdh 51,9, 69,2 and 82,5).

[1632] Cf. also Saṁdh VII.25 (81,20-22): ... *chos bdag ma mchis pa de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa gang lags pa de ni yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid lags te*. Similarly VII.26 (82,25-27) and VII.27 (83,23f).

[1633] Saṁdh VIII.20.2.2: *mtshan nyid kyi de bzhin nyid ni chos thams cad kyi gang zag bdag med pa dang chos bdag med pa gang yin pa'o* ||; sTog (43a7): ... *gang chos thams cad kyi gang zag la bdag med pa dang* | *chos la bdag med pa'o* ||), probably corresponding to **lakṣaṇatathatā yat sarvadharmāṇāṁ pudgalanairātmyaṁ dharmanairātmyaṁ ca*.

[1634] AĀĀ$_V$ 375,29-31 (AĀĀ$_W$ 269,12-14), on Aṣṭ 48,10f (AĀĀ$_W$ 268,7-9).

[1635] The meaning "zur Erscheinung bringen" suggested in *pw* for *pariniṣpādita* at *Kāraṇḍavyūha* 39,22 is rightly rejected by EDGERTON (*BHSD* 326a).

[1636] For the use of (*pari*)*nipphanna* in the sense of "arisen [from conditions]", which means real but impermanent, and thus excludes both mere designations (*paññatti*) and the unconditioned (*asaṅkhata*), see KARUNADĀSA [2]1989: 42f and 67f. For the opponent in the Kv (XI.7–8 [459–462] and XXIII.5 [626f]), however, *parinipphanna* seems to be used in the sense of "truly real", in the sense of the true nature of things pervading the particulars.

duced" or simply "come forth, arisen, originated" (see Pt. II § 359), and it would seem that it is in the latter sense that Haribhadra has understood it in the expression *bhūtakoṭiprabhāvita*,[1637] if *niṣpanna* is indeed intended to explain the literal meaning of *prabhāvita*.

306.3. Likewise, none of the other instances of *pariniṣpanna* adduced by Buescher (B: 187f) in support of his assumption of the meaning "(perfectly) manifested" is convincing:

1. In the passage BoBh$_D$ 37,13f, *abhilāpyenâtmanâpariniṣpannatvāt* is obviously contrasted with *nirabhilāpyenâtmanā vyavasthitatvāt*: a thing like the one called '*rūpa*' has not really come about (i.e., is not really existent) in terms of an essence that can be designated [thus], but it is indeed established in terms of an inexpressible nature.[1638]

2. As regards the next passage, viz., DBhS$_R$ 6O (52,15f: ... *prayujyate 'pariniṣpannānāṁ bodhyaṅgānāṁ pariniṣpattaye*), Buescher himself admits that the connotation of 'accomplishment' is more dominant. Actually, 'manifestation' is, in my opinion, quite inappropriate because the bodhisattva should, of course, accomplish or perfect the *bodhyaṅga*s but not display them, and I do not see any sense in assuming that he should manifest them to himself in addition to just producing and perfecting them, or in assuming a previous hidden presence of the *bodhyaṅga*s so that they need not be produced or accomplished but must only be manifested.

3. In the case of ŚrBh 405,2-7, Buescher's rendering of the sentence *sa ca taṁ pariniṣpannaṁ samādhiṁ niśritya adhiprajñaṁ dharmavipaśyanāyāṁ prayujyate* runs as follows:

> And based upon that perfectly manifested recollectedness he is intuitively engaged ... in the discernment of dharmas (...). (B: 188,1f)

But why and to whom has the *samādhi* been manifested? In this case, too, the natural understanding is that the *samādhi* has been fully accomplished[1639] or perfected, practised to perfection.[1640]

306.4. Thus, Buescher's interpretation of the *pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa* as "perfectly manifest characteristic" is hardly tenable from a semantic point of view. Since this characteristic of things is, moreover, only realized when the habit of superimposing linguistic properties on things is transcended, i.e., only after a considerable amount of spiritual training (and at any rate not before the *darśanamārga*), calling it "perfectly manifest" is also hardly appropriate from a systematic point of view. Apart from this, the meaning "fully accomplished" or "perfect" is also confirmed by the Tibetan renderings *yongs su grub pa* and *yongs su rdzogs pa* (Saṁdh$_{TH}$)[1641] as well as by Hsüan-tsang's equivalent 圓成實 ("perfectly real").[1642]

[1637] Cf. also AAĀ 335,8f (AAĀ$_W$ 143,6f): *asaṁskṛtaprabhāvitam iti ... asaṁskṛtanirjātam*.

[1638] Buescher's rendering "is not at all manifested by itself as something that can be designated" is also odd from a syntactical point of view, for in order to admit of being taken not as an attribute of *ātmanā* ("self" in the sense of "essence, nature", cf. MSABh 38,2f: *ātmā svabhāvārthena*) but as a predicative complement ("*as* something ...") of *apariniṣpanna* (mis)understood as "manifested", what would be required is *abhilāpyatvena*, not *abhilāpyena*.

[1639] Cf. YBh$_C$ 458b8: 圓滿.

[1640] By the way, I also seriously doubt that "intuitively" is an appropriate rendering of *adhiprajñaṁ*. Rather: "engaged in the discernment of dharmas with reference to [accomplishing liberating] insight".

[1641] HAKAMAYA 1986a: 602 (fol. 65a2) = 2008: 680 (VI.7 end).

306.5. As for Buescher's (B: 189,15f) designation of the *parinispanna-lakṣaṇa* as the "diaphanously clear noematic reference point (*viśuddhālambana*)", it is based on an almost certainly wrong Sanskrit equivalent for Tib. *rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa.*[1643] At any rate, I have not been able to locate an occurrence of **viśuddhālambana*, but there is sufficient evidence, in comparable contexts, for *viśuddhyālambana*[1644] and *pariśuddhyālambana.*[1645] According to Saṁdh VII.6, the *paramārtha* (in the sense of "object of the highest comprehension")[1646] is that which is the objective support of purity or purification, i.e., that which, when it becomes the objective support of cognition, leads to spiritual purification,[1647] a function which only the *parinispanna-lakṣaṇa*, i.e., the *tathatā*, can fulfil (cf. also VI.6). In VII.25–27, the **viśuddhyālambana* is expressly equated with *dharmanairātmya*, i.e., *lakṣaṇa-*

[1642] Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 693a17, etc.; Bodhiruci (Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 669c17, etc.) replaces the term by 第一義, usually corresponding to *paramārtha*.

[1643] Saṁdh VII.6 (68,22) and VII.25–27 (see fn. 1632); cf. also IV.8. For a reconstruction as **viśuddhyālambana* (instead of **viśuddhālambana*), see also HAKAMAYA 1994: 136 and KATŌ Kōjirō in *IBK* 59.2 [123] (2011): 978 (English summary in *IBK* 59.3 [124]: 1386).

[1644] Most closely related to Saṁdh VII.6 is ASBh 114,23-25 (see Pt. III § 499): *parinispanno viśuddhyālambanatvād ...-abhāvasvabhāvatvāc ca ... paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatayā niḥsvabhāvaḥ*; cf. also 88,21: *paramārtho viśuddhyālambanam*; PPU # III.5.4.3.5: *tṛtīyaḥ* (sc. *svabhāvaḥ*) *paramārthasat, viśuddhyālambanatvāt*; MAVBh 23,9 (ad MAV I.13d): "If [emptiness (= *tathatā*)] were identical [with the dharmas], it could not be the objective support for purification nor the common characteristic [of all dharmas]" (*ekatve sati viśuddhyālambanaṁ*[1] *na syāt sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ ca*). On the basis of these passages, I suggest that in TrBh *44,19 (L. 40,11f: *athânanya evam api parinispanno na viśuddhyālambanaḥ syāt*) we should emend to *viśuddhyālambanaṁ* ("If, on the other hand, [the *parinispanna*] were identical [with the *paratantra*], even so [we would have a problem, viz., that] the perfect [nature] would not *be* the objective support for purification"); for *ālambana* is neuter, and a bahuvrīhi does not make sense since the perfect nature, as defined in Tr(Bh), viz., as *paratantrasya parikalpitena rahitatā*, is not a cognitive factor and thus cannot *have* an *ālambana*. A tatpuruṣa is also confirmed by Tib. (TrBh **44,27: *rnam par dag pa'i dmigs par mi 'gyur te*), and Vinītadeva (TrṬ P ku 58a8) equates *viśuddhi* with the Path (*lam* = *mārga*), just as Sthiramati does in MAVṬ 48,24 (see fn. 1648). Cf. also TAKAHASHI 2005: 186f n. 12, suggesting **viśuddhyālambana* also for YBh$_t$ P zi 304a3 (TAKAHASHI 2005: 125 # 1.5.4; likewise KRAMER 2005: 72 and 107, # 5.4).

[1] Ed. adds *jñānaṁ* on the basis of the two Chinese versions but against the testimony of the ms. and of MAVṬ 48,23f. Still, the grammatical subject to be supplied must be *śūnya(tā)*, not *jñāna*, for *sāmānyalakṣaṇaṁ* is not meaningful as a predicate noun qualifying *jñāna*. Moreover, the addition of 智 = *jñāna* in the Chinese versions is easily understood as an attempt to explicate the somewhat elliptic expression *viśuddhyālambana*, which in fact presupposes the involvement of a cognitive act, because only cognitive acts can have an *ālambana*. Therefore, Hsüan-tsang has simply replaced the phrase "objective support of purification" by "objective support of pure comprehension" (T 31.1600: 465c10: 若一, 則應非淨智境, 亦非共相), without disturbing the syntactical structure, whereas Paramārtha's version (T 31.1599: 452b19f: 若一者, 清淨境界智 及通相 不成就) would seem to entail a change of subject: "In case of identity, a comprehension with a pure objective support and [emptiness as] the common character [of all dharmas] would not be established".

[1645] SamBh 159 (# 3.1.2.2.18): *yaś ca* (sc. *manaskāraḥ*) *pariśuddhyālambanālambanaḥ*, i.e., "the concentrative act that has as its objective support (i.e., concentrates on) the objective support [conducive] to complete purification".

[1646] See fn. 1624.

[1647] Cf. also MAVBh 24,1: "[Emptiness = *tathatā* is called '*dharmadhātu*' because it is the cause of the noble (i.e., supramundane) spiritual qualities], for the noble qualities arise from it [insofar] as [it has become the] objective support [of contemplation/insight]" (*āryadharmāṇāṁ tadālambanaprabhavatvāt*: see Pt. III § 551).

tathatā, not *vijñaptitathatā*, and *viśuddhi* surely has no ontological meaning in this compound but refers to spiritual purification.[1648]

307. In view of the preceding considerations, I do not perceive, in Saṁdh VI/VII, any elements that in any significant way go beyond the half-way prefigurations of an 'idealist' ontology as found in the TattvP (second picture) and the five-*vastu*-pattern and might indicate a tacitly presupposed *vijñaptimātratā* ontology. Nor is there, as far as I can see, any trace of a subliminal form of *vijñāna*. Even in a context where one would strongly expect it, viz., in connection with the mind being imbued (**paribhāvita*) with linguistic usage, the text is entirely traditional in using merely the term *citta*, not *ādāna*- or *ālayavijñāna*.[1649] And in another passage[1650] the impregnations (*vāsanā*) of the 'fictive character' are located in the 'dependent character', without any further specification. From the point of view of the Saṁdh as a composition in one casting, this is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the subliminal mind had already been introduced in chapter V. Under these presuppositions, I find it hard to explain why this basic concept should not have been integrated into the new ontological pattern, as has actually been done in the case of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (ch. II).[1651] In the light of this text, it may likewise come as a surprise that, if Buescher's interpretation is correct, the key concept of the novel ontology of the Saṁdh, viz., *vijñaptimātratā*, is not (as in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*) introduced in the section concerned with the basic ontological framework, i.e., Saṁdh VI/VII, but only in chapter VIII, the subject of which is spiritual practice.

308.1. Of considerable interest is, in this connection, a kind of parallel to the Saṁdh's concept of *svabhāvatraya*, found in an appendix to some versions of the Larger *Prajñāpāramitā*,[1652] which the first editors (E. CONZE and Sh. IIDA) have titled *Maitreya's Questions*

[1648] Cf. MAVṬ 48,24, explaining *viśuddhyālambana* as a genitive-tatpuruṣa in the sense of the objective support of "that by which one becomes purified, i.e., [of] the [supramundane] Path" (*viśudhyate 'neneti viśuddhir mārgaḥ*). Alternative explanation as a dative-tatpuruṣa ibid. 49,5f (reconstructed); according to Tib.: "Or: *viśuddhyālambana* means the objective support [contemplated] for the sake of purification" (MAVṬ$_t$ P tshi 48a5: *yang na rnam par dag par bya ba'i phyir dmigs pa ni | rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa'o ||*). Cf. also ASBh 20,13: *viśuddhaye ālambanaṁ paramārthasat, paramārthajñānagocarārthena*, and PPU # III.5.4.3.5: *viśuddhaya ālambanam na saṁkleśāyêti kṛtvā.*

[1649] Saṁdh VII.10 (70,34f): *tha snyad btags pas yongs su bsgos pa'i sems*. In sTog (na 26a2f), the passage reads *tha snyad btags pas sems yongs su bgos shing*, and in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ (HAKAMAYA 1987a: 346 = 2008: 668 [fol. 56b3]) *spyod pa la kun du bsgom ba'i sems kyis*. On the passage as a whole see YAMABE 1989: 50f with n. 20. Byang-chub rdzu-'phrul (SaṁdhVy P co 130b3f) naturally equates *citta* with *ālayavijñāna.*

[1650] Saṁdh VI.9 (62,19f): *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid la kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid kyi tha nyad kyi bag chags*. Similarly sTog na 21b2f. Saṁdh$_{TH}$ (HAKAMAYA 1986a: 600 = 2008: 678 [fol. 65b4]): *gzhan gyi dbang las mtshan nyid la kun du rtog pa'i mtshan nyid rtsod pa'i bag chags pa.*

[1651] It may be worth noting in this connection that the structure of MSg I–III (I: *ālayavijñāna*; II: *svabhāvatraya*; III: spiritual realization of *vijñaptimātra* culminating in the *darśanamārga*) corresponds exactly to that of Saṁdh V–VIII provided that the chapter on the threefold *niḥsvabhāvatā* is disregarded (but cf. MSg II.30).

[1652] In part of the Sanskrit and Tibetan transmission (for details see MaiQ p. 229f), but not in any Chinese translation of the Larger *Prajñāpāramitā* versions (HAKAMAYA 1975a: 496 = (23)).

(MaiQ).[1653] In this text, dharmas are stated to have three aspects, designated as 1. purely fictitious (*parikalpita*), 2. resulting from imagination (*vikalpita*),[1654] and 3. the [true] nature of things (*dharmatā*), respectively (MaiQ ## IV.37–41).[1655] The similarity of this pattern to that of the three *lakṣaṇas*/*svabhāvas* of Saṁdh VI is obvious. The fact that this chapter is a later interpolation into the *Prajñāpāramitā* does not imply that it (or some prototype) must be later than the Saṁdh, for actually its basic pattern is already referred to in the AS (31,6-11; AS_G 29,1-6) and even in the MAV (III.16cd).[1656] The text may well be an attempt by early Yogācāras to protect the *Prajñāpāramitā* from (what they felt to be) a nihilistic interpretation, as criticized in the TattvP of the BoBh, by introducing a corrective section into the *Prajñāpāramitā* text itself, but it may also have existed as an independent sūtra in the beginning.

308.2. In connection with the issue under discussion it is worth noting that MaiQ does not contain any reference to *ālayavijñāna* or to *vijñaptimātratā*. But whereas there is no trace of a subliminal form of mind, MaiQ would seem to come one step closer to *vijñaptimātratā* than Saṁdh VI because as pointed out above we find in MaiQ, instead of the realistic-sounding term '*paratantra*' of Saṁdh VI, the expression '*vikalpita*', which conveys an illusionist nuance and which is defined in MaiQ not only in terms of a dependence on imagination (*vikalpa*) but even in terms of consisting ultimately in nothing but imagination (*vikalpamātra-dharmatāyām avasthānatā*).[1657] This is also confirmed by another passage according to which things in the sense of conditioned phenomena (*saṁskāranimitta*) are nothing but imagination (*vikalpamātra*).[1658] It is, however, not very easy to decide whether the purport of this formulation is merely to lay more stress on the fact that even the conditioned phenomena upon which the fictitious linguistic properties are superimposed are only products of imagination, i.e., deceptive mental activities, and hence ultimately illusory and no longer perceived when a bodhisattva is actually engaged in insight free from all imagination,[1659] or whether the

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[1653] Ed. also in $Pañcav_K$ VI–VIII: 145,28–157,30. The title "*Maitreya's Questions*" has been taken from the Tibetan tradition, which refers to this chapter as *Byams zhus kyi le'u* (MaiQ p. 230; HAKAMAYA 1975a: 499 = (20)), whereas Ratnākaraśānti refers to it as *Aviparyāsaniveśana* (PPU # III.5.4.3.10).

[1654] Cf. §§ 290.2 and 303.2.

[1655] $Pañcav_K$ VI–VIII: 151,11–152,16. Cf. HAKAMAYA 1975b: (12)–(14), with quotations from Bhavya's *Tarkajvālā* (P dza 229b3–230a1) and from $MSgU_C$ (399b28–c13). See also the paraphrase in Sār 190,5-14.

[1656] Cf. HAKAMAYA 1975a: (24)–(27), referring also to MSg II.32.2.

[1657] MaiQ # IV.40 ($Pañcav_K$ VI–VIII: 152,6-11): *yā punas tasya saṁskāranimittasya vastuno vikalpamātradharmatāyām avasthānatā ..., idaṁ vikalpitaṁ rūpam, ... ime vikalpitā buddhadharmāḥ.*

[1658] MaiQ # III.35 ($Pañcav_K$ VI–VIII: 150,31–151,1), where the Buddha asks the rhetorical question: *nanv*[1] *evaṁ sati vikalpamātram etad yad uta saṁskāranimittaṁ vastu yatrêdam āgantukaṁ nāmadheyaṁ prakṣiptaṁ yad idaṁ rūpam iti*, etc.

[1] Both editions read *na tu*, but LUO Hong is doubtless right in reading *nanu* in the quotation of the passage in PPU # III.5.4.3.10. Cf. Kj P no. 731 (*Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā Prajñ.*) di 248b4-6: *de lta na ... de dag rnam par rtog pa tsam du zad pa ma yin nam* |; cf. also Kj P no. 732 (*Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñ.*) phi 174a1f (almost identical with Tj P ca 373b7–374a1): *de lta yin na ... de rnam par rtog pa tsam du zad dam* | *rnam par rtog pa tsam nyid do* ‖ (suggesting **nanv evaṁ sati vikalpamātram etad ...? vikalpamātram eva!*).

[1659] Cf. MaiQ # III.32 ($Pañcav_K$ VI–VIII: 150,18-22; cf. also the paraphrase in Sār 190,2f), where Maitreya asks:

formulation is indeed intended to indicate that these phenomena exist merely as the contents of these activities. But even in the latter case emphasis is clearly on the imaginary, illusory character of conditioned phenomena,[1660] and not on their being images in the mind, or purely *mental* representations.

4.3.3. *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* Chapter VIII

309.0. Chapter VIII of the Saṁdh is dedicated to spiritual practice (*yoga*), with *śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* as central categories. It is in this chapter that the principle of *vijñaptimātra(tā)* is introduced,[1661] and it is only in this chapter that this term as well as the concept of *vijñapti-tathatā* occurs.[1662] In contrast to the chapters discussed before, the VIII[th] chapter, as it stands, presupposes the chapters V and VI, or at any rate their key concepts,[1663] viz., *ādānavijñāna* and the three *lakṣaṇa*s, for they are indeed referred to, albeit only once in each case.

> When a bodhisattva who is actually engaged in insight concentrated on the inexpressible realm [of true reality] no [longer] perceives [any] such thing [consisting in a] conditioned phenomenon ..., does he not perceive it [although it is still] existent or [because it is] not existent [anymore]?
>
> *saced ... bodhisattvo ... nirabhilāpyadhātūpanibaddhe prajñāpracāre vartamānas tat saṁskāra-nimittaṁ vastu nôpalabhate, ... tat kathaṁ ... vidyamānaṁ (vâvidyamānaṁ vā) nôpalabhate?*

The Buddha (MaiQ # III.33) answers that the *saṁskāranimittaṁ vastu* has no [autonomous] existence (cf. Pañcav Kj P di 248b2: *rang dbang du yod pa nyid*), and hence no non-existence (in the sense of cessation of prior existence) either. The reason for this is obviously its being nothing but [a product of] imagination (*vikalpamātra*, see fn. 1658), i.e., an illusion, because it is only perceived when one imagines it but not when imagination has ceased (MaiQ # III.35; tentative translation; cf. also CONZE 1975: 647):

> When, however, the [bodhisattva] abides in [the insight that conditioned phenomena are] nothing but [a product of] imagination or in the sphere [of true reality] that is beyond imagination — when all forms of imagination has ceased —, what existence or non-existence of such [a thing] ... could be found?
>
> *vikalpamātre vā punas tasya nirvikalpe vā dhātau vartamānasya vikalpeṣv apagateṣu katamā tasya vidyamānatā vâvidyamānatā vôpalabhyate* ... (the Tibetan versions diverge considerably).

Cf. also Sār 190,3f: *yadi vikalpato grahaṇam eti, na vikalpeṣv apagateṣu, tadā parikalpamātraṁ* (Tj P sher-phyin, tha 240a6: *de'i tshe de ni rnam par rtog pa tsam mo* = vikalpamātram!) *iti na tasya sattvam asattvaṁ vā.*

1660 Thus also in *Bhavasaṁkrāntisūtra* vs. 4 (TSENG 2010: 442; cf. also HAKAMAYA 1977: 278f): *asadbhūtā hy amī dharmāḥ kalpanātaḥ samutthitāḥ | sâpy atra kalpanā nâsti yayā śūnyaṁ vikalpyate.* This verse is very much reminiscent of the last verse of PratyS III (see Pt. II §§ 452.1–452.2 with fns. 2067 and 2073). Cf. also *Acintyastava* vs. 36 (LINDTNER 1982: 152). In *Bhavasaṁkrāntisūtra* vs. 1 (TSENG 2010: 438: *nāmamātram idaṁ sarvaṁ saṁjñāmātre pratiṣṭhitam | abhidhānāt pṛthagbhūtam abhidheyaṁ na vidyate* ||), the immediate context (*nāman, abhilāpa*) suggests taking **saṁjñā* (in spite of Tib. *'du shes*) in the sense of "designation" (thus also TSENG 2010: 439) or "notion (insofar as shaped by language)".

1661 Saṁdh VIII.7–9 (see Pt. II; cf. also Pt. IV §§ 583–584); VIII.20.2.3; 29.8 (108,24).

1662 Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3 (see fn. 2516); 28.3; 37.2 (118,8f).

1663 The key concept of ch. VII, the threefold *niḥsvabhāvatā*, is not mentioned. — Incidentally, in the subsequent chapters (IX and X), the concepts *vijñaptimātra(tā)* and *ādānavijñāna* do not occur, but in one paragraph (IX.18.6) of ch. IX at least the three *svabhāva*s and the three *niḥsvabhāvatā*s are enumerated, and in addition there is a summary reference to the sevenfold *tathatā*, showing that at least the author of this part of Saṁdh IX was familiar with Saṁdh VIII.20 (and thus, implicitly, with the concept of *vijñaptimātratā*). In ch. X, I have noted only two references to the *parikalpitasvabhāva* (X.7.1.2 [154,7] and X.7.4.2 [154,24f]).

309.1. As for the occurrence of the three *lakṣaṇa*s in the VIII^th^ chapter of the Saṁdh, the respective passage (VIII.31)[1664] may be understood as a revision of the TattvP's definition of emptiness (*śūnyatā*) in terms of the three *lakṣaṇa*s of Saṁdh VI,[1665] but contrary to what one would expect it does *not* contain an explicit adaptation of the three-*lakṣaṇa*-pattern to the principle of *vijñaptimātra(tā)*.

309.2. In the case of *ādānavijñāna*, the situation is different. The reference to this concept in VIII.37.1.1 is closely connected with the issue of *vijñaptimātratā*, for the passage occurs in a list of varieties of mind (*citta*) a bodhisattva is enjoined to comprehend in terms of *vijñapti-tathatā* (VIII.37.2), i.e., *vijñaptimātratā*. If my reconstruction and interpretation of the crucial sentence ⓧ in Saṁdh VIII.7 (see Pt. II) is correct, the concept of *vijñaptimātra(tā)* is closely connected with the Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* as cognition (*vijñapti*) of an objective support (*ālambana*). From this point of view, *ādānavijñāna*, too, in order to be a *vijñāna* in its own right, had to be conceived as cognition of an object (*ālambanavijñapti*), albeit a subconscious one, and this is in fact what is taught in Saṁdh VIII.37.1.1 (see Pt. IV § 582.3.3). Apart from this passage, *ādānavijñāna* may be alluded to in two more places, viz. VIII.22 (104,3) and VIII.36.2.1 (114,17), where *ādāna* is listed as the first of a set of four characteristic functions of the mind (*citta*), and since this set clearly alludes to the four *smṛtyupa-sthāna*s we can be sure that *ādāna* refers to the appropriation of the body, i.e., to a function that in Saṁdh V is typical of *ādānavijñāna*. There is, however, no reference in Saṁdh VIII to *ādānavijñāna* as containing all Seeds, or functioning as the Seed of all [dharmas], although this function is clearly important for a *vijñaptimātra* ontology and epistemology. This might be explained by the assumption that Saṁdh VIII presupposes the existence of Saṁdh V and, being focussed on different issues, could thus take the existence of a subliminal mind comprising all Seeds for granted.

310. Still, had *vijñaptimātratā*, *ādānavijñāna* and the three *lakṣaṇa*s been conceived as systematically interrelated elements of an entirely new paradigm, I cannot but find the (except for the one in VIII.37.1.1, at best allusive) references in Saṁdh VIII to *ādānavijñāna*, not to speak of the single reference to the three *lakṣaṇa*s, unexpectedly scanty and incidental. As has already been indicated above (§ 301.1): if Saṁdh as a whole (or, at any rate, V–VIII, or V–X) was composed in one casting, with the main aim of proclaiming an entirely new ontological paradigm, would one not expect, at least at a certain point (i.e., after the introduction of all the essential new concepts) a more explicit systematic presentation of this novel paradigm? To my mind, the facts as summed up in the preceding paragraphs more likely point to a certain independence of the chapters, to a collection of loose ends, so to speak, with chapter VIII constituting the real innovative break-through and a first step of integration, but hardly a full-fledged synthesis, as we find it in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*.

1664 Saṁdh 110,14-19 (Saṁdh$_{TH}$: HAKAMAYA 1987a: 324 fol. 32a3–b1; 2008: 646): In the Mahāyāna, emptiness (**śūnyatā*) means that the *paratantralakṣaṇa* and the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* are completely devoid of the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa* concerning both pollution and purification, and that this *lakṣaṇa* is not [really] (or: no [longer]?) perceived in them. In YBh$_t$ P 'i 83a5f (D zi 75b7f), the text runs as follows: *gzhan gyi dbang gi mtshan nyid dang yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid rnam pa thams cad du kun nas nyon mongs pa* <u>*pa*</u> (P : om. D) *dang rnam par byang ba* <u>*pa'i*</u> *kun brtags* (D : *btags* P) *pa'i mtshan nyid dang shin tu rnam par bral* <u>*ba nyid*</u> *dang | de de la* <u>*mi*</u> *dmigs pa gang yin pa* ...; this suggests **sāṁkleśika* and **vaiyavadānika* as attributes of **parikalpitalakṣaṇa*.

1665 Cf. B: 168 and 190.

5. Conclusion

311. As has already been pointed out in the introduction (§ 7), I do not pretend to have established my former hypothesis concerning the origin of *ālayavijñāna* as the only possible one. But I hope to have demonstrated at least that Matsumoto's and Buescher's theories have their own problems, and that their arguments against my hypothesis are inconclusive or at least disputable.

312.1. For M tsumoto (for details, see ch. 4.2.2), the history of *ālayavijñāna* is, from the point of view of what he seems to regard as true, genuine Buddhism, a history of deterioration, of approximation to the non-Buddhist pattern of thinking in terms of 'locus', or of asserting a substantial self (*ātmavāda*).

1. The V^th chapter of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṁdh) is for him the origin of this development because V.2 and partly V.3 basically still reflect three canonical concepts: the concept of the four nutriments (*āhāra*), the concept of the mutual dependence of the mind (*vijñāna*) and name-and-body (*nāmarūpa*) and, above all, the concept of the four dwelling-places of the mind (*vijñānasthiti*) as found in the *Bījasūtra*, where the mind connected with clinging/grasping or 'fuel'/support (*sopādānaṁ vijñānam*) is stated to be comparable to the five kinds of fertile seeds (*bīja*), or reproductive parts of plants, while the four *vijñānasthiti*s, i.e., the other four *skandha*s, are comparable to a field where the seed takes root. In accordance with these canonical concepts, Matsumoto takes Saṁdh V.2 to express 1. the generation of the *nāmarūpa* of a new existence by the 'All-Seed Mind' (**sarvabījaṁ cittam* acc. to Matsumoto), i.e., the *vijñāna* of the previous existence (= the nutriment *vijñāna*) functioning as the 'seed', and 2. the *vijñāna*'s being based, in the new existence, on the four *vijñānasthiti*s = *nāmarūpa* = basis-of-individual-existence (*ātmabhāva*) as its 'locus'. The concept of *nāmarūpa* he finds indicated in Saṁdh V.2 by the twofold *upādāna*, to be understood in a passive-locative sense as "support", consisting 1. in the physical (*rūpin*) sense faculties along with their seats, and 2. in the imprint (*vāsanā*) of the multifarious conventional dealing (**vyavahāraprapañca*) with phenomena (*nimitta*), names (*nāman*) and imagination (*vikalpa*).

2. In Saṁdh V.3, this *vijñāna* (the 'All-Seed Mind') is, according to Matsumoto, called '*ādānavijñāna*' in the sense of "mind taking hold of a new basis of existence" (*lus*, **ātmabhāva*), and '*ālayavijñāna*' in the sense of "mind being based on the present **ātmabhāva* and clinging to it as the self" (see § 123). At the same time, Matsumoto takes '*ālaya*' (in the name *ālayavijñāna*) to suggest "dwelling in" in the sense of "being submersed in", which may further entail the idea of "lying at the bottom of", so as to transform this *vijñāna* from a 'super-locus' into a 'locus' (see §§ 126 and 144). This transformation is conspicuous already in Saṁdh V.4–5 (*ādānavijñāna* as the support of the six traditional *vijñāna*s) and V.7 (*ādānavijñāna* as a possible object of the notion of a [permanent] self). One step further in this direction is, for Matsumoto, the transformation of the idea of (*ālaya*)*vijñāna* as *being* the Seed of all dharmas (**sarvabīja*, tatp.) into the idea of (*ālaya*)*vijñāna* as containing or *carrying*, i.e., being the 'locus' of, the Seeds of all dharmas (**sarvabījaka*, bahuvrīhi) — an idea still absent, according to Matsumoto, even in the *ālayavijñāna* treatise of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* (VinSg) and emerging only in the 'Basic Section' (MauBh) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (YBh). From this he concludes that not only the occurrences of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* in the

MauBh but all passages that express the idea of a *vijñāna containing* all Seeds must be interpolations postdating not only the Saṁdh but even the *ālayavijñāna* treatise in the PañcMBhVin. The same holds good according to him also in the case of my 'Initial Passage' (*IP*: §§ 1, 25), though for different reasons (see § 94.2).

312.2. 1. The crucial problem with Matsumoto's interpretation of Saṁdh V.2–3 is the fact that it is based on the assumption of Tib. *lus* = **ātmabhāva* (psycho-physical basis of individual existence) as the central concept of the passage. However, the evidence of the closely related original text of the *Pañcaskandhaka*, published in the meantime (§ 121), is not in favour of this assumption but rather confirms my former reconstruction of *lus* in Saṁdh V.3 as **kāya* as against **ātmabhāva* in V.2. Moreover, even in V.2 the expression **ātmabhāva* is hardly used in the sense of the concrete *basis* of individual existence as the 'locus' of the 'All-Seed Mind' but rather in the sense of a temporally limited individual existence in one of the destinies where a sentient being may be reborn (ch. 4.2.3). Thus, Matsumoto's contention that the term *ālayavijñāna* in V.3 has (also) the meaning "mind clinging to [the *ātmabhāva* as the self]" is hardly tenable (§§ 125–127). Nor does it seem possible to derive a central function of the concept of *ātmabhāva* (or of *nāmarūpa* in the same sense) in Saṁdh V.2–3 from the canonical patterns he considers to be presupposed, i.e., from the four *vijñāna-sthiti*s, etc., because most of the respective key terms are not found here, at any rate not in a suitable meaning (ch. 4.2.4.4). In addition, Matsumoto's specific distribution of these patterns on either the previous or the present life (cf. also § 153) is problematic and at any rate not supported by early Yogācāra exegesis (ch. 4.2.4.1-3). This is not meant to deny an influence of the respective canonical sources (especially the *Bījasūtra* and the *Āhārasūtra*) on Saṁdh V.2–3, but it has to be recognized that this influence is mediated by the exegetical tradition and doctrinal considerations of early Yogācāra as documented in the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg) and some other parts of the YBh. The key notions taken over from this tradition in Saṁdh V.2 are the 'All-Seed Mind' and the twofold *upādāna*.

2. The concept of a *vijñāna* functioning as the Seed, or carrying the Seeds, of all dharmas (especially of those that constitute future existences) is found or implied in several parts of the YBh from the VaSg onward. In the VaSg exegesis of the *Bījasūtra* (§ 199), the seed-like *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of this sūtra (ch. 4.2.5.2) is explained as the *vijñāna* furnished with the Seeds of defilements (**kleśabīja*). This means that in this text *upādāna* is defined as spiritually negative clinging in a *latent* form. In the exegesis of the *Āhārasūtra* (ch. 4.2.5.6), *vijñāna* associated with negative clinging under the influence of karma and defilements is nutriment for rebirth, whereas *vijñāna* is nutriment in the present life in that it appropriates (**upādāyaka*?) the primary elements of the sense faculties. This kind of *upādāna* must be distinguished from spiritually negative clinging and corresponds to the Abhidharmic concept of *upā(da)tta* characterizing the physical organism of sentient beings insofar as it is 'appropriated' or assimilated by the mind so as to be a living, sentient organism (ch. 4.2.5.5).

3. In Saṁdh V.2, the *upādāna* of the physical sense faculties along with their seats represents this 'biological appropriation', whereas the *upādāna* of the imprint (*vāsanā*) of the multifarious conventional dealing (*vyavahāraprapañca*) with phenomena (*nimitta*), etc., is a Mahāyānist modification of spiritually negative clinging in its latent aspect (ch. 4.2.5.7). It is this distinction that I consider important, and not the question whether *upādāna* should be understood as an action noun or in a passive-objective sense (as Matsumoto contends). Both in the canonical texts (ch. 4.2.5.2) and in the exegetic tradition (ch. 4.2.5.4) as well as in the interpretation of Saṁdh V.2 in later Yogācāra sources (ch. 4.2.5.8), both possibilities are well

documented, but especially in the case of spiritually negative clinging what is decisive for bondage and release is the mental act or attitude, not the objective support in itself (cf. §§ 175.2, 200.6).

4. In Saṁdh V.2–3, the concept of 'locus' in the sense of an existential support could perhaps be applied to the body as the abode of *ālayavijñāna* (§§ 127, 229.1), but the dependence is in any case mutual (they share one and the same destiny: §§ 127, 129), because unless 'biologically' appropriated by *ālayavijñāna* the body will die and rot (§ 129.2.3). As regards spiritually negative *upādāna*, it is, to be sure, in dependence on the imprint of multifarious conventional dealing with phenomena, etc., that the 'All-Seed Mind' is reborn, but from the perspective of ontological support the 'All-Seed mind' must be the 'locus' of the imprint(s), not the other way round (§ 229.1). Furthermore, in Saṁdh V.4–5 *ādānavijñāna* (= *ālayavijñāna*) is unambiguously characterized as the 'locus' of the six traditional forms of mind, which surely holds good for their mental associates (*caitta*) as well (§ 229.2). On my part, I cannot detect any basic conceptual shift within the Vth chapter of the Saṁdh (ibid.).

5. Nor can I follow Matsumoto in his conviction that the concept of 'All-Seed Mind' must mean "mind that is the Seed of all [dharmas]" (**sarvabījaṁ*, tatp.) and not "mind that carries or contains all Seeds" (**sarvabīja(ka)ṁ*, bahuv.) (§§ 248–250). Actually, already in pre-*ālayavijñāna* Yogācāra materials we find phrases that characterize something as *being* a Seed and phrases that characterize it as *having* or containing Seeds side by side (§ 251), and already in the VaSg the *sopādānaṁ vijñānam* of the *Bījasūtra* is explained as being *furnished with* Seeds (Matsumoto's rejection of this passage as an interpolation without independent evidence amounts to circularity of the argument: § 252). Therefore, the phraseological difference is rather a matter of perspective and not (or at least not yet at this stage) the expression of a different theoretical position (§ 250.3.4). It does not serve the purpose of chronological stratification and is therefore not sufficient to prove a post-Saṁdh or even post-VinSg date for the MauBh passages concerned (§§ 253–254). As regards the *IP*, I refer to the discussion in ch. 3 (§ 33).

313.1. 1. Buescher's fundamental assumption is the logical inseparability of the three basic concepts of Vijñānavāda, i.e., *vijñaptimātra(tā)* ("representation only"; B.: "purely noetic constitution"), *ālayavijñāna* and the pattern of the three *lakṣaṇa*s ("characters") or *svabhāva*s ("natures") (§§ 2.2, 11, 296, 298). This logical inseparability implies that these concepts must have originated together, as elements of a new paradigm. Since the oldest text in which all the three of them occur is the Saṁdh (provided, of course, that the relevant portions of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* belong to a somewhat later period), it must be in this text that the three basic concepts were introduced for the first time. And if they are logically inseparable elements of a homogeneous paradigm, at least those chapters of the Saṁdh in which one of these concepts is introduced (i.e., V–VIII) must presuppose the other concepts as well, and they must constitute a homogeneous compositional unit in which each part has been designed in such a way that it presupposes the others from the very outset (§ 296, 298).

2. This holds, of course, good also for the Vth chapter, where the concept of the "mind containing all Seeds" (B.: **sarvabījakaṁ cittam*), also called *ādāna-* and *ālayavijñāna*, is introduced. That this concept is an innovation is, according to Buescher (§ 136), evident from the sūtra's own express statement that it has not been taught before, and from the fact that the explicit purport of the sūtra is to disclose the secret points concerning the mind (*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*). From Buescher's premises it results, moreover, that we have to interpret the teaching of the Vth chapter in the light of the other innovative concepts, which implies that we

have to presuppose a *vijñaptimātra* ontology, an assumption Buescher finds supported by the concept of **sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* (§ 133), a concept that for him implies that *all* dharmas, even the material entities, are "constituted by consciousness" (§ 134). In line with these presuppositions, Buescher understands Saṁdh V.2–3 as a kind of metaphorical descent of the new **sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* from the sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpyadhātu*) and the sphere of [subtle] corporeality (*rūpadhātu*) (V.2) into the sphere of sensual pleasures (*kāmadhātu*) (V.3), and the attribution of three names to it along with their explanations as pointing out three different functions of the new kind of mind (in the *kāmadhātu*) (§ 135). For Buescher, the term *ālayavijñāna* is thus not an attempt to integrate an already existing concept into a new or more advanced theory but a neologism intended to show that even in a form of existence connected with a gross body the 'All-Seed Mind' preserves its character of latency (§ 135). Actually, it is this aspect of latency that is, for him, the central meaning of '*ālaya*' in the term *ālayavijñāna*, also in later sources (ch. 4.1.3–4.1.6).

3. Since the term *ālayavijñāna* is, for Buescher, a neologism created by the author(s) of Saṁdh V, its occurrences in the MauBh must be post-Saṁdh interpolations (all tacitly presupposing the *vijñaptimātra* ontology: cf. § 16.3). This holds good, of course, also for the *IP*, which Buescher tries to unmask as a fairly late insertion, proposing an interpretation that is fundamentally different from my own, which he takes great pains to prove to be entirely mistaken (§ 26, etc.). In addition, Buescher's understanding of the concept of *sarvabīja(ka)ṁ vijñānam* forces him to also declare the occurrences of *this* concept in the MauBh, and even the one in the VaSg, to be post-Saṁdh interpolations (§§ 133, 262).

313.2. 1. Buescher's assumption of the logical inseparability of the three basic concepts of Vijñānavāda is contradicted by the fact that we find quite a number of sources in which only one or two of these concepts can be found, although there is sufficient occasion to introduce the other(s) as well, and by the fact that there are texts where sets of arguments to prove one of these concepts are adduced without even mentioning the other two, let alone indicating their being implied (ch. 2). There is thus no need to assume that the three concepts must have been introduced together as interrelated elements of a homogeneous new paradigm, without any significant precursors, and hence no necessity to discard the *ālayavijñāna* passages in the MauBh, let alone the *IP* (for which see ch. 3 with the resumé in ch. 3.3.7), as post-Saṁdh interpolations. Even in the Saṁdh the interdependence of the three concepts is hard to prove: Saṁdh V is exclusively concerned with the 'All-Seed Mind' (/*ādāna*-, *ālayavijñāna*) (ch. 4.3.1), and Saṁdh VI and VII deal with the three *lakṣaṇa*s or *svabhāva*s (and the three *niḥsvabhāvatā*s), but completely ignore not only *vijñaptimātratā* but also the *ādānavijñāna*, although it had already been introduced in Saṁdh V (ch. 4.3.2). It is only in Saṁdh VIII, where *vijñaptimātratā* is introduced, that the other two concepts, too, occur in one passage, each, but it is only in the case of *ādānavijñāna* that a systematic connection with *vijñaptimātratā* is implied by the wider context (ch. 4.3.3).

2. In this perspective, Buescher's contention that Saṁdh V must be interpreted in the light of *vijñaptimātratā* (as set forth in Saṁdh VIII) is questionable. Nor is this contention justified by the characterization of the mind as ** sarvabīja(ka)*, for there is no need to interpret this expression in terms of a *vijñaptimātra* ontology, because this concept occurs or is presupposed already in pre-*ālayavijñāna* strata of the YBh (including the VaSg) and because Buescher's attempt to get rid of the respective passages by declaring them to be post-Saṁdh interpolations without any independent evidence amounts to a circular argument (ch. 4.2.6.2).

3. As for Buescher's suggestion to take Saṁdh V.2–3 as a kind of metaphorical descent of the new * *sarvabīja(ka) ṁ vijñānam* from the *ārūpya-* and *rūpadhātu* into the *kāmadhātu*, it is hardly acceptable because already in V.2 rebirth is, to be sure, dealt with in a comprehensive perspective, but with focus on rebirth in ordinary destinies in a sphere where there is corporeal matter (**rūpiṇi dhātau*, not *rūpadhātau*: § 266), the parenthetic reference to rebirth in the sphere of incorporeality being for the sake of indicating that in this case one of the two *upādānas* (viz., 'biological appropriation') is lacking or latent (ch. 4.2.7). But Buescher is right in taking the etymologizing explanations of the names of the new kind of mind in V.3 (especially those of the names *ādāna-* and *ālayavijñāna*) to be focused on our own world-sphere; I would even suggest: on our present, human existence, in the first place (§ 266).

4. As regards the meaning and function of etymologizing explanations, a re-examination of the Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources that supply us with traditional explanations of the element '*ālaya*' in the name *ālayavijñāna* (see ch. 4.1.3–4.1.6; resumé in § 131) has convinced me that we have to start from the meaning "to stick to" or "to abide in" (be it in an active or passive/locative analysis) and that the nuance "to lie hidden *in*" may come in as a secondary connotation, but that *ālaya* never means abstract latency, as Buescher's renderings often suggest. Thus, the explanation in V.3 should be taken to mean, in the first place, that *ālayavijñāna* is designated as it is because it is closely attached to the body in the existential sense that they share one and the same destiny, and that its lying *hidden* in the body is rather a connotation (§§ 122, 127, 129.1, 279).

5. I also disagree with Buescher as regards the primary role of these names and their explanations, because I still think that only '*ādānavijñāna*' is a new term, whereas '*ālaya-vijñāna*' and '*citta*' are taken over from earlier sources. In the case of '*citta*', this is uncontroversial, but it is even possible to point out a passage in the *Śrāvakabhūmi* as the source from which the etymologizing explanation has been taken over (§ 277). I do not see any reason why the term *ālayavijñāna* (and its meaning) should not also have been taken over from some closely related circle, not so much in the context of an "interscholastic conflict" (§ 135) as for the sake of attracting the respective group to the sūtra's own, more far-reaching ideas (§ 292).

6. In my opinion (ch. 4.2.9), Saṁdh V is indeed innovative, though not in the sense of having newly introduced the concept of *ālayavijñāna* but rather in the sense of having invested it with sūtra authority and in the sense of having decisively contributed to the consolidation and further development of the concept. First, in V.4–5 the sūtra establishes the subliminal layer of the mind as the basis of a new model of mental processes in which the simultaneous occurrence of different forms of mind in one personal continuum is expressly affirmed and elaborated (§ 288.2). Second, in V.2 the function of the subliminal layer of the mind is explicitly stated to cover both types of *upādāna* ascribed to the *vijñāna* as nutriment in the VaSg (ch. 4.2.5.6–7), i.e., not only 'biological' appropriation but also spiritually negative clinging in a latent form, a step which seems to have entailed a fundamental change of the concept of *ālayavijñāna* (§ 22). Third, as a Mahāyāna sūtra, the Saṁdh (V.2) modifies the content of spiritually negative clinging and its latent form by substituting multifarious conventional dealing with phenomena, etc., for the traditional factors (sc., karma and defilements) (§ 290). Finally, the sūtra (V.6) transcends its own new model by stating that in order to be conversant with the ultimate truth concerning *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna* a bodhisattva must, in his personal experience, no longer perceive such entities, including *ādāna-vijñāna* and *ālayavijñāna* (§ 291).

314. In the preface of S 1987, I apologized for the "complete lack of what is called philosophical depth" in my presentation, and I readily concede that "a slightly higher degree of philosophical attention" (B: 49 n. 1) might have been desirable, and that this holds good for the present study as well. There can be no doubt that texts or traditions with philosophical import await, after all, to be studied from a philosophical perspective, be it comparative or systematical. For philosophers, the question of the origin of *ālayavijñāna*, or, for that matter, of other central concepts, may not be of that much importance.[1666] They may rather be interested in more complete stages of development (and this may also hold good for most historians of ideas). But in any case philosophers will basically have to rely on the groundwork of philologists and historians.[1667] Otherwise, they may build their conclusions on all kinds of misunderstandings or unfounded speculations, and if they are committed to a specific tradition or trend of Western philosophical thought, this may easily become an obstacle for understanding Indian ideas and concepts in their own context and with their 'emic' implications.[1668] There are, of course, scholars who are competent in both areas, but this is hardly the rule, and unfortunately I myself do not belong to this species. However, just as a philologist may not be a competent philosopher, a philosopher may not automatically be a competent philologist either; but couldn't one expect him to at least be aware of this? Actually, as will have become evident from my detailed response to Buescher's criticism, his monograph is marred by all too many far-fetched and misleading translations and interpretations of text passages, sometimes based on elementary philological errors. In the subsequent appendix, I shall briefly discuss a few more cases where I find his philological understanding of a passage unacceptable, and some more will have to be dealt with in Pt. II of the present study.[1669]

[1666] I personally find it illuminating to reconstruct a development by starting from the origins, if accessible. I readily admit that my understanding of the history of ideas tends to be more 'evolutionist' than 'creationist', if I may say so.

[1667] This does not of course exclude that conversely philosophical reflection may, in its turn, often stimulate a better understanding of semantic aspects and argumentative structures.

[1668] One is tempted to quote Stanisław Schayer's (1936: 168, reprint 1988: 504) remark: "In keinem Fall ist aber die Interpretation *obscurum per obscurius* zulässig und noch weniger eine Interpretation, welche durch die *vastuśūnya vikalpas* des modernen philosophischen Jargons die durchaus klaren Formulierungen der indischen Originale verdunkelt."

[1669] Cf., especially, Pt. II §§ 374 and 399.3.1 as well as fn. 1787 and fn. 1931.

Appendices to Pt. I

Appendix 1: Some Additional Philological Details

315. B: 15,11f: Buescher refers to TrBh *9,3f (L. 19,23) where Sthiramati states, with regard to the assumption of *ālayavijñāna* as a form of mind the objective support (B.: reference point) and mode of perception of which cannot be distinctly ascertained or defined (*aparicchinnālambanākāra*),[1670] that the *anyavijñānavādinaḥ* must likewise assume such a form of mind in states like *nirodhasamāpatti*:

anyavijñānavādinām api nirodhasamāpattyādyavasthāsu tulyam etat.

Buescher, writing *anyaVijñānavādinām*, seems to refer this expression to a different group of Vijñānavādins (cf. Tib. *rnam par shes pa smra ba gzhan dag*), but I doubt that this is an unobjectionable analysis of the compound. The expression should rather be taken to refer to masters who accept only the other (i.e., the six traditional) *vijñāna*s, or even more specifically to those who assert the presence of another type of *vijñāna* (i.e., a kind of *manovijñāna*) in these states, as the Tibetan translation of practically the same sentence in the KSi suggests.[1671] This seems to be basically confirmed by Vinītadeva, since he specifies them as "the Sautrāntikas, etc.", who only accept the set of six kinds of *vijñāna* but not *ālayavijñāna*,[1672] and by Sumatiśīla, who identifies them as "Bhadanta-Vasumitra and others, who advocate [the presence of *vijñāna* in states like *nirodhasamāpatti*] without accepting *ālayavijñāna*."[1673]

316. B: 19 n. 2: Buescher quotes AAĀ$_W$ 47,12ff (corresponding to AAĀ$_V$ 296,6[ff]) as "*tat* [= *vijñānam*] *punas trividhaṁ rūpam* ...", obviously as evidence for Haribhadra referring to the three *lakṣaṇa*s of the MaiQ (see § 308) as a "threefold *noetic* structure" (my emphasis). However, *tad* does not resume the immediately preceding *vijñānam* but has to be construed with *rūpaṁ*, which had been introduced and defined along with the remaining *skandha*s in the

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[1670] Buescher (2010: 353) translates this expression in PSk 16,10 as "having indistinct-uninterrupted noematic reference points and noetic structures". Although there is evidence for the meaning "uninterrupted" for *aparicchinna* in other contexts (S 1987 n. 634), this nuance does not seem to be aimed at in the expression under discussion, which is meant to ensure the intentional structure of *ālayavijñāna*, and not its continuity (expressed by *santānānuvṛtti* in PSk 16,11). This is also confirmed by the above-quoted remark that such a kind of *vijñāna*, i.e., a *vijñāna* of *indistinct* movement or *function* (KSiṬ P ku 105b5; D hi 93a5f: *rnam par shes pa rgyu ba mi gsal* [D : *bsal* P] *ba*), has to be accepted even by the *anyavijñānavādinaḥ*, not, to be sure, throughout, but nevertheless *in states like nirodhasamāpatti*. Cf. also PSkV ms. 50b1 and 3f: *na hy asyâlambanaṁ paricchettuṁ śakyate, nâkāraḥ* | ... *etac câlambanaṁ sūkṣm⟨atv⟩āt lokapaṇḍitair api duravadhāram ity ato 'paricchinnālambanākāram ity ucyate* |.

[1671] KSi # 36 (KSi$_{Mu}$ 45,10-12): *de ni 'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la sogs pa'i gnas skabs na rnam par shes pa yod par smra ba gzhan dag dang yang mtshungs so* ||.

[1672] TrṬ P ku 19b1f: *gang dag rnam par shes pa drug po rnam⟨s⟩ nyid 'dod kyi* | *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa ni mi 'dod pa rnam par shes par smra ba gzhan mdo sde pa la sogs pa* ...

[1673] KSiṬ P ku 105b6f (D hi 93a6): *btsun pa dbyig bshes la sogs pa kun gzhi'i rnam par shes pa khas mi len par smra ba dag go* ||

preceding sentence: "Furthermore, this (aforementioned) *rūpa* is threefold,[1674] (viz., ...). In the same way, *vedanā*, etc., (= the other four skandhas) should also be described [as threefold] (*evaṁ vedanādayo 'pi vācyāḥ*)."

317. B: 29 n., continuing from the preceding page: Buescher gives pāda c of *Yuktiṣaṣṭikā* 34[1675] as *tajjñāne vigamaṁ yadi*, which he translates as "If, upon knowing that [to be so], it disappears". His translation follows SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1991: 252), but he does not tell us that *yadi* is a conjecture by D. SEYFORT RUEGG (1981: 20 n. 44), taken over by SCHERRER-SCHAUB (1991: 253,3). As pointed out in LINDTNER 1982: 111 n.34, the verse is quoted twice by Jñānaśrīmitra with the readings *yānti* (405,2) and *yāti* (545,8) instead of *yadi*. I must confess that I cannot construe the pāda with the conjectural reading *yadi*, for in this case *vigamaṁ* would either have to be a verb/participle or a nominative, both of which is impossible, for *vigama* is a masc. noun. Thus, *vigamaṁ* can only be an accusative, which construes excellently with *yāti* (confirmed also by Ratnākaraśānti's PPU # III.5.4.3.10 and by the *Yuktiṣaṣṭikāvṛtti* fragment in YE 2013: 238), *vigamaṁ yāti* being semantically equivalent to *vigacchati*. Pādas c and d would then be independent sentences, their logical connection ("if", or perhaps rather "since", "in view of the fact that") being implicit. It would perhaps also make good sense to follow Ratnākaraśānti[1676] and the editor of PPU, Luo Hong, in reading *taj jñāne* as two words, with *tad* as the subject:

> [Since] in [supramundane] comprehension they (i.e., *mahābhūtādi*, the primary elements confined to mundane mind) vanish, is it not that [they are but] falsely imagined?[1677]

318. B: 52 n. 2: AKVy 167,20:

> *citte 'pi sendriyasya kāyasya bījam asti kāye ca sendriye cittasya*

is translated by Buescher as

> it is in the psychical, in fact, where the potentiality of the sensory organism exists, and [that] of the psychical is present in the sensory organism,

as if the text had *hi* ("in fact") instead of *api*. Actually, his translation suggests that the potentiality (/Seed) of the sensory organism exists only, or in the first place, in the psychical (/mind). But this is not what the 'bi-polar *bīja*-model' says. Rather, it is, in the first place, in the sensory organism that the Seed of the sensory organism is present, yet not only there but *also* (*api*) in the mind, and vice versa.

319.0. B: 89f: YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,7ff.

319.1. YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,8f:

> *tadanyasūkṣmendriyamahābhūtavyatimiśro 'nyas tatsabhāgaḥ śukraśoṇitapiṇḍo jāyate sendriyaḥ*.

[1674] Cf. Tib. (Tj D sher-phyin, cha 33b4): *gzugs de yang rnam pa gsum ste.*

[1675] The complete verse runs thus: *mahābhūtādi vijñāne proktaṁ samavarudhyate* | *tajjñāne vigamaṁ yāti nanu mithyā vikalpitam* ||. SCHERRER-SCHAUB 1991: 252: "Les éléments universels [et autres entités], que l'on enseigne [à certains], sont contenus dans le *vijñāna*. S'ils cessent [d'exister] lorsqu'on connaît cela, comment ne [seraient-ils] imagination fausse."

[1676] PPU # III.5.4.3.10: *jñāne tu lokottare ... tad astaṁgacchati*. Cf. also Kamalaśīla's MAlaṁP 303,13-15: *gang gi phyir yang dag pa'i ye shes la de mi snang ba de'i phyir log par rnam par brtags pa yin no zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*.

[1677] Translation adapted from Luo Hong (PPU # III.5.4.3.10, transl.). Cf. also ISAACSON 2013: 1041f.

Buescher's translation:

> ... another [state of] analogous immanent correspondence (*tatsabhāga*) is generated: the globule of sperm-cum-ovum endowed with [genetic] capacities; being mingled together with the subtle genetic matter [it is one that is] different from that [continuity of consciousness in the intermediate state].

1. As for Buescher's interpretation of *kāyendriya* as "genetic capacity", see ch. 3.3.1.2.

2. Buescher's equation of *tatsabhāga* with the term *nikāyasabhāga* or *°sabhāgatā* (see B: 89 n. 4) is arbitrary and not confirmed by any of the occurrences of *tatsabhāga* in the AK(Bh), where it is always a technical term of its own (see § 63.4). In the present passage, however, *tatsabhāga* cannot be understood in this technical sense but simply means "similar to that",[1678] viz., to the globule of 'sperm-cum-ovum' (lit.: blood; "ovum" is Buescher's modernizing translation) of the preceding moment, i.e., of the last moment of the intermediate existence. Cf. also YVy P yi 112b1 (D 'i 92b1):

> "It is called *tatsabhāga* because although being, indeed, endowed with a sense faculty, it has ⟨not⟩ lost the appearance of the [preceding globule]"
>
> *de dang mthun pa'i zhes bya ba ni dbang po dang bcas pa nyid kyang de'i rnam pa yongs su ⟨ma⟩*[1679] *btang ba'i phyir ro.*

3. The new globule is mingled with subtle primary elements belonging to the *indriya*s (in contrast to those forming their gross support, the *indriyādhiṣṭhānamahābhūta*s, cf. 24,11f), which are qualified as *tadanya*-, i.e., as different not from the "continuity of the consciousness in the intermediate state" (a difference which, after all, goes without saying!) but rather from the primary elements of the globule as it existed in the mother's womb, still without any sense faculty, at the last moment of the intermediate state.[1680] The primary elements of this globule could perhaps be regarded as having their continuation not in the *indriyamahābhūta*s but in the *indriyādhiṣṭhānamahābhūtas* of the proto-embryo.

4. For my own translation, see S 1987: 128,12ff. Cf. also YAMABE 2013: 602.

319.2. YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,10: *baddhaḥ pratisandhiḥ*. Buescher (B: 89 n. 1) finds *baddhaḥ*, which is missing in the ed. but had been supplied by me on the basis of the manuscript (!), superfluous. But *baddhaḥ pratisandhiḥ* is an unobjectionable perfect passive formation from *pratisandhiṁ badhnāti* (ASBh 21,19; cf. 39,12 *pratisaṁdhiṁ badhnataḥ*), the verbal equivalent to the current nomen actionis *pratisandhibandha* (e.g., YBh$_{Bh}$ 212,8f; ASBh 75,16; AKBh 448,4; TrBh *40,4 [L. 37,15]; *BHSD* s.v. *pratisaṁdhi*). It also makes perfect sense in the context, since the purport of the sentence is to make clear that "at this stage it can be said that *vijñāna* has established itself [in the new existence] and that the 'linking up' has been 'bound' (i.e., completed)".

[1678] For another case of the non-technical use of *sabhāga* see ASBh 41,4f: a homogeneous (*sabhāga*) objective support (*ālambana*) is, e.g., a wholesome (*kuśala*) [dharma, or action] as the objective support of a wholesome [state of mind].

[1679] I cannot make sense out of the sentence without supplying a negation.

[1680] Cf. YVy P yi 112a8f (D 'i 92a7f): "'*tadanya*°' means: mixed with subtle primary elements that are the [inseparable] basis (see fn. 1681) of a sense faculty (sc., touch) [and thus] different from the primary elements belonging to the preceding globule that had [still] been devoid of [any] sense faculty" (*"de las gzhan pa'i ..." zhes bya ba ni dbang po med pa'i gong bu snga ma de la 'byung* [D : P *'gyung*] *ba chen po gang dag yod pa de las gzhan pa dbang po'i gnas kyi 'byung ba chen po cha phra ba dag dang 'dres pa la bya'o* ||).

319.3. YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,10-12:

> *tāni ca tasya kalalasyêndriyamahābhūtāni kāyendriyeṇaîva sahôtpadyante | indriyādhiṣṭhānamahābhūtāni ca tair evêndriyamahābhūtaiḥ kāyendriyeṇa ca sahôtpadyante* (ms.: *sahabhūtāny utpadyante*).

Buescher's translation:

> And those genetic material elements of the *kalala* do exist together with only the capacity of nervous organization. And [this means that in this normative state] the elements of the sensory capacities and [their organic] bases (*indriyādhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūtāni*) do exactly coincide with those genetic material elements (*indriyabhūtāni* [sic!]) and with the capacity of nervous organization (*kāyendriya*).

Buescher's problematic modernist terminology apart, his translation is unnecessarily obscured by his interpretation of the compound *indriyādhiṣṭhānamahābhūtāni* as "the *mahābhūtas* of the *indriyas* and of [their] *adhiṣṭhānas*", instead of "the *mahābhūtas* of the *adhiṣṭhānas* of the *indriyas*", i.e., the primary elements constituting the gross support of the *indriya*(s) (at this stage only one, viz. the *kāyendriya*), as it is also understood in the Tibetan translation (YBh$_t$ P dzi 13b5: *dbang po'i rten gyi 'byung ba chen po rnams*). Cf. also the explanation of the YVy: the *indriyamahābhūtas* are the primary elements on which the *indriyas* as derivative matter (*upādāyarūpa*) are based and from which they cannot be separated; the *indriyādhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūtas* are, for example, those of the white [part of the] eye-ball.[1681] The purport of the passage is to make clear that at this stage the *indriya*-primary-elements arise (*utpadyante*, not "exist") together solely with the *kāyendriya*, and accordingly the primary elements of their gross support arise in conjunction with precisely these *indriya*-primary-elements and *kāyendriya* only, and not yet with the other *indriyas* and their primary elements. Keeping to a conventional terminology, I should thus translate the passage as follows:

> Furthermore, the [above-mentioned] primary elements of sense faculties[1682] (*indriya-mahābhūtāni*) of this *kalala* arise together with only [one physical sense faculty, viz.,] the sense of touch, and the primary elements of seats of sense faculties (*indriyādhiṣṭhānamahābhūtāni*) [accordingly] arise together with precisely these [aforementioned] primary elements of sense faculties[1683] and with the sense of touch.[1684]

319.4. Let me in this connection also take the opportunity to respond to Wayman's (1996: 461) criticism of my "view that the *ālayavijñāna* is the kind of *vijñāna* that descends into the male-female element union in the womb, supposedly bringing life thereto". One of the two

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[1681] YVy P yi 112b2f (D 'i 92b1f): "'The *indriyamahābhūtas*': those that are the basis of secondary matter (*upādāyarūpa*) [consisting in] the faculty of vision, etc., and occur in such a way that they are inseparable (*avinirbhāga*, cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 53,16-18) [from the faculty of vision, etc.]. 'The *indriyādhiṣṭhāna-mahābhūtas*': for example, the primary elements of the white [part of the] eyeball" (*"dbang po'i 'byung ba chen po de dag kyang" zhes bya ba ni mig la sogs pa rgyur byas pa'i gzugs rnams kyi rten po ste | tha mi dad par 'byung bar 'gyur ba gang yin pa dag go || "dbang po'i rten gyi 'byung ba chen po rnams" zhes bya ba ni dper na mig gi 'bras bu dkar po'i 'byung ba chen po dag lta bu ste |*).

[1682] I have avoided the definite article because it seems that not only the other sense faculties but also their seats come about only in the course of the ongoing development of the foetus. Cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 24,12f. In n. 7 to p. 24,13, the editor points out that the Tibetan translation contains an additional sentence, but actually this sentence is found in the ms. as well, which reads: *tāni cêndriyādhiṣṭhānamahābhūtāny upādāya krameṇa indriyādhiṣṭhānāny api niṣpadyante*.

[1683] I.e., with those inseparable from the sense of touch.

[1684] Cf. also the similar translation in KRITZER 2000: 255f.

passages adduced by him as evidence against me is YBh_{Bh} 24,4f, where Wayman, unimpressed by my re-edition of the passage in S 1987: 127, viz.:

> *yatra* [ms.] *tat* [ms.] *sarvabījakaṁ vipākasaṁgṛhītam āśrayopādātṛ ālayavijñānaṁ saṁmūrcchati*),

sticks to the reading *āśrayopādānād* of the edition and translates the passage as

> There, the 'store-consciousness' all-seeded and restrained [!] by maturation, *after* taking a body, faints (or falls unconscious, or becomes inactive). (my emphasis)

But the ms. quite unambiguously reads *āśrayopādātṛ* (no sandhi). Thus, since there is no ablative that might perhaps be taken in the sense of "after", there is no temporal sequence. Rather, the *ālayavijñāna* itself is clearly specified as appropriating a new body by merging into semen-cum-blood so as to enable it to reproduce itself, in the very same moment, in such a way that it is now furnished with a sense faculty (the sense of touch), i.e., as a sentient organism. It is true that the semen-cum-blood of the immediately preceding moment is, at least in our sense of the word, living organic matter, but in the Buddhist perspective it is not yet a sentient physical organism of its own, and therefore not yet a *kalala*, for the text is unambiguous in stating that it is only after the development of previous lump of semen-cum-blood into one furnished with a sense faculty due to *ālayavijñāna* merging into it that we can speak of the *kalala* stage (YBh_{Bh} 24,10). And when later on (YBh_{Bh} 24,18f: Wayman's second textual evidence) it is stated that

> "that spot of the *kalala* where the *vijñāna* had 'fainted' (or merged into: *saṁmūrcchitam*, not *saṁmūrcchati*, as Wayman's rendering "faints" suggests) becomes at that moment the region of the heart of the [*kalala*]" (*yatra ca kalaladeśe tad vijñānaṁ sammūrcchitaṁ so 'sya bhavati tasmin samaye hṛdayadeśaḥ*; my transl.),

this does not by any means imply that the *kalala* as such preexists *ālayavijñāna*'s merging into the lump of semen-cum-blood. What preexists the *kalala* is the insentient lump of semen-cum-blood, and it is only at the very moment of the *ālayavijñāna*'s merging into it that this lump is transformed into a sentient proto-embryo called *kalala*. I could continue for pages discussing further inaccuracies of Wayman's criticism, but the preceding remarks (see also fns. 21, 95, 515, 2056, 2108, and 2121) should suffice as a warning against taking his arguments for granted.

320. B: 110f n. 2:

> Y[Bh_{Bh}] 4,11f. explicitly characterizes this *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* as a condition that is non-actualized (*nirvṛttaḥ*).

Such a meaning of *nirvṛtta* is unknown to me and not confirmed by Tib. or Ch., both of which presuppose the usual meaning "arisen", "come about".[1685] What is stated in the passage is merely that the *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* is the result-of-karmic-maturation containing all Seeds (*sarvabījako vipākaḥ*) that has *come about* due to [the respective sentient being's] previous fondness for mundane diversity (*prapañcābhirati*) as the [main] cause (*hetu*, i.e., as the condition without which there would not be any rebirth at all; cf. YBh_{Bh} 25,12f: *sarvabījakāyām ātmabhāvābhinirvṛttau śubhāśubhakarmahetutve 'pi sati prādhānyena* [=ms] *prapañcābhiratir eva kāraṇaṁ draṣṭavyaṁ*). Hence Buescher's conclusion that

> as an attribute of *sarvabījakaṁ ālayavijñānam*, *nirvṛtta* complements *avyākṛta* ('unexplicit'), the attribute of *vipāka*

[1685] YBh_t P dzi 3a1 = D tshi 2b2: *mngon par 'grub* (read *grub*?) *pa*; YBh_c 279b2f: 所生.

is unfounded. Let me add that in view of the fact that in connection with *vipāka* the term *avyākṛta* definitely means "*karmically* indeterminate", I find it rather confusing that on p. 117 n. 1 (4th line) Buescher renders it as "experientially non-explicit".

321.0. B: 151 with ns. 2 and 3: YBh_{Bh} 200,1-3 (SavitBh), corresponding to YBh_t P 'i 285b7–286a1 (D zi 247a4f; YBh_c 827c29–828a2: VaSg III.1.i):

> *ārūp(y)eṣu punar* [1] *nāmāśritaṁ rūpabījāśritaṁ* (ms.) *ca vijñānaṁ* [2] *vijñānāśritaṁ nāma rūpabījaṁ ca pravartate, yataḥ punar bījāt samucchinnasyâpi rūpasyâyatyāṁ prādurbhāvo bhavati.*
>
> In the immaterial realms, however, *vijñāna* [continues] on the basis of *nāman* and of the Seed of corporeal matter, [and] *nāman* and the Seed of corporeal matter [in their turn] continue on the basis of *vijñāna*; and it is from this Seed that corporeal matter, although completely cut off [in the immaterial realms], can re-emerge in the future. (my transl.)

Buescher expressly insists, against S 1987 n. 1135, on reading, in [2], *nāmarūpabījaṁ ca* with the ed.,[1686] thinking that

> it is necessary to retain ... *nāmarūpabījaṁ* as a compound for both grammatical consistency (*pravartate*; 3. sg) and descriptive correctness of the phenomenological state.

But his arguments are inconclusive:

321.1. The passage Buescher quotes in support (viz., YBh_t P zi 15b7f) is a statement concerning the *Seeds* accompanying *vijñāna in general* (cf. also §§ 257–262), whereas the sentence under discussion is concerned with the *mutual dependence* of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* in the special case of the incorporeal realms, i.e., the world-sphere of incorporeality (*ārūpya-dhātu*).

321.2. Since there is no actual corporeal matter (*rūpa*) in the *ārūpyadhātu*, *rūpa* is represented there merely by the *Seeds* of *rūpa* (accompanying *vijñāna*). But in the case of *nāman*, there is not the slightest justification for reducing it to Seeds. If, being contrasted with *rūpa* on the one hand and with *vijñāna* on the other, *nāman* is taken to refer to the three remaining *skandhas* comprising the factors associated with the mind (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*), these are, of course, as active in the *ārūpyadhātu* as in the *kāmadhātu*, for although there are no sense perceptions in the sphere of incorporeality, there is non-sensory cognitive activity (*mano-vijñāna*), and hence there are also the mental factors associated with it (cf. AK VIII.2c: *ārūpyāś catuḥskandhāḥ*).[1687] But in view of the use of *nāman* in the preceding paragraphs of the text (see § 166.2) it is more probable that in the present passage as well it is meant to also comprise *vijñāna* itself in its function as *samanantarapratyaya* of the subsequent *vijñāna*-moment. Thus, both as a support (*nāman* as *āśraya* in the sense of the preceding *vijñāna*-moment as *samanantarapratyaya*) and as what is supported (*nāman* as *āśrita*, viz. as the remaining immaterial *skandhas*), *nāman* in the sphere of incorporeality is *actual nāman*, just

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[1686] Thus also HARADA 2004: 150,9, although his translation would seem to presuppose the reading *nāma rūpabījaṁ ca*; cf. ibid. 151,8: ($4b_1$) 名称と ($4b'_2$) 肉体の種子; cf. 151,6f: $4b_1$ = 名称, $4b'_2$ = 肉体の種子 (色種子).

[1687] For the presence of *nāman* in the *ārūpyadhātu*, cf. also Vi 431b9f and c18f, showing that there was no dispute concerning the presence of *nāman* but only with regard to *rūpa* (Vibhajyavādins: presence of both *nāman* and *rūpa* and hence mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāmarūpa* even in the *ārūpya-dhātu*; Vaibhāṣikas: no *rūpa* and hence only mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāman* in the *ārūpya-dhātu*; our YBh passage, using the concept of *bījas*, steers a middle way with regard to *rūpa*, but there was no reason at all for also reducing *nāman* in the *ārūpyadhātu* to mere Seeds).

as in the other two world-spheres. Therefore, the mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāman+rūpa* in the *kāma-* and *rūpadhātu* must, in the *ārūpyadhātu*, only be modified to a mutual dependence of *vijñāna* and *nāman+rūpabīja*, not *nāmabīja+rūpabīja*. If this is accepted for the dependence of *vijñāna* on *nāmarūpa* ([1] *nāmāśritaṁ*[!] *rūpabījāśritaṁ ca vijñānam*), why not for the reverse dependence, viz., [2]?

321.3. That in [2] we have to read *nāma rūpabījaṁ ca* (and not *nāmarūpa-bījaṁ ca*) is in fact confirmed also by the Tibetan (YBh$_t$ P dzi 116b1f = D tshi 101b7: *gzugs kyi sa bon dang ming yang rnam par shes pa la brten cing 'jug ste*) as well as by the Chinese translation (YBh$_c$ 321b16 名及色種子 and 828a1 名及色種, against 321c2 名色種子 = *nāmarūpa-bīja*).

321.4. Buescher's argument that in [2] the verb in the sg. (*pravartate*) requires a single noun in the sg. as its grammatical subject is hardly conclusive, since it is not unusual that in the case of a plurality of subjects the predicate agrees with the final one (cf. RENOU 1975: 500 # 369), at least when the nouns are not conceived as acting together but as acting alternatively[1688] or each by itself. An incontrovertible example is BuCar III.54cd:

taṁ ... mṛtam ... sūtaḥ kumāraś ca dadarśa nānyaḥ ||[1689]

Similarly MMK 24.25:

yadā duḥkhaṁ samudayo nirodhaś ca na vidyate | ...

Some examples from the YBh:

YBh$_{Bh}$ 199,13-15: see § 166.2.2 with fn. 821.

VinSg$_{ms}$ 21a8–b1: *tatra rūpadhātau gandho rasaś ca nāsti, taddhātur asti* ... | ⟨*tadabhāvād*⟩ *ghrāṇavijñānaṁ jihvāvijñānam api na vidyate samudācārata eva, no tu dhātutaḥ*.[1690]

321.5. What is of special importance is the position of *ca* in [2]. If taken to combine [2] with [1], it should, of course, be placed second, i.e., after *vijñānāśritaṁ* (the predicate noun).[1691] It therefore must combine *rūpabījaṁ* with *nāma*, just as *ca* in [1] combines *rūpabījāśritaṁ* with *nāmāśritaṁ*. Hence, in [2] a compound *nāmarūpabījaṁ* would seem to be *excluded* also from a syntactical point of view.

322. B: 159 n. 2: *anutpatta* must be a misprint for *anutpatti*. But when at the end of the note (already on p. 160) in the sentence *avidyamāneṣu sarvadharmeṣu katamo dharmo ... niryāsyati* ([Aṣṭ 12,13 =] AAĀ$_W$ 105[,20f]) the expression *niryāsyati* is rendered as "could come about", this is not in tune with the context, for what is at stake is that in reality there is no *bodhisattva* who might go forth (*nir-√yā*) from (i.e.: transcend) the world of the three spheres (*traidhātuka*), nor any *Mahāyāna* by means of which he could do so (Aṣṭ 12,5ff; 10-12). For a

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1688 Thus clearly MAVṬ 25,3f: *tenâpi rūpādiparamāṇavaḥ tatsamūho vâlambanatvena parikalpyate* ("By this [opponent], too, either the atoms of visible [things], etc., [are regarded] as the objective support, or the aggregate of these [atoms] is regarded [so]").

1689 JOHNSTON (BuCar, part II: 41): "... only the charioteer and the prince, and none other, saw the corpse ...".

1690 "In the sphere of fine materiality, smell and taste are absent, [only] their latent disposition is [still] there. ... On account of their absence, olfactory and gustatory awareness are also absent [there], [though absent] only in terms of actual occurrence, but not as latent dispositions."

1691 If an asyndetic coordination of [1] and [2] is found disturbing (but cf. SPEYER 1886: 337f # 436), all one could do is to insert (against the ms.!) another *ca* after *vijñānāśritaṁ*.

detailed discussion of the meanings of *nir-√yā* in the *Prajñāpāramitā*, see VERBOOM 1998: II 208–213.

323. B: 160 n. 1: The word *mkhas pa* ("wise", "learned", "expert") in the fourth line of the verse quoted (Saṁdh VII.24: 80,3-6) is translated as "saint", which seems unusual.

324. B: 168 n. 1: Saṁdh IV.9 (51,18-21; S na 16b1f; YBh_t P 'i 56b7f):

> *de bzhin nyid kyi rjes su 'brang ba*[1692] *gnyis su* (S, YBh_t) *med pa'i shes pa* (S *ye shes*) *la rten*[1693] *pa de nyid kyis don dam pa thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid nges par 'dzin pa ... kho nar byed de*[1694] |

Buescher's translation:

> Assimilating (**upādāya*) the knowledge of non-duality associated with Being-as-such, they (i.e. the Bhikṣu-Yogācāras) do thereby indeed (**tena eva*) ascertain the ultimate reality as being altogether characterized by a single [experiential] flavour (**paramārthaṁ sarvatr<u>aikarasa</u>lakṣaṇaṁ avadharanti*).

Buescher's **avadharanti* is of course impossible, the correct form being **avadhārayanti*. **Sarvatra* hardly means "altogether", rather "everywhere" (cf. VII.7 [69,17f]: the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* is **sarvatraga*, "all-pervading"). And "assimilating" for the quasi-post-positional *upādāya* is highly idiosyncratic (cf. § 120.2). Apart from this, sTog's reading *yang dag par rten pa* does not favour **upādāya* but rather a derivate of **sam-ā-√śri* or the like, probably a verbal noun with which the demonstrative pronoun *de* can be construed. My suggestion:

> [Rather,] just by this relying on the non-dual comprehension that conforms to the *tathatā* [of one single *skandha*: cf. 51,10f; AHN 2013: 1220f with n. 17] they infallibly (*kho na* = *eva*) ascertain ... the ultimate reality [as being] characterized by [being of] a single flavour everywhere.

325. B: 168 n. 2 (third line from below): *bskyed* should be *bskyod*. The Sanskrit of the passage (Saṁdh IX.4.8) can be found in MATSUDA 1995: 69 (# 4-8):

> *animitte anābhogatāṁ nimitta(kleśasa)[mu]dācārāvicālyatāṁ côpādāya a[ṣṭa]mī bhūmir acalêty ucyate.*

326. B: 174 n. 3 (*Madhyamakahṛdaya* V.83ab): a syntactically smoother emendation of the ms. reading (*svayam āpāyikatvāsau pare⟨ṣāṁ ca⟩ vipādakaḥ*) than *āpāyikatve 'sau* would be *āpāyikaś cāsau*, which may not be less probable even graphically. Tib. (ECKEL 2008: 432: *rang yang ngan song gzhol ba dang* || *gzhan yang phung bar byed pa yin* ||) does not show any trace of an abstract suffix, and 'A *dang* B *yang* ...' would suit 'A *ca* ... B *ca* ...' quite well.

327. B: 175,27ff: $BoBh_D$ 30,26-28:

> *yaś ca rūpādīnāṁ dharmāṇāṁ rūpādikasya vastunaḥ prajñaptivāda-svabhāvaṁ svalakṣaṇam asadbhūtasamāropato*[1695] *'bhiniviśate*[1696], ...

[1692] *'brang ba* YBh_t : *'jug pa dang* S.

[1693] e.c. : *brten* YBh_t : *yang dag par rten* S.

[1694] For *don dam pa ... byed de*, S has *thams cad du ro gcig pa'i mtshan nyid don dam pa khong du chud ... par 'gyur te gzhan du ni ma yin no* ||.

[1695] Thus $BoBh_D$ 30,27, $BoBh_W$ 45,15, and TAKAHASHI 2005: 98; B 176,3: °*ropito* (misprint?).

[1696] Thus $BoBh_D$ 30,28, $BoBh_W$ 45,16 and TAKAHASHI 2005: 98 with n. 7 (mss.); B: °*ti*.

Buescher takes this to mean that

> such a position would, through an untrue imputation, be insistently clinging to an intrinsic characteristic of the 'something-being-present' of the dharmas (of sensory form etc.) *as* [real] sensory form etc., while [such a characteristic is actually only] one whose intrinsic nature is a designative proposition.

Why be simple if it can be done in a complicated way? First, the grammatical subject indicated by the relative pronoun (*yaḥ*) is surely not a proposition but a person (viz., one of the two types of persons who are declared to have fallen away from the Buddhist teaching). Second, I fail to see how *rūpādīnāṁ dharmāṇāṁ rūpādikasya vastunaḥ* can be rendered as "of the 'something-being-present' of the dharmas (of sensory form etc.) as [real] sensory form etc.", i.e., how *rūpādikasya* (or *rūpādīnāṁ*?) can be construed as a predicativum with *abhiniviśate* (if this is indeed the purport of Buescher's rather cumbrous rendering). Actually, in accordance with the style of large portions of the TattvP and especially its immediately preceding section, we have to understand *rūpādīnāṁ dharmāṇām* and *rūpādikasya vastunaḥ* as juxtaposed quasi-synonymic expressions, the latter being, syntactically, an apposition to the former:[1697] cf., e.g., 30,10: *ekasya dharmasyaîkasya vastuno*; 30,11: *ekasmin dharme ekasmin vastuni*; 30,15: *sarvadharmāṇāṁ sarvavastūnāṁ.*[1698] The meaning is thus: "dharmas like *rūpa*, a thing like *rūpa*", i.e., dharmas or things like that which in everyday life is called (or conceived as) *rūpa*, cf. 30,23: *rūpādisaṁjñake dharme rūpādisaṁjñake vastuni*. As for *rūpa*, it probably represents, in the first place, the *skandha rūpa*, i.e., the body, or (in a wider sense) material things, as can be gleaned from the full list given at BoBh_D 26,18ff. This does not of course exclude *rūpa* as one of the sense objects (sc., visibles) also being comprised (see 26,20), but as far as I can see the TattvP does not explicitly distinguish sense perception from conceptual cognition but rather takes all everyday mental processes as tinged with language and fiction. As for a translation, I should basically follow FRAUWALLNER (1956b: 276,25-29 = 2010: 180,4-7) and TAKAHASHI (2005: 164 # 5.3.1):

> [The first of these two persons is the one] who clings to an individual characteristic of dharmas like *rūpa*, of a thing like *rūpa*, [a characteristic] that has the nature of linguistic designations, in that he superimposes [on them something] unreal.

328. B: 187f (ŚrBh 405,2-7; cf. also § 306.3.3).

1. In the last line of the ŚrBh text, viz.,

> ... *anabhisaṁskāreṇa vipaśyanā pariśuddhā paryavadātā śamathānuyogatā kalyatāparigṛhītā pravartate*,

the °*yo*° in *śamathānuyogatā*, should of course be deleted (cf. SAKUMA 1990: II 24 # F.2!): cf. Tib. (ibid. II 61 # F.2, line 10) *rjes su song ba* = °*anugatā* and Ch. (YBh_C 458b10f) 隨奢摩他

[1697] This is also confirmed by Tib. (YBh_t P zhi 30a8: *gzugs la sogs pa'i chos rnams | gzugs la sogs pa'i dngos po la ...*) and Hsüan-tsang (YBh_C 488b10f: 於色等法 於色等事).

[1698] Some other examples for the appositional juxtaposition of quasi-synonymic expressions from the TattvP: BoBh_D 27,2 *nirvastukatā nirnimittatā*; 27,2f *nāsti{ka}tā asaṁvidyamānatā*; 29,17f *kāruṇyacittenânukampācittena*; 29,18 *yathāśaktyā ... yathābalam*; 30,4 *vāggocaro vāgviṣayaḥ*; 30,12 *prajñaptaya upacārāḥ*; 30,14: *tādātmyaṁ tanmayatā tatsvabhāvatā*; 30,24 *anena kāraṇenânayā yuktyā*; 38,1 *anudayād aprādurbhāvāt*.

("following the *śamatha*").[1699] Buescher seems to have kept the wrong reading deliberately since he translates the passage as

> ... without any dispositional program, the altogether clear and pure Discernment goes on in *conjunction* with Tranquil Abiding enveloped in sublimity. (B 188,5-7; emphasis mine)

But it is hard to see how an abstract formation in °*tā* (and this is what the expression cannot but be if the ms. reading is kept) fits in syntactically with what is clearly a series of participles all used in a predicative (modal) function. Theoretically, one could perhaps construe the abstract together with *kalyatā* as part of the prior member of a compound ending in °*parigṛhītā*, but in this case Buescher should have quoted the text as °*yogatākalyatā*°, and in any case a compound X-*anuyogatā* (instead of X-*anuyoga* or X-*anuyuktatā*) sounds rather strange. What is more, Buescher's rendering "conjunction" is also semantically implausible because in Buddhist texts *anuyoga* usually means either "devotion, addiction, application to" or "questioning, examination" (*BHSD* 32b; *CPD* I 211b; *DP* 131b), and as far as I can see this seems to hold good for the YBh as well.

2. Buescher's rather nebulous rendering of *kalyatāparigṛhīta* as "enveloped in sublimity" is hardly satisfactory either. In connection with *śamatha*, the meaning of *kalyatā* would seem to be close to that of *karmaṇyatā*, ("pliability", "adaptability"); cf. *CPD* s.v. *kallatā* ("2. adaptability, readiness") and the commentarial explanation of the bahuvrīhi *kallacitta* (*CPD* s.v.) as *kammaniyacitta*, *kammakkhamacitta* or *bhāvanākammayogyacitta*. But like *karmaṇya*, *kalya* also contains the nuance of "well-being" (*CPD* s.v. *kallatā*: "1. health"; *MW* s.v. *kalya*: "healthy ...") or "ease" (Tib. *nyams bde ba*: cf. SAKUMA 1990: II 128 n. 722).

3. My proposal:

> ... without effort, Discernment goes on altogether clear and pure, accompanied by Tranquil Abiding and furnished with pliancy-and-ease.

329. B: 190 (BoBh$_D$ 187,15-17: definition of *śūnyatāsamādhi*). Buescher follows DUTT's text

> *bodhisattvasya sarvābhilāṣātmakena svabhāvena virahitaṁ nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ vastu paśyato* (for ed. °*taḥ*) *yā cittasya sthitiḥ* |

and translates this as follows:

> that psychic stability due to which the something-being-present is being perceived as the one that is of inexpressible essential nature, [i.e.,] one *deprived* of any intrinsic being as a nature [possibly forming the object] of the bodhisattva's aspiration.

Apart from disregarding the bahuvrīhi character of the compound ending in °*ātmaka* (not "a nature of X" but "having the nature of X"), Buescher translates the active participle *paśyataḥ* (gen. sg.) as if it were a passive main verb of a relative clause, and renders the relative pronoun *yā* — practically nothing but a marker of the *definiens* in a nominal definition — by a causal phrase ("due to which"), which seems impossible. The consequence is that he has to construe the genitive *bodhisattvasya* with *abhilāṣa*, a concept which can be adapted to the purport of the sentence only through a strained interpretation as "[object of] aspiration".

[1699] ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III (2010): 26,10 proposes emending to *śamathānuyogā kalpakā*, but *kalpakā* does not make sense to me, and Tib. *rjes su song ba* clearly supports *anugatā*.

Actually, in the light of related BoBh passages[1700] it is quite obvious that *abhilāṣa* is simply a misreading or misprint for *abhilāpa*, as is not only confirmed by Tib. (P zhi 165b5: *brjod pa thams cad*) as well as by Hsüan-tsang (YBh$_c$ 543c8: 一切言說) but also by a look at Wogihara's edition (BoBh$_W$ 276,3). And *bodhisattvasya ... paśyataḥ* is easily construed as a possessive genitive dependent on *cittasya sthitiḥ*. As for *vastu*, it is doubtless the object of the participle *paśyataḥ*, but the question is whether we should understand it, with Hsüan-tsang,[1701] as referring to conventional things, or rather as referring to true reality, i.e., as standing for *vastumātra*. This, again, has some bearing on the question whether the qualifications preceding *vastu* (viz., *...virahitaṁ* and *nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ*), should be taken in a predicative or in an attributive function. If *vastu* is understood as referring to conventional things, the qualifications hardly make sense unless taken in a predicative sense. However, in the following two paragraphs of the text (defining the *apraṇihita-* and the *animitta-samādhi*), the *vastu* is taken up as *tad eva nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ vastu*, which means that in these paragraphs *nirabhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ* is unambiguously an *attribute* of *vastu*, and this fact would perhaps also favour taking it as an attribute in the sentence under discussion. In accordance with the Tibetan translation,[1702] we may then translate:

> The stability (i.e., unwavering concentratedness) of the mind of a bodhisattva who (or: when he) perceives [true] reality (*vastu*), which is devoid of an intrinsic nature made up of (*°ātmaka*) any linguistic expression, [yet nonetheless not non-existent but] of inexpressible intrinsic nature: (this is called his 'meditative concentration on Emptiness').[1703]

I cannot, however, exclude Hsüan-tsang's alternative:

> (...) who perceives thing[s] as being devoid of (...).

330. B: 194: When dealing with the passage BoBh$_D$ 37,3ff, Buescher quotes the text as

> *bodhisattvo ... sarvābhilāpaviśliṣṭaṁ nirabhilāpyaṁ tadrūpādisaṁjñakaṁ vastu paśyati*

and translates:

> (...) the bodhisattva perceives the something-being-present as dissociated from all designative expressions, as inexpressible — [while ordinarily it is] conceived of as [specific] sensory forms etc. through those [expressions] — (...).

The alleged compound *tadrūpādisaṁjñakaṁ* = "conceived of as ... sensory forms etc. through those [expressions]" sounds rather tortuous, and the complication is, once again, unnecessary, for *tad* can be separated from the compound[1704] and construed with *vastu* in an anaphoric function referring to the immediately preceding *vastuni* (37,4) or to *rūpādisaṁjñake vastuni* in

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[1700] BoBh$_D$ 180,24: *abhilāpātmakaḥ svabhāva eṣāṁ nāsti*. Cf. also 180,27f: *te 'bhilāpyāḥ svabhāvā dharmāṇāṁ ... na saṁvidyante*; 37,13f: *abhilāpyenâtmanâpariniṣpannatvāt*; 188,17: *sarvasaṁskārāṇāṁ abhilāpyasvabhāvaṁ nityakālam eva nāstîty upalabhya*; 190,19f: *sarveṣv abhilāpyeṣu vastuṣu sarvābhilāpasvabhāvo*[1] *dharmo na saṁvidyate*; 239,7f: *abhilāpābhisaṁskārapratibhāsasya svabhāvasya ... avidyamānasya*.

[1] YBh$_t$ P zhi 168a8 (*brjod pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi chos thams cad*) would seem to suggest *sarvo 'bhi°*.

[1701] YBh$_c$ 543c7f: "... the bodhisattvas who perceive all things as [ultimately] free from any intrinsic nature [corresponding] to designative expressions ..." (謂諸菩薩觀一切事遠離一切言說自性).

[1702] YBh$_t$ P zhi 165b5: *... brjod pa thams cad kyi bdag nyid kyi ngo bo dang bral ba | brjod du med pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi dngos po mthong nas ...*

[1703] Cf. also ARAMAKI 1976 (2): 19,15-17; HOTORI 1982: 50 n.71.

[1704] Thus also BoBh$_W$ 54,5 and TAKAHASHI 2005: 112 # 9.3.2.2.

the preceding paragraph (36,24f).[1705] Cf. also passages like 37,12, where the same expression occurs in the locative case (*tasmin rūpādisaṁjñake vastuni*),[1706] leaving no doubt as to the anaphoric function of the pronoun. That *tad* qualifies *vastu* is also confirmed by Tib. (P zhi 36a1: *gzugs la sogs par ming btags pa'i dngos po de*), where, in addition, °*saṁjñaka* is taken to mean not "conceived as" but "designated as", which is equally possible.

Appendix 2: Additional Remarks on *upaya/upaga*

331. In a note (M2: 459–462: n. 156), Matsumoto argues at length that in the *Bīja*- and *Upayasutta* (see §§ 173.2 and 173.5) as well as in the formula of the four *vijñānasthiti*s in the *Saṅgītisūtra*[1707], *upaya/upaga*[1708] has to be taken in a passive-objective sense, i.e., in the sense of 'locus', but at the same time he emphasizes that *upaya* is construed with a noun in the locative (於格形: M2: 460,18 and 461,1),[1709] which would seem to presuppose an active use.

332. 1. Actually, the question of an active or passive analysis of *upaya/upaga* is not crucial for my argument. My main point is rather that what is at stake is, in the first place, *vijñāna*'s being involved in *rūpa*, etc., in the sense of emotional attachment and existential identification (an aspect not denied by Matsumoto: cf. p. 460,17: 所著) entailing that *vijñāna* continues to be bound up with them in a further life after death. In my opinion, the passage hardly purports a 'locus'–'super-locus' relation in a spatial or ontological sense, at any rate not with regard to *vedanā*, etc. (see § 159.1).

2. The aspect of 'attachment' is probably also envisaged by the Chinese rendering of the phrase *rūpopagaṁ vijñānaṁ tiṣṭhati* (see § 200.2) as 色封滯識住 in SĀ$_c$ 9b1, since both 封 and 滯 are attested as (part of expressions) rendering derivates of (*anu-*)√*sañj* and *abhi-ni-viś*,[1710] so that the phrase would mean "sticking to *rūpa* the *vijñāna* persists".

3. Apart from this, it is true that a passive analysis of *upaya/upaga* does occasionally occur in exegetical literature, as in Pj II 558,4f, explaining Sn 897 *so upayaṁ kim eyya* as

> *so upagantabbaṭṭhena upayaṁ rūpādisu ekaṁ pi dhammaṁ kiṁ* (CSCD) *upeyya*
>
> How could he approach (= become involved in) [any] *upaya*, [to be understood] in the sense of something to be approached, even [if it were only] one item among [those items ordinary persons get involved in, viz.,] *rūpa*, etc., [let alone all of them]!

But even here *upayaṁ ... eyya* in the verse text may just be a paraphrase for *upeyya* (*upaya* as a verbal abstract + √*i*, like *vigamaṁ* √*yā* in § 317); the Sanskrit version of the verse quoted in BoBh$_D$ 33,10-13 has simply *asau kena upādadīta*.

[1705] For other occurrences of *rūpādisaṁjñakaṁ vastu* without *tad-* see, e.g., BoBh$_D$ 30,26 (gen. sg.: see § 327); 30,23; 32,14; 33,14; 35,13 (all loc. sg.).

[1706] Similarly BoBh$_D$ 35,20: *tasminn eva rūpādisaṁjñake vastuni*; 32,15f: *kiṁ punas tatra* (= *tasmin*) *rūpādisaṁjñake vastuny avaśiṣṭam?*; cf. also 33,4f: *te rūpādisaṁjñakā dharmāḥ*; 33,7f: *teṣāṁ rūpādisaṁjñakānāṁ dharmāṇāṁ*.

[1707] STACHE-ROSEN 1968: IV.23, quoted Vi 706b16f and AKBh 117,19: *rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ*, etc.

[1708] Cf. also fn. 813.

[1709] Cf., however, fn. 872.

[1710] *HIRAKAWA* no. 907 and 2078.

4. In the *Upaya-* and *Bījasutta* I consider a passive meaning of *upaya/upaga* extremely improbable, both where it qualifies a person and where it qualifies *vijñāna*, and here a passive meaning does not seem to be confirmed by the exegetical literature either.[1711] Matsumoto (M2: 461,3-10) argues for a passive meaning by associating the expression *(an)upaya* in the *Upayasutta* with the frequent phrase *anupādāya āsavehi cittāni vimucciṁsu*, which in its turn he assumes to reverberate in MMK 26.7 *anupādāno mucyeta*. Such an association may not be unjustified, but it is anything but certain that in this kārikā *upādāna* is used in a passive-objective sense (cf. § 170.2), and even if it were, this would hardly suffice for a passive interpretation of the absolutive *anupādāya* ("without clinging [to anything]") or of *upaya*.[1712]

333. 1. The situation is essentially different in the case of the *Saṅgītisūtra* (IV.23) formula *rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ*, etc. This formula is obviously a nominalization of the corresponding verbal phrase found in the *Upaya-* and the *Bījasutta* (and kept unchanged in the Pāli version of the *Saṅgītisutta*: DN III 228,6-13), a Sanskrit version of which is quoted in the VinSg (see § 200.2): *rūpopagaṁ vijñānaṁ tiṣṭhati*, etc. A problem arises because in the nominalized phrase *°upaga* is no longer an attribute of *vijñāna*, as in the verbal phrase, but of *sthiti*. My suggestion is that originally the purport of the nominalized phrase may not have been meant to be different from that of the verbal phrase and that the formulation is somewhat elliptic, intended to mean something like

> the persistence of *vijñāna* [characterized by the fact] that [*vijñāna*] approaches (=is involved in) *rūpa* (etc.).

Such an interpretation of the nominalized formula is of course problematic from the perspective of normative grammar, and this may have been the reason for the emergence of different explanations in the exegetic traditions.

2. In Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, *sthiti* was understood in a locative sense as that where *vijñāna* settles down (AKBh 117,24: *pratiṣṭhā hi sthitiḥ*; AKVy 263,18f: *vijñānaṁ tiṣṭhaty asyām iti vijñānasthitiḥ*). Understood in this way, the *vijñānasthiti*s *consist* in *rūpa*, etc. In this sense, Vi 706b17f, e.g., defines *rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ* as

> matter (*rūpa*) that is contaminated (**sāsrava*), invites appropriation (**upādānīya*) and is reckoned as [belonging to] a sentient being (**sattvasaṁkhyāta*) (色隨識住者, 謂 色有漏隨順於取 有情數攝).

It is, however, hardly admissible to conclude, with Matsumoto (M2: 462,1-4), from such a *definition* that its author has interpreted *upaga* in a passive sense. The attributes in this definition rather have the function of *specifying* the matter (*rūpa*) that serves as *vijñānasthiti* and of *distinguishing* it from matter that does not. There is no reason to take one of these attributes, viz. **upādānīya*, to be semantically equivalent to *upaga* so as to prove a passive meaning of the latter, quite apart from the fact that **upādānīya* need not be understood in a strictly passive sense here (see ch. 4.2.5.3).

3. That a passive meaning of *upaga* cannot be taken for granted should become evident by having a look at a couple of proposals for analysing the formula *rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ* that are adduced by Yaśomitra. In the first of these (AKVy 263,18-20),[1713] obviously of Vaibhāṣi-

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[1711] Cf. fn. 872 and § 200.4.2 with fn. 1116.

[1712] For examples of an active use of °*upaga(ta)* cf. also *CPD* III 438b s.v. *kāyûpaga* and *kāyûpagata*.

[1713] Cf. also $AKBh_{LVP}$ III: 23f; LO.SA. II 1133.

ka provenance,[1714] *sthiti* is explained in a locative sense, but *upaga* is nonetheless understood in an *active* sense:

> *upagacchatîti upagā, vijñānasya samīpacāriṇîty arthaḥ,*

and *rūpoga* is analysed as a karmadhāraya. The whole phrase *rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ* is taken to mean

> the place-where-*vijñāna*-settles (*vijñānaṁ tiṣṭhaty asyāṁ*) that is (= consists in) *rūpa* and approaches (*rūpaṁ ca tad upagā ca sā*), i.e., comes near to (= involves?) *vijñāna*.

4. Matsumoto (M2: 462,8-21) is doubtless right in characterizing this analysis as somewhat unnatural. By way of contrast, he himself, insisting on a passive-objective interpretation of *upaga*, takes *rūpopaga* as a bahuvrīhi and proposes explaining the formula *rūpopagā vijñāna-sthitiḥ* as

> the fact that *vijñāna* persists in that it takes *rūpa* as *upaga* (= that which is approached), i.e., as its 'locus'.
>
> M2: 461,16: 色を "upaga" (近づかれるもの)〔基体〕として、識が住すること (vijñānasthiti).

5. This interpretation comes indeed close to that ascribed by Yaśomitra (AKVy 263,21-24) to the master Bhagavadviśeṣa as being in accordance with Sautrāntika exegesis, with the exception that Bhagavadviśeṣa does not speak of a 'locus' but takes *rūpa* to be 'approached' in the sense of being apprehended as one's own (*ātmīyataḥ*):

> *upagam iti upagamyate tad ātmīyata iti.*[1715]

6. But there is yet another explanation of the expression according to which neither *sthiti* nor *upaga* is taken in a passive-objective or locative sense. According to this explanation (AKVy 263,25-27), *sthiti* means craving (*tṛṣṇā*), as that due to which *vijñāna* persists in *saṁsāra*, because due to craving the succession of rebirths is not cut off:

> *tṛṣṇā sthitiḥ, tiṣṭhaty anayā vijñānaṁ, punarbhavasaṁtatyanucchedād iti kṛtvā,*

and *sthitiḥ* = *tṛṣṇā* is *rūpopagā* because it approaches *rūpa* in that it is intensely attached to it:

> *sā rūpam upagacchati tadabhiṣvaṅgata iti rūpopagā.*

7. Finally, Yaśomitra (AKVy 264,2-4) mentions yet another explanation (perhaps his own?) according to which °*upaga* is said to be equivalent to °*svabhāva*, i.e., simply taken to mean "consisting in". This explanation also presupposes a locative interpretation of *sthiti*, taking *rūpopagā vijñānasthitiḥ* to mean

> the 'dwelling-place' of *vijñāna* that consists in *rūpa*.

8. Whatever the merits of these different explanations, they clearly demonstrate that a passive interpretation of *upaga* is not impossible but not the rule either, for it is advocated in only one out of four alternatives.

[1714] Cf. AKVy 263,27. Cf. also NA 466b25, where *upaga* (隨) is explained as "close" (親附) or "near" (隣近).

[1715] Cf. $AKVy_t$ P cu 288a8: *nye bar 'gro ba zhes bya ba ni de bdag nyid kyi yin par khas len pa'o.*

Pt. II: Reconsidering the *vijñaptimātra(tā)* Passage in *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* VIII.7

1. Introductory Remarks

334. In 1984, I published an article entitled "On the *vijñaptimātra* passage in *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* VIII.7" (S 1984), in which I discussed the presumable Sanskrit original of what appears to be the earliest, at any rate the earliest transmitted, occurrence of the (Yogācāra-)-Vijñānavāda key term *vijñaptimātra(tā)*. Unfortunately, the original Sanskrit of this passage has not emerged so far, and all we have is several Tibetan and Chinese translations (see §§ 344–345). However, these translations diverge significantly in their understanding of the syntax and the meaning of the passage. In view of the considerable number of testimonia, there would seem to be some hope for an approximately successful reconstruction of the original Sanskrit wording of the passage, allowing us to explain the divergences between the transmitted testimonia as different interpretations of the original or as based on explicable variant readings. Actually, there were several attempts to reconstruct the original wording of the passage,[1716] the most carefully backed up reconstruction being the one proposed by Noritoshi ARAMAKI,[1717] who made use not only of the different versions of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṁdh) but also of those of a quotation of the passage in *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg) II.7.1. However, a systematic comparison of the Tibetan and Chinese versions at my disposal[1718] and of the preserved commentaries on both the Saṁdh and, especially, the MSg led me to a different hypothesis, supported, according to the result of my investigation, by the majority of the testimonia though not by all of them, a minority of testimonia confirming Aramaki's proposal. According to my hypothesis, the decisive difference between the two groups of testimonia consists, basically, in the absence or presence of an anusvāra in the respective Sanskrit original (see § 346), the version without anusvāra deserving to be regarded as the authentic one.

335. While meeting with approval on the part of N. Aramaki,[1719] my paper was extensively criticized by Shirō MATSUMOTO in a lengthy article written in Japanese with the title 『解深密経』の「唯識」の経文について ("Considerations on the *vijñaptimātra* Passage in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*"), in *Komazawa-daigaku Bukkyōgaku-bu Kenkyū Kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部研究紀要 no. 61 (2003): 141–224 (henceforward: M1). I am deeply impressed by Matsumoto's explicit, well-documented and well-considered argumentation as well as by the objective and polite style of his criticism. His thorough investigation of the matter raises the

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[1716] For examples, see S 1984: 436 (# 5) with ns. 23 and 24 (Nozawa, Odani, Takasaki, Nagao). Cf. also M1: 144a.

[1717] In connection with his reconstruction of MSg II.7 in NAGAO 1982: *63*.

[1718] The Tun-huang version became accessible to me only after the article had been submitted but was discussed by me in S 1987: 382f.

[1719] ARAMAKI, 2000: 55–56. My reconstruction has also been adopted in KATŌ (K.) 2002: 58.

discussion to a considerably higher level, and I readily concede that he has rightly pointed out a number of flaws in my somewhat hastily written paper[1720] and that he succeeded in clarifying a number of problems I had been unable to solve.

336. Even so, I must confess that as regards the central issue of the reconstruction and interpretation of the sentence under discussion and the evaluation of the evidence on which it is based I simply do not feel convinced by Matsumoto's arguments. One of my objections in regard to Matsumoto, who advocates a reconstruction basically identical with the one that had previously been suggested by Aramaki, is that he tends to disqualify counter-evidence by assuming, to an extent far beyond what is probable, misunderstandings on the part of the Tibetan and Chinese translators or textual corruption, and in the case of the usually most reliable testimonia at that. Another point is that I cannot agree to Matsumoto's position concerning to the meaning of the word *prabhāvita* in the controversial sentence — an issue that has led Matsumoto to a detailed reassessment of the meaning of this term in other sources as well, which I find extremely stimulating but in essential points also disputable.

337. More recently, my understanding and reconstruction of the crucial Saṁdh passage has also been vehemently challenged by Hartmut BUESCHER on pp. 177–185 of the monograph that has already been dealt with in Pt. I of this book (*The Inception of Yogācāra Vijñānavāda*, Vienna 2008; henceforward: B). Like Matsumoto (but without referring to him), Buescher opts for a reconstruction which is basically in agreement with Aramaki's former proposal. Buescher's criticism is, however, based on a reconsideration of Tibetan materials only, with special emphasis on the Tun-huang version and commentarial explanations.

338. Since critical discussion is the way scholarship proceeds to truth, I have, after some hesitation, decided to continue the debate on a level of explicitness that tries to come up to Buescher's and especially Matsumoto's challenge, hoping that my arguments are conclusive and not merely the expression of my being blinded by an ingrained line of thought, reinforced by old age. The final judgement, if possible at all, must be left to uncommitted competent readers, or, in the case of the reconstruction of the controversial sentence, to the (perhaps unlikely but not impossible) future discovery of some Sanskrit source or manuscript enabling a final decision of the matter.

339.1. It may be argued that the issue — the (anyway conjectural) reconstruction of the original Sanskrit of one small passage — may not be worth the amount of paper wasted on it. Since the core of the disagreement can almost be narrowed down to the question of the presence or absence of a mere anusvāra — just a small dot! —, I am afraid that we are coming alarmingly close to the asymptote of the proverbial specialists who know everything about nothing (and still disagree!). But on the one hand some more general issues of philological methodology are involved, and I feel the case to be a kind of touchstone for what has been the basis of much of my work for decades. On the other hand, the passage is definitely a crucial one for the question of the origin of one of the key concepts and basic ideas of (Yogācāra-)-Vijñānavāda thought.

339.2. Indeed, as already mentioned above, the VIII[th] chapter of the Saṁdh is, to my knowledge, the earliest text to use the term "(being) representation only" (*vijñaptimātra-(tva/tā)*), and the first to introduce, into what we are used to calling the Yogācāra school

[1720] Unfortunately I had no chance to see the proofs, so that a number of misprints could not be corrected. For a couple of corrections, see S 1987: 381–382.

proper,[1721] the idea that whatever is perceived or cognized, even in ordinary sensory and cognitive awareness, is nothing but images in the mind.[1722]

339.3. This position has traditionally been called "idealism" by Buddhologists, but since there is nowadays some debate about the legitimacy of applying this 'etic' term to (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda thought and because readers may come up with associations from Western philosophy that were not intended by the Buddhist masters, its application is perhaps better avoided, at least as long as the matter remains controversial. Still, for want of a better term I still use it, but in inverted commas, simply as a label for the Vijñānavāda view as expressed in the sources, suspending the question of what it may or may not imply because this does not concern the historico-philological problems of the present study, which is concerned with the question of the origination of the *Indian* concept only.

339.4. The place where the term '*vijñaptimātra*' occurs for the first time in the Saṁdh and where the idea expressed by this term is explicitly developed and discussed is Saṁdh VIII.7-9. The other occurrences of this term in this text[1723] and the related term '*vijñaptitathatā*'[1724] obviously presuppose both the term and the idea as already introduced. From this I concluded in a former article[1725] that Saṁdh VIII.7–9, showing all signs of an innovation, has preserved the original context in which the term was introduced for the first time, viz., in the context of a reflection on the nature of objects visualized in certain meditative practices.

340. This conclusion, which Matsumoto seems to accept,[1726] has not, however, met with universal approval. It was briefly but uncompromisingly rejected by Robert H. SHARF (1995:

[1721] I.e., the tradition the earliest materials of which were collected in the *Yogācārabhūmi*, more precisely: the one ascribed, by tradition, to Maitreya or Asaṅga (YBh). When using the expression 'Yogācāra (school)', I refer to this specific tradition. For further distinctions, see Pt. I fn. 8.

[1722] To quote a passage from the MSABh (91,17-19):

> Indeed, regardless of whether one is aware of [the fact that there is] nothing but the mind, [knowing:] '[What] presents itself [is] only the mind appearing as an objective support, but there is no objective support apart from the mind', or whether one is not aware [of this fact]: the objective support is just mind, nothing else.
>
> *"cittam eva hy ālambanapratibhāsaṁ vartate, na cittād anyad ālambanam asti" iti jānato vā citta-mātram ajānato vā cittam evâlambanaṁ, nânyat |*

Or MSg II.6:

> These representations (*vijñapti*) are mere representations (*vijñaptimātra*), because there is no [corresponding] thing/object (*artha*). ... Just as in a dream there appear, even without a thing/object (*artha*), just in the mind alone (**vijñānamātra eva*?), forms/images (**ākāra*?) of all kinds of things /objects like visibles, sounds, smells, tastes, tangibles, houses, forests, land, and mountains, and yet there are no [such] things/objects (*artha*) at all in that [place].
>
> *rnam par rig pa 'di dag ni don med pa'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam mo ... || dper na rmi lam na don med par yang rnam par shes pa tsam nyid du gzugs dang | sgra dang | dri dang | ro dang | reg bya dang | khang khyim dang | nags tshal dang | sa dang ri la sogs pa'i don sna tshogs kyi rnam par snang gi de na don ni ci yang med do ||*

For the fully developed Vijñānavāda system as found in the CWSL, see JIANG 2005: 252f and, as regards my own view, S 2005 (read "if" instead of "unless" on p. 55,12 and 如何 on p. 63,25).

[1723] Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3 (read *rnam par rig pa ⟨tsam⟩ nyid* with YBh_t P 'i 78b4) and 29.8.

[1724] Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3, 28.3 (p. 107,18) and 37.2 (p. 118,8f).

[1725] S 1973: 167–172; S 1976a: 240–244.

[1726] M1: 142a, referring to YOKOYAMA 1979: 5-6.

237f; see also 271 n. 10), and subjected to a more detailed criticism by Johannes BRONKHORST (2000: 77–93). Both authors are extremely sceptical about the role of meditative experience in the history of Buddhism and seem to consider a decisive influence of meditative experience on the formation of philosophical theories, or theoretical positions, to be *a priori* improbable. Recently, Eli FRANCO (2009) has argued in a similar vein. Franco (2009: 109) does not discuss the Saṁdh passage in detail but rejects its importance for the question of the origin of Buddhist 'idealism' with the argument that this text is too late to offer a reliable account, since according to my own above-mentioned article[1727] an 'idealist' position can already be found much earlier in pre-Yogācāra (or at least pre-Vijñānavāda) Mahāyāna sūtras like the *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṁmukhâvasthita-samādhi-sūtra.* But as long as we are concerned with the introduction of an 'idealist' view into the Yogācāra school proper, it is precisely this Saṁdh passage from which we have to start (cf. Pt. IV § 565).

341. One of the arguments of Bronkhorst (2000: 82,28-33), too, is that the Saṁdh

> is admittedly not the text that introduces idealistic notions for the first time. If it has borrowed these notions from other texts, it may have borrowed the link with meditational experiences along with them without the latter being the reason why those notions were borrowed.

It is not clear from this sentence which texts, precisely, Bronkhorst has in mind: the above-mentioned pre-Yogācāra Mahāyāna sūtras or other, unpreserved sources actually using the term '*vijñaptimātra*', but from another remark of his (2000: 92,29-33) it follows that he thinks of the former alternative. In fact, one might argue that in the controversial sentence in Saṁdh VIII.7 the Buddha seems to expressly trace the concept of *vijñaptimātra* back to a previous utterance of his, provided that the *verbum dicendi* in the Tibetan translation, viz., *ngas bshad do* ("I have explained"), does indeed represent a perfect form in the original Sanskrit. This problem (to which I shall come back in § 351.1) was in fact one of the reasons why I became interested in the reconstruction of the original Sanskrit wording of the sentence and in the question of whether the statement really forces us to assume an earlier, untransmitted passage in which the term '*vijñaptimātra*' had already been used. On the basis of the reconstruction arrived at in my former article (S 1984) I concluded that the *idea* expressed in Saṁdh VIII.7-8, viz., that the objects perceived are nothing but mind, as well as the raw materials, so to speak, for the coining of the term '*vijñaptimātra*' can, basically, be derived from sources predating or at least contemporary with the Saṁdh. But there is no reason to doubt that it was precisely in this passage that '*vijñaptimātra*' was newly created as a *term* with an 'idealist' connotation and that a generalized 'idealist' view came to be introduced into what we are used to calling the Yogācāra school proper. Matsumoto (M: 160b) seems to agree with me in that the reference to a former dictum of the Buddha in our passage does not involve the occurrence of the term '*vijñaptimātra*' in an older source. According to him (M1: 163b–164a), the reference is in fact to the *cittamātra* passage in the sixth chapter of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* ($DBhS_R$ 6E).[1728] But this does not explain the employment of '*vijñapti*' instead of '*citta*'.

342. In my discussion of the controversial sentence at Saṁdh VIII.7, I shall start (ch. 2) with presenting the textual material and the reconstructions of the passage, adding some clarifications concerning my own proposal. In ch. 3, I shall reply to Matsumoto's objections

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[1727] S 1973: 175f; S 1976a: 246f.

[1728] As pointed out in M1: 224a–b (additional remark), this possibility had already been taken into consideration by J. Takasaki (1982: 14–15 and 37 n. 30).

against the internal acceptability of my reconstruction and the interpretation it involves. Chs. 4–7 are dedicated to a re-examination of the testimonia. Thereafter, I shall discuss Matsumoto's reconstruction of the passage under aspects of both syntax and meaning (ch. 8), and finally (ch. 9) offer an updated version of my own understanding of the passage. The question of the original context of and the motive(s) for the introduction of an 'idealist' view into the Yogācāra tradition as well as the question of its possible antecedents and, briefly, also the wider issue of the relation between spiritual practice and philosophical theories in Buddhism will, in response to the objections of Sharf, Bronkhorst and Franco, be reconsidered separately in Pt. IV of the present study.

2. The Textual Material and the Reconconstructions Proposed

343. The Saṁdh passage under discussion is embedded in a context introduced by Maitreya's question (VIII.7, 1st part) whether the images or replicas (*gzugs brnyan*, **prati-bimba*) which are the object (*spyod yul*, **gocara*) of meditative concentration (*ting nge 'dzin*, **samādhi*) are different /separate[1729] (*tha dad pa*, **bhinna*) from the contemplating mind (*sems*, **citta*) or not. The Buddha answers that they are not different/separate. To the question why this is so he replies: "Because these images are **vijñaptimātra*." This sentence, called ⓨ in Matsumoto's analysis, is followed by the controversial sentence, which Matsumoto has labelled ⓧ. In the subsequent section of the text (VIII.7, 2nd part), Maitreya raises the question of how a self-referential activity, which appears to be implied if the image perceived is not different/separate from mind, would be possible.[1730] In his answer, the Buddha points out that no such activity takes place, and in order to illustrate the apparent difference /separation of the image from mind he refers to the case of an image reflected in a mirror which is only apparently separate from the thing reflected.[1731] In the next section of the text (VIII.8), the Buddha confirms that what had been said of the images perceived in meditative concentration holds good for the objects of ordinary perception[1732] as well: they too are *vi-*

[1729] Skt. *bheda*/*bhinna* may mean both qualitative or numerical difference and spatial separation.

[1730] See fn. 2072.

[1731] Cf. S 2007a: 238 (= 73 rl) n. 96.

[1732] In my translation (see fn. 1733), I have rendered *rang bzhin du gnas pa* (**prakṛtistha*?; LAMOTTE suggests **svabhāvāvasthita*) as an attribute of the image = object, in accordance with Tib., but as Matsumoto (M1: 176–178 n. 55) points out, in Hsüan-tsang's translation (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 698b9-11: 若諸有情 自性而住緣色等心所行影像, 彼與此心 亦無異耶。) the situation is different (whereas in Bodhiruci's version the expression is not represented at all). Matsumoto, basing himself on the use of *prakṛtistha* qualifying persons as being in the 'natural' state as contrasted with meditative concentration (AKBh 365,21 and AKVy 574,8f: M2: 88f), takes the Saṁdh passage to mean "objects of ordinary people [who are not in the state of meditation]" (M2: 178,3). This makes perfect sense, but is hardly reconcilable with the Tibetan text. Actually, the Chinese text is ambiguous, also allowing for the construal of 自性而住 (**prakṛtistha*) with 心 (*citta*), which is in fact how Wŏn-ch'ŭk (SaṁdhṬ$_C$ 306c1f) seems to take it: "As for the image-objects like visibles, etc., that are the objective support of the mind of sentient beings that is not [produced] from [meditative] exertion but in its natural state, ..." (若諸有情 不由功用 自性住心所緣色等諸影像境; cf. SaṁdhṬ$_T$ P thi 123a6: *sems* ⟨*can*⟩ *rnams ni rtsol ba med par rang bzhin du gnas pa'i sems kyis* ...). On the other hand, in the BoBhVin (YBh$_t$ P 'i 4b2f; YBh$_C$ 697b8-11; KRAMER 2005: 75f and 114f: # 9.1.1.4[1-2]) we have the distinction of "natural phenomena" (**prakṛtinimitta*) and "image-phenomena" (*pratibimbanimitta*, i.e., images deliberately produced in meditative concentration); cf. also MSA(Bh) XIX.50: *purataḥ sthāpitaṁ*

jñaptimātra.[1733] The text then goes on (VIII.9) to apply the preceding analysis of the objects of both meditative and ordinary experience to spiritual practice, redesigning the path leading to insight into Truth in terms of *vijñaptimātratā.*[1734]

344. I now present the transmitted versions of the crucial sentences ⓨ and ⓧ:[1735]

Tib$_{Sa}$: ⓨ *gzugs brnyan de rnam par rig pa tsam du zad pa'i phyir te*[1736] | ⓧ *byams pa rnam par shes pa ni*[1737] *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin no zhes ngas bshad do* || (cf. M1: 143 [3])

TH: ⓨ *rnam par rig pa tsam gyi phyir te* | *gzugs brnyan de la* ⓧ *dmyigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam du rab du bsgoms pa ste* | *byams pa ngas rnam par rig pa zhes bshado* || (M1: 152a [12])

Bo: ⓨ 以唯是心觀彼境像。ⓧ 何以故。我說但是心意識觀得名故。(M1: 142b–143a [1])

Hs$_{Sa}$: ⓨ 由彼影像唯是識故。ⓧ 善男子。我說識所緣唯識所現故。(M1: 143a [2])

345. For ⓧ, we have, moreover, a quotation in MSg II.7.1. Here, ⓨ is missing,[1738] and ⓧ follows immediately upon the question *ci'i phyir zhe na* (Ch. 何以故), which corresponds to

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nimittaṁ (like the rotting corpses visualized by a yogi in the *aśubhabhāvanā*: SAVBh P tsi 242b8f) as against *yat svayaṁ sthitam* = *yat prakṛtyâlambanībhūtam*, i.e., soil, pillars, pots, etc. (*sa dang ka ba dang bum pa la sogs pa*: SAṬ P bi 180a7; *bum pa dang snam bu la sogs pa rang gi ngang gis sems la snang ba*: SAVBh P tsi 243a2).

[1733] Saṁdh VIII.8 (Saṁdh$_t$ P ngu 29b5-7; S na 38b6–39a1; D ca 27a7–b2):

[Maitreya asked:] Exalted One, should we [indeed] say that even the normal (*rang bzhin du gnas pa*, **prakṛtistha*?) images — [those that are the object] of the [ordinary states of] mind of sentient beings [and] appear as [external things like] visibles (*rūpa*), etc. — are not different from the mind? [The Buddha] answered: We must [indeed] say that [these too] are *not* different. Only foolish persons with wrong ideas erroneously conceive of them [as external things] because they do not correctly understand this [fact] that these [ordinary] images [too] are nothing but representation.

bCom ldan 'das sems can rnams kyi gzugs la sogs par snang ba sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa[1] *gang lags pa de yang sems de dang tha dad pa ma lags zhes* (DS : *shes* P) *bgyi'am* | *bka' stsal pa* | *Byams pa tha dad pa ni* (S : om. DP) *ma yin zhes bya ste* | *byis pa phyin ci log gi blo can rnams ni* (DP : *kyis* S) *gzugs brnyan de dag la rnam par rig pa tsam de nyid* (DP : om. S) *yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du* (S : om. DP) *mi shes pas phyin ci log tu sems so* ||

[1] S: *sems kyi gzugs brnyan rang bzhin du gnas pa gzugs la sogs pa*

[1734] Cf. S 2007a: 238f (= 73–72 rl).

[1735] **Tib$_{Sa}$** = canonical Tibetan version of Saṁdh: Kj P no. 774, vol. ngu: 29a8–b1; D no. 106, vol. ca: 27a4; S vol. 63 (na): 38b1f; cf. also YBh$_t$ P 'i 74b7f (D zi 68a3).

TH = Tun-huang version: HAKAMAYA 1987a: 336,27-29 = 2008: 658,23-26 (fol. 31b4f).

Bo = Bodhiruci: T 16.675: 674c23f.

Hs$_{Sa}$ = Hsüan-tsang's translation of Saṁdh: T 16.676: 698b1f, identical with YBh$_C$ 724a5f.

[1736] S omits *te*, but Phug-brag has it (information courtesy of Dr. Kōjirō Katō).

[1737] For the rejection of the conjecture *pa'i* (Lamotte, Nozawa) for *pa ni*, see S 1969: 110 n. w, and S 1984: 435f. The reading *pa ni* is confirmed by P, S and D (see fn. 1735) and is accepted also by Matsumoto (M1: 145a; cf. also 215a n. 9).

[1738] The question whether the wording of the passage in MSg II.7 represents a shorter version of the sūtra text or rather (as I consider more probable) an abbreviated quotation is, as far as I can see, not of primary importance for the present investigation.

the *ci'i phyir tha dad pa ma yin zhe na* that in Saṁdh VIII.7 precedes ⓨ. MSg II.7 (and hence ⓧ as it is quoted there) is preserved in five versions:[1739]

Tib$_{MSg}$: ⓧ *rnam par shes pa ni*[1740] *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can yin no zhes ngas bshad do* || (M1: 159b [19])

Bu: 彼念唯識所明識我說。(M1: 159a [16])

Pa: ⓧ 我說唯有識。此色相境界識所顯現。(M1: 159a [17])

Dh: ⓧ 定心所緣 唯識所顯。我說為識。(but in the Bhāṣya [285b29–c1] quoted as: 此攀緣 唯識所顯故 我說唯識。) (M1: 166a [21] and 167a [23])

Hs$_{MSg}$: ⓨ 由彼影像唯是識故。ⓧ 我說識所緣唯識所現故。(M1: 159a [18])

346. On the basis of these materials (to be discussed in detail in ch. 5) and the commentarial documents to be discussed in ch. 6, the original of ⓨ can be reconstructed as follows:

ⓨ **vijñaptimātratvāt tasya pratibimbasya* |

"because this image is representation only".

While this reconstruction remained uncontroversial, there is disagreement with regard to the original form of ⓧ,[1741] for which I had proposed the following reconstruction (underwelled part dubious):

S : ⓧ **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ vijñānam (iti mayā deśitaṁ / ity ahaṁ vadāmi)* | (MSg version)

"It has been taught by me (/I teach) that mind (i.e., cognitive awareness, *vijñāna*) is distinctively/essentially characterized by a bare cognition of (/a mere representation as) its objective support" (for details, see ch. 3, especially §§ 352 and 357.5).

Against this, Matsumoto advocates, mainly on the basis of **TH**:

M : ⓧ **ālambanaṁ hi vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ Maitreya vijñānam iti mayoktam* | (Saṁdh version)

"… because (*hi*) the objective support, produced by representation only, has, O Maitreya, been taught by me to be mind" (for details see ch. 8).

This comes close to Aramaki's original suggestion:

A : ⓧ *(*tad*) *ālambanaṁ hi vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ vijñānam ity ahaṁ vadāmi* | (MSg version)

Similarly, Buescher (B: 185,1f), who also follows **TH** to the extent of leaving the problem of punctuation between ⓨand ⓧ up in the air, proposes:

B : ⓨ+ⓧ **vijñaptimātratvāt tasya pratibimbasyālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ Maitreya mayā vijñānam ity uktam*[1742] | (Saṁdh version; transl. see § 447).

[1739] **Tib$_{MSg}$** = canonical version in MSg$_t$ P li 15b1f (D ri 14a3f).

Bu = Buddhaśānta: T 31.1592: 101a22f.

Pa = Paramārtha: T31.1593: 118b27f.

Dh = Dharmagupta:[1739] T 31.1596: 285b22f.

Hs$_{MSg}$ = Hsüan-tsang: T 31.1594: 138b7f; includes ⓨ, surely inserted by the translator himself due to his familiarity with Saṁdh VIII.7. Cf. M1: 161a–b and 217 n. 31.

[1740] See fn. 1737.

[1741] For earlier proposals assuming **vijñānālambanaṁ*… on the basis of Hs see the references in fn. 1716.

347. In my reconstruction (S), I disregarded the vocative **Maitreya*, which is missing in the MSg version of ⓧ, as well as *hi*, the presence of which is suggested by some versions (especially **Bo** and **Hs**). The main reason was an aporia: My evaluation of the testimonia resulted in accepting the existence of two different readings, viz., one starting with a compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ*, i.e., S (**Tib**$_{Sa}$ **Tib**$_{MSg}$ **U**$_t$ **Bych**), and another one starting with **ālambanaṁ* as a separate word, as in A and M (**Pa Dh Jñg**).[1743] As long as the difference between these two readings can be limited to the presence or absence of the anusvāra, the origination of one reading from the other can easily be explained by the (unintentional or intentional) addition or omission of this anusvāra. The presence of the vocative and *hi*, however, seemed to me to involve a complication for which I had no solution. On the one hand, I wanted to reconstruct ⓧ in terms of S in such a way that its transformation into a text agreeing with A/M, i.e., a text starting with *ālambanaṁ* instead of *ālambana-*, could easily be explained. On the other hand, inserting *hi* and the vocative after *°prabhāvitaṁ* (the place where one would expect them in S) would have led to a text-form of S the transformation of which into A/M would seem to raise considerable difficulties, because in A/M *hi* and probably also the vocative, normally placed after the first word or linguistic unit of the sentence, should follow immediately after *ālambanaṁ*.[1744] However, my problem would at least partly vanish if we accept Matsumoto's observation (M1: 162b–163a) that in the MSg quotation of ⓧ not only the vocative but also *hi* seems to have been lacking, being (or having become) superfluous because of the absence (or omission) of ⓨ in this quotation, so that ⓧ comes to follow immediately upon the preceding **tat kasya hetoḥ*.[1745] Now — provided that we disregard, for the time being, **TH** (which was not yet available to me when writing S 1984) and the anyway dubious case of **Jñg** (see ch. 6.3) — the two testimonia I accepted to clearly support A/M were, both of them, MSg versions. They are thus based on an original that did not contain the vocative or, probably, *hi*, so that a transformation of S (without *hi* and vocative) into A/M could easily happen through the mere intrusion or addition of an anusvāra at the end of the word *ālambana*.

348.0. S as reproduced in § 346 (perhaps with **uktam* rather than **deśitam*) would then be the reconstruction of the MSg version of ⓧ. But there is one more problem, viz., the question whether the quotation of ⓧ in the MSg started with an additional anaphoric demonstrative pronoun, as suggested in A on the basis of **Bu**, **Pa** and **Dh**. In S 1984 (437f # 6.2), I wondered if the demonstrative pronoun in **Pa** and **Dh** might not have crept in under the influence of the *Bhāṣya*, and if the 彼 in **Bu** might not represent the *tat* of the preceding

[1742] According to Buescher (B: 179 n. 3), it "may be possible that, like the *Revatasūtra* as quoted in ŚrBh 198ff., ... Saṁdh read *pratirūpa-*, not *pratibimba-* (both terms are translated by Tib. *gzugs brnyan*)." This is, however, quite improbable in view of the fact that Hsüan-tsang's rendering of *pratirūpa*(*ka*) in the *Revatasūtra* quotation (viz., 相似: YBh$_C$ 428b6) is different from his rendering corresponding to *gzugs brnyan* in the present passage (viz., 影像, which in his idiom represents *pratibimba*, cf., e.g., YBh$_C$ 427a25f = ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 193,5f).

[1743] For **U**$_t$, **Jñg** and **Bych** see chs. 6.1.1., 6.3 and 6.4, respectively.

[1744] The respective remark in S 1984 (437 # 6.1) has indeed been misunderstood by Matsumoto (M1: 155b–156a), as he himself suspects (M1: 156a3-4).

[1745] It should, however, be noted that *hi* is not infrequently found even in sentences answering directly to *tat kasya hetoḥ*; cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 93,10f, etc.; 225,2f; 228,13; 229,5; 229,15; 229,22f; 230,9; Śikṣ 106,2f; 200,4f.

tat kasya hetoḥ. Against this, Matsumoto (M1: 161b–162b) produces two arguments in support of a demonstrative pronoun at the beginning of the MSg version of ⓧ:

348.1. First, Matsumoto (M1: 162a5-7) argues that **Bu** tends to follow the word order of the Sanskrit original (so that if 彼 were to render the *tat* of *tat kasya hetoḥ* it should precede 何以故). I am not quite sure whether we can trust Buddhaśānta to follow the Sanskrit word order in every detail, but anyway just a few lines earlier (MSg$_{\text{Bu}}$ 101a16) he employs the usual 何以故 (without 彼), so that my doubt regarding Bu's 彼 as supporting an initial *tad* in the MSg version of ⓧ appears unjustified.

348.2.1. In his second argument (M1: 162a7–b8), Matsumoto points out that in the MSg *tad* is, in view of the omission of ⓨ, required for the coherence of the argument: Without an anaphoric pronoun, the reader would not easily understand the word *ālambana* to refer to the object of meditative concentration mentioned before. This argument works under the presupposition that ⓧ is really intended to be a statement on the object(s) of meditative concentration only, and not a general statement. As against this, the author of the *Upanibandhana* (see ch. 6.1) obviously understands ⓧ as a general statement valid for any *vijñāna*, and thus takes it to explain the special case of the object of meditative concentration by embedding it in a general theory on the status of the objects of mind. This latter understanding is, in my opinion, basically in line with the (virtual) function of ⓧ in the Saṁdh itself (see § 460.1). But the *Bhāṣya* (see ch. 6.2) is quite explicit in interpreting ⓧ as a statement confined to the specific case of meditative concentration.

348.2.2. Now, as far as the function of the quotation in the MSg is concerned, there seems to be good reason for accepting the interpretation of the *Bhāṣya*, for the MSg quotes only Saṁdh VIII.7, but not the subsequent paragraph VIII.8, in which the sūtra explicitly generalizes the principle of *vijñaptimātratā*. In the MSg (II.7.2), this generalization is only indicated as an *inference* which the bodhisattva himself should make on the basis of his understanding of the images experienced in meditative concentration. Thus, in the context of the Saṁdh quotation in the MSg, ⓧ may not have been understood as an anticipation of *vijñaptimātratā* as a general principle. From this point of view, the combination of ⓨ + ⓧ may have been felt somewhat redundant, so that ⓨ was omitted. In this case, it makes sense to assume that the anaphoric pronoun at the beginning of the earlier MSg versions of ⓧ is authentic. Its absence in **Tib**$_{\text{MSg}}$ as well as in **Hs**$_{\text{MSg}}$ would then have to be explained as an omission. It is possible that this omission is due to a manuscript tradition in which *tad* was missing (cf. M1: 161b16f). But it is also possible (and perhaps even more likely) that the Tibetan team of translators deliberately neglected the *tad* under the influence of either the canonical version of the Saṁdh (which they obviously used when translating the quotation)[1746] or under the influence of the MSgU (which was translated by exactly the same team, most probably together with the *mūla*-text). The same holds good for Hsüan-tsang, and in his case it is certain that he more or less copied his own translation of the Saṁdh (cf. M1: 161b12f), as is evident from the fact that he even inserted ⓨ.[1747]

348.2.3. If this is correct, my reconstruction of the MSg version of ⓧ should read thus:

[S]$_{\text{MSg}}$: **tadālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ vijñānam* (<u>iti</u>) <u>mayoktam</u> |

[1746] See fn. 1865.

[1747] See § 345 with fn. 1739.

The first part of the compound, viz. *tadālambana-*, could without difficulty be taken as a karmadhāraya in the sense of "that (= the aforementioned) object", just as the uncompounded *tad ālambanaṁ* in [A] / [M].

349.0. However, in reconstructing the *Saṁdh* version of ⓧ, it would seem to be much more difficult if not impossible to find a solution on the basis of which a corruption of [S] into [M] (or the other way round) could easily be explained, because here we have to add, in any case, the vocative, and, most probably, also *hi*.

349.1. As for the latter, Matsumoto (M1: 154b) argues that it is supported by **Hs**$_{\mathbf{Sa}}$ 故 and **Bo** 何以故 … 故 as well as **Tib**$_{\mathbf{Sa}}$ *ni*. Moreover, he points out that without *hi*, the logical relation of ⓧ to ⓨ would remain obscure. The latter argument makes sense, and the Chinese versions, too, strongly support a causal particle. As for the conclusiveness of *ni* as an indicator of *hi*, I have some doubt. Apart from the fact that *ni* is also present in **Tib**$_{\mathbf{MSg}}$, the original of which according to Matsumoto himself did not contain *hi*, a provisional check of a number of occurrences of *ni* in the Tibetan translation of the *Śikṣāsamuccaya* has yielded the result that only around half of them correspond to a *hi* in the original Sanskrit. Actually the function of the two particles is entirely different: whereas *hi* has the function of indicating that a *statement* expresses an *obvious or at least uncontroversial fact* and hence often characterizes a statement as a reason, Tib. *ni* marks a *word* or part of a sentence as being *thematic*, similar to the Japanese は. On the other hand, the additive Tibetan particle *ste*, though not functionally coinciding with *hi* either, frequently serves to add an explanation and may then indicate the presence of *hi* in the following sentence[1748] (cf. also M1: 154b18-21). Thus, in view of the fact that ⓨ ends in *ste*, **Tib**$_{\mathbf{Sa}}$ is at any rate compatible with the assumption of *hi* in ⓧ. **TH** is more difficult to judge since it contains two *(s)te* (see also ch. 5.2). Nevertheless, I too consider it highly probable that the original of the Saṁdh version of ⓧ contained *hi*.

349.2. But in none of the versions there is any indication whatsoever concerning the *position* of *hi* in the sentence. Even if *ni* were, somehow, induced by *hi*, it does not let us know the position of the latter. It is well known that both *hi* and the vocative tend to occupy the second position in a sentence.[1749] In the case of their combination the (admittedly insufficient) material I have collected from Buddhist prose texts in Sanskrit and Pāli proves that *hi* always precedes the vocative, in the great majority of cases directly,[1750] and only occasionally separated from it by, e.g., an unemphasized pronoun[1751] or by a word that is so closely connected with the first word of the sentence as to almost form a conceptual unit with

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[1748] Cf., e.g., TrBh *5,4/**5,6; *7,20/**7,27; *12,6/**12,8; *15,16/**15,25; *18,13/**18,16.

[1749] This means that they normally follow upon the first word or syntactical unit of the sentence. Occasionally, the syntactical unit consists of more than one word, e.g., of a sequence of juxtaposed parallel expressions (cf. Aṣṭ 97,20f: *asaktā abaddhā amuktā asamatikrāntā hi Subhūte sarvajñatā*; 225,11f: *sarvadharmaviviktavihāreṇa sarvadharmānupalambhavihāreṇa hi Kauśika Subhūtiḥ sthaviro viharati*), or even of a sentence-like nominal phrase regarded, for some reason, as a close unit (cf. MN III 267,23f ≈ SN IV 37,28f: *nandīsamudayā dukkhasamudayo Puṇṇā (/Migajālā) ˉti vadāmi*).

[1750] Cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 29,23: *sarvajñajñānasya hi Kauśika tena kulaputreṇa … pūjā kṛtā bhaviṣyati*; 233,13f: *prajñāpāramitāyāṁ hi Subhūte carato bodhisattvasya … dānapāramitā paripūriṁ gacchati* (cf. also 233,15f); Śikṣ 5,20–6,1: *bodhicittaṁ hi kulaputra bījabhūtaṁ sarvabuddhadharmāṇāṁ*; 19,17f: *evaṁ hi gṛhapate gṛhiṇā bodhisatvena na kasmiṁścid vastuni mamatvaṁ parigraho vā kartavyaḥ*.

[1751] Cf. Śikṣ 14,19f: *tat kasya hetoḥ | paramo hy <u>ayaṁ</u> Śāriputra lābho yad uta gṛhāvāsān niṣkramaṇam*; Aṣṭ 8,29, 10,15, etc.: *na hy etad* + voc., *no hīdaṁ* + voc.

it.[1752] In the case of [S], a position of *hi* + vocative after the first word of the sentence would seem most natural (at least as long as *iti*, on which see § 351.2, is not taken into account):

[S] Sa: **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ hi Maitreya vijñānam (iti) mayoktam* |

350. That the syntactical structure of the nuclear part of this sentence (PredN *hi* Voc Subj)[1753] would be syntactically unobjectionable, is proved by a syntactically parallel sentence quoted by Matsumoto (M1: 209b: [54]) from the *Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*:

[A1] *prajñāpāramitānirjātā hy Ānanda (buddhānāṁ bhagavatāṁ) bodhiḥ*. (Aṣṭ 229,5)[1754]

In both [A1] and [S], the PredN obviously supplies the new or crucial information ("comment") of the statement and is, in this sense, emphasized, whereas the Subj is taken up from the preceding context ("theme"),[1755] '*vijñāna*' in [S] being equivalent to '*citta*' in the introductory sentence of Saṁdh VIII.7.

351.0. Still, there is a couple of problems connected with the fact that the nuclear phrase is governed by a *verbum dicendi*:

351.1. The precise form of the *verbum dicendi* itself remains hypothetical. Aramaki had proposed *ahaṁ vadāmi*. Actually, as far as I can see *ngas bshad do*[1756] more often than not

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[1752] Aṣṭ 232,7f: *yo hi kaścit Subhūte bodhisattvo ... pratītyasamutpādaṁ vyavalokayati ...*; Śikṣ 95,12f: *yo hi kaścin Mañjuśrīs tathāgatabhāṣite* (ed. and ms. °*ta*°) *dharme kasmiṁścic chobhanasaṁjñāṁ karoti kvacid aśobhanasaṁjñāṁ, sa saddharmaṁ pratikṣipati*; 255,6-8: *pūrvā hi koṭir mahārāja na prajñāyate aiśvaryādhipatyānām anubhūyamānānāṁ*. Cf. also Aṣṭ 233,10f: *prajñāpāramitāvihāreṇa hi viharato 'sya Subhūte bodhisattvasya ... sadevamānuṣāsuro loko 'vatāraṁ na labhate grahaṇāya*. In the latter passage, what causes the separation is probably the unemphasized anaphoric *asya* which has to precede the vocative but cannot precede *viharato*, as would seem to be confirmed when one contrasts the beginning of this sentence with the similar one at Aṣṭ 233,13f (see fn. 1750); Aṣṭ 13,20f: *yasmin hi samaye Bhagavan bodhisattvo imān dharmān ... vyupaparīkṣate ...* (*samaye* unemphasized and closely associated with the relative pronoun).

[1753] PredN = predicate noun, Voc = vocative, Subj = grammatical subject.

[1754] As for a statement which is parallel to [S] not only in its syntactical structure (apart from the fact that the vocative [cf. fn. 1767] and the 'definiens-marker' °*prabhāvita* are missing) but also insofar as it is a definition of *citta* = *vijñāna*, see § 355.2.2 [A7]. A parallel statement (without vocative) with a PredN ending in °*prabhāvita* is Vajr 33,1f (see fn. 1913). It must suffice here to document, by way of close parallels, that the syntactic pattern of [S] is unobjectionable. Actually, the pattern "PredN (= comment) [– particle – Voc] – Subj (= theme)" is so frequent in the prose style of Mahāyānasūtras like Aṣṭ (cf., e.g., in chapter 8: 93,2; 93,11-13 [*pūrvāntāsvabhāvaṁ hi Subhūte rūpam ...* | *aparāntāsvabhāvaṁ ...* | *pratyutpannāsvabhāvaṁ ...*]; 94,4; 95,30; 95,31; 96,1; 96,9f; 97,20 [see fn. 1749]; 97,30; 98,2f) that I am inclined to regard it as the normal sequence as long as the emphasis is solely on the PredN and the Subj a substantive. Anteposition of the Subj (substantive) would seem to imply a certain emphasis on it, as, e.g., Aṣṭ 230,13 (*sarvadharmā hi Ānanda ajānakā apaśyakāḥ*), where the purport is that the predicates hold good not only for the miraculous appearances the Buddha had produced but for all dharmas. Similarly 96,3: *sarvadharmā api Subhūte prakṛtiviviktāḥ*, i.e., all dharmas are so, not only the *prajñāpāramitā* (96,1). For some other divergent patterns and their conditions, see § 444.2. At any rate, a systematic in-depth study of the word order in nominal sentences and its conditions in Mahāyānasūtras is urgently required. It goes without saying that rules or stylistic habits to be observed in prose may not work in verse texts, and that even in prose stylistic habits may show some variation in different periods, areas or even texts.

[1755] Cf. GREN-EKLUND 1978: 10-11; ICKLER 1973: 113 ("Theme" ↔ "Rheme").

[1756] I have noted a few more occurrences of *ngas bshad (la/de/do)* in the Saṁdh (II.2 [p. 40,4, 9, 14, 19 and 24]; VII.24 [p. 80,8]; X.8 [p. 161,12]), but it is not easy to draw conclusions from them with regard

renders a present verb.[1757] In my own earlier reconstruction, I nevertheless preferred the (equally possible)[1758] perfect passive form *mayā deśitam* or *uktaṁ*[1759] because **Bh$_{Hs}$** (我所說) suggests a passive expression (S 1984: 439 [# 9]). Matsumoto (M1: 154a) accepts this suggestion and votes for *uktam*, which is perfectly possible. But the passage in **Bh$_{Hs}$** (see § 428.2) is not part of a quotation of the *mūla*-text but rephrases the sentence in such a way that the expression 我所說 — which, although the literal meaning would be "what I teach or have taught/mentioned", is the habitual rendering of a passive form — seems to be construed there as an *attribute* of the object of the mind in meditative concentration. Without further evidence, I am afraid we have to leave the matter unresolved. The question is of some importance because the use of a perfect form would definitely have to be taken as a reference to some earlier teaching. The use of the present, on the other hand, would surely not necessarily imply such a reference, though not exclude it either if we take it in an atemporal sense. Anyway, both Matsumoto and myself, albeit in different ways, agree in interpreting ⓧ as somehow referring to an earlier teaching.

351.2. Another problem is whether the original of ⓧ contained *iti* or not. Matsumoto (M1: 154b) opts for its presence, which is an important point for his reconstruction because it would facilitate assigning a predicative function to *vijñānam* by limiting the scope of *iti* to it. But the presence of *zhes* in the Tibetan versions (**Tib** and **TH**) is hardly infallible evidence. As far as I can see we cannot exclude the possibility that *zhes* was added by the Tibetan translators under the influence of the *verbum dicendi*.[1760] What may also be worth noting is that

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to the tense of the original *verbum dicendi*. At VII.24, e.g., the teaching the Buddha refers to is the teaching of the three forms of lack of inherent being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) which is surely innovative (like *vijñaptimātratā*), but here too *ngas bshad* (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 696b4: 我 ... 已顯示!) may refer to the fact that this teaching is regarded as implicitly contained in his earlier teaching of lack of inherent being in the *Prajñāpāramitā* (VII.3).

[1757] Cf., e.g., Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 176a3 *ngas bshad do* = Laṅk 272,6 *deśayāmy aham*. Most of the occurrences of *(ngas) bshad* noted by me correspond to Skt. *(ahaṁ) vadāmi*, e.g., Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 99a6 = Laṅk 88,13 (II.148d); 103b5 = 98,3; 114b5 = 122,7; 120a2 *ma bshad do* = 134,5f *na vadāmi*; KP$_{SH}$ ## 65 and 127 (cf. KP$_{VD}$ 27 fol. 33v3f and 44 fol. 64r2): *zhes ngas bshad do* = *aham ... iti vadāmi*; Śikṣ$_t$ P ki 88b1 (D khi 75b3): *zhes bshad do* = Śikṣ 132,1 *iti vadāmi*, but 90,16 *iti vadāmi* = Śikṣ$_t$ P ki 66b5 (D 55b6) *zhes nga smra 'o*, and Laṅk 296,12 (X.239d) *cittaṁ buddhaṁ vadāmy aham* = Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 183a8 *sems ni sangs rgyas shes nga 'chad*; similarly 271,14 (X.55) = 175b8.

[1758] Cf., e.g., Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 135b2f: *ngas ... X zhes ma bshad do* = Laṅk 170,8-10 *na ca ... uktaṁ mayā X iti*; 123b5 ... *de la dgongs nas ngas de skad ces bshad do* = 143,6 *idaṁ ... saṁdhāyêdam uktaṁ mayā*; 171a3: *ma bshad do* = 254,5-7: *na ... deśitaṁ*. Also possible are *bhāṣita* and *kathita*: cf. Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 93a6 *zhes ngas bshad do* = Laṅk 75,12f *iti bhāṣitaṁ mayā*; 124a6 *ngas bshad do* = 144,12 *kathitaṁ mayā*. On the other hand, at Saṁdh VII.15 (74,18) Skt. *na ... uktā mayā* (quoted in TUCCI 1971: 22,8) is rendered as *ngas ma bstan no*, but S (vol. 63 [na]) 28a4f has *ngas ma bshad do*.

[1759] Thus in S 1987 II: 382 (n. 625).

[1760] A closely parallel case would be Aṣṭ 176,25f *avikalpo hy āyuṣman Śāriputra svapnaś ca divasaś cokto Bhagavatā*, where Aṣṭ$_t$ (P mi 210b6f; S ka 277b1f) reads *tshe dang ldan pa Śā ri'i bu rmi lam dang nying par ni rnam par mi rtog pa'o zhes bCom ldan 'das kyis gsungs te*. Cf. also AKBh 375,13: *śaikṣasya câpramāde*[1] *'pramāda*[2]*karaṇīyaṁ vadāmi* = AKBh$_t$ P ngu 38a4 (D khu 33b1): *slob pa la bag yod pa la bag yod par bya'o zhes nga* (D: *dang*) *smra'o*. Other examples are from verse: Laṅk 153,9 (III.26d) *etāṁ mātrāṁ vadāmy aham* = Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 128a6: *de ni tsam zhes ngas bshad do*; Laṅk 296,12 = Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 183a8 (see fn. 1757).

[1] Thus ms., AKVy 588 n. 2, AKBh$_t$ and AKBh$_{Pa}$ 281b6f; ed.: *câpramādakaraṇīye*.

*Asvabhāva's quote of the *mūla*-text with interspersed glosses has no *zhes* but only a terminative particle, which mostly (though, it is true, not always)[1761] renders constructions with a *verbum dicendi* without *iti*.[1762] As regards [S]$_{Sa}$, it would construe perfectly well without *iti*, *vijñānam* being either the grammatical subject of *uktam* or the object of *vadāmi*, and *ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* the PredN. If the original did contain *iti*, the acceptability of the reconstruction [S]$_{Sa}$ would depend on whether it is legitimate to insert *hi* and especially the vocative into the phrase governed by *iti*. Actually, to judge from a couple of examples[1763] such a position of the vocative (and hence most probably also of *hi*) is possible. Alternatively, one might consider a reconstruction with *iti* preceding *hi* and the vocative[1764] as suggested in § 376.2 (TH-rec3), or in a form like *...°*prabhāvitaṁ vijñānam iti* (*hi*) *Maitreya mayôktam*, less close to **TH** but likewise compatible with both [S] and [M] / [B].

351.3. Yet another question is the position of the pronoun of the first person singular.[1765] With *iti*, one would expect it between *iti* and *uktam* (or *vadāmi*) or even after the verb.[1766]

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[2] Thus ms. and AKVy 588 n. 2; read °*māda(ṁ)* (with SAKURABE & ODANI 1999: 377 n. 4)? SN IV 125,13f has *tes'* (= *sekhānaṁ*) *˜āham ... appamādena karaṇīyan˜ti vadāmi*; SĀ$_{C}$ 53c18f: 我為其說不放逸行.

[1761] Cf., e.g., Laṅk 172,14 *tam ahaṁ siddhānta iti vadāmi* = Laṅk$_{t}$. P ngu 136b3f *de ni ngas grub pa'i mthar bshad de*; 252,13f *māṁsaṁ sarvam abhakṣyaṁ iti vadāmi* = 170b3 *sha thams cad mi bza' bar bshad do*; 255,6f *akalpyaṁ ... māṁsabhojanam iti vadāmi* = 171a8 *sha'i zas ni mi rung bar bshad do*; Śikṣ 164,15 *sarvās tā anāpattaya iti vadāmi* = Śikṣ$_{t}$ P ki 108a5 (D khi 92a3) *thams cad ni ltung ba ma yin par bshad do*; BoBh$_{D}$ 190,20f: *sarvadharmā anātmāna iti ... prajānāti* = YBh$_{t}$. P zhi 168a8f (D wi 148a3): *chos thams cad bdag med par ... rab tu shes so*.

[1762] Cf., e.g., AKBh 375,13f: *arhato 'py aham Ānanda lābhasatkāram antarāyakaraṁ vadāmi* = AKBh$_{t}$. P ngu 38a5 (D khu 33b1): *Kun dga' bo dgra bcom pa la yang rnyed pa dang bkur stis bar chad byed pa yin par nga smra'o*; Śikṣ 97,1: *nâhaṁ teṣāṁ paryantakṛtaṁ nirayavāsaṁ* (ed.: °*yaṁ saṁ*°) *vadāmi* = Śikṣ$_{t}$ P ki 69b7 (D khi 58b5): *de dag ni sems can dmyal ba na gnas pa* (P : *pa'i* D) *mthar phyin par nga mi smra'o*.

[1763] Unambiguous is Aṣṭ 95,5: *rūpam āyuṣman Śāriputra śūnyam iti saṅgaḥ*, for the passage clearly means: "Thinking 'the body (/matter) is empty' is [a form of] attachment." Cf. also Aṣṭ 20,20f: "*samyaksaṁbuddho 'py ārya Subhūte māyopamaḥ svapnopama" iti vadasi?*; Laṅk 255,6f: "*akalpyaṁ Mahāmate pravrajitānāṁ māṁsabhojanam" iti vadāmi*. With *hi* + vocative: Aṣṭ 235,22f: *vijñānaṁ hi Subhūte ... svabhāvena na rajyate na virajyate prakṛtipariśuddhatvād iti prajñāpāramitā anugantavyā*; 228,13f (confirmed by Aṣṭ$_{ms}$ 462,2): *tat kasya hetoḥ? atītānāgatapratyutpannānāṁ hy Ānanda tathāgatānām ... dharmakāyatêti tāṁ dharmatāṁ pramāṇīkṛtya* (Aṣṭ$_{t}$. P mi 270b1: *Kun dga' bo ... de bzhin gshegs pa ... rnams kyi chos kyi sku yin no zhes chos nyid de tshad mar bya'o*); here, the *iti*-clause would seem to specify the "way things are by nature" (*dharmatā*) as the fact that the Tathāgatas of all times have the Dharma (i.e., the *Prajñāpāramitā*?) as their [true] 'body'. From the Pāli canon: MN III 267,23f ≈ SN IV 37,28f: *nandīsamudayā dukkhasamudayo Puṇṇā* (*/Migajālā*) *˜ti vadāmi*; SN II 99,7f: *evam eva khv˜āhaṁ, bhikkhave, kabaḷīkāro āhāro daṭṭhabbo ti vadāmi*. In the latter passage, even the unemphasized pronoun of the first person to be construed with *vadāmi* has been included into the *iti*-clause: "I declare, monks, that it is precisely in this way that material food should be seen" (cf. also BODHI 2000: I 598). In this connection, also hybrid constructions like Aṣṭ 20,24 (*tam* [sc. *dharmam*] *apy ahaṁ māyopamam ... iti vadeyam*), KP # 65 (*tam aham acikitsyam iti vadāmi*) or KP # 127 (*tān ahaṁ daridrapuruṣān iti vadāmi*), where the PredN is in the accusative as if no *iti* were there, are worth noting; as for the expected nominative, cf., e.g., Laṅk 172,14: *tam ahaṁ siddhānta iti vadāmi*.

[1764] Thus, e.g., Aṣṭ 96,29f: "*rūpaṁ sasaṅgam asaṅgam" iti Subhūte na carati*.

[1765] It seems that on the whole (with, as far as I can see, very few exceptions) *ngas bshad* corresponds to *mayoktam*, *ahaṁ vadāmi* or similar expressions containing a pronoun of the first person singular, whereas simple *vadāmi* is normally rendered by simple *bshad* or *smra*.

Without *iti*, the pronoun, being unemphasized, may well have had its place between *hi* and the vocative,[1767] but a later position does not seem to be excluded either.[1768] In deciding on the position of the personal pronoun in the original Sanskrit, we can hardly rely on those translations which strictly follow the rules of Tibetan and Chinese syntax, like **Tib** and **Hs**; but even a version like **Bu** that tends to follow the word order of the Sanskrit more closely may not have gone so far as to produce blatantly impossible sequences like *我識說 for "*vijñāna* has been explained by me" if the original had actually read **mayā vijñānam uktam*, as **TH** may be taken to suggest. But let me leave it at that for the time being and come back to this problem in connection with the discussion of **TH** (ch. 5.2).

3. Answer to Matsumoto's Internal Criticism of my Reconstruction and its Meaning

3.1. Syntactical Analysis and the Meaning of *vijñapti*

352. For [S] I proposed four translations[1769] (though [S4] is not my own but rather the one that seems to be presupposed by **Tib**, especially **Tib**$_{MSg}$), suggesting that the author(s) of Saṁdh VIII availed himself (/themselves) of the traditional Abhidharmic definition and systematic interpretation of *vijñāna* (= *citta*) in order to give his (/their) innovative idea (innovative and even revolutionary, at any rate, for the ambience addressed) a traditional appearance or footing:

[S1] I (have) declare(d) that mind (*vijñāna*, sensory or cognitive awareness) is characterized as (or: consists in)[1770] merely cognizing (lit. making known) [its] object [without stressing any of its peculiarities].

[1766] But cf. SN II 99,7f, quoted in fn. 1763.

[1767] For unemphasized *aham* or *mayā* following *hi*, see Śikṣ 198,18f: *ebhyo hy aham evaṁrūpebhyo bhayabhairavebhyo bhīto 'raṇyāvāsam upagataḥ*; 196,7f: *na hi mayaîkasatvasya kuśalamūlāni saṁjanayitavyāni*. For unemphasized *aham* + vocative, cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 117,29f: *na khalu punar ahaṁ Subhūte ebhir ... sūtrāntair bodhisattvasya ... sarvajñatāṁ paryeṣitavyāṁ vadāmi*; 194,10f: *na câhaṁ Subhūte bodhisattvasya ... evaṁvidhaṁ vivekaṁ vadāmi, yaduta ...*; RGVV 28,3f; AKBh 375,13f (see fn. 1762); many examples in Pāli, e.g., AN I 161,26f: *tatonidānaṁ p' āhaṁ, Vaccha, puññassa āgamaṁ vadāmi*; AN I 194,7: *Abhijjhā ti kho ahaṁ, Sāḷhā, etam atthaṁ vadāmi*. Other unemphasized pronouns seem to follow the same patte . Cf. also THOMMEN 1903: 45-47.

[1768] Cf. Laṅk 143,4 *dharmadvayaṁ Mahāmate saṁdhāya mayaitad uktam* and 143,6 *idaṁ Mahāmate dharmadvayaṁ saṁdhāyêdam uktaṁ mayā*. I do not know whether the different positions of *mayā* in these sentences make any difference in meaning or emphasis, and thus I am unable to decide which position, if any, would be the most adequate in the case of the passage under discussion (ⓧ).

[1769] S 1984: 441.

[1770] I must admit that the inconsistency in my rendering of *-prabhāvita* in these four alternatives is somewhat disconcerting. The expression will be discussed in detail in ch. 3.2 and in Pt. III. As I see it, in the present context it would be adequate to understand *-prabhāvita* as "distinctively and/or essentially characterized by or as", with two possible nuances: 1. distinctively characterized by some property or function which may (at least analytically) be distinguished from the thing itself, or *attributed* to it: "characterized *by* X"; 2. distinctively characterized by some qualification which points to the *very nature* of the thing: "characterized *as* X" or "characterized *by [being]* X", amounting to "constituted by X", "consisting in/of X". The distinction is not always a clear-cut one, the nuances overlap. In [S1] and [S2] both nuances would make sense, depending on whether *vijñāna* is envisaged

[S2] ... mind is characterized by (or: consists of) mere cognition of [its] object [without there being any *real* object].

[S3] ... mind is characterized by [*the fact that* its] object is nothing but cognition.[1771]

[S4] ... mind has an object which is constituted by mere cognition.[1772]

Among these four, [S1] reflects the understanding suggested by the use of the terminology of the traditional Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna*. The other three translations are alternative interpretations in line with the innovative idea Saṁdh VIII wants to introduce. Matsumoto has reservations about all four.

353. [S4] is discarded by Matsumoto as unnatural from a grammatical point of view, the order of the members of the compound to be normally expected in the case of such a bahuvrīhi being **vijñaptimātraprabhāvitālambana-* (M1: 148a). I admit this, but taking it as a bahuvrīhi with inverted members is just what the Tibetan translators (and explicitly so those of the quotation in the MSg) seem to have found the best way to understand the compound so as to obtain the meaning they (more or less correctly, to my mind) thought it must express. I shall come back to this when discussing the testimonia (see § 372).

354. As for [S3], Matsumoto (M1: 147b) refutes it by stating that it would require an abstract suffix, i.e., a reading *°vijñaptimātratā°*.[1773] True, but this is precisely what I myself acknowledged by stating that this interpretation is based on supplying a *virtual* abstract suffix. In other words: according to this interpretation the phrase is *deliberately* understood as if there were an abstract suffix although there is none. Indian exegetes have no problem with this stratagem; cf., e.g., MAVṬ 191,7-9,[1774] referring to an interpretation of *dharmakāya* as *dharmatākāya*, an interpretation achieved, as Haribhadra[1775] explicitly states, by assuming the elision of an abstract-suffix, i.e., its *virtual* presence. As a philologist, one should not, of course, lightly take recourse to such native exegetic stratagems. On the other hand, it is to be

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as having or as being the function or event of cognizing (*vijñapti*). [S3] is an instance of the first nuance ("characterized by"), whereas [S4] is clearly a case of the second nuance ("characterized as", "constituted by").

[1771] Cf. also the translation in POWERS 1992: 75: "I explain that consciousness is distinguished by [the fact that its] object of observation is cognition-only (*rnam par rig pa tsam*, *vijñaptimātra*)."

[1772] Cf. also NOZAWA 1957: 192,2 (rl): 識は唯記識によって顯示される所縁を有す、と吾れは説く。("*Vijñāna* has an objective support that is manifested by *vijñapti* only: thus I teach.").

[1773] I do not understand why Matsumoto (M1: 147b20-22) would find a compound *ālambanavijñaptimātratāprabhāvita*, with abstract suffix, too complicated and unnatural. An incongruity would only result from his presupposition that in the Saṁdh *prabhāvita* must mean "produced by". To be sure, "*vijñāna* is produced by *the fact that* the/its object is nothing but *vijñapti*" would not make sense. But if *prabhāvita* is taken to mean "[distinctively/essentially] characterized by", the abstract is alright. Actually, in Saṁdh III and VII (see Pt. III, ch. 6) we have several statements where the prior member of a compound ending in *°prabhāvita* is an abstract noun, viz., *nairātmya*, excluding the meaning "produced by" (see § 360.2).

[1774] "Others explain that the *dharmakāya* is nothing but the sphere of true reality (*dharmadhātu* = *tathatā*) insofar as it is perfectly pure (i.e., fully disclosed in its natural purity) due to the complete removal of adventitious defilements, [and thus has to be taken in the sense of] 'body consisting in the true nature of things' (*dharmatākāya*)" (*anye tu niḥśeṣāgantukamalāpagamāt suviśuddho dharmadhātur eva dharmatākāyo dharmakāya iti varṇayanti*).

[1775] AAĀ$_W$ 916,10f = AAĀ$_V$ 535,28f: *sa eva dharmatākāyo dharmakāya iti bhāvapratyayalopād vyapadiśyate*.

expected that the authors of our texts, at least in a period when exegetic work was already in full bloom, were familiar with these exegetic practices and hence may, under certain conditions, have presupposed their application. Such a condition would be given if my assumption that the passage tries to exploit a traditional Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* by way of a double entendre (*śleṣa*, a well-known figure in Indian poetics) is correct. Given the context, especially the preceding sentence ⓨ, the reader was almost forced to understand the traditional phraseology in a new sense and could thus be expected to grasp the double entendre.

355.0. However, the utilization of the Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna*, as expressed in [S1], is another point Matsumoto does not accept. It is true that he concedes that the use of the word *vijñapti* in connection with *vijñāna* indicates some kind of influence of this definition (M1: 151a14-20). But he rejects my assumption that the terminology and structure of the nuclear part of ⓧ as a whole is modelled on the Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna*.

355.1.1. One of his objections is that none of the Abhidharmic definitions of *vijñāna* adduced by me contains the expression **ālambanavijñaptimātra*, or even the expression **ālambanamātravijñapti*, which Matsumoto (M1: 150f) seems to consider more appropriate in a traditional Abhidharmic context, and that even the only example of *vijñāna* defined as *ālambanavijñapti* I was able to produce, viz., the one from Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka*, was merely reconstructed from Tibetan (M1: 149 with 215f n. 15). But in the meantime a Sanskrit manuscript of this text has become available, and also a manuscript of Sthiramati's commentary on it, and at least the latter confirms my reconstruction (for details see § 462.2). Even so, Matsumoto could object that this definition is, after all, later than the Saṁdh.[1776] Still, it is actually nothing but a generalization of the old Abhidharmic special definitions of the different kinds of *vijñāna*, as found in the *Prakaraṇa*[1777] and taken up in very first chapter of the 'Basic Section' (MauBh)[1778] of the YBh, the one dealing with the 'level of sense-perception' (PañcBh):

[A2] *cakṣurvijñānaṁ katamat? yā cakṣurāśrayā rūpaprativijñaptiḥ* (YBh_{Bh} 4,5),

and analogously for the other *vijñāna*s. A few lines later, *rūpa* (in the specific sense of *visible* matter) is expressly stated to be the objective support (*ālambana*) of visual awareness (*cakṣurvijñāna*).[1779] If it was no problem for later authors to transform, if required, these specific definitions of *cakṣurvijñāna*, etc., into a general definition of *vijñāna*, this holds good for the Saṁdh as well.

[1776] The same would hold good for NA 390c10f: "**alambanavijñapti* is the function of *vijñāna*" (了別所緣 是識功用). But at least the definition of (the function of) *vijñāna* as **vijñapti* is already found in the *Vibhāṣā* (Vi_2 281c5f: 別識義是識義; Vi 371b22: 了別是識業).

[1777] $Prak_H$ 693a5-9. For the Skt., cf. AVinSūN 117,12f.

[1778] See Pt. I § 1 with fn. 2.

[1779] YBh_{Bh} 4,12f. That visual awareness (*cakṣurvijñāna*) and the other sense perceptions have the nature of cognizing visible things (*rūpa*), etc., as their respective objective support (*ālambana*) had already been explicitly stated in early Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma, e.g., SaṅgP 429a16-19 (VI.3; cf. STACHE-ROSEN 1968: 160) or DhSk 502c20-23 (色為所緣); cf. also *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* (T 28.1555) 993b17f: "[The expression] '*rūpaprativijñapti*' indicates the objective support (**ālambana*) of visual awareness" (各了別色者 顯眼識所緣). Instead of *prativijñapti* in the *Prakaraṇa* definition, these definitions obviously contained a series of three synonyms (in the DhSk: 諸了別 異了別 各別了別色), probably including both *vijñapti* and *prativijñapti*.

355.1.2. Fortunately, such an assumption is unnecessary since a generalizing formulation is likewise already found in the PañcBh of the MauBh. In connection with the definition of the function of visual awareness, it is stated:

[A3] *svaviṣayālambanavijñaptiḥ karma.* (YBh$_{Bh}$ 5,16f)

[A3]-tr: The function [of visual awareness] is to apprehend an objective support [which is part] of its own object-domain (i.e., which is visible).

This definition is expressly stated to hold good (mutatis mutandis) for the other sense perceptions as well.[1780] Accordingly, a general definition of *vijñāna* in the *Manobhūmi* (ManoBh) of the MauBh reads:

[A4] *vijñānaṁ katamat | yad ālambanavijñaptau pratyupasthitaṁ* | (YBh$_{Bh}$ 11,8)

[A4]-tr: What is *vijñāna*? That which is engaged in the cognition of an objective support.

Since the bulk of the materials contained in the MauBh is, on the whole, less developed and hence, at least in substance, probably somewhat older than the Saṁdh, it seems likely that at least one or the other of these formulations was known to the author(s) of Saṁdh VIII.

355.1.3. That we are entitled to presuppose the expression *ālambanavijñapti* in connection with the function of mind (*citta*, *vijñāna*) for Saṁdh VIII receives strong support from another passage of this very text itself, viz., VIII.37.1, where 16 kinds of [ways] mind (*citta*, i.e., cognitive acts or processes) may arise (*sems kyi skye ba*) are enumerated, the second of which is described as follows:

[A5] *dmigs pa*[1781] *rnam pa sna tshogs rnam par rig pa 'i ni 'di lta ste rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa ... kho na'i'o* || (Saṁdh VIII.37.1.2 [116,31f])

[A5]-sTog: *rnam pa sna tshogs la dmigs pa'i rnam par rig pa de 'di lta ste rnam par rtog pa'i yid kyi rnam par shes pa... 'o* || (vol. 63 [na]: 53a4-7)

[A5]-Hs: 二者 種種行相所緣識生, 謂 ... 分別意識。(T 16.676: 702b26-29)[1782]

[A5]-Bo: 取種種相觀識, 譬如 ... 無(!)分別意識 ....。(T 16.675: 679a29-b1).

The most probable reconstruction of this phrase would seem to be:

[A5]-rec: **citrākārālambanavijñapteḥ*,[1783] *tadyathā*[1784] *vikalpakasya manovijñānasya* ... |

[1780] YBh$_{Bh}$ 7,3, 7,19, etc.

[1781] Thus with YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 86a7 (= D zi 78b3), SaṁdhVy P co 254a4 (D cho 213b1) and Jñānagarbha (NOZAWA 1957: 96 n. 261: D and P: *pa*) against Lamotte who reads *dmigs pa'i* (= Saṁdh$_{t}$ P ngu 40b5; D ca 37a4) but nevertheless reconstructs it as **nānāvidhālambanavijñapti*. The reading *dmigs pa'i rnam pa sna tshogs rnam par rig pa'i ni* may have arisen under the influence of the subsequent five items, viz., *dmigs pa'i mtshan ma chung ngu rnam par rig pa'i ni ...* (**parīttālambananimitta-vijñapteḥ ...*), etc., which all start with *dmigs pa'i mtshan ma*, i.e., have enlarged the expression *X-*ālambanavijñapti* to *X-*ālambananimittavijñapti*, i.e., cognition/representation of a (certain) *nimitta* as its (or: in the sense of) objective support (cf. ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 160,16: *ālambananimitta* as against *nidāna-nimitta*). In a closely related passage of the VinSg, the same set of expressions appears simply as *X-*ālambanavijñapti* (*rgyu* [see S 1987 n. 647] *chung ngu'i dmigs pa rnam par rig pa*, etc.: YBh$_{t}$ P zi 5a3f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 28 [2001: 392] #**1.c**); cf. also ibid. 5a2f *dmigs pa rnam pa gnyis rnam par rig pa* = **dvividhālambanavijñapti*.

[1782] SaṁdhṬ$_{t}$ P thi 271a4 renders the first part as *rnam pa sna tshogs kyi dmigs pa'i rnam par rig pa'i skye ba* (attribute + genitivus objectivus + action noun + ...).

[1783] This would be the natural reconstruction of [A5] (*dmigs pa rnam par rig pa* = object + action noun; *rnam pa sna tshogs* = apposition to the object). The reconstructed sequence of the elements of

[A5]-tr: [The arising] of the cognition/representation of manifold objective supports, i.e., [the arising] of the ... conceptualizing non-sensory awareness.

If this is correct (and I do not perceive a reasonable alternative), we have a second occurrence of the compound *ālambanavijñapti* characterizing the function of *citta*/*vijñāna*. It need not concern us here how the two passages (viz., Saṁdh VIII.7 and VIII.37) are related text-historically (for this problem, see Pt. IV § 582.3.3). What matters in the present context is merely the additional evidence for the compound *ālambanavijñapti* in the Saṁdh itself.[1785]

355.2.1. As for the non-occurrence of the expression *ālambanavijñaptimātra*, my reply is as follows: The author of Saṁdh VIII does not want to repeat a given Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* verbatim. What he wants is rather to make use of this definition as a vehicle for his innovative view of objects being not different/separate from the mind. It was for this purpose that he had to rephrase the definition in such a way that its elements were, on the one hand, either literally borrowed from or at least in conformity with the Abhidharmic definition and understanding of *vijñāna* and, on the other, suitable to be understood in the sense of the new idea he wanted to introduce. He therefore added °*mātra*, and I think he was able to do so also from the traditional Abhidharmic point of view because beside the simple definition of *vijñāna* (abstracted from the definition of its different types like visual awareness, etc.) there was still another context which contained a kind of definition, viz., the context where the function of the mind (*citta* or *vijñāna*, normally equivalent) was distinguished from the functions of the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) or mind-associates (*cittasaṁprayuktā dharmāḥ*). In this context, the function of *vijñāna* is defined in the ManoBh as follows:

[A6] *sakalaṁ vastulakṣaṇaṁ vijñānena vijñāpayati* (YBh$_{Bh}$ 59,16).

[A6]-tr: By means of *vijñāna* one cognizes[1786] the whole character of the thing (i.e., the thing perceived as a whole).[1787]

This is contrasted with the functions of the mind-associates by which one cognizes the special features of that same object.[1788] Now, what is meant is obviously that by way of *vijñāna* one cognizes or perceives, to be sure, the object as a whole, but in an undifferentiated way, with no focus on peculiar features. Both aspects, viz., entirety and lack of differentiation, may also

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the compound is confirmed by all the other versions. For [A5]-sTog, see § 380.2. In [A5]-Bo, 觀 represents *ālambana* (cf. ch. 5.6).

1784 Cf. [A5]-sTog *de 'di lta ste* (confirming *tadyathā*) and Bo 譬如 (confirming *yathā*).

1785 Cf. also YBh$_t$ P zi 13a4-8 (D zhi 11a4-7; YBh$_c$ 582c19-25), stating that the four *smṛtyupasthāna*s are, strictly speaking, investigations into aspects or functions of the mind (*citta*) only, the *citta-smṛtyupasthāna* referring to the *citta*'s function of **vijñapti* (13a7: *rnam par rig pa*) = **ālambanavijñapti* (13a8: *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa*). This passage is somehow related to Saṁdh VIII.22 (104,3f) and VIII.36.2.3 (114,19), where *vijñapti*, occurring in the same set of concepts, also seems to refer to the *citta-smṛtyupasthāna*.

1786 Cf. § 357.2 and fn. 1798.

1787 Buescher's (B: 164 n. 3) rendering of the passage, viz.,

"thereby the entitative characteristic as a whole is noetically constituted by the consciousness"

is, apart from superimposing a *vijñaptimātratā* interpretation, grammatically flawed because he renders the active verb *vijñāpayati* as if it were passive and takes *vijñānena* as the agent of this allegedly passive verb.

1788 For mind and mind-associates having one and the same object (*ekālambana*) but different ways of portraying it (*anekākāra*), see also YBh$_{Bh}$ 5,14.

be expressed by adding the quasi-suffix *°mātra*. Furthermore, there were two different ways of applying this quasi-suffix: One could *either* use it for characterizing *vijñāna* as a cognition of the entire *object* and at the same time of its overall form only, *or* for characterizing *vijñāna* as being a full *cognition* of the object but at the same time only a bare awareness of it without any discrimination or selection of special features. In other words: when *°mātra* is used to indicate the specific cognitive function of *vijñāna*, there was the choice of adding it to the word denoting the *object* cognized or to the word denoting the cognitive *function* itself.

355.2.2. Actually, examples for both alternatives are available, provided that we take into account that the terms which constitute the definition of *vijñāna*, viz. *ālambana* and *vijñapti*, admit of being replaced by quasi-synonyms, like *viṣaya*, *vastu* or *artha* for *ālambana*, and *upalabdhi* or *graha(ṇa)* for *vijñapti*.[1789] Indeed, the first mode of expressing the matter (viz., adding *°mātra* to the word designating the object cognized) is more frequent,[1790] but an unambiguous example of the second is provided by the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* ad *Abhidharmadīpa* II.120:

[A7] *vastūpalabdhimātraṁ hi cittaṁ.* (ADīVṛ 78,11)

The fact that this definition is given as an explanation of *vastumātragraha* in the verse proves that in this context the position of *°mātra* is *optional*, "apprehending merely the object [as a whole]" and "merely perceiving the object [without grasping special features]" being equivalent.

355.2.3. To the passage just quoted from the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* one may perhaps add the following comment by Saṅghabhadra on the definition of AK I.16a (*vijñānaṁ prativijñaptiḥ*):

[A8] 識謂了別者，是唯總取境界相義。(NA 342a17)

[A8]-tr: '*Vijñāna* means cognizing': This means that it cognizes the feature(s) of its object *only* in a summary way.

We cannot perhaps exclude the possibility that the restrictive particle (唯) is merely an addition of the translator, but actually Saṅghabhadra himself explains his own comment in such a way that the restrictive particle has a crucial function, for among other things he takes the definition to mean that the *vijñāna* simply (唯) apprehends the object (e.g., something blue) but does not apprehend, or pick out, specific aspects of the object like being pleasant or unpleasant.[1791] Actually, Sthiramati's recording of the passage confirms the presence of a restrictive particle when he states, with regard to visual awareness, that it does not apprehend such specific features because it apprehends only the visible [as such] (**rūpamātropalabdheḥ*).[1792] It has to be admitted that, in contrast to the Chinese version of Saṅghabhadra's **Nyāyānusāriṇī*, in Sthiramati's record the restrictive particle (*°mātra*) is unambiguously

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[1789] For a replacement of *ālambana* and/or *vijñapti* in the definition of *vijñāna* with quasi-synonyms see, e.g., YBh$_t$ P zi 189b5 (D zhi 182a6; YBh$_c$ 651b23f): *rnam par shes pa ni yul so sor rnam par rig pa'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa'o* (**vijñānaṁ yad viṣayaprativijñaptilakṣaṇam*); MSg I.6 (see fn. 1802); AK(Bh) 11,6f: *vijñānaṁ ... viṣayaṁ viṣayaṁ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir ...*; AVinSūN 120,2: *viṣayopalabdhir vijñānam*; *Śālistambasūtra* (SCHOENING 1995: II 714,5): *vastuprativijñaptir vijñānam*; Śikṣ 250,7 (from the *Pitṛputrasamāgama*): *yā ṣaḍindriyādhipateyā ṣaḍviṣayārambaṇā viṣayavijñaptir, ayam ucyate vijñānadhātuḥ*. Cf. MAVṬ 248,1f: *arthopalabdhir vijñaptiḥ*. For quasi-synonyms of *vijñapti*, see also fn. 1804.

[1790] Cf. the examples quoted in S 1984: 440 n. 35 (like MAVBh 20,19, AKVy 38,22-24, or PrasP 65,2).

[1791] NA 342a19-22: 然 … 唯取青等，… 非可意不可意等.

[1792] AKṬT P to 77a1f: *gzugs tsam dmigs pa'i phyir ro.*

connected with the word that corresponds to '*ālambana*' and definitely not with the one that corresponds to '*vijñapti*', but this merely shows the practical equivalence of the two modes of expression.

355.2.4. A restrictive particle qualifying *vijñapti* in what is *de facto* a definition of *vijñāna* is also found in another passage of the **Nyāyānusāriṇī*, viz.:

[A9] 識於所緣唯了別 ... (NA 466a15f).[1793]

[A9]-tr: [The function of] *vijñāna* with regard to its object (**ālambana*) is *nothing but* to cognize [it] (**(prati)vijñapti*).

In this case, the function of *vijñāna* is explicitly contrasted with that of mind-associates like *vedanā*. Thus here too the restrictive particle is most probably authentic. It is, however, difficult to decide whether 唯 renders °*mātra* or rather *eva*, but from the point of view of meaning this does not matter.

355.3. It is true that these passages are from texts which are later than the Saṁdh. But they are from conservative Abhidharma texts, and we can be fairly sure that they were not influenced by the Saṁdh (if they were,[1794] they would lend even stronger support to my reconstruction!). What I take them to prove is that the traditional Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* could, if required by the context, easily be enlarged by the addition of a restrictive particle like °*mātra* added either to the word for 'object' *or to the action noun*. If this was possible in conservative Abhidharma texts, why not in the Saṁdh, especially if I am right in assuming that the author(s) of the Saṁdh had a strong motive, viz., to give the definition a form by which it would become suitable for expressing a second meaning by means of a *śleṣa*. This latter aspect would also explain why the expression **ālambanavijñaptimātra* does not occur as a term in later Vijñānavāda sources, as Matsumoto (M1: 151b) thinks it should, in view of the central importance of ⓧ. Actually, the expression as a whole is not at all a term and makes sense only in composition with °*prabhāvita* and as a predicate of *vijñāna* in the context of the double entendre contrived in the unique situation of justifying the innovative doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* by making use of a conventional-looking phraseology and by presenting its novel interpretation as the deeper meaning (*sandhi*), so to speak, of the traditional definition of *vijñāna*. The new *term* is thus not **ālambanavijñaptimātra* but only *vijñaptimātra* (in its new meaning). This is also clear from the fact that already the Saṁdh itself uses only the latter as a term, introducing it already in ⓨ (thus immediately before ⓧ!),

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[1793] For my argument it does not matter that this formulation is used by an opponent, especially because this is not the controversial point in the discussion between Saṅghabhadra and this opponent.

[1794] As MUROJI 2000: 175f and 2011: 92f appears to assume for the *vijñāna*-definition in the PSk (for which see § 355.1). MUROJI is surely right in presupposing Vasubandhu's familiarity with the Saṁdh, documented from the KSi onward, and a kind of tacit allusion for readers who already embraced a full-fledged Vijñānavāda position may well have been intended. But taken by itself the definition of *vijñāna* as *ālambanavijñapti* is fully explicable on the basis of YBh_{Bh} 11,8 (see § 355.1.2 text [A4]) and 5,16f (text [A3]), especially in an extremely concise text like the PSk (which does not dwell on defining the traditional *vijñāna*s one by one), and there is not the slightest indication of a *vijñaptimātra* position, at least not for a reader brought up in traditional Abhidharma or pre-Vijñānavāda Yogācāra. The same would hold good if the original PSk text had *ālambanaprativijñapti* (see § 462.2 with text [A27]), which would just be a generalization of the traditional Abhidharmic definition of *cakṣur-vijñāna*, etc., as found in the *Prakaraṇa* (see § 355.1.1 with fn. 1777) and in YBh_{Bh} 4,5, etc. (see ibid. text [A2]), without any further implications.

and taking it up again in the crucial paragraph VIII.8 as well as in VIII.9, and later on in VIII.20.2.3 and 29.8.

356.1. In another objection, Matsumoto (M1: 156b–157b) argues from the structure of the closer context. The Buddha had been questioned whether the image or replica which is the object of meditative concentration is different/separate from the mind, and his answer had been that it is not (let me call this thesis ⓣ). The reason for ⓣ is given by ⓨ + ⓧ. Subsequently, the text has Maitreya point out that if ⓣ is accepted, a difficulty emerges. Basing himself on this structure and on the fact that just as in ⓣ so also in ⓨ the image = object is the *grammatical* subject and a concept corresponding to the mind the predicate noun, Matsumoto concludes that this must also be the case in ⓧ.[1795] This, however, according to him, requires a reconstruction in which the term for the object, i.e., *ālambana*, is the grammatical subject, as is the case in 🄰/🄼 but not in 🅂. I do not think that this assumption is compelling. In view of the presence of *hi* in ⓧ, ⓧ must either function as a reason for ⓨ, or for the fact that ⓨ implies ⓣ. In order to do so, it need not have the same grammatical subject or structure as ⓨ or ⓣ. The only requirement is that it serves the purpose. To give an example:

{1} A penguin is a bird, {2} because it has feathers and propagates through eggs;

{3} for birds are specifically characterized by having feathers and propagating by means of eggs.

Though having a different subject from {1} and {2}, {3} works perfectly well as a proof.[1796] Similarly, as an authoritative statement on the mind (or as a reference to a former authoritative statement), and as a statement at that which has an appropriate bearing on the status of the image — and this is precisely what ⓧ would be if reconstructed in terms of 🅂 —, ⓧ would indisputably serve the purpose of proving ⓨ, irrespective of its grammatical structure.

356.2. In another place,[1797] Matsumoto argues that the object (*ālambana*) must be the grammatical subject of ⓧ because he presumes that the reference to a former dictum (*ngas bshad do*, **mayoktam*) in ⓧ points to the *cittamātra* passage of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (DBhS), where the objective element (*idam* = *traidhātukam*) is the grammatical subject and the subjective element (*cittamātra*) the predicate noun. The problems connected with the very assumption of ⓧ referring to the DBhS will be discussed later (§§ 456.1–456.3). But even if we take this assumption for granted, it will hardly be a sufficiently strong basis for Matsumoto to make his point. Rather than equating *cittamātra* with *vijñāna*, I would be inclined to relate it to *vijñaptimātra*, which is formed in an analogous way and looks very much like a terminological refinement of the expression *cittamātra*. This equation may not be incompatible with 🄼. But it would not exclude 🅂 either; for in this case the statement of the

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[1795] M1: 157a22–b2: とすれば、ⓧにおいても、その主語は "pratibimba" ... に相当するものであり、述語は "citta" ... に相当するものでなければならない。

[1796] In this case, {3} would offer the reason why {2} implies {1}. As an example of a case where {3} backs up {2}, one could give the following example:

{1} The cover of this book is not separate from this book,

{2} because the cover is a part of this book;

{3} for books are defined as consisting of printed pages and a cover.

Once again, {3} serves the purpose in spite of having a different grammatical subject.

[1797] M1: 160b–161a; cf. also 168b.

DBhS could be regarded as being embedded in the complex predicate noun of ⓧ, corresponding to the expression **ālambanavijñaptimātra* in which *ālambana* can be taken as the logical subject of *vijñaptimātra* if ⓧ is interpreted in the sense of [S3] (§ 352) or [S6A] (see § 357.5), i.e., as that which is a mere representation/appearance, or merely appears. It may be worth noting that as a nominal sentence the DBhS passage has the same structure as the nuclear part of [S], viz. "PredN – Subj", and not "Subj ... PredN" as in [M].

357.1. Finally, Matsumoto (M1: 193a–b) wonders if *vijñapti* can at all be construed with an object — an objection which, if justified, would especially jeopardize [S2], but also [S1] (§ 352). In determining the meaning of *vijñapti* (which he renders by the neologism 表識 "making known /knowing", combining two traditional equivalents of *vijñapti*, in order to distinguish it from *vijñāna*), Matsumoto (ibid.; cf. 218b6f) is inclined to follow Nagao who renders *vijñapti* as 表象 ("representation"), arguing that in Vijñānavāda sources it does not so much mean the act of cognizing as the content cognized or experienced. This means that *vijñapti* would denote the appearing object or image, and is, in this sense, better rendered by "representation" or "appearance".

357.2. Now, *vijñapti* is mostly regarded as a nominal derivation from the caus. of *vi-√jñā* and would thus mean "making known", but it seems that the causative aspect is practically irrelevant when *vijñapti* is used in an epistemic context.[1798] As mentioned above (§ 355.1), in traditional Abhidharma it is doubtless used to denote the function of *vijñāna*. In this case, it rather means "cognition" or "apprehension" in the sense of the act of cognizing or apprehending. This is also confirmed by the standard Tibetan rendering *rnam par rig pa* ("to know distinctly") as well as by the Chinese rendering 了別 ("to discern"), which Hsüan-tsang prefers in this context (while in the case of *vijñaptimātra* he uses 識, as in ⓨ and ⓧ). It seems that *vijñapti* in this function is merely the nominal equivalent of the canonical definition of *vijñāna* in verbal terms (*vijānātîti vijñānam*).[1799] We occasionally, we find *vijānanā̆* instead of *vijñapti*,[1800] but also *vijñā̆payati* for *vijānāti*,[1801] again without a recognizable causative function. As these verbal forms are unambiguously construed with an accusative object, it is hard to see why Matsumoto is so sceptical about *vijñapti* admitting of the corresponding construction with an objective genitive or a prior member having this value. Actually, such a construction is frequently met with. Suffice it here to refer to the expression

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[1798] For this reason, Lee (2004) proposes, in accordance with *Dhātupāṭha* 10.81: *jñapa jñāne jñāpane*, a derivation from *√jñap* in a non-causative sense. I wonder if this *Dhātupāṭha* entry may not, from a modern point of view, be understood as merely testifying to the grammarians' being aware of the fact that the causative of *√jñā* was also used in a non-causative sense, but I must leave it to Vyākaraṇa specialists to decide the matter. Cf., in this connection, the non-factitive use of causatives in Middle Indic and BHS, including *verba sentiendi* and *cognoscendi* like *paṭisaṁvedeti* (*pratisaṁvedayati*) in the sense of "to perceive" or even "to recognize" (SAKAMOTO-GOTO 1993, esp. 287f). This may perhaps suggest a semantic development "makes known [to oneself]" > "cognizes". Buescher's (B: 164 n. 3; cf. fn. 1787) interpretation as "active constitution of the cognized" is of course inapplicable to pre- or non-Vijñānavāda sources.

[1799] Cf. SN III 87,17f (SĀ$_c$ 11c10; VETTER 2000: 63f) and the parallel quoted in S 1984: 440 n. 32. Cf. also NA 636a10-12: 如契經言。了別了別 故名為識。何所了別。謂 了別色 至了別法。(*yathôktaṁ sūtre: vijānāti vijānātîti vijñānam. kiṁ ca vijānāti? rūpaṁ vijānāti yāvad dharmān vijānāti*).

[1800] ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 143,11 (= ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ I 240,8) and 386,2.

[1801] YBh$_{Bh}$ 59,16 (see § 355.2.1: [A6]).

ālambanavijñapti already discussed in § 355.1 and to the equivalent expression *viṣayavijñapti* denoting the function of (the traditional forms of) *vijñāna*, as, e.g., at ASBh 13,6 (quotation from the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*), or at TrBh *7,7f (L. 18,18f),[1802] corresponding to Tr 2b *vijñaptir viṣayasya.*[1803] Although the latter is viewed with some suspicion by Matsumoto (M1: 220 n. 62), the construction of *vijñapti* with an objective genitive is quite natural as long as *vijñapti* is used in its basic meaning of an action noun, as is clearly the case in these passages.[1804]

357.3. Since *vijñāna* is thus defined as the cognizing of an object (the definition in one sentence would be: *viṣaya-* or *ālambanavijñaptir vijñānam*), it should also not be a problem to express the fact that *vijñāna* is the *bare* cognition of an object by defining it as *viṣaya-* or *ālambanavijñaptimātra*, just as the definition of the *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti* (see § 355.2.2: [A7]) does, although employing (perhaps deliberately) synonyms for *ālambana*, *vijñapti* and *vijñāna*. Still, I have to confess that my reference (S 1984: 454 # 22) to MSg II.8 (27,26-28) as an instance of *vijñaptimātra* being predicated of *vijñāna* is, as Matsumoto (M1: 217f n. 40) rightly points out, erroneous.[1805] An example, however, of *vijñaptimātra* being predicated of unambiguously subjective factors (with the Vijñānavāda purport of denying external objects!) is found in *Asvabhāva's commentary, in a passage commenting on the *cittamātra* passage of the DBhS.[1806] After having equated *citta* with *vijñapti* and pointed out that *°mātra* excludes [external] objects (*artha*), and after having explained *traidhātuka* as "the *vijñapti*s appearing as the triple world" (*khams gsum du snang ba'i rnam par rig pa rnams*), the text continues as follows:

> [A10] *khams gsum pa smos pas ni 'dod pa la sogs pa'i sred pa dang mtshungs par ldan pa khams gsum par gtogs pa'i* <u>*sems dang sems las byung ba rnams*</u> *rnam par rig pa tsam nyid du dam bca' ba ste* | ...
> (MSgU$_t$ P li 271a3f; D ri 221a7f)

[1802] Cf. also MSg I.6: *yul la rnam par rig pa'i phyir rnam par shes pa'o*, with MSgBh$_t$ P li 150b7 (D ri 128b2): *yul la 'dzin pa'i don gyis na rnam par shes pa*, and (adapted to Vijñānavāda phraseology) MSgU$_t$ P li 240b8 (D ri 196b3): *yul 'dzin par snang ba'i phyir rnam par shes pa'i sgrar grub bo.*

[1803] That *viṣayasya* is a genitivus objectivus is evident from the parallel formulation *viṣayasyôpalabdhiḥ* at Tr 8c. Cf. also the Tibetan translation, which renders both *vijñaptir viṣayasya* in Tr 2b and the corresponding compound *viṣayavijñapti* in TrBh *7,7f (L. 18,18f) as *yul* <u>*la*</u> *rnam par rig pa* (**7,4 and 11). At YBh$_t$ P zi 3b5, however, *viṣayavijñapti* is translated as *yul rnam par rig pa* (unmarked object), and in the Tibetan version (P shi 13a7) of the quote at ASBh 13,6 as *yul gyi rnam par rig pa* (genitivus objectivus) (cf. HAKAMAYA 1978: 13 [2001: 335] # v).

[1804] At Tr 2b *vijñaptir viṣayasya* refers to the six traditional *vijñāna*s, viz., the sense-perceptions and *manovijñāna* (cf. TrBh *7,7f [L. 18,18f]: *cakṣurādivijñānaṁ ṣaṭprakāram*). That *vijñapti* is, in this case, to be taken as an action noun is clear from Tr 8bc, where the expression is taken up by *ṣaḍvidhasya ... viṣayasyôpalabdhiḥ*, on which TrBh *17,8 (L. 25,2f) remarks: ... *upalabdhir grahaṇaṁ pratipattir ity arthaḥ*. Cf. also fn. 2136. Of course, in the Vijñānavāda system there is strictly speaking no object outside the mind, since it is the mind itself that appears as the object, sc. visibles etc.; cf. TrBh *7,7 (L. 18,17f): *rūpādiviṣayapratyavabhāsatvāt*; MAVṬ 33,9f: X-*vijñāpanāt tannirbhāsatayā vijñānam* (X = object).

[1805] The subject of the main clause (with the predicate noun *rnam par rig pa tsam*) is not *rnam par shes pa* but *der snang ba* (*ni*: MSgU$_t$ P li 272a6) ("what appears thus", i.e., as a past thing emerging in memory).

[1806] MSgU$_t$ P li 270b7–271a4. For *sems can* at MSgU$_t$ P li 270b7 read *sems tsam* with D ri 221a4.

[A10]-tr: By using [the expression] 'triple world', [the DBhS] asserts that [all those forms of] mind and mental [factors] (*citta-caitta*) that are associated with desire for sensual pleasures, etc., [and thus] belong to the triple world (**traidhātukāvacara*) are *vijñapti-mātra*.[1807]

It is obvious that predicating *vijñaptimātra* of *citta* is equivalent to predicating it of *vijñāna*.[1808]

357.4. Even so, in the MSg *vijñaptimātra* is mostly predicated of *vijñapti* (or rather of the various types of *vijñapti*s).[1809] It may indeed be preferable to understand *vijñapti* in this text as "representation" or "appearance"[1810], the contents of which would comprise both 'objective' elements ("appearance of visible things", etc.) and 'subjective' ones ("appearance of visual awareness", etc.). I am not sure to what extent this use excludes the active meaning. The meaning of *vijñapti* at this stage may well be similar to that of the English word "representation" or the German word "Vorstellung", which combine both an active and a passive /resultative aspect,[1811] emphasis on one or the other aspect being flexible.[1812] Actually, in the context of the description of the *prayogamārga* in some early (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda sources this flexibility is obvious: This crucial part of the Path starts from the perception of the object being *vijñaptimātra*, i.e., mere appearance, which entails that an object (*artha*) to be grasped (*grāhya*) and believed to exist outside the mind is no longer perceived. This, however, in its turn leads to the non-perception even of *vijñaptimātra* because without an object to be grasped or perceived the grasping (*grāhaka*) perception itself is not possible. At this stage,

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1807 It is worth noting that Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the passage (MSgU$_C$ 400b11-13) differs fundamentally:

"'The three spheres' (= the triple world) means what is associated with the fetters *kāmarāga*, etc., and belongs to the three spheres. The statement that these are 'mind only' establishes that there are only mind and mental factors. There are no three spheres [in the form of an externally existent] objective support as it is falsely imagined.

言三界者,謂與欲等愛結相應墮在三界。此唯識言成立唯有諸心心法,無有三界橫計所緣。

In view of the comparatively faithful rendering of Tibetan translations, I suspect that it is Hsüan-tsang who has rephrased the passage since he may indeed have found *vijñaptimātra* as a predicate of *citta* unusual.

1808 Cf. also MAVṬ 24,7f, discussed in fn. 1943.

1809 E.g. MSg II.2 (last sentence: *rnam par rig pa 'di rnams kyi rnam par rig pa tsam nyid*); II.6 (*rnam par rig pa 'di dag ... rnam par rig pa tsam mo*); II.7.2 (last sentence); II.9 (first sentence); II.11 (first sentence).

1810 I.e., to take the suffix *-ti* in the sense of the concrete result of the action or process.

1811 Cf. *WEBSTER* p. 1926c s.v. representation: "**1**: one that represents or is represented", esp. "**e** (1): an image or idea formed by the mind", and **2**: "the act or action of representing or the state of being represented".

1812 An interesting passage in this connection is MSg II.9, where an opponent (or student) admits that it is, to be sure, plausible that the *vijñapti*s of (i.e., appearing as) the six forms of *vijñāna*, viz., visual awareness, etc., are *vijñaptimātra*, but wonders how this can be true of the *vijñapti*s appearing as sense faculties or objects. This opponent obviously presupposes an active meaning of *vijñapti* ("*act* of manifesting") which tallies only with the *vijñāna*s which are, indeed, nothing but acts of representation, whereas the sense faculties and objects are not, and can be called *vijñaptimātra* only in the sense of mere appearances.

vijñaptimātra is equivalent to *grāhaka* and thus clearly refers to the grasping activity of the mind[1813] (which itself turns out to be a mere appearance).

357.5. Returning to the Saṁdh, it may not be impossible to understand, even in ⓨ, *vijñaptimātra(tva)* as meaning that the images are nothing but (i.e., nothing apart from) the mind's act of cognizing them, but it definitely sounds more appropriate to call them mere appearances, i.e., to take *vijñapti* in the passive/resultative sense. The same holds good for the occurrences at Saṁdh VIII.8 and VIII.9 as well as for VIII.20.2.3 (conditioned things *(saṁskāra)* are mere appearances), and is not impossible in ⓧ either. Thus, [S2] could be replaced by

> [S5] O Maitreya, I (have) declare(d) that mind (*vijñāna*, i.e., sensory and cognitive awareness) is distinctively /essentially characterized[1814] by the mere representation (/appearance) of an objective support [and not by the cognition/manifestation of a real, external object].

Or we may consider the possibility of analysing **ālambana-vijñaptimātra* as a karmadhāraya compound in which either the second member (*vijñaptimātra*) determines the first (*ālambana*), as in *mantriśrotriya* "a minister who is learned in the Veda":[1815]

> [S6A] O Maitreya, I (have) declare(d) that mind is distinctively/essentially characterized by an objective support that is a mere representation (= appearance),

or the other way round, as in *vīrapuruṣa* "a man who is a hero","a heroic man":[1816]

> [S6B] O Maitreya, I (have) declare(d) that mind is distinctively/essentially characterized by a mere representation (= appearance) as [its] objective support.

In a historical perspective, I suppose that the predominance of the passive/resultative aspect in the meaning of *vijñapti* may go back to its use in the *Buddhāvataṁsaka* tradition, especially the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, but verification of this conjecture would require a thorough scrutiny of the pertinent materials, which is beyond the scope of the present study.

3.2. On the Meaning of *prabhāvita*

358. As for the reason for keeping my former rendering of *prabhāvita* more or less unchanged instead of following Matsumoto's idea that this expression should, at least in texts before Asaṅga and hence also in the Saṁdh,[1817] be understood exclusively in the sense of "produced by",[1818] I have to limit myself to a brief indication of the general reasons why I consider this position inacceptable, and I shall come back to the specific problem how *prabhāvita* should be understood in ⓧ in ch. 8.2 and in ch. 9, § 461. An exhaustive discussion of

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[1813] Cf., e.g., MAVBh ad I.6-7 (20,2-7): *vijñapti-mātropalabdhiṁ niśrityârthānupalabdhir jāyate | arthānupalabdhiṁ niśritya vijñaptimātrasyâpy anupalabdhir jāyate | evam asal-lakṣaṇaṁ grāhya-grāhakayoḥ praviśati | ... upalabhyārthābhāve upalabdhy-ayogāt |* Cf. also MSA VI.7-8 with MSABh 24,13-15 and MSA XIV.24–27; MSg III.8–9.

[1814] See fn. 1770.

[1815] This type of compound (*AiGr* II.1: 251) is generalized from compounds in which an animal (originally: cattle) is specified by the second member, e.g., *dhenu-ṣṭarī* "a milch cow ceasing to give milk", *aja-vṛṣabha* "billy goat" (*AiGr* II.1: 250).

[1816] *AiGr* II.1: 251; cf. also II.1: 250 (*puruṣa-mṛga* "male antelope", etc.).

[1817] M1: 196a18; 197a6-8; 212a6–b3; 214a8-13.

[1818] M1: 212a15f: 「...によって生みだされた」「...から生みだされた」.

the semantic field and history of this controversial expression, especially of its meaning(s) in Mahāyāna sūtras and their exegesis, would require an in-depth study that would by far exceed the limits of the present work. All I can do is outline the pertinent aspects of my (admittedly provisional) understanding of this polysemous expression and discuss, in Pt. III, a selection of pertinent passages from Yogācāra sources, which also includes a critical review of Matsumoto's interpretation of some of these passages.

359. There can be no doubt that in Buddhist sources (especially in late canonical and post-canonical Pāli texts as well as in certain Mahāyāna sūtras) forms and nominal derivatives of the causative of *pra-√bhū* are often used in the sense of "to produce", and that accordingly a frequent meaning of *prabhāvita* is "produced from/by", or even "originating from", since the causative meaning is not always prominent.[1819] But there are, at any rate in Mahāyāna sūtras, also quite a few occurrences where *prabhāvita* and related forms occur in contexts, or in series of related concepts, that rather suggest meanings like "manifested", "displayed", "elucidated" or "promulgated".[1820] This use is made explicit by Sthiramati in his *Tattvārthā* on *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya* 15,14f[1821] when he explains *prabhāvita* by *prakāśita*.[1822] It would therefore appear preferable to start from *pra-√bhū* in the sense of "to come forth", to "emerge", comprising the aspect of origination as well as that of becoming manifest or visible. Probably even the meaning "to come forward"[1823] should not be lost sight of, especially if we could take this meaning to include not only the facets of increasing or surpassing in number or strength ("to prevail", "to become powerful") but also the facet of distinguishing oneself. Perhaps a rendering like "made to emerge " would be vague enough to comprise most of the connotations ("made to arise", "made to appear or become manifest", "made to stand out"). The polysemy of the expression is also confirmed by the variety of commentarial explana-

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1819 Cf., e.g., Ap 51,15: *Gaṅgā bhāgīrathī nāma himavantā pabhāvitā*, where the natural understanding would be that Ganges *originates* from the Himālaya (abl.!), as is also suggested by the commentary (Ap-a 303): *himavantato paṭṭhāya pabhāvitā pavattā sandamānā*. Cf. also the explanation of *asaṁskṛtaprabhāvita* (Aṣṭ 18,22f) as *asaṁskṛtanirjāta* ($AĀ_W$ 143,6f; $AĀ_V$ 335,9) and the occurrence of *tathāgatāḥ ... prajñāpāramitātaḥ* (abl.!) *prabhāvitāḥ* (Aṣṭ 231,13f) beside *ato* (=*prajñāpāramitātaḥ*) *nirjātāḥ ... tathāgatāḥ* (Aṣṭ 125,27; cf. also M1: 207–210 and 222f n. 86). On the other hand, in the case of the similar phrase *ato hi sarvajñatā prabhāvyate, ato hi sarvajñatā gaveṣitavyā* (ms.) ... *yaduta prajñāpāramitātaḥ* ($Aṣṭ_m$ 80,1f; defective in Aṣṭ 40,7 and $Aṣṭ_W$ 245,14f), Haribhadra ($AĀ_W$ 245,18; $AĀ_V$ 370,32) seems to insist on the causative aspect by glossing *prabhāvyate* with *samutpādyate* (though even in this case $AĀ_W$ notes a v.l. *samutpadyate*!).

1820 Cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 24,15f: *yas tathāgatasya prādurbhāvaḥ, sa āryeṇa Subhūtinā ... subhāṣitenêha sūcyate deśyate prakāśyate prabhāvyate*; 135,2: *ato ... tathatāto buddhānāṁ bodhiḥ prabhāvyate prakāśyate*; Gv 13,29: *pareṣāṁ prabhāvayeyur vā deśayeyur va sūcayeyur vā saṁvarṇayeyur vā saṁdarśayeyur vā ...*; 137,3f: *darśitaṁ śrāvitaṁ deśitaṁ saṁvarṇitaṁ ... vibhaktaṁ prabhāvitaṁ*.

1821 AKBh 15,14f: *kāmaguṇarūpaprabhāvito ... kāmadhātuḥ*, etc.

1822 AKṬT P to 94a8: *phye ba ni gsal bar byas pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste*. It is not relevant to my argument whether in the passage concerned Sthiramati's interpretation hits the mark. I merely adduce it as evidence for an aspect of the semantic range assigned to *prabhāvita* by an Indian commentator. Cf. also $AĀ_V$ 362,22 (ad Aṣṭ 29,14-16): *prabhāvanêti* (so read with $AĀ_W$ 211,9) *prakāśanā*.

1823 Cf. Aṣṭ 113,13: (*bahūni prāṇaśatāni ... anuttarāyāṁ samyaksaṁbodhau*) *prasthāpayiṣyāmaḥ ... samādāpayiṣyāmaḥ samuttejayiṣyāmaḥ saṁpraharṣayiṣyāmaḥ saṁprabhāvayiṣyāmaḥ* ("cause them to advance", or "give them strength [to attain it]"?).

tions[1824] and Chinese renderings, but again a systematic investigation would lead me far beyond the limits of this study.

360.1. However this may be, there is plenty of evidence that in Yogācāra sources *prabhāvita* is frequently used in such a way that it cannot be understood as "produced by/from)". To give just one example from a somewhat later source:

[A11] ... *bāhyaṁ hi rūpaṁ saṁvarttavivarttaprabhāvitam, ādhyātmikās tu* ⟨*saṁskārā*⟩[1825] *jātijarādiprabhāvitā iti* | (ASBh 10,4f)

[A11]-tr: ..., because (*hi*) external matter is distinctively/essentially characterized by [cyclical cosmic] dissolution and evolution, whereas the internal conditioned factors are distinctively/essentially characterized by birth, aging, and [dying].

"Produced by evolution" and "produced by birth" may be a choice, but "produced by dissolution" and "produced by aging" do not make sense. The predicate nouns obviously qualify their subjects in terms of a distinctive feature or property, one that is typical and essential for the respective subject and distinguishes it from the other. Therefore, *prabhāvita* should, in this case, be taken to mean "revealed by" or "distinguished by", in the sense of "distinctively/essentially characterized by". This would also fit in with the fact that in this passage[1826] as well as in the case of almost all occurrences in Yogācāra sources Hsüan-tsang (like Paramārtha) renders *prabhāvita* by 所顯(現) ("manifested", "disclosed"), and also with its usual Tibetan rendering *rab tu phye ba*,[1827] which may mean "opened", i.e., "revealed", "disclosed" (cf. *rnam par 'byed pa* = *vi-*√*vṛ*) or "separated [from other things]", i.e., "distinguished", "distinctively characterized".[1828] In support of the meaning "distinctively

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[1824] Cf., e.g., in addition to the explanations mentioned in fn. 1822 and § 360.2, Sthiramati's explanation of *prabhāvyate* (MAVBh 50,8) as *pratīyate* (MAVṬ 168,14f), and of *prabhāvita* (MAVBh 33,15f) as *vyavasthāpita* (MAVṬ 93,12 and 22f), agreeing with his commentary (AKṬT P tho 430a3) on AKBh 384,12, where he explains *prabhāvyante* by *rnam par 'jog*, i.e., *vyavasthāpyante*, as is confirmed by Yaśomitra (AKVy 603,5), who, however, alternatively proposes *pradhānīkriyante*, suggesting the aspect of predominance (cf. SAKURABE & ODANI 1999: 434,8: 強力となる). A similar facet is also indicated by Yaśomitra's gloss *prakarṣita* (AKVy 50,7; Tib. *shas che ba*) on *prabhāvita* at AKBh 15,14f (cf. also 為勝 in the corresponding passage NA 345b16f). To conclude these stray remarks, let me quote Sthiramati's remark on this AKBh passage in full:

'*Prabhāvita*' means (... *ity arthaḥ*) 'revealed' (**prakāśita*). That which is most important (**pradhāna*) in something, by precisely that the latter is characterized (**upalakṣita*).

phye ba ni gsal bar byas pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig ste | gang na gang zhig gtso bo de nyid kyis de nye bar mtshon par byas pa yin no || (AKṬT P to 94a8–b1)

[1825] Supplied from ASBh$_t$ (P shi 10b3), ASVy$_t$ P shi 161a5 (*nang gi 'du byed rnams ni*), ASVy$_c$ 700b24 (內諸行) and the parallel in PSkV ms. 46a3f.

[1826] ASVy$_c$ 700b24f.

[1827] Thus also in the present passage: ASBh$_t$ P shi 10b3; ASVy$_t$ P shi 161a5 (D li 132b1).

[1828] This aspect was not sufficiently highlighted in my former attempt to differentiate the nuances in the use of the expression *prabhāvita* (S 1969: 109f: 1. "erzeugt", 2. "manifestiert", 3. "bestimmt als", 4. "[wesentlich] gekennzeichnet durch"). From this point of view, KIM (2007: 952–951 rl) is right in postulating a fifth nuance, but as far as I can see in the two passages adduced by him there is no need to understand X-*prabhāvitatvāt* as "because X is conspicuous (or strong)" (X が顕著(強力)であるので). The compound is more naturally (and in accordance with Tib. X *kyis rab tu phye ba*) taken as an instr.-tatpuruṣa in the sense of "distinguished by X", "made to stand out by X", or "distinctively characterized by X". In AKBh 354,15f, the *śraddhādhimukta* and the *dṛṣṭiprāpta* are stated to be so called because they are, respectively, distinguished (*prabhāvita*) by conviction (*adhimukti*) and insight

/essentially characterized", I pointed out (S 1969: 110–112) that *prabhāvita* is occasionally translated as *nye bar mtshon pa* (usually representing *upalakṣita*)[1829] and that the phrase "A is X-*prabhāvita*" alternates with "A is X-*lakṣaṇa*" (bahuv.), i.e., "A has X as its defining characteristic".[1830]

360.2. As a typical example for a non-causal use of *prabhāvita* in earlier Yogācāra sources, let me adduce the following definiton of Suchness or True Reality (*tathatā*) from the VinSg:

[A12] *de bzhin nyid gang zhe na | chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba... 'i dngos po gang yin pa 'o* ||[1831]

[A12]-tr: What is 'Suchness' (*tathatā*)? It is the reality (**vastu*) which is [essentially] characterized by/as the dharmas' lack of self (in the sense of a true individual essence and inherent existence) (**dharmanairātmyaprabhāvita*).

Since the *tathatā* is unconditioned, *prabhāvita* obviously cannot mean "produced by/from" here, whereas "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as"[1832] would seem to make good sense. Thus, here, too, the meaning X-*prabhāvita* would be close to that of X-*lakṣaṇa*, with X representing an essential, defining characteristic more or less equivalent to the own-being or specific nature (*svabhāva*) of the definiendum.[1833] This explains that the expression "A is X-*prabhāvita*" may, in cases like [A12], even alternate with a simple equation "A is X", as in the corresponding definition in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya*:

[A13] *chos dge ba rnams kyi de bzhin nyid gang zhe na | bdag med pa ... ste* | (**kuśalānāṁ dharmāṇāṁ tathatā katamā? nairātmyam ...* |),[1834]

or in that of the *Pañcaskandhaka*:

[A14] *tathatā katamā | yā dharmāṇāṁ dharmatā dharmanairātmyam* |(PSk 19,7).

To be sure, there may be a subtle difference beween the two types of formulation, but at any rate the alternation supports the assumption that the meaning of X-*prabhāvita* may sometimes come close to "has the nature of X", as is indeed explicitly confirmed by the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā*

(*dṛṣṭi*) on account of the respective prevalence of belief (*śraddhā*) and comprehension (*prajñā*). And in MAVṬ 266,5f (reconstructed from the Tibetan, see 66,26-28) it is pointed out that for the bodhisattvas the *jñeyāvaraṇa* is an obstacle because they are distinguished (*rab tu phye ba*: D) [from the śrāvakas] by [the requirement of] being provided with learning (**śrutasaṁbhāra*, i.e., being well-versed in all the five *vidyāsthāna*s).

[1829] Viz., in the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*: see MATHES 1996: 61,11-12 and n. 5.

[1830] For examples, see Pt. III, §§ 495 and 496.

[1831] YBh_t P zi 302b4 (D zhi 287b3f; YBh_c 696a4-6); cf. KRAMER 2005: 69 and 101 (# 2.4); TAKAHASHI 2005: 121f. and 182 (# 1.2.3).

[1832] For the alternative "by/as" see fn. 1770. In the present case, "as" would be preferable insofar as *dharmanairātmya* <u>is</u> *tathatā*. But cf. also § 363.

[1833] For the occasional quasi-synonymity of the terms *lakṣaṇa* and *svabhāva* cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 76,13f (*tajjātikaṁ tallakṣaṇaṁ ... tatsvabhāvam*), or MSA(Bh) IX.56 (X-*lakṣaṇa* explained in the *Bhāṣya* as referring to *svabhāva*; see Pt. III, § 495.3). Similarly MSABh 25,2 + 25,10f (ad VII.1). Both passages use *lakṣaṇa* as an equivalent of *svabhāva* in the context of the stereotyped pattern *svabhāva*, *hetu*, *phala*, etc.

[1834] AS_t P li 62a8–b1 (D ri 54a1f) has *bdag med pa rnam pa gnyis dang* ..., but the AS-text in $ASVy_t$ D li 136b3f (P śi 166a1f) has only *bdag med pa dang* (D : *gang* P) ...; likewise AS_c 666a23: 何等善法真如。謂無我性。Cf. also AS 12,20 (reconstr.).

commenting on MaiQ # IV.45 (Pañcav$_K$ VI–VIII: 152,26f: *yad dharmatārūpaṁ tat ... paramārthaprabhāvitaṁ*[1835] *draṣṭavyaṁ*):

[A15] *"don dam pas rab tu phye ba" zhes bya ba ni don dam pa'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go | "rab tu phye" zhes bya ba'i sgra ni ngo bo nyid kyi don to ||*[1836]

[A15]-tr: *paramārtha-prabhāvitam*: the meaning is "[it is] of the nature of the ultimate reality" (**paramārthasvabhāvam*). The expression '[X]-*prabhāvita*' means "[X]-nature[d]"

361. Matsumoto does not categorically deny that in later texts, especially later Yogācāra texts, *prabhāvita* assumed the meaning of "[essentially/distinctively] characterized by" or "constituted by", with no aspect of causality properly speaking (i.e., implying a temporal succession of cause and effect) being involved. But as already pointed out in § 358, he rejects this meaning for 'pre-Asaṅga' Yogācāra texts, including the Saṁdh, and insists on "produced by/from" as the only meaning of *prabhāvita* in these sources. In order to eliminate evidence to the contrary, he discusses in detail quite a number of pertinent passages. For the present purpose, it should suffice to deal with three points: 1. his interpretation of the alternation of X-*prabhāvita* with X-*lakṣaṇa* (§ 362), 2. his attempt to force the meaning "produced by" even on passages where *prabhāvita* is used in definitions concerning unconditioned entities (§ 363), and 3. his dealing with occurrences of *prabhāvita* in early sources (particularly: the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*) that do not lend themselves to being interpreted in a causal sense (§ 364).

362.1. In order to maintain his causal interpretation of X-*prabhāvita* even in cases where it alternates with X-*lakṣaṇa* (used as a bahuvrīhi), Matsumoto tries to deduce, from statements like MSA IX.1-2 (vs.)

[A16] *ameyāvaraṇakṣayāt* (MSABh: *prahāṇāt*) ... *buddhatvam*

beside RGV II.4 (verse)

[A17] *buddhatvaṁ ... prahāṇa-...-lakṣaṇaṁ,*[1837]

a causal meaning of *lakṣaṇa*, taking it to mean "necessary condition" (必要条件) or "indispensable cause" (要因: M1: 201b1-4).

362.2. I do not deny that in epistemological Buddhist texts (e.g., in Dharmakīrti's works) *lakṣaṇa* is sometimes used in the sense of "necessary conditions" or, better perhaps, "requirements", as when it is stated that the absence of a thing in a place can be inferred from the fact that it is not observed or ascertained (*anupalabdhi*) there only in cases where this thing is *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta*, i.e., meets the requirements for being perceived if it were

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[1835] At the end of MaiQ # IV.45 (Pañcav$_K$ VI–VIII: 153,6f), the compound is resolved into *paramārthena prabhāvitā(ḥ)*, sc. *buddhadharmāḥ*.

[1836] Tj P no. 5206, vol. pha: 327a7-8 (D no. 3808, vol. pha: 287b6). Cf. also Jñānavajra's explanation of *prabhāvita* at Laṅk 218,12-15 as "pervaded (**vyāpta*) by them, being of their nature (**tatsvabhāvabhūta*)" (Tj P no. 5520, mDo tshogs pi 280a1f: *de dag gis khyab cing de'i rang bzhin du gyur pa'o*). Another interesting case is found in the *Dharmadhātu-prakṛty-asaṁbheda-nirdeśa* (a *Ratnakūṭa* text), where in the question **tathāgatānāṁ bodhiḥ kiṁprabhāvitā* (Kj D no. 52, dKon-brtsegs kha 161b5: *de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi byang chub ci zhig gis rab tu phye ba yin*) as well as in the subsequent series of corresponding answers °*prabhāvita* is rendered into Chinese by *Mand(a)rasena(?), a translator active in the beginning of the 6th century, as 體性: (T 11.310: 150a24, etc.), which somewhat later (150c9 and 11) corresponds to Tib. (D 163b1f) *rang bzhin* = **svabhāva*.

[1837] M1: 200b; cf. also M1: 201a: PrasP 521,13f *sarvaprapañcopaśamalakṣaṇaṁ nirvāṇam* compared with PrasP 522,1f *sarvaprapañcaparikṣayād eva tad-(=nirvāṇa-)adhigamāt*.

there — requirements that include conditions that have a causal function for the coming about of perception, like light or attention, but also perceptibility, which is hardly a cause in the strict sense of a causal relation implying a temporal sequence (cf. M1: 198b4: 時間的因果関係) but rather a *property* of the respective thing.[1838] At any rate, the basic, normal meaning of *lakṣaṇa* is no doubt "characteristic", "(essential or distinctive) mark, feature or property",[1839] both in the sense of characterizing (an entity as belonging to) a wider group of entities (*sāmānyalakṣaṇa*)[1840] and in the sense of characterizing one group, sub-group or individual as distinguished from others (*svalakṣaṇa*),[1841] as that by which an entity, or a class of entities, can be defined.[1842] The characteristic features of a thing may, to be sure, be understood to include its specific cause(s), and such a broader use of *lakṣaṇa* is not completely absent even in earlier Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources.[1843] But this would seem to be the exception, and normally the *lakṣaṇa* may, to be sure, be constitutive of a thing, but not in the sense implying a temporal sequence of cause and effect, rather in the sense of its distinctive or essential nature or own-being (*svabhāva*).[1844]

362.3. The occurrence of causal formulations beside formulations in terms of X-*lakṣaṇa* is easily explained by the fact that expressions like *kṣaya* or *prahāṇa* can be used to denote the process (→ causal relation) as well as the result (→ essential characteristic, identity). For the above-mentioned sample passages, this would suggest the following translation:

[A16]-tr: Buddhahood (is the attainment of omniscience) due to the [successfully accomplished *process* of the] vanishing of innumerable obstacles.

[A17]-tr: Buddhahood ... is characterized by [the fact] (or: as [the *state*]) [of accomplished] removal [of all obstacles] (comparable to the sun or the sky [when they are no longer veiled by clouds]).

In [A16], the focus of attention is on the *process* of vanishing, including, to be sure, its completion; but what is important here is the causal function of the process as a whole. In [A17], on the other hand, the decisive aspect is the *state* attained through and remaining after the completion of the process, the fact that all obstacles are gone (Tib. here rightly renders *prahāṇa* by the perfect form *spangs pa*).

1838 Cf., e.g., KELLNER 1997: 105f. Cf. also the detailed discussion of the expression *upalabdhilakṣaṇaprāpta* and its meaning in STEINKELLNER 2013: 26–32, showing that even in this context the *basic* meaning of *lakṣaṇa* is "characteristic".

1839 Cf., e.g., the 32 characteristic physical properties or marks of a Buddha.

1840 Cf., e.g., the four characteristics of conditioned entities (*saṁskṛtalakṣaṇāni*): YBh_{Bh} 61,7-15; YBh_t P zi 21b1ff (YBh_c 585c9ff); the term itself: YBh_t P zi 22a4.

1841 In $VinSg_{ms}$ 17b3 (YBh_t P zi 41a8; D zhi 39a4; cf. YBh_c 593c26-28), the distinctive characteristic that holds good for the whole *rūpaskandha* is its *sāmānyalakṣaṇa*, whereas the *svalakṣaṇa* is the characteristic feature of subclasses of *rūpa*. Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 59,16-21, attributing to *vijñāna* the cognition of the character (*lakṣaṇa*) of a thing as a whole, and to the *caitta*s *manaskāra*, etc., the apprehension of specific features (*lakṣaṇa*) of this thing (see § 355.2.2).

1842 Cf., e.g., AS 2,10 (reconstr.; original now in AS_{Li} 244,1: see fn. 260).

1843 Thus MSA(Bh) VIII.2–10, where the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of certain states is taken to comprise their specific cause (*kāraṇa*), nature (*svabhāva*) and function/effect (*karman*).

1844 For the semantic affinity of *lakṣaṇa* and *svabhāva*, cf., e.g., the three *lakṣaṇa*s or *svabhāva*s of Saṁdh VI, YBh_t P 'i 19b6ff (YBh_c 703a23ff), etc.

362.4. Therefore, if X-*prabhāvita* alternating with X-*lakṣaṇa* indeed designates X as a necessary, indispensable element by which a thing Y is constituted and without which it cannot exist, X should not be understood as the cause of Y but rather in the sense of the essence or an essential, distinctive property of Y. Actually, in later Buddhist logic the relation of X being a necessary condition of Y, or something without which Y is not possible (*avinā-bhāva*), not only exists between a thing (effect) and its cause but also between a thing and its 'own-being' (*svabhāva*). In my opinion, it is in the first place the latter aspect that will be expressed by *lakṣaṇa*, at least in an ontological (and not logical) perspective, which is the one we are concerned with here.

363. Even in the case of [A12] (see § 360.2), Matsumoto (M1: 205b: texts [42] and [43]) is not ready to desist from his rigorous application of the causal meaning of *prabhāvita*, for even here he translates the presumable °*prabhāvita* (*rab tu phye ba*, Ch. 所顯) as "produced by" (M1: 205b8: によって生みだされた), although he cannot but realize that Suchness (*tathatā*), being unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*),[1845] cannot be produced, as the text itself indeed explicitly confirms.[1846] Nor can the dharmas' [ultimate] lack of distinctive essence and inherent being (*dharmanairātmya*), which is not conditioned either, function as a cause (in the strict sense of the word). Matsumoto proposes solving this problem by shifting the causal relation expressed by °*prabhāvita* from the ontological to the spiritual level, i.e., he takes the statement to indicate a causal relationship between the *comprehension* (理解) of *tathatā* and the *comprehension* of *dharmanairātmya*: Without a comprehension of *dharmanairātmya* (or: as long as clinging to dharmas has not ceased), *tathatā* cannot be comprehended. The idea as such is no doubt appealing, even more since at $BoBh_D$ 28,9-11 a (preparatory) cultivation of the comprehension of *dharmanairātmya* indeed appears to be regarded as the means for fully comprehending *tathatā* as such. But would anybody express such an epistemic dependence by way of a phraseology which suggests ontological causality, as would be the case if Matsu-moto's rendering of [A12], sticking to the meaning "produced" for °*prabhāvita*, were accepted? In view of the semantic possibilities of *prabhāvita*, Matsumoto's interpretation in terms of a spiritual causality would rather suggest taking *prabhāvita* in [A12] in the sense of "revealed, manifested": *tathatā* is *revealed* [to the yogi] by [means of contemplating] *dharmanairātmya*. In view of the fact that [A12] forms part of a set of definitions of five categories (*vastu*) it would, however, appear more likely that the primary purport of the sentence is to *define tathatā* by pointing out, in the first place, its very nature or an essential characteristic, as in the parallels [A13] and [A14] adduced from somewhat later sources. Even so, I admit that the difference in phraseology may not simply be due to a predilection for brevity in the later texts. It may well be that by using *prabhāvita* the author of [A12] wants to indicate that Suchness (*tathatā*) is something more than just the negative abstract *dharma-nairātmya*, that it is rather some ineffable True Reality that is merely hinted at or 'disclosed' by the negative characterization as the dharmas' lack of self (or true individual essence and inherent being). Thus, Matsumoto's interpretation of the passage has its merits, but only on

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1845 YBh_t P 'i 6a6 (YBh_c 698a7); KRAMER 2005: 78 and 123 (# 10.2.3).

1846 The *tathatā* exists really (*dravyataḥ*) and ultimately (*paramārthataḥ*: as the object of purification) (YBh_c 696b6f; 11f; 23f), but is not produced (696c1f) and has no cause (698b6-8); cf. KRAMER 2005: 70ff and 105ff (## 3.2, 4.4, 5.4, 6.4., and 10.2.12.1-2); TAKAHASHI 2005: 123f and 184ff (## 1.3.6, 1.4.4, 1.5.4 and 1.6.4).

the condition that *prabhāvita* is, in this case, not understood as "produced by/from" but as "disclosed by".

364. As I have tried to demonstrate in the preceding paragraph, Matsumoto's view that at the time of the composition of the Saṁdh *prabhāvita* was exclusively used in the causal sense of "produced by/from" is hardly tenable since a different meaning is attested in a text incorporated into the VinSg and hence more or less contemporaneous with the Saṁdh. Actually, there are many more occurrences that do not admit of a causal interpretation, not only in the VinSg but also in earlier parts of the YBh,[1847] including the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh), which is commonly assumed to predate the Saṁdh. Matsumoto (M1: 213) is anxious to eliminate this evidence by dismissing the occurrences of *prabhāvita* in the BoBh as later interpolations, with the argument that no equivalent of *prabhāvita* is recognizable in the earlier Chinese translations by Guṇavarman (T 30.1582) and Dharmakṣema (T 30.1581). But as far as I can see, the reliability of Dharmakṣema's translation, and even more so that of Guṇavarman's, is often questionable, at least as regards details of the syntax and phraseology of the original, and sometimes even as regards the meaning. In the absence of any formal inconsistency in the transmitted Sanskrit wording of the passages concerned, I consider it much more probable that the two translators may not have bothered rendering an expression like °*prabhāvita* by a separate word in a situation where its function is similar to that of °*lakṣaṇa* or °*svabhāva* (bahuv.), i.e., comes close to a nominal equivalent of a copula,[1848] though perhaps not just a copula but rather a copula implying that the predicate is a distinctive property or essential characteristic of the subject, or perhaps a pointer or clue rather than a property strictly speaking. Besides, in addition to the two passages discussed by Matsumoto there are further interesting occurrences of *prabhāvita* in the BoBh, and I am unable to detect an internal reason justifying the assumption of a later interpolation of so many *prabhāvita*s. For a detailed analysis of the respective passages, the reader is referred to Pt. III, ch. 5.

365. In view of the preceding remarks, Matsumoto's claim that in the Saṁdh *prabhāvita* can only mean "produced by/from" because this was the only meaning current in the early period ('before Asaṅga') is hardly tenable. Actually, the occurrence of *prabhāvita* in ⓧ is not the only one in the Saṁdh, and among the other occurrences there are some that exclude a strictly causal interpretation on the same grounds as in the case of [A12], because in these Saṁdh passages, too, *prabhāvita* is used in connection with a definition or characterization of the unconditioned ultimate reality. In the VIIth chapter, e.g., "lack of own-being as the ultimate reality" (*don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid* = *paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*) is repeatedly stated to be *dharmanairātmya-prabhāvita* (*chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba*), which in my understanding amounts to a definition or at least an indication of what this lack of own-being essentially is, or consists in. It would be possible to render *X-prabhāvita* as "disclosed [as what it essentially is] by X" or as "distinguished [from other definienda] by X", but I do not see how *prabhāvita* could, in such a case, be understood in terms of a temporal-causal relation between two aspects referring to the unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*) true nature (*dharmatā*) of dharmas (*chos rnams kyi chos nyid 'dus ma byas pa*: Saṁdh 70,11f). A more detailed discussion of the pertinent Saṁdh material can be found in Pt. III, ch. 6.

[1847] For examples, see Pt. III, ch. 2 and ch. 3, respectively.

[1848] Cf. M1: 198a10-14, quoting a note on the term from TAKASAKI 1999: 264 n.3. For Matsumoto's argument that if °*prabhāvita* had a copula-like function, expressing an equation, it would not make any difference to say A-*prabhāvitam* B or B-*prabhāvitam* A, see Pt. III, § 494.6.

4. Re-examination of the Evidence: General Considerations

366. In summing up the results of his analysis of the textual evidence for ⓧ, Matsumoto (M1: 195a) asserts that all witnesses — except, perhaps, the commentary ascribed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul, a work which is, however, probably based on Saṁdh_t only and not on a Skt. original[1849] — clearly support M. Should this contention prove incontrovertible, my preceding argumentation would be pointless. But as I shall try to prove, Matsumoto's evaluation of the evidence is by no means incontestable.

367.0. Before reconsidering the various witnesses, I should like to lay stress on a methodological aspect, even though it may seem obvious. In assessing the value of a certain testimonium for the reconstruction of the lost Sanskrit text, it is indispensable to take into account the quality of this testimonium. In the case of a translation, one has to pay attention to its general standard and intention.

367.1. Thus, the canonical Tibetan translations of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṁdh_t)[1850] and the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg_t)[1851] are of a fairly high quality. In principle, they render the meaning of the original quite faithfully and are, at the same time, comparatively literal. But they also try to translate the Sanskrit original into readable Tibetan, i.e., to produce a translation that accords fairly well with the syntactical structure of the Tibetan language. This means that even though occasional misunderstandings cannot be excluded, we can, on the whole, trust these translations as reproducing the meaning and the important ("sinntragend") words of the original, especially technical terms, quite accurately. But they do not, e.g., preserve the word order of the Sanskrit sentence, to the extent that, e.g., even a sequence of main clause and subordinate clause may be inverted. In this regard, these translations follow, in the first place, the requirements of Tibetan syntax. In other respects, too, the syntax of the original is normally reflected in these translations in a way adapted to the syntax of the Tibetan language.

367.2. In contrast to this, the Tun-huang translations are often much more 'literal' but less adequate from the point of view of understanding the meaning. At least some of them (and to a certain extent Saṁdh_{TH} appears to be such a case)[1852] tend to preserve the word order of the

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[1849] STEINKELLNER 1989: 236–241. Cf. M1: 219 n. 57.

[1850] No indication of the translator(s) in the colophon. There are two versions which sometimes disagree notably, called the Eastern recension (D, P et al.) and the Western recension (sTog et al.); cf. KATO 2006.

[1851] Translated by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye shes sde around the beginning of the ninth century. On Jinamitra and Ye shes sde and their competence see DELEANU 2006: 73f and SKILLING 1997: 115–125 (esp. 122!) and 129f.

[1852] [I.] Cf., e.g., the Tun-huang version (fol. 47a4–58a3 and 63a3-5; HAKAMAYA 1986a: 608/606 and 604; 2008: 686 and 684/682) of Saṁdh V.5 and V.7 with the Sanskrit original as far as it has been preserved in TrBh *33,18–34,3 (L. 33,26–34,4): At the beginning of V.5, the word order of Saṁdh_{TH} (*'di lta ste | Yangs pa bye brag phyed pa*) corresponds exactly with that of the Skt. (*tadyathā Viśāla-mate*), against Saṁdh_t *Blo gros yangs pa 'di lta ste*. In V.7, Saṁdh_{TH} preserves the original sequence of the pādas c and d, whereas Saṁdh_t inverts it. In pāda b, Saṁdh_{TH} (*'bab las ji ltar 'byung ba'i sa bond kund*) follows the Skt. word order (*ogho yathā vartati sarvabījo*), while Saṁdh_t adapts it to

original, which sometimes makes them difficult to understand as Tibetan texts, but nevertheless most valuable for the task of reconstructing the Sanskrit original, more precisely: certain aspects of its phraseology and especially the word order. On the other hand, they are not always very reliable as far as the meaning of the text and the correct syntactical construction of the words is concerned.

367.3. As for the Chinese translations, those by *Hsüan-tsang*[1853] (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ and MSg$_{Hs}$) are excellent in rendering the meaning and normally faithful to it. But on the whole he does not hesitate to add minor clarifications or to change the syntax in accordance with the requirements of the Chinese language (though his Chinese would seem to be more Sanskrit-influenced than that of, e.g., Kumārajīva). Hsüan-tsang appears to feel more free when translating commentaries than in the case of *mūla*-texts. I do not have sufficient experience with *Dharmagupta*, but as far as I can see the character and quality of his translation (MSg$_{Dh}$) is basically similar to Hsüan-tsang's. *Paramārtha*, on the other hand, is a much more creative translator than Hsüan-tsang, and when using his translation (MSg$_{Pa}$) for reconstructing the wording, syntax and interpretation of the original one must be very careful, all the more in the case of commentaries. As for *Bodhiruci*, his translation of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (T 16.671) gives me the impression that he makes use of the original rather freely, and to a certain extent this also seems to hold good for his translation of the *Saṁdhinirmocana* (Saṁdh$_{Bo}$). Against this, *Buddhaśānta*'s translation of the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg$_{Bu}$) follows the original more

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Tibetan syntax, placing *sa bon thams cad* = *sarvabījo*, as another attribute of the subject *ādānavijñāna*, before the comparison-cum-predicate *chu bo'i klung ltar 'bab*. Apart from this, the syntax of Saṁdh$_{TH}$ is somewhat strange here (*'bab las, 'byung ba'i*), and at any rate different from that of the Sanskrit. Also at the beginning of V.5, Saṁdh$_{TH}$ *chu chen po rgyund du bab pa de la* does not exactly correspond to Skt. *mahata udakaughasya vahataḥ* (whereas Saṁdh$_t$ *chu'i klung chen po 'bab pa la* does), and *sacet* is not represented in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ except for the *na* at the end of the conditional clause (against Saṁdh$_t$ *gal te ... na*). In the apodosis, Saṁdh$_{TH}$ has *der rlabs gcig* (**tatraîkaṁ taraṅgam*?) instead of Skt. *ekam eva taraṅgam* (Saṁdh$_t$ *rlabs kyang (!) gcig kho na*, but the Western recension has only *rlabs gcig*: KATO 2006: 1207). As can be gleaned from the last example (*rlabs gcig* against Skt. *ekasya ... taraṅgasya*), to a limited extent even Saṁdh$_{TH}$ conforms to the laws of Tibetan syntax; cf. also its rendering of *tasyôdakaughasya* by *chu ... bab pa de nyid kyi* (< **tasyaîvô°*?, cf. the Western recension of Saṁdh$_t$), placing the attributive demonstrative pronoun behind the substantive in accordance with Tibetan syntax.

[II.] A systematic comparison of Saṁdh$_{TH}$ (fol. 49a1–38a5; HAKAMAYA 1987a: 320; 1987b: 604/602; 2008: 640/638/636, corresp. to Saṁdh IX.3.2–IX.6) with the corresponding portion of the long fragment from the IXth chapter published in MATSUDA 1995 would exceed the limits of this paper, but even a first glance at the initial portion of this material warns us against blindly trusting Saṁdh$_{TH}$. In IX.3, the recurrent phrase *sa tenâṅgena paripūrṇo bhavati* is rendered in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ by *des yan lag de dag yongsu rdzogs pa yi(n)no* (against Saṁdh$_t$ *de yan lag des ...*), with a strange displacement of the instrumental and a problematic *dag* (missing only in the first occurrence of the phrase). In the second sentence of IX.3.2 (*na tu śaknoti ... saṁprajānacārī bhavitum*), *tu* is not represented in Saṁdh$_{TH}$, and the equivalent of the initial *na śaknoti* is placed at the end of the sentence in accordance with Tibetan syntax. In the last sentence of IX.3.2, Saṁdh$_{TH}$ unreasonably cuts the sentence after the final dative *paripūraye*: the original ms. of Saṁdh$_{TH}$ has *yongsu rdzogs par bya ba'i phyir ro || 'bad cing ...* (in contrast to the later occurrences of the phrase, where Saṁdh$_{TH}$ has twice ... *phyir 'bad* ... and once ... *phyir | 'bad*).

[III.] For the Saṁdh$_{TH}$ version of Saṁdh VII.6 see fn. 1870, for VII.7 and VII.9 see Pt. III §§ 514 and 515.

1853 As for the quality of Hsüan-tsang's translations (especially of Yogācāra texts), see also DELEANU 2006: 109.

or less literally (though sometimes grossly misunderstanding it or faithfully reproducing mistakes in the Sanskrit original used by him),[1854] and on the whole (though not infallibly)[1855] he tends to preserve the word order of his original. His translation is therefore, somewhat like Saṁdh$_{TH}$, very valuable for reconstructing the word order of the original and certain aspects of its phraseology, but to be handled with care as far as the meaning is concerned.

368. This means that in the case of reconstructing the original wording of ⓧ the normal procedure would be to start with the canonical Tibetan translations (**Tib$_{Sa}$** and **Tib$_{MSg}$**) in order to grasp the meaning and to reach a reliable approximation of the wording (though not to the word order). The next step would be to check the meaning with the help of **Hs**. Thereafter, one should re-examine the wording and try to find clues for establishing the word order with the help of **TH** and **Bu**. **Pa** and **Bo** would be the last to be consulted. As for **Dh**, I have no clear idea and would normally use it to countercheck **Hs**, but for practical reasons I shall refer to it at the end.

369. In a second step, the result of the examination of these testimonia should be checked against the Indian commentaries, i.e., in the first place, the explanation of the quotation of Saṁdh VIII.7 in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-bhāṣya* (**Bh**) ascribed to Vasubandhu and in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-upanibandhana* (**U**) of *Asvabhāva. As regards these explanations, the relative importance of the Tibetan translations (**Bh$_t$**, **U$_t$**) for reconstructing the original wording is even greater than in the case of ⓧ itself, because in the case of commentaries the Chinese versions tend to be even less literal than in the case of *mūla*-texts. The value of the explanation of ⓧ in the commentary on Saṁdh VIII by Ye shes snying po (Jñānagarbha: **Jñg**) is problematic, even more so that of the commentary ascribed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul (**Bych**); for the latter commentary was written in Tibet (probably by Klu'i rgyal mtshan),[1856] so that its testimony cannot be acknowledged as direct evidence for the Skt. original, and the same may be true of Jñānagarbha's commentary as well.[1857]

370. Matsumoto obviously presupposes a different evaluation of the testimonia. This is most conspicuous in his treatment of **Tib** as well as **Bh$_t$** and **U$_t$**, which he considers to have misconstrued the sentence and (in the case of **Tib$_{MSg}$**, **Bh$_t$** and **U$_t$**) to be flawed with textual mistakes, because otherwise they would contradict his position. Likewise, **Hs** is not taken

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[1854] Cf., e.g., MSg II.11 and 12, where instead of MSg$_t$. *sna tshogs kyi rnam par/pas* ("manifold") MSg$_{Bu}$ (101b21 and c1) has 畫師 ("painter"), obviously based on a miscopying or misreading of **citrākāra* as **citrakāra*. Another case is Buddhaśānta's (109a17) odd rendering of *yathārhataḥ* ("as suitable in each case", cf. Tib. *ji ltar 'os 'os su*) as 如羅漢 ("like an arhat['s]") in MSg VIII.20.a (=ASBh 42,4). It would be easy to add further examples.

[1855] To give just one example: in MSg VIII.20.f (= ASBh 42,14f), Buddhaśānta (109a27f), apart from ignoring the negations (*'vikalpe*, *sarvārthākhyānato*) as well as *hi* in the first line, reverses the sequence of the elements of the compound *sarvārthākhyāna* (現一切義), which would be in agreement with Chinese syntax if *(ā)khyāna* (thus Bu.) were a transitive action noun. In pāda c (*arthābhāvo 'vagantavyaḥ* [ed. *'pa°*]), he correctly adapts the word order to Chinese syntax (應知無義事). In the somewhat difficult pāda d (*vijñaptes tadabhāvataḥ*, i.e.: "[and] on account of the non-existence of the [object, one should comprehend the ultimate non-existence] of [its] cognition/representation [as well]"; cf. MSg$_t$ *de med pas na rnam rig med*), he unduly reverses the position of *vijñapti* (記) and the demonstrative pronoun (彼) that belongs to *abhāva*, and ignores the ablative-suffix °*tas*. (彼記永所無).

[1856] See fn. 1849.

[1857] STEINKELLNER 1989: 231–233. Cf. M1: 219 n. 52, and DELHEY 2013: 537fn. 195.

seriously, whereas **Pa** is (apart from **Dh**) almost the corner-stone of his reconstruction, and **TH** is given more weight than **Tib** not only with regard to the word order but also with regard to the syntactical structure of the original. But let me now reconsider the testimonia one by one.

5. Re-examination of the Evidence: The Basic Texts

5.1. The Canonical Tibetan Translation (Tib)

> **Tib**: (ⓨ *gzugs brnyan de rnam par rig pa tsam du zad pa'i phyir te* |) ⓧ (*byams pa*) *rnam par shes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba* (*can*) *yin no zhes ngas bshad do* ||

371.0. In the case of **Tib**, we have to distinguish between **Tib**$_{Sa}$ and **Tib**$_{MSg}$ (see § 367.1). In both of them, the syntactical structure of ⓧ is crystal clear: Subj (= 'theme') *ni* PredN (= 'comment') *yin no zhes ngas bshad do*. The Subj is, in both versions, *rnam par shes pa* = *vijñāna*, and the PredN is, in **Tib**$_{Sa}$, *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba*, whereas **Tib**$_{MSg}$ adds *can*.[1858]

371.1. Matsumoto takes the PredN in **Tib**$_{Sa}$ as substantive + attribute (in appositional position). At first glance, the Tibetan sentence governed by *iti* would then mean

> ⓐ I (have) declare(d) that mind is an objective support that is distinctively/essentially characterized[1859] by [being] (Matsumoto: has been produced by) representation only. (= [T2] in S 1984: 436)

This hardly makes much sense.[1860] Matsumoto therefore maintains that the Tibetan translators have confounded Subj and PredN, i.e., have mistranslated a Sanskrit original supposed to have been identical with Ⓜ.[1861] But the normal sequence of words in a simple nominal Sanskrit sentence with a nominal Subj as the 'theme' and the PredN as the 'comment' supplying the new or emphasized information is "PredN–Subj".[1862] This means that **Tib** is almost certainly right to take *vijñānam* as the Subj. Since **ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* does not make good sense as a predicate, we should try to understand the Tibetan phrase differently.

371.2. There are three possibilities:

[1858] At MSgU$_t$ P li 303b5f (D ri 249b1: ad MSg III.17), ⓧ is quoted in the form *rnam par shes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pas rab tu phye ba can no zhes ngas bshad do*, i.e., without *tsam* = *mātra* and without *yin*.

[1859] I keep this rendering of *prabhāvita* (for details, see fn. 1770) even for the Tibetan and Chinese translations as long as it fits the purport of the passage.

[1860] BUESCHER may disagree: see § 399.2.1, along with my response.

[1861] That the canonical Tibetan translation of ⓧ may have been influenced by Hsüan-tsang's translation of the sentence via SaṁdhṬ$_t$ (M1: 216f n. 28) is highly improbable, even from a syntactical point of view; for as Matsumoto himself remarks, the subject of ⓧ in SaṁdhṬ$_t$ is not *rnam par shes pa* but *rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa* (see § 385).

[1862] See fn. 1754.

1. One is to take *dmigs pa* as the object of *rnam par rig pa*, presupposing *vijñapti* to be used as an action noun, so that the sentence would mean

ⓑ I (have) declare(d) that mind (i.e., sensory or cognitive awareness) is distinctively /essentially characterized by [being] a mere cognition/representation of [its] objective support. (≈ [T1] in S 1984: 436)

This would correspond to my translations [S1] or [S2] (§ 352). Actually, it is probably more or less in this way that the sentence would, at first glance at least, be understood by a traditionally trained Tibetan scholar.[1863]

2. The second possibility would seem to be an appositional relationship of *dmigs pa* and *rnam par rig pa tsam* (in this case to be taken as designating the product or content), corresponding to my translation [S6A] (§ 357.5):

ⓒ I (have) declare(d) that mind is distinctively/essentially characterized by an objective support that is a mere representation (= appearance).

3. Yet another possibility is to take the PredN as a nominalized sentence with its own subject and predicate, which is perfectly possible in Tibetan syntax[1864], so that the sentence would mean:

ⓓ: I (have) declare(d) that mind is [an entity] the objective support [of which] is distinctively/essentially characterized by [being] a mere representation (= appearance).

In this case, too, *vijñapti* would seem to be used in its resultative or objective meaning.

371.3. Both ⓑ, ⓒ and ⓓ unambiguously presuppose a PredN consisting of a single compound word, i.e., **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, hence [S]. In ⓑ and ⓒ this compound is understood as an adjectival case-tatpuruṣa (X^{instr}-*prabhāvita*, X being either another tatpuruṣa with an objective genitive as prior member or a karmadhāraya). In ⓓ the compound is interpreted as if it were an irregular bahuvrīhi with inverted members (i.e., **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* instead of **vijñaptimātraprabhāvitālambana*). The authors of $\mathbf{Tib}_{MSg}$ obviously opted for the latter possibility (ⓓ) because they added *can* at the end of the PredN, thus clearly marking it as a bahuvrīhi, corresponding to my translation [S4] (§ 352).

372.1. Matsumoto (M1: 148a, 164b) rejects the latter interpretation with the argument that a bahuvrīhi with inverted members is impossible, at least in a text like the Saṁdh. He discards my reference to cases like *putrahata* or *putrajāta* (*AiGr* II.1: 302f), considering such an irregular type of bahuvrīhi compound to be incompatible with the simple style of a text like the Saṁdh. Taking his reconstruction [M] for granted, he rather thinks that the Tibetan translators may have wrongly taken **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as a bahuvrīhi (M1: 165a, 171a), or that *can* is merely a corruption (M1: 145b).

372.2. But surely the Tibetan translators were not so silly as to take the current expression X-*prabhāvita*, which must have been quite familiar to them, as a bahuvrīhi (which is altogether absurd: see also § 374). There is absolutely no reason for an insertion of *can* unless someone expressly wanted to mark the more complex expression (i.e., *dmigs pa ... rab tu*

[1863] Cf. BUESCHER 2008: 180,27-29 (referring to Tarab Tulku).

[1864] For an attributive use of a nominalized sentence with a subject of its own see, e.g., MSg II.29.3: *sa khong na gser yod pa* ("soil in the interior [of which] there is gold"); cf. also SCHWIEGER 2006: 175: *khron pa gting rgya shin tu che ba* "a very deep well" (lit.: "a well the depth [of which is] very great").

phye ba) as a bahuvrīhi. I suppose that either the translators[1865] or the revisors of MSg$_t$ deliberately added *can* for the sake of making clear that what was meant is ⓓ, not ⓑ or ⓒ, let alone ⓐ. After all, formations like *putrahata* are recognized even by the native grammarians as inverted bahuvrīhis.[1866]

372.3. Besides, since we have only a few fragments of the original text of the Saṁdh and thus know little about its style, it may be difficult to exclude, *a priori*, the occurrence of irregular compounds, especially in view of the fact that instances of compounds with an irregular sequence of members are by no means unknown in Buddhist texts. Especially interesting are two instances of compounds from the MSA which very much look like bahuvrīhis with inverted members, viz., IX.3d *prabhāvamahatāṁ* (gen.pl.) in the sense of *mahāprabhāvānām*, and IX.12d *viṣayasumahato* instead of *sumahāviṣayasya*, paraphrased in the MSABh (36,2) as *anantajñeyaviṣaya-* (bahuv.). Theoretically, it may, to be sure, be possible to understand such compounds as "great as regards their power", "very extensive as regards its objects". Analogously, one might understand **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as "characterized by *vijñaptimātra* as regards its object". Even so, I readily admit that these compounds look somewhat unusual.

372.4. There is, however, no need to assume that the Saṁdh itself had used the expression **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* in the sense of such an irregular bahuvrīhi or 'relational compound'. If my understanding of the text is correct, what the sūtra had in mind is a double entendre in the sense of [S1] + [S5] (or [S6A/B]), which does not require the bahuvrīhi interpretation. It was probably the Tibetan translators, especially those of MSg$_t$, who chose to render, or interpret, the compound ad sensum as if it were a bahuvrīhi with inverted members,[1867] perhaps under the influence of its commentarial explanation in MSgU (see § 395: U-rec(S) {2a} and § 397.5).

373. In this way, the Tibetan translation of ⓧ makes perfect sense as it stands, and there is no need to charge the otherwise excellent Tibetan translators (and transmitters) with all kinds of silly mistakes (confounding the syntax, introducing a nonsensical *can*), merely for the sake of rendering their translation suitable for being based on [M]. As it stands, **Tib** clearly presupposes [S] as its original. **Tib**$_{Sa}$, admitting of translations ⓑ, ⓒ and ⓓ as it does, may even be considered to have aptly rendered the double entendre assumed by me for ⓧ (though I would not dare to pretend that it was actually calculated to do so by the translators).

374. Like Matsumoto, Buescher (B: 180,19ff) charges the translators of Saṁdh$_t$ as well as those of MSg$_t$ with having misunderstood the passage by making *vijñāna* instead of *ālambana* the definiendum (and grammatical subject) of ⓧ. In contrast to Matsumoto, however, he (B: 182–184) accepts the presence of a bahuvrīhi compound as indicated by the particle *can* in **Tib**$_{MSg}$, but at the same time he (B: 183,22-25) accuses me of not having properly recognized

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[1865] In view of the striking coincidence of the wording, it is hard not to get the impression that the translators of MSg$_t$ made use of the canonical version of Saṁdh$_t$, making only a few changes and omitting those phrases which (as confirmed by Buddhaśānta) were lacking in the Sanskrit original of the MSg.

[1866] Cf. *AiGr* II.1: 303.

[1867] Or, in the case of **Tib**$_{Sa}$, perhaps as a kind of exocentric sentence-compound, like *sarvabhūtātmabhūta* at Laṅk 248,15, which in a Buddhist context can hardly mean anything but "[a bodhisattva <u>for whom</u>] all beings (*bhūta*) are [like] himself (*ātmabhūta*)", regardless of its original meaning in a Hindu context.

this bahuvrīhi compound and its relation. I am afraid the fault is his, for what he takes as a bahuvrīhi allegedly qualifying *ālambanaṁ* is the expression *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam*. This expression, however, can hardly be analysed as a bahuvrīhi compound, and Buescher does not bother to explain us how he thinks it could.[1868] Actually, he renders the expression as "(one that is) manifested by a purely noetic constitution". This rendering is (at any rate syntactically) perfectly correct, but it is surely not the rendering of a bahuvrīhi. It is, on the contrary, the rendering of an instrumental tatpuruṣa (with a perfect passive participle as second member). In fact, it is in the sense of instrumental tatpuruṣas ("produced/constituted/manifested/distinguished by X") or, occasionally, ablative tatpuruṣas ("produced /arisen from X") that compounds with *prabhāvita* as final member are regularly used (cf. the material collected in Pt. III). Thus, if the bahuvrīhi marker *can* is taken seriously, as it surely has to be (see § 372.2), its scope cannot be limited to *rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba*, but has to be accorded a wider scope, viz., *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba*, marking this whole phrase as a bahuvrīhi. It hence has to be understood as presupposing a compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, as in [S], interpreted in the sense of ⓓ (see §§ 371.2–371.3).

5.2. The Tibetan Translation from Tun-huang (TH)

TH: ⓨ① *rnam par rig pa tsam gyi phyir te* | ⓨ② *gzugs brnyan de la* ⓧ① *dmyigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam du rab du bsgoms pa ste* | ⓧ② *byams pa ngas rnam par rig pa zhes bshado* ‖ (see fn. 1735)

375.0. **TH** is one of the main witnesses adduced by both Matsumoto and Buescher for [M] / [B]. Matsumoto's main argument is that **TH** splits ⓧ into two, adding *ste*| just after *rab du bsgoms pa* = °*prabhāvita*. But we must be careful.

375.1. It is true that Saṁdh$_{TH}$ is extremely valuable for the reconstruction of the Sanskrit original because it tends to mirror the essential features of the word order of the latter. In particular, **TH** supports the assumption, suggested by **Bu** (ch. 5.3) and the Tibetan commentaries on MSg II.7 (ch. 6.1.1 and ch. 6.2.1), that in ⓧ **ālambana*°...°*prabhāvitaṁ* comes first and *vijñānam* later. It also shows that in ⓨ *vijñaptimātratvāt* preceded *tasya pratibimbasya* (cf. also **Bo**: ch.5.6),[1869] since **TH** construes *tasya pratibimbasya* not with the preceding (viz., ⓨ① *vijñaptimātratvāt*) but with the following (viz., ⓧ①). Moreover, **TH** indicates that in the Sanskrit original the vocative followed after °*prabhāvitam*, i.e., formed part of the second half of ⓧ, rendered in **TH** as a sentence of its own.

375.2. On the other hand, **TH** may be less reliable as a witness for the syntactical structure of the original[1870] and for the determination of its purport. **TH**'s construction of *tasya prati-*

[1868] For analysing *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as a bahuvrīhi, we would have to take *prabhāvita*, exceptionally, as an action noun, i.e., understand the compound to be analysed as "the production /manifestation of which is [by/from] representation only"). But I fail to see any serious reason why any Tibetan translator should have skipped the obvious and regular analysis of this compound as a case tatpuruṣa in favour of such a far-fetched (if not practically impossible) and utterly arbitrary interpretation as a bahuvrīhi.

[1869] See also M1: 152b8f.

[1870] Cf. the remarks in fn. 1852. Cf. also HAKAMAYA 1987a: 348,17-19 (2008: 670,5f: S. no. 683, b1f): *gang chos rnams gyi chos la bdag myed pa'o* || *de ni de dag ste ngo bo nyid myed ces bya'o* ||. In this passage (for which see § 513), the relative clause has erroneously been cut off from the correlative

bimbasya with what follows instead of with the preceding *vijñaptimātratvāt* is not supported by the other versions (**Tib**$_{Sa}$, **Bo**, **Hs**) and is, as Matsumoto (M1: 152a), too, admits, quite unnatural (for Buescher's suggestion of a double bind construction see § 447.4). Likewise, **TH**'s rendering of *prabhāvita* as *rab du bsgoms pa* ("intensely cultivated"),[1871] though exactly mirroring the formation of the word, is not in agreement with the current connotations of this expression but rather based on the usual meaning of the simplex *bhāvita* or on that of *paribhāvita*. Apart from this, for the assessment of **TH** it should be kept in mind that, generally speaking, Saṁdh$_{TH}$ does not always preserve the word order of the Sanskrit original in all minute details.[1872] One example is **TH**'s rendering of *tasya pratibimbasya* by *gzugs brnyan de la* (anteposition of the demonstrative pronoun in Sanskrit but postposition according to the rules of Tibetan syntax). Some caution may also be called for with regard to the position of the vocative, for as far as I can see on the basis of spot checks, in this respect Saṁdh$_{TH}$ does not slavishly reproduce the Sanskrit word order (enclitic position of vocatives) but tends to place the vocative at or near the beginning of the sentence, with only conjunctions or adverbs like *yang*, *de la*, *'di lta ste*, etc., preceding the vocative. Finally, even Saṁdh$_{TH}$ does not indicate the presence (or absence) of particles like *hi* in a reliable way.[1873] The use of *(s)te* may sometimes indicate the occurrence of *hi* in the original,[1874] but hardly its position. Thus, **TH** cannot unreservedly be trusted to mirror the details of the word order and the syntactical structure of the Sanskrit original of ⓧ. In addition, as I shall try to show (§§ 377–381.3), even the syntactical structure of **TH** itself is not unambiguous in the passage under discussion.

376.1. For these reasons, the reconstruction of the Sanskrit original of **TH** is, in decisive details, fraught with uncertainties, with the result that the reconstructions proposed so far diverge. Matsumoto and Buescher feel entitled to reconstruct **TH** in a way coinciding with [M] and [B], respectively:

> TH-rec1[M] (ⓨ added by me): ⓨ① **vijñaptimātratvāt* {|} ⓨ② *tasya pratibimbasya* ⟨|⟩ ⓧ① *ālambanaṁ hi vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ* ⓧ② *Maitreya vijñānam iti mayôktam* | (M1: 153b: = [M])

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clause by the final particle (*'o* ||), and in the correlative sentence *de dag ste* instead of Saṁdh VII.6 (68,29) *de dag gi* is puzzling.

[1871] Similarly in VII.6, VII.7 and VII.9 (HAKAMAYA 1987a: 348,20; 346,4; 346,10; 2008: 670,7, 15 and 21), but in X.9 (HAKAMAYA 1987b: 576,12; 2008: 610,13) *prabhāvita* is rendered in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ by *skyes pa* ("arisen"). See Pt. III, ch. 6.

[1872] Cf. the remarks in fn. 1852.

[1873] Cf., e.g., HAKAMAYA 1987a: 334,3f (2008: 656,1f): *byams pa chos gang yang chos gang la yang rtog pa myed mod kyi | de ltar sems skyes pas de de ltar snango*, corresponding to Saṁdh 91,8-11: *na hi Maitreya tatra kaścid dharmaḥ kaṁcid dharmaṁ pratyavekṣate, api tu tathā samutpannaṁ tac cittaṁ yat tathā khyāti* (see fn. 2072). Here, *hi* is not represented at all in Saṁdh$_{TH}$. Apart from this, *tatra* is not represented either (Saṁdh 91,9 has *de la*); the negated verb *pratyavekṣate* (Saṁdh 91,9: *rtog par mi byed* = "does not contemplate") is rendered by a negated action noun (*rtog pa med* = "lacks contemplation"). In the second part of the sentence, the syntax of the Sanskrit, viz., "this [moment of] mind (*citta*) has arisen in such a way that (*yat*) it appears thus", has been transformed in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ into "because (*(pa)s*) this [moment of] mind has arisen in such a way it appears thus", with the effect that the word order in Saṁdh$_{TH}$ diverges slightly from the Sanskrit (*sems*3 *skyes-pas*1 *de*2 instead of *samutpannam*1 *tac*2 *cittam*3) and that there is no separate equivalent for *yat* in Saṁdh$_{TH}$.

[1874] See fn. 1748.

TH-rec1[B]: ⓨ① **vijñaptimātratvāt* ⓨ② *tasya pratibimbasya* ⓧ① *ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ* ⓧ② *Maitreya mayā vijñānam ity uktam* | (B: 185,1f: = [B])

In contradistinction to this, my own attempt (see S 1987 II: 382 n. 625) presupposed an original compatibility with [S], with a possible corruption of *ālambana-* to *ālambanaṁ*, and would, if *hi* is tentatively added, run as follows (with actual or possible corruptions /misunderstandings presupposed by **TH** enclosed in {}):

TH-rec2[S]: ⓨ① **vijñaptimātratvāt* {|} ⓨ② *tasya pratibimbasya* ⟨|⟩ ⓧ① *ālambana{ṁ?}vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ* (*hi*) ⓧ② *Maitreya mayā vijñānam uktam* |.

376.2. It is obvious that a clarification of the position of *hi* (cf. § 349.2) would perhaps settle the question whether ⓧ should be reconstructed in terms of [M]/[B] or [S]. However, as has already been indicated (§ 375.2), such a clarification is hardly possible on the basis of **TH**, not to mention the other versions; if it is at all, it would only be possible by taking into account the rules and stylistic habits of word order in Sanskrit prose, more specifically: in the prose style of Mahāyāna sūtras (cf. §§ 349.2 and 446). As for the position of *mayā*, my reconstruction (TH-rec2[S]), like Buescher's (TH-rec1[B]), follows **TH**, whereas Matsumoto's (TH-rec1[M]) deviates from the word order of **TH** by placing *mayā* after *vijñānam* (as **Bu** does: see ch. 5.3) — a position which would not disturb my reconstruction either. On the other hand, TH-rec2[S] presupposes, in contrast to TH-rec1[M] and TH-rec1[B], that *zhes* in ⓧ② does not render Skt. *iti* but is rather an idiomatic element of the Tibetan translation in connection with the *verbum dicendi* (cf. § 351.2). Actually, the reading **mayā vijñānam ity uktam* (with the scope of *iti* limited to *vijñānam*), proposed in TH-rec1[B] (Buescher), would be compatible with [M]/[B] and perhaps even with [S] as possibly understood in **TH** (cf. §§ 380.1–381.2), but hardly with [S] as understood by me (see ch. 3). On the other hand, *vijñānam iti mayoktam*, proposed in TH-rec1[M], may not be incompatible with the original purport of [S] either (cf. § 351.2). Since even Saṁdh$_{TH}$ sometimes diverges in minor details from the wording or word order of the original (cf. fn. 1852), we may even consider the possibility that there was an *iti* in the original but that its function and position did not exactly correspond to that of *zhes* in **TH**, so that a reconstruction like

TH-rec3: ⓧ① ... *°*prabhāvitaṁ* ⓧ② *iti* (*hi*) *Maitreya mayā vijñānam uktam* |[1875]

may not be excluded. This phraseology would work with [S] as well as with [M]/[B]. If ⓧ① is reconstructed in terms of [S] (**ālambanavi°*), the *iti*-phrase would be equivalent to the PredN of the *verbum dicendi*, with *vijñānaṁ* as the subject (or object, if the original had **ahaṁ vadāmi* instead of **mayôktam*). If ⓧ① is reconstructed in terms of [M]/[B] (*ālambanaṁ vi°**), the *iti*-phrase could perhaps be understood in a causal sense (cf. §§ 444 and 454.2.1), or *iti hi* ("thus, indeed") could be taken as introducing a new sentence containing a resumé or conclusion (as, e.g., in Aṣṭ 15,28, 20,13f, 89,16, etc.), and this would anyway be how the Tun-huang translator took it, regardless of whether in ⓧ① his original agreed with [S] or with [M]/[B].

377.0. As indicated above, one of the reasons for dissent concerning the reconstruction of the original on which **TH** is based is the fact that the Tibetan sentence itself is not free from difficulties and ambiguities.

[1875] For the problems of the precise form of the *verbum dicendi* and for the problem of the pronoun of the first person sg. and its position see §§ 351.1 and 351.3. One of the problems is that in **TH** the pronoun of the first person precedes **vijñānam*, whereas in **Bu** (識我說) it is the other way round.

377.1. It is obvious that, apart from construing **tasya pratibimbasya* with ⓧ, **TH** divides ⓧ into two halves connected by the particle *ste*. However, such a division into two sentences does not suggest itself in any of the previous reconstructions of the Sanskrit original. In fact, the only reconstruction which would explain why the translator(s) of **TH** could punctuate after *°prabhāvitaṁ* without violating the syntax of the Sanskrit text is TH-rec3, for it is only here that what follows, i.e. ⓧ②, may be taken as a correct sentence on its own. In the other reconstructions (TH-rec1[M], TH-rec1[B], TH-rec2[S]) this sentence would have to start with a vocative, which is impossible.

377.2. As Matsumoto's rendering of **TH** ⓧ[1876] suggests, the translator of **TH** probably understood both *°prabhāvitam* in ⓧ① and *vijñānam* in ⓧ② as predicate nouns. Still, even if this is taken for granted, it does not automatically settle the question whether **TH** presupposes 🄼 or 🅂. As far as I can see, the passage allows of more than one interpretation, both syntactically and as regards the meaning. The crucial question is the syntactical position of *dmyigs pa* in ⓧ①, but in order to understand the purport of **TH** we must also pay due attention to the fact that it construes ⓨ② (*gzugs brnyan de la* = *tasya pratibimbasya*) with ⓧ① and not with ⓨ①. When evaluating the various possibilities, we should, of course, also take into account their respective compatibility with the presumable Sanskrit original and their logical consistency. Although we cannot perhaps be sure to what extent the translator's understanding of the Sanskrit text and of the argument was flawless, we should give him the benefit of the doubt and try our best to find out how he may have read and understood the passage.

378. According to Matsumoto's understanding of **TH**, *dmyigs pa* in ⓧ①is the subject of both ⓧ① and ⓧ②, which would mean that **TH** read *ālambanaṁ* and is thus based on 🄼 (see TH-rec1[M] in § 376.1). Matsumoto shares my opinion that **TH** misconstrues *tasya pratibimbasya*, and for this reason he disregards *gzugs brnyan de la* in his assessment of the meaning of ⓧ. But as pointed out above (§ 377.2), when trying to find out the Tibetan translator's own understanding of the passage we cannot disregard it. Taking this into account, I propose, on the basis of Matsumoto's syntactical analysis,[1877] the following translation of the passage:

TH-tr1A: ⓣ [The image which is the object of meditative concentration] is not different /separate from the [contemplating] mind (*citta*) ...,
ⓨ① because [it = the image] is nothing but representation;
ⓨ② for (... *te*) in the case of this image [which is the object of meditative concentration], ⓧ① the objective support (*dmyigs pa* = **ālambanaṁ*) [of the contemplating mind] has been intensely cultivated [and produced /made to appear] (*rab du bsgoms pa* = *prabhāvita*) as a mere representation,
ⓧ② and [thus] (... *ste*), O Maitreya, I (have) explain(ed) [it = the objective support, i.e., the image] to be representation (*rnam par rig pa*, but Skt. *vijñāna* = awareness, i.e., mind (*citta*)).

From the point of view of logical form, this makes good sense. The argument would start with the thesis (ⓣ) followed by the reason (ⓨ①), continue with an explication of the reason (ⓨ② +ⓧ①: "amplified reason"), and end with a conclusion (ⓧ②).

[1876] M1: 153b ⑭: ālambana は、vijñapti-mātra-prabhāvita である。 つまり、Maitreya よ、私によって〔ālambana は〕vijñāna であると説かれた。

[1877] See fn. 1876.

379.1. But there are also problems. One of them is the syntactical integration of the expressions *gzugs brnyan de la*, which I have loosely rendered as "in the case of this image" because this seems to be the only way it can reasonably be incorporated into TH-tr1A. But in the reconstructed Sanskrit of both [M]/[B] and [S], the genitive **tasya pratibimbasya* (for which no alternative appears feasible) hardly admits of being construed in this way. The natural meaning of the phrase **tasya pratibimbasya ālambanaṁ*, presupposed by **TH** read in terms of [M] and [B], would doubtless be "the objective support *of* this image", which, however, does not make good sense since the image *is* the objective support (*samādhigocara* ≈ *ālambana*).[1878] Buescher's (B: 185 n. 1) rendering, viz., "that image's [appearance as noematic] reference point", would make sense but is supplemented in a way that is inacceptable from the point of view of grammar (see § 447.4).

379.2. One might also consider the possibility that *la* was prompted by *dmyigs pa* since the latter is often used as a verb or verbal noun construed with *la*, both in the sense of "perception" or "apprehension" (*upa-√labh*, *upalabdhi*, etc.) and as a rendering of *ā-√lamb* ("to lay hold of or take something as an objective support", "to apprehend") or verbal nouns derived from this verb.[1879] Actually, this is obviously the way Tibetan scholars tend to understand the text.[1880] We would then have to translate the passage as follows:

TH-tr1B: ... ⓨ① because [it = the image] is nothing but representation;

ⓧ① + ⓨ② for [the act of] apprehending that image has been intensely cultivated (Skt.: is distinctively/essentially characterized) as a mere representation [of that image] (*rnam par rig pa tsam du*),

ⓧ② and [thus], O Maitreya, I (have) explain(ed) [it = the image?] to be representation (Skt.: awareness = mind).

In this interpretation, **tasya pratibimbasya* could, in the Sanskrit reconstructions presupposing [M] or [B], easily be construed as an objective genitive depending on the action noun **ālambanaṁ*.

380.0. There is, however, one more problem, viz., the fact that *dmyigs pa*, which in TH-tr1A and TH-tr1B is construed as the grammatical subject, or theme, is not unambiguously characterized as such in the Tibetan text (i.e., it is not marked off by the particle *ni*). To be sure, such a characterization is not compulsory,[1881] but in view of the resulting ambiguity I

1878 Cf. Jñānagarbha (NOZAWA 1957: 21,14f): *dmigs par bya ba ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan*, and Paramārtha's rendering of *samādhigocara* as 定心所緣境 (MSg$_{Pa}$ 118b26). Cf. also ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 195,7f (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 44,15 + 46,1): *tasya tasmin samaye ... tat pratibimbam ālambanaṁ bhavati.*

1879 Cf., e.g., *bde ba la dmigs pa* = *sukhopalabdhi* (*NEGI* 10: 4569b); AKBh$_t$ D ku 54a2 *rang gi don* (...) *la dmigs pa(r bya ba la)* = *svārthopalabdhi°* (AK II.2a), *svārthasyôpalabdhau* (AKBh 39,7); 95b1 *nam mkha' dang mya ngan las 'das pa la dmigs pa'i shes pa med pa la dmigs par 'gyur ro* = 93,13f *ākāśanirvāṇālambana⟨ṁ?⟩ vijñānam asadālambanaṁ syāt*; 105a3f *skye mched bcu gnyis la dmigs pa* = 106,15 *dvādaśāyatanālambanaṁ* (sc. *manovijñānam*). Tib. seems to take the expression X-*ālambana* not as a bahuvrīhi ("having X as its objective support") but rather as a case-tatpuruṣa with an adjectival agent noun (cf. *AiGr* II.2: 180 # 81) as its second member ("leaning on X [as its objective support]", "apprehending X").

1880 Cf. B: 180,15-17, referring to TARAB Tulku. Similarly Dorji WANGCHUK (oral communication).

1881 Cf., e.g., Saṁdh VII.9 (70,19-21): *ngas "chos thams cad* (Subj) *ma skyes pa...'o* (PredN)*" zhes bstan to*. But even here Saṁdh$_{TH}$ (HAKAMAYA 1987a: 346,10-12; 2008: 670,21-23: *ngas ... bshad pa "ma skyes pa ... ni chos thams cad do"*), though preserving the presumable word order of the original,

myself find its absence somewhat surprising.[1882] Not marked as the subject, *dmyigs pa* might as well be construed as the *object* of the verbal noun *rnam par rig pa*. Actually, the formulation *dmyigs pa rnam par rig pa* strongly suggests the compound *ālambanavijñapti*, as in the case of YBh_t P dzi 3b6 (D tshi 3a6) = YBh_{Bh} 5,16 (see § 355.1.2) or $PSkV_t$ P hi 45a1 (see § 462.2).[1883] In this case, **TH** would, of course, presuppose an original conforming to [S] (see TH-rec2[S] in § 376.1), not [M] or [B]. Once again, the problem is how to construe *gzugs brnyan de la* and its Sanskrit equivalent **tasya pratibimbasya*.

380.1. If *dmyigs pa* is taken in the sense of "objective support", we would have to understand *gzugs brnyan de la dmyigs pa rnam par rig pa* in the sense of "an object[-related] representation referring to that image". In the Sanskrit reconstruction (TH-rec2[S]: **tasya pratibimbasya ālambanavijñapti°*), the genitive could be taken as an objective genitive dependent on *(ālambana)vijñapti*. A translation of **TH** would then run as follows:

TH-tr2: ⓣ [The image ...] is not different/separate from the [contemplating] mind (**citta*),
ⓨ① because [it = this image] is nothing but representation;
ⓧ① for (... *te*) [it = this image is not an external thing but] has been intensely cultivated [and produced /made to appear] (*rab du bsgoms pa* = **prabhāvita*) as a mere object-*representation* (*dmyigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam* = **ālambanavijñaptimātra*)
ⓨ② referring to (Skt.: of) this image,
ⓧ② and [thus] (... *ste*), O Maitreya, I (have) explain(ed) [it = the image] to be representation (*rnam par rig pa*, but Skt. *vijñāna* = awareness, i.e., mind *(citta)*).

380.2. Alternatively, we may, in this case, too, suppose that the translator of **TH** understood *dmyigs pa* as a verbal noun to be construed with *la* (see § 379.2), taking the phrase **tasya pratibimbasya ālambanavijñaptimātra°* to mean "a mere representation objectifying (i.e., visualizing) this image",[1884] with **tasya pratibimbasya* as an objective genitive depending on the first member of the compound **ālambanavijñapti°*.[1885] As a case that is parallel in this regard, one could adduce Saṁdh VIII.37.1.2 (see § 355.1.3: [A5]), where sTog translates a presumable original **citrākārālambanavijñapti* ("representation of manifold objective supports") as *rnam pa sna tshogs la dmigs pa'i rnam par rig pa* ("representation objectifying [i.e., apprehending] manifold [things, or: various forms]"). A similar transformation would no doubt also make excellent sense in the passage under discussion. Yet, **TH** does not modify the phrase to that extent and keeps *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa*, without a genitive

viz., **mayoktam anutpannāḥ* ... (PredN) *sarvadharmāḥ* (Subj), separates the two elements by inserting *ni*.

[1882] Thus, in a similar construction in Saṁdh VII.6 (68,30f) we find the pattern "Subj *ni* PredN" in both the canonical version (*don dam pa ni* ... *ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis rab tu phye ba yin pas*)[1] and $Saṁdh_{TH}$ (HAKAMAYA 1987a: 348,19f; 2008: 670,6f: *dond dam pa ni* ... *ngo bo nyid myed pa la rab du goms pa'o*).

[1] sTog vol. 63 [na]: 24b5f reads *med pas* for *med pa nyid kyis* and *yin te* for *yin pas*.

[1883] At YBh_{Bh} 11,8 and 12,1 *ālambanavijñapti* is rendered as *dmigs pa rnam par rig par byed pa* (YBh_t P dzi 6b3 and 7a4; D tshi 5b5 and 6a4f).

[1884] Or: "a mere representation [consisting in (epexegetic genitive) an act of] objectifying (i.e., visualizing) this image".

[1885] As for case forms depending on the initial member of a compound, see SPEYER 1968 ([1]1886): 177f # 231; RENOU 1975: 506 # 374a. The expression $X^{genit.obj.}$ *ālambana-vijñapti°* would thus be a mere phraseological variant of *X-ālambana-vijñapti°* understood as "representation [consisting in] an 'objectification' (/apprehension, objectifying visualization) of X".

particle that could be taken to transform "x *la dmigs pa*" into an attribute of *rnam par rig pa*. But precisely this construction without a genitive particle is also found at the aforementioned passage YBh$_{t}$ P dzi 3b6 (D tshi 3a6), where YBh$_{Bh}$ 5,16 *svaviṣayālambanavijñaptiḥ* is rendered as *rang gi yul la dmigs pa rnam par rig pa*. In such cases, we should probably take *dmigs pa* and *rnam par rig pa* as two action nouns standing in apposition, so that we might translate thus:

TH-tr2A: ... ⓧ① for [it = this image ...] has been intensely cultivated ... as a mere representation (*rnam par rig pa* = *vijñapti*) [which consists in] an 'objectification' (= objectifying visualization) (*dmyigs pa* = *ālambana*) ⓨ② of that image; ⓧ② ...

381.1. Two minor points remain: 1. the particle *ste* at the juncture of ⓧ① and ⓧ② appears rather weak, if ⓧ② is meant to be a logical conclusion ("and [thus/therefore]"). 2. In the context of the argument, one would expect ⓧ② to be a conclusion in the sense of a *nigamana*, i.e., the final deduction of the thesis ⓣ ("therefore, [it, i.e., the objective support = the image] is [not different/separate from] the mind (Skt. *vijñāna* = *citta*)". But the rendering *rnam par rig pa* for *vijñāna* may suggest that the translator of **TH** rather understood it as referring to the central concept of the reason, viz., *vijñapti*. Perhaps he took ⓧ② not as a final deduction of the thesis ⓣ but as a final confirmation of the presence of the reason in the subject of the argument (≈ *upanaya*), i.e., as a concluding statement that the image which is the object of contemplation is in fact [merely] a representation.[1886]

381.2. There is, however, yet another possibility, and one at that which may also offer a clue for making sense of **TH**'s somewhat disconcerting construction of ⓨ② with ⓧ①. Could it perhaps be that the translator of **TH** did not regard the image as the logical subject of the amplified reason, and not even of the reason itself, possibly because he tended to understand the expression *vijñapti* (in accordance with the Abhidharmic usage) as "representation" in the sense of a mental *action* in the first place, and not so much as its content?[1887] Should this be correct, the passage might be rendered as follows:

TH-tr3: ⓣ [The image ...] is not different/separate from the [contemplating] mind (*citta*),
ⓨ① because [the contemplating mind] is nothing but a representation;
ⓧ① for (... *te*) [the contemplating mind is not the perception of an external thing but] has been intensely cultivated (*rab du bsgoms pa* = *prabhāvita*) as a mere representation [consisting in] an 'objectification' (= objectifying visualization) ⓨ② of that image,
ⓧ② and (... *ste*) [just this], O Maitreya, [is what] I (have) call(ed) 'representation' (*rnam par rig pa*) [in ⓨ①].

In this interpretation of the argument, the whole of ⓨ② + ⓧ would merely function as an explanation of the reason, viz. *vijñaptimātratvāt* (ⓨ①), understood as a qualification of the meditative mind as being merely a deliberate visualization without an external object. In this case, *rnam par rig pa* in ⓧ② would not be a further definiens but would rather take up a kind of second-degree definiendum, viz., the basic concept of the reason (ⓨ①), which had been further explained by the "amplified reason" (ⓨ② + ⓧ①).[1888]

[1886] In chapter V, Saṁdh$_{TH}$ consistently renders *vijñāna* as *rnam p(h)ar shes p(h)a* (HAKAMAYA 1986a: 610,18ff; 2008: 682,26ff: D4–E7[63a5]). Thus also in HAKAMAYA 1987b: 580,16 (2008: 614,16), corresp. to Saṁdh X.7.4 (158,9).

[1887] Dorji WANGCHUK also tends to such an understanding (oral communication).

[1888] Cf., in this connection, the explanation of the PSk's definition of *vijñāna* (see §§ 355.1.1 and 462.2) in Guṇaprabha's commentary (Tj P hi 93b1-2; D si 24b4): (*dmigs pa* ...) *de dag khong du chud*

381.3. A similar interpretation would also be possible if we presuppose, with TH-rec1[M] and TH-rec1[B], the reading *ālambanaṁ* (i.e. [M] / [B]) for the original Sanskrit:

TH-tr4: ... ⓨ① because [the contemplating mind] is nothing but a representation;
ⓨ②+ⓧ① for [the act of] apprehending that image [is not the perception of an external thing but] has been intensely cultivated (Skt.: is distinctively/essentially characterized) as a mere [visualizing] representation [of that image],
ⓧ② and [just this], O Maitreya, [is what] I (have) call(ed) 'representation' (*rnam par rig pa*) [in ⓨ①].

382. None of the proposals for how to understand **TH** are fully satisfactory, at any rate not from the point of view of the Sanskrit original. The reason for this is, in my opinion, the syntactical analysis of the passage as presupposed by the translator of **TH**, characterized by splitting up ⓧ into two sentences and construing ⓨ② with the former (ⓧ①). However, the main purport of my disquisition was to show that the precise purport of **TH** is open to debate and that it is by no means easy to decide on which type of Sanskrit original ([M] or [S]) it is based. I readily admit that my investigation is tentative and that specialists who are more familiar with the linguistic peculiarities of Tun-huang Tibetan may be able to reach more solid conclusions.

5.3. Buddhaśānta (Bu)

Bu: 彼念唯識所明識我說。(T 31.1592: 101a22f)

383. 1. As pointed out in § 367.3, Buddhaśānta tends to follow the word order of the Sanskrit original rather closely, and in this regard MSg_{Bu} is therefore extremely valuable for the reconstruction of the latter. But nonetheless some caution is required because to a limited extent even Buddhaśānta adapts his translation to the rules of Chinese syntax. The result is, naturally, anything but idiomatically polished Chinese, and actually MSg_{Bu} is often hard to understand if not unintelligible. In view of these difficulties, it seems hazardous to use **Bu** for reconstructing the syntactical structure of the Sanskrit original of ⓧ, not to speak of its meaning.

2. At any rate, Matsumoto's punctuation before the second 識 (M1: 159a text [16]; 162a) appears arbitrary. Though the first part of the resulting bipartite sentence (彼念唯識所明, i.e., "that object *(*念 *= ālambana)* is manifested by nothing but awareness/representation") would be syntactically unobjectionable, the remaining portion 識我說, to be taken as "I explain [it to be] mind", is anyway grossly at odds with Chinese syntax. This fact is not perhaps a decisive argument against Matsumoto's interpretation, but it does not recommend it either.

3. It may not be easy to decide how Buddhaśānta understood the sentence (if he understood it at all and didn't just render it word by word), but to my mind the most probable way would be something like:

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pa ni rnam par rig pa ste rnam par shes pa'o, i.e. "The apprehension of such objective supports is 'cognition' (*vijñapti*), and [this is] *vijñāna*." Here, *rnam par shes pa* following after *ste* can hardly be anything but a repetition of the definiendum. Unfortunately, the Sanskrit original of this commentary has to date not come to light.

Bu-tr: [Sensory or cognitive] awareness manifested (i.e., distinctively characterized?) by [being] a mere awareness (/representation) of that[1889] object (or: by that object being a mere representation) [is what] I teach (or: what has been taught by me).

384. In my opinion, all we can safely gather from **Bu** is information on the sequence of words in the original. In this regard, **Bu** fully confirms **TH** with regard to position of **ālambana°... °prabhāvitam* (first) and **vijñānam* (second), but since no vocative or *hi* is expressed in the MSg versions I do not see how **Bu** could unambiguously support either [M] or [S]. Nor does it help us in deciding whether its original had *mayôktam* or *(aham) vadāmi*, and whether this was preceded by *iti* or not (the lack of a corresponding word in **Bu** is hardly sufficient for proving its absence).

5.4. Hsüan-tsang (Hs)

Hs:[1890] ⓨ 由彼影像唯是識故。ⓧ (善男子。) 我說識所緣唯識所現故。[1891]

385. **Hs**ⓧ is not easy to assess. The natural reading for a Chinese reader[1892] is doubtless the one supported by the rendering of the passage in SaṁdhṬ$_t$ (*rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa ni* ...),[1893] where 識所緣 ("the objective support of *vijñāna*") is taken as the subject of an object-sentence dependent on 我說 ("I (have) declare(d)"), and 唯識所現 (**vijñaptimātra-prabhāvita*) as its predicate, the caesura being in the middle of the period (5+5), just in between the subject and the predicate of the object-sentence.

386. At first glance, **Hs**, understood in this way, seems to support neither [M] nor [S]. The fact that 所緣 (*ālambana*) functions as the subject is at variance with [S], and the fact that 識 (*vijñāna*) is not construed as the predicate noun contradicts [M]. Still, in view of the overwhelming evidence of the other testimonia we can safely exclude the possibility of an original in which *vijñāna* was construed as a genitive attribute of *ālambana* or as the first member of a tatpuruṣa *vijñānālambana* (cf. also M1: 182a). Thus **Hs** should indeed be based on either [M] or [S].

387. It is not surprising that Matsumoto (M1: 158a12-17) assumes that **Hs**, too, rather supports [M]. For this purpose, he suggests punctuating not after 所緣 but after the first 識, i.e., 我說識, 所緣唯識所現(故). The result would, according to Matsumoto (M1: 181b–182a) be a bipartite structure, reflecting that of the original (as postulated by him) in a reverse order. Taken in this way, the structure of **Hs** would be similar to that of **Pa** (see § 390). Actually, Matsumoto (M1: ibid.) thinks that Hsüan-tsang opted for this reverse order under the influence of Paramārtha's rendering because, according to Matsumoto, he approved of the latter's understanding of the passage. Matsumoto thus takes **Hs** as an intentional reversal of what, in view of the original as reconstructed and understood by Matsumoto (i.e., [M]), should properly speaking have read *所緣唯識所現 我說識 (故) (M1: 181b20f).

1889 For 彼, see § 348.

1890 I.e., **Hs**$_{Sa}$ (T 16.676: 698b1f: see fn. 1735) and **Hs**$_{MSg}$ (see fn. 1739), identical except for the vocative at the beginning of ⓧ in **Hs**$_{Sa}$.

1891 ⓧ (without the vocative) is also quoted in precisely the same form in MSgU$_c$ 418a24 (ad MSg III.17).

1892 Cf. also M1: 157b19–158a11; 181b21–182a2.

1893 P thi 117b6f = D thi 104b1. Cf. S 1984: 442 n. 42.

388.0. I must confess that I do not find this hypothesis plausible.

388.1. First, an influence of **Pa** on **Hs** appears rather improbable. As Matsumoto (M1: 161a–b) himself points out, Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the Saṁdh quotation in MSg II.7 makes use of his translation of the Saṁdh, which was finished almost one and a half years before the translation of MSg and MSgBh.[1894] Since Paramārtha's translation of the Saṁdh seems to have been limited to the first four chapters from the outset,[1895] a Saṁdh VIII translation by him does not seem to have been available, and in view of the fact that Hsüan-tsang started translating MSg and MSgBh (which might have prompted him to have a look at MSg_{Pa} and/or $MSgBh_{Pa}$) only some time later, it is not very likely that he was influenced by **Pa** when translating the Saṁdh.

388.2. Second, let us assume that the change of the word order in **Hs** was indeed motivated by Hsüan-tsang's being impressed by Paramārtha's understanding of ⓧ, especially by his interpretation of the words **vijñānam iti mayoktam* as mirroring the *cittamātra* passage of the DBhS: would one not expect, in this case, that **Hs**, too, would bring out this idea in a perceptible way, at least by adding, like Paramārtha, 唯 ("only") before the first 識 (=*vijñāna*)? As the sentence stands in **Hs**, neither terminology nor context are, in any specific way, reminiscent of the DBhS passage, at any rate not in the context of the Saṁdh where, in contrast to MSg II.7, no quotation of this passage precedes.

388.3. Third, in the case of a rather faithful translator and great Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) scholar like Hsüan-tsang, whose works are, moreover, very well transmitted, we should start from the evidence as it stands and try to understand it in a way that makes good sense, from the point of grammar and style as well as content. Only then will we arrive at valid conclusions regarding the original on which his translation is based. Now, if we accept, for the time being, Matsumoto's punctuation (in spite of its rhythmical asymmetry: 3+6(/7)), a reasonable interpretation in terms of Ⓜ is hardly possible. I do not think any unbiased reader would understand the sentence to mean (in line with Paramārtha's bipartite analysis):

> The reason is: I have taught [sensory or cognitive] awareness; the objective support is made to appear by awareness (/representation) only ([3+6] 故).[1896]

Nor should we charge Hsüan-tsang with having confounded Subj and PredN of the Sanskrit original by taking his translation to mean

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[1894] See KUWAYAMA & HAKAMAYA 1981: 253f (⑨⑩⑰⑱). The translation of the Saṁdh was carried out during the period from the 18th day of the fifth month to the 30th day of the seventh month of the year 21 of the era 貞觀 (= 647 AD). The translation of MSg and MSgBh was started only in the twelfth month of the year 22 of that era (see also M1: 217 n. 31). It is only the translation of MSgU — of which no translation by Paramārtha is available — that was begun earlier, viz., on the first day of the third month of the year 21 of the era 貞觀, but it was completed only in the middle of the year 23 of that era, so that it is highly improbable that the translation of its second chapter was carried out before the completion of the Saṁdh translation.

[1895] Cf. HAKAMAYA 1994: 37. Already the *Chung ching mu lu* 眾經目錄 (T 55.2146: 120a17), compiled in 594, and the *Li tai san pao chi* 歷代三寶紀 (T 49.2034: 87c14), compiled in 597, list Paramārtha's Saṁdh translation as consisting of 1 *ch'üan* only, which agrees with the extant text. Cf. also *K'ai yüan lu* 開元錄 (T 55.2154, compiled 730) 593a16-18.

[1896] Or: "I have taught [sensory or cognitive] awareness, because the objective support is made to appear by awareness (/representation) only" (3+7).

(Because) I (have) declare(d) that awareness is the object, which is manifested by awareness (/representation) only,

for since this statement does not make much sense, a great scholar like Hsüan-tsang is not likely to have committed such a blunder. If Matsumoto's punctuation is kept, **Hs**ⓧ would rather have to be understood as

Hs-tr1: ⓧ Because, (O Maitreya,) I (have) declare(d) that [sensory or cognitive] awareness is 'revealed'[1897] (i.e., essentially characterized) by [its] objective support [being] mere awareness (i.e., a mere representation = appearance).

Understood in this way, its meaning would be unobjectionable, but it would obviously represent [S], not [M]. If in Hsüan-tsang's original ⓧ had indeed the form of [S], he was perfectly right in taking, like **Tib** and in line with the normal word order in this type of nominal sentence,[1898] *vijñānam* as the Subj and **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* as the PredN of the sentence governed by *iti*. In Chinese, this sentence is quite naturally transformed into an object-sentence dependent on 我說 = **mayoktam* (or **ahaṁ vadāmi*), and the position of 識 = *vijñānam* at the beginning of this object-sentence is mandatory from the point of view of Chinese syntax. There is thus no need to assume influence from the side of **Pa**. Nor does the initial position of 我說 require any justification because the anteposition of the *verbum dicendi* governing the object-sentence is quite regular in Chinese.[1899]

389. It is, however, is almost certain that Hsüan-tsang himself understood his translation the same way SaṁdhṬ$_t$ does,[1900] for a kind of paraphrase of the sentence in **Bh**$_{Hs}${3} (see § 425) most probably has the caesura after the expression denoting the object (338c24f: 顯我所說 定識所行 唯識所現: 4+4+4, more likely than 6+6).[1901] Still more cogent are Hsüan-tsang's paraphrases in **U**$_c${2a} and {3} (see § 400), where the introduction of the *de facto* copula 是 unambiguously marks 識所緣境 ("the objective support of the *vijñāna*") as the Subj. In {2a}, 識所緣境 is additionally proven to be a unit by the preceding attribute 在外 ("external") which can only refer to the object. In view of these passages, there can be no doubt about how Hsüan-tsang himself understood his translation, and it would seem hazardous to insist on a different explanation. Hence the syntactical structure in **Hs** represents neither [M] nor [S]. Still, whereas the position of 識 = *vijñāna* in **Hs** is hardly explicable from

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1897 In the case of this (as will be shown below: improbable) interpretation of **Hs**, 所現 must be taken as equivalent to the usual 所顯(現), i.e., "revealed" or "disclosed" in the sense that "A is 'revealed' by X" means "A is distinctively and/or essentially characterized by X", X being a property or feature revealing, so to speak, the specific or essential nature of A.

1898 See fn. 1754.

1899 Cf., e.g., Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 689c24f: 我說 勝義 是諸聖者內自所證 (= Saṁdh II.2, p. 40,3f: *don dam pa ni 'phags pa rnams kyi so so rang gis* [P 6a3, S 8b2 : *gi* ed., D 5b5] *rig pa yin par ngas bshad la* | ...); 690a1: 我說 勝義 不可言說 (= Saṁdh II.2, p. 40,13f: *don dam pa ni brjod du med pa yin par ngas bshad la* | ...); AKBh$_{Hs}$ 130a19: 我說 有學 應不放逸 非阿羅漢 (= AKBh 375,13: *śaikṣasya ... apramādakaraṇīyaṁ vadāmi ..., nârhataḥ*; see fn. 1760); 130a20f: 我說 利養等 亦障阿羅漢 (= AKBh 375,13f: *arhato 'py aham ... lābhasatkāram antarāyakaram vadāmi*).

1900 Cf. also the quotation of ⓧ at CWSL 39a7 where 識 is omitted, so that 所緣 is clearly the grammatical subject.

1901 Cf. also M1: 182a1, referring, in the same sense, to **Bh**$_{Hs}${2} (cf. § 425): 謂 識所緣 唯識所現 (4+4).

a version where 識 was the PredN, it is easily explained if his translation was based on [S], because the sentence

> Because, (O Maitreya,) I (have) declare(d) that awareness is distinctively/essentially characterized by the mere representation of an objective support,

if taken to mean

> ... that awareness is distinctively/essentially characterized by [its] objective support [being] a mere representation = appearance,

can without any significant change of meaning be transformed[1902] into the clearer statement

> **Hs**-tr2: Because, (O Maitreya,) I (have) declare(d) that the objective support of awareness (識 = *vijñāna*) is [essentially something represented, i.e.,] made to appear[,][1903] by awareness/representation (識 = *vijñapti*) only.[1904]

5.5. Paramārtha (Pa)

Pa: ⓧ② 我說 唯有識。ⓧ① 此色相境界識所顯現。(T31.1593: 118b27f)

390. It is obvious that Paramārtha, in his rendering of the quotation of ⓧ in the MSg, does not construe *vijñānam* as the Subj of a nominal sentence with a PredN (as in [S]). Nor does he render it as the PredN of a sentence with the Subj *ālambanam* (as in [M]). He rather transforms *vijñānam* into a full-fledged statement of existence enlarged by 唯 = *mātra* and dependent on 我說 = **mayoktam*.[1905] Paramārtha thus translates *vijñānam (iti) mayoktam* (ⓧ②) as a separate sentence:

> **Pa**-trⓧ②: I (have) declare(d) that *there is only* awareness (= mind).

Moreover, he places this sentence in front of what was, in the original, the first part of ⓧ (ⓧ①). The result is what Matsumoto (M1: 153b, 163a) calls a "bipartite structure" (二分說), similar to **TH** but with an inverted sequence of the two parts. As pointed out by Matsumoto,[1906] Paramārtha's rendering of ⓧ② is identical with his rendering of *cittamātra* in the famous DBhS passage, which had been quoted in the MSg immediately before the Saṁdh quotation as the first of two āgamic proofs for *vijñaptimātratā*. As Matsumoto (M1: 163b–

[1902] For a somewhat similar case, cf. the transformation of the statement of MSA IX.57ab + 59c that the purified *dharmadhātu* (Subj) is *sarvatas tathatājñānabhāvanāsamudāgamaḥ* (bahuv., PredN; for the reading as one word see § 495.3) into *sarvatas tathatājñānabhāvanā* (PredN) *dharmadhātuviśuddhihetuḥ* (genitive-tatp., Subj) in the MSABh.

[1903] If **Hs** is interpreted in this way, the unusual (cf. M1: 212a20–b1) rendering of °*prabhāvita* by 所現 instead of 所顯(現) appears justified, because the meaning is "made to appear", and not "revealed" in the sense pointed out in fn. 1897.

[1904] Cf. also CLEARY 1995: 45: "I say that the objects of consciousness are only manifestations of consciousness"; KEENAN 2000: 53: "I have taught that the object of consciousness is nothing but a manifestation of conscious construction only."

[1905] In view of the fact that Paramārtha renders the PredN *cittamātra* in the DBhS passage in the same way (viz., as 唯有識), one could argue that in ⓧ, too, he rendered *vijñānam* in this way because he took it as a PredN. Even so, if Matsumoto is right in assuming that Paramārtha has taken ⓧ② to be almost equivalent to a quotation of the DBhS passage in the Saṁdh, the logical Subj to be supplied (i.e., the point of reference of the statement) would not be the same as in ⓧ①, viz. the visible phenomenon which is the object of yogic experience, but rather the triple world, as in the DBhS passage.

[1906] M1: 163b; cf. S 1984: 442 n. 41.

164a) aptly suggests, Paramārtha wants to show, in this way, that the reference of ⓧ to a former enunciation of *vijñaptimātratā* refers to the DBhS passage and is, in a sense, the basis for explaining the objects of meditative concentration as mere appearances. For this purpose, Paramārtha has placed ⓧ② first and adapted it to the DBhS passage by using the same wording for both, a procedure which implies extracting °*mātra*° from ⓧ① and combining it with the *vijñāna* of ⓧ② so as to obtain 唯(有)識, which is identical with his rendering of *cittamātra* in the DBhS passage. It would seem that this equation had been prepared by the MSgBh, where the DBhS passage had already been paraphrased in such a way that *citta* had come to be replaced with *vijñāna*.[1907]

391. However, against Matsumoto and against my own rendering and interpretation of Paramārtha's wording in S 1984 (p. 442 # 12.2), I am no longer convinced that **Pa** presupposes [M]. Actually, my rendering of ⓧ① in S 1984 was:

> **Pa**-trⓧ① (old): ... This object which appears as [something] visible is manifested by mind /cognition (*vijñapti* ...).

This means that I took 此色相境界 (corresponding to **tad ālambanam*) as the Subj and 識所顯現 (corresponding to **vijñaptiprabhāvitam* [without °*mātra*°, see above]) as the PredN. Matsumoto, if I can judge from his punctuation after 境界 ≈ **ālambana* (M1: 179,12) and from the fact that he takes **Pa** (as I myself also did) as clearly representing [M], obviously understands it in more or less the same way. Yet, there is an alternative, viz., taking only 此色相 as the subject and 境界識所顯現 as the predicate. This may come as a surprise, but precisely this is what I am now convinced, after a reconsideration of the text, that Paramārtha's version of the *Bhāṣya* (**Bh**$_{Pa}$) compels us to do, as I am going to demonstrate in § 423. It should also be noted that the same expression (viz., 此色相) is also the grammatical subject proper in Maitreya's introductory question[1908] and (implicitly) in the Buddha's answer (與心不異), for which ⓧ is meant to supply a reason. On this basis, Paramārtha's version of ⓧ① should rather be translated thus:

> Pa-trⓧ① (new): This visible phenomenon (色相, i.e., the image perceived in meditative concentration) is manifested (or: made to appear: 所顯現) by the object-awareness /object-representation (境界識).

An explanation of the term "object-awareness", or "object-[like part of] the mind", will be given in § 423 in connection with the discussion of **Bh**$_{Pa}$. At any rate, it is obvious that this understanding of Paramārtha's version of ⓧ① clearly presupposes an original **tad ālambana-vijñapti{mātra}prabhāvitam*, hence [S], with **tad* being taken as the Subj and **ālambana-vijñaptiprabhāvitam* as the PredN.

[1907] MSgBh$_t$ P li 171b1 (D ri 144a6): *'di dag ni rnam par shes pa tsam mo zhes bya ba Sa bcu pa las gsungs pa.*

[1908] MSg$_{Pa}$ 118b26f: 此色相 是定心所緣境 為與心異 與心不異, which in view of 是 I would understand as: "This visible phenomenon (corresp. to **pratibimba*) [which] is the object of the mind in meditative concentration (corresp. to **samādhigocara*): is it different from the mind or not different from the mind?" To be sure, since the visible phenomenon is equated with the object, this formulation by itself does not exclude the possibility of taking 此色相境界 ("this visible phenomenon which is the object") as the Subj of ⓧ①, and without the evidence of **Bh**$_{Pa}$ it would probably be most natural to do so. But if I am not mistaken in understanding 是 as having a copula-like function, the Subj proper in 118b26f is 此色相 ("this visible phenomenon"). Thus, it would not be unnatural to take it as the Subj of ⓧ① as well.

5.6. Bodhiruci (Bo)

Bo: 何義不異。ⓨ 以唯是心觀彼鏡像。[1909] ⓧ 何以故 我說但是心意識觀得名故。(T 16.675: 674c23f)

392. Bodhiruci's rendering of our passage is difficult to understand (cf. also M1: 157b14-18), at least for one who is, like myself, not sufficiently familiar with his style and translation practice. 得名 ("comes to be, or may be, named after [→ distinguished by?]") is Bodhiruci's normal rendering of *prabhāvita*.[1910] Both 唯是心 in ⓨ and 但是心 ("is only mind") in ⓧ, used to render *cittamātra* in Bodhiruci's translation of the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, must represent *vijñaptimātra*, as in VIII.29.8 (Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 677c28) and VIII.8 (675a5), respectively. 彼境像 ("that object-image", or 彼鏡像 "that image") in ⓨ corresponds to *tasya pratibimbasya*, confirming the position of this expression after *vijñaptimātratvāt* (cf. M1: 152b). In ⓧ, 何以故...故 ("Why? Because...") may reflect the presence of *hi* in the original, and 我說 ("I *(*have*)* declare*(*d*)*") clearly renders *mayoktam* or *ahaṁ vadāmi*, obviously taken by Bodhiruci to govern the whole of ⓧ. As has also been suggested by Matsumoto (M1: 157b18), 觀 (lit. "to contemplate") in ⓧ may represent *ālambana*,[1911] but in ⓨ it appears to be a stylistic addition (obviously with a verbal function). Finally, 識, or perhaps 意識,[1912] would seem to correspond to *vijñāna*. But even so the syntax of Bodhiruci's translation of the passage, especially of ⓧ, remains enigmatic to me,[1913] and I am not even sure that he had a clear idea of the

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[1909] The Taishō edition lists the variants 唯＝惟【宋】【元】【明】【宮】 and 境＝鏡【宋】【元】【明】【宮】【聖】【聖乙】.

[1910] Cf., e.g., Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 670c25f (Saṁdh VII.6 [68,30f]); 671a4f (VII.7 [69,15f]); 671a17; 19f; 25f (VII.9); 687b5 (X.9 [161,23-25]); T 16.671: 556a27f (Laṅk 218,12-15).

[1911] Cf., e.g., Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 674b14 奢摩他觀 and 16f 毘婆舍那觀, corresponding to Saṁdh VIII.2 *zhi gnas kyi dmigs pa* and *lhag mthong gi dmigs pa*, which can hardly represent anything but **śamathālambana* and **vipaśyanālambana*, as is confirmed by Hsüan-tsang's rendering 所緣(境事) (Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 697c22f).

[1912] Cf. Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 669a8, etc., and 669b13, etc. (Saṁdh V.1 and V.6), where *sems dang yid dang rnam par shes pa* (*citta*, *mano*, *vijñāna*) is always rendered as 心意意識 (influence of the phraseology of Laṅk *citta-mano-manovijñāna*?). Similarly 676b27 = VIII.20.2.3; cf. also 687b5 = X.9 (161,24), where, however, most testimonies have only 識 for *vijñāna*.

[1913] [**I.**] In Bodhiruci's translation of the *Vajracchedikā*, the sentence *asaṁskṛtaprabhāvitā hy āryapudgalāḥ* (Vajr 33,1f) is translated as 一切聖人 皆以無為法得名 (T 8.236: 753b22f), but in his translation of Vajrarṣi's commentary we also find practically the same sentence without 以 (T 25.1512: 819a23; 820a8; 823a8f). Similarly, in Bodhiruci's translation of the commentary on the *Vajracchedikā* ascribed to Vasubandhu we find, beside 一切聖人 依真如法清淨得名 (T 25.1511: 784c7), a parallel phrase without 依, viz., 諸佛如來 清淨真如得名 (789b1). Thus, in Bodhiruci's phraseology A 以 B 得名 and A 依 B 得名 may be abbreviated to A B 得名. Cf. also Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 671a19f and 25f: 第一義 法無我得名,[1] corresponding to Saṁdh VII.9 *don pam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid chos bdag med pas rab tu phye ba* (**dharmanairātmyaprabhāvitā paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*), or Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 687b5: 如來非心意意(v.l.om.)識得名, corresponding to Saṁdh X.9 (161,23-25) *de bzhin gshegs pa rnams ni sems dang* | *yid dang* | *rnam par shes pas rab tu phye ba ma yin*. If the subject (A) is obvious from the context, it may be omitted, as, e.g., at T 25.1512: 823a9f: 為是無為法得名, 為當有為法得名 "Are they (= the *srotaāpanna*s, etc., mentioned immediately before) *asaṁskṛtaprabhāvita* or *saṁskṛtaprabhāvita*?"

[1] Saṁdh$_{Bo}$ 671a17 has 第一義者 依無我得名 instead, where 依 may be a mistake for 法 (or 依⟨法⟩?).

[**II.**] Starting from these observations, I am, *very tentatively*, inclined to understand Bodhiruci's rendering of the passage as follows:

meaning. In any case, I am not in a position to draw any well-founded conclusions with regard to the precise wording of the Sanskrit original used by Bodhiruci.

5.7. Dharmagupta (Dh)

Dh: ⓧ 定心所緣 唯識所顯 我說為識。(T 31.1596: 285b22f).

393. As stated already in S 1984, Dharmagupta's rendering of ⓧ as quoted in the MSg is unambiguous evidence for [M]. In this version, *vijñāna* is definitely understood as the PredN, and *ālambana* as the Subj.

> **Dh**-tr: ⓧ [As for] the objective support (所緣 = *ālambana*) of mind (心 = *citta*) in concentration (定 = *samādhi*),[1914] [because it is][1915] manifested by awareness (/representation) only (唯識所顯 = *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*), I (have) declare(d) it to be [just] awareness (/mind) (識 = *vijñāna*).

This rendering obviously presupposes the reading *ālambanaṁ*. In view of the fact that in the quotation of ⓧ in the MSg the difference between [M] and [S] is probably merely a matter of the presence or absence of an anusvāra at the end of the word *ālambana*, the origination of a variant reading in one or the other direction can easily be explained. Since, as I hope to have demonstrated, most of the other testimonia, especially the more reliable ones, support [S] rather than [M], I suppose that the original used by Dharmagupta contained a mistaken anusvāra (cf. the case of the *Pañcaskandhaka* manuscript, see § 462.2), either inserted by a scribe or user who (like Matsumoto) took exception to the compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* or – who knows? – by a fly that happened to leave its droppings on the spot. On the other hand, it is not impossible that Dharmagupta himself introduced the anusvāra (or at least read the text as if there were one). The fact that in the quotation of ⓧ in the *Bhāṣya* he replaces 為識 by 唯識 may indicate that he was somehow influenced by **Pa**, and **Pa** may also have stimulated him to take *vijñānam* as the PredN. This, in its turn, may have led him to consider *ālambana-* in the *mūla*-text as a mistake for *ālambanaṁ* to be regarded as the Subj, especially if the *Bhāṣya* did contain an explanation of the compound paraphrasing it as **tad*(-) *ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* (see §§ 414.2.2.2–415.1).

> **Bo**-tr1: In which sense is [the image that is the object of meditative contemplation] not different [from the contemplating mind] (何義不異)? ⓨ Because (以: °*tvāt*?) [it is in the form of something that in reality] is nothing but mind [that one] visualizes (觀) that image (v.l.: object-image). ⓧ Why? Because I (have) declare(d) that [in reality] it is only the mind [itself] that comes to be designated (得名: *prabhāvita*) as the object (*ālambana*: 觀 in a passive sense?) of cognition (意識: *vijñāna*).

[**III.**] As a simpler and perhaps preferable alternative, I would suggest the following translation:

> **Bo**-tr2: … ⓨ Because (it is) only the mind (that) perceives that image (/object-image). ⓧ Why? Only mind, thought or cognition (*citta*, *manas*, *vijñāna*), [when] perceiving [such an image], come to be designated [thus, i.e., as object-image].

I have to admit that if one of these tentative translations does indeed mirror Bodhiruci's idea, this would mean that he had considerable difficulties with the syntax of the passage and thus fell back on a paraphrase in which he rearranged the syntactical relationship of the elements of the phrase in his own way, to the extent that it appears difficult to decide precisely how his original looked.

[1914] There is a certain ambiguity with regard to the understanding of the initial *tad*. In the *mūla*-text, we have 定心所緣 ("the *ālambana* of mind in meditative concentration") as the subject, which suggests **tad-ālambanam*, but in **Bh**$_{\mathbf{Dh}}$ (285b29) it is quoted as 此攀緣 ("this *ālambana*"), which rather corresponds to **tad ālambanam*. In either case, what is meant is, of course, the image perceived in contemplative concentration, which is the theme of the discussion.

[1915] Added in the quotation of this phrase in **Bh**$_{\mathbf{Dh}}$ (285c1: 唯識所顯故).

6. Re-examination of the Evidence: The Commentaries

6.1. *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-upanibandhana*

394. Turning now to the commentaries, let me start with *Asvabhāva's commentary on the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, the *Mahāyānasaṁgrahopanibandhana* (MSgU), because this commentary is more explicit than Vasubandhu's (MSgBh) and, at least formally, independent of it.[1916] The MSgU is preserved in two versions:

1. a Tibetan translation ($MSgU_t$), which is by the same team of translators as MSg_t (viz., Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye shes sde: see § 371), and
2. a Chinese version by Hsüan-tsang ($MSgU_c$: T 31.1598).

In accordance with the methodological considerations set forth in ch. 4, in order to reconstruct *Asvabhāva's commentary on ⓧ (symbol: U) I first (ch. 6.1.1) take up its Tibetan version (symbol: $\mathbf{U_t}$), and thereafter (ch. 6.1.2) Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version (symbol: $\mathbf{U_c}$).

6.1.1. The Tibetan Version (U_t)

395. In $MSgU_t$, the commentary on ⓧ runs as follows:

$\mathbf{U_t}$: {1a} *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye* (P: *dbye*) *ba can zhes bya ba ni* {1b} *phyi rol gyi dmigs pa med pa'o* ‖ {1c} *rnam par shes pa dmigs pa yin par ngas bshad do* ‖ *zhes bya ba ni* {2a} *'di ltar dmigs pa de rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba ni* {2b} *de'i ngo bo nyid ces bya ba'i tha tshig go* (D: *ste*) | {3} *rnam par shes pa ni dmigs par snang ba tsam gyis rab tu phye ba yin par bshad do zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* ‖ ($MSgU_t$ P li 271b1-3; D ri 221b4-5)

Taking {1a}–{1c} as a quotation of ⓧ interspersed with glosses and somewhat inappropriately dissected into two in $\mathbf{U_t}$, I proposed the following reconst uction of the lost Sanskrit original (symbol: **U**):

U-rec(S): *{1a} *ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* (*iti*)[1917] {1b} *bāhyālambana(vi)rahitam*[1918] ($\mathbf{U_t}$: |) {1c} *vijñānam upalabdhir iti*[1919] *mayôktam*[1920] *iti* |

[1916] Buescher (B: 182,5f; 183,22f and 33f) refers to MSgU as quoting the Saṁdh sentence under discussion from MSgBh, but he does not offer any reason for such an assumption. As far as I can see MSgU is throughout a commentary on MSg, and not a subcommentary on MSgBh (see Pt. I fn. 1509).

[1917] *iti* may be added in accordance with Tib. *zhes bya ba* but is not indispensible (see § 399.1.2).

[1918] For Tib. *med pa* representing Skt. °*(vi)rahita*, cf., e.g., Laṅk 115,7 *kriyākārakarahita* = $Laṅk_t^1$ P ngu 111b3 *bya ba dang byed pa med pa*; 68,10 and 124,1 *ātmātmīyarahita* = 89b7 and 115b1 *bdag dang bdag gi (ba) med pa*, against *bdag dang bdag gi dang bral ba* in the case of 75,2, 80,7 and 225,14 = 92b8, 95b4 and 159a1; similarly, for the phrase *utpādabhaṅgarahita* (22,6; 264,5; 334,18; 370,8) we find *skye 'jig ma mchis* (69b4) and *skye dang 'jig pa med pa* (195b7) beside *skye (ba dang ni) 'jig bral* (173b6; 206b6); $DBhS_K$ 53,8 °*chandarahita* = $DBhS_t^2$ P Phal-chen li 79b8 *mos pa med pa*; 98,6f and 102,5 *kārakavedakarahita* = 103a7 and 106a1 *byed pa po dang tshor ba po med pa*; 102,15 *svabhāvarahita* = 106a8 *rang bzhin med pa*. It must, however, be conceded that the usual rendering of X-*(vi)rahita* seems to be X *dang bral ba*, and this holds also good, as far as I could check, for the team of translators to whom we owe $MSgU_t$, for in the case of $ASBh_t$ (translated by the same team) I found only one passage (ASBh 12,9) where X-*virahita* is rendered by X *med pa* ($ASBh_t$ P 12b2), against about a dozen cases of X-*(vi)rahita* = X *dang bral ba*. In $TrBh_t$, translated by the same team,[3] the ratio

{2a} *tathā hi tadālambanaṁ* (**U**ₜ: *tad ālambanaṁ*)[1921] *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ*,
{2b} *tatsvabhāvam ity arthaḥ* |
{3} *ālambanapratibhāsamātraprabhāvitaṁ*[1922] *vijñānam uktam ity arthaḥ* |

For this, I propose the following translation (slightly modified from S 1984):

U-rec(S)-tr: {1a} "To be distinctively/essentially characterized by the mere representation (/appearance) of an objective support",[1923] {1b} [i.e.,] devoid of an external objective support, {1c} "I (have) declare(d) awareness", [i.e.,] apprehension;

{2a} for (/that is to say) its (/this)[1924] objective support is distinctively/essentially characterized by [being] a mere representation;

{2b} the purport is: [it = the objective support] has the nature of that (viz., of a mere representation = appearance).

{3} The purport [of the whole sentence] is: awareness has been declared to be distinctively/essentially characterized by merely appearing as an objective support.

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is more favourable, since *rahita* is rendered by *med (pa)* in three cases (*26,1, *44,7 [Tr 21d] and *45,7) out of eight, though not in the close parallels *49,10 *artharahitacittamātra*° and *49,17 *vijñaptimātram ... artharahitam*, which both have X *dang bral ba*. Thus, I have to admit that evidence in support of my former reconstruction is not lacking but not too strong either, and that alternatives should be taken into consideration, e.g., though merely as a guess, **avidyamānabāhyālambanam* (or **asadbāhyālambanam*) in the sense of "one in the case of which an external objective support is non-existent"; cf. TrBh *36,13 (L. 35,17) *asadālambanatvāt* as understood in the Tibetan translation (**36,19: *dmigs pa med pa'i phyir ro*, i.e., "[the *vijñānapariṇāma* is called *vikalpa*] because its objective support is non-existent"). For the proposed compound beginning with *avidyamāna*, cf. *Tattvasaṁgraha* vs. 1257: *avidyamānasāsnādi*°, i.e.: "[an animal] which has no dewlap, etc.", and which therefore cannot be a cow. In any case, as regards **U**, I should, in view of ... *dmigs pa med pa'o*, prefer a nominal phrase, not a verbal one as assumed by Buescher (see § 399.1.2).

[1] Translator(s) not mentioned in the colophon.

[2] Team of translators including Jinamitra and Ye shes sde.

[3] In the MAVṬ, also translated by this team, I have noted one instance of X *med pa* = X-*rahita* out of five, viz., MAVṬₜ P tshi 25a1 = MAVṬ 11,2, but I have not searched this text systematically.

[1919] Not expressly represented in **U**ₜ and perhaps missing in the original. But there are examples for Skt. *iti vadāmi* being represented by °*r bshad do* (see fn. 1761). One might wonder whether without *iti* the neuter **mayôktaṁ* would not tend to be attracted by the immediately preceding fem. **upalabdhiḥ*, as in cases like AKBh 306,16: *rūpārūpyāvacarā anuśayā ... eko bhavāsrava* (ed.: *bhavāgra*) *uktaḥ*; 309,10: *tisro dṛṣṭayo dṛṣtisaṁ{pra}yojanam ... uktam*,[1] but in the present case the neuter would probably be protected by the fact that it is part of the wording of the sūtra.

[1] For the emendations, cf. also ODANI & HONJŌ 2007: 17f (lr).

[1920] Or *ahaṁ vadāmi*; without *iti*, {1c} would in this case run thus: **vijñānam upalabdhim (ahaṁ) vadāmi*, which sounds quite acceptable.

[1921] As for the question whether we should read *tad ā*° (as **U**ₜ) or rather *tad-ā*°, see fn. 1955.

[1922] Instead of *pratibhāsa*, other derivations from √*bhās* like *ābhāsa* or *nirbhāsa* are, of course, also possible.

[1923] My translation of {1a} follows the pattern of [S5] (see § 357.5), but [S6A] or [S6B] would also do. However, the Tibetan translators of MSgU (and MSgₜ: see § 371.3) understood {1a} in terms of [S4] (see § 352), probably under the influence of the *ad-sensum*-explanation of the compound in **U**ₜ{2a/b} (see § 397.5). Cf. also § 398.

[1924] See § 397.5.3 (with fn. 1955).

396.0. In regard to my interpretation of $\mathbf{U_t}$ and my reconstruction of its Skt. original, Matsumoto (M1: 182a–189a) raises the following objections:

396.1. According to Matsumoto, my interpretation and reconstruction of **U** disregards the "bipartite structure" of the passage. He admits that {3} rephrases the whole of ⓧ (M1: 183a4-5), but he attaches great importance to the fact that the preceding part of $\mathbf{U_t}$ does indeed have a bipartite structure (M1: 182b17–183a4, 188b), as is obvious from the parallelism "Quotation ⓧ① *zhes bya ba ni* Explanation ‖ Quotation ⓧ② *zhes bya ba ni* Explanation" (M1: 186a). In accordance with this assumption, he replaces my segmentation of the passage by his own: {1a/1b} becomes ⓐ, {1c} + {2a/b} becomes ⓑ, and {3} becomes ⓒ (M1: 182b, 183a–b).

396.2. In {3} (=ⓒ), which is indeed of fundamental importance for my understanding of $\mathbf{U_t}$, Matsumoto (M1: 186b3–188a1) rejects my interpretation as incompatible with his understanding of his section ⓑ (= {1c}+{2a/b}). Instead, he takes {3} as a paraphrase of M by conjecturing *dmigs pa* for *dmigs par*, which allows him to reconstruct the passage as **ālambanaṁ pratibhāsa°* (M1: 187,18f), and by assuming, once again, that the Tibetan translators confounded subject and predicate. He argues that if {3} (=ⓒ) were a paraphrase of S one might wonder why in this paraphrase *can* has not been added to the predicate noun, and why we have *dmigs <u>pa</u> rnam par rig pa* in ⓧ but *dmigs <u>par</u> snang ba* in the paraphrase. On the basis of these assumptions he reconstructs and translates {3} (=ⓒ) as follows:

U-rec(M) ⓒ: {3} **ālambanaṁ pratibhāsa-mātra-prabhāvitaṁ vijñānam ity uktam ...*[1925]

U-rec(M)-tr ⓒ: {3} (The meaning is [this], namely:) It has been declared (*ukta*) that the objective support (*ālambana*) that has been produced (*prabhāvita*) by a mere appearance (*snang ba tsam, pratibhāsa-mātra*) is awareness/mind (*vijñāna*).[1926]

396.3. Since in {2a/b} (=ⓑ, explanatory part) *ālambana* seems to be the Subj instead of forming a compound with *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* (cf. M1: 188a8), Matsumoto asserts that in {1a}, too, *dmigs pa* = *ālambana* has to be taken as the Subj, qualified as *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, and *can* has to be regarded as a mistaken addition, just as in the canonical Tibetan translation of the *mūla*-text (M1: 183a15f, 187b17f). Accordingly, **bāhyālambanavirahita* in {1b} (=ⓐ, explanatory part), too, qualifies *ālambana*, not *vijñāna*. My reservations about using **bāhyālambanavirahita* as an attribute or predicate of *ālambana* are discarded as groundless (M1: 183b–184a).

396.4. My proposal to understand *dmigs pa* in {1c} (=ⓑ, first part) as **upalabdhi*, glossing *vijñāna*, is rejected by Matsumoto with the argument that in the present context the Tibetan versions of Saṁdh, MSg and MSgBh use *dmigs pa* only for *ālambana*, so that a sudden shift to *upalabdhi* is inacceptable. Hence, in the present passage, too, *dmigs pa* has to correspond to *ālambana*, which in the original must have functioned as a repetition of the Subj of the sentence, with *vijñāna* as the PredN (M1: 185b17–186b2). He therefore reconstructs {1c} as

U-rec(M): {1c} **ālambanaṁ vijñānam iti mayā uktam*,[1927]

with **ālambanaṁ* being taken over from {1a} (=ⓐ, first part), as reconstructed in M.

[1925] M1: 187a18f.

[1926] M1: 183b7-10: ⓒ 即ち、顕現のみ (snaṅ ba tsam, pratibhāsamātra) によって生みだされた (prabhāvita) 所縁 (ālambana) は識 (vijñāna) であると説かれた (ukta) 、という意味である。

[1927] M1: 182b22f; 183b2.

396.5. Since {1c} (=ⓑ, first part) is for Matsumoto, just like {1a}, only a quotation[1928] of the *mūla*-text, {2a/b} (=ⓑ, second part) must not be regarded as an additional explanatory remark referring to ⓧ as a whole but is the explanation of {1c} only, and hence must be understood as explaining that the objective support (*ālambana*) is in reality mind (*vijñāna*) (M1: 188a–b). That is, for Matsumoto *zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* at the end of {2b} governs the whole preceding text from the beginning of {2a} onward. This text governed by *zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* has to be taken as a nominal sentence with *dmigs pa ... ni* as its Subj and *de'i ngo bo nyid* as its PredN, and *de'i* has to be understood as representing *vijñāna*, not *vijñapti* (M1: 188b–189a). He therefore translates {1c}+{2a/b} as follows:

> U-rec(M)-tr ⓑ: {1c} As regards the statement "**ālambanaṁ vijñānam iti mayôktam*", {2a/b} the meaning is [this], namely: that objective support (**tad ālambanam*), which has been produced by cognition only (**vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*), has that (= *vijñāna*) as its nature (**tat-svabhāvam*).[1929]

397.0. Rejoinder:[1930]

397.1.0. There is no question that $\mathbf{U_t}$ deals with ⓧ in such a way that it splits it into two parts, viz., by introducing a final particle and a double *shad* after the explanation of the first half (ⓧ①), i.e., after {1b}, and then continuing with the second half (ⓧ②). I disagree, however, with Matsumoto with regard to the assessment of the structure and function of the text that follows after the double *shad* as well as with regard to the assessment of the significance of the bipartition.

397.1.1. My disagreement with regard to the structure is based on the following arguments:

1. First, I find it strange that the alleged Subj of the sentence, i.e., *ālambanaṁ*, which had already been part of the quotation of ⓧ①, should be repeated in the quotation of ⓧ②. One could imagine that it might be repeated, along with an anaphoric pronoun, *before* the quotation of the *mūla*-text, or in the *explanation*, but hardly in the quotation of the *mūla*-text itself.

2. Second, the introductory *'di ltar* = **tathā hi*[1931] at the beginning of {2a/b} indicates that {2a/b} is not a simple gloss on ⓧ② ({1c}) in the same way as {1b} is a simple gloss

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[1928] In the present context, I use "quotation" in the sense of sentences or parts of sentences from the *mūla*-text reproduced in the commentary for the sake of commenting on them.

[1929] M1: 183b2-6: ⓑ "ālambanaṁ vijñānam iti mayā uktam" というのは、即ち、表識のみによって生みだされた (vijñapti-mātra-prabhāvita) その所縁 (tad ālambanam) は、それ (vijñāna) を自性とする (tat-svabhāvam)、という意味である。

[1930] In what follows, §§ 397.1, 397.2, etc., respond to §§ 396.1, 396.2, etc., respectively.

[1931] Buescher (B: 182,21), without any argument, replaces my reconstruction of *'di ltar* = **tathā hi* with **evaṁ*, but he does not render it in his translation of {2a/b}, nor does he point out the logical function it might have. I have taken the trouble to search through all occurrences of *'di ltar* in VśVṛ$_t$ (D), MAVBh$_t$ (D), TrBh$_t$ (D) and ASBh$_t$ (D), which were translated by the same team as MSgU$_t$, and to check the corresponding Skt. equivalents. In VśVṛ$_t$, I have noted 7 occurrences of *'di ltar*, all of which stand for *yasmāt* (*tathā hi* does not occur in this text except for VśVṛ 6,6, where, however, *tathā* has to be construed with the following *deśyamāne*). Of the 16 instances of *'di ltar* in MAVBh$_t$, 11 correspond to *yasmāt*, 4 to *yaduta* and 1 to *tathā hi* (the only occurrence of this word in this text!). In TrBh$_t$, I have noted 19 occurrences, 8 of which render *tathā hi* (ca. 40%), 6 *yasmāt* and 4 *yataḥ*, but none *evam*. In ASBh$_t$, ca. 45 (i.e., around 60%) out of ca. 75 instances of *'di ltar* correspond to Skt. *tathā hi*, the remaining instances representing *tadyathā* (10), *yasmāt* (6), *yataḥ* (5), *yaduta* (4) and *hi*

on {1a}. *Tathā hi* rather introduces a clarification or justification. The question is then whether it introduces a clarification or justification referring to {1c} only (which, if the bipartition is taken seriously, should mean: to ⓧ② only), or one referring, in some way or other, to the whole of ⓧ. Now, judging from the words occurring in {2a/b}, it should be obvious that the clarification or justification does not refer, in any specific way, to ⓧ② but, on the contrary, takes up the whole vocabulary of ⓧ①. This means that any unbiased reader will understand {2a/b} as a clarification or justification of ⓧ as a whole with special reference to the portion ⓧ①, the more so since it can hardly be denied that it is above all, and especially so if my reconstruction ([S]) is correct, the phraseology of ⓧ① that must have been felt to require some additional comment (I shall come back to this point in § 397.5). In this way, however, the bipartite structure as assumed by Matsumoto is exploded.

397.1.2. In my opinion, even the bipartite structure of {1a–c} is merely the work of the Tibetan translators, for I take the original of {1a–c} to have been a quotation of ⓧ as a whole interspersed with glosses (see § 397.4). As for the *zhes bya ba ni* at the end of {1c}, I take it to represent an *iti* that concluded this quotation-cum-glosses of ⓧ in order to set it off from the additional clarifications which are not embedded in the quotation of ⓧ, viz., {2a/b} and {3}.

397.2.1. It seems hard to deny that $\mathbf{U}_t${3} (=ⓒ) makes excellent sense as it stands and that it is flawless also from the syntactical point of view. Since the word order in $\mathbf{U}_t${3} =ⓒ is the same as in **Tib**ⓧ, it stands to reason that this holds good, analogously, for the Sanskrit original of {3} as well, i.e., that **vijñānam* was placed at the end of the nominal sentence dependent on the *verbum dicendi*. Because in $\mathbf{U}_t${3} as it stands *dmigs pa* (**ālambana*) is in the terminative case and thus to be construed as the content of *snang ba*, it must, provided that $\mathbf{U}_t${3} as it stands mirrors its Sanskrit original correctly, have formed part of the compound ending in °*prabhāvita*, which can only be the PredN, and the Subj of the nominal sentence must have been **vijñāna*, not **ālambana*. The text reconstructed on this basis (see § 395: U-rec(S)) is in perfect agreement with the usual word order in this type of nominal sentence (see § 350) and would, of course, support [S].

397.2.2. Matsumoto (M1: 187a20-22) frankly admits that his reason for rejecting this reconstruction is that it would not be compatible with ⓑ, especially its first part (my {1c}), but his understanding and reconstruction of this passage in terms of [M] is disputable (see §§ 397.4 and 397.5). Why not argue in the reverse way and try to interpret the ambiguous passage (ⓑ= {1c}+{2a/b}) in line with the unambiguous one (ⓒ= {3})? This is indeed called for because Matsumoto's choice compels him to alter the text and, in addition, to charge the Tibetan

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(1), i.e., conjunctions/particles indicating either a reason or an explication and thus expressing one of the two facets of the function of *tathā hi*. In two cases, *'di ltar* renders *iti*, once (ASBh_t D li 10a6 = ASBh 12,12) in the function of summing up a preceding series of arguments, and once (89a7 = 122,1 [em.]) in a strongly deictic function (ASBh 121,29f: ... *tat sarvam ... ekaṁ bhāgaṁ karoty ... ekaṁ rāśiṁ karoti; ekaṁ yāvat rāśiṁ kṛtvā iti{ḥ}* [thus ms.] *pratisaṁśikṣate: 'sarvam etad anityam ...'*, i.e.: "he ponders/meditates as follows: '...'"). There is, finally, only one case (78b7 = 107,31) where *'di ltar* renders *tathā*, and there are only two (12b2 = 15,18 and 67a7 = 93,6) where it renders *evaṁ*, and in all the three cases the function of the conjunction is *summing up* a preceding set of qualities or achievements. Apart from this, in the first of the two cases of *'di ltar = evam* only D has *'di ltar*, whereas P (shi 15a6) has the usual *de ltar* for *evam*. Thus, it is highly improbable that in MSgU_t, translated by the same team as ASBh_t, *'di ltar* corresponds to *evaṁ*, and for replacing the statistically well-founded equation of *'di ltar = tathā hi* with *'di ltar = evam* one should be able to adduce very strong reasons unless one is willing to run the risk of being charged with arbitrariness.

translators, once again, with having confounded Subj and PredN. Though a secondary corruption of *dmigs pa snang ba* to *dmigs par snang ba* would not be inconceivable since *snang ba* is, as he rightly remarks (M1: 187a13-15), frequently construed with the terminative, the assumption of such a mistake remains arbitrary in a sentence which makes perfect sense as it stands, and to charge the otherwise admirably competent translators with having confounded Subj and PredN so as to produce an abstruse sentence ("Mind is an objective support ...") is hardly acceptable. But let me return to the problem of the compatibility of {3} and {2a/b} later (§ 398), after my discussion of {2a/b} (in § 397.5).

397.2.3. As for Matsumoto's arguments against my reconstruction and understanding of {3}, attention should be paid to the fact that the final *zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* = *ity arthaḥ* indicates that the rephrasing is meant to show the *purport* of the passage (i.e., ⓧ), so that no word for word correspondence or strict syntactical equivalence of the elements of {3} on the one hand and ⓧ on the other would be required. Actually, however, according to my reconstruction which keeps to $\mathbf{U_t}$ as it stands, the rephrasing is confined to replacing **vijñapti* by **pratibhāsa* (or the like). This replacement suggests an understanding of ⓧ more or less in the sense of [S5] (see § 357.5). Since such an understanding does not involve an interpretation of the compound ending in *°prabhāvita* as a bahuvrīhi, no *can* is required. At the same time, the expression X-*pratibhāsa*° is not in every regard equivalent to X-*vijñapti*. *Vijñapti* as a transitive action noun would require an object as its complement,[1932] and even when used in the sense of the content it may still be conceived as the representation = appearance *of* this content (as that which is represented or appears).[1933] *Pratibhāsa*, on the other hand, is derived from an intransitive verb which, like its Tibetan equivalent *snang ba*, favours an "as"-complement: "to appear *as* X".[1934] A different syntactical construction of X-*vijñapti* and X-*pratibhāsa* in Tibetan would thus be quite natural even on the basis of an interpretation of ⓧ in terms of [S5], all the more if ⓧ was, as in $\mathbf{U_t}$ as we have it, understood by the translators in terms of [S4] (see § 371.3).

397.3.0. In order to adapt the quotation of the first part of ⓧ ({1a}) to [M], Matsumoto once again interferes with the transmitted text by deleting *can*, an operation I consider arbitrary (see § 372). Nor am I completely persuaded by his defence of **bāhyālambanavirahita* as a possible qualification not of *vijñāna* (the Subj in [S]) but of *ālambana* (the Subj in [M]).

397.3.1. In Sarvāstivāda and also in Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources we can indeed find statements to the effect that an *ālambana* may or may not, in its turn, have an *ālambana*. But such statements are not directly applicable to the passage under discussion. They are rather based on the traditional Abhidharmic concept of *ālambana* as the objective correlate in a cognitive relation. To *have* an *ālambana* is thus peculiar to entities with a cognitive, 'intentional' structure, i.e., to the mind (*citta*) and the factors associated with the mind (*caitasika*), whereas entities lacking such a structure, like material factors, cannot *have* an *ālam-*

[1932] I.e., in Skt., an objective genitive. In Tibetan, *rnam par rig pa* may be construed with a direct object (see § 399.3.2 with fn. 1966; cf. also fn. 1313) or with *la* (e.g., TrBh **7,4 and 6f *yul la rnam par rig pa* = *7,3f *vijñaptir viṣayasya* and *viṣayavijñapti°*).

[1933] Cf., e.g., MSg II.2 and 5 (*lus dang lus can dang za ba po'i rnam par rig pa*, etc.).

[1934] Cf., e.g., MAVṬ 18,6f: *yat* (sc. *vijñānaṁ*) *pañcendriyatvena* ... *pratibhāsate*. For Tibetan, cf., e.g., VśVṛ 5,16 *vijñānam eva rūpādipratibhāsam* = VśVṛt D shi 6a1 *rnam par shes pa nyid gzugs la sogs par snang (gi* | ...).

bana.[1935] Since both kinds of entities can become the objective correlate in a cognitive relation, the dichotomy recurs on the level of *ālambana*: material entities, etc., as the objective correlate (*ālambana*$_1$) of a cognition are, in their turn, devoid of an objective correlate (*ālambana*$_2$), but if a cognition or mental factor becomes the objective correlate (*ālambana*$_1$) of another cognition, it is still cognized as the cognition of something, i.e., as possessing a cognitive structure implying an objective correlate of its own (*ālambana*$_2$). Thus, there are *ālambana*s that do not have an *ālambana*, as, e.g., material entities insofar as they are the object of a cognitive factor, and there are *ālambana*s that have an *ālambana*, viz., cognitive factors that have become the object of other cognitive factors.[1936]

397.3.2. In the passage under discussion, however, we are confronted with a more sophisticated concept of the objective correlate. While the traditional Abhidharmic principle implies, at any rate in Sarvāstivāda, that all cognitive factors invariably have an objective correlate in the form of some other existent entity,[1937] some (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda sources, including the MSg, point out that obviously some cognitive factors, like representations of past or future things, or dreams and illusions, have no objective correlate[1938] or a non-existent one.[1939] This situation is, moreover, generalized and extended to all cognitions or representations.[1940] In the passage under discussion, t s view is harmonized with the Abhidharmic doctrine that all mental events have an objective correlate (*ālambana*) by positing for all of them (cf. Saṁdh VIII.8) an *internal* object — made to emerge by, and consisting in, representation only (**vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*: U-rec(S) {2a}) — while at the same time *rejecting* an *external* objective correlate. There is surely no problem in expressing this idea in the form proposed by me as U-rec(S) {1a–c}, viz., with *vijñāna* as the Subj,[1941] since it is mental entities with a cognitive structure that are, according to the Vijñānavāda revision of the Abhidharmic principle, considered to have an internal objective correlate (*ālambana*$_A$) but to lack an external one (*ālambana*$_B$). Nor would there be a problem if *vijñapti* were the Subj as long as *vijñapti* is understood as the cognitive act or at least as the full cognitive structure comprising

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[1935] See, e.g., Dhs 253,21-26 (# 1508–1509); AK(Bh) 23,1-6 (I.34ab); II.64a-c; BoBh$_D$ 70,5f; PSk 22,9-11; ASBh 40,21-23.

[1936] Prak$_H$ 719b23-29; JP$_H$ 987b20-25; Vi 704a7–b4; ASBh 40,26f: *anālaṁbanam ālaṁbanaṁ rūpaṁ cittaviprayuktā asaṁskṛtaṁ ca | sālaṁbanam ālaṁbanaṁ cittacaitasikā dharmāḥ*.

[1937] Thus explicitly AKVy 65,13 and 15f: the seven *cittadhātu*s and the mental factors included in the *dharmadhātu* are not only the only entities connected with an objective support (*saptaîva sālambanāḥ*, etc.) but also are so *exclusively* (*sālambanā eva*), i.e., are never devoid of an objective support.

[1938] MSg II.14.2 ≈ ASBh 42,1 (see § 397.4.1: [A18], [A19]); MAVṬ 25,18f: 〈**svapnādau ca* (?; ed.: *tu*, but Tib. *yang*) *vijñānam a*〉*nālambanam iti siddham* (MAVṬ$_t$ P tshi 34a4: *rmi lam la sogs pa la yang rnam par shes pa dmigs pa med par grub bo*).

[1939] Cf. ASBh 40,24f: "A non-existent objective support: e.g., [that] of mistaken states of mind and mental factors, and an objective support like the past, the future, a dream, a reflected image or an illusion" (*asad ālambanam: tadyathā viparyastānāṁ cittacaitasikānām, atītānāgatasvapnapratibiṁbamāyādyālaṁbanaṁ ca*). Cf. also 42,6f (= MSg II.14^b.b and VIII.20.b): *atītādau tathā svapne pratibiṁbadvaye 'pi ca asadālaṁbanatvāc* ... (ed.: *asannā°* and ms. 38b1 *āsannā°*, but ASBh$_t$ P śi 38b6 *dmigs pa med pa'i phyir* and MSg *dmigs pa yod pa ma yin pas*).

[1940] Cf. MSg II.14 (30,18f): ... *rnam par rig pa thams cad kyi don med pa khon du chud par 'gyur te*; MAVṬ 148,1 *na ca bāhyārtha ālambanapratyayo vijñānasya, tena vinâpi bhāvāt*.

[1941] Cf. the equivalent (though syntactically different) statement in MAVṬ 148,1 (see fn. 1940).

this aspect. But if, as in Matsumoto's reconstruction of **U**$_t$, what is envisaged as the Subj is only the internal objective correlate, viz., the objective element of this cognitive structure (i.e., *ālambana*$_A$), its not having an objective correlate whatsoever (= *ālambana*$_2$) in the *technical* sense would be obvious and not worth mentioning, unless it (viz., *ālambana*$_A$ = *ālambana*$_1$) were the internal replica of another *cognitive* factor. But this is not the case in Ⓧ because in the context of Saṁdh VIII the objective correlates (*ālambana*$_1$) at stake are, in the first place, visualized images or replicas of visible things,[1942] etc., in general (Saṁdh VIII.8), which have no cognitive structure. It would thus only be in a less technical sense that the internal *ālambana* could be stated (with Matsumoto) to lack an external *ālambana*, viz., in the sense that there is no external *ālambana* (*ālambana*$_B$) corresponding to, or resembling, the internal one (*ālambana*$_A$). Even so, as long as no reliable and unambiguous example for such a use is presented,[1943] I myself consider *vijñāna* to be definitely more likely as the Subj of a PredN **bāhyālambanarahita* than *ālambana*.

[1942] Cf. MSg II.7.2: *shes bya'i gzugs brnyan rnam par bsngos pa la sogs pa* = **vinīlakādijñeyapratibimbam*, and 此色相 in **Pa** (see § 391). Cf. also Saṁdh VIII.12 (93,27f).

[1943] MAVṬ 24,7f, unfortunately incompletely preserved, would hardly serve the purpose. In YAMAGUCHI's edition, the passage runs as follows:

⟨idaṁ vijñaptimātratva⟩m ālambanārtharahitaṁ svabījaparipākād rūpādyābhāsaṁ ⟨vijñānaṁ⟩[1] *pravartate, na tu rūpādiko 'rtho 'sti.* [1] ms. om. (STANLEY 1988: 29 n. 140).

The Tibetan translation (MAVṬ$_t$ P tshi 33a6f; D bi 200b6f) reads:

dmigs pa'i don dang bral ba 'di ni rnam par rig pa tsam nyid de| rang gi sa bon yongs su smin pa las gzugs la sogs par (D : *pa* P) *snang ba'i rnam par shes pa skye ba yin gyi | gzugs la sogs pa'i don ni yod pa ma yin no.*

I would, in any case, prefer to reconstruct the beginning of the passage as

⟨vijñaptimātram evêda⟩m ālambanārtharahitam ... ⟨vijñānaṁ⟩ pravartate ...

In addition, the position of the word *vijñānaṁ* in the original may be a matter of doubt, but in view of the Tibetan let us keep it in the place where Yamaguchi inserted it. Now, the Tibetan version, inserting the semi-final *de* (= *ste*) after *nyid*, seems to have understood *⟨vijñaptimātram evêda⟩m ālambanārtharahitam* as a sentence of its own, where *idam* might be taken to mean "this [world] here", so that one might argue that in this passage the objective world is stated to be "without an objective support". But even if this is accepted the predication would be *mediated* by the fact that "this [world] here" is first reduced to a mere *vijñapti*, which includes an objective and a subjective aspect, and in its subjective aspect it may well be explained to be "without an objective support". Apart from this, it would also be possible to understand *idam* in a subjective sense, viz., as "this [experience of phenomena]" (cf. also § 357.3: [A10]), and to take the Tibetan version to mean:

"This [experience of the phenomenal world], being devoid of an [external] object [functioning as its] objective support, is just mere representation, and [it is only] due to the maturation of its Seed [that] *vijñāna* arises so as to appear as visibles, etc., ...".

Yet, I am not quite sure whether the Tibetan translators should be followed in splitting the passage into two sentences instead of taking it as a unit. In the latter case, *idam* would construe with *vijñānam*, whatever its precise position (why not *⟨vijñaptimātram evêdaṁ vijñāna⟩m ālambanarahitaṁ ... rūpādyābhāsaṁ pravartate*?), and what is a mere representation without an objective support would then be the *vijñāna*:

"As nothing but a mere representation, without an [external] object [functioning] as [its] objective support, this *vijñāna* arises, due to the maturation of its Seed, so as to appear as visibles, etc., but there is no [external] object [in the form of] visibles, etc."

Such an interpretation would fit in excellently with the context of the argument, where *vijñapti(mātra)* refers to the (imagined) cognizing subject, the *grāhaka* (MAVṬ 24,9; 26,20-25).

397.4.1. Matsumoto's argument that *dmigs pa* in $\mathbf{U}_t${1c} cannot represent *upalabdhi* because in the other pertinent testimonia it is used, in the present context, exclusively for *ālambana*, appears unconvincing. Surely Matsumoto does not want to say that *Asvabhāva cannot have employed the word *upalabdhi* in his commentary because neither the *mūla*-text nor the *Bhāṣya* (see § 409) had made use of it. Thus, the argument probably means that in view of the fact that in the Tibetan translations of the related testimonia (and, so one may add, also in $\mathbf{U}_t$, apart from the sentence under discussion) *dmigs pa* is used, in the present context, for *ālambana* only, it is methodically unsound to assume that in one place, viz., {1c}, it exceptionally renders *upalabdhi*. This argument would seem to presuppose the expectation that in case *upalabdhi* had actually occurred in the original, the translators would, in view of the immediate proximity of *dmigs pa* representing *ālambana*, have chosen another word for rendering **upalabdhi*. However, such an expectation seems to be unwarranted, for precisely the same sudden shift from *dmigs pa* = *ālambana* to *dmigs pa* = *upalabdhi* can be found, even in one and the same sentence, in MSg II.14.2 (translated by the same team):

[A18] *<u>dmigs pa</u> med pa'i rnam par rig pa <u>dmigs pas</u> ni* ...,[1944] i.e.:

[A18]-tr Because one observes (**upalabdhi*) cognitions/representations (**vijñapti*) that lack a [real or external] objective support (**ālambana*) (viz., in the case of apprehending past or future [events], or in the case of dreams, reflected images, etc.) ...

The passage recurs, in an abbreviated and slightly different form but in precisely the same context, at ASBh 42,1:

[A19] *an<u>ālambana</u>vijñān<u>opalabdhyā</u>*[1945]

[A19]-Tib *<u>dmigs pa</u> med pa'i rnam par shes pa <u>dmigs pa</u>...s* (ASBh$_t$ P śi 38a3).

There is thus no reason to exclude the use of *dmigs pa* for *ālambana* and *upalabdhi* side by side,[1946] less so since in view of the fact that the equation of *vijñāna* with *upalabdhi* was current[1947] the reader could indeed be expected to understand *dmigs pa* in {1c} correctly as the act of apprehending (i.e., *upalabdhi*).

397.4.2. Apart from this, if in {1c} (=ⓑ) *rnam par shes pa dmigs pa yin pa* is taken as a complete nominal phrase, *rnam par shes pa* should, according to the habitual Tibetan word order, be the Subj ('theme') and *dmigs pa* the PredN ('comment'), and not the other way round as Matsumoto understands it. This means that in his interpretation the translators would

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[1944] Text acc. to NAGAO 1982: I 71 (lr).

[1945] It is worth noting that in the ASBh version we have *vijñāna* instead of *vijñapti*, which proves that when *vijñapti* is declared to be devoid of an *ālambana* it not so much used in the resultative-static sense of "appearance" but is still felt as having an (at least apparent) 'intentional' structure.

[1946] For further evidence, see, e.g., MSg I.52.2: *dmigs pa dang rnam pa* (D) *mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro* (MSg$_{Hs}$ 137a7: 所緣行相不可得故; reconstr. acc. to NAGAO 1982: I 49 lr: **ālambanākārānupalabdheḥ*); I.34.2: *yid kyi rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa la mi dmigs pa'i phyir ro* (MSg$_{Hs}$ 136a4f: 意識所緣不可得故; reconstr. acc. to NAGAO 1982: I 38 lr: **manovijñānālambanānupalambhāt*). Likewise, in his commentary on ⓧ (see § 430), Ye shes snying po first ({2}) uses *dmigs pa* in the sense of *ālambana*, whereas slightly later ({4}) it must represent *upalambha*. Cf. also the passage MAVṬ 24,7f quoted in fn. 1943, where *dmigs pa* is used for *ālambana*, although in the immediately preceding sentence (= MAVBh 20,3f) *dmigs pa* had twice rendered *upalabdhi*, and does so once more in the subsequent lines (MAVṬ$_t$ P tshi 33a7f = MAVṬ 24,9f). In the following lines, *dmigs pa* again renders forms of the verb *ā√lamb* as well as the noun *ālambana*.

[1947] Cf., e.g., AKBh 11,7 (see fn. 1789; here, too, Tib. has *dmigs pa* for *upalabdhi*), or Paṭis-a 517,11: *upaladdhī ti viññāṇaṁ*.

have misunderstood {1c} in the same abstruse way in which he accuses them to have misunderstood ⓧ (see ch. 5.1) and $\mathbf{U}_t${3} (see § 396.2). But judging from the overall quality of $\mathbf{U}_t$, such an assumption is hardly plausible.

397.4.3. I must admit that my own interpretation is not without problems either, but I consider them to admit of plausible explanations. It may indeed look strange that what I take to be a quotation of ⓧ with interspersed glosses is split up into two parts by a final particle followed by a double shad (*med pa'o* ||) at the end of the first gloss ({1b}). Still, it is quite possible that due to the interruption by the first gloss ({1b}), perhaps preceded by *iti*, the translators no longer felt the quotation of ⓧ as a whole to be a syntactical unit but rather took {1a/b} as a mere word-quotation + gloss. They were thus left with **vijñānam upalabdhir iti mayoktam* as a sentence of its own and translated it as it stood. The result is correct as far as the main purport, viz., the equation of *vijñāna* with **upalabdhi*, is concerned, but infelicitous insofar as the scope of **(iti) mayoktam* is represented as if it were confined to this equation. Another possibility is that in order to preserve the syntactical unity of the whole quotation of ⓧ([S]) in Tibetan, the translators would have been forced to place *rnam par shes pa* and the gloss on it first (i.e., before {1a}), because they would have had to avoid the sequence "PredN ('comment') – Subj ('theme') – *yin pa*", which is not usual in Tibetan. For some reason, however, they preferred to split the sentence and to preserve, thereby, the sequence of the original,[1948] but they failed to render the scope of **(iti) mayoktam* correctly in that they translated the second half of the quotation-cum-glosses as if it meant "I have declared *vijñāna* to be *upalabdhi*" instead of "[Thus, i.e., as characterized by ...,] I have declared *vijñāna*, i.e. *upalabdhi*, to be". But this is surely not such a serious mistake as producing an abstruse statement by confounding Subj and PredN.

397.5.0. Since the question of the position of {2a/b} within the structure of $\mathbf{U}_t$ has already been discussed above (§ 397.1), I may now address the more specific issues connected with this phrase.

397.5.1. First, it must be asked whether the pattern "*tathā hi* A^{nom} B^{nom} *ity arthaḥ*" in the sense of "The meaning is [this], namely: A is B" does occur at all.[1949] Second, the word order[1950] of {2a/b} appears problematic if Matsumoto's interpretation is accepted; for in Tibetan the demonstrative (*de*) should, as far as I can see, follow the expression *rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba* (**vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam*) if the latter were a postpositive attribute of *dmigs pa* (**ālambanam*),[1951] as Matsumoto assumes.[1952] Finally, the assumption

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[1948] Cf. also MSgU$_t$ P li 270b7–271a7 (cf. fn. 1806) on the DBhS quotation, where the predicate noun *cittamātra* is commented on first, and the subject *traidhātukam* only thereafter, in accordance with the Skt. and against the Tib. translation of the quotation in MSg II.7.1.

[1949] Unfortunately, I could find only one sentence starting with *tathā hi* and ending with *ity arthaḥ*, viz., AKVy 76,28f (ad AKBh 28,20): *tathā hîndriyadhātavo vijñānadhātūn āśrayabhāvena yathā-yogaṁ bhajante, sevanta ity arthaḥ* (Tj P cu 80b8f [D gu 70b6f]: *'di ltar dbang po'i khams dag ni ... rten* [P : *brten* D] *te rten* [D : *brten* P] *par byed do zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go*), but at least this example would seem to confirm my point, since *sevante* is clearly a gloss on *bhajante* only.

[1950] As for the anteposition of the subject in connection with an anaphoric pronoun, see § 445.2 with fn. 2045.

[1951] Cf., e.g., BoBh$_t$ P 85b2f (D 74b2f): *byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyi tshul khrims kyi ngo bo nyid yon tan bzhi dang ldan pa de ni (... dge ba yin par rig par bya'o ||)* = BoBh$_D$ 95,24f: *tat (punar) etac caturbhir guṇair yuktaṁ svabhāvaśīlaṁ bodhisattvānāṁ (kalyāṇaṁ veditavyam)*.

that the demonstrative pronoun *de* in *de'i ngo bo nyid* (**tatsvabhāvam*) takes up the somewhat remote *rnam par shes pa* (**vijñāna*) instead of the immediately preceding *rnam par rig pa* (**vijñapti*), though almost inevitable in the context of Matsumoto's interpretation, sounds far-fetched. Would one not expect the author, in case he really had *vijñāna* in mind, to have avoided the possibility of a misunderstanding by using the noun instead of the misleading pronoun?

397.5.2. Nevertheless, in view of the frequent use of *ity arthaḥ* for marking an additional ad sensum explanation, I consider it most probable that in the sentence **tathā hi tad*(-?) *ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ tatsvabhāvam ity arthaḥ*, provided that my reconstruction is correct, **ity arthaḥ* governs only the last word,[1953] as Hsüan-tsang correctly understood it (see § 404). I admit that in $\mathbf{U}_t$ *ste* would have been more appropriate than *ni*. As it stands, I would render the $\mathbf{U}_t$ passage as follows:

> $\mathbf{U}_t$-tr {2a/b}: That is to say: as regards [the statement] that this objective support is distinctively/essentially characterized by [being] nothing but representation, what is meant is that it has the nature of that (i.e., of a mere representation = appearance).

397.5.3. As I understand it, {2a/b}, clearly marked off by *'di ltar* = **tathā hi* as an additional explanation (see § 397.1.1.2), has been added to the quotation-cum-glosses in order to clarify the *purport* of the compound predicate noun of ⓧ, without keeping to the syntactic pattern of the nuclear part of ⓧ[1954] as a whole. What *Asvabhāva wants to tell us in **U**{2a/b} is that the qualification of *vijñāna* as **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* in ⓧ(🅂) makes sense because this (or perhaps rather: its = the *vijñāna*'s)[1955] objective support is **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, and in view of the polysemy of *prabhāvita* he feels obliged to specify its purport in the present context by an ad sensum explanation taking the expression **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* to be equivalent to "has the nature of a mere representation (= appearance)". For X-*prabhāvita* = X-*svabhāva*, see text [A15] in § 360.2; cf. also § 499.2.

[1952] Cf. his translation of the passage (see § 396.5 with fn. 1929).

[1953] Cf. fn. 1949. On the pattern "X, [i.e.] Y, C *ity arthaḥ*" cf., e.g., ASBh 27,9f: *prakṛtyā ... iti svarasena, vinā kalyāṇamitrādibalenêty arthaḥ*; Sv I 104,21: *viriyam anvāya āgamma, paṭiccā ti attho*; 106,22f: *takkapariyāhatan ti takkena pariyāhataṁ, tena tena paryāyena takketvā ti attho*.

[1954] Viz., the nominal phrase (PredN + Subj) dependent on *(iti) mayoktam*.

[1955] Since Indian manuscripts would normally write *tadālambanam*, regardless of whether *tad ālambanam* or *tad-ālambanam* is intended, the decision for one or the other is a matter of interpretation, and must take into account the fact that different commentators or translators may have decided differently if both alternatives make sense. If we choose *tad ā*°, the pronoun *tad* would refer to the fact that the *ālambana* had already been mentioned, e.g., in the preceding quotation of the sūtra text ({1a}). If, however, we decide on *tad-ā*°, the pronoun would represent *vijñāna* ({1c}). For Matsumoto, who, presupposing 🄼, takes *vijñāna* as the PredN, the latter alternative may not make much sense. But if 🅂 is presupposed, it does. Certainly, if the quotation of ⓧ in the *mūla*-text of the MSg already contained an anaphoric pronoun, the pronoun in **U**{2a} would probably better be taken in the same way, i.e., as an *attribute* of *ālambanaṁ*, as in $\mathbf{U}_t$. But there is no trace of an anaphoric pronoun in the quotation of ⓧ in $\mathbf{U}_t$ nor in $\mathbf{U}_c$. Therefore, the alternative of reading *tad-ā*°, i.e., understanding *tad* to refer to *vijñāna*, may be worth considering. Taken in this way, *Asvabhāva would, in his explanation, have transformed the statement of ⓧ(🅂) that *vijñāna* is **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* into the simpler statement that the objective support (*ālambana*) of *vijñāna* is *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, which would perfectly coincide with the transformation of ⓧ in **Hs** (see ch. 5.4).

397.5.4. It is worth noting that my interpretation of **U** implies that in {2a/b} **U** tacitly converts the compound ending in °*prabhāvita* from a qualification of *vijñāna* (as which I take it in ⓧ [S] and in **U**{3}) into a qualification of *ālambana*. Reduced, in this function, to *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, the compound is an entirely unproblematic instrumental-tatpuruṣa, and hence no addition of *can* is appropriate. At the same time, it is obvious that precisely this explanation in **U**{2a/b} could easily lead the team of translators, who translated both the *mūla*-text and the MSgU (but not the MSgBh!), to understand the more complex compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, predicated of *vijñāna*, as a bahuvrīhi with inverted members: "*having* an objective support that is distinctively/essentially characterized by [being] a mere representation = appearance (or: made to appear, and in *this* sense 'produced', by nothing but the manifesting activity of the mind)".

398.1. This leads me back to the problem of the compatibility of **U**{2a/b} and **U**{3}, which in my understanding, based on $\mathbf{U}_t$ as it stands, would seem to presuppose different analyses of the compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*. In {2a/b}, the fact that *prabhāvita* is predicated of *ālambana* would seem to presuppose an analysis of this compound in terms of [S4] (or at least in terms of an exocentric sentence-compound)[1956]. In {3}, on the other hand, *prabhāvita* is predicated of *vijñāna*, and the presupposed understanding of the compound comes close to [S5] (§ 357.5). How can this divergence be removed or explained?

398.2. According to Matsumoto, the whole of **U** should be adapted to the structure of {2a/b} (with *ālambana* as the Subj), but this compels him to assume, in $\mathbf{U}_t$, two textual mistakes or corruptions (wrong *can* in {1} and *dmigs pa̱r* in {3}) and two basic misunderstandings (mixing up of Subj and PredN in {1c} and {3}) on the part of the translators, which seems too extreme.

398.3. It would surely be less problematic to bring {2a/b} in line with [S] by assuming that an anusvāra had intruded in the Sanskrit manuscript used by the translators of $\mathbf{U}_t$, transforming an original **tathā hi tad (sc. vijñānam) ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ, tatsvabhāvam ity arthaḥ* into the **tathā hi tad(-) ālambanaṁ vi°* presupposed by $\mathbf{U}_t$. But I do not think that this is the right solution, or that it is required for the assumption that $\mathbf{U}_t$ is based on [S].

398.4. I rather prefer to keep to $\mathbf{U}_t${2a/b} as it stands and to the reconstruction based on it, and to assume that in {2a/b} *Asvabhāva explained the PredN of ⓧ in such a way that the syntactical structure of the nuclear part of ⓧ[1957] as a whole is disregarded or suspended, so to speak; i.e., he either (if we follow $\mathbf{U}_t$ in reading **tad ālambanaṁ*) freely expounded the purport of the PredN of ⓧ regardless of its precise formal structure within the syntactical pattern of ⓧ as a whole, or (if we read **tad-ālambanaṁ*) he transformed, in **U**{2a/b}, the syntactical pattern of the nuclear portion of ⓧ in a way similar to the one Hsüan-tsang applied in his translation to ⓧ itself. And it may well be that Hsüan-tsang's transformation of ⓧ was actually inspired by precisely this version of **U**{2a/b} that can be reconstructed from $\mathbf{U}_t$.[1958]

398.5. As already stated before (§ 397.5.4), in this explanation *prabhāvita* comes to be predicated of the objective support (**ālambana*). This may be taken to mean that *Asvabhāva understood the compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* in ⓧ as a bahuvrīhi with

[1956] See fn. 1867.

[1957] See fn. 1954.

[1958] Actually, Hsüan-tsang started his translation work on the MSg complex with the MSgU (see fn. 1894).

inverted members (i.e., in terms of [S4]), as the Tibetan translators (who probably translated MSg and MSgU at the same time) seem to have concluded. In this case, it would follow that the syntactical structure of the ad sensum paraphrase of ⓧ in {3} in terms of [S5] (see § 397.2.3) is merely due to the replacement of *vijñapti* with *pratibhāsa* but does *not* mirror *Asvabhāva's own view on precisely how the compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* should be resolved. But I do not exclude the possibility that *Asvabhāva himself may have wavered between a resolution of the compound in terms of [S4] and in terms of [S5].

399.0. My analysis and reconstruction of $\mathbf{U}_t$ have recently also been rejected by Buescher (B: 182–184), who, like Matsumoto, thinks that $\mathbf{U}_t$ supports a reconstruction of ⓧ in terms of 🄼 / 🄱. Buescher's analysis of the overall structure of $\mathbf{U}_t$ is similar to Matsumoto's, but since his arguments are partly different I cannot avoid adding some comments, and apologize for a certain degree of repetitiveness.

399.1.0. $\mathbf{U}_t${1a–b}:

399.1.1. As has already been pointed out (§ 374), the basic flaw of Buescher's interpretation of ⓧ in $\mathbf{Tib}_{\mathbf{MSg}}$ is that he limits the scope of the bahuvrīhi-marker *can* in ⓧ① (=$\mathbf{U}_t${1a}) to *rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba*, because he mistakes the underlying case-tatpuruṣa **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* for a bahuvrīhi.[1959] It is only on the basis of this blunder that he is able to feel entitled to take $\mathbf{U}_t${1a} as a phrase with *ālambana* as the Subj and **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as an attribute qualifying *ālambana*, and to charge me with not having properly recognized this alleged fact.

399.1.2. In addition, Buescher (B: 183,26f) accuses me of "ignoring the quotation indicator (*zhes bya ba* [= *iti*])" at the end of {1a}. It is true that I omitted **iti* in my reconstruction (S 1984: 449) because I regarded it as phraseologically dispensable (*zhes bya ba ni*/*la* after an explanandum does not necessarily correspond to an *iti* in the Sanskrit original).[1960] But it should have been clear from my former article[1961] that I, too, understand {1b} as a gloss on or explanation of the sūtra phrase quoted (from MSg, not MSgBh!)[1962] in {1a}, and adding **iti* at the end of {1a} would not make any difference to me. The issue on which we disagree, apart from the original wording of the sūtra phrase, is rather the question of how {1b} should be reconstructed. Buescher (B: 182,12) opts for a verbal phrase, viz., **nāsti bāhyālambanam* (Buescher: "there exists no external reference point"), and this phrase (or **nāsti bāhyam ālambanam*) would in fact be unobjectionable from the point of view of meaning even if {1a} were, in spite of the problems involved in view of the bahuvrīhi-marker *can*, reconstructed in terms of 🄼 / 🄱 as **ālambanaṁ vi°*, since a verbal phrase would, unlike an adjectival phrase like **bāhyālambanarahitam*, not involve the difficulties pointed out in § 397.3. But the

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[1959] B: 181,19f: "The translators of both MSgrBh and MSgrU indicate the compound °*prabhāvitaṁ* as a *bahuvrīhi samāsa* by adding the particle *can* to °*rab tu phye ba*."

[1960] Cf., e.g., ASBh$_t$ P shi 39a4ff, where the explananda (*rten la dbang byed pa*, etc.) are all marked by *zhes bya ba la* or *zhes bya ba ni* although there is no *iti* in the Sanskrit original (ASBh 42,20ff: *pratiṣṭhādhipatitaḥ*, etc.). Still closer to the passage under discussion is TrBh (same team of translators!) **49,25f *'di dag rnam par rig pa tsam nyid ces bya ba ni don dang bral ba ste* = *49,17 *vijñaptimātram evêdam artharahitaṁ* (no *iti*!).

[1961] S 1984: 449,6f: "As for ①, it is, according to U$_t$, a pratīka [read: quotation (L.S.)] of the Sūtra sentence interspersed with glosses."

[1962] See fn. 1916.

Tibetan text of {1b} (... *med pa'o*) suggests a nominal phrase, not a verbal one (for which one might expect ... *med do*), and for this reason Buescher's reconstruction appears less probable. Moreover, even in the case of such a verbal phrase I fail to see a reason that would exclude taking it as an explanation of, or (to be sure: less elegant) parenthetical gloss on, **ālambana-vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam*.

399.2.0. U_t{1c} and {2a–b}: Like Matsumoto (see § 396.1), Buescher (B: 182,13ff) understands {1c} as a quotation of the second half of ⓧ, and {2a–b} as a gloss thereon, and takes *dmigs pa* in {1c} to represent **ālambanaṁ*, repeated from the first part of ⓧ that had already been quoted in {1a}.

399.2.1.1. As regards {1c}, Buescher, though assuming (B: 182 n. 2) that the original Sanskrit had **ālambanaṁ vijñānam iti mayôktam* (with **ālambanaṁ* to be taken as the Subj?), deliberately translates the sentence in accordance with the Tibetan (where the Subj is clearly **vijñānam*):

> U_t{1c}-tr(B): [When the sūtra speaks] as follows: 'I have explained consciousness to be present *as* the reference point', ... (B: 182,15f).

According to Buescher (B: 182 n. 2) this reversal of **ālambana* and **vijñāna* as Subj and PredN has "no ontological consequences; it only effects [sic!] the logical structure".

399.2.1.2. My rejoinder:

1. If we start (as Buescher does) from the Tibetan translation of ⓧ as we find it in**Tib**$_{MSg}$ and U_t, **ālambana* is not available in ⓧ as a separate word because it must be part of the bahuvrīhi compound indicated by *can*, since Buescher's claim that **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* alone is a bahuvrīhi is mistaken (see § 399.1.1). For this reason, **ālambana* cannot function as the Subj of ⓧ and consequently also not as the Subj of {1c} if {1c} is, as Buescher presupposes ("[When the sūtra speaks] as follows: ..."), a literal repetition of a part of the sūtra's wording.

2. a) For the same reason, if {1c} is a literal repetition of a part of ⓧ, **ālambana* is also not available for being taken to function as the PredN in {1c}, with *vijñāna* as the Subj (Buescher: "I have explained consciousness to be ... the reference point").

b) Moreover, such an equation would be abstruse, at any rate rather cryptic, from the point of view of meaning. Buescher's tortuous rendering of the simple copula *yin* by "to be present as" shows that even he himself must have felt the blunt equation of consciousness (/awareness) with its objective support problematic. What one would expect in such a case are expressions like "[it is] consciousness (/awareness) [itself that] manifests (or: develops into, presents itself as) a reference point (/objective support)", but not a simple equation, because awareness is not reducible to its objective support or content.

c) Lastly, a statement equating consciousness/awareness (as the Subj) with the objective support (as the PredN) is not in line with the alleged gloss ({2a–b}), where the Subj is clearly the latter (i.e., *dmigs pa*, **ālambana*).

399.2.2. As regards U_t{2a–b}, Buescher's translation runs as follows:

> U_t{2a/b}-tr(B): ... the meaning is: that [noematic] reference point, which is one that is manifested by a purely noetic constitution, has that [noetic constitution] as its intrinsic nature. (B: 182,16-18, presupposing a reconstruction **evaṁ*[1963] *tad ālambanaṁ* ...)

[1963] For the inacceptability of *evaṁ*, see fn. 1931.

Buescher's understanding of the syntax is largely the same as Matsumoto's. The main difference from Matsumoto consists in the fact that Buescher seems to understand the demonstrative pronoun in *de'i ngo bo nyid* = **tatsvabhāvam* as referring to *vijñapti* (in the immediately preceding phrase **vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam*), and not to *vijñāna* (as Matsumoto does). I agree, but in this case *vijñāna* would (since Buescher reconstructs **tad ālambanaṁ*: "that [noematic] reference point") not be represented in **U**{2a–b} at all, so that one would have to ask how **U**{2a–b} could be a gloss on an equation of the objective support (*ālambana*) with awareness (*vijñāna*) — or vice versa —, as Buescher assumes. In order to interpret **U**{2a–b} as a paraphrase of such an equation, one would have to take *vijñapti* and *vijñāna* as synonyms and take the passage to mean that the objective support (/reference point), since (or: insofar as) it is manifested (= created) by a mere representation (/purely noetic constitution: *vijñapti*), is of the nature of this representation (/noetic constitution: *vijñapti*), and that this is tantamount to its being of the nature of awareness (*vijñāna*). This would no doubt make sense, but in view of the philological arguments set forth § 397.1 and, especially, § 397.5, I still prefer my own former solution. As pointed out in § 397.5.3–4, I understand **U**{2a–b} as an additional comment on ⓧ, in which the focus is solely on the clarification of the *purport* of the compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, its precise formation and its syntactical embedding in ⓧ as a whole being left out of consideration. In {2a}, this compound is taken to indicate that the objective support (Subj) (of awareness) is 'caused to emerge' by nothing but representation (*vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*: case-tatpuruṣa, hence no *can*!) — an explanation which probably inspired the interpretation of the compound in ⓧ as a bahuvrīhi with inverted members in $\mathbf{Tib}_{\mathrm{MSg}}$ and $\mathbf{U}_t${1a}. In addition, in {2b}, the polysemous and hence ambiguous X-*prabhāvita* is *explained* as amounting to X-*svabhāva*: "having X as its nature", i.e., the statement that the objective support is **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* is taken to mean, properly speaking, that the objective support is "essentially characterized by [*being*] nothing but representation (= appearance)".

399.3.1. $\mathbf{U}_t${3} is reconstructed by Buescher (B: 182,28f; cf. also 183,12) as follows:

$\mathbf{U}_t${3}-r(B): **vijñānam ālambanapratibhāsamātraprabhāvitoktam ity arthaḥ.*

The alleged compound **ālambanapratibhāsamātraprabhāvitoktam* is extremely odd, and unnecessary at that since the natural reconstruction of $\mathbf{U}_t$ 'Subj PredN *yin par bshad do*' is of course 'Subj^{nom} PredN^{nom} *uktam*' or, in view of the word order in the sūtra sentence of which {3} is an ad sensum paraphrase: 'PredN^{nom} Subj^{nom} *uktam*' (or 'PredN^{acc} Obj^{acc} *vadāmi*'), as in § 395.

399.3.2. Still, Buescher's translation of {3}[1964] is (apart from rendering °*prabhāvita* as "manifested by way of") not essentially different from mine, and in contrast to Matsumoto, Buescher accepts the Tibetan text as it stands. What he attacks is my contention that {3} unambiguously supports the reconstruction of ⓧ in terms of [S] because in {3} *ālambana* is unquestionably the first part of the compound ending in °*prabhāvita* which functions as the PredN (or 'comment') in a sentence where *vijñāna* (*rnam par shes pa*) is the Subj (or 'theme', marked by *ni*). Buescher (B: 183,9ff) bases his objection on the semantic difference between **pratibhāsa* and *vijñapti* and on the different syntactical construction of *ālambana* in $\mathbf{U}_t${3} (*dmigs par snang ba*) as against ⓧ/$\mathbf{U}_t${1a} (*dmigs pa rnam par rig pa*), arguing that if in ⓧ/$\mathbf{U}_t${1a} *ālambana* were part of the compound we ought to have *dmigs par rnam par rig pa*

[1964] B: 182,25f: "That will say, consciousness has been explained as being manifested by way of merely appearing as a [noematic] reference point."

or *dmigs pa'i rnam par rig pa*. Still, precisely because of the semantic difference (cf. also § 397.2.3), *rnam par rig pa* (at any rate as an action noun in the sense of cognition or representation as a "noetic act") can, in contrast to *snang ba*, be construed with a direct object, and *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa*[1965] for *ālambanavijñapti* is well attested[1966] and thus a reasonable option in the case of interpreting **Tib**$_{Sa}$ (see § 371.2.1ⓑ). Yet, this is not how the phrase was understood by the team of translators who translated both MSg$_t$ and MSgU$_t$. In their understanding, the syntactical difference between the PredNs of the two sentences (viz., ⓧ and **U**{3}) results from the fact that in spite of their identical overall purport they were analysed quite differently: as a bahuvrīhi in ⓧ/**U**{1a}, but as a case-tatpuruṣa in **U**{3}. Thus, Buescher's objection hinges, once again, on his mistaken construction of the bahuvrīhi-marker *can* (see §§ 374 and 399.1.1). If the bahuvrīhi-marker is construed correctly, the overall syntactical structure of ⓧ presupposed in **Tib**$_{MSg}$ and in **U**$_t${1} (as is evident from the presence of the bahuvrīhi-marker in **U**$_t${1a}) is exactly paralleled, and thus confirmed, by **U**$_t${3}: in both cases, *vijñāna* is the Subj, and the PredN is a compound beginning with *ālambana-* and ending in *-prabhāvita* (regardless of how it is analysed).

399.4. As for Buescher charging me with "demolishing the lucid structure of MSgrU's stepwise explanation in the form of three separate sentences" (B: 184,15f), I must leave it to unbiased readers to decide whether my interpretation of **U**$_t$ (1. quotation with interspersed glosses, 2. explanation of the crucial expression, 3. explanation of the overall purport) is less lucid than his (and Matsumoto's). At least, it does not force me to mistake a case-tatpuruṣa for a bahuvrīhi or, alternatively, to tamper with the text by deleting the bahuvrīhi-marker *can* in the sūtra quotation against the unanimous evidence of MSg$_t$, MSgBh$_t$ and MSgU$_t$[1967].

6.1.2. The Chinese Version of the Upanibandhana (U$_c$)

400. Text and translations:

U$_c$: {1c} 我說識{ 1a } 所緣唯識所現故者: {2a} 我說 在外識所緣境 唯是內識之所顯現。{2b} 即是 所緣境 識為自性 義。{3} 此意說言: 識所緣境 唯是識上所現影像, {1b} 無別有體。(T 31.1598: 400b25-28)

Tib. transl. of **U**$_c$: {2a} *rnam par rig pa tsam las logs shig na dmigs pa'i yul yod pa gang yin pa de ni nang gi rnam par rig pas rab tu phye'o zhes bshad pa* {2b} *de ni dmigs pa'i spyod yul rnam par rig pa'i ngo bo nyid kyi don to* || ... {3} *de ni 'di skad du* | *rnam par shes pas dmigs pa'i spyod yul gang yin pa de ni rnam par rig pa tsam las snang ba'i gzugs brnyan yin gyi* | *logs shig na bdag nyid du gyur pa ni med do zhes bstan par 'gyur ro*[1968] || (SaṁdhṬ$_t$ P thi 117b7–118a1; D thi 104b2f)[1969]

[1965] Object + verb, nominalized by *pa*.

[1966] Cf., PSkV$_t$ P hi 45a1 (for Skt., see § 462.2); similarly Guṇamati (PSkViv P hi 93b1); cf. also PSk 80,4 (PSk$_t$ P si 16b8) and PSkBh hi 178a3 (see § 462.2); YBh$_t$ P dzi 6b3 has *dmigs pa rnam par rig par byed pa* for YBh$_{Bh}$ 11,8 *ālambanavijñapti*, YBh$_t$ P dzi 3b6 *rang gi yul la dmigs pa rnam par rig pa* for YBh$_{Bh}$ 5,16 *svaviṣayālambanavijñapti* (see § 355.1).

[1967] Cf. also fn. 1858.

[1968] Cf. MSgU$_c$ 430b4 (此意說言 ...) = MSgU$_t$ P li 324a1 (... *zhes bstan par 'gyur ro*). Cf. also *HIRAKAWA* 493a: 意說 = *abhiprāya, abhipreta*.

[1969] Chinese original: X 21.369: 305a8-11.

U$_c$-tr: {1a/c} "Because I (have) declare(d) that the objective support of [sensory /cognitive] awareness [is something] made to appear by awareness (= representation) only": {2a} I (have) declare(d) that the external objective support of awareness is merely [something] made to appear by the awareness within. {2b} This means: the objective support is of the nature of awareness.[1970] {3} The purport of this is: The objective support of awareness is merely an image made to appear in (lit.: on) awareness (= in the mind); {1b} it has no substantial existence apart.

401. The structure of **U**$_c$ may, according to my understanding, be described as follows:

{1a/c} bare quotation of ⓧ

{2a} repetition of the full wording of ⓧ interspersed with clarifying characters and glosses

{2b} explanation (即是 X 義 = X *ity arthaḥ*)[1971] of the meaning of {2a}

{3} explanation of the purport of ⓧ (此意說言), again using the syntactical structure and the wording of ⓧ with some clarifying and explanatory additions, and attaching a further explanation which somehow corresponds to the gloss {1b} in **U**$_t$.

It may not be superfluous to bring out the parallel structure of the sentences by presenting them accordingly:

{1a/c}	我說		識	所緣	唯	識	所	現	故者,
{2a}	我說	在外	識	所緣境	唯是內識	之所	顯	現。	
{2b}	即是			所緣境		識	為自性		義。
{3}	此意說言:		識	所緣境	唯是	識上	所	現影像,	{1b} 無別有體。

402. It is obvious from a comparison of these sentences that, if we disregard the frame elements (我說...故, etc.), the nuclear parts of {1}, {2a} and {3} and, in principle, also {2b} are construed on exactly the same pattern. In {1}, {2a} and {3}, the nuclear part is almost identical with the nuclear part of Hsüan-tsang's translation of ⓧ, with 所緣 (**ālambana*) being the Subj, preceded by 識 (**vijñāna*) as a genitive attribute, and with 唯(是)識所現 (**vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*) as the predicative element. The difference is that in {2a} and {3} the basic wording of ⓧ has been enriched by supplementary and explanatory characters, including the copula 是 which leaves no room for doubt regarding the syntax of the sentences. In {2b}, on the other hand, the common nuclear part has been reduced to its most basic elements by omitting the genitive attribute 識 and the particle 唯, and 所現 has been replaced by 為自性 (°*svabhāva*, bahuv.). Both changes make excellent sense when we keep in mind that the express purpose of {2b} is to explain the meaning of {2a}, the only element requiring explanation being, obviously, 所(顯)現 = *prabhāvita*.

403. Contrary to the preceding structural analysis of **U**$_c$, Matsumoto (M1: 184b) equates the first part of {2a}, i.e., 我說在外識所緣境, with the quotation of ⓧ② in **U**$_t$ (i.e., {1c}), concluding that the presence of 所緣(境) proves that *dmigs pa* in **U**$_t${1c} represents **ālambana* and not **upalabdhi*. But in this case **tadālambanaṁ* (or: *tad āla*°) in {2a}, the Subj of the subsequent PredN *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* = 唯是內識之所顯現, would have no counterpart in **U**$_c$, for as the Subj it must precede its PredN in Chinese syntax, and the 所緣境 in {2b}, which anyway belongs to a different syntactical unit, has merely been added by

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[1970] Lit.: makes awareness its nature (= 以識為自性).

[1971] Cf., e.g., ASVy$_C$ 742c11f = ASBh 93,17; AKBh$_{Hs}$ 3b25 變壞 即是可惱壞義 = AKBh 9,12 *rūpyate: bādhyata ity arthaḥ*.

Hsüan-tsang in order to complete the sentence. Therefore, the controversial phrase (在外)識所緣境 almost certainly represents **tadālambanam* in {2a} (with 在外 being an echo of **bāhya-* in {1b}) and is of no use for deciding the problem of the Sanskrit original of *dmigs pa* in $\mathbf{U}_t${1c}.

404. In view of the strict parallelism of the structure of the four syntactical units in $\mathbf{U}_c$, I also find it unnatural to equate — as Matsumoto (see § 396.5) does — the 識 in {2b}, which forms part of the PredN, with the 識 which functions as the genitive attribute of 所緣(境) in the other sentences, i.e., with **vijñāna*, instead of equating it with the 識 which forms part of the PredN in the other sentences, i.e., with **vijñapti*. The natural way to understand {2b} is to understand it as an explanation of **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as **vijñaptisvabhāva*, and this is in fact how the passage has been rendered into Tibetan in SaṁdhṬ$_t$, which uses *rnam par rig pa* and not *rnam par shes pa*.[1972] Apart from this, $\mathbf{U}_c$ unambiguously confirms my view that the scope of **ity arthaḥ* (即是... 義) is confined to {2b}, while {2a} definitely constitutes a complete sentence by itself.

405. As already pointed out in § 389, I understand Hsüan-tsang's rendering of ⓧ as a transformation of [S] by way of modifying the statement "awareness (**vijñāna*, 識) is 'revealed' (i.e., distinctively/essentially characterized) by its objective support being a mere representation/appearance (**vijñapti*, 識, i.e., something made to appear by awareness itself)" into the statement "the objective support <u>of awareness</u> (識) is merely [something] made to appear by awareness (識) [itself]". As already indicated (§ 398.4), I do not even exclude the possibility that it was not only due to the statement ⓨ in Saṁdh VIII.7 but also under the influence of **U**{2a} — as Hsüan-tsang (correctly, in my opinion) understood it, viz., as a characterization of the objective support (**ālambana*) as **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* — that he devised this transformation of ⓧ,[1973] converting its original subject **vijñāna* into a genitive attribute of **ālambana*.

406. As for the remaining divergences between $\mathbf{U}_c$ and $\mathbf{U}_t$, I suppose that Hsüan-tsang found it more appropriate to start with a bare quotation of ⓧ. For this reason, he would seem to have simply disregarded the synonym gloss **upalabdhi* for **vijñāna* (or, if Matsumoto's view is followed, the repetition of *ālambana*) in {1c} as not worth translating. $\mathbf{U}_c$ is thus unfortunately of no help with regard to the question of the Sanskrit word represented by Tib. *dmigs pa* in {1c}. The more substantial gloss {1b}, on the other hand, was shifted to the explanatory part. We may find a trace of {1b} in the reference to an external object in {2a}, remodelled by Hsüan-tsang into a full rephrasing of ⓧ as a whole (instead of merely being an explanation of its PredN). But a more explicit equivalent of {1b} was skilfully inserted by him at the end of {3}. There, the subject of the sentence is, as throughout in $\mathbf{U}_c$, no doubt the objective support (所緣(境)), but it is worth noting that when appending the reference to the absence of an object existing apart from awareness (i.e., from the mind), Hsüan-tsang opts for

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[1972] Indeed, as Matsumoto (M1: 188b22–189a3) rightly points out, this merely proves how the translator (Chos-grub) understood the passage. But in this case I think Chos-grub is right, though I have to admit that this is not always the case. E.g., he also renders the first 識 in {2a} by *rnam par rig pa (tsam)* although it clearly represents *vijñāna*, like the first 識 in {1} and {3} both of which are correctly represented by *rnam par shes pa*. For another mistake, see fn. 2006.

[1973] Actually, Hsüan-tsang started translating MSgU already two and a half months before engaging in the translation of the Saṁdh (cf. KUWAYAMA and HAKAMAYA 1981: 253: ⑨ and ⑩).

a rendering ad sensum, no doubt aware of the inappropriateness of qualifying the objective support as lacking an external objective support (cf. § 397.3).

6.1.3. MSgU: Conclusion

407. Summing up the result of my re-examination of $\mathbf{U_t}$ and $\mathbf{U_c}$ in the light of Matsumoto's and Buescher's criticism, I cannot find any compelling argument for either of them being based on M / B rather than on S. On the contrary, as far as $\mathbf{U_t}$ is concerned, Buescher's reconstruction of **U** in terms of B is based on his misunderstanding of what can only be a case-tatpuruṣa as a bahuvrīhi, and Matsumoto has to suppose the remarkable number of two textual mistakes and two serious misunderstandings on the part of the translators in order to bring $\mathbf{U_t}$ in line with M. Contrary to this, the thesis of $\mathbf{U_t}$ being based on S does not require any alteration of the text but merely the assumption of a somewhat infelicitous (but not inexplicable) dissection of the quotation-cum-glosses in {1a–1c}. $\mathbf{U_c}$ is throughout structured in accordance with $\mathbf{Hs_{MSg}}$, and I do not find Matsumoto's ttempt to bring $\mathbf{U_c}$ in line with M more convincing than his efforts to prove $\mathbf{Hs_{MSg}}$ and $\mathbf{Hs_{Sa}}$ to be based on M (see §§ 387–389).

6.2. *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-bhāṣya*

408. The *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-bhāṣya* (MSgBh), ascribed to Vasubandhu, is transmitted in four translations: a Tibetan translation (MSgBh_t) produced by Dīpaṁkaraśrījñāna and Tshul khrims rgyal ba in the middle of the eleventh century, at the beginning of the 'Later Propagation', and three Chinese translations by Paramārtha (MSgBh_{Pa}), Dharmagupta (MSgBh_{Dh}), and Hsüan-tsang (MSgBh_{Hs}), respectively. Since in the passage commenting on ⓧ these versions diverge considerably, the reconstruction of the original Sanskrit (symbol: **Bh**) and its meaning is particularly difficult. After reconsidering the testimonia, I had to modify the results of my former investigation (S 1984: 443–448) to a certain extent, not least thanks to Prof. Matsumoto's severe but stimulating criticism, but in spite of that I still find, as I shall try to prove, that some of the versions are more likely to support S than M.

6.2.1. The Tibetan version of the *Bhāṣya* ($\mathbf{Bh_t}$)

409. According to my former experience, the Tibetan version of the MSgBh is, as far as a fully appropriate rendering of the meaning is concerned, not always as good as the Tibetan translation of the *mūla*-text and that of the *Upanibandhana* done by Jinamitra, Śīlendrabodhi and Ye shes sde, but there is no reason not to trust it with regard to the wording. Hence, as far as the wording of the commentary on ⓧ is concerned we should start from the Tibetan version (symbol: $\mathbf{Bh_t}$) as the most reliable testimonium for **Bh**, but we should not trust it blindly in matters of interpretation.

$\mathbf{Bh_t}$ (P li 171b1-4; D ri 144a6–b1):

{1} *dGongs pa nges par 'grel pa'i mdo las kyang* | *rnam par shes pa ni dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can no zhes ngas bshad do* (=ⓧ) *zhes gsungs pa des na*

{2} *dmigs pa rnam par rig*[1974] *pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can de ni rnam par rig pa tsam nyid de* | *don gyis stong pa zhes bya ba'i tha tshig go* |

[1974] For *par rig* (D), P has *par rig par rig* (dittography).

> {3} *rnam par shes pa zhes ngas bshad do zhes bya ba'i rnam par shes pa smos pa des ni ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gyi rnam par shes pa bstan to* ||

A literal translation of **Bh**$_t$ would run like this:

> **Bh**$_t$-tr: {1} Also in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* it has been said: "I (have) declare(d) mind (**vijñāna*) to have an objective support (**ālambana*) that is distinctively/essentially characterized (**prabhāvita*) by [being] representation only (**vijñaptimātra*)" (=ⓧ); therefore
>
> {2} that (*de*) which has an objective support (**ālambana*) distinguished by [being] representation only (**vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*) is just nothing but representation; this means: devoid of an [external or separately existing] object (**vijñaptimātram evârtha-śūnyam ity arthaḥ*).
>
> {3} By the employment of the word '*vijñāna*' in [the segment] "I (have) declare(d) mind (**vijñāna*) [...]", the *vijñāna* of the objects of [meditative] concentration has been indicated.

410. The structure of the explanatory portion in **Bh**$_t$ as it stands is clearly bipartite, containing

a) an explanation of what according to the Tibetan translation of ⓧ is the PredN, viz., **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* ({2}), and

b) the remark, preceded by a repeated quotation of what in the original must have been of the second part of ⓧ, that the word *vijñāna* here refers, specifically, to the mind in meditative concentration({3}).

The latter portion shows that the *Bhāṣya* does not take ⓧ in a general sense but understands it as still confined to the context of meditative concentration. Actually, in the basic text, too, the generalization is introduced only later, viz., in MSg II.7.2 (functionally corresponding to Saṁdh VIII.8).

411.0. On closer examination, however, **Bh**$_t$ as it stands is by no means without problems.

411.1. One of these is the precise function of *des na* ("therefore") at the end of {1}, which does not make logical sense as an adverb introducing {2}. My suggestion was that in the Sanskrit original it could have belonged to the preceding sentence:

> **Bh**$_t$-rec(S): {1} **Saṁdhinirmocanasūtre 'py uktam* "ⓧ" *ity anena* | ...
>
> **Bh**$_t$-rec(S)-tr: {1}: Also in the Saṁdh it has been declared [that all appearances are only mind,[1975] namely] by this [statement, viz.:] "ⓧ".

Matsumoto (M1: 217b n. 39) seems to accept this, but Buescher, without providing any reasons, follows **Bh**$_t$ in construing *des na* with the subsequent sentence (i.e., {2}):

[1975] The full sentence has the form ⌜A⌝ *zhes bya ba* X *las gsungs pa dang* | Y *las kyang* "ⓧ..." *zhes gsungs pa des na*, which I take to go back to = ⌜A⌝ *iti* X^{loc} *uktam;* Y^{loc} *apy uktam* "ⓧ" *ity anena*. In agreement with MSgBh$_{Dh}$ (285b28f: 此唯有識者，如十地經及解節經所說故； cf. M1: 168a), MSgBh$_{Pa}$ (182c2f: 由此夢譬 於十八界等處 應知唯識 ≈ 182b21 [beginning of MSg II.6]; cf. M1: 169a) and MSgBh$_{Hs}$ (338c21-23: 此唯有識 由教顯示。如十地經言: ...; cf. M1: 168a), I take ⌜A⌝ (= *'di dag ni rnam par shes pa tsam mo*) *zhes bya ba* as the *patiens* (in Sanskrit: the grammatical subject) of the first and, implicitly, also of the second *gsungs pa* = *uktam*, i.e., as the thesis corroborated by these scriptures, and not (or at least not in the first place) as a quotation, or rather rephrasing, of the *cittamātra* passage of the DBhS (as M1: 169a suggests). I rather presume that ⌜A⌝ resumes the beginning of MSg II.6, viz., *rnam par rig pa 'di dag ni ... rnam par rig pa tsam mo*, i.e., the thesis that is discussed in this section (II.6–9) and is proved by authoritative scripture in II.7.

Bh$_t$-tr(B) {2}: the meaning hereby is: that reference point, which is one that is manifested by a purely noetic constitution, is nothing but the purely noetic constitution, devoid of an object (B: 181,23),

which he reconstructs as

Bh$_t$-rec(B) {2}: **tatra tad ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam vijñaptimātram evārthaśūnyam ity arthaḥ* (B: 182,2).

Yet his reconstruction of *des na* as *tatra*, translated as "hereby" (in an obsolete locative sense?)[1976], is hardly possible, for *des na* surely corresponds to *tena*, *anena*, *ataḥ* or the like, but not to *tatra* (which normally would be *de la*).

411.2. Another problem is the precise range of the scope of **ity arthaḥ* at the end of {2}. Buescher, once again without providing any reasons, extends it to the whole of {2} (see § 411.1: **Bh$_t$**-tr(B)), but this would be unusual, since **ity arthaḥ* marks ad sensum explanations, and in a sequence of explanations frequently those that are added to literal explanations.[1977] Especially if, as in Buescher's interpretation, the first part of {2} (up to the particle *ni*) — i.e., according to his reconstruction, the expression **ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* — is nothing but a literal repetition of the first part of the quotation to be explained, this part of {2} at least is extremely unlikely to fall under the scope of **ity arthaḥ*. One would, in this case, rather tend to take **vijñaptimātram eva* as the literal explanation of the explanandum, and **arthaśūnyam* as the ad sensum explanation marked as such by **ity arthaḥ*, as Matsumoto (cf. M1: 172,10-14) does and as **Bh$_t$** itself seems to suggest.[1978] The situation would be, of course, different if the first part of {2} were not just a repetition of the explanandum. In this case, one may ask whether the scope of **ity arthaḥ* might not be taken to cover not just **arthaśūnyam* but also **vijñaptimātram eva* (as Dharmagupta may have assumed: cf. § 420).

411.3.1. Still another problem, and a more serious one at that, is the demonstrative pronoun *de* in {2}, which is confirmed by **Bh$_{Dh}$** and **Bh$_{Pa}$** but differently construed by them (see ch. 6.2.2). In **Bh$_t$** as it stands, the demonstrative can only refer to *vijñānam* because it is placed in apposition to *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba can*, for in view of *can* this expression must render a compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* (see § 371.3), which can only qualify *vijñāna*. This means that **Bh$_t$**, provided that it has been transmitted correctly and has rendered its original faithfully, is based on [S]. I therefore proposed the following reconstruction of the Sanskrit original of {2} as presupposed by **Bh$_t$**:

Bh$_t$-rec(S): {2} **tad ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitam vijñaptimātram eva arthaśūnyam ity arthaḥ* | (S 1984: 444,12-18 and 445 # 13.3.1)

In support of my assumption that **Bh$_t$** is basically correct at least in referring the explanatory qualifications to *vijñāna*, I remarked (S 1984: 446,14-16) that I wonder if **arthaśūnya* could really be predicated of the objective support (*ālambana*), as it would have to be if we start from [M].

411.3.2. Against this, Matsumoto raises the following objections:

[1976] Cf. *WEBSTER* 1058f (s.v. hereby): "**a** *obs.*: by this place, near here".

[1977] Cf. the examples in fn. 1949 and fn. 1953.

[1978] Cf. the presence of the semi-final *de* = *ste* before *don gyis stong pa*.

a) My doubt whether **arthaśūnya* may be predicated of the objective support (*ālambana*) is not shared by Matsumoto. For him, such a predication would be unobjectionable (M1: 172a).

b) On the other hand, he in his turn has reservations about *vijñaptimātra* being predicated of *vijñāna*, as my understanding of *tad=vijñānam* in {2} would definitely imply (M1: 171a–b).

c) According to Matsumoto, referring *de* to *vijñānam* would contradict the bipartite structure of the commentarial part (as found in **Dh** and **Pa**), according to which the word *vijñānam* belongs to the second part of ⓧ, commented upon in {3} only (M1: 175a).

411.3.3. a) As regards the first issue, i.e., the question whether *arthaśūnya*, *artharahita* or the like may be predicated of the *ālambana*, I cannot exclude this possibility, but I should like to see an unambiguous occurrence.[1979] Anyway, in {2}, even if the Subj were *ālambanam*, its characterization as *arthaśūnyam* is not a direct one but is *mediated* by the intercalation of its characterization as being a mere representation (*vijñaptimātram eva*) and would *therefore* indeed be unobjectionable.[1980] For this reason, I admit that in the case of the passage under discussion my former reservation is unjustified.

b) The second objection has already been dealt with in §§ 357.1–357.4.

c) As for the third objection, the problem of the bipartite structure and the problem of what the demonstrative pronoun *de* in {2} refers to and how it might be construed will be discussed in connection with my assessment of Matsumoto's own interpretation and reconstruction of **Bh**$_t$.

412. Before doing so, however, a short remark on section {3} of **Bh**$_t$ is inevitable. It is obvious that {3} consists of two parts:

{3.1} a repetition of the latter part of the quotation of ⓧ, and

{3.2} the statement that "by using the word '*vijñāna*' … the text refers to the *vijñāna* of the objects of meditative concentration" (S 1984: 445,3-4), i.e., to "the mind [that cognizes] the objects [perceived in] meditative concentration" (S 1984: 447,11-13).

In Sanskrit, {3.2} may have looked like this:

Bh$_t$-rec(S): {3.2} **anena vijñānagrahaṇena samādhigocaravijñānaṁ dyotitam* (or *darśitam*, or the like).

[1979] MAVṬ 147,16: *vartamānasya vijñāna⟨syâlambanaṁ nirarthakaṁ bhavati, tadātmatvena siddhatvāt⟩* would not be a suitable example because the context is different and *nirarthaka* means "useless" here. On the other hand, a qualification of *citta*, *vijñāna* or *vijñapti* as devoid of an "*artha*" is well attested; cf., e.g., MHṛd V.29 (ECKEL 2008: 243 and 405): *vikalpitārthaśūnyaṁ … vijñānaṁ*; MSg II.27: *sems dang sems las byung ba don med pa rnams*; II.6: *rnam par rig pa 'di dag ni don med pa'i phyir rnam par rig pa tsam mo*; MAV I.3: *X-pratibhāsaṁ prajāyate vijñānaṁ, nāsti câsyârthaḥ*; TrBh *49,10 (L. 42,23) *artharahitacittamātra*°.

[1980] Cf. TrBh *49,17 (L. 43,3): *vijñaptimātram evedaṁ artharahitam, na bāhyo 'rtho 'sti*. In this passage, *idaṁ* would seem to refer, preferably, to objects of meditative visualization, like skeletons or decaying corpses (TrBh *50,1-3), so that the situation would be the same as in **Bh**{2} if the Subj were **ālambanam*. Strictly speaking, *artharahitam* may, in the TrBh passage, even be construed as a postpositive, explanatory attribute of the neuter substantive (RENOU 1975: 117) *vijñaptimātram*, and this would also be possible in **Bh**{2}, especially if the scope of **ity arthaḥ* is taken to include *vijñaptimātram eva*. Cf. also MAVṬ 24,7f, discussed in fn. 1943.

Matsumoto (M1: 173b–174b) is perfectly right in discarding my former reconstruction, viz., **samādhigocaraṁ vijñānaṁ dyotitam* (S 1984: 447,28), which, being at variance with my own translation, crept in inadvertantly and would, instead of a genitive-tatpuruṣa, presuppose a bahuvrīhi which neither fits the Tibetan nor the required meaning.[1981]

413.0. Matsumoto's own assessment of **Bh**$_t$ is, just like his assessment of **Tib**$_{MSg}$, altogether different from mine.

413.1. 1. In order to make **Bh**$_t$ agree with 🄼, he (M1: 172b15f) discards the *can* in {2}, just as he had done in the case of **Tib**$_{MSg}$ (see § 372) and (tacitly) of course also in the quotation of Ⓧ in **U**$_t${1a} and **Bh**$_t${1},[1982] regarding it as a mistake or corruption. By doing so, he can presuppose the reading

> **Bh**$_t$-rec(M): {2} **tad ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ vijñaptimātram eva artha-śūnyam ity arthaḥ*

and take *ālambanaṁ* as the Subj of the sentence, with *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ* as a post-positive attribute and *vijñaptimātram eva* as the PredN, additionally glossed by *arthaśūnyam*:

> **Bh**$_t$-rec(M)-tr(M): {2} That objective support which has been produced by representation only is nothing but representation only;[1983] the meaning is: [it] lacks an [external] object.[1984]

2. Basically[1985] the same reconstruction (cf. § 411.1) and interpretation of **Bh**$_t${2} is also advocated by Buescher (B: 181,19–182,5), but since it is merely based on his mistaken understanding of the compound **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as a bahuvrīhi,[1986] already rejected in § 374, it needs no further discussion.

413.2. In {3}, too, Matsumoto (M1: 173b–174a) starts from the assumption, based on **Bh**$_{Dh}$ (see ch. 6.2.2.a), that **Bh**$_t$ must presuppose 🄼. This implies that *vijñānam* should be the PredN. In order to adapt **Bh**$_t$ to this assumption, Matsumoto (M1: 218 n. 45) resorts to yet another conjecture, proposing that one read *spyod yul ni* instead of the transmitted *spyod yul gyi*.[1987] This would correspond to a text like

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[1981] In the case of a bahuvrīhi, Tib. should have *spyod yul can* (M1: 173b12-15). Moreover, the *vijñāna* does not have *samādhi* but rather the *samādhi*-object(s) as its object, which means that a bahuvrīhi making sense in the context should not read *samādhigocaraṁ* but *samādhigocaragocaraṁ*.

[1982] Cf. Matsumoto's translations of **Bh**$_t${1} (M1: 167b18) and of **U**$_t${1} (M1: 183a21f), where the quotation of Ⓧ is rendered by a reconstruction in terms of 🄼.

[1983] I.e., is a mere appearance (if I understand Matsumoto correctly).

[1984] M1: 172b10-14: 表識のみによって生みだされた (vijñapti-mātra-prabhāvita)、その所縁 (tad ālambanam) は、表識のみ (vijñapti-mātra) にほかならない。 つまり〔それは〕〔外的な〕対象を欠いている (arthaśūnya)、という意味である。(English translation mine).

[1985] I.e., apart from the minor divergences discussed in §§ 411.1 and 411.2.

[1986] B: 182,4f: "In my view, MSgrBh clearly considers *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* to be a *bahuvrīhi* compound related to *ālambanam*." Cf. also § 399.1.1 with fn. 1959.

[1987] The reference (M1: 218 n. 45) to just one case (PSkBh P hi 199b7; D si 112b3) where *kyi* seems to be a mistake for *ni* merely proves that such a mistake is not impossible (cf., e.g., also SAṬ P bi 80b4 *skye ba mi snang ba'i* for D bi 72a3 ~ *ba ni*; PSkV$_t$ P hi 60b5 *bshad pa thams cad kyi* for D shi 244b3 ~ *thams cad ni*; cf. PSkV ms. 65b5 *sarvā deśanā* [nom.]), but neither documents its frequency nor, of course, justifies changing any *kyi* into *ni* ad libitum if the text makes good sense just as it stands.

Bh$_t$-rec(M): {3} *... *vijñānagrahaṇena samādhigocaro vijñānaṁ dyotitaḥ*.[1988]

Accordingly, Matsumoto translates as follows:

> **Bh**$_t$-rec(M)-tr(M): {3} With the word '*vijñāna*', it has been explained that the object of concentration is mind (*vijñāna*).[1989]

414.0. The main problem with Matsumoto's understanding of **Bh**$_t$ is that it involves *two substantial alterations* of the transmitted Tibetan text, and we have to ask whether they are really necessary or at all probable. Leaving the Chinese versions aside for the time being, the question would be whether they are required, or might suggest themselves, for internal reasons.

414.1. As regards {3}, it should be obvious that the sentence makes excellent sense as it stands and that Matsumoto's alteration (*ni* for *gyi*) is basically motivated by his endeavour to make **Bh**$_t$, on the authority of the Chinese versions (actually, as we shall see, only **Bh**$_{Dh}$), tally with Ⓜ. But even for this purpose the alteration may not be necessary because what the transmitted text of **Bh**$_t${3} actually says is merely that the expression '*vijñāna*' in ⓧ should be taken to refer to the *vijñāna* in meditative concentration; there is absolutely no commitment concerning the syntactical function of the word '*vijñānam*' in ⓧ.

414.2.0. An assessment of the situation in {2} is more difficult. In order to make {2} compatible with Ⓜ, the elimination of *can* is inevitable. However, the resulting reconstruction (§ 413.1: **Bh**$_t$-rec(M){2}) as understood by Matsumoto would seem to involve problems:

414.2.1. First, in the syntactical pattern of Ⓜ, **vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam*, *following* the substantive it refers to (viz., **ālambanam*), is not likely to be a mere attribute but should rather be a conjunctive participle with some predicative function (see § 444). If we follow Matsumoto in making **Bh**$_t${2} agree with the pattern of Ⓜ by deleting *can*, we have to assume that the translators failed to realize this predicative function because they placed the demonstrative pronoun *de* after *rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba*, thereby clearly assigning to the latter the function of a postpositive attribute only.

414.2.2. Second, if **Bh**$_t$ were indeed based on Ⓜ, one might ask precisely how the second part of {2}, viz. **vijñaptimātram evârthaśūnyam ity arthaḥ*, should be understood: Is it, as **Bh**$_t$ and also Matsumoto's translation might suggest, taking it as a PredN, a paraphrase-cum-explanation of what in Ⓜ is the PredN of ⓧ, viz., **vijñānam*,[1990] or is it merely a gloss on **vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam*?

1. In the former case, the 'bipartite structure' of the explanatory part of **Bh**$_t$, emphatically asserted by Matsumoto (M1: 175a), would be seriously impaired because the element

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[1988] Cf. M1: 174b15-18. In contrast to S 1984: 447,27f (proposing ... *dyotitaḥ*), the assumption of an attraction of the predicate by the predicate noun (SPEYER 1886: # 27.2), i.e., **dyotitam*, would perhaps be preferable. In case *bstan to* corresponds, somehow, to an active verb form (cf. *NEGI* p. 1932a: *paridīpayati*, *darśayati*, *nirdiśati*, *pradarśitavān*), we could reconstruct **samādhigocaraṁ* (acc. object) *vijñānaṁ* (PredN, acc.) *dyotayati* (or the like). This would, once again, reduce the point of controversy to the presence or absence of an *anusvāra*.

[1989] Matsumoto (M1: 174a5-7): 「識」(vijñāna) という語によって (...)、三昧の行境 (samādhigocara)〔ア〕は、識 (vijñāna)〔イ〕であると説かれたのである。(English transl. mine).

[1990] In this case, the scope of *ity arthaḥ* must definitely be confined to *arthaśūnyam* since *vijñaptimātram eva* would be a paraphrase of *vijñānam*.

explained, viz., *vijñānam*, belongs to the second part of ⓧ, whereas its explanation would be included in the first part, which would explode the neat bipartition and is in fact not accepted by Matsumoto himself.[1991]

2. In the latter case, the syntax of **Bh$_t$** and Matsumoto's translation (see § 413.1: **Bh$_t$**-rec(M)-tr(M)) is somewhat misleading. The sentence should rather be taken either as a comment on a syntactically incomplete repetition of the first part of ⓧ:

> **Bh$_t$**-rec(M)-tr(S1): {2} "That objective support, being *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* […]": this means: [being] nothing but a mere representation (= appearance), devoid of an [external] object.[1992] {3} "[…] is *vijñāna*: thus have I declared": with this employment of the word '*vijñāna*', …

or as continuing into the repeated quotation of the second part of ⓧ in the first part of {3} after a parenthetic gloss:

> **Bh$_t$**-rec(M)-tr(S2): {2} "That objective support, being *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*" — this means: nothing but a mere appearance, devoid of an [external] object —, {3} "is *vijñāna*: thus have I declared". With this employment of the word '*vijñāna*', ...

Taken in this way, the passage would explain X-°*prabhāvita*, at least ad sensum, by X *eva*, i.e., in terms of *identity*. This would work regardless of how we fix the *literal* meaning of the polysemous °*prabhāvita*, i.e., regardless of whether we take *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* as "'produced' (= made to appear) by a mere [act of] representation" or as "distinctively /essentially characterized by [being] (or: as) a mere representation (= appearance)".

414.3. The solution proposed in § 414.2.2.2 would be logically consistent and is easily combined with the second part of {3} as found in the transmitted text of **Bh$_t$**. As has already been pointed out, this additional statement, taken as it stands, would merely clarify that '*vijñāna*' in ⓧ refers, in this context, to the mind in meditative concentration, and not yet to mind in general: a statement which tallies perfectly well with the specification of the objective support as the objective support of meditative concentration indicated by the use of the demonstrative pronoun **tad* in {2} as understood by Matsumoto.[1993]

415.1. In this way, it appears possible to interpret the Sanskrit original presupposed by **Bh$_t$**{2} and {3} in terms of M in an internally consistent way, provided that the cancellation of *can* is accepted and the result of my examination of ⓧ in **Tib$_{MSg}$** (see ch. 5.1) disregarded.

[1991] M1: 175a10-16: チベット訳〔25〕のⓑによるならば、... "vijñānam iti mayoktam" に当る部分の註釈はなされていないのである。"According to section ⓑ [corresponding to my section {2}] of the Tibetan translation (i.e., **Bh$_t$** = text〔25〕in M1), … the part corresponding to '*vijñānam iti mayoktam*' is not explained [in this section of **Bh**]." (my transl.)

[1992] I have taken *ity arthaḥ* as governing the whole gloss in order to avoid the problem of whether *arthaśūnya* can be predicated of the objective support. If the scope of *ity arthaḥ* is limited to *arthaśūnya*, the translation should run: "… — [i.e.,] nothing but a mere appearance, which means: devoid of an [external] object — …". In this case, *vijñaptimātram eva* would be a *direct* gloss on *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* (and not merely an *ad-sensum*-explanation), and °*prabhāvita* would most probably have to be taken not as "'produced' (= made to appear) by" but as or "distinctively /essentially characterized as" (= "consisting of").

[1993] M1: 172a10-13: そこでは、主語は単なる"ālambana"ではなく、"tad ālambanam"つまり、"samādhi-gocara-pratibimba"としての"ālambana"なのである。"Here, the subject is not just '*ālambana*' but '*tad ālambanam*', i.e., the *ālambana* that consists in the *samādhi-gocara-pratibimba*" (my transl.).

Still, in view of **U**$_t${2a/b} one could also imagine the original of **Bh**$_t${2} to have contained a text with **ālambanam* as the subject even if the original of ⓧ was not M⃞ but S⃞. In this case, {2} would not be a quotation-cum-explanation but rather a syntactically loose *para-phrase*-cum-explanation of the unusual compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita* (as in **U**$_t${2a/b}: see § 398), and the Tibetan punctuation (full stop at the end of {2}) would be correct. The passage could then be translated as follows:

> **Bh**$_t$-rec(M)-tr(S3): {2} [This is to say:] That (or perhaps rather: Its *(tad-)*, i.e., the *vijñāna*'s)[1994] objective support is *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, [i.e.] nothing but a mere representation, which means: devoid of an [external] object. {3} [As for the phrase] "[...] is *vijñāna*: thus have I declared": with this employment of the word '*vijñāna*', ...

Since in this interpretation the explanation would have disintegrated the syntactical embedding of the explanandum in the basic text, one might even be tempted to extend, in this case, the scope of *ity arthaḥ* to the whole of {2}:

> **Bh**$_t$-rec(M)-tr(S4): 2}That (/Its) objective support is *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*, [i.e.] nothing but a mere representation, devoid of an [external] object: this is the meaning [of the compound **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*]. {3} ...

415.2. Yet even this solution, though compatible with S⃞ and hence with ⓧ as it stands in **Tib**$_{MSg}$ as well as in its quotation in **Bh**$_t$({1}), would necessitate the deletion of *can* in {2}. It is, to be sure, not at all inconceivable that *can* might have intruded into {2} from the quotation of ⓧ in {1} and should therefore be deleted. But such an assumption would be arbitrary without a compelling reason, external or internal. An *external* reason could be the evidence of the Chinese translations, to be examined in ch. 6.2.2, and the fact that the analysis of **U**$_t${2a/b} suggests a similar type of explanation (see § 397.5). The only *internal* reason I can think of would be the inadequacy of a Subj *vijñāna* in a sentence in which *vijñaptimātra* is the PredN, as asserted by Matsumoto (see § 411.3.2(b)). If this assertion were justified, I should not hesitate to accept his reconstruction (see § 413.1: **Bh**$_t$-rec(M){2}) as the basis of **Bh**$_t${2}, though not as a conclusive proof for **Bh**$_t$ as a whole being based on M⃞.

416.1. However, as pointed out in § 357.2, the incompatibility of a PredN *vijñaptimātra* with a Subj *vijñāna* seems to be contestable, since *vijñapti* may refer to the act of making known or making appear as well as to an appearance as the product of the latter. This being the case, an interpretation of {2} in terms of the syntactical structure of S⃞ would not pose basic difficulties either, apart from having the advantage of no alteration of the text being required.

416.2. What may, however, be required in this case, too, is a certain departure from the syntactic interpretation expressed in **Bh**$_t$. If we want to follow the transmitted text of **Bh**$_t$ in referring the demonstrative pronoun to *vijñāna* (now to be taken as the Subj), we should, just as in **Bh**$_t$-rec(M)-tr(S2) (see § 414.2.2.2), take {2} and the beginning of {3} as a syntactical unit, viz., as a repetition of the quotation of the *mūla*-text with an explanation intercalated as a parenthesis.[1995] In this case, the original would have read as follows:

[1994] If **Bh**{2} was, similar to in **U**{2a/b}, a paraphrase breaking away from the syntactic pattern of ⓧ, a reading **tad-ālambanaṁ* (= *tasya vijñānasyâlambanaṁ*) may not be excluded (see fn. 1955) here either.

[1995] As for the problem of whether the demonstrative pronoun formed part of the *mūla*-text from the outset or belongs, originally, to the *Bhāṣya*, see § 348.2.

Bh$_t$-rec(S): {2} **tad ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ — vijñaptimātram eva artha-śūnyam ity arthaḥ* — {3} **vijñānam* (*iti*) *mayoktam iti* (|) *anena vijñānagrahaṇena ...*

Bh$_t$-rec(S)-tr1: {2} "As distinctively/essentially characterized by [being] a mere representation of [its] objective support" — [i.e.,] as [being] nothing but a mere representation, which means: as devoid of an [external] object[1996] — "this [aforementioned] {3} *vijñāna* has been declared by me." With this[1997] use of the word '*vijñāna*', the *vijñāna* of the objects of [meditative] concentration has been indicated.

416.3. I admit that I am not at all sure whether the word order of this sentence (anaphoric demonstrative pronoun [= attribute of the Subj] – PredN ... – Subj) is syntactically unobjectionable.[1998] But it may well be that the Tibetan translators misconstrued the pronoun and that it should be taken to form part of the compound *ālambana°*, *tadālambana°* most probably being a karmadhāraya:

Bh$_t$-rec(S)-tr2: {2} "[As being] ...characterized by [being] a mere representation of that objective support (**tad-ālambana-vijñaptimātra-prabhāvita*)" — [i.e.,] ... — {3} "has the *vijñāna* been declared by me." With this use ...

In this case, we may even follow **Bh$_t$** in ending the sentence after *ity arthaḥ*:

Bh$_t$-rec(S)-tr3: {2} "[As being] ...characterized by [being] a mere representation of that objective support [...]", [i.e.,] as nothing but a mere representation, which means: devoid of an [external] object. {3} "[...] has the *vijñāna* been declared by me": by this use of [the word] '*vijñāna*' the *vijñāna* of the objects of meditative concentration has been indicated.

Regardless of which alternative is followed, the use of the demons rative pronoun in {2}, referring, as suggested by Matsumoto (see § 348.2), to the preceding statement of the sūtra that the image which is the object of meditative concentration is not different/separate from mind, agrees with the statement of {3} that the word '*vijñāna*' in ⓧ refers to mind in meditative concentration, and not yet to mind in general.

417. Summing up the result of my re-examination of **Bh$_t$**, I hope to have shown that even if the bahuvrīhi-marker *can* in {2} is regarded as a mistranslation or textual corruption, **Bh$_t$** may but need not be based on [M]/[B] as the original form of ⓧ. It may as well presuppose [S], still more so if the bahuvrīhi-marker is considered genuine and justified. Nor is there any justification for a conjectural change of the wording of {3}, which makes sense as it stands and is syntactically neutral. Whether the matter can be decided with the help of the Chinese versions will be investigated in the next chapter.

[1996] Or, if we extend the scope of *ity arthaḥ*: "..., i.e., is nothing but a mere representation devoid of an [external] object]."

[1997] I must confess that I am not entirely happy with this pronoun. Should we perhaps take it in the same way as it was understood at the end of {1}, i.e. as a replica of the latter to be construed with the quotation-cum-gloss, and punctuate accordingly (*... *ity anena* | *vijñānagrahaṇena* ...)??

[1998] But cf. the examples collected in CANEDO 1937: 90 (# 72.f): emphasized predicate noun placed between an initial attributive demonstrative referring to the subject and the subject itself.

6.2.2. The Chinese versions of the *Bhāṣya*

418. In S 1984 (443–448), the investigation of the three Chinese versions of **Bh** led me to the conclusion that **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Hs}}$ is likely to support [S], whereas **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Pa}}$ and especially **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$ seem to presuppose [A], which means [M] / [B]. For Matsumoto, on the other hand, all Chinese versions support [M]. After reconsidering the evidence, I cannot but state that I do not feel convinced by his arguments concerning **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Hs}}$. In addition, I now have serious doubts that **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Pa}}$ supports [M], so that it is only in the case of **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$ that the evidence is uncontroversial.

a. Dharmagupta (Bh$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$)

419. Text and translation:

Bh$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$: ... {1} 及解節經所說故。此攀緣 唯識所顯故 我說唯識者: {2} 此所攀緣 唯識所顯, 此有何義。為顯唯識離義故。{3} 由是識所攝故, 佛言 我說為識 顯彼三昧境界是識故。(T 31.1596: 285b29–c3)

Bh$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$-tr: ...{1} and because of what the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* teaches. As for [the statement] "This objective support, because of [its being something] made to appear by awareness (/representation) only, I declare [it] to be awareness (/mind) only": {2} what does [the expression] 'this objective support, [being something] made to appear by awareness only' mean? [It is used] in order to indicate [that it is] awareness (= representation) only, without an [external] object (義, *artha*). {3} Because it is comprised in awareness,[1999] the Buddha says: "I declare [it] to be awareness", in order to indicate that those objects of [meditative] concentration are [just] awareness (= mind only).

420. I fully agree with Matsumoto in that **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$, just as **Dh** (ch. 5.7), is based on [M]: Both in the main quotation of the *mūla*-text ({1}) and in its partial repetition in {3} as well as in the explanatory portion of {3}, 識 (*vijñānam*) is clearly the PredN, and the (logical) Subj of this PredN is, in the main quotation of the *mūla*-text as well as in the explanatory part of {3}, "this object", or "the object of/in [meditative] concentration". This clearly presupposes a reading *ālambanaṁ*. The expression *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* is understood in a predicative function (conjunct participle) with a causal nuance in the main quotation of the *mūla*-text, and this is corroborated by its predicative function in {2}. In the explanatory part of {2}, **Bh**$_{\mathrm{Dh}}$ seems to take the scope of *ity arthaḥ* to include **vijñaptimātram eva*, which means that **arthaśūnyam* (離義) may be taken as an apposition qualifying *vijñaptimātram* (唯識).

b. Paramārtha (Bh$_{\mathrm{Pa}}$)

421. Text and translation:

Bh$_{\mathrm{Pa}}$ (T 31.1595: 182c14-20):

{3} 佛說唯有識, 無塵故。

{0} 若爾 此色 是觀行人所見, 為是何法。

{1} 如經言: 此色相 境界識所顯現。{2} 實無境界。是識變異所作。

{4a} 先說唯識, 後說境界識。此二識 有何異。{4b} 欲顯有兩分。前識 是定體。後識 是定境。此體及境 本是一識。一似能分別起。一似所分別起。

[1999] Matsumoto (M1: 167a) takes 由是識所攝故 with the preceding clause, i.e. {2} (in my analysis), but then it would not correspond to anything in the presumable original. It rather looks like an unsuccessful rendering of **vijñānagrahaṇena*. This is why I have taken it with {3}, but I am by no means certain that this is how Dharmagupta actually understood it.

Bh$_{Pa}$-tr:[2000]

{3} "The Buddha declares that there is only awareness (= mind)" (ⓧ②), because there is no [external] object.

{0} [Question:] If so, what dharma on earth is this visible [phenomenon] (色, *rūpa*) that is (?) perceived by the yogi?

[Answer:] {1} According to [what] the sūtra says, "this visible phenomenon (色相) is made to appear by the 'object-awareness (or -representation)' (境界識)" (ⓧ①). {2} [That is,] in reality there is no object; [it (= the visible phenomenon)] is [rather] created by a transformation of awareness (識變異, *vijñānapariṇāma*).

{4} {4a} [Question:] First [the sūtra] speaks of 'awareness (= mind) only', later it speaks of the 'object-awareness'; what is the difference between these two [kinds of] awareness?

{4b} [Answer: The sūtra] wants to indicate that [awareness] has two parts. The former [part of] awareness is the 'body/substance' (體) of [meditative] concentration (定, *samādhi*), the latter [part of] awareness is the object of [meditative] concentration. This 'body/substance' and [this] object are basically one [and the same] awareness. One [part] arises looking like the conceptualizing [activity or subject] (能分別, *vikalpa(ka)*), the other arises looking like the conceptualized [object] (所分別, *vikalpya*).

422. **Bh$_{Pa}$** on ⓧ starts with a repetition of the second part of ⓧ (=ⓧ②) — which in **Pa** precedes the first part (=ⓧ①) (cf. § 390) and coincides literally with Paramārtha's rendering of the expression *cittamātra* in the DBhS quotation[2001] —, followed by a short remark stating that the reason why the Buddha has declared that there is only awareness (= mind) is that there are no [material, external] objects (塵) ({3}). This statement arouses a question about the status of the visible phenomena perceived in yogic experience ({0}). The answer is presented in the form of a quotation of ⓧ① ({1}), which Paramārtha seems to regard as the innovative contribution of the Saṁdh (cf. M1: 181b1-3). In a sense, Paramārtha's line of thought moves in the opposite way compared with that of the Saṁdh itself, which starts with the objects of yogic concentration and proceeds from them to a general statement. But it may well be that Paramārtha, in his own commentary on ⓧ① ({4}), implicitly uses the objects of yogic concentration as a catalyser for clarifying the general problem of how objects are perceived even though there is only awareness (/mind).

423. The crucial point, in the context of the present article, is, however, the information to be gleaned from **Bh$_{Pa}$** on ⓧ① for the syntactical interpretation of the latter and its implications for the Sanskrit original presupposed by **Pa** and **Bh$_{Pa}$**. As already pointed out in § 391, my revised understanding of ⓧ① in **Pa** is based on Paramārtha's own explanation. The decisive passage is the portion {4}, obviously added by Paramārtha on his own. After the repetition of ⓧ① and the short glosses based on the original text of the *Bhāṣya*, he continues:

{4a} First [the Saṁdh just quoted] speaks of 'awareness (= mind) only' (唯識), afterwards it speaks of 'object-awareness (境界識); what is the difference between these two [forms of] awareness?

Matsumoto (M1: 179b) takes "first" and "afterwards" to refer to MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 182c4 (前是略說。後是廣說。, i.e.: "the former is a brief teaching, the latter is an expanded teaching"), where

[2000] Paramārtha has considerably enlarged the text of the *Bhāṣya*; the respective portions have been set off from those corresponding to the other versions by indentation.

[2001] MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 182a1f: 如十地經中 佛世尊言: 佛子 三界者 唯有識。

"the former" refers to the DBhS passage and "the latter" to the Saṁdh quotation. But he (M1: 180a) is also aware of the fact that the two expressions 唯(有)識 and 境界識 appear almost immediately before {4a} in the quotations of ⓧ② (placed first in **Pa** and **Bh**$_{Pa}$) and ⓧ① (placed second in **Pa** and **Bh**$_{Pa}$), respectively, and in my opinion it is fairly sure that it is only to these quotations that {4a} refers. From the subsequent answer ({4b}) it becomes clear that Paramārtha understands the two expressions 唯識 and 境界識 as two parts or components of one and the same awareness, viz., awareness itself as the subjective part, and object-awareness as the objective part (cf. M1: 180a). There can thus be no doubt that Paramārtha uses the expressions 唯識 and 境界識 as nouns,[2002] almost as technical *terms*, corresponding to *vijñāna* (equated with *cittamātra*) and *ālambanavijñapti*, respectively. This implies that we have to take 境界識 in Paramārtha's rendering of ⓧ① as a unit, and that without very strong reasons (which I fail to see)[2003] we are not allowed to separate these characters through punctuation, taking one part (viz., 境界) with the grammatical subject of the sentence and another one (viz., 識) with the predicate, as Matsumoto (M1: 167a1) does and as I myself did in S 1984 (see § 391).[2004] Rather, we have to construe 境界識 as a whole with the predicate and confine the grammatical subject to 此色相 ("this visible phenomenon", i.e., the image perceived in yogic concentration). This means that **Pa** presupposes a reading **tad ālambana-vijñapti⟨mātra⟩prabhāvitam* for ⓧ①, which agrees with [S].

424. After having clarified the syntactical structure of Paramārtha's rendering of ⓧ①, we can now proceed to the explanations in {2}, which follow immediately upon the quotation of ⓧ① and would seem to correspond (in reverse order) to the explanations given by the original text of the *Bhāṣya*. The first (實無境界) has the form of a negated statement of existence but is clearly the rendering of **arthaśūnya*. In view of the subject of ⓧ① being, according to **Pa**, only **tad*, i.e., the image perceived in yogic concentration, Paramārtha takes **arthaśunya* to be predicated of this image, hence, it is true, not of *vijñāna*, but not of *ālambana* either. This would seem to make a subtle difference, because the term "image" (*pratibimba*), or "visible phenomenon" (色相) in **Pa**, is easily contrasted with *artha* as the real thing, whereas I am still not sure whether it would be unobjectionable to qualify an objective support (*ālambana*) as being *devoid of* a real thing (*artha*). The second explanation in {2}, according to which the visible phenomenon is created by an internal transformation of the mind itself (是識變異所作), is reminiscent of the concept of *vijñānapariṇāma* as used in texts like *Viṁśikā* and *Triṁśikā* and would seem to be Paramārtha's interpretative rendering of the expression **vijñaptimātram eva* in the presumable original. This expression too is in **Bh**$_{Pa}$ predicated of the *image* perceived in yogic concentration.

[2002] Cf. M1: 180a11: 境界としての識, i.e., "awareness as an object", or perhaps, as I would understand the expression, "awareness [insofar it appears] as an object", i.e., the image of the object within awareness, which more or less automatically tends to appear as if outside, and in this sense the 'object-awareness' may be said to manifest itself as an image experienced as if it existed external to awareness.

[2003] I do not think it is admissible to avoid this conclusion by taking 境界識 in {4} as a kind of shorthand for the whole of ⓧ①, as Matsumoto (M1: 180a) seems to suggest. I do not perceive any reason whatsoever why the 境界識 in {4} should not take up just the identical expression in ⓧ① and nothing else.

[2004] Cf. also the punctuation of what seems to be a paraphrase of our passage at T 48.2016 (a Ch'an text): 846a4f: 識論云。如觀行人 定中所見 色相境界。識所顯現。定無境界。 But at 889a19f the same text introduces 境界識 as a synonym of 心相, 心影 and 相識, so that in 846a4f, too, we should perhaps rather read 如觀行人 定中所見色相 境界識所顯現, 定無境界。

c. Hsüan-tsang ($\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$)

425. Text and translations:

$\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$ (T 31.1597: 338c22-25):

{1} 解深密經中 我 說 識所緣 唯識所現 故 者:
{2} 謂 識所緣 唯識所現, 無別境義。
{3} 復舉識者，顯 我 所 說 定 識所行 唯識所現, 無別有體。

SaṁdhṬ$_t$ P thi 118a2-3; D thi 104b4-5:[2005]

{2} *'di lta ste | rnam par shes pa'i dmigs pa ni rnam par rig pa tsam las* (P,D!) *snang ste | gud na yul gyi don du gyur pa ni med do ||*

{3} *gzhan yang rnam par shes pa smos pa ni ngas rnam par shes pa'i spyod yul ni nges par*[2006] *rnam par rig pa tsam la* (P,D!) *snang gi gud na bdag nyid du gyur pa ni med do zhes bshad pa yang* (D : om. P) *rab tu bstan pa'o ||*

$\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$-tr: {1} In the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*, [it is stated:] "Because I (have) declare(d) that the objective support of [sensory or cognitive] awareness (識 = *vijñāna*) is [something] made to appear by awareness (/representation: 識 = *vijñapti*) only."

{2} [This] means: The objective support of awareness is [something] made to appear by awareness (/representation) only, [i.e.] there is no object apart [from it].[2007]

{3} [By] again[2008] using the word 'awareness' (識, *vijñāna*), I (= the Buddha) indicate that the object of awareness [in meditative] concentration mentioned by me is [something] made to appear by awareness (/representation) only, without there being a substance (or: existence) apart [from it].

426. It should be obvious from my above arrangement of the Chinese text of $\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$ that just as in $\mathbf{U_c}$ Hsüan-tsang has adjusted the text of {2} and {3} to the structure of the quotation of ⓧ as restructured by him ({1}) and has added some or all of the missing elements. To that extent I fully agree with Matsumoto (M1: 175b–177a). But as has already been pointed out

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[2005] Chinese original: X 21.369: 305a11-13.

[2006] Here the Tibetan translator has seriously misunderstood the Chinese, mistaking 定 to be an adverb of necessity, even though in this passage it represents, of course, *samādhi*.

[2007] I take 境義 as a compound in the sense of *artha* "object", as it appears to be used at MSgU$_c$ 367b27f (境義非真實有) and c21 (一切境義皆不顯現), 22 (境義實無所有) and 24 (所識境義既無所有; cf. MSgU$_t$ P li 328a2 *don med do*, and b6f: *don thams cad mi snang bas*, *don med pa'i phyir*, *rnam par shes par bya ba'i don med na*). Cf. also SaṁdhṬ$_t$ *yul gyi don du gyur pa* (as the subject of *med do*). On the other hand, in KIK (Yuga) 8: 62,12 (別の境無しとの義なり), 境 seems to be taken as *artha* "object" and 義 as representing *ity arthaḥ*.

[2008] "Again" makes sense only from the point of view of Hsüan-tsang's rendering both *vijñapti* and *vijñāna* by 識. At the same time, "again" must refer to the sequence of these words in the Sanskrit original where *vijñāna* comes second. I am not sure, however, if 復舉 actually has to be understood in the sense of "using a second time". It may, to be sure, have this meaning, as at MSgU$_c$ 380c22 (ad MSg Prastāvanā 1, where the word '*Mahāyāna*' does indeed occur twice; cf. also the unambiguous expression 重舉 a few lines later [380c26], and MSgU$_t$ P li 233b2f *yang ... smos pa ni*), or at MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 352b25f (MSgBh$_t$ P li 195b6, ad MSg III.12, where **nimitta* occurs twice). But in other cases 復舉 merely refers to the use of another word in addition. In such cases, the expression may have the connotation of apparent redundancy (thus, e.g., MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 336b8f and 377a15f), but even this much does not seem to always be the case (as, e.g., at MSgBh$_{Hs}$ 321c4f; cf. MSgBht P li 142b6: X *smos pa ni yang* ...). Thus, Hsüan-tsang may have added 復 merely in the sense of an additional use of the word 識 (irrespective of its being second in sequence), viz., its use before 所緣 where it might, perhaps, be felt superfluous (cf. its absence in the quotation mentioned in fn. 1900).

(ch. 5.4), I disagree with him as regards the original on which Hsüan-tsang's restructuring of ⓧ is based, taking his version to be based on [S], not [M]. In view of the fact that Hsüan-tsang adapts also the commentarial statements to his restructured version of ⓧ, it is not very probable that additional information on the syntactical structure of the Sanskrit original may be gathered from them.

427. In {2}, the key phrase of ⓧ is repeated in full and then explained by the statement that "there is no object apart", which is syntactically too loose to be used as evidence that **arthaśūnya* could be predicated of the objective support (*ālambana*). What is interesting is that there is no separate rendering of **vijñaptimātram eva*, which may indicate that Hsüan-tsang considered **vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* and **vijñaptimātram eva* to be almost equivalent so that a separate rendering of the latter would have been redundant.

428.1. 1. As for {3}, Matsumoto (M1: 176a–b) suggests that the characters 我(所)說 … 識 at the beginning of the explanation correspond to the quotation of the latter part of ⓧ as found in $\mathbf{Bh_t}$, $\mathbf{Bh_{Pa}}$ and $\mathbf{Bh_{Dh}}$ at the beginning of {3} and that Hsüan-tsang has integrated this part of the quotation into his rendering of the explanation because he found a repetition of the quotation superfluous. With the first 識 in Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the explanation being explained in this way as corresponding to the word *vijñānam* in the *quotation*, Matsumoto thinks that the second 識 (viz., the one in the expression 唯識所現) must represent the *vijñāna* that can be inferred from $\mathbf{Bh_t}$ and $\mathbf{Bh_{Dh}}$ to have occurred in the *explanation*. Since the expression 唯識所現 is, in $\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}${3}, the *predicate* of the grammatical subject 定識所行, i.e., of the object (*gocara*) of mind in meditative concentration, Matsumoto concludes that $\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$ must be based on the reading **vijñānagrahaṇena samādhigocaro vijñānaṁ dyotitam* (or the like), with °*gocaro* as the subject and *vijñānam* as the predicate noun, which would definitely correspond to [M], not [S].

2. The argument is ingenious, but I find it much more probable that 唯識所現 corresponds, as in all other occurrences, to *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* (as is also confirmed by SaṁdhṬ_t *rnam par rig pa tsam la snang*), and that — just as in the rendering of ⓧ to which Hsüan-tsang's version of {3} is parallel in structure — 識 (*vijñāna*) in 定識所行 has to be construed as a genitive-attribute of the "object" (所行 = *gocara*, i.e., the *ālambana* of awareness in *samādhi*) now functioning as the grammatical subject. This 識 in 定識所行 would thus represent both the *vijñāna* of the explanation and that of the quotation, the identity of the two being, after all, the express purport of {3} (as in $\mathbf{Bh_t}$) or at any rate compellingly implied ($\mathbf{Bh_{Dh}}$). In other words: I consider it more probable, or at least equally possible, that the original Hsüan-tsang had before him was just the one reconstructed from $\mathbf{Bh_t}$, that he adapted the statement of {3} (viz., that the expression *vijñāna* in ⓧ should be taken as referring to the *vijñāna* perceiving the objects in *samādhi*) to the syntactical pattern of his version of ⓧ, and that he restructured and amplified {3} accordingly. Thus, $\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$, too, is, as far as I can see, no convincing evidence for [M].

428.2. Somewhat problematic is the use of 我所說 in {3} instead of 我說 in ⓧ. I would normally construe it as an attribute of 定識所行, and this is how I translated it above.[2009] Yet, in SaṁdhṬ_t it is rendered by a frame construction (*ngas … zhes bshad pa*), just as one would normally understand the introductory 我說, in accordance with what the Tibetan versions of

[2009] Cf. also KIK (Yuga) 8: 62,12f: 我が所説の定識の所行も.

ⓧ in the *mūla*-text suggest. Maybe in {3} Hsüan-tsang, inspired by a passive form in the original, simply added 所 for stylistic reasons (4-character-pattern!).

6.2.3. MSgBh: Conclusion

429. Summing up the result of the preceding re-examination of the explanation of ⓧ as found in the various versions of the MSgBh: $\mathbf{Bh_t}$ as it stands is clearly in favour of [S] as the original of ⓧ, and there is hardly sufficient justification for textual alterations, except, perhaps, for the deletion of *can* in {2}, though even this would not exclude [S] as the original of the *mūla*-text. Likewise, as regards $\mathbf{Bh_{Pa}}$, in spite of its reinterpretation of the structure of ⓧ, closer examination has led me to the conclusion that it too presupposes [S]. As for $\mathbf{Bh_{Hs}}$, it does, at least, not provide any compelling evidence that would jeopardize my conclusion that Hsüan-tsang's restructuring of ⓧ is most probably based on [S]. The only version that is unambiguously based on [M] is, as in the case of the *mūla*-text, $\mathbf{Bh_{Dh}}$.

6.3. Ye shes snying po (Jñānagarbha: Jñg)

430. Ye shes snying po (Jñānagarbha), in the pertinent passage of his commentary on Saṁdh VIII[2010] (symbol: **Jñg**ⓧ), does not refer ⓧ (which he quotes in precisely the same form as we find it in $\mathbf{Tib_{Sa}}$) to a former dictum of the Buddha but rather introduces it ({1}) with the remark that it has the purpose of pointing out a logical argument (*rigs pa*, *yukti*) [for the preceding statement(s)], and then adds his own explanation ({2}–{4}):

Jñgⓧ: {1} *rigs pa bstan pa'i phyir* ⓧ *zhes gsungs so* || {2} *dmigs pa ni yul gyi rnam par sems snang ba yin la* | {3} *de yang rnam par rig pa dang tha dad pa ma yin te* | {4} *cig car dmigs pa'i phyir ro* ||

Jñgⓧ-tr: {1} In order to show the logical argument [the Buddha] has said: "ⓧ". {2} The objective support (*dmigs pa*, **ālambana*) is an appearance of the mind (*sems*, **citta*, i.e., sensory/cognitive awareness) in the form of an object, {3} and as such it[2011] is not

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[2010] *Āryamaitreya-kevala-parivarta-Bhāṣyam Saṁdhinirmocanasūtre*, ed. in NOZAWA 1957: 1–108 (lr). The commentary on ⓧ is on p. 22:3-7; Japanese translation ibid. 193,7-10 (rl). Cf. also POWERS 1992: 75.

[2011] Matsumoto (M1: 189b–190a) takes pains to prove that *de* in {3} takes up *ālambana* in {2}, and not its appearance in the mind, because in [M] the Subj of *vijñānam* as the main PredN is *ālambanam* and because such an understanding of *de* would also fit the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument ({4}), which implies the simultaneous apprehension of two items, viz., the object (*ālambana*) and its cognition (*vijñapti*). Still, to my mind the *yang* in {3} strongly suggests a change of the *grammatical* Subj, from the objective support (*ālambana*) as the Subj of {2} to its appearance (*snang ba*) — i.e., to the mental *image* of an object, which the objective support had been defined as in {2} — as the Subj of {3}. Literally, {3} should therefore perhaps be translated as

"{3} and (... *la*) this [appearance or image] (*de*) in its turn (*yang*) is ...".

But since the objective support (*ālambana*) is *identical* with this image, the *logical* subject does not change, so that the proposed ad sensum rendering

"{3} and as such (i.e., as a mere image in the mind) it (= the objective support, *ālambana*) is ..."

may be preferable. The decisive point is — regardless of how *de* should be understood — that the non-difference of the objective support from the cognitive act is *mediated* by its being nothing but a mental image, and this would seem to hold good for the *sahopalambhaniyama* argument as well.

different/separate from [the act of] cognition (*rnam par rig pa*, **vijñapti*), {4} because [these two] are [by necessity] perceived simultaneously.

431. In S 1984: 451, I admitted that **Jñg**ⓧ can hardly be adduced in support of 🅂, but rather appears to confirm 🄰 or, in terms of the present study, 🄼/🄱. The explicit presupposition was, however, that {2} and {3} are actually a paraphrase of (the nuclear part of)[2012] ⓧ, preserving its syntactical structure. Starting from this presupposition, we would have to assume that *dmigs pa* = **ālambana* was, at least in the version on which **Jñg**ⓧ is based, the subject of ⓧ. Both **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* and **vijñāna* would then have to be regarded as predicative elements, corresponding in **Jñg**ⓧ to *yul gyi rnam par sems snang ba* in {2} and *rnam par rig pa dang tha dad pa ma yin (pa)* in {3}, respectively.

432. 1. It is, however, somewhat disturbing, as Matsumoto (M1: 190a) also admits, that *rnam par rig pa* = *vijñapti* shows up in {3}, where one would rather expect *vijñāna* or at least *citta*, while the latter occurs in {2}, where we should have *vijñapti*.

2. The main problem is, however, that we cannot be sure of the presupposition that **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3} is indeed a paraphrase of (the nuclear part of) ⓧ as a whole. Even less so if, as has been made highly probable by Steinkellner,[2013] Ye shes snying po (Jñānagarbha), the author of this commentary, was a Tibetan who probably wrote his commentary on the canonical Tibetan translation of the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṁdh$_t$) in Tibetan. Thus, in the case of ⓧ, too, his basis was probably not a Sanskrit original but just **Tib**$_{Sa}$. If we accept this, as Matsumoto (M1: 219 n. 52) also does, it is hardly possible that **Jñg**ⓧ is based on 🄼; for even if one supposes that ⓧ in **Tib**$_{Sa}$ is an unskilful translation of 🄼, no Tibetan reader would ever have understood it in terms of 🄼, the Subj ('theme') in **Tib**$_{Sa}$ being unambiguously *rnam par shes pa* = **vijñāna*, not *dmigs pa* = **ālambana*. The latter is rather (if we follow explanation ⓓ in § 371.2) merely the Subj in the nominalized phrase (corresponding to **ālambanavijñaptimātraprabhāvita*) that as a whole forms the PredN ('comment') in **Tib**$_{Sa}$, just as in 🅂. Therefore, if Ye shes snying po's commentary is based on Saṁdh$_t$ (without recourse to a Sanskrit ms.), **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3} cannot be a paraphrase of ⓧ as a whole but, if anything, only a paraphrase of the nominalized phrase that in **Tib**$_{Sa}$ functions as the PredN.

433.1. This supposition would seem to receive support if we take a closer look at the way in which **Jñg**ⓧ is embedded in its argumentative context. The natural starting point is the thesis ⓣ that the apprehending mind (*citta*) and the apprehended image that is the object of meditative concentration are not different.[2014] It is, as Ye shes snying po expressly confirms, with the aim of providing a reason (*gtan tshigs*, **hetu*) for this thesis that the sūtra then continues with ⓨ: "Because this image is nothing but representation" (*gzugs brnyan de rnam par rig pa tsam zad pa'i phyir*, **vijñaptimātratvāt tasya pratibimbasya*). Ye shes snying po comments on this phrase as follows:

[2012] The frame element *zhes ngas bshad do* (**iti mayoktam*) is not represented in Ye shes snying po's explanation.

[2013] See fn. 1857.

[2014] NOZAWA 1957: 21,14-17 (lr): *dmigs par byed pa sems dang | dmigs par bya ba ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul gzugs brnyan de gnyis ci tha dad pa nyid ces bya 'am | zhes zhus pa dang | ... tha dad pa ma yin zhes bya'o ||*.

Jñgⓨ {1} *des 'di skad ston te* | {2} *sems nyid gzugs brnyan lta bur dmigs par snang ste* | {3} *sems dang tha dad pa ma yin no zhes ston to* ||[2015]

Jñgⓨ-tr: {1} [What the Buddha] points out with that [sentence, viz., ⓨ, is] this: {2} The mind itself appears as an objective support in the same way as [a model/face (*bimba*) may appear as] a reflected image (**pratibimba*);[2016] {3} [this image-like objective support] is [thus] not different from the mind.

In this explanation, {3} is obviously a repetition of the thesis ⓣ, while {2} would seem to be an informal explanation of the reason (*hetu*), i.e., viz., ⓨ; 'informal' insofar as the syntactical structure of the text to be explained (viz., ⓨ), where the image is the logical subject (subjective genitive) and "being a mere representation" the PredN, is disregarded in the explanation, in which the grammatical subject is the mind (*sems*, **citta*). Still, in the *logical* context of the *argument*, the purport of {2} must be to show that the image-like *objective support* of the mind in meditative concentration is a mere appearance within the mind itself (and hence nothing different from the mind).

433.2. After this explanation of ⓨ, ⓧ is introduced by Ye shes snying po as supplying a [further] logical argument or justification (*rigs pa*, **yukti*) (**Jñg**ⓧ {1}). Indeed, this argument is, if I understand it rightly, presented by Ye shes snying po as a formal inference consisting of

a) the thesis to be proved, comprising the statement of the subject of the inference (*sādhyadharmin*) and the property to be proved (*sādhyadharma*), and

b) the property serving as a proof (*sādhanadharma*) or reason (*hetu*).

The *subject* of the inference, marked off by *ni*, is the objective support (*dmigs pa*, **ālambana*), the *property to be proved* is expressed by the remaining part of **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3}, viz., that the objective support is an appearance of the mind in the form of an object and hence not different from the [mind as a] cognitive act, and the *reason* is the fact that [object and cognitive act] are [by necessity] apprehended simultaneously ({4}), i.e., their *sahopalambhaniyama*.[2017]

433.3. What has been taken (by MATSUMOTO and also by myself) to reflect the syntax of ⓧ in terms of 🄼 is **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3}, in other words: the part of **Jñg**ⓧ that functions as the thesis to be proved. Now, it is obvious that **Jñg**ⓧ {2} and {3} is, from the point of view of *content*, substantially identical with Ye shes snying po's explanation of ⓨ, i.e., with **Jñg**ⓨ {2} and {3}, respectively. The main difference is of a formal nature, viz., the fact that in **Jñg**ⓧ {2} the objective support (*dmigs pa*, **ālambana*) is the grammatical subject, and not, as in **Jñg**ⓨ {2}, embedded in a phrase the grammatical subject of which is the mind (*sems*, **citta*). But this difference is easily explained by the fact that **Jñg**ⓧ is not, like **Jñg**ⓨ, an explanatory paraphrase, but a formal inference intended to back up not this explanatory paraphrase but the argument it paraphrases, viz., ⓨ as a reason for ⓣ. In other words: the purpose of **Jñg**ⓧ is to further substantiate, by way of a formal inference, the statement of ⓨ (as explained by Ye shes snying po) that the image that is the objective support of visualizing meditation is

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2015 NOZAWA 1957: 22,1-3 [lr]; cf. ibid. 193,6f [rl]; POWERS 1992: 75.

2016 Cf. Saṁdh 91,11-13: *dper na gzugs la brten nas me long gi dkyil 'khor yongs su dag pa la gzugs nyid mthong yang ⸢gzugs brnyan mthong ngo⸣ snyam du sems te*; NOZAWA 1957: 24,4f: *gzugs nyid 'khrul pa'i gzugs brnyan skyed par byed de des na ⸢gzugs brnyan mthong ngo⸣ snyam du sems so.*

2017 Cf. IWATA 2004: 69f. For details concerning the history of the *sahopalambhaniyama* inference, see IWATA 1991.

nothing but a form in which the mind itself appears and therefore not different from the mind (=ⓣ). In this inference, the logical and hence grammatical subject is necessarily the image or, in order to leave its yet unestablished ontological status undetermined, the objective support (*dmigs pa*, **ālambana*).

433.4. If **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3} is substantially nothing but an adaptation of **Jñg**ⓨ {2} + {3} to the requirements of a formal inference in which **Jñg**ⓨ {2} + {3} comes to function as the thesis to be proved, the assumption that **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3} must reflect the wording or even the word order of ⓧ becomes problematic. To be sure, it *may* mirror [M], but it may as well merely correspond to the nominalized sentence that functions as the PredN of ⓧ in $\textbf{Tib}_{\textbf{Sa}}$ (and [S]), viz., *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa tsam gyis rab tu phye ba*, according to which the objective support is nothing but a representation or appearance, as in ⓨ, and the reference, in **Jñg**ⓧ {3}, to its being, hence, not different from the mind may well have been supplied from the overall context, as in **Jñg**ⓨ {3}. This would still leave us with the question why in **Jñg**ⓧ {3} Ye shes snying po uses *rnam par rig pa* (**vijñapti*) instead of *sems* (**citta*) or *rnam par shes pa* (**vijñāna*), but this fact is equally puzzling if we take **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3} to mirror [M]. My suggestion is that the use of *rnam par rig pa* (**vijñapti*) instead of **citta* or **vijñāna* in **Jñg**ⓧ {3} is induced by the *reason*, i.e., the **sahopalambhaniyama*, because in this connection the mind (or awareness) as contrasted with the object(-image) tends to be envisaged as the subjective act of cognizing, i.e., *vijñapti*.

434.1. There is, however, one more problem left. If we take **Jñg**ⓧ {2} + {3} as the thesis (subject + property to be proved), basically identical with ⓨ and its explanation (**Jñg**ⓨ {2} + {3}) and at the same time corresponding to (the nuclear part of) ⓧ or at least to what in $\textbf{Tib}_{\textbf{Sa}}$ (and [S]) is its PredN, what is then the textual fundament of the reason (*hetu*)? In which way is the *sahopalambhaniyama* expressed or indicated in the sūtra? After all, it is this reason by which the inference goes beyond what had already been pointed out in ⓨ and its explanation. Could it be that, contrary to my assumption in § 433, ⓧ was understood by Ye shes snying po not as a kind of repetition of ⓨ and hence of what has now become the thesis to be proved, but rather as encapsulating the reason, i.e., the *sahopalambhaniyama*? Unfortunately, as far as I can see Ye shes snying po does not indicate an answer to this question, and if we were to answer it in the affirmative we can only speculate.

434.2. If I may take the liberty of advancing such a speculative reconstruction of the exegetic move through which Ye shes snying po might have managed to interpret ⓧ in the sense of *sahopalambhaniyama*, it would seem that starting from [M] one could perhaps interpret the statement **ālambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* in the sense that the object is made to appear if and only if (*tsam*, °*mātra*) there is a cognitive act. But this would cover only one side of the *sahopalambhaniyama*, viz., that the object is never experienced without its cognition. We also need the other side, i.e., that cognition is never experienced without an object, and I fail to see how it could be extracted from [M]. If, however, we start from $\textbf{Tib}_{\textbf{Sa}}$ (hence [S]), the phraseology would be sufficiently pliable to cover both sides, for in this case we might interpret ⓧ in terms of

a) awareness having an object that is made to appear only by a cognitive act,[2018] i.e., if and only if there is a cognitive act, and

b) awareness being distinctively /essentially characterized by [being] exclusively (i.e., necessarily) cognition of an object,[2019] i.e., as arising if and only if an object is cognized.

[2018] This would be a variant of the interpretation ⓓ in § 371.2.

As pointed out before, this reconstruction of the argument is entirely speculative and therefore not conclusive with regard to the textual basis of **Jñg**ⓧ, but even so I hope that my disquisition has shown that the assumption that **Jñg**ⓧ presupposes [M] and not [S] rests on premises that on closer inspection turn out to be highly problematic, and are at any rate hardly tenable if the commentary was written by a Tibetan on the basis of the Tibetan version of the Saṁdh only, i.e., if **Jñg**ⓧ is based on nothing but $\mathbf{Tib}_{\mathrm{Sa}}$ⓧ.

6.4. Byang chub rdzu 'phrul (Bych)

435. In the commentary on the Saṁdh attributed to Byang chub rdzu 'phrul but probably written (in Tibetan) by the translator-monk Klu'i rgyal mtshan in the first half of the ninth century,[2020] the passage commenting on ⓧ (symbol: **Bych**) reads as follows:

> **Bych**: {1} *'o na sems dang gzugs brnyan zhes gdags su yang ji ltar rung snyam pa las* ⓧ *zhes bya ba gsungs te* | {2} *rnam par shes pa nyid gzugs brnyan gyi dmigs pa lta bur snang bas sems dang gzugs brnyan zhes gdags su yang rung la* {3} *sems kyi ngo bo nyid*[2021] *las tha mi dad pa'i gzugs brnyan de ni rang rig pa'i tshul gyis rnam par rig pa ni rnam par shes pa'i mtshan nyid yin no zhes bstan to* ||[2022]

Let me, for the time being, repeat my translation of {2} and {3} given in S 1984 (p. 452), supplemented by a translation of {1}:

> **Bych**-tr(S1): {1} [Someone might] think: "[If the mind (*citta*)[2023] and the image (*pratibimba*) are not different,] then how is it appropriate to designate them [by way of different terms, viz.,] as 'mind' and 'image', [respectively]?" [The Buddha] said: "ⓧ". {2} Since mind itself (*vijñānam eva*) appears as the object (*ālambana*) [in the form of a mental] image (*pratibimba*), it can be called both 'mind' (*citta*) and 'image'. {3} The essential characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of mind (*vijñāna*) is that this image which is not different from mind itself ...[2024] is cognized (*vijñapti*) by way of self-perception (*svasaṁvitti*) — this is what has been taught.

436. The crucial sentence for my argument was {3}, which I considered to be a paraphrase of ⓧ. My presupposition was that the basic syntactical structure of {3} is

A *ni* B *kyi mtshan nyid yin no* ($\mathrm{A}^{\mathrm{nom}}$ $\mathrm{B}^{\mathrm{gen}}$ *lakṣaṇam*)[2025]

A is the defining property of [the definiendum] B.[2026]

[2019] See § 371.2 ⓑ.

[2020] See fn. 1849. Cf. also M1: 219 n. 57.

[2021] As pointed out by Matsumoto (M1: 219b–220 n. 59), in S 1984 *nyid* was, unfortunately, inadvertently omitted.

[2022] P no. 5845, Ngo mtshar bstan bcos, co 193b1-3; D no. 4358, sNa tshogs, cho 162b2-4. Cf. NOZAWA 1957: 197,11-15 (Japanese transl.).

[2023] Even though this commentary was probably written in Tibetan, without an Indian original, I insert the usual Sanskrit equivalents for the sake of clarity.

[2024] *sems kyi ngo bo nyid*, corresponding to *cittasvabhāva*, not *citta(sva)rūpa* (as in S 1984); see fn. 2021.

[2025] Cf., e.g., MSABh 65,4f (ad XI.40): ... *ayam abhūtaparikalpaḥ paratantrasya lakṣaṇam*. The word order may vary in accordance with context, emphasis, etc.; cf., e.g., PrasP 261,4: *agner auṣṇyaṁ lakṣaṇam*; 129,9: ... *ākāśasyânāvaraṇaṁ lakṣaṇam ucyate*.

[2026] See S 1984: 452 n. 59.

This I took as a phraseological variant[2027] of

B *ni* A *kyi mtshan nyid can (yin) no* (A-*lakṣaṇa*^{nom} [bahuvrīhi!] B^{nom})[2028]

B has A as its defining property,

which in my opinion is, in certain contexts, more or less equivalent to

B *ni* A *kyis rab tu phye ba yin no* (A-*prabhāvita*^{nom} B^{nom})

B is distinguished (/essentially characterized) by A.

Since the definiendum 'B' in {3} is unambiguously *rnam par shes pa* = *vijñāna*, {3} would seem to correspond to [S], where the definiendum is likewise *vijñāna*, and not to [M], where the definiendum is *ālambana*. The defining property in {3}, corresponding to **ālambana-vijñaptimātra* in ⓧ, would then be *gzugs brnyan de ni rang rig pa'i tshul gyis rnam par rig pa*, with *gzugs brnyan* (*pratibimba*) replacing *ālambana*, and *rang rig pa'i tshul gyis* ("by way of self-perception") being an interpretation of °*mātra* in terms of later Buddhist epistemology.[2029] I took *gzugs brnyan* (*pratibimba*) as the logical object of *rnam par rig pa* (*vijñapti*): *vijñāna* is defined as the cognition of the (non-separate) image by way of self-perception.

437.1. Matsumoto approves of my assumption that {3} is a paraphrase of ⓧ (M1: 192a15f) but raises a number of objections against my translation and interpretation of the sentence:

a) He wonders if the occurrence of the word *mtshan nyid* (*lakṣaṇa*) is indeed sufficient to guarantee that *rnam par shes pa* (*vijñāna*) is the definiendum and hence the subject (M1: 192a16–b3).

b) He also doubts that *vijñapti* can be construed with an object, because it should not be understood as the act of cognizing but rather, in accordance with G.M. Nagao's reflections on the meaning of this term, in the concrete sense (具体的に) of the content manifested or cognized (表現され知られている内容)[2030] (M1: 192b4–193b11).

c) According to Matsumoto, my analysis of {3} disregards the fact that *gzugs brnyan*, taken by me as the object of *rnam par rig pa*, is separated from the latter not only by the expression *rang rig pa'i tshul gyis* but also by the particle *ni*, the double occurrence of which in {3} he finds anyway unusual and obscuring the syntax of the sentence (M1: 193b11-16; 192b13-21).

d) Finally (M1: 194b3-11), he points out that my interpretation of {3} in terms of [S] presupposes the equivalence of X-*prabhāvita* with X-*lakṣaṇa* (bahuv.), i.e., the meaning "characterized by" for °*prabhāvita* (which he rejects, at least for the Saṁdh: see § 450).

[2027] Actually, at ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 143,6-11 (= ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ I 240,4-8), the Tibetan translation (YBh$_t$ P wi 68b7–69a1) renders a set of definitions of the type "A-*lakṣaṇa*^{nom} (bahuv.) B^{nom}" in terms of the pattern "B *kyi mtshan nyid* A *yin*", e.g., *kharalakṣaṇā pṛthivī* = *sa'i mtshan nyid sra ba yin*. Similarly ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 386,1-3 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ III [2009]: 36,12) = YBh$_t$ P wi 170a6f: *kharalakṣaṇā pṛthivī* = *sa'i mtshan nyid ni sra ba'o*, etc. However, the pattern of {3} differs from these transformations insofar as it reverses the thematization, for instead of "B *kyi mtshan nyid (ni)* A *(yin) no*" it has "A *ni* B *kyi mtshan nyid yin no*". This will be discussed below (see § 438.2.3).

[2028] Cf., e.g., AKBh$_t$ P gu 123b5 (D ku 107a2) *gzugs ni gnod par byar rung ba'i mtshan nyid can no* = AKBh 108,9 *rūpaṇālakṣaṇaṁ rūpam*.

[2029] Cf. also M1: 194a9-19, which suggests that this equation may be based on the assumption that °*mātra* means "without an external object", so that experience can only be self-perception.

[2030] Matsumoto (M1: 193b4-8) quotes NAGAO 1982: 278.

437.2. On the basis of these objections, Matsumoto discards my analysis of **Bych**{3} in terms of [S] and replaces it with his own interpretation in terms of [M] (M1: 194a). According to Matsumoto, the word *mtshan nyid* (*lakṣaṇa*) in {3} is not very meaningful (大きな意味はなく: M1: 194a7), and the expression *rnam par shes pa'i mtshan nyid* as a whole corresponds merely to *vijñānam* in ⓧ. He thus feels entitled to take this expression as a PredN ('comment') intended to *equate* the Subj ('theme'), i.e., *gzugs brnyan* (*pratibimba*, corresponding to *ālambana*), with *vijñāna*. As for the middle part of the sentence, viz., *rang rig pa'i tshul gyis rnam par rig pa*, he interprets it in a predicative sense with a virtual causal function,[2031] as would indeed be natural if **Bych**{3} were based on [M] (cf. § 444).

438.0. Rejoinder:

438.1. Let me start with a comment on Matsumoto's own proposal. First, I consider it altogether inadmissible to dispose of the word *mtshan nyid* as having no meaning simply because it disturbs the desired analysis of the sentence. It would be as if a sentence "horns, hunchback and dewlap are the defining characteristics of a zebu" were reduced to the sentence "horns, hunchback and dewlap are a zebu", which is clearly wrong. Second, ignoring *mtshan nyid* (*lakṣaṇa*) would imply that there is no equivalent of *prabhāvita* in **Bych**{3}. The only way to account for this would be to assume that the author of **Bych** regarded it as a term of identification not worth rendering, but this would hardly suit Matsumoto's assumptions concerning the meaning of *prabhāvita*. Third, Matsumoto's interpretation of the syntactical position of the middle part (viz., *rang rig pa'i tshul gyis rnam par rig pa*) in a predicative sense would necessitate a conjunctive particle ("X is A [and] B", or, as he puts it: "X is A, [therefore] B"). But the particle *ni* surely cannot be used in this way since its function is thematization. Thus, Matsumoto's proposal is hardly acceptable. On the other hand, his (preliminary?) translation of {3}, viz.,

> **Bych**-tr(M): As for the image ..., the fact that it is a cognition/representation (*vijñapti*) by way of self-perception is the characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of mind (*vijñāna*),[2032]

is basically in agreement with the syntactical structure of the Tibetan text (cf. § 438.2.4).

438.2.0. As for Matsumoto's arguments (§ 437.1[a–d]) against my own proposal, my answer is as follows:

438.2.1. (ad d) The fourth argument has been briefly dealt with in ch. 3.2. Moreover, even Matsumoto himself does not deny the use of °*prabhāvita* in the sense of "distinguished /characterized by" for later authors,[2033] so that in **Bych** it may well have been understood in this way regardless of its original meaning in the Saṁdh, all the more if Byang chub rdzu 'phrul's commentary is based on the **Tib**$_{\mathbf{Sa}}$ only, where *prabhāvita* is anyway represented by *rab tu phye ba* ("distinguished").

438.2.2. (ad b) With regard to the second argument, I hope to have shown in § 357.2 that the primary meaning of *vijñapti* is "act of cognizing", and that its combination with an object is both natural and well attested. It is true that in Vijñānavāda texts *vijñapti* is often used in a

[2031] M1: 194a20-22: "pratibimba" なる "ālambana" は "vijñapti-mātra-prabhāvita" であり, 〔故に〕 "vijñāna" である ...

[2032] M1: 191b8-11: ... 影像 ... は,自己認識 (svasaṁvitti) というありかた (tshul) によって表識 (vijñapti) であることが, 識 (vijñāna) ... の相 (lakṣaṇa) である ...

[2033] Cf. M1: 212a17-20; 213b22–214a3.

sense focussing on the *content* which appears in the mind, but this does not justify a categorical dismissal of its use in an active sense construable with an object, even in later Vijñānavāda sources.

438.2.3. (ad a) If Matsumoto's first objection is intended to play down the significance of the use of *lakṣaṇa* in **Bych**{3}, I find this inadmissible, for the reason already offered in my criticism of Matsumoto's own proposal (§ 438.1). I do not see any justification for doubting that in a sentence "A *ni* B *kyi mtshan nyid yin no*" 'B' is the *lakṣya* or definiendum. A different matter is the question of what is the grammatical subject and what is the predicate noun, or what is 'theme' and what is 'comment'. From a formal point of view, the word order in Tibetan (Subj – PredN – *yin no*) establishes 'A' as the Subj (additionally marked by *ni* as the 'theme') and 'B *kyi mtshan nyid*' as the PredN (a fact which I ought to have taken into account in my translation). Thus, **Bych**{3}, compared with ⓧ in Tib and [S], quite obviously shifts thematization from *rnam par shes pa* (*vijñāna*) to the object. In this regard, Matsumoto is right. But this cannot invalidate the equally obvious fact that 'B' (= *vijñāna*) remains the definiendum, just as in **Tib** and [S], and in contradistinction to [M]. Therefore, **Bych**{3} must be based on [S], not [M]. Even so, the shift of thematization requires explanation, but let me first deal with Matsumoto's remaining objection.

438.2.4. (ad c) Matsumoto's third objection is the most important one. The double occurrence of *ni* in **Bych**{3} is indeed somewhat unusual, and I have to admit that I did not pay due attention to the first *ni*. But its explanation is not as difficult as it may appear at first glance. The reason for its employment would seem to lie in the fact that {3} starts with taking up, or thematizing, an element nestled in {2} but not thematized there, viz., the image (*gzugs brnyan*) qualified as not different/separate from mind as such. In {3} this 'theme' is then 'commented upon' by a phrase which in its turn, too, consists of a 'theme' marked off by *ni* and a 'comment'.[2034] From this point of view, I now propose the following translation:

> **Bych**-tr(S2): {3} As for this image which is not separate from the 'own-being' of the mind (*sems*, *citta*, i.e., from the mind itself), [its] cognition (*rnam par rig pa*, *vijñapti*, i.e., the cognition of the image) by way of self-perception is the defining characteristic (*mtshan nyid*, *lakṣaṇa*) of mind[2035] (*rnam par shes pa*, *vijñāna*): thus has it been taught.

Matsumoto's suggestion to understand the middle portion as "... the fact that it is cognition (表識 *(vijñapti)* であることが) by way of self-perception ..."[2036] is an interesting alternative since it would fit the context quite well (see § 439.1), even though, as Matsumoto himself (M1: 192b19-21) seems to admit, it may be somewhat odd to take *rnam par rig pa* (without *yin pa*) as a PredN. At any rate, his reluctance to accept the possibility of the image being the object of *rnam par rig pa* (*vijñapti*) appears unjustified (see § 438.2.2). Actually, the defining

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[2034] For an instance of a similar pattern (A *ni* | B1 *ni* PredN *yin la* | B2 *ni* ... PredN ... *ma gyur te* |) in Rong-zom-pa's *Sangs rgyas kyi sa chen mo* (in: *Rong zom bka' 'bum*, Thimpu 1976: 461f), see ALMOGI 2009: 395,31–396,3):

> *sangs rgyas rnams ni* | ... *skyon thams cad ni* ... *yongs su dag pa yin la* | ... *yon tan ni* | ... *mthar ma phyin par* ... *'ga' yang ma gyur te* |
>
> "As regards the Buddhas, ... all defects ... have been entirely cleared away, and ... as for the good qualities, ... there is none which has not become perfect" (my transl., adapted to the present purpose; cf. ALMOGI 2009: 249 # 6).

[2035] In the sense of a momentary event cognizing an object.

[2036] See § 438.1 with fn. 2032. Cf. also M1: 192b20.

characteristic of *vijñāna*, which the phrase under discussion is bound to contain, is its cognizing an object (*ālambanavijñapti*, see § 357.2). Hence, in the present context *rnam par rig pa* does require an object, which can only be the image, even if, being thematized by *ni*, it is not directly construed as the object of *rnam par rig pa*. But it has at least to be supplied.[2037] On the other hand, the cognition of the image (= object) is stated to take place by way of *self-perception* (*rang rig pa*), which *implies* that the image is also the subject, i.e., the *vijñapti*. The image is, in this sense, a *cognition* of itself as its *object*, an *ālambanavijñapti* with itself as the *ālambana*, and thus satisfies the defining characteristic of *vijñāna*. This will become clearer when we now consider {3} in the context of the whole of **Bych**.

439.1. In assessing the purport of **Bych**{3} in the context of **Bych** as a whole, we should start from the fact that {3} forms part of the explanation of ⓧ and that ⓧ is introduced in {1} as answering the question how mind and image, though non-different, may yet be designated by different terms, viz., as 'mind' and as 'image'. In my opinion, the answer is given in {2} and {3}, but from different angles:

1. Section {2} starts from the *mind* (*rnam par shes pa*, *vijñāna*) as the 'theme' and explains its being designatable not only as 'mind' (*sems*, *citta*) but also as 'image' by referring to the fact that the very mind itself (*rnam par shes pa nyid*) appears as the image.

2. By way of contrast (... *la* |), {3} starts from the *image* and explains its being designatable not only as 'image' but also as 'mind'[2038] by referring to the fact that the image, being non-different from mind, cognizes (*rnam par rig pa* = *vijñapti*), so to speak, itself by way of self-perception (*rang rig pa*), and thus satisfies the definition of mind (*vijñāna*).

439.2. Scrutinized attentively, both {2} and {3} turn out to be, each of them, interpretations of the whole nuclear part of ⓧ (with *zhes bstan to* as a paraphrase of *zhes ngas bshad do* added at the end of the whole of {2}+{3}):

1. In {2}, *rnam par shes pa* (*vijñāna*) is, as in **Tib** and [S], taken as the subject ('theme'), and *gzugs brnyan gyi dmigs pa lta bur snang ba* paraphrasing *dmigs pa rnam par rig pa* (*ālambanavijñapti*) is the predicate ('comment'); °*prabhāvita*, probably understood in the sense of "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as", is not represented, and the limitative function of *tsam* (°*mātra*) would seem to have been taken over by the *nyid* connected with *rnam par shes pa*. It should be obvious that {2} cannot be based on [M]. It rather suits [S] understood in a similar way as in MSgU_t {3} (see § 395).[2039]

2. As for {3}, the correspondences with ⓧ have already been pointed out in § 436. Even though the intention of the commentator in {3} is to show that the image (= objective support) may also be called 'mind', he does not simply identify the image with mind (which he could easily have done had his textual basis been [M]). He has rather tried to reach his objective through a transformation of the syntactical pattern of ⓧ and a shift of thematization which

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[2037] If I were to follow Matsumoto's proposal to take *rnam par rig pa* as a PredN, I would therefore translate the passage as "... the fact that it is a cognition [of itself] by way of self-perception ...".

[2038] This has, of course, implicitly to be supplied in the text of {3} in analogy to that of {2}.

[2039] Which may be taken as an interpretation or paraphrase of [S2]/[S5] (see §§ 352 and 357.5) or, if we start from $\mathbf{Tib}_{Sa}$, of ⓑ (see § 371.2).

still leaves the mind (*rnam par shes pa* = *vijñāna*) in the position of the definiendum, in accordance with **Tib**/S.[2040]

440. Thus, even if we disregard its Tibetan origin, **Bych**, correctly analysed, clearly supports S. This is even more the case, as Matsumoto himself admits (M1: 194b15–195a4), if we take into account that the author may not have had a Sanskrit original at his disposal and may have based his explanation merely on the canonical Tibetan translation (i.e., **Tib**$_{Sa}$). I cannot imagine how, starting from this version, any Tibetan reader might have interpreted the text in terms of M, the Subj or 'theme' and definiendum in **Tib**$_{Sa}$ being unambiguously *rnam par shes pa* (*vijñāna*), not *dmigs pa* (*ālambana*).

7. Re-examination of the Evidence: Resumé

441. The main result of the preceding reconsideration of the testimonia is that the only incontestable witness for M is Dharmagupta's translation of the MSgBh (including both his version of the *mūla*-text and that of the *Bhāṣya*). On the other hand, the rendering of ⓧ in the witnesses that are, from the point of view of content, usually the most reliable, viz., **Tib**, **U**$_t$ and **Hs**, cannot be interpreted in the sense of M unless we charge the translators with serious misunderstandings of the meaning and, in the case of **Tib** and **U**$_t$, even presuppose additional textual corruption. Taken as they stand, they are only explicable on the basis of S. The same is true of **Bh**$_t$, although this translation may be less reliable. **U**$_c$ and **Bh**$_{Hs}$ are structured in accordance with Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *mūla*-text (i.e., **MSg**$_{Hs}$) and do not offer any clues that might support M. Even **Pa** and **Bh**$_{Pa}$ which I had originally taken as evidence for A, i.e., M, have, on closer examination, turned out to presuppose S. **Bu** and **TH** are important for securing the word order. As for reconstructing the syntactical structure of ⓧ, **Bu** is too ambiguous to be of any help, and **TH**, being demonstrably unreliable in this regard, only admits of somewhat shaky and ambivalent indirect conclusions. Hardly anything can be gained from Bodhiruci, whose rendering of ⓧ (**Bo**) is rather obscure. The two commentaries on the Saṁdh by Jñānagarbha and Byang chub rdzu 'phrul seem to have been written by Tibetans, perhaps without recourse to a Sanskrit original. Thus, their testimony is of doubtful import for the reconstruction of the latter. In any case, **Bych** is in agreement with the canonical Tibetan translation, hence with S, and even **Jñg** can be interpreted in this way. Thus, my re-examination of the testimonia has left me (and, as I sincerely hope, also the reader) with the conviction that evidence for S is, on the whole, much broader than for M. It is, however, certain that Dharmagupta's translation of MSg(Bh) presupposes a reading *ālambanaṁ* (with an anusvāra), i.e., the MSg version of M. I also cannot exclude the possibility of the presence of such an anusvāra in the original on which **TH** is based. But in my opinion this anusvāra is a secondary reading which was either intentionally introduced (lectio facilior) or had intruded through a corruption, as, probably, in the comparable case of the *Pañcaskandhaka* manuscript (see § 462.2).

[2040] It is not easy to decide on which understanding of ⓧ its interpretation in **Bych**{3} is based. The most likely possibility would seem to be [S6A] (see § 357.5) or, if we start from **Tib**$_{Sa}$, ⓒ (see § 371.2), provided that we take *vijñapti* (*rnam par rig pa*) to preserve, at least metaphorically, its function as an action noun: "mind is [essentially] characterized by an object that is cognition only (i.e., cognition of itself by way of self-perception)".

8. Internal Criticism of Matsumoto's and Buescher's Reconstruction and Interpretation

442. Provided that the preceding re-evaluation of the testimonia is correct, there is good reason to assume that as a reconstruction of the original Sanskrit of ⓧ, [S] is more probable than [M]. I shall now try to show that [M] is problematic also from internal points of view, including aspects of syntax, especially word order (ch. 8.1), as well as aspects of the logical structure of the argument and of terminology (ch. 8.2).

8.1. Problems of Syntax

443. [M] (**ālambanaṁ hi vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ Maitreya vijñānam iti mayoktam*) is translated by Matsumoto as follows:

> [M]-tr(M): For the object (*ālambana*), which has been produced (*prabhāvita*) by cognition only (*vijñapti-mātra*), is mind (*vijñāna*): thus has it been taught by me.[2041]

444. From [M]-tr(M) it is clear that Matsumoto takes *ālambanam* as the Subj, *vijñapti-mātraprabhāvitaṁ* as an attribute of the Subj, and *vijñānam* as the PredN. Habitually, however, an attribute would have to precede the noun it specifies. If it follows the noun — and this applies particularly to participles (participium coniunctum) —, it normally has a predicative function (thus correctly Buescher, see § 447.1: [B]-tr), often with a conditional or causal nuance.[2042] Actually, a causal nuance would even seem to make better sense in [M] (see § 454.2.1).

445.0. Moreover, I am not sure whether a sentence in which *ālambanam* is the Subj and *vijñānam* the PredN would actually show the word order of [M] if the Subj is the 'theme' and the PredN the 'comment', i.e., the new, emphasized information.

445.1. As far as I can see, in prose the normal word order in such sentences, at least in the style of Mahāyāna sūtras, is PredN – Subj (see § 350). Cf. also the sentence from the DBhS (6E) which is, according to Matsumoto (cf. § 356.2), the former dictum referred to by the Buddha in ⓧ, viz.,

> *cittamātram* (PredN) *idam* (Subj) *yad idam traidhātukam* (appended specification of the Subj) (see § 451.1: [A20]).

The expected word order for [M] would thus rather be

> **vijñānaṁ* (PredN) *hi Maitreya ālambanaṁ* (Subj) *vijñaptimātraprabhāvitam* (appended specification of the Subj with causal function) *(iti mayôktam)*,

but this would be incompatible with **TH** and **Bu**.

445.2. There are, to be sure, many cases showing an inverted order, but from an admittedly very preliminary investigation I have got the impression that most of these cases belong to

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[2041] M1: 156a22–b1 and 196a17-19: [Mt]: というのも、表識のみ (*vijñapti-mātra*) によって生みだされた (*prabhāvita*) 所縁 (*ālambana*) は識である、と私によって説かれたからである。The English translation is by Prof. Matsumoto (personal letter dated 06.06.2006). As he kindly explained to me, 表識 for *vijñapti* is a technical translation he has coined himself in order to make a distinction between *vijñāna* and *vijñapti*.

[2042] Cf. THOMMEN 1903: 24; SPEYER 1886: # 16.3. Cf. also *AiSynt* 19f.

definable types of sentences. Typical cases for an inverted word order are nominal sentences where special emphasis is on the Subj.[2043] This is, e.g., the case when in a series of sentences the same PredN is applied to varying subjects.[2044] But in [M] (as understood by Matsumoto) emphasis is clearly on the PredN (viz., *vijñānam*). Another reason for inversion seems to be the subject's being accompanied or represented by an anaphoric pronoun.[2045] This may hold good for the MSg version of [M] (if it had indeed started with **tad ālambanaṁ* ...). In the Saṁdh version, however, no anaphoric pronoun accompanying the Subj can be traced in any of the testimonia, and all one could do is to take such an anaphoric pronoun to be implied, on the assumption that '*ālambana*' resumes the preceding '*pratibimba*', i.e., refers to the image as the object (**gocara*) of meditative concentration. To be sure, there may be yet other reasons for an inversion, and I am not in a position to disprove the possibility that inversion may take place due to the presence of a conjunct participle. But it would be incumbent upon the defendent of [M] to present pertinent evidence.

445.3. Even if such evidence were available, in view of the strong emphasis on *identity* I would still find the bare expression *vijñānam* as a PredN surprisingly weak. Wouldn't one, in such a case, expect at least an *eva* to have been added, still more so if the PredN of the passage, viz. *vijñānam*, were, as Matsumoto assumes, meant to be an allusion to the *citta-mātram* of the DBhS? Would the required emphasis on *vijñāna* indeed be sufficiently clear from *iti* on the condition that its scope is (with **Pa**, **Dh** and **TH**) regarded as limited to *vijñānam* (as M1: 154b might be taken to suggest)? Anyway, as already pointed out it would be

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2043 Cf., e.g., the anteposition of *sarvadharmāḥ* as Subj when emphasis is on the fact that *all* dharmas share the respective PredN, as, e.g., at Aṣṭ 136,25f: *sarvadharmā ajānakā apaśyakāḥ; ... sarvadharmā hi Subhūte śūnyāḥ*, etc. As against this, we find the postpositioning of *sarvadharmāḥ* when emphasis is on the PredN(s), as at 148,30ff, where *śūnyatāgatikā hi ... sarvadharmāḥ* is followed by a whole set similar phrases with the same Subj but different PredNs. Change of position indicates a change of emphasis, as at 20,12-15: *māyopamās te ... sattvāḥ, svapnopamās te ... sattvāḥ* (emphasis on the PredN). ... *sarvadharmā api ... māyopamāḥ svapnopamāḥ* (change of emphasis to applicability of the PredN to the totality of *dharma*s, underlined by *api*). Similarly 96,1+3.The shift of emphasis is also palpable in cases like Aṣṭ 231,4-6:

{1} *apramāṇā hy Ānanda prajñāpāramitā* | {2} *nāmakāyapadakāyavyañjanakāyāḥ khalu punar Ānanda pramāṇabaddhāḥ* | {3} *nêyam Ānanda prajñāpāramitā pramāṇabaddhā* |

"{1} The perfection of wisdom, o Ānanda, is, of course, unlimited. {2} It is, mind you, [only] names, words and letters[1] that are subject to limitation. {3} This perfection of wisdom [however] is *not* subject to limitation." [1] In systematizing exegesis: words, sentences and sounds.

In {1}, emphasis is on the PredN. In {2}, the main emphasis is on the Subj, which is contrasted with the Subj of {1} as being of a different character. In {3}, this different character (taken over from {2} and hence unemphasized) is (emphatically) negated for the Subj (identical with the Subj of {1} but now emphasized).

2044 As, e.g., at Aṣṭ 11,11f: *tathā hi Bhagavan rūpam abaddham amuktam, evam vedanā*, etc.; 18,22-24: ⌜*srotaāpattiphalam asaṁskṛtaprabhāvitam*⌝ *iti na sthātavyam* (cf. M1: 207b: [45]), *evaṁ sakṛdāgāmiphalam*, etc.

2045 Cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 149,31f: *sa khalu punar ayaṁ Subhūte saṁnāho ... na rūpasaṁbaddhaḥ ...* |, or BoBh$_{D}$ 96,8: *tat punar gṛhipakṣāśritaṁ pravrajitapakṣāśritañ ca śīlaṁ samāsatas trividham*. The inversion is frequent after a relative clause anticipating the subject, e.g. Aṣṭ 147,11: *yaḥ Subhūte rūpasyâsaṁbandhaḥ, sa rūpasyâśleṣaḥ*. But even when the Subj is accompanied by an anaphoric pronoun the emphasized PredN may come first, as at Aṣṭ 20,12f: *māyopamās te devaputrāḥ* (voc.) *sattvāḥ, svapnopamās te devaputrāḥ sattvāḥ*, or 21,16: *anirjātāny etāny ārya Subhūte puṣpāṇi*.

the burden of the defendent of [M] to present unambiguous examples of the syntactical pattern proposed.

446. There is yet another problem, concerning merely the reconstructed Sanskrit text of [M], not the translation. The normal position of enclitic particles (like *hi*) belonging to the sentence as a whole is after the first word (or linguistic unit) of the sentence, and the unemphasized vocative normally follows *hi* directly unless other enclitics (like enclitic pronouns) are intercalated (cf. § 349.2). By contrast, in [M] only *hi* occupies its proper position after the first word of the sentence (viz. *ālambanam*), whereas the vocative is placed after *°prabhāvitam* and thus separated from *hi* by the second non-enclitic word of the sentence. This position of the vocative after *°prabhāvitam* is suggested by **TH**, which Matsumoto, too, considers to mirror, by and large, the word order of the original Sanskrit. But such a position of the vocative appears odd in [M] because the vocative should not normally be separated from *hi* by a non-enclitic expression. It is true that there are occasional exceptions, but as far as I can see at least in prose they seem to be restricted to specific cases with objectifiable criteria.[2046] To assert that the addition of a conjunct participle allows for, or even necessitates, a displacement of the vocative (but not of *hi*) would, once more, entail the obligation to present unequivocal examples, preferably from Mahāyāna sūtras in prose.[2047]

447.1. The problem of the position of the vocative is also an argument against Buescher's reconstruction of the Saṁdh passage, and here it is aggravated by the fact that he construes ⓨ and ⓧ as a single sentence:

> [B] ⓨ+ⓧ: **vijñaptimātratvāt tasya pratibimbasyâlambanaṁ vijñaptimātraprabhāvitaṁ Maitreya mayā vijñānam ity uktam* | (B: 185,1f)
>
> [B]-tr: Because such a visualized image has the nature of being a purely noetic constitution, [its] reference point (/that image's [appearance as noematic] reference point)[2048] — being one that is manifested by the purely noetic constitution — has been explained by me, Maitreya, to exist *as* consciousness. (B: 185,3-6)

If [B] is understood in terms of [B]-tr, the correct position of the vocative *Maitreya* would probably be immediately after *vijñaptimātratvāt*. At any rate, its position after *°prabhāvitaṁ*, confirmed by **TH**, would hardly be possible.

447.2. Buescher's construction of the initial *vijñaptimātratvāt* (ⓨ①) with ⓧ is not confirmed by any of the transmitted versions. In **Tib**, ⓨ is marked off from ⓧ by the semi-final particle *te*,[2049] and even in **TH** this holds good for ⓨ① (**vijñaptimātratvāt*). In cases where a reason is to be construed with the following text, the semi-final particle after the causal phrase (... *phyir*) is normally missing.[2050] In the Chinese versions of the Saṁdh, ⓧ is

[2046] See fn. 1752.

[2047] It may be worth noting that at Aṣṭ 225,4f even a non-predicative apposition (of which the connection with the substantive to which it belongs would seem to be closer than that of a predicative apposition) does not cause a displacement of the vocative: *<u>Subhūtir</u> hi Kauśika <u>sthaviraḥ</u> prajñāpāramitām api ... na samanupaśyati*.

[2048] Thus according to an alternative offered by BUESCHER (B: 185 n. 1) on the basis of his proposal of a double bind construction of **tasya pratibimbasya*.

[2049] *te* is, however, missing in S, but present in Phug-brag (see fn. 1736).

[2050] In case evidence is wanted, it may suffice to point out AKBh$_t$ D ku 26a3f: *mi shes pa ni yang dag pa'i don mthong ba la bgegs su gyur pa'i <u>phyir</u> mun pa ste* (AKBh 1,10 [EJ. 1,12f]: *ajñānaṁ hi*

explicitly marked as a reason of its own,[2051] and in **Bo** it is even additionally characterized as such by an introductory question (何以故= "why?"), strongly suggesting the presence of a *hi* in ⓧ (cf. § 349.1).

447.3. Buescher's reconstruction of the latter part of ⓧ as ... *mayā vijñānam ity uktam*, which follows the word order of **TH** in all details, would normally suggest a limitation of the scope of *iti* to '*vijñānam*'.[2052] However, in this case **Tib** and **Hs** could not have interpreted the passage as they actually do. Apart from this, Buescher's rendering of the predicative part of ⓧ as "... has been explained by me ... to exist *as* consciousness" is somewhat disturbing. There is no equivalent for "to exist", either in **TH** or in [B].

447.4. A major problem in Buescher's interpretation of the passage is his suggestion of a double bind construction, actual or virtual, of **tasya pratibimbasya* (=ⓨ②), as shown by his translation.[2053] Though such a construction may be possible from a mere syntactical point of view, it meets with difficulties from the point of view of meaning; for as was pointed out in § 379.1, the natural interpretation of the alleged syntagma **tasya pratibimbasyâlambanaṁ*, viz., "the objective support *of* this image", does not make good sense since the image *is* the objective support. Buescher's alternative rendering, viz., "that image's [appearance as noematic] reference point", would, it is true, make sense but is grammatically inadmissible; for by means of his addition in square brackets Buescher manipulates the text in that he tacitly converts the syntactical pattern 'X^{gen} Y', in which — at any rate as long as **ālambanaṁ* is taken in the sense of "reference point" (/"objective support") — the genitive can only be a possessive genitive, into something quite different, viz., into a relation according to which X *appears as* Y. But such a relation can hardly be expressed by the pattern 'X^{gen} Y'; it would surely require a completely different phraseology.

8.2. Problems of Logical Structure and Terminology

448. There can be no doubt that the passage under discussion (viz., ⓨ+ⓧ) is meant as a response to the question of why the image that is the object of visualizing meditative concentration is not different/separate from the contemplating mind, in other words: that it is intended to provide a proof or justification for ⓣ. On the basis of his interpretation of ⓨ+ⓧ as a single sentence, Buescher seems to understand this sentence as expressing one single reason (cf. B: 184,26ff). To simplify Buescher's somewhat tortuous phraseology, we may perhaps reduce the argument to the statement that the image, or reference point (*ālambana*), is [non-different from] consciousness (/awareness) because it is *vijñaptimātra*, i.e., in Buescher's words, "because it has the nature of a purely noetic constitution". In the context of this argument, the role of the parenthetic apposition to the reference point, viz. "being one that is manifested by the purely noetic constitution" (*vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*), remains obscure,

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bhūtārthadarśanapratibandhād andhakāram); 26a4: *de yang ... phyis mi skye ba'i chos can du gyur pa'i phyir gtan nas ye bcom pa ste* (1,11: *tac ca ... atyantam sarvathā ... punaranutpattidharmatvād dhatam*); 26a7: *'khor ba ni 'gro ba kun tu chags pa'i gnas yin pa'i phyir dang / brgal bar dka' ba'i phyir 'dam lta bu yin te* (1,15f: *saṁsāro hi jagadāsaṅgasthānatvād duruttaratvāc ca paṅkabhūtaḥ*).

[2051] Thus also **Jñg** (see § 430), introducing ⓧ with the words *rigs pa bstan pa'i phyir ... zhes gsungs so*. Cf. also **Bych** (see § 435).

[2052] Cf., however, the examples quoted in fn. 1763.

[2053] Cf. also B: 179 with n. 4.

and Buescher does not comment on its function in the argument. Actually, in his rendering it looks like a slightly more explicit but logically redundant rephrasing of the reason. Alternatively, one might take it to indicate a sub-reason: the image functioning as the reference point is "of the nature of a purely noetic constitution" *because* it is "manifested by the purely noetic constitution", or, in my terminology: it is nothing but a representation (= appearance) because it is manifested by a mere [act of] representation or visualization. But if this is what the passage wants to express, Buescher's syntactical analysis, apart from the philological difficulties pointed out in § 447, does not serve the purpose very well. It would be much better to follow the transmitted versions of the text and split the passage into a sequence of two arguments, as even **TH** does (see § 447.2 and ch. 5.2), though the division found in the other versions (viz. into ⓨ and ⓧ) is surely preferable.

449. In this latter point, Matsumoto's interpretation of the passage fully agrees with my own. We both take the argument to develop in three steps. In the first step (ⓣ), the Buddha asserts that the image or replica (**pratibimba*) which is the object (*gocara*) of meditative concentration is not different/separate (**bhinna*) from the contemplating mind (*citta*). This is then justified by the second sentence, viz., ⓨ (**vijñaptimātratvāt tasya pratibimbasya*), to which the third sentence, viz., ⓧ, adds yet another reason, and it is only with regard to the original wording of this additional reason (M vs. S) and the interpretation of its meaning and argumentative function that Matsumoto's position differs from my own.

450. One of the controversial issues is the meaning of *prabhāvita*. According to Matsumoto, *prabhāvita* in ⓧ must be understood in the sense of "produced" because this is its original meaning and because the meaning "characterized by/as" cannot be presupposed in pre-Asaṅga sources.[2054] In ch. 3.2 I have tried to show that even in pre-Asaṅga sources the meaning of *prabhāvita* cannot be restricted to "produced" and that the Saṁdh itself contains occurrences of *prabhāvita* that do not admit an understanding in terms of "produced" but make excellent sense if the expression is taken to mean "distinctively/essentially characterized by". This does not, of course, imply that the latter meaning should automatically be applied to the controversial passage ⓧ as well, but it nevertheless explodes the fixation on "produced" as the only candidate.

451.0. In accordance with his narrowing down the semantic range of *prabhāvita* in the Saṁdh to the meaning "produced", Matsumoto (M1: 212a6-12) takes the reasoning employed by the sūtra in support of ⓣ to consist of

1. a reductive statement ⓨ ("A is only B"), and
2. a causal one ⓧ ("A has been produced from B").

He tries to substantiate this interpretation with a structural argument based on parallelizing ⓨ and ⓧ with two passages from other texts.[2055] These passages are taken to be comparable to the passage under discussion in that in order to characterize the world or external phenomena they make use of the expression '*cittamātra*' which is both formally and semantically close to '*vijñaptimātra*', and in that they too contain or, according to Matsumoto, at least imply a similar combination of a reductionist and a causal statement.

[2054] See §§ 358 and 361.

[2055] In addition, Matsumoto (M1: 211b1f) adduces, in this connection, *Chāndogya-Upaniṣad* VI.2.1, but it appears rather hazardous to interpret Saṁdh VIII.7 in terms of a source from a remote period and an entirely different ambience.

451.1. The first passage Matsumoto adduces in this connection (M1: 211a) is *Daśabhūmikasūtra* (DBhS) 6E:

[A20] *cittamātram idaṁ yad idaṁ traidhātukam.*

This clearly means:

[A20-tr] This, viz. this triple world,[2056] is nothing but mind.

This is also accepted by Matsumoto, but at the same time he *interprets* this statement to mean that the phenomenal world is merely a false appearance that has been *produced by* mind.[2057] This interpretation he (M1: 211b7-12) finds confirmed by the Chinese rendering of the passage in Buddhabhadra's translation of the *Avataṁsakasūtra* as

"the three [world-]spheres are illusory, they are merely *produced* by the mind"[2058]

and by Buddhaśānta's analogous translation of the quotation of the DBhS passage in MSg II.7.1.[2059]

451.2. The second passage adduced by Matsumoto (M1: 211b) is *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Laṅk) III.32,[2060] where *cittamātram* (32d) occurs side by side with *cittasaṁbhavam* (32b):

[A21] *vikalpavāsanābaddhaṁ vicitraṁ cittasaṁbhavam* |
bahir ākhyāyate nṛṇāṁ[2061] *cittamātraṁ hi laukikam* ||

The exact meaning of this verse is not without problems,[2062] but it seems justified to derive from it, with Matsumoto, a characterization of the multifarious phenomena of ordinary ex-

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[2056] *traidhātuka* (n.) is, pace WAYMAN 1996: 453f, doubtless a collective noun formed by substantivizing the adjective *traidhātuka* "comprising the three [world] spheres" (see *AiGr* II.2: 529f). Cf. Aṣṭ 78,12, where *tryadhvatraidhātukāparyāpannatvād* sums up the preceding reference to the three times and the three world spheres (Aṣṭ 78,10f: *aparyāpannaṁ kāmadhātau, aparyāpannam rūpadhātau, aparyāpannaṁ ārūpyadhātau* ...), and the explanations in Sār 62,27f: *adhvatraye dhatutraye cânantargatatvād ity arthaḥ* and AAĀ$_V$ 393,22: *kāmādidhātutrayasyânupalambhāt*). For *traidhātuka* (n.) as a collective noun cf. also AKVy 5,29 (*saṁsaranty asmin sattvā iti saṁsāras traidhātukam*); 318,17 (*saṁbhavaiṣiṇaḥ ... traidhātuke saṁbhavaiṣitvāt*); 431,23 and 26; 648, 24 and 27.

[2057] M1: 211a14-18: しかし、「これは、心だけである」という主張は、「これ」という現象的世界は、虚妄なものであって、それは実在する「心」だけから生じたもの、あるいは、「心」だけが作りだしたものである、ということを、当然含意する。"However, the statement 'This here is only mind' naturally implies that 'this here', i.e., the phenomenal world, is something delusive, that it is something that has merely arisen from the really existent 'mind', or that it is something that only the 'mind' has produced" (my transl.).

[2058] T 9.278: 558c10: 三界虚妄 但是心作. Cf. also the Tibetan translation (DBhS$_t$ Phal-chen P li 109a7; S vol. 31: 139a6) of the corresponding gāthā line (DBhS$_K$ 108,2), where *cittamātra* is rendered as "arisen from the mind as [its] cause" (*sems kyi rgyu las byung ba*), in contrast to the prose where we have *sems tsam* (DBhS$_t$ Phal-chen P li 103a8; S vol. 31: 131b1; mDo S vol. 54: 86b3).

[2059] T 31.1592: 101a19f: 三界唯心作.

[2060] Laṅk 154,3-4; cf. also X.486.

[2061] The cadence ⏑–⏑x in uneven pādas is characteristic of the Vedic anuṣṭubh but not usual in later literature. Laṅk X.486 has *bahirdhā jāyate nṝṇāṁ*; I would suggest emending to *bahirdhā khyāyate nṝṇāṁ*. Actually, *khyāyate* ("appears") is supported by Tib. (Laṅk$_t$ P ngu 128b1f ≈ 193a1f) *snang* as well as by Guṇabhadra's (T 16.670: 500b9) 現 and Bodhiruci's (T 16.671: 543c7) and Śikṣānandas's (T 16.672: 610a5) 見. For Guṇabhadra, Tokiwa (2003: 210,1) presupposes a reading **vikalpa-vāsanā-vṛttaṁ* on the basis of the transmitted text 妄想習氣轉, but I consider it more probable that 轉 is a transmissional mistake for 縛 as found in the other Chinese versions.

perience as both arising from the mind (*cittasaṁbhava*) and being nothing but mind (*cittamātra*).

451.3. Even so, one may ask to what extent the two passages are strong enough to support an analogous structure for the Saṁdh passage under discussion. In the Laṅk passage, the structure is, to be sure, sufficiently explicit, but the text is almost certainly later than the Saṁdh; at any rate, I am not aware of any demonstrable influence of the Laṅk on the Saṁdh (or any other pre-Vasubandhu Yogācāra text). On the other hand, the DBhS is, to be sure, earlier than and familiar to the Saṁdh, but as pointed out by Matsumoto the causal aspect is, in the passage adduced, not explicit but at best implied.

452.1. There is, however, another instance of a juxtaposition of phrases of causality and identity, not mentioned by Matsumoto, and one at that which is immediately connected not only with the expression *cittamātra* but also with an object visually perceived in meditative concentration, viz., in the *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṁmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra* (PratyS), which was translated into Chinese by Lokakṣema and Chu Fo-shuo 竺佛朔 as early as 179 C.E.[2063] In its third chapter, this sūtra deals with visions of the Buddha Amitāyus attained in meditative concentration, and in connection with these visions the bodhisattva is stated to realize that this triple world (**traidhātuka*) is nothing but mind (**cittamātra*).[2064] Subsequently the meditation experience is interpreted as follows:

[A22] *sems kyis sangs rgyas byed pa ste* || *sems nyid kyis kyang mthong ba 'o* ||
sems nyid nga yi sangs rgyas te || *sems nyid de bzhin gshegs pa 'o* ||
sems nyid nga yi lus yin te || ... (PratyS ## 3O.1a–2a)[2065]

[A22]-tr By the mind is the Buddha produced, and by the mind only is he seen. The Buddha is only my mind, the Tathāgata is only mind (**cittam eva tathāgataḥ*). My body [too] is only mind, ...[2066]

2062 Both ancient (see fn. 2061) and modern translations differ considerably; for the latter, cf., apart from Matsumoto's rendering (MI: 211b), SUZUKI 1973 ([1]1932): 133, slightly improved in SUTTON 1991: 200,5-8 and TOKIWA 1994: 163,2f (Jap.). Provisionally, I would translate the verse as follows:

"Entailed by the imprint [left by previous] imagination, a diverse [variety of phenomena], [though] arisen from the mind, appears to [ordinary] people as if it were outside: [this is], indeed, 'nothing but mind' [on the] mundane [level]."

My translation of pāda d is in accordance with the Tibetan version and Guṇabhadra. Most translators take *laukikaṁ* as the Subj and *cittamātram* as PredN ("..., since what[ever] is mundane is mind only"). Thus also Matsumoto, who somewhat surprisingly construes the main verb *(ā)khyāyate* as an attribute of *laukikam* (... 顕現している世間的なものは、心だけ ... である。).

2063 HARRISON 1990: 270. Cf. also ibid.: 232f and 247–249.

2064 PratyS # 3L (see § 576.1).

2065 According to HARRISON 1990: 234, in Lokakṣema's original translation these verses were rendered as prose, and a versified version was added only in a somewhat later redaction. Actually, the prose paragraph corresponding to the verses (viz., 3N) contains equivalent statements.

2066 Modified from HARRISON 1990: 43f. Against Tib., T 13.416: 877b6, 417: 899b28f and 418: 906a2, I take, in pādas 1cd and 2a, the **cittam eva* of the presumable Sanskrit original as the PredN, as does T 13.419: 923a3f in the case of 1d (如來但意耳) and 2a (及我身意也) though apparently not in the case of 1c (provided that I am right in punctuating after 但是我意為佛). In pāda 1c, I follow T 13.416: 877b6 (我心是佛) and 419: 923a3 (但是我意為佛: "only[1] my mind makes [/turns into, appears as] the Buddha") in construing the possessive pronoun with *citta*. In pāda 2a, on the other hand, I have construed the possessive pronoun with **kāya* in accordance with Tib., T 418: 906a2 and T 419: 923a4,

Later on, the text adds that "all these dharmas are insubstantial, arisen from imagination" (*asārakā ime dharmāḥ manyanāyāḥ samutthitāḥ*).[2067]

452.2. Viewed from the context in which the concept of *cittamātra* occurs here, viz., objects perceived in meditative concentration, this PratyS passage is definitely much closer to our Saṁdh passage than the *cittamātra* passage of the DBhS (which emerges in the context of reflections on the twelve-membered chain of dependent origination). Hence, the juxtaposition, in the PratyS, of statements expressing a causal dependence of the object perceived on the mind and statements expressing its being just mind may indeed be of some importance for our understanding of Saṁdh VIII.7. It is true that no quotation of the PratyS is known from Yogācāra treatises,[2068] but at least the *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* (Laṅk) has incorporated a verse from this sūtra,[2069] and the DBhS[2070] as well as the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*[2071] mention a bodhisattva-*samādhi* named "the one in which all Buddhas of the present are directly encountered" (*pratyutpanna-sarva-buddha-saṁmukhâvasthita*), which looks like a reference to the PratyS or at least to its central idea. Hence, it is by no means impossible that the author(s) of the Saṁdh also had some knowledge of the PratyS. This would hold good all the more if we take into account that the second half of Saṁdh VIII.7[2072] indeed gives the impression of being a refutation of the next step of the PratyS, viz., the deconstruction even of the mind itself[2073] through pointing out the impossibility of reflexive cognitive activity, i.e., of the mind

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but it would also make sense to follow T 13.416: 877b6 in connecting it, ad sensum, with both **kāya* and *citta*.

[1] Cf. *HYD* I 1240a: 但是 = 只是 ("merely, only").

[2067] PratyS # 3O.4ab. Cf. Laṅk X.10ab (where the whole verse 10 has been incorporated [HARRISON 1990: 44]; for the 2nd line see fn. 2073):

asārakā ime dharmā manyanāyāḥ samutthitāḥ |

[2068] See IKEDA 2006: 148.

[2069] See fn. 2067.

[2070] DBhS$_R$ 10B (82,17f; DBhS$_K$ 179,4). Cf. HARRISON 1990: xxiii n. 21.

[2071] Gv 67,13 (see below § 458.3 with fn. 2097).

[2072] Saṁdh VIII.7 (91,6-11; Sanskrit text preserved in PPU # III.5.5.4.1.2 and (second half) in JñN 478,3f; cf. IWATA 2004: 68f):

"Maitreya said: Exalted One! If this image which is the object of meditative concentration (Tib.) is not different from the [respective moment of] mind: how can one [moment of] mind contemplate that very same [moment of] mind? The Exalted One said: Maitreya! There is not, of course, any dharma that contemplates any dharma; rather, that [moment of] mind has arisen in such a way that it appears like that (viz. as the object)."

Maitreya āha | *yadi Bhagavaṁs tadgocaraṁ* (Tib.: *ting nge 'dzin gyi spyod yul*) *pratibimbaṁ tasmāc cittād anyat, kathaṁ tenaîva cittena tad eva cittaṁ pratyavekṣyate* | *Bhagavān āha* | *na hi Maitreya tatra kaścid dharmaḥ*[1] *kaṁcid dharmaṁ pratyavekṣate* | *api tu tathāsamutpannaṁ tac cittaṁ yat tathā khyāti* |

[1] I apologize that the wrong sandhi (*dharmo*) in S 1987: 409 n. 741 (subn. 1) and S 2007a: 240 n. 106 went unnoticed.

[2073] Cf. also PratyS # 3O.4cd: *stong pa nyid las gang rlom pa'i* | *rlom sems de 'dir stong pa yin*, quoted Laṅk X.10cd: *sā 'py atra manyanā śūnyā yayā śūnyêti manyate* ("Even the conception by which one conceives that [the dharmas] are empty is [itself] empty here."). For *śūnyêti*, the ms. used by the Tibetan translators may have read *śūnyatu* (or *-tŏ*), which would mean "... conceives [the dharmas] as empty ..." but seems to have been understood somewhat differently by them.

cognizing itself.[2074] Even so, we must not mechanically superimpose the structure of one text on the other, and we should also reflect for a moment on what the causal relationship, and the words "produced" or "arisen", might actually mean in the present context.

453. To begin with the second point, it should be obvious that at least in the PratyS (and also the Laṅk), "production" and "arising" cannot mean that objects are produced by, or originate from, the mind in a *real* sense, i.e., as entities existing *outside* the mind, be it only for the time of their perception or even so as to continue to exist there even when they are no longer perceived. What is meant is clearly that these objects are produced as mere images or appearances *within* the mind, or as *mere illusions*. In other words: properly speaking, to 'produce' them merely means to create them as appearances, to *make* them *appear*. Only in this way can the object's being 'produced' by mind or 'originating' from the mind be reasonably taken to imply its being nothing but mind, and thus offer a logical clue from which its being nothing but mind can be inferred. Thus, if °*prabhāvita* in ⓧ represents the aspect of production, it may have been chosen deliberately in view of its semantic ambiguity, comprising as it does the aspect of "produced" as well as that of "caused to appear" (cf. § 359).

454.0. As regards the contention of a parallelism between the Saṁdh passage under discussion and the passages adduced from the DBhS, the Laṅk and the PratyS, i.e., the combination of a reductive statement (ⓨ) and a causal one (ⓧ), it must be examined how this could work in the argumentative frame of the Saṁdh passage. In view of the presumable presence of the particle *hi* in ⓧ, which is also presupposed by Matsumoto, a simple juxtaposition of two independent reasons for the thesis ⓣ (viz., the thesis that the image which is the object of meditative concentration is not different/separate from mind) would seem to be excluded.[2075] Therefore, in [M], ⓧ can only have

a) the function of justifying the ascription of the reason set forth in ⓨ to the logical subject (in technical terminology: the *pakṣadharmatā*), or

b) the function of establishing the *vyāpti*, i.e., the fact that the reason set forth in ⓨ indeed implies the property to be proved.

1. In the first case, the argumentation as a whole could have the form

[A23] ⓣ S is A, ⓨ because S is B, ⓧ for (**hi*) S, being C, is B (and therefore A),

with the emphasis of ⓧ being on the argument as such. But ⓧ would also make sense if its purport is merely the confirmation of ⓨ by the authority of the Buddha:

[2074] PratyS # 3O.3: "Mind [can]not cognize mind, mind [can]not perceive mind (**cittaṁ cittaṁ na jānāti,*[1] *cittaṁ cittaṁ na paśyati*). The idea of mind (i.e., the idea that mind, after all, really exists) is ignorance (*ajñāna*). ..." (*sems kyis sems ni mi shes shing* || *sems kyis sems ni mi mthong ngo* || *sems su 'du shes mi shes yin* || ...). Cf. also # 3O.2d: "The mind itself is without own-being" (*sems nyid rang bzhin med pa 'o*), though not represented in the prose of the Chinese versions (HARRISON 1990: 44 n. 29).

[1] Cf. Aṣṭ 76,4, but missing in the older versions: KARASHIMA 2011: 139f n. 95.

[2075] The situation is, of course, different in the quotation of our Saṁdh passage in the MSg, where ⓨ is missing. In this version, ⓧ can only be the reason directly justifying ⓣ, and can, if we presuppose [M], to my mind only mean that the objective support (**ālambana*) is [not different from] awareness (**vijñāna* = mind, *citta*) *either* because it is 'produced' (= made to appear: § 453) by [the act of] cognition/representation only *or* because it consists in a mere representation = appearance (**vijñaptimātraprabhāvita*), the two alternatives not necessarily being mutually exclusive but also able to be conceived of as complementary perspectives (cf. the proposal made in § 454.2.3.1).

[A24] ⓣ S is A, ⓨ because S is B; ⓧ for (*hi*) there is incontrovertible evidence (i.e., an explicit *buddhavacana*) that S is B (and therefore A).

In both [A23] and [A24], ⓧ may, moreover, be taken to be formulated either with specific reference to the S of ⓣ only (i.e., with reference to the object visualized in meditative concentration only), or in a general sense (i.e., with reference to objects of sensory or cognitive awareness in general).

2. In the second case, the argumentation could be formalized thus:

[A25] ⓣ S is A, ⓨ because S is B; ⓧ for (*hi*) there is incontrovertible evidence (/a *buddhavacana*) that whatever is B is also A.

454.1. Since Matsumoto interprets ⓨ and ⓧ as a reductive statement and a causal statement, respectively, it seems that he takes ⓧ to provide an additional argument for the ascription of the reason set forth in ⓨ to the subject. In other words: that he understands the argumentation as a whole basically in terms of pattern [A23]. This is in accord with his contention (cf. § 356.1) that ⓧ, being an argument in support of ⓨ, should have the same grammatical (and, *a fortiori*, logical) subject, a contention that implies, if I understand him correctly, that **ālambana* must be taken to refer to the image which is the object of meditative concentration (M1: 157a–b), and that accordingly **vijñāna*, equivalent to *citta*, must be the mind in meditative concentration, i.e., the **citta* of ⓣ. In this regard, Matsumoto's interpretation agrees with the explanation given by the MSgBh (see §§ 348.2.1 and 409) and perhaps with the way it was understood by the author of the MSg itself (cf. § 348.2.2). Slightly formalized, the line of argumentation in the Saṁdh as reconstructed and understood (see § 443: [M]-tr(M)) by Matsumoto would then run like this (obj^c = the object of meditative concentration; $mind^c$ = the mind in meditative concentration):

ⓣ: obj^c is not different from $mind^c$,

ⓨ: because obj^c is nothing but *vijñapti*,

ⓧ(M): for (**hi*) obj^c, which has been produced (**prabhāvita*) by nothing but *vijñapti*, is awareness (= $mind^c$) — thus have I (= the Buddha) taught.

454.2.0. Yet to my mind the logical structure of this line of argumentation is not without problems.

454.2.1. If ⓧ is meant as an argument backing up ⓨ by presenting a subsidiary reason for obj^c being indeed nothing but *vijñapti*, would one not expect this subsidiary reason to be introduced as that, i.e., *as a reason*, and as new information at that, instead of being presented in the form of a mere attribute of the subject, suggesting its being already familiar from the preceding context? Now, this problem could be solved by taking the expression "produced by nothing but *vijñapti*" in a predicative function with a causal connotation, as is suggested anyway in view of its position (see § 444):

[M]-tr(S1) ⓧ: for (*hi*) obj^c, (because of) being produced by nothing but *vijñapti*, is awareness (= $mind^c$) — thus have I (= the Buddha) taught.

454.2.2. Still, there is one more problem. If ⓧ is intended as a subsidiary argument backing up the primary argument presented in ⓨ, viz., that obj^c is not different from $mind^c$ because it is nothing but *vijñapti*, the immediate *sādhyadharma* of ⓧ would be the (visualized) object's being nothing but *vijñapti*, and its being not different from $mind^c$ would result from this argumentative step only indirectly, on the strength of ⓨ. It would thus, to be sure, by no means be out of place to conclude argument ⓧ with the statement that obj^c is (hence) not different from $mind^c$, but this would be optional and should at any rate be

preceded by a statement to the effect that because of the subsidiary reason, viz., being *produced by* nothing but *vijñapti*, obj^c has indeed the property that functions as the primary reason, viz., *being* nothing but *vijñapti*. However, in ⓧ as understood by Matsumoto this *crucial* step of the argument is *missing*, whereas the *optional* conclusion that sums up the result of the argumentation as a whole is there.

454.2.3. From the point of view of Matsumoto's understanding of ⓧ, the only way to cope with this logical defect that comes to my mind would be to simply assume an ellipsis of the intermediate link (viz., *being vijñaptimātra*), however improbable such an omission may be. I could think of several other solutions, which, however, involve a somewhat different interpretation and will hence hardly meet with Matsumoto's approval.

1. One possibility would be to give up Matsumoto's restriction of the meaning of *prabhāvita* to "produced" and to take it in a broader sense, assuming that it may have been chosen deliberately to include both the aspect (I) of "produced" (in the sense of "made to appear") and the aspect (II) of "being distinctively/essentially characterized as", or "having the nature of":

> M -tr(S2) ⓧ: for (**hi*) obj^c, (because of) being [not an external thing but] produced (= made to appear) by cognition only (*vijñaptimātra-prabhāvita*^{I}) and hence essentially characterized as a mere appearance (*vijñaptimātra-prabhāvita*^{II}), is [just] awareness (i.e., not different from mind^c) — thus have I (= the Buddha) taught.

2. Another possibility (though perhaps not the most natural one) is to take *vijñānam* as representing not the *citta* of ⓣ but rather the *vijñaptimātra* of ⓨ:[2076]

> M -tr(S3) ⓧ: for (**hi*) obj^c, (because of) being *produced by* cognition (*vijñapti*) only, *is* [nothing but] awareness (i.e., *is* a mere appearance, *vijñaptimātra*) [and therefore not different from mind^c] — thus have I (= the Buddha) taught.

3. Still another possibility might be to understand ⓧ not as a subsidiary argument backing up ⓨ (i.e., in terms of [A23]) but as providing incontrovertible evidence (in this case: the Buddha's authority) either for ⓨ, i.e., for obj^c being nothing but *vijñapti* ([A24]) or for the *vyāpti*, i.e., for the fact that the *hetu* "is *vijñaptimātra*" (ⓨ) invariably implies the *sādhya-dharma* "is (not separate from) mind" (ⓣ) ([A25]). In this case, however, it is obvious that in order to secure a lucid logical structure we would have to understand *vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* in ⓧ as practically equivalent to *vijñaptimātra* in ⓨ, i.e., we would have to take °*prabhāvita* exclusively in the sense of "distinctively/essentially characterized as", practically amounting to "consisting in":

> M -tr(S4) ⓧ: For (**hi*) *I (= the Buddha) have taught* that the object (obj^c or any object), [because of] consisting in nothing but *vijñapti* (representation, appearance), is [not different from the respective moment of] awareness (*vijñāna* = mind, *citta*).

This means that understood in this way ⓧ, even in the form it has in M, would not contain a causal statement but only back up the reductive statement of ⓨ with the authority of the Buddha.

455.1. In connection with Matsumoto's insistence on restricting the meaning of *prabhāvita* in ⓧ to "produced", one more problem requires discussion, viz., the fact that, even though suggesting, in ⓧ, the translation "cognition" for *vijñapti*, he tends to reject, at least in the case of Vijñānavāda texts, an understanding of *vijñapti* as denoting the subjective act of cognition

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[2076] As the translator of **TH** may have done (see § 381.1).

or representation in favour of a resultative-objective meaning, corresponding to "representation" in the sense of "appearance".[2077] But as long as we confine *prabhāvita* to the meaning "produced", even in the sense of "made to appear", *vijñapti* in the compound *vijñaptimātra-prabhāvita* can hardly mean "appearance". It would seem that the object can be produced, or made to appear, only by (or: in) an *act* or event of cognition or representation but hardly by the appearance which is the result of this act or event; for this result, this appearance, is the object itself, as that which appears or is made to appear.

455.2. The idea that the object is produced by a *vijñapti* in the resultative sense, i.e, by an appearance, would make sense only if the object is the product of *another* appearance. In later Vijñānavāda philosophy, the object appearing, e.g., in a sense-perception is somehow conditioned and prefigured by the corresponding object appearing in the *ālayavijñāna* or, according to the terminology of the Saṁdh, *ādānavijñāna*. But although the *ādānavijñāna* as an unconscious representation of the surrounding world is mentioned in the VIII[th] chapter of the Saṁdh (37.1.1),[2078] it would seem hazardous to postulate the full-fledged epistemological development of later texts for the Saṁdh passage under discussion, and even in the later system this may not work in the case of the deliberately visualized objects of meditative concentration.[2079]

455.3. Hence, as long as the meaning of *prabhāvita* is limited to "produced", *vijñapti* in ⓧ should be taken in an active sense, i.e., as "cognition" or "act/event of making appear", and not in the resultative-objective sense of "appearance". To understand it in the latter sense would only be possible if the compound **vijñaptimātraprabhāvita* is not taken in the usual way, viz., as an instrumental-tatpuruṣa (which is also the way Matsumoto takes it: cf. § 443, 🄼-tr(M): 表識のみ...によって) but rather as what one may call an 'essive'-tatpuruṣa: "produced *as* a mere appearance". In this case, however, I fail to see how the information to be gleaned from the expression would significantly go beyond characterizing the object or image as something that is merely an appearance and not something 'outside' (since the *mere fact* of its having been 'produced', i.e., made to emerge, is self-evident). This, however, would jeopardize the interpretation of ⓧ as providing a further reason backing up the primary reason set forth in ⓨ, viz., *being* a mere representation = appearance.

456.0. What would still be possible is to interpret ⓧ in terms of [A24], i.e., as merely backing up the statement of ⓨ with an explicit reference to the authority of the Buddha. This leads me to the last issue to be discussed, viz., Matsumoto's contention[2080] that the Buddha's utterance to which ⓧ alludes is the *cittamātra* passage of the DBhS (see § 451.1: [A20]). I do not deny that this passage is one of the sources that had a decisive influence on the *vijñaptimātra* position set forth in Saṁdh VIII.7–8 (see § 458.1), but I doubt that is was the only one, and I also doubt that it was the most influential one as far as the specific phraseology of ⓧ is concerned.

456.1. As a support for his assumption, Matsumoto (M1: 169a) points out that the same connection is made by Paramārtha in his commentary on MSg II.7. Probably influenced by

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[2077] Cf. M1: 192f (see § 437.1(b) with § 438.2.2); 218a (where Matsumoto is right: see § 357.3). Cf. also Pt. I § 241.2.1.

[2078] See Pt. I § 309.2 and Pt. IV § 581.3.

[2079] Cf. S 2005: 42 n. 82.

[2080] M1: 160a20–b3; 160b19-22; 168b15-18.

the fact that the MSgBh introduces both sūtra quotations (DBhS 6E and Saṁdh VIII.7) as corrobor ting the thesis th t this [triple world (*traidhātuka*)] is nothing but awareness (**vijñānamātram idam*),[2081] Paramārtha, on the one hand, renders the key phrase of the DBhS, in accordance with this formulation, as "as regards the three spheres, there is only *awareness* (**vijñānamātra* instead of *cittamātra*)".[2082] On the other hand, in the case of the Saṁdh quotation he finds the very same thesis expressed in the second half of ⓧ, which he therefore places in front (see § 390), rendering it with precisely the same phrase: "I have declared *that there is only* awareness".[2083] It is probably this (deliberately constructed) identity of the wording of the two statements that makes Paramārtha ask why the author of the MSg, in order to prove his position to be in accordance with the teaching of the Buddha, quotes *two* scriptures.[2084] His answer is that the first statement (DBhS 6E) is a concise formulation, and the second (Saṁdh VIII.7) its elaboration. The latter statement at the same time is verified by the former.[2085] This may well mean that Paramārtha takes ⓧ to substantiate the specific case of the objects visualized in meditative concentration being ' wareness only' by means of a reference to the general statement as set forth in the DBhS, from which the specific statement can be deduced. But one should not lose sight of the fact that Paramārtha is, in the first place, an exegete and a thinker with his own ideas, and not a historian.

456.2.1. It must be conceded, however, that Paramārtha's rigid splitting of ⓧ into two separate syntactical units (with no common Subj) avoids a difficulty that emerges if ⓧ is reconstructed in terms of [M] and taken as a syntactical unit, as is the case in Matsumoto's interpretation ([M] tr(M): see § 443); for in spite of his emphasis on a bipartite structure he nonetheless understands *vijñānam* as a PredN with *ālambanam* as the Subj. Since he, however, insists on the identity of the Subj in the whole argumentation (ⓣⓨⓧ) and consequently takes *ālambanam* in the specific sense of the object of meditative concentration, i.e., the visualized image (see § 454.1), the connection of the (possible) reference to a former dictum of the Buddha with the *cittamātra* passage of the DBhS becomes problematic. For in contrast to ⓧ the context of DBhS 6E is not the images visualized in meditative concentration but origination in dependence (*pratītya-samutpāda*), and the Subj of the PredN *cittamātra* is the whole world.

456.2.2. Moreover, in the DBhS the *cittamātra* sentence,[2086] judged from its immediate context, may, at least at face-value, not be directed against the existence of an external world but rather be intended to indicate that the saṁsāric world is merely mind (*citta*) in the sense of functioning with the fluctuating mind-series alone as the 'subject' of karmic action and experience, without a permanent, substantial self (*ātman*), as Candrakīrti[2087] and Bhā-

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[2081] MSgBh$_{t}$ P li 171b1: *'di dag ni rnam par shes pa tsam mo*. See fn. 1975.

[2082] MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 182c1f: 三界者 唯有識.

[2083] MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 182c13f: 我說唯有識.

[2084] MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 182c3f: 何故 引二阿含 明聖教。

[2085] MSgBh$_{Pa}$ 182c4f: 前是略說, 後是廣說。即以前證後。

[2086] It would exceed the limits of this paper to enter into a discussion of divergent interpretations of this much-discussed passage (see also fn. 2089). For my own understanding, see S 1973: 172–175 (references to earlier literature in n. 37); S 1976a: 244–246 (references: 245 n. 1); S 2009: 141–143.

[2087] MAvat 182,2-18. (S 1973: 174 n. 39; cf. also SEYFORT RUEGG 2002: 203f). See also Vasubandhu's commentary on DBhS 6E-F (see S 1973: 174 n. 40 and S 2009: 145f) and passages like

viveka[2088] explain. However that may be, the passage is anything but explicit and, taken in isolation, in the *wider* context[2089] or against the background of other texts like the PratyS,[2090] it could easily be interpreted in the sense that the three-sphered world (*traidhātuka*) is merely an appearance, as is in fact done in the MSg (II.7) when it is quoted in support of *vijñaptimātratā*. But even if the *cittamātra* passage is taken in this way, the problem remains that such a general statement would not smoothly fit in with Matsumoto's understanding of ⓧ as referring, not only in the MSg but also in the Saṁdh, to the objects of meditative concentration only.

456.3. However, the most serious argument against a primary or even exclusive influence of DBhS 6E on ⓧ is, in my opinion, the striking difference in terminology, which, partly effaced in **Pa**, is nonetheless guaranteed by the other testimonia. As stated before, I do not deny that DBhS 6E was almost certainly one of the major sources of inspiration for Saṁdh VIII.7–8. There can be no doubt that the term *vijñaptimātra* resembles the expression *cittamātra* both structurally and with regard to meaning. One might also point to the fact that at least in the gāthā corresponding to DBhS 6E and 6F we have a striking phraseological parallel insofar as the first quarter rephrases the *cittamātra* sentence, whereas in the third quarter we find the expression *cittuprabhāvita.*[2091] But the third quarter belongs to the interpretation of the twelve-membered *pratītyasamutpāda* as being based on one single [moment of] mind (*ekacittasamāśrita*),[2092] an idea which is alien to ⓧ and its context, and apart from this the DBhS gāthā line containing the word *prabhāvita* is rather enigmatic and,

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Laṅk 80,7, etc., AS$_{G}$ 29,26-28 and SAVBh P tsi 123a8–b1 (see S 1973: 174 ns. 40 and 41). For the YBh, cf. ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 490,21–491,1 (see S 1987: 297 n. 221); similarly YBh$_{t}$ P zi 70b2-4 (YBh$_{c}$ 605a9-12). In the same sense probably also YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 185b2-5 (D zi 163a3-6; YBh$_{c}$ 788c10-15: VaSg I.5.vi): One is not afraid that one's self might be annihilated in Nirvana if one knows that only one's mind (**cittamātra*) continues being polluted if involved in the four *vijñānasthiti*s and that due to abandoning them only one's mind will cease and not be polluted any longer.

[2088] MHṛd V.28cd: "In the sūtra, 'mind only' has been taught as a negation of a [substantial, permanent] agent and subject of experience" (*sūtre ca cittamātroktiḥ kartṛbhoktṛniṣedhataḥ*)[1]; according to the *Tarkajvālā*, reference is to DBhS 6E, and what is negated is an agent and subject of experience that is different from *vijñāna*, as non-Buddhists imagine (HOORNAERT 2001: 150 and 168f; ECKEL 2008: 404f and 242f). In *Prajñāpradīpa* ch. 25 (LINDTNER 1984: 89,22–90,3), Bhāviveka interprets the *cittamātra* sentence as rejecting the existence of a divine Lord (*īśvara*) who acts as the creator of the world. A non-'idealist' interpretation of DBhS 6E is also implied in Śubhagupta's argument (*Bāhyārthakārikā* 59f: see MIMAKI 1988) when he argues that even on the eighth *bhūmi* the bodhisattva still perceives the atoms of the various regions of the world in all their details, including their number.

[1] Text in accordance with HOORNAERT 2001: 150; LINDTNER 2001: 61 reads *sūtreṣu* but remarks on p. 158 that the ms. reads *śāstreva*, which is more easily emended (with Tib. *mdo las*) to *sūtre ca*. Eckel (2008: 404) follows Lindtner but reads *cittamātroktikartṛbhoktṛniṣedhitaḥ*, which sounds problematic.

[2089] Cf. S 2009: 142 with n. 393. For a detailed and innovative (albeit somewhat complicated and speculative) proposal of an interpretation in the wider context of sixth chapter of the DBhS, see MUROJI 2001a and 2001b.

[2090] Cf. also a passage like Aṣṭ 188,29 (Aṣṭ$_{L}$ 459b26 [KARASHIMA 2011: 355,8f]; cf. Pañcav$_{K}$ V 2,8): *svapnopamam idaṁ sarvaṁ traidhātukam.*

[2091] DBhS$_{K}$ 108,2: *te cittamātra ti traidhātukam otaranti* (gāthā 5a), and 108,4: *saṁrāgajātu api cittuprabhāvitas tu* (gāthā 5c).

[2092] DBhS$_{R}$ 49,12f (DBhS$_{K}$ 98,9f).

as far as I can see, not concerned with the nature of the objective support of the mind.[2093] The main problem is, however, the shift from *cittamātra* in DBhS 6E to *vijñaptimātra* in Saṁdh VIII.7, which cannot be explained on the basis of the DBhS alone (nor on the basis of the PratyS) and would seem to require a different — or rather: more complex — solution. Such a solution should also explain the somewhat surprising shift from *pratibimba* / *gocara* and *citta* in the preceding (and also in the following) sentences of Saṁdh VIII.7–8 to *ālambana* and *vijñāna*, respectively, in ⓧ — a shift that cannot be explained on the basis of DBhS 6E either.

9. Reformulation of my own Proposal

457. In view of the preceding re-examination of the evidence and considering the problems involved in the alternative proposals, I am still confident that my own reconstruction of ⓧ, viz. [S], is not only better supported by the testimonia, especially if they are weighed according to their reliability, but also presents less problems than [M] and [B], and in particular enables us to explain the shift of terminology in ⓧ.

458.0. Let me first assemble the pertinent materials which must or at least may have been available to the author(s) of our Saṁdh passage:

458.1. Matsumoto is surely right in taking the familiarity of the author(s) of our passage with the *Daśabhūmikasūtra* for granted, since this text is presupposed by the IX[th] chapter of the Saṁdh and is also a source of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh), which in its turn must precede the Saṁdh (see § 458.4). We can thus safely assume that the *cittamātra* passage of DBhS 6E was known to the author(s) of ⓧ, and the same can be taken for granted, in view of its attestation by Dharmarakṣa,[2094] also for the corresponding verse (see § 456.3)

[2093] The prose sentence to which this line corresponds merely says that when a thought (*citta*) associated with passion (*rāga*) arises with regard to some object, this [thought] is the *vijñāna* (i.e., the third member of the twelve-membered formula of origination in dependence) ($DBhS_K$ 98,10f: *yasmiṁ vastuni rāgasaṁyuktaṁ cittam utpadyate tad vijñānam*). It is, however, not easy to see how the verse quarter under discussion might be understood in a similar sense. The majority of the Chinese versions seem to be based on a different wording since they take the line to mean that (the whole of) birth-and-death (**saṁsāra*?) has arisen, or has been produced, from the mind (cf., e.g., Kumārajīva [T 10.286: 516b4]: ... 生死 但從心而出; Śikṣānanda [T 10.279: 195b18]: 生死皆由心所作). This may support an understanding of *prabhāvita* in the sense of "produced" but does not fit in with the corresponding prose, which corroborates (*saṁ*)*rāga*, confirmed not only by the Tibetan version ($DBhS_t$ 'Phal-chen P li 109a7f [S vol. 31: 139a7]: *'dod chags skyes pa de las sems su brjod*) but also by the oldest Chinese translation, the one by Dharmarakṣa: "Arisen from passion, mind proceeds (or: acts) also like that" (T 10.285: 477c22: 從貪婬而生 心行亦如之(/是)). Even so, the Sanskrit is fraught with uncertainties: we could read *cittuprabhāvitas* as a compound (*BHSG* # 8.13) or as two words (*cittu prabhāvitas*), and not only (°)*prabhāvita* (Chin. "arisen", "produced", against Tib. "designated") but also °*jātu* admits of different interpretations ("arisen from", "full of", "the whole mass of"). Very tentatively, I suggest translating the passage like this:

> "And what is specified/taught as 'mind' [in this connection] is [the mind that is] full of passion."

As an alternative, less close, to be sure, to the prose sentence but perhaps equally meaningful in the context of declaring the mind to be the primary factor in saṁsāric existence (cf. AS_G 29,26-28), the following translation may be worth considering:

> "Also the whole mass of passion [and other defilements] has emerged (/been produced) from the mind [alone, and not from a substantial self]."

[2094] Active during the second half of the third century AD: ZACCHETTI 2005: 3.

458.2. The *cittamātra* sentence occurs in other texts as well, the oldest one — as far as I can see — and perhaps its original source being the PratyS (see § 452.1). It is true that the early attestation of this text does not guarantee that it was known to the author(s) of Saṁdh VIII since it may have circulated in a different ambience. Still, in view of the clues pointed out in § 452.2 some acquaintance with it is not unlikely. To what extent familiarity with or at least the atmospheric influence of other Mahāyāna sūtras that either make use of the *citta-mātra* sentence[2095] or proclaim the idea that the world, or saṁsāric existence, is an illusory effect of the mind (*citta*)[2096] can be presupposed, may be still more difficult to decide.

458.3. Of special interest in this connection is, however, a passage in the eighth chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, describing Sudhana's encounter with the guild-leader Muktaka. In this passage, which shows some similarity to the third chapter of the PratyS,[2097] Muktaka declares that in a special kind of meditative concentration (*samādhi*)[2098] he is able to see whichever Tathāgata living in other world systems he wants to see:[2099] Amitābha in Sukhāvatī,[2100] or whomever. At the same time, he is aware of the fact that these Tathāgatas do not come here and that he himself does not go there.[2101] He knows them to be rather appearances (*vijñapti*) comparable to a dream, to a reflected image or to a body created by magic, appearances that are dependent on his own mind (*svacitta*), which in its turn appears [to function] (or: makes [them] appear) (*vijñapti*) in a way that can be compared to walking around (?) as in a dream, to a vessel filled with clear water, or to [an act of] magic or conjury, respectively.[2102] If this passage did exist in its present form at the time of the composition of Saṁdh VIII,[2103] it may well have contributed to the choice of the expression *vijñaptimātra* instead of *cittamātra*, and perhaps also to the use of *vijñapti* in a passive-objective sense in ⓨ and (as one aspect) also in ⓧ (see § 357.5).

[2095] See Pt. IV §§ 578.2.1–578.2.2.

[2096] Like the '*Suyāma gāthā*s' (see Pt. IV § 578.2.3).

[2097] Cf. the reference to the *pratyutpannasarvabuddha...saṁmukhāvasthitasamādhi* in Gv 67,13.

[2098] Gv 64,20f (*sarvakṣetrasamavasaraṇaṁ nāma ... bodhisattvasamādhimukhaṁ samāpadyata*); 65,21 (*tasmāt samādher vyutthāya*).

[2099] Gv 66,27: ... *yaṁ yaṁ tathāgataṁ draṣṭum ākāṅkṣāmi, taṁ tam eva tathāgataṁ paśyāmi.*

[2100] Gv 66,18f: *yasyāṁ ca velāyām icchāmi, tasyāṁ velāyāṁ Sukhāvatyāṁ lokadhātāv Amitābhaṁ tathāgataṁ paśyāmi.*

[2101] Gv 66,28: *na ca te tathāgatā ihâgacchanti, na câhaṁ tatra gacchāmi.*

[2102] Gv 66,29-32: *svapnopamavijñaptiṁ ca tathāgatānāṁ prajānan, svapnasamavicāravijñaptiṁ* ⟨*ca*?⟩ *svacittasya prajānan, pratibhāsasamavijñaptiṁ ca tathāgatānāṁ prajānan, acchodakabhājanavijñap-tiṁ ca svacittasya prajānan, māyākṛtavijñaptiṁ ca tathāgatānāṁ prajānan, māyopamavijñaptiṁ ca svacittasya prajānan*, ... | For a Japanese translation of the passage see KAJIYAMA (ed.) 1994: I 150,13-16. Cf. also NAMAI 1995: 874,1-5 and GRANOFF 1998: 361. My rendering of the meaning of *vicāra* in this passage is tentative (cf. also the parallels in Gv 369,13f and 29), and a clarification of precisely what is meant by *vijñapti* here (my rendering is admittedly provisional) would require a systematic investigation of the other occurrences of this expression in the Gv, where it is by no means rare.

[2103] Actually, the Chinese translations, especially the older ones (T 9.278: 695a3-5; T 10.279: 339c28–340a1; cf. also T 10.293: 687c21-24) have a much simpler text, in which *vijñapti* is not represented (cf. VETTER 2004: 65). But it depends very much on the reliability of the translators whether it is safe to conclude, in the case of such complicated passages, that they had a simpler text before them or whether their translations are more likely simplifying or even tentative ad-sensum renderings.

458.4. Since the theory of the three *lakṣaṇa*s and the three *niḥsvabhāvatā*s, developed in the VI[th] and VII[th] chapters of the Saṁdh, would seem to be a systematic development presupposing the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*[2104] and since the Saṁdh in other respects as well represents a more advanced stage of doctrinal development than the BoBh does, I take it for granted that the author of our passage knew the theory of the *Tattvārthapaṭala* according to which the conventional designations (*prajñapti*) applied to things as if corresponding to their specific nature or properties are in reality 'nothing but designations' (*prajñaptimātra*),[2105] with no specific essence corresponding to them in reality, and that True Reality (*vastumātra*, *tathatāmātra*) is beyond speech (*nirabhilāpya*).[2106] In the *Tattvārthapaṭala*, we find, moreover, a theory of mutual conditioning of imaginative mental activity (*vikalpa*) and things (*vastu*) (cf. Pt. I § 303.2), which is also attested in the Saṁdh, where this level of 'things', also called *saṁskāranimitta* (perhaps: phenomena in the sense of conditioned-and-conditioning factors), is distinguished from the entirely fictitious (*parikalpita*) character of things (cf. Pt. I § 304.2). Still, being a product of *vikalpa*, the *saṁskāranimitta*s are not ultimate reality either, but — as is expressly stated in Saṁdh I.5 — comparable to [products of] magic, i.e., illusory (**māyopama*).[2107] From this perspective it is, if their illusory nature is emphasized, only a small step to characterizing them as "nothing but imaginative mental activity" (*vikalpamātra*), as is done in an appendix to the Larger *Prajñāpāramitā* (MaiQ: see Pt. I § 308). If this text, which seems to be referred to already in the *Madhyāntavibhāga* and in the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* (see ibid.), predates Saṁdh VIII, it would, in spite of its different emphasis, seem to come fairly close to a *vijñaptimātratā* position.

458.5.1. In the initial part of chapter VIII, which deals with the practice of calm abiding (*śamatha*) and contemplation (*vipaśyanā*), the Saṁdh introduces a set of categories (viz., *savikalpaṁ pratibimbam*, etc.) which, being presupposed as already known, are obviously taken from the second yogasthāna of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh) where they are introduced and explained in detail.[2108] In connection with a detailed treatment of these categories, the ŚrBh

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2104 See Pt. I §§ 303–304.

2105 Cf. BoBh$_D$ 30,2f; 36,16f; 37,7 and 12. It is worth noting that in these passages the subject predicated with *prajñaptimātra* is (°)*prajñapti*, in contrast to BoBh$_D$ 31,13f and 16, where it is *tattva*, but what is quoted and subsequently refuted in these latter passages is the view of an opponent.

2106 See Pt. I § 303.1.

2107 Saṁdh 38,7f (see Pt. I § 304.2 with fn. 1630).

2108 Most scholars agree with regard to the relative chronology of ŚrBh and Saṁdh; cf., e.g., ARAMAKI 2000: 39 n.2. WAYMAN's (1996: 448f.) assertion of a priority of the Saṁdh is not at all convincing. He merely refers to his review of SAKUMA 1990 in *JAOS* 113.1 (1993): 144, where he takes the mere presence of "virtually the same" passage on the three doors of *vipaśyanā* in the ŚrBh ($_{Sh}$ 367,11–368,9) and in the Saṁdh (VIII.10) as proof for the priority of the latter without taking a closer look at the (quite conspicuous) differences. These, however, clearly show that the version in the Saṁdh is more advanced and technical than the one in the ŚrBh. Likewise, the introduction of the four concepts of *savikalpa pratibimba*, etc., in ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 193,4ff (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 42,1ff; SAKUMA 1990: II 4ff) gives the impression that it is an original contribution because it is accompanied by a detailed and consistent explanation of each of them (193,7–197,17), authorized, in addition, by an extensive sūtra quotation (197,17–200,20), which is, significantly, *not* from the Saṁdh. In contrast to this, in Saṁdh VIII.2 the four categories are introduced as already established notions (... *bzhi po 'di lta ste| rnam par rtog pa dang bcas pa'i gzugs brnyan dang ... zhes gang dag bstan pa,* ...), without any definition or explanation.

quotes a sūtra which cannot be traced in the canon.[2109] This sūtra, which I call the *Revata-sūtra* after the person addressed, describes a similar process of meditative practice, and in this context expressly declares the objects visualized in meditative concentration to be only replicas (*pratirūpaka*) or images (*pratibhāsa*); they are

> nothing but knowing /cognition (*jñānamātra*), nothing but seeing (*darśanamātra*), nothing but recollection (or mindful observation: *pratismṛtamātra*[2110]).[2111]

It is worth noting that the phraseology of this passage is canonical, taken over as it is from the *Smṛtyupasthānasūtra*,[2112] as is confirmed by a quotation, obviously from this sūtra, in the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論).[2113] But in its canonical context, the phrase is used for pointing out that the monk should practise mindfulness merely for the sake of knowing and being mindfully aware[2114] of what he is doing, experiencing or concentrating on, whereas in the *Revatasūtra* the expressions are used to characterize the ontological status of the image or replica the yogi has generated as the object of his meditative concentration.

458.5.2. A similar situation is met with in a passage of the BoBhVin,[2115] where the mutual dependence of things (**vastu*) and verbal expressions (*ming dang brjod pa*) is illustrated, on the one hand, by the fact that in everyday life one observes that only when there are things they can be specified by verbal expressions, and, on the other hand, by the fact that in meditative concentration object-like images (**jñeyavastusabhāgāni pratibimbāni*) emerge in the meditators' mind-continua (**cittasantāna*) in accordance with their respective linguistically structured contemplative acts (**manojalpa-manaskāra*). This text surely also presupposes some dependence on verbal expressions of the things of everyday life,[2116] but does not

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[2109] I.e., a so-called *muktaka-sūtra*.

[2110] ASBh 116,2 reads, in a similar context, *pratismṛtimātra*°, which is also supported by the canonical parallel (see fn. 2112). If *pratismṛta*° were to be kept, the expression could mean "nothing but something remembered", but *pratismṛta* (n.) may also be taken as an action noun. The latter alternative would seem to be preferable in view of the fact that *jñāna* and *darśana* are also action nouns, the purport probably being that the object experienced in contemplative concentration is nothing separate from the act or event of its mental representation, perception or visualizing recollection.

[2111] ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 199,17f; ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 52,19f; SAKUMA 1990: II 12,8f and 109.

[2112] See MN I 56,33 (no. 10): *yāvad-eva ñāṇamattāya paṭissatimattāya* (cf. DN II 292,7). MĀ$_{C}$ 582b23 (no. 98) has four expressions (有知有見 有明有達), the first two of which correspond to *jñāna* and *darśana*, but has no equivalent for °*mātra*.

[2113] HsienY 578a24: 乃至或唯有智 或唯有見 或唯繫念, i.e., **yāvad eva jñānamātrāya vā darśanamātrāya vā pratismṛtimātrāya vā*.

[2114] Slightly different ANĀLAYO 2011: I 78 with n. 261, who suggests "continuity of mindfulness" for *paṭissati*, taking *paṭi-* "in its temporal nuance of 'again'". Perhaps more precisely: again and again, in all situations, whatever he is doing (*pratir vīpsārthaḥ*, cf. AKVy 38,23f).

[2115] YBh$_{t}$ P 'i 23b6–24a2 (D zi 22a1-4; YBh$_{C}$ 704b20-27; TAKAHASHI 2005: 143 and 207f [# 2.7.2.5.2.2]); cf. S 1973: 171f; 1976: 244, but also TAKAHASHI 2005: 67f with n. 58). As for the question whether this piece of text is earlier than Saṁdh VIII.(7–8) and whether, if so, it was known to the author(s) of the latter, I have no answer. But from the point of view of the development of ideas it would seem to me to reflect a slightly earlier stage.

[2116] Cf. the following paragraph of the text (TAKAHASHI 2005: 143f #2.7.2.5.2.3), where it is stated that for one who concentrates his mind on the transphenomenal realm (**ānimitta-dhātāv upanibaddha-cittasya*)[1] that is the antidote (**pratipakṣa*) to verbal expressions all phenomena (**nimitta*) disappear,

necessarily (and at any rate not expressly) equate them with the images visualized in meditative concentration in terms of being mere appearances in the mind continuum.

458.6. Finally, it is hardly conceivable that the author of our passage was not familiar with Abhidharmic definitions of *vijñāna* as *ālambanavijñapti*, etc., as found in the PañcBh and the ManoBh of the YBh (see § 355.1.2), and with the specification of its function as cognizing merely the object as a whole in an overall way in contrast to the mind-associates which concentrate on special features of the object (see § 355.2).

459. Among these texts, the one to which the VIIIth chapter of the Saṁdh, especially in the preceding paragraphs, seems to have the closest relationship is the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. Therefore, there is some probability that the primary point of reference of ⓧ (be it as a former dictum expressly referred to or be it merely as an influential predecessor)[2117] is the *Revatasūtra* (§ 458.5.1). Since what is thematic in this text in the first place is the object (*ālambana*) of meditative concentration, the appearance of this term in ⓧ is easily explicable, the more so since the expressions *samādhigocara*[2118] and *pratibimba* used in the preceding sentences of Saṁdh VIII.7 had also been used in the immediately preceding passage of the ŚrBh in support of which the *Revatasūtra* is quoted. Moreover, the interpretation of this object as "nothing but knowing/cognition" (*jñānamātra*), though not identical with *vijñaptimātra*, uses at least a derivative of the same root *jñā*. But even so we have to ask: why the change from *jñānamātra* to *vijñaptimātra*?

460. My answer to this question is, indeed, hypothetical, and based on a hypothetical reconstruction of the original Sanskrit (S⃞) at that. Still, I hope it is at least consistent and plausible.

460.1. I presume that the author(s) of Saṁdh VIII belonged to a group of meditation specialists[2119] who were closely related to the ambience from which the ŚrBh arose, or at least had the intention to address that ambience. Thus, they can be assumed to have had some knowledge of traditional Abhidharma as well. At the same time, however, they were Mahāyānists familiar with the BoBh as well as with the DBhS and perhaps also further pertinent Mahāyāna sūtras like the PratyS and the *Gaṇḍavyūha*. For this reason, for them not only the objects visualized or experienced in meditative concentration but also the objects of ordinary,

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whereas the mind of one who does not do so[2] is taken along by the phenomena even against his will (*brjod pa'i gnyen po mtshan ma med pa'i dbyings la sems* [DC : om. PN] *nye bar gtod* [Tak. reads *gtong*] *pa'i*[1] *mtshan ma thams cad mi snang bar 'gyur la* | *nye bar mi gtod* [Tak. reads *gtong*] *pa'i sems ni*[2] *mi 'dod bzhin du mtshan ma rnams kyis khrid par 'gyur bas* ...).

[1] YBh$_C$ 704b27f: "when one concentrates one's mind on the *ānimittadhātu*" (若安置心於無相界).

[2] YBh$_C$ 704b28f: "when one does not concentrate one's mind on the *ānimittadhātu*" (若不安心於無相界).

[2117] The purport of this alternative is to take into account the fact that there are two possibilities for reconstructing *zhes ngas bshad do*, viz., either as **(iti) mayoktam* or as **(ity) aham vadāmi*, the latter of which does not necessarily imply a reference to a former dictum. From a historical point of view, however, it does not make much difference whether an explicit reference to a former dictum is involved or not; an explanation of the influences and motives behind the specific formulation of ⓧ is nevertheless required.

[2118] In a lacuna at ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 195,11 to be filled in from Tib. and Ch.: cf. SAKUMA 1990 II: 7 (A.1.3) and ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 46,5.

[2119] I deliberately leave it open to what extent they were actually engaged in contemplative practice or rather in theoretical reflection on it.

everyday experience were unreal. Actually, the author of our passage, perhaps inspired by the PratyS (§ 458.2), quite obviously makes use of the objects experienced in meditative concentration just in order to illustrate the unreality of the objects of everyday experience as well, as becomes clear in Saṁdh VIII.8 (see § 343). I assume that it was precisely for this reason that he *deliberately* formulated ⓧ in such a way that it does not specifically refer to the objects of meditative concentration (as understood in the MSgBh and, probably, already in the MSg)[2120] but *implicitly* suggests an application to objects of experience in general, including everyday experiences as well. It is precisely this implicit generalization that, after the intercalated discussion of the problem of a reflexive cognitive activity of the mind (see § 452.2), makes Maitreya — one can almost sense his (pretended) bewilderment — ask the Buddha whether even the objects of ordinary experience are not different from mind.

460.2. Now, the author of our passage, intending to convince a more traditional (though not antagonistic: cf. VON ROSPATT 2013: 854 with n. 4) audience, was not content with justifying the non-difference of the objects of meditative concentration from the mind through a tautological statement of their being nothing but mind (*cittam eva*, *cittamātra*: §§ 458.1–458.2) and with simply pointing out that this holds good for the whole world, i.e., all objects. Perhaps he also found the expression *cittamātra* to be not sufficiently unambiguous (see § 456.2.2).[2121] Nor could he resort to the nominalist theory of the BoBh according to which

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[2120] See §§ 348.1–348.2 and ch. 5.2. — If the quotation in MSg II.7 were assumed to reflect a shorter, more original version of Saṁdh VIII.7 in which ⓨ was missing, the formulation of ⓧ would, to be sure, on the surface have to be interpreted as referring to the object visualized in meditative concentration only. But even in this case the phraseology is so patently reminiscent of both the expression *prajñaptimātra* of the BoBh and the general definition of *vijñāna* as *ālambanavijñapti* in the PañcBh and the ManoBh that a generalizing application must have been tacitly intended. On the other hand, if ⓨ was part of the Saṁdh text from the outset, the question arises why it was omitted in the MSg. This omission is all the more remarkable in view of the fact that the MSg does not quote the explicit generalization of *vijñaptimātratā* in Saṁdh VIII.8 either, i.e., appears to have deliberately confined the quotation to the aspect of the 'ideality' of the visualized image, while presenting the generalization as an inference to be drawn by the bodhisattva himself on the analogy of the 'ideality' of the visualized images he has learnt from the sūtra (MSg II.7.2). Perhaps it was precisely this challenge that motivated the author of the MSg to limit his quotation from the Saṁdh to the obvious case of the visualized image.

[2121] Cf. also the use of the expression *cittamātra* in the sense that the emotional, volitional and conceptual factors, usually listed as entities in their own right that accompany the mind (*cittasaṁprayuktā dharmāḥ*), are in reality nothing but mind, i.e., merely specific forms or states of *citta* — a view referred to in the VinSg (YBh$_t$ P zi 80b2; D zhi 77a1; YBh$_c$ 609a3f), though only by an opponent, and subsequently refuted. The remarks in WAYMAN 1996: 451f are misleading because they are based on more or less consistently mistaking the words of the opponent for those of the proponent ("Asaṅga"). It is definitely not the opponent who states that "[i]t is not valid that there is a mind-only in the sense of a 'continuous substantiality' (*dravyatas*), because it contradicts scripture" (ibid. 451,29-31). Rather, what the text says is that there are certain ascetics (**śramaṇa*) and brahmins who recognize, among [the factors traditionally subsumed under] *nāman* (in contrast to *rūpa*), only the mind (**cittamātra*) as an entity existing in its own right (**dravyatas*) but do not accept the mental factors (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*), and that [the position of] these [people is] not right.[1] I.e., the *proponent* rejects this position (which would correspond to the view ascribed to Buddhadeva in Vi 661c17-19 and 730b25-29) and subsequently tries to refute it by means of arguments (*yukti*) and canonical passages (**āgama*: 'scripture': YBh$_t$ zi 80b8ff). Actually, the existence of mental factors as entities in their own right is, exceptions like MSA(Bh) XI.34 apart, usually taken for granted in Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) literature.

all designations are nothing but designations (*prajñaptimātra*: § 458.4), because he was concerned not with language or conceptualization but with visualizations. Likewise, in view of the perceptual character of visualizations the term *vikalpa*, too, must have appeared unsuitable, because it is too much focused on falseness, whereas the aim of the author(s) of Saṁdh VIII may rather have been to establish phenomena in a way that avoided the extremes of either taking them at face value or merely denying them. On the other hand, the term *prajñapti* may well have evoked the term *vijñapti*, which was used to define the nature of *vijñāna*, the latter in its turn largely synonymous with *citta*. This, again, would have stimulated him to make use of the traditional Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* (§ 458.6), in the generalized form "*ālambanavijñaptir vijñānam*" that could easily be derived from formulations incorporated in the YBh (§ 355.1), and to transform this definition in such a way as to achieve a double entendre applicable to the traditional concept of *vijñāna* ([S1]) as well as to his new idea of *vijñāna* manifesting objects that are nothing but appearance ([S5] or [S6A/B]). As pointed out in § 355.2, I presume that the inevitable addition of °*mātra*° was facilitated by the view, also testified in the YBh (§ 355.2.1: [A6]), that *vijñāna* (= *citta*), in contrast to the mind-associates, grasps only the object as a whole, even if no sufficiently early formulation with °*mātra*° is available to me. At the same time, the application of the new term *vijñaptimātra* to the *object* follows the use of *jñānamātra* in the *Revatasūtra* and of *cittamātra* in the DBhS and PratyS, and may well have stimulated the semantic shift from "representation" in the sense of "(act of) cognition" to "representation" in the sense of "appearance" that is obvious in ⓨ[2122] and may additionally have been inspired by the use of *vijñapti* in the Muktaka chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* (§ 458.3) if the author of our passage was indeed familiar with this text.

460.3. As for the question of a former dictum (in case the original actually had **mayoktam*), we may think of the *Revatasūtra* tacitly interpreted in a *virtually* generalized sense in line with the *cittamātra* passage in the DBhS or PratyS. Or we may assume that the author considered his formulation of the definition of *vijñāna* to be a legitimate *interpretation* of the Abhidharmic definition, which in its turn is just a nominalized equivalent of the canonical definition of *vijñāna*, viz., *vijānātîti vijñānam* followed by an enumeration of objects.[2123] Actually, a quotation of this canonical definition at AKBh 473,23 is rendered by Hsüan-tsang as "*vijñāna*s cognize objects (所緣 = *ālambana*)".[2124]

461. If my hypothetical reconstruction of ⓧ and its background is correct, the most probable meaning of *prabhāvita* would, in the context of a (re)definition of *vijñāna*, surely be "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as". The meaning "produced by" or "originated from" would hardly be possible, at any rate not in the strict sense of a causal relationship implying a temporal difference. To be sure, in Abhidharmic thought the objective support (*ālambana*) is regarded as a condition (*pratyaya*) of mind and mental factors. Viewed from this perspective, the occurrence of the term *ālambana* may indeed have evoked the idea of a

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[1] *dge sbyong dang bram ze la la ming la sems tsam zhig rdzas su 'dod la sems las byung ba'i chos rnams ni mi 'dod pa gang dag yod pa de dag kyang mi 'thad do* ||

[2122] And also in Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3 (see fn. 2516).

[2123] Cf. S 1984: 440 n. 32 (*Zas lta bu zhes bya ba'i mdo*, quoted YVy P yi 86b5f [D 'i 72b1] and corresponding to SĀ$_{C}$ 11c9f [no. 46]; slightly different: SN III 87,17-22 [no. 22.79: *Khajjani*]; cf. also VETTER 2000: 63f [# 125]).

[2124] AKBh$_{Hs}$ 157b20: 諸識能了所緣.

causal or conditional relationship. Following this track, it may be tempting to interpret *prabhāvita* (also) in a causal sense even in [S] (albeit in a direction opposite to the one that would result from [M], where the *ālambana* would be the effect[2125] and not the condition). But it would surely be daring to assume that the Saṁdh in this way anticipated an idea we can find, later on, as a second alternative in Dignāga's *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, viz., that what functions as the *ālambanapratyaya* of a given moment of mind is the image of the object in a *previous* moment of mind, by means of conferring energy (*śaktyarpaṇāt*) upon the mind-continuum.[2126] There is no indication in the text of the Saṁdh that the image or object under consideration is anything but the very image that is just being experienced. Thus, if an aspect of causation or conditioning is indeed implied,[2127] we would rather have to understand this in the sense of Dignāga's first alternative, viz., that the very image of the object in a given moment of mind is itself the *ālambanapratyaya* of this moment of mind.[2128] This, however, is not possible in the form of a causal relationship implying a temporal difference between cause and effect. The image, being not different/separated from the moment of mind experiencing it, cannot produce this same moment of mind in the strict sense of the word but can only condition it in the sense of being a necessary constituent of it, i.e., in the sense of *avyabhicāra*, as Dignāga puts it.[2129] In this non-temporal sense, however, *prabhāvita* would have to be translated by "constituted"[2130] rather than by "produced":

> [S7] I (have) declare(d) that mind (*vijñāna*, i.e., sensory or cognitive awareness) is [not produced by an external objective support but] constituted by a mere appearance of/as the [respective] objective support.[2131]

[2125] I.e., the effect of the act of representation (*vijñapti*): see § 443: [M]-tr(M).

[2126] ĀP 7b: *śaktyarpaṇāt kramāt* | (Vṛtti:) ... *so 'rthāvabhāsaḥ svānurūpakāryotpattaye śaktiṁ vijñānādhārāṁ karoti* ... |

[2127] I am not sure whether such an aspect is indeed implied in passages like ASBh 40,15f, where it is stated, in a basically traditional Abhidharmic context, that certain mental factors — viz., such as refer to spheres to which a certain person has no experiential access at all, as well as unfounded speculations concerning the future[1] — objectify nothing but their own fancy (*svaparikalpamātrālambanāt*).

[1] In ASBh 40,14f I read *anirdhāritavastukāṁś cānāgatālambanān* with Tib. and Ch.

[2128] ĀP 6a-c: *yad antar jñeyarūpaṁ tu bahirvad avabhāsate* | *so 'rthaḥ*. (Vṛtti:) ... *phyi rol lta bur snang ba nang na yod pa kho na dmigs pa'i rkyen* (= *ālambanapratyaya*) *yin no* ||

[2129] ĀP 7a: *pratyayo 'vyabhicāritvāt.*

[2130] Cf. *WEBSTER* p. 486c: "[1]**constitute** ... [1]b: to make (a person or thing) something; ... 4: to make up (the element or elements of which a thing, person, or idea is made up)".

[2131] Apart from a completely different understanding of the meaning of °*prabhāvita*, [S7] would, from the point of view of syntactical structure, be basically in agreement with Aramaki's (2013: 411) recent rendering of the passage. Divested of its copious interpretative additions, it would run thus:

> *vijñāna* is supernaturally taught (*prabhāvita*) to appear (*vijñapti*) as [all kinds of][1] objects (*ālambana*) without any such external objects (*mātra*).

[1] My simplifying summary of Aramaki's detailed list of objects.

In his interpretative additions, Aramaki specifies *vijñāna* as two-layered (the subconscious *ādānavijñāna* and the traditional six forms of awareness), and the objects as comprising both the receptacle-world as the object of the subconscious *ādānavijñāna* and the different objects of various types of supraliminal awareness, both ordinary and meditative. This specification is based on the distinction of several forms of mind (*citta*) in terms of object-representation in Saṁdh VIII.37, which is legitimate,

From the point of view of meaning, this translation is not very different from [S5] or [S6A/B]. The main difference is that "constituted" is an attempt to cover a broader spectrum of the polysemy of *prabhāvita*, one that is intended to comprise not only the (dominant) aspect of "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as" but also the aspect of "being conditioned by" or "being dependent on" in a non-temporal sense compatible with *mutual* dependence, i.e., with the fact that just as awareness is dependent on an image functioning as its objective support, so this objective support is, in its turn, conditioned by or dependent on awareness, which has simply arisen in such a way that it appears in the form of this image.[2132]

10. Conclusion

462.1. In the preceding pages I have attempted to clarify my position and improve its argumentative basis. If I have succeeded, this is not least the merit of Matsumoto's thorough and stimulating criticism of my former article. I am, of course, fully conscious of the fact that in spite of all arguments any reconstruction of the crucial sentence of Saṁdh VIII.7 (Ⓧ) remains hypothetical, and that a final decision will probably only be possible if the original wording is discovered. Even this may not settle the matter, at least if the decision were dependent on the mere presence or absence of the anusvāra at the end of the word *ālambana*.

462.2. Actually, in a strikingly parallel case, viz., the definition of *vijñāna* in Vasubandhu's *Pañcaskandhaka*, the only known manuscript of the text (PSk p. 16 n. 7) has the reading

[A26] *vijñānaṁ katamat* | *ālambanaṁ prati vijñaptiḥ* |

In the apparatus of the edition, this is compared with AKBh 11,7: *viṣayaṁ viṣayaṁ prati vijñaptir upalabdhir vijñānaskandha ity ucyate*, which paraphrases AK I.16a *vijñānaṁ prativijñaptiḥ*. However, the construction with *prati* as a postposition without a repetition (*vīpsā*) of the noun depending on it (as in the AKBh passage) arouses suspicion, and one is tempted to emend the text to

[A27] *vijñānaṁ katamat* | *ālambanaprativijñaptiḥ* |

This reading would be in perfect agreement with the Tibetan rendering of the definition of the PSk as quoted in the PSkBh, the extensive commentary ascribed to *Pṛthivībandhu (or *Vasubandhu?), viz.,

[A28] *rnam par shes pa gang zhe na* [...] | [...] *dmigs pa so sor rnam par rig pa'o* ||[2133]

It is true that we cannot be sure that this rendering is based on [A27] and not on [A26], but in view of the Tibetan rendering of the AKBh parallel, which has *yul dang yul la so sor rnam par rig ... pa*, the lack of *la* after *dmigs pa* may point to an original where *prati* was a prefix

although the focus of Saṁdh VIII.7–8 may not yet have been on all these details but rather on the principle of *vijñaptimātratā* as such. As regards Aramaki's rendering of °*prabhāvita*, he seems to derive it from the use of the expression *(*mahā*)*prabhāva* (*mthu chen po*) in VIII.37 (116,13 and 119,2: cf. ARAMAKI 2000: 56). But this expression refers to the supranormal power a bodhisattva is stated to attain when he becomes familiar with the various ways mind arises, comprehends the *vijñaptitathatā*, etc., and I fail to see how this has anything to do with the meaning of °*prabhāvita* in VIII.7.

2132 See fn. 2072.

2133 PSkBh P hi 178a2f; D si 93b5f.

and not a postposition.[2134] What is more important, however, is the fact that the Tibetan translation of the PSk does not render *prati* at all:

[A29] *rnam par shes pa gang zhe na | dmigs pa rnam par rig pa'o* ||,[2135]

and it is for this reason that I had, before the Sanskrit original had become available, reconstructed it as

[A30] *vijñānaṁ katamat | ālambanavijñaptiḥ* |

That this reconstruction is, in spite of the reading of the PSk manuscript, by no means off the mark is, fortunately, corroborated by the Sanskrit ms. of Sthiramati's PSkV (to be edited by Jowita Kramer), where (ms. fol.48b3f) the PSk's definition of the skandha *vijñāna* is quoted in precisely the same form as in my reconstruction.[2136]

462.3. Thus, even discovering a manuscript does not always settle all textual problems. In the case of ⓧ, however, what would probably be decisive is the *position of the enclitics*, at least if access to the Saṁdh version of ⓧ were obtained. If, e.g., *hi* were placed after °*prabhāvitam*, this would be precisely the position where it belongs in my reconstruction, i.e., [S], but unless comparable examples can be adduced, I have some doubts whether such a position of *hi* would be compatible with [M], even if the hypothetic ms. had *ālambanaṁ* (with anusvāra). If, on the other hand, *hi* or any other enclitic, or the vocative, were found after *ālambanaṁ*, my reconstruction would definitely be ruled out, even if the anusvāra were lacking.

[2134] Thus also MUROJI 2011: 93. In view of the parallel formulations in the YBh (see § 355.1) there is indeed in the context of the PSk no need for the reader to understand the definition of *vijñāna* as *ālambana(prati)vijñapti* in terms of *vijñaptimātratā* (cf. also Sthiramati's analysis: see fn. 2136), though it may well be that it was not without some arrière pensée that Vasubandhu decided upon precisely this formulation.

[2135] PSk 80,4 = P si 16b8; D shi 15b1. Thus also the quotation of the *mūla* text in $PSkV_t$ P hi 44b8–45a1 (D shi 231a7).

[2136] Sthiramati's commentary (PSkV 48b4 = $PSkV_t$ P 45a1f) is also explicit in analyzing the compound *ālambanavijñapti* as a genitive tatpuruṣa (objective genitive: see fn. 1803): *ālambanaṁ cittacaittaviṣayaḥ ..., tasya vijñaptiḥ, grahaṇam avabodhaḥ pratipattir ity arthaḥ* |.

Pt. III: Some Materials for the Meaning of *prabhāvita* in Yogācāra Sources

463. The objective of this collection of materials is *not* to supply the material basis for a *comprehensive* investigation of the meaning of °*prabhāvita* in Yogācāra texts, let alone in Buddhist literature as a whole. My aim is far more modest: I simply want to substantiate my contention (see Pt. II ch. 3.2) that contrary to Matsumoto's assumption both in later and in fairly early Yogācāra sources °*prabhāvita* is not only used in the causal sense of "produced by/from" but also, and even for the most part, in different meanings, and particularly in the sense of "essentially/specifically characterized by/as".[2137] For this purpose, I should like to present some additional material, first (ch. 1) from Yogācāra commentaries, mainly the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya* (ASBh), second (ch. 2) from the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* (VinSg), which comes closest to the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* (Saṁdh) in time and thought, and third (ch. 3) from the 'Basic Section' (MauBh) of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and the *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* (VaSg) i.e., from materials which, on the whole, would seem to precede the Saṁdh. I do not deny that these sources likewise contain passages where the nuance "produced by/from" is also involved or even dominant, but since my aim is to prove the validity of the meaning "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as" in these texts, I have mainly selected passages where this meaning appears to be the dominant one or even the only one possible. After this review of significant passages in the aforementioned sources, I shall then (ch. 4) proceed to re-examine some passages from these materials or related sources that have been discussed by Matsumoto and have been presented by him as evidence for his understanding of °*prabhāvita* in a causal sense. Finally, I am going to discuss in detail first (ch. 5) the occurrences of °*prabhāvita* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (regarded as interpolations by Matsumoto), and finally (ch. 6) the occurrences (apart from ⓧ) of this expression in the Saṁdh itself.

1. Yogācāra Commentaries

464. ASBh 10,4f: see Pt. II § 360.1.

465. ASBh 54,4f

[B1] *vipula⟨ṁ⟩ duḥkham ... kāmāvacaram ..., sarva-duḥkhatā-gati-yoni*-prabhāvita*tvāt kāmadhātor ...* |

[B1]-tr: The 'extensive suffering' is [suffering] that belongs to the sphere of sensuality, because the world-sphere of sensuality is distinctively characterized by all [the three kinds of] unsatisfactoriness, all [the five] destinies and all [the four] forms of birth.

"*Produced* from all the three kinds of unsatisfactoriness" does not make sense. The world-sphere of sensuality is rather *characterized* by all of them, or *consists* of dharmas incorporating all of them. Nor is the world-sphere of sensuality *produced* by the five *gati*s or four *yoni*s. It rather *consists* of them or, more precisely, *contains* all of them, for it is only the

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[2137] See fn. 1770.

sentient beings belonging to this sphere who may be born in any one of these *gati*s and *yoni*s, in *contrast* to the sentient beings in the *rūpa-* and *ārūpyadhātu*, where the unsatisfactoriness consisting in pain (*duḥkhaduḥkhatā*)[2138] as well as most of the *gati*s and *yoni*s, i.e., all except the destiny of heavenly beings (*devagati*)[2139] and spontaneous birth (*aupapādukā yoniḥ*),[2140] are missing.

466. ASBh 55,13-15

[B2] *kleśadauṣṭhulya*-prabhāvita*tvād aduḥkhāsukhavedanā*-prabhāvita*tvāc ca* {|} *ālaya-vijñānaṁ viśeṣeṇa saṁskāraduḥkhatāvasthaṁ* ... |

[B2]-tr: Because it is distinctively characterized by the corruption [connected with] defilements and distinctively (/typically) characterized by neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling, the *ālayavijñāna* is in a specific way in the state of unsatisfactoriness of conditioned factors [qua conditioned factors].

One could imagine *ālayavijñāna* to be produced by the residues of former defilements as one of its conditions, but it is surely not produced by neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. Rather, it is typically (i.e., constantly and exclusively) *associated* with this kind of feeling (in *contrast* to ordinary cognitive processes, which may *also* be associated with agreeable or disagreeable feelings), and is thus specifically characterized by it. Consequently, *kleṣadauṣṭhulyaprabhāvita* should likewise be understood as referring to being fraugh with the latent potentialities, or Seeds (*bīja*), of defilements in this very life as an essential and distinctive feature of *ālayavijñāna*.

467. ASBh 86,7-9

[B3] *kāyasmṛtyupasthānena duḥkhasatyam avatarati, saṁskāraduḥkhatālakṣaṇena dauṣṭhulyena* prabhāvita*tvāt kāyasya* | *tathāhi tatpratipakṣabhūtā praśrabdhiḥ kāya eva viśeṣeṇôtpadyata iti* |

[B3]-tr: By means of directing mindfulness to the body one comprehends the Truth of Suffering, because the body is specifically (or: typically) characterized by corruption (or unwieldiness, uneasiness), which has the character of the unsatisfactoriness of conditioned factors [qua conditioned factors]; for ease, which is the opposite of [corruption], arises especially in the body.

If one comprehends the Truth of Suffering by means of mindfully observing the body, the body must somehow represent the Truth of Suffering, must be a particularly suitable instance of it. The body therefore should *not* merely be *caused* by Suffering or unsatisfactoriness, or by a state which is essentially qualified by and hence equivalent to unsatisfactoriness, but rather should be *typically* or *essentially characterized* by it. Significantly, MAVBh 50,8f (ad MAV IV.1) employs, in order to explain why by means of examining the body one comprehends the Truth of Suffering, precisely the reverse formulation, viz., *kāyena hi dauṣṭhulyaṁ prabhāvyate*, which I take to mean that it is through the body that corruption is *revealed* or rendered perceptible, because the Truth of Suffering has conditioned factors fraught with corruption as its essential character (*sadauṣṭhulyasaṁskāralakṣaṇatvāt*), i.e., because the

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2138 Cf. AK(Bh) 46,20-22 and 26f; 47,1f; SaṅgP 384b20-23 (III.19); Prak$_{H}$ 717c5-7.

2139 AKBh 114,7: *rūpārūpyadhātvor ekasyā devagateḥ pradeśaḥ*. The opinion of the Vaibhāṣikas that there are animals even in the world of heavenly beings quite obviously refers to their presence among the six classes of heavenly beings of the *kāmadhātu* (cf. Vi 867a5-12; 626b23[ff]; *Hôb* 311b).

2140 AKBh 119,12: *sarve ... devāḥ ... upapādukā eva.*

Truth of Suffering is not so much an abstract concept but concretely consists in these factors, is, so to speak, embodied in them. Thus, in this context at least, corruption is not the cause of the body but something by which the body is typically characterized and which is therefore displayed by the body more conspicuously than by other things. Likewise, ease (*praśrabdhi*), the opposite or antidote of uneasiness/inertness, is not the cause of the body but manifests itself *in* the body as a symptom of the latter's transmutation due to deep meditative concentration.

468. MSABh 23,1-3 (ad VI.2)

[B4] *nāpi duḥsaṁsthitatā* (sc., *ātmalakṣaṇā*) | *tathā hi sā vilakṣaṇā ātmalakṣaṇāt parikalpitāt* | *sā punaḥ pañcôpādānaskandhāḥ, kleśadauṣṭhulya*-prabhāvita*tvāt* |

[B4]-tr: Nor has 'being in a bad condition' [the character of the self], for it is different from the character of the self as it is imagined (viz., as permanent, blissful, etc.). This 'being in a bad condition' is rather the five constituents [that are the object of, or invite,] appropriation,[2141] because these are essentially characterized by the corruption of the defilements.

In this passage, one may be tempted to understand *prabhāvita* as "produced", as both Sthiramati (at least according to the Tibetan translation of his commentary)[2142] and Prabhākaramitra's Chinese translation of the MSA(Bh)[2143] seem to have done. But since the reason *kleśadauṣṭhulyaprabhāvitatvāt* is meant to prove why the five *upādānaskandha*s can be *equated* with 'being in a bad condition' (*duḥsaṁsthitatā*), its main function must be to disclose the unsatisfactory *nature* or character of the *upādānaskandha*s, and not their cause. Actually, 'being in a bad condition' (*duḥsthitatā*) is used as a gloss for *dauṣṭhulya* at MAVṬ 167,9f and is hence equivalent to the latter.

469. MSABh 38,14-17 (ad IX.25)

[B5] *buddhānāṁ citte jñāne ca dāhatimirasthānīyayo rāgāvidyayoḥ śāntir na bhāvaḥ śasyate, tadabhāva*prabhāvita*tvāc cetaḥprajñāvimuktyor, nâbhāvas, tena tena vimuktilakṣaṇena bhāvāt* |[2144]

[B5]-tr: In the case of the Buddhas' mind and knowledge, the extinction of desire and ignorance — which are comparable to the heat [of the glowing iron] and the *timira*-

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[2141] See Pt. I fn. 850.

[2142] SAVBh P mi 86b2f (D mi 76a2; HAYASHIMA 1983: 51,24f): *nyon mongs pa'i gnas ngan len gyis bskyed pas na ngan pa'i gnas zhes bya ba ste* |

[2143] T 31.1604: 598c6f: "Nor is it (sc. the *ātmadṛṣṭi*) without an objective support, because being *generated* by the 'habit-energies' (習氣, usually rendering *vāsanā*) of the defilements (*kleśa*), it takes the five *upādānaskandha*s as its objective support" (非無緣者, 煩惱習氣所起 緣五受陰故。). It is obvious that in this rendering the concept of *duḥsaṁsthitatā* ("being in a bad condition") is replaced (also in the verse itself) by a completely different idea, viz., the absence of an objective support (< "being badly established"??), with the result that the context of the expression *kleśadauṣṭhulyaprabhāvitatvāt* is considerably different here. I have, however, serious doubts that this divergence is based on a different text in a Sanskrit manuscript as the basis of this translation (cf. § 501), and I am therefore very hesitant to regard Prabhākaramitra's rendering of °*prabhāvita* as reliable evidence for the original meaning of this expression in this MSABh passage.

[2144] For the emendations (*citte jñāne ca* and °*vimuktyor*) on the basis of mss. see NAITŌ 2009: 60. The repetition of *tena* is not confirmed by $MSABh_t$ (P phi 166a8) = SĀṬ (P bi 77a7): *mtshan nyid de lta bur*.

disorder [of the eye] — is not taught to be an entity, because freedom of mind and freedom by insight are essentially characterized as (i.e., consists in) the absence of these (sc., desire and ignorance). Nor is it something not existing [at all], because it does exist in the form of the respective freedom.

In this case, one might think that the twofold freedom or liberation (*vimukti*) cannot be an entity (*bhāva*) because it is *brought about* by a 'non-existence' or disappearance (*abhāva*), viz., the fact that desire and ignorance have ceased to exist. But in the preceding sentence we read that in the case of the similes, namely the glowing iron and the eye affected by the *timira*-disorder, the [accomplished] extinction of heat and eye-disorder (*timiramala*) cannot be an entity because it is *characterized* by (or: as) the absence of heat and eye-disorder, respectively (*dāhatimirayor abhāvalakṣaṇatvāt*). This parallel statement proves beyond doubt that °*prabhāvita* is used here in a sense which is equivalent, or at least comes very close to, the meaning of °*lakṣaṇa*, and as pointed out in Pt. II § 362 I cannot follow Matsumoto in his assumption that *lakṣaṇa* means "cause", at any rate if "cause" is taken to imply an act of causation and a temporal sequence. If, on the other hand, it is taken in the sense of a constitutive factor, the *lakṣaṇa* is actually that element or aspect of a thing due to which this thing is what it is, in other word: its distinctive or essential characteristic or own-being, and this would coincide with my understanding of °*prabhāvita* as "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as".

2. *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*

470. YBh$_t$ P zi 21a3f (D zhi 18b2f; YBh$_c$ 585b23-25; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1023a13-15)

[B6] *da ltar gyi 'du byed rnams ni mtshan nyid gsum gyis* rab tu phye ba *yin te* | *'das pa rnams kyi 'bras bu'i dngos po dang* | *ma 'ongs pa rnams kyi rgyu'i dngos po dang* | *rang gi mtshan nyid kyi rgyun mi 'chad pas so* ||

[B6]-tr: The present (*pratyutpanna*) conditioned factors (*saṁskāra*) are distinctively characterized (*prabhāvita*) by three features: by being the effect of past [factors] (**atīta-phalabhāvena*), by being the cause of future [factors] (**anāgatahetubhāvena*), and by [the fact] that the continuum of their specific characteristic (*svalakṣaṇa*) is not cut off (ie., is still continuing).

It is obvious that taking *prabhāvita* as "produced" does not make sense here. The conditioned factors of the present may have been produced by past conditioned factors, but it would be odd to take them to be produced *by the fact that they are* the effect of past factors, and they are definitely not produced by future factors or by the fact that they are the cause of the latter. Rather, what the text wants to explain is why the Buddha has taught the existence even of past and future conditioned factors although, strictly speaking, only the present factors exist. The solution offered is that the past dharmas exist insofar they have produced [the present factors as] their effect, and that the future dharmas exist insofar as [the present factors] are furnished with their cause (= Seed).[2145] In other words, the present conditioned factors, though existing only in the present, are nevertheless, due to their being both conditioned and conditioning, essentially *characterized*, or constituted as what they are, not only by the actual existence of

[2145] YBh$_t$ P zi 21a1-3 (YBh$_c$ 585b19-23): *bcom ldan 'das kyis* "*'du byed 'das pa rnams ni yod de* | ... || *'du byed ma 'ongs pa rnams ni yod de* | ..." *zhes gang gsungs pa de la dgongs pa gang zhe na* | *'du byed 'das pa rnams ni 'bras bu bskyed pa las yod de* | *'du byed ma 'ongs pa rnams ni rgyu yongs su 'dzin pa las yod de* | ...

their own specific character (*svalakṣaṇa*) but also by their causal relatedness to past and future dharmas in terms of being their effect and their cause, respectively.[2146]

471. YBh$_t$ P zi 22a4–b1 (D zhi 19b2-6; YBh$_c$ 586a1-8; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1023b9-18)

This interpretation of [B6] is confirmed in the subsequent section of the text (on the 'marks of the conditioned': *saṁskṛta-lakṣaṇāni*), where the statement that conditioned factors (*saṁskāra*)[2147] are distinctively/essentially characterized (*prabhāvita*) by the three times introduces the answer to the question why the Buddha has taught only three 'marks of the conditioned'[2148] (and not four, as distinguished in the Abhidharma)[2149]:

[B7] {1} *ci'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis skye ba dang | 'jig pa dang gnas pa las gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid dang gsum kho na gsungs she na |*

{2} *'du byed rnams ni dus gsum gyis* rab tu phye ba *yin te |*

{3} *des na ma 'ongs pa'i dus na ma byung ba las 'byung bar 'gyur bas | de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis ma 'ongs pa'i dus la* (D : *las* P) *brten te 'byung ba yang 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid yin par gsungs so ||*

{4} *byung ba rnams 'das pa'i dus su zhig* (P : *zhigs* D) *par gyur pas de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis 'das pa'i dus la* (D : *las* P) *brten te zhig* (P : *zhigs* D) *pa yang 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid yin par gsungs so ||*

{5} *gnas pa gang yin pa dang | gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid gang yin pa'i mtshan nyid gnyis ni da ltar gyi dus kyis* (D : *kyi* P) rab tu phye ba *yin te | 'di ltar gnas pa yang da ltar gyi dus nyid na dmigs pa yin la | snga ma las phyi ma gzhan nyid du gzhan du*[2150] *gyur pa nyid kyang da ltar gyi dus nyid na dmigs pa yin pas | de'i phyir bcom ldan 'das kyis da ltar byung ba'i dus la* (D : *las* P) *brten te | gnas pa dang | gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid gcig tu bsdus nas 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid yin par gsungs so ||*

[B7]-tr: {1} Why has the Exalted (or: Fortunate, Venerable) One[2151] taught only three [marks of the conditioned (*saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*), viz.,] coming into being (*utpāda*), vanishing (*vyaya*), and change-while-being-in-existence (*sthity-anyathātva*)?

{2} Conditioned factors are distinctively/essentially characterized (*prabhāvita*) by the three times:

{3}[2152] From their non-existence in the future they come into being:[2153] therefore it is with reference to the future that the Exalted One has taught coming into being to be a mark of the conditioned.

[2146] Cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 128,5-9, where the sūtra passage that teaches the existence of past and future *skandha*s is interpreted as referring to their characteristic mark (*lakṣaṇa*) of [being] result and cause, respectively, while the existence of the present *skandha*s is stated to be taught with reference to the existence of their specific characteristic, i.e., of the present *skandha*s as such. See also § 484.

[2147] They are not explicitly qualified as "present" here, but in view of the preceding rejection of the existence of past and future factors it can be taken for granted that what is meant is the present factors.

[2148] Cf. AKBh 75,20; AKVy 171,26-28; PrasP 145,4f; AN I 152 (3.47); *Ekottarikāgama* (T 2.125) 607c13-23 (see PĀSĀDIKA 1989: 39: no. 93 and 94). Cf. also JP$_H$ 926b20f.

[2149] Cf. JP$_H$ 926a4; AK(Bh) 75,17f; YBh$_{Bh}$ 61,7-15.

[2150] D omits *gzhan du*, but cf. D zhi 19b1.

[2151] For various traditional interpretations of the honorific name *Bhagavat*, cf., e.g., DhSk 461c13–462a2 and AKṬU P tu 3a1–b4 (see SKILLING & HARRISON 2005: [137]–[139] and [147]–[148]); VisM VII.53–64; MPPU 70b14–71b13 (LAMOTTE 1949: 115–125); AAĀ$_V$ 272,5-12; BBhU 292a24–b13; BBhVy I: 29 # 3.

{4} Because after having come into being they have vanished into the past, it is with reference to the past that the Exalted One has also taught vanishing to be a mark of the conditioned.

{5} The two marks 'being-in-existence' and 'change' are distinctively/essentially characterized (**prabhāvita*) by the present time, for both being-in-existence and change, [the latter manifesting itself] as a difference of the later [phases] from the earlier, are *observed* only in the present time. Therefore, it is with reference to the present that the Exalted One has taught being-in-existence and change, combined into one, to be a [third] mark of the conditioned.

In {2}, it hardly makes sense to understand °*prabhāvita* in a causal meaning. The conditioned factors (*saṁskāra*) are surely not *produced* by the three times, for in early Yogācāra time is not a real entity but is only nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*).[2154] Nor is it acceptable to understand the statement to mean that the present factors are produced by the past, present and future *factors*, for even if it would make sense to take them as produced by past factors, they can hardly be produced by future factors. Rather, the subsequent sentences ({3}–{5}) clearly show that what is meant is that the conditioned factors are distinctively and essentially *characterized* (and in *this* sense *constituted*) by the three times in terms of the three *characteristics* of the conditioned (*saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*) in that they pass from non-existence into an unstable existence and then back into non-existence. In {5}, on the other hand, it is not the conditioned factors themselves that are stated to be *prabhāvita* by the present time but the two *marks* of the conditioned that characterize these factors while they are present. In this case, too, it makes perfect sense to understand these two marks as distinctively and essentially *characterized* by the present time, but alternatively one might also consider the possibility of taking the two marks to be *manifested in* the present time. But it would hardly make sense to understand them as being (in the strict sense of the word) *produced* by or from the present time, because, as has been pointed out, time is not regarded as a real entity in its own right, nor are the *saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*s regarded thus.[2155]

472. YBh$_t$ P zi 22b1-4 (D zhi 19b6–20a2; YBh$_c$ 586a9-13; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1023b18-22)

[B8] {1} *gang gi tshe 'phags pa nyan thos kyis 'dus byas kyi mtshan nyid gsum dang ldan par yongs su brtag par byas pa'i tshe | ci'i phyir 'phags pa nyan thos phung po rnams*

[2152] The introductory *des na* (= **tena*) does not make sense to me. There is no equivalent in the Chinese versions. Could Tibetan be based on a dittography **te{nā}nāgata*° for **te 'nāgata*°??

[2153] I.e.: From the non-existence by which they are characterized as long as they are, so to speak, still waiting for their arising in the future, they now arise into the present. Cf. YBh$_c$ 586a2f: "From their original non-existence in the future time [they now] arise" (從未來世本無而生) and VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1023b10f: "From the future, where they had not yet arisen, they obtain arising" (從未來世 未生得生).

[2154] Thus explicitly YBh$_t$ P zi 208a6 (D zhi 199b6; YBh$_c$ 659a15): time (*dus*, **kāla*) in a list of concepts that are mere designations superimposed on the so-called conditioned entities and hence only nominally existent (*prajñaptisat*: YBh$_t$ P zi 207b7f; D zhi 199b1f; YBh$_c$ 659a4-6); AS 11,20f (AS$_G$ 19,8f); cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 69,3 (*kāla* in a list obviously enumerating the *prajñaptidharmāḥ* mentioned YBh$_{Bh}$ 68,12), and YBh$_t$ P zi 29a5-7 (D zhi 26b1-3; YBh$_c$ 588b29–c4): **kāla* defined in connection with more or less the same set of concepts, the first of which, viz., *prāpti*, is explicitly stated to be **prajñaptisat*: YBh$_t$ P zi 24b7f; YBh$_c$ 586c25-27.

[2155] See YBh$_t$ P zi 21b1f (D zhi 18b7f; YBh$_c$ 585c9f): *ci'i phyir gzugs la sogs pa 'du byed rnams las skye ba dang | rga ba dang | gnas pa dang | mi rtag pa nyid dag rdzas gzhan du yod pa ma yin par khong du chud par bya zhe na* | ...; P zi 208a4 (see fn. 2154); cf. also YBh$_{Bh}$ 69,2 (see ibid.).

la 'byung ba dang 'jig pa kho nar rjes su lta zhing gnas so zhes gsungs la gnas pa dang gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid rjes su lta zhing gnas so zhes ma gsungs she na |

{2} *gang gi phyir 'byung ba gang yin pa dang | gnas pa las gzhan du 'gyur ba nyid gang yin pa'i mtshan nyid de gnyi ga yang 'byung bas* rab tu phye ba *yin pas |de'i phyir mtshan nyid gnyis cha gcig tu mdzad de 'byung ba'i phyogs su rnam par bzhag* (D : *gzhag* P) *nas 'byung bar rjes su lta zhing gnas so zhes gsungs so ||*

[B8]-tr: {1} If a noble disciple[2156] (**āryaśrāvaka*) must contemplate[2157] [things] as marked by all the three marks of the conditioned, why then did [the Buddha] say that the noble disciple continuously observes the skandhas merely[2158] as arising and vanishing (**udayavyayānudarśī viharati*),[2159] but did not say that he continuously observes their change-while-being-in-existence (**sthityanyathātva*)?

{2} Because the mark 'coming into being' and [the mark] 'change while being-in-existence' are both characterized (*prabhāvita*) by [being aspects of] arising (*'byung ba*, **udaya*), [the Buddha,] combining [these] two marks into one and establishing them as the aspect of arising, taught that [the learned disciple] continually contemplates [the *skandha*s] as arising (**udayānudarśī viharati*).

It would surely not make sense to take coming into being (*utpāda*, Tib. *'byung ba*, Ch. 生) to have been *produced* by arising (**udaya*), expressed by the same Tibetan and Chinese word (*'byung ba*, 生), i.e., by itself. Rather, what the text wants to convey is that both 'coming into being' and 'change while being in existence' are *characterized* by [being aspects of] arising (**udaya*), and hence may be subsumed under this category,[2160] because — we may add — *udaya* may be taken to comprise both the process and the result, just like *bhāva*, which may include becoming as well as the resulting existence.

[2156] "Disciple of the Noble One (= the Buddha)" may be a more authentic rendering (cf. the commentarial explanations in *CPD* I 430b), but Tib. *'phags pa nyan thos* means "the disciple who is a noble one", and Paramārtha has "saintly persons" (諸聖人); Hsüan-tsang's 佛聖弟子 is ambiguous, since it may mean "saintly disciple of the Buddha", but (at least in earlier translations like Dharmarakṣa's) also "disciple of the Buddha, the Saint" (cf. KARASHIMA 1998: 150: 佛聖 = "a *buddha*, i.e. a saint").

[2157] Tib. *gang gi tshe ... brtag par byas pa'i tshe* is somewhat odd; one would expect either *brtags par byas pa* or *brtag par bya ba*, and in view of the Chinese translations the latter seems preferable. Apart from this, a conditional clause appears more appropriate than a temporal clause. Hsüan-tsang: "[Since] a *buddhaśrāvaka* should contemplate the conditioned as completely furnished with the three marks, ..." (佛聖弟子 應觀有為具足三相, ...); Paramārtha: "If these three marks are what noble persons [should] contemplate, ..." (若此三相 是諸聖人之所思量, ...).

[2158] The position of the restrictive particle in Hsüan-tsang ("why then did [the Buddha] *only* say ...") may sound preferable from a logical point of view.

[2159] Cf., e.g., *Mahāśūnyatāsūtra* # 12.4 (SKILLING 1994: 240; 1997: 389); AKṬU P tu 269b1f (D ju 236a1): *'phags pa nyan thos des nye bar len pa'i phung po lnga rnams la skye ba dang 'jig pa yang dag par rjes su lta zhing gnas te*; MN III 114,32-33; 115,3f (*pañcasu upādānakkhandhesu udayabyayānupassino viharato*); cf. also I 56,30-32, etc. For °*anudarśin* see ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 299,18 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 188,8), etc., but °*anupaśyin* also occurs (ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 299,20,[with ms.]; ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 188,10).

[2160] This is one of the cases where °*prabhāvita* could reasonably be explained by °*saṁgṛhīta*, which HOTORI (1982: 45 n. 22) regards as the proper meaning of °*prabhāvita*. Cf. also fn. 2168. But as far as I can see this connotation is not always appropriate, and I find it difficult to derive it from the semantic range of *pra-√bhū*.

473. YBh$_t$ P zi 22b6f (D zhi 20a3f; YBh$_c$ 586a16-18; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1023b26f)

[B9] *mi rtag pa nyid kyang ma byung ba las 'byung bas* rab tu phye ba *dang* | *byung nas kyang med par 'gyur bas* rab tu phye ba *yin te* ⟨|⟩ *ma byung ba las 'byung ba ni 'byung ba yin la* | *byung nas med par 'gyur ba ni 'jig pa yin no* ||

[B9]-tr: Impermanence, in its turn, is distinctively/essentially characterized (*prabhāvita*) by coming into being out of [previous] non-existence (*abhūtvā bhāva-*) and by becoming [again] non-existent after having come into being (*bhūtvā abhāva-*). Coming into being out of non-existence is arising (*udaya*), becoming [again] non-existent after having come into being is vanishing (*vyaya*).

Arising and vanishing are clearly not the *causes* of impermanence but its *nature*, its defining, constitutive characteristics or inalienable properties, as is obvious from, e.g., the famous verse Uv I.3:

Conditioned things are, alas, impermanent, bound to come into being and to vanish
anityā bata saṁskārā utpādavyayadharmiṇaḥ,

or YBh$_t$ P zi 251a6 (D zhi 238a1; YBh$_c$ 674c8f):

Perceiving conditioned things as arising and vanishing is seeing [them] as impermanent.
'du byed rnams la 'byung ba dang 'jig par lta ba ni mi rtag pa nyid du lta ba yin no ||[2161]

474. YBh$_t$ P zi 39b1f (D zhi 37a4f; YBh$_c$ 593a15-18; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1028c17-19)

[B10] {1} *de la nam mkha' gang zhe na* | *gzugs med pa tsam gyis* rab tu phye ba *ni nam mkha' yin te* | {2} *'di ltar gang la gzugs kyi rnam pa mi dmigs pa de la nam mkha'i 'du shes 'byung bar 'gyur bas* {3} *de'i phyir de yang btags* (P : *brtags* D) *pa'i yod pa yin par rig par bya'i rdzas su ni ma yin no* ||

[B10]-Skt (VinSg$_{ms}$ 16b6; beginning of the line damaged; first akṣara hardly legible in my copy): {1} – – – *(ta?)m ākāśa⟨ṁ |⟩* {2} *tathā hi yatra rūpagataṁ nopalabhyate tatrâkāśasaṁjñā pravarttate* | {3} *tasmāt tad api prajñaptito* ⟨'⟩*stîti veditavyaṁ na dravyataḥ* ||

[B10]-tr: {1} What is space (**ākāśa*)? Space is distinctively/essentially characterized as the mere absence of matter (**rūpābhāvamātra-prabhāvita*). {2} That is, where no material things (**rūpagata*) are perceived, with regard to that the notion (**saṁjñā*) of [empty] space comes about. {3} Therefore, it (sc., space), too, must be understood to exist only as a designation (**prajñaptitas*), not as a real thing (**dravyatas*).

Neither as an unconditioned entity nor as a purely nominal entity (as it is clearly conceived here) could space be *produced*. One might argue that {2} suggests a causal relation not on the ontological but on the epistemic level: the *notion* of empty space is *produced* by the *non-perception* of any material things in a certain place. But {2}, introduced by *tathāhi*, is not a mere gloss on the wording of {1} but rather an explanation or justification. Moreover, the reductive °*mātra* in {1} suggests that the purport of the statement is to show that 'space' is not a positive entity but, on the contrary, nothing but the absence of all material objects, an absence which we have the habit of calling 'space'. It would therefore make good sense to understand 'X(*-mātra*)*-prabhāvita*' in the present passage as "*established* [as a mere

[2161] Cf. also AKBh 330,7f: *udayavyayadharmitvād anityaṁ paśyanti*, which does not of course establish arising and vanishing as the *cause* of impermanence but rather as the constitutive, i.e., essential and distinctive characteristic: "They perceive [something as] impermanent because it is bound to arise and vanish."

denomination] with reference to (nothing but) X”.[2162] Understood in this way, {a} would be equivalent to a statement like YBh_t P zi 208a7 (D zhi 199b6f; YBh_c 659a16f):

> On the basis of and with reference to nothing but the non-occurrence (**apravṛtti*, cf. Ch. 不轉) of material things (**rūpa*) one speaks of (**upacāra*) ‘[empty] space’ and designates (**prajñapti*) [it] as ‘the unconditioned entity space’.
>
> *gzugs kyi 'jug pa med pa tsam la gnas te ltos shing brten nas nam mkha' zhes nye bar 'dogs te nam mkha' 'dus ma byas zhes gdags pa.*[2163]

On the other hand, it seem equally adequate to take ‘X-(*mātra*)*prabhāvita*’ to mean “*constituted* by (nothing but) X”, in the sense of “distinctively/essentially *characterized* by [being] (nothing but) X”, amounting to “*consisting* in (nothing but) X”. This seems to be confirmed by definitions like AS 13,6 (= ASBh 14,17) where (empty) space is simply *identified* with the absence of material things:

> *ākāśaṁ katamat? rūpābhāvaḥ.*[2164]

Actually, in ASBh 14,17f this definition is explained as

> The state (*dharma*) that is *characterized* as the absence of material things only (and not of feelings, etc.) by being opposed to them and is the object of non-sensory cognitive awareness, that is [empty] space.
>
> *rūpasyaîva viparyayeṇâbhāvalakṣaṇo yo dharmo manovijñānaviṣayas, tad ākāśam* |

In this explanation, space (*ākāśa*) is defined in basically the same sense as in {1}, but instead of the phrase ‘X-(*mātra-*)*prabhāvita*’ a bahuvrīhi ‘X-*lakṣaṇa*’ is used. This would seem to suggest that in [B10], too, an understanding of °*prabhāvita* in the sense of “distinctively /essentially characterized as” is not unfounded.

475. YBh_t P zi 44a7f (D zhi 42a2; YBh_c 594c13f) = $VinSg_{ms}$ 18b5f

> [B11] *tatrâvasthāto jātijarādīnāṁ ci⟨ttaviprayuktasaṁskārāṇāṁ vyavasthā⟩naṁ tadavasthā*prabhāvita*tvāt* |
>
> [B11]-tr: Among these, [analysis of the *skandhas*] under the aspect of [different] states means to establish the ‘conditioned factors dissociated from the mind’, like birth, aging, etc., because these are distinctively/essentially characterized by [being nothing but certain] states of the [*skandhas*].

The ‘conditioned factors dissociated from mind’ are mere designations of certain states of the real entities. They are *not* of course *produced* by or from these states, but simply *consist* in them, or are *established* [as mere denominations] on the basis of these states.

[2162] Cf. Bodhiruci’s standard rendering of °*prabhāvita* as 得名 (see Pt. II § 392).

[2163] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 133,13: *rūpābhāvamātra ākāśaprajñaptiḥ*. Cf. also YBh_c 879a15-18 (not in YBh_t):

> The unconditioned entity ‘[empty] space’ (**ākāśa*) is established as a designation (*prajñapti*) with reference to (**apekṣya*) material things (**rūpagata*?): If in a certain place material things are absent, one designates this as ‘empty space’. It is not the case that apart from the state (**dharma*) manifested (**prabhāvita*: distinguished/constituted) by the absence of material [things], any real entity ‘empty space’ existing separately can be found, [and] what is manifested (/distinguished/constituted) by a [mere] absence cannot be called really existent (**dravyasat*).
>
> 虛空無為 待諸色趣 而假建立。若於是處 色趣非有，假說虛空。非離色無所顯法外 別有虛空實體可得。非無所顯 得名實有。

[2164] Similarly, at AKBh 92,4f (empty) space is defined as the mere absence of tangibles (*spraṣṭavyābhāvamātram ākāśam*).

476. YBh$_t$ P zi 86b2-4 (D zhi 82b7–83a2; YBh$_c$ 611b15-19)

[B12] ... *gang dag bdag po med pa dang | byed pa po med pa dang | tshor ba po med pa dang | bdag nyid g-yo ba med pa dang | rang dbang med pa dang | rgyus bskyed pa dang | rkyen la rag las shing* (D adds *'br⟨e?⟩l bar*) *'jug pa dang | ma byung ba las 'byung ba'i chos can dang | byung nas 'jig pa'i chos can dang | chos tsam gyis* (P : *zhag*[!] D) rab tu phye ba *dang | chos rnams kho nas mngon par brlan pa dang | chos rnams kho na mngon par rlan par byed pa dang | rgyud du gtogs pa dang | de ltar de lta bu dang mthun pa de dag ni* (D : *gi* P) *rten cing 'brel par 'byung ba'i chos rnams kyi mtshan nyid yin par rig par bya'o ||*

[B12]-tr: [Dharmas] that are without an owner (**svāmin*), without an agent (**kāraka*), without a subject of experience (**vedaka*), without autonomous movement, without self-dependence, [dharmas that are] generated by causes and arise in dependence on conditions, [that are] bound to originate after not having existed and to perish after having existed, [that are] essentially characterized by [being] (i.e., consist in) dharmas only (**dharmamātraprabhāvita*), [that] are irrigated (**abhiṣyandita*, i.e., made to thrive) only by dharmas and [in their turn] irrigate only dharmas, and belong to a continuum: these types of [properties] should be known to be the characteristic of dependently arising dharmas.

The pertinent property is **dharmamātraprabhāvita*, which could be interpreted as "produced by/from nothing but dharmas", i.e., not from any metaphysical principle like a creator god or primeval matter. But it can also be understood as "characterized by, or consisting in, nothing but dharmas", i.e. lacking a metaphysical owner, agent or subject of experience, i.e., an *ātman*, and this is at least how the expression is understood in To-ryun's (道倫 (/遁倫)) commentary:

"[The expression] 'revealed (*prabhāvita*, i.e., essentially characterized) by [being] nothing but dharmas' summarizes [the attributes] 'without an owner', etc."
唯法所顯者, 結初無主宰等。(T 42.1828: 658c29).

477. YBh$_t$ P zi 219a1–b1 (D zhi 208b2–209a1; YBh$_c$ 662c11-24)

[B13] {1} *mya ngan las 'das pa 'dus byas 'gags* (D : *'gag* P) *pa las* (D : *la* P) *gud na yod dam zhes 'dri ba yang tshul bzhin ma yin pa yin la | lan 'debs pa yang tshul bzhin ma yin pa yin | sems pa yang tshul bzhin ma yin pa yin par rig par bya'o || gud na med pa dang | ... zhes 'dri ba yang tshul bzhin ma yin pa yin la | ... ||*

{2} *de ci'i phyir zhe na* | {3} *'di ltar 'gog pa ni 'dus byas rnam par zhi ba tsam dang | 'dus byas dang mtshan nyid mi 'dra bas* rab tu phye ba *yin pa'i phyir te* | (YBh$_c$: 由彼涅槃 唯有為滅之**所顯**故, 與有為法其相異故。)

{4} *de la 'dus byas rnam par zhi ba tsam yin pa'i phyir ni* (YBh$_c$: 唯有為滅之**所顯**故) *gud na yod dam zhes 'dri ba 'am ... sems pa ni ma spros pa spros par byas pa yin no ||* {5} *'dus byas dang mtshan nyid mi 'dra ba'i phyir ni gud na med dam zhes 'dri ba dang ... sems pa yang ma spros pa kho na spros par byas pa yin no ||*

{6} ... *mya ngan las 'das pa ni thams cad kyi thams cad du med pa yin no zhes ... sems pa de yang mi rung ste* | {7} ... *mya ngan las 'das pa ni zhi ba dang spros pa med pa dang | so so rang rig pa'i mtshan nyid du yod pa yin par rig par bya'o ||*

[B13]-tr: {1} To ask whether Nirvana exists apart from the (accomplished: D) cessation of the conditioned dharmas[2165] is inappropriate, and to answer or think that it does is also

[2165] The phrase is not without problems. D would also allow a rendering as "exists apart from the conditioned factors that have ceased", but YBh$_c$ supports an action noun (**saṁskāranirodha*): "By destroying the conditioned dharmas, one attains Nirvana; if [someone asks]: '[As regards] Nirvana, is

inappropriate — so one should know. To ask whether it does not exist separately is also inappropriate, (and to answer or think so is likewise inappropriate, and the same holds good for the simultaneous affirmation or denial of both alternatives).

{2} Why? {3} Because Cessation (**nirodha*; Ch.: *nirvāṇa*) is distinctively/essentially *characterized* (*prabhāvita*) by [being] the mere coming to rest of the conditioned (**saṁskṛta-vyupaśama-mātra*) and by being (Ch.: and *is*) [essentially] different from the conditioned (**saṁskṛta-vailakṣaṇya*).

{4} Because [Cessation] *is* (Ch.: is manifested/indicated by) the mere coming to rest of the conditioned, to ask whether it exists separately or to (answer or) think so means to [conceptually] diversify what is beyond diversification.[2166]

{5} Because [Cessation] *is* [essentially] different from the conditioned, to ask whether it does not exist separately or to (answer or) think so means to diversify what is beyond diversification. ...

{6} Nor is it appropriate to think that Nirvana does not exist at all. ...

{7} One should [rather] know that Nirvana is existent as [a state that has] the character (*lakṣaṇa*) of [being] peaceful (**śānta*), beyond diversification (**niṣprapañca*), and accessible to personal experience [only] (**pratyātmavedanīya*).

1. If we follow the Tibetan version, Cessation is stated in {3} to be *prabhāvita* by the mere coming to rest of the conditioned, but in {4} this fact is taken up by the statement that Cessation simply *is* the coming to rest of the conditioned. This strongly suggests that *prabhāvita* is used here in an identificatory, definitional function, i.e., in the sense of "distinctively /essentially characterized as", amounting to "consisting in", and not in a causal sense; for the latter would only be possible if coming to rest (**vyupaśama*) were understood as a process and Cessation (**nirodha*) as the result, and on the condition that Cessation is not envisaged in

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there [something] different?', ..." (滅有為法證得涅槃。若謂涅槃為有異者, ...). An action noun is also corroborated by ASBh 74,10f (on the parallel passage AS_t P li 108a2-4): "If this Cessation were something other than the coming to an end of the conditioned factors, it would be unrelated to them [and hence] an [entirely] different entity. If it were nothing else, it would have the characteristic of pollution" (⟨*sacet*?⟩ *saṁskārāṇām uparamāt sa nirodho 'nyaḥ syāt, tadasaṁbadhyamāno 'rthāntara-bhūtaḥ syāt | athânanyaḥ syāt, saṁkleśalakṣaṇaḥ syāt* |). It appears, however, that the second argument makes sense only on the presupposition that Cessation is nothing different from the conditioned factors that are assumed to have ceased (and would therefore, like them, be polluted). Thus, in the first alternative, too, the expression 'something other than the coming to an end of the conditioned factors' would seem to imply the idea of a separate entity different from, and hence unrelated to, the conditioned factors that cease, in contrast to the concept of the mere coming to an end *of* these very factors. It is worth noting that in Hsüan-tsang's translation ($ASVy_c$ 733b2f) this alternative is rendered as "If ... this Cessation could be said to be different from those conditioned factors, ..." (若彼 ... 寂滅 與彼諸行 可說異者, ...). In the sūtra by which [B13] is obviously inspired and which is indeed quoted in AS_t P li 108a4-6, viz., $S\bar{A}_c$ no. 249 (esp. 60a2ff) ≈ AN no. 4.174 (II 161f), the question is probably whether after[1] the complete cessation of the six bases of impressions (*phassāyatana*) something different [from them] exists or not, etc.

[1] AN abl., AS_t *las*, but $S\bar{A}_c$. 盡…沒已 and Mp III 150,10 and 151,6-8 *etesu* ... *niruddhesu*.

[2166] AS_t P li 108a4f: *spros pa med pa spros par byed do*; cf. AN II 161,29, etc.: *appapañcaṁ papañceti*. ASBh 74,12 ($ASBh_t$ P śi 67a2f): "In this context, *prapañca* means inappropriate thinking ..." (*prapañcaḥ punar asminn arthe 'yoniśaś cintêti* ... [ed. °*ntyêti*]); cf. YBh_t P 'i 254b2 (D zi 220a7f; YBh_c 815a27f. — Incidentally, Matsumoto's long note on *asminn arthe* in BoBh 2,7 (M2: 172 n. 21) is entirely off the mark; the expression is current in the sense of "in this context", "in this connection": cf., e.g., AS 53,5 (ASBh 63,10; BAYER 2010: 131; Tib. *skabs 'dir*, just as in the case of BoBh 2,7 and ASBh 27,12); AKBh 223,16 (LO.SA. II 1365: "in the text with which we are dealing"); $AA\bar{A}_V$ 287,27 ($AA\bar{A}_W$ 31,11).

the ontological perspective, i.e., as unconditioned[2167] (in which case it could only be obtained or *revealed*). In the case of the second PredN in {3}, a causal interpretation of *prabhāvita* appears even less feasible, for how could anything be *produced* by its difference from something else? Rather, Cessation is distinctively and essentially *characterized* by its difference from the conditioned, or, as stated in {5}, *is* just different from it.

2. In the Chinese version, it is true, there is no such alternation of one and the same statement first with °*prabhāvita* and then without. Rather, Cessation is consistently stated to be, on the one hand, *prabhāvita* by the mere coming to rest of the conditioned and, on the other, just to *be* different from the conditioned. At least the occurrence of °*prabhāvita* also in {4} in connection with "coming to rest" may be a deliberate addition on the part of Hsüan-tsang, for my impression is that what he wants to express is that Cessation (as unconditioned) is merely *disclosed* by the coming to rest of the conditioned.

3. In view of sections {6} and {7}, there is indeed good reason for understanding Cessation, or final Nirvana, in this text as not being exhaustively described by a mere negation of the conditioned. Actually, Nirvana is explicitly stated to be not simply non-existent. But belonging to an entirely different ontological level, it can only be described *via negationis*. It can be *disclosed* only by the coming to rest of the conditioned, and it can be *characterized* only as a *state* where the conditioned *has* come to rest.

478. YBh$_t$ P zi 221a7–b1 (D zhi 210b4f; YBh$_c$ 663b29–c4)

[B14] *sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pas* rab tu phye ba *gnas ngan len du gtogs pa 'du byed gnas pa'i lus mi rtag pa la rtag par phyin ci log ... tu 'gyur bas | de'i phyir sdug bsngal yang ma yin bde ba yang ma yin pa'i tshor ba la ni ma rig pa bag la nyal zhes bya'o ||*
於非苦樂之所顯現 麁重所攝 所有安立行自體中, 於無常性 計常顛倒, ... 是故說彼不苦不樂受 無明所隨增。

[B14]-tr: Because one mistakes as permanent (**nitya*) the impermanent (**anitya*) [basis of] individual existence (**ātmabhāva*), which is a configuration of conditioned factors (**saṁskāra-saṁniveśa*?), specifically characterized by neither painful nor pleasant feeling (**aduḥkhāsukhavedanāprabhāvita*) and comprised in (or: infested with?) corruption (**dauṣṭhulya-saṁgṛhīta*, or *-parigṛhīta*?)[2168] ..., therefore it is said that ignorance (/misconception) (**avidyā*) adheres (**anuśete*) to neither painful nor pleasant feeling.

It makes no sense to take the basis of individual existence, i.e., either the body or the 'sixfold basis' (*ṣaḍāyatana*), to be *produced* by neither painful nor pleasant feeling. Cf. [B2] (§ 466), where the same statement was made about the *ālayavijñāna*, which in the course of systematization took over the position of the 'sixfold basis' as centre of individual existence.

479. YBh$_t$ P zi 231a7f (D zhi 219b5; YBh$_c$ 667a23-25)

[B15] *'das pa kha cig ni ji ltar nyams su myong ba dran pa kho na tsam yin la | kha cig ni mi 'dran la 'gags par* (sic DP) rab tu phye ba *kho na tsam* (Ch. 唯滅所顯) *yin pas byed pa med pa yin par rig par bya ste |*

2167 Cf. YBh$_t$ P zi 218b8 (YBh$_c$ 662c7), introducing the whole paragraph as "analysis of the unconditioned dharmas" (*chos 'dus ma byas rnams kyi rab tu dbye ba*).

2168 Cf. ASBh 55,14 (see § 466), where we find *dauṣṭhulyaprabhāvita* in an analogous context. This might be adduced as another possible case of an overlapping of the meanings of °*prabhāvita* and °*saṁgṛhīta* (cf. fn. 2160).

[B15]-tr: Some past [dharmas] are merely remembered in accordance with how they had been experienced, others are not [even] remembered but merely characterized as perished and thus without any function — so one should know.

To understand °*prabhāvita* here as "produced" would obviously result in an absurdity ("produced by having perished"). Rather, °*mātra* indicates a reductive purport. It is worth noting that in this passage the Tibetan translators have construed *rab tu phye ba* with the terminative instead of the usual instrumental, perhaps in order to make clear that there is no substratum left that could be characterized by a property: past things that are not even remembered are simply characterized (or designated?) *as* perished, without having left any trace.

480. YBh$_t$ P zi 232b5-8 (D zhi 221a2-4; YBh$_c$ 667c7-11; cf. S 2013: 472 # 5.5)

In connection with the question of the range of applicability of the term *kuśala* ("wholesome", "beneficial") — and analogously of the term *akuśala* (YBh$_t$ P zi 232b8–233a2) —, *kuśala* is stated to be applicable in five senses, the first two of which are:

{1} having a desired result (**iṣṭaphala*);

{2} being opposed to (or: the antidote of) [spiritual] pollution (**saṁkleśapratipakṣa*).

The text then continues:

[B16] {3} *kun nas nyon mongs pa nye bar zhi bas* rab tu phye ba *ni 'di lta ste | mya ngan las 'das pa'o ||*

{4} *rnam par dag pa'i gnas pas* rab tu phye ba *ni 'di lta ste | 'dod chags dang bral ba | tshe 'di la bde bar gnas pa dge ba 'phags pa la sogs pas gnas pa rnams kyi'o ||*

{5} *sems can la phan 'dogs pas* rab tu phye ba *ni 'di lta ste | 'dod chags dang bral ba rnams kho na'i ste | gzhan la snying brtse ba can gyi nyan thos rnams dang | byang chub sems dpa' rnams dang | de bzhin gshegs pa rnams kyi gzhan gyi don spyod pa'i dge ba sna tshogs gang dag yin pa rnams so ||*

[B16]-tr: {3} [Thirdly, something may be *kuśala*] in the sense of being distinctively characterized as the [accomplished] coming to rest of all pollution (**saṁkleśa-vyupaśama-prabhāvitataḥ*[2169]), viz., Nirvana.

{4} [Fourthly,] in the sense of being distinctively characterized as a pure spiritual state (**viśuddha-vihāra-prabhāvitataḥ*), viz., [the meditative states] of [persons] who have become free from attachment, when they abide in pure states that are blissful [already] in this life, like the 'Noble [States]'[2170] (**yaduta vītarāgāṇām āryādi-śubha-dṛṣṭa-dharma-sukha-vihāra-vihāriṇām*).

{5} [Fifthly,] in the sense of being distinctively characterized by benefiting [other] sentient beings (**sattvānugrahaprabhāvitataḥ*), viz., the various beneficial [acts] of altruistic practice (**parārthacaryā*) of those very [persons] free from desire (**vītarāgāṇām eva*), [i.e.,] of śrāvakas, bodhisattvas, and Tathāgatas, who (/insofar as they) have compassion for others.

1. In the case of {3}, it would be possible to take *prabhāvita* in the sense of "brought about" if Nirvana is understood as a spiritual state achieved by a process of extinguishing pollution. But in the corresponding item of the explanation of the term *akuśala*, viz., its application in the sense of **saṁkleśāvyupaśamaprabhāvita*, the fact that the process of pollution coming to rest has not yet taken place can hardly be a cause but at best a precondition for

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2169 The suffix °*tas* is not visible in Tib. but confirmed by Ch. (三, 雜染寂滅所顯故).

2170 I.e., the concentrative states of emptiness, transphenomenality and disinterestedness: (*śūnyatā-*, *ānimitta-*, *apraṇihita-samādhi*) and *nirodhasamāpatti*: BoBh$_D$ 63,20f; ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 508,15f (S 1982b: 464).

dharmas (probably: the whole of *saṁsāra*) being *akuśala*. The relation is rather one of *svabhāva* than of temporal causality: dharmas can be termed *akuśala* in the sense of being essentially characterized by [the fact that] pollution has not yet come to rest, i.e., in the sense of being ultimately insecure (*akṣema*).[2171] Accordingly, in the case of the corresponding aspect of *kuśala*, too, it is more probable that what is intended is that Nirvana may be termed *kuśala* in the sense of being constituted, i.e., essentially *characterized*, by the fact that pollution has come to rest. This seems to be confirmed by the explanation of the AKBh (202,7f) that Nirvana is *kuśala* in the highest sense (*paramārthena*) of ultimate security or welfare (*paramakṣematva*) because it *is*, i.e., consists in, the having come to rest of all suffering (*nirvāṇaṁ hi sarvaduḥkhavyupaśamaḥ*), 'suffering' (*duḥkha*) being substantially coextensive with 'pollution' (*saṁkleśa*)[2172] and being at any rate represented by the third of the latter's three components, viz., *janma-saṁkleśa*.

2. Likewise, it is, in {4}, the pure spiritual states *themselves* (or the factors of which they consist), and, in {5}, the altruistic activities *themselves* that are qualified by the respective kind of *kuśala*, and *not* anything *produced* by them.

481. YBh$_t$ P zi 243b7–244a2 (D zhi 231a1-3; YBh$_c$ 671c14-22)

[B17] *nyan thos kyi kun nas nyon mongs pa dang | rnam par byang ba'i gnas de yang mdor bsdu na | rgyu gsum gyis yongs su shes par bya ste |* {1} *ngo bo nyid dang |* {2} *rgyu dang |* {3} *nyes dmigs kyis so ||*

{ad 1} *mi'i lus 'di'i ngo bo nyid ni mtshan nyid gnyis kyis rab tu phye ba yin te | gzugs can gyis ni de las gzhan pa'i lus thams cad spyi'i mtshan nyid kyis* rab tu phye ba *yin no || rags pas ni so so rang gi mtshan nyid kyis* rab tu phye ba *yin te | mi gsal ba nyid kyis lha'i lus dang mi 'dra ba'i phyir ro ||*

{ad 2} *de'i rgyu yang rnam pa gsum ste | lus kyi spyi'i mtshan nyid kyi rgyu ni 'di lta ste | 'byung ba chen po bzhi po dag go || mi'i lus de'i so so'i rang gi mtshan nyid kyi rgyu ni rnam pa gnyis te | …*

[B17]-tr: This basis of pollution and purification (**saṁkleśavyavadānâśraya*, i.e., the human body) of the disciple (*śrāvaka*), should be understood in terms of three aspects (Ch. 相 = **ākāra*)[2173]: {1} its nature, {2} its causes, and {3} its disagreeable consequences (**ādīnava*).

{ad 1} As for the <u>nature</u> (**svabhāva*) of this human body, it is characterized (**prabhāvita*) by two characteristics (**lakṣaṇa*): [firstly,] by [being] material (*rūpin*), [which means that it] is characterized (**prabhāvita*) by a characteristic which all other bodies have in common [with it]; [secondly,] by [being] coarse (*audārika*), [which means that it] is [also] characterized (**prabhāvita*) by an individual characteristic, because it is different from the body of heavenly beings (*deva*) by not being luminous.

{ad 2} Its <u>cause</u>, on the other hand, is threefold: [firstly,] the cause of the common characteristic of [all] bodies, viz., the four gross elements (*mahābhūta*). [Secondly and thirdly,] the cause of the individual characteristic of the human body, [which] is twofold: …

[2171] Cf. AKBh 202,21: *saṁsāraḥ paramārthenâkuśalaḥ, sarvaduḥkhapravṛttyātmakatvena paramākṣematvāt*. Cf. also S 2013: 470–472.

[2172] This follows from AKBh 328,12-14, where it is stated that the *upādānaskandha*s are both *duḥkha*- and *samudaya-satya*, depending on whether they are viewed as *phala* or as *hetu*.

[2173] Tib. *rgyu* appears to presuppose **kāraṇa*, which seems less appropriate.

In this passage, the nature of the human body is expressly stated to be *prabhāvita* by two *lakṣaṇas*. Since *lakṣaṇa*, as has been shown (Pt. II § 362) and as is confirmed by the present passage where it specifies *svabhāva*, does not normally mean "cause" but rather "mark", "characteristic", especially in the sense of an *essential* and/or *distinctive* characteristic, and only in *this* sense "*constitutive* element", *prabhāvita* in [B17] can hardly mean "produced" and must mean "characterized". This is confirmed by the fact that in this text the *causes* of the human body are treated *separately* as an issue of its own and that in this connection *prabhāvita* is *not* used. Finally, the passage shows that *prabhāvita* need not mean "*specifically* characterized" and can also be used if the characteristic is not specific but still essential: materiality is not specific for the *human* body though nevertheless essential to it as a *body*.

482. YBh$_t$ P zi 250a1 (D zhi 236b4f; YBh$_c$ 674a19-21)

[B18] *gog pa'i bden pa yod na sems can rnams kyi mya ngan las 'das pa ni de mngon du byas pas* rab tu phye ba *yin gyi* | *bskyed pas* rab tu phye ba *ni ma yin no* ||

[B18]-tr: In view of the fact that the Truth of Cessation (*nirodhasatya*) is [permanently] in existence, the Nirvana of sentient beings is constituted by its (= the *nirodhasatya*'s) having been [spiritually] realized; it is not constituted by [its] having been produced.

1. At YBh$_t$ P zi 249b4f (YBh$_c$ 674a11f), the Truth of Cessation (*nirodhasatya*) is stated to be called as it is because of the cessation of the defilements (*kleśa*) and, finally, of all 'possessions' (*upadhi*, especially the *skandha*s). Then (249b6) a dilemma is raised: How can the Truth of Cessation be *permanent* if it comes about after not having been there before? If, on the other hand, it is indeed permanently in existence, why have all sentient beings not already entered Nirvana? The answer (249b6–250a1) is that the Truth of Cessation is indeed permanent and without cause but that only those are liberated who have realized or actualized (**sākṣāt-kṛ*) it by means of having removed all corruptions (*dauṣṭhulya*). The text then continues with [B18].

2. If we understand Nirvana in this passage as the *state* of liberation to be attained by the individual, it may be possible to take *prabhāvita* in a causal sense, viz., in the sense that the spiritual or 'existential' *state* of Nirvana or liberation is *brought about* by spiritually *realizing* the unconditioned, permanently existing *nirodhasatya*, which in itself cannot of course be produced. Even so, in view of Tib. using the perfect form for rendering what were probably ambivalent verbal nouns in the original, I prefer to take *prabhāvita* in the sense of "essentially characterized as" = "consisting in", admitting, however, the possibility of both explanations.

483. YBh$_t$ P 'i 30b4f (D zi 28a5f; YBh$_c$ 707a16-18)

[B19] *de la chos kyi dbyings rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid ni mtshan ma thams cad zil gyis mnan pa'i phyir gnas gyur pa de ni chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pas* rab tu phye ba *yin no* || *de de lta bu ma yin du zin na mi rtag pa dang bsam du rung bar 'gyur ba zhig na* | ....

界清淨法相者, 謂 此轉依 已能除遣一切相故 是善清淨法界所顯。若不爾, 此應無常, 應可思議。...

[B19]-tr: As for the [accomplished] purification of the 'Dharma-Sphere' (**dharmadhātu-viśuddhi*, cf. Ch. 法界清淨) as a characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) [of *āśrayaparivṛtti*]: the

[aforementioned] Renewal[2174] or Transmutation of the Basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) is characterized as (= consists in) the completely purified 'Dharma-Sphere' (**suviśuddha-dharmadhātu-prabhāvita-*, cf. Ch. 善清淨法界)[2175] because all phenomena (*nimitta*) have been removed.[2176] Otherwise, it would follow that [the *āśrayaparivṛtti*] is impermanent and conceivable, (but actually it is permanent and inconceivable).

The passage is one of those that support the equivalence of 'A is B-*prabhāvita*' and 'B is the *lakṣaṇa* of A'. At the same time, it stresses the permanence of *āśrayaparivṛtti* (in the ontological perspective), precluding thereby a causal process in the strict sense. If *prabhāvita* is taken in the sense of "brought about", the "bringing about" can only be understood as an unveiling or making visible. But *lakṣaṇa* rather suggests a characteristic (i.e., distinctive and/or essential) feature which makes a thing identifiable as what it is. And if it is justified to derive from Ch. an original **suviśuddha-dharmadhātu-prabhāvita*, an interpretation of *prabhāvita* as "brought about" in any sense whatsoever is hardly possible, because no process would be involved, since the "completely purified *dharmadhātu*" can only designate the final state of accomplished purification, i.e., Buddhahood, which is in fact the subject under discussion (*mahābodhi*: YBh_t P 'i 30a6; YBh_c 707a5).

3. 'Basic Section' of the *Yogācārabhūmi* and *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī*

484. YBh_{Bh} 128,10-11 and 14-15

[B20] *dvādaśākāram anāgatalakṣaṇaṁ veditavyaṁ* | *hetu*prabhāvita*m* | *anutpannaśarīraṁ* | *pratyayāpekṣaṁ* | ...
dvādaśākāraṁ pratyutpannalakṣaṇaṁ veditavyaṁ | *phala*prabhāvita*ṁ* | *utpannaśarīraṁ* | *samavahitapratyayaṁ* | ...

1. It is hard to believe that one of the marks of *future* factors should be that they *have been* produced by (or *have* arisen from) their [main] cause (*hetu*), still less so since the text expressly adds that, in contrast to present factors, their 'body' (*śarīra*) has *not* [yet] arisen (second mark) and that [for their arising] they require the [appropriate] conditions (*pratyaya*) (third mark). Likewise, it can hardly be a mark of present factors to have been produced from the *result* (whatever this might mean!). I rather prefer to follow the hint given by the Tibetan translation, where *hetuprabhāvita* is rendered as *rgyur rab tu phye ba* and *phalaprabhāvita* as *'bras bur rab tu phye ba*,[2177] i.e., taken to mean "distinctively characterized *as* cause (/result)".[2178] If we understand, in accordance with the definition of the *hetupratyaya* at YBh_{Bh} 110,18,[2179] the *hetu* as the (preexisting) Seed (*bīja*) of the respective dharma, it makes

[2174] I have chosen this rendering (in German: "Neugestaltung") of '*āśrayaparivṛtti*' in order to include the substantially different explanations of this process in terms of transmutation, purification from adventitious defilements, or replacement.

[2175] For the substantial equivalence of *dharmadhātuviśuddhi* and *viśuddho dharmadhātuḥ* see fn. 2212.

[2176] Tib. presupposes a form or derivate of *abhi-√bhū*, while Ch. (除遣) suggests a form of *vi-√bhū*. Cf. SAKUMA 1990: II 197 (iv) with n. 1048.

[2177] YBh_t P dzi 76a1 and 3f (D tshi 64b6 and 7).

[2178] I.e. as what one might call an 'essive'-tatpuruṣa, to be resolved as *hetutvena* (or *hetubhāvena*) *prabhāvitam*, etc. Cf., in this connection, also fn. 2180.

[2179] *tatra bījaṁ pratyayādhiṣṭhānam adhiṣṭhāya hetupratyayaḥ prajñāpyate*. Cf. also YBh_{Bh} 105,6. For the concept of *hetupratyaya*, see also fn. 2378.

good sense to qualify a future dharma as "characterized (*prabhāvita*) as [existing, for the time being, only in the form of its own] *hetu* (= *bīja*)". Accordingly, a present factor is "characterized as the 'fruit'/result [that has grown from this Seed/cause]", whereas a past dharma is marked by the fact that both its [main] cause (or rather: its causal state in the form of a Seed) and the result [of the latter], i.e., the factor itself as the 'fruit' of this Seed,[2180] have passed.[2181]

2. My translation of the passage would therefore run as follows:

[B20]-tr: The characteristic of a future [dharma] should be known to be twelvefold: [it is] distinctively characterized as (or: by [being in the state of]) cause; [its] 'body' (= the dharma as such, as an actually existing entity) has not yet arisen; [it] is waiting for conditions; ...

The characteristic of a present [dharma] should be known to be twelvefold: [it is] distinctively characterized as (or: by [being in the state of]) result; its 'body' has arisen; the conditions [required for its arising] have assembled (/become present); ...

3. In support of my interpretation, I should like to adduce BoBh$_D$ 188,22–189,1 (BoBh$_W$ 278,1-8), where we read that in the case of future conditioned factors the bodhisattva realizes that they exist as a cause (i.e., in a potential, seed-like state) but not yet as such (*teṣāṁ ... hetuto vidyamānatāṁ paśyati no tu svabhāvataḥ*), whereas the present conditioned factors exist as such (i.e., actually, as a result), and no longer as a cause (i.e., merely in a seed-like state) (*teṣāṁ svabhāvato vidyamānatāṁ samanupaśyati no tu hetutaḥ*).

485. YBh$_{Bh}$ 213,18f

[B21] *jāti⟨r⟩ jarāmaraṇaṁ ca duḥkhasatya*prabhāvite |[2182]

[B21]-tr: Birth and Aging-and-dying are essentially characterized by (/as [forming part of]) the Truth of Suffering.

A statement qualifying Birth and Aging-and-Dying as *produced* by the Truth of Suffering does not make sense. Rather, they are *characterized* by the Truth of Suffering, or they *consist in* or at least form part of[2183] the Truth of Suffering,[2184] as is evident from the old canonical formula of the latter: *jātir duḥkham, jarā duḥkhaṁ ... maraṇaṁ duḥkham*.[2185]

486. YBh$_{Bh}$ 215,8f

[B22] *kena kāraṇena hetupratyayena na pratyayāny etāny aṅgāni* | *svabhāvabīja-*

[2180] Cf. YVy P yi 171a8–b1 (D 'i 137b3): "'Its [being a] fruit has passed' means: its *state of* fruit (**phalabhāva*) has passed" (*'bras bu 'das pa zhes bya ba ni 'bras bu'i dngos po 'das pa la bya'o*).

[2181] YBh$_t$ P dzi 76a5-6 (D tshi 65a2): *rgyu 'das pa dang ... 'bras bu 'das pa*; the Skt. ms. has a lacuna here.

[2182] Ed.: *jātijarāmaraṇaṁ duḥkhasatyapravibhaktaṁ*. My reading follows the ms. (with the exception of emending *jāti-* to *jāti⟨r⟩*). Cf. YBh$_t$ D tshi 110a2 (P dzi 125b1): *skye ba dang* (D : om. P) *rga shi ni sdug bsngal gyi bden pas rab tu phye ba yin no* ||.

[2183] Cf. fn. 2160.

[2184] Namely, if the Truth of Suffering is, as is often the case, understood in a *concrete* sense, viz., as the totality of the dharmas that are unpleasant or unsatisfactory in terms of the threefold *duḥkhatā*.

[2185] NidSa # 23.13b; ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II: 118,4f; BoBh$_D$ 167,15f; AS 37,13f (reconstr., but see ASBh 49,8); cf. Vi 402b7f; Vin I 10 (*jāti pi dukkhā*, etc.).

*pratyaya*prabhāvita*tvād*[2186] *dhetupratyayasya* |

[B22]-tr: Why are these links [of the twelve-membered chain of arising-in-dependence] not conditions in terms of the *hetu*-condition? Because the *hetu*-condition is distinctively characterized as the condition consisting in the Seed of the 'own-being' [of the result].

It is obvious that the purport of the answer is to show *what* a *hetupratyaya* is, rather than to inform us about its *origin*. Actually, at YBh_{Bh} 110,18 (see § 484.1) the *hetupratyaya* is *equated* with the Seed (*bīja*).

487. YBh_{Bh} 231,14-16

[B23] {1} *katīnām aṅgānāṁ nirodha āsravakṣaya*prabhāvita*ḥ* | *trayāṇāṁ* |

{2} {2a} *katīnām aṅgānāṁ nirodhaḥ pratyayakṣaya*prabhāvita*ḥ* | {2b} *teṣām eva trayāṇāṁ*, {2c} *tadanyāṅgapratyayabhūtatvāt* |

{3} {3a} *katīnām aṅgānāṁ nirodhaḥ vedanākṣaya*prabhāvita*ḥ* | {3b} *prahīṇeṣu kleśeṣu upadhinirodhakāle* (ms.) *ihaîva sarvaveditoparamād ekasya* ||

[B23]-tr: {1} The cessation of how many links is constituted by (/is characterized as = consists in) the wasting away of contaminants? [The cessation] of three [links].

{2} {2a} The cessation of how many links is constituted by (/characterized as) the wasting away of the [decisive] condition(s)? {2b} [The cessation] of these same three [links], {2c} because they are the [decisive] condition(s) of the other links.

{3} {3a} The cessation of how many links is constituted by (/characterized as) the wasting away of feeling? {3b} [The cessation] of one link, {3c} because when the defilements have been abandoned, all feeling (/experience) comes to an end at the moment the 'possessions' (= *skandhas*) [of that person] cease, in (= at the end of) this very life.

1. It is obvious that the three links the cessation of which is 'made to emerge' (*prabhāvita*) by the wasting away or destruction of the evil influxes or contaminants (*āsrava*) are these very same contaminants, namely those links that make up the 'track of defilements' (*kleśa-vartman*) or 'pollution in terms of defilements' (*kleśasaṁkleśa*), i.e., ignorance (*avidyā*), craving (*tṛṣṇā*) and clinging/grasping (*upādāna*).[2187] This is clear from {2}, where the three links concerned are stated to be the condition of all the other links, which makes sense only if what is meant are the three links consisting in defilements, because defilements invariably entail karmic actions and rebirth but not the other way round. Moreover, in {3} the one link the cessation of which is 'made to emerge' by the wasting away of feeling (*vedanā*) can only be the link 'feeling' itself, as {3c} explains, because the defilements the abandonment of which entails the coming to an end of all feeling cannot be meant since they would comprise three links. Thus, {3} corroborates beyond doubt that in [B23] the links that have ceased and the factors by the wasting away of which their cessation is 'made to emerge' are identical.[2188]

[2186] YBh_t P dzi 126a6 (D tshi 110b4) *rang gi sa bon* ("[the product's] own (=specific) Seed") has no equivalent for °*bhāva*°, but YBh_c 324c19 (自體種子) confirms *svabhāvabīja*°.

[2187] Cf., e.g., YBh_{Bh} 218,10f; AS 27,14f (AS_G 26,22f; read ⟨*kleśa*⟩*saṁkleśa*° with KRITZER 1999: 53 n.116); $DBhS_R$ 6I; AKBh 134,6f.

[2188] Cf. also T 42.1828: 377a18-20:

That [the cessation] of three links is 'manifested (/distinguished) by the exhaustion of contaminants' means: *avidyā*, *tṛṣṇā* and *upādāna* are factors that are contaminants; therefore, the state when they are completely exterminated is stated to be 'manifested(/distinguished) by the exhaustion of contaminants'.

2. Now, it would theoretically be possible to understand *°prabhāvita* in a causal sense if one takes the cessation as the accomplished result and the wasting away as the process culminating in this cessation. But in my opinion this would be a rather trivial statement. Moreover, the expression *āsravakṣaya* is generally associated with the state of an arhat, i.e., suggests the accomplished result, and so does *sarvaveditoparama*, more so because it is expressly connected with the cessation of the *skandha*s, i.e., with the arhat's entering into Nirvana without remainder. My impression is therefore that the purpose of the passage is to locate the crucial stages of liberation — viz., the destruction of the *āsrava*s that are the decisive condition (*pratyaya*) for rebirth and the destruction of all feeling indicating entrance into final Nirvana — in the process of the reversal of dependent origination. This means that the stages of liberation are *equated* with stages of the reversal of dependent origination, and for this reason I prefer to understand *°prabhāvita* also in this passage in the sense of "distinctively /essentially characterized as" or "constituted by", "consisting in", though "indicated by" or "established as" would also appear possible.

488. *Ābhiprāyikagāthā-nirdeśa* (ad *gāthā* 3)

ĀbhGN 96[=*67*],14-16, reprinted in ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 342,18f:

[B24] ... *caturṣu duḥkhasamudayanirodhamārgasatyeṣv ekaikasminn anityādicaturākāra-jñānaśuddhi*prabhāvita*tvād*[2189] *adhiprajñaṁ śikṣāyāḥ* |

[B24]-tr: ... because the training concerning insight is constituted/characterized by the purity of the comprehension of four aspects, viz., impermanence, etc., with regard to each among the four Truths, viz., suffering, [its] origin, [its] cessation and the path.

In this passage, too, one might consider the possibility of understanding the 'training concerning insight' (*adhiprajñaṁ śikṣā*) as being *produced* from the *process* of a gradual purification (*śuddhi*) of the comprehension of the four aspects. Still, since the concept of 'training' (*śikṣā*) itself suggests a process this would make sense only if the 'training concerning insight' is taken as the higher stage of a process of training that presupposes a preliminary phase of purification. Even so, we may as well understand the passage to mean that this higher stage is *characterized* by an (already accomplished) purity of the comprehension of the four aspects, and hence take *prabhāvita* in the sense of "characterized by". This would also work if the 'training concerning insight' is interpreted in a more comprehensive sense, for in this case the passage could mean that this training is *characterized* by the [gradual] purification of the comprehension of the four aspects. Since in the case of the 'training concerning correct behaviour' (*adhiśīlaṁ śikṣā*) the fourfold purity (*viśuddhi*) seems to

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Exactly through destroying these three conditions, the remaining links, too, become exhausted. Therefore [the cessation of the aforementioned three links] is [also] stated to be 'manifested (/distinguished) by the exhaustion of the conditions'.

三支**漏盡所顯**者, 謂 無明愛取 是漏法。故斷此盡位 名**漏盡所顯**。即由滅此三緣 餘支亦盡。故言 **緣盡所顯**。

[2189] My emendation. In ĀbhGN, MAEDA reads *°śuddhena prabhāṣi°*, but both the ŚrBh ms. (fol. 1*a7) and the YBh ms (fol. 109b2) have *°siddhiprabhāvi°* (*°vi°* is somewhat blurred in the ŚrBh ms. and could in fact be read as *°ṣi°*). YBh$_t$ (P dzi 246b1: *shes pa dag pa...s ... rab tu phye ba'i phyir*) and YBh$_c$ (367b11f: 由此淨智之所顯故) confirm *°prabhāvita°* but presuppose *°śuddhi°* or *°śuddha°* against the mss., as is also corroborated by the gāthā (... *caturākārajñānaśuddhaḥ sadā bhavet*). I prefer *°śuddhi°* because it involves the emendation of only one akṣara and because it construes much better, and this is actually also the reading adopted in ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II.

qualify this training from the outset,[2190] I suppose that the 'training concerning insight' is also meant to be characterized by the purity of the comprehension of the four aspects from the outset, i.e., distinctively and essentially.

489. *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ*

YBh$_{ms}$ 133b1f (YBh$_t$ P dzi 296a5-7; D tshi 254a6–b1; YBh$_c$ 385a24-27):

[B25] *asya khalu bhāṣitasya saṁkṣiptena vyākaraṇaṁ bhavati | samāsato Bhagavatā śrāddhasya caturākārā pratipat*, *paridīpitā* ⟨ | ⟩ *bhogasaṁvarttanī sugatisaṁvarttanī āpāyikaduḥkhanivṛtti*prabhāvitā *ca sarvaduḥkhanivṛtti*prabhāvitā *ca* ⟨ | ⟩ *idam atra saṁkṣiptena vyākaraṇaṁ veditavyaṁ* |

[B25]-tr: This statement (viz., Uv 28.2) is now briefly explained [as follows]. In short, the Exalted One has elucidated a fourfold path for a faithful [person]: one that is conducive to [mundane objects of] enjoyment (wealth, etc.), one that is conducive to heaven, one that is distinctively characterized by [entailing][2191] the cessation of the suffering of evil existences, and one that is distinctively characterized by [entailing] the cessation of all suffering. This should, with regard to the [above statement], be regarded as the explanation in a few words.

Since the path cannot be produced by the goal to which it leads, *prabhāvita* can here hardly mean anything but "specifically characterized by X" or "distinguished by X". However, since X is the goal, and not the essence or an essential part of the path, "characterized by" does not, in this case, amount to an equation, i.e., is not equivalent to "consisting of/in" or "having the nature of". It is, however, important to note that in the case of the first two goals the word °*saṁvarttana* had been used, and not °*prabhāvita*. There must be a reason. I suspect that the change in phraseology has to do with the fact that the last two effects are not positively brought about or caused but rather consist in the cessation of the causation of, respectively, a certain kind of suffering or all suffering. In other words: the cessation of suffering is, as an absence (*abhāva*), not something caused, like a thing is, nor is the existing suffering destroyed; rather, the respective paths are distinctively and essentially characterized by having the effect that no further suffering is produced.

490. *Nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ*

NirupBh ## 2.2.0–2.2.1 ([B26]) and # 2.2.4.1.d2 ([B27]):

[B26] *avyābādhanirvṛtiḥ katamā? yaḥ ... āśrayapari⟨vṛtti*prabhāvito *'nāsravo⟩ dhātuḥ*,

[B26]-tr: What is extinction [consisting in] freedom from harm? The Immaculate Sphere ... that is constituted (/ insofar as it has been disclosed) by the Renewal of the Basis.

[B27] *sa (= anāsravo dhātuḥ) tath⟨at⟩āviśuddhi*prabhāvita *ekāntanirmalaḥ*.

[B27]-tr: This [Immaculate Sphere] is constituted (/disclosed) by the purification of Suchness (or True Reality) [and] completely free from stains.

[2190] ĀbhGN 96[=*67*],2-8 (reprinted in ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 342,7-12, where the text has rightly been corrected to *caturvidhā śīlaviśuddhiḥ paridīpitā* |).

[2191] This ellipsis may be the reason why Hsüan-tsang does not render °*prabhāvita* in his usual manner but modifies the phraseology from "[conduct] characterized by the cessation of X" to "pure conduct that frees from X" (離 X 清淨修行).

1. If we take 'extinction' as well as the 'Immaculate Sphere' as a spiritual or 'existential' *state* obtained as the final result of spiritual purification,[2192] it would be possible to understand °*prabhāvita* in a causal sense, i.e., as indicating that this spiritual state or level has been generated by the process of *āśrayaparivṛtti* equivalent to the process of the purification of the *tathatā* (from adventitious impurities). By the same token, however, we can also understand °*prabhāvita* in the sense of "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as" and take the passages to mean that the 'Immaculate Sphere' as the state of final extinction is *characterized* as such by, or consists in, the [accomplished] *āśrayaparivṛtti* or purification of the *tathatā*.

2. Yet since the 'Immaculate Sphere' is subsequently (NirupBh # 2.2.3) stated to be unborn, unproduced and unconditioned, it is also, and perhaps primarily, envisaged in its *ontological* dimension, i.e., as basically identical with the *tathatā*, and from this perspective the causal interpretation is problematic. What would be meaningful is that the 'Immaculate Sphere' is *manifested* or disclosed (*prabhāvita*) in its intrinsic purity by the *accomplished* process of *āśrayaparivṛtti* or purification of the *tathatā* (i.e., its own accomplished purification from adventitious stains or obscurations). Alternatively, what would also make sense is that final 'extinction' is the (unconditioned) 'Immaculate Sphere' insofar as it is *distinctively characterized* (*prabhāvita*) by *āśrayaparivṛtti* (as a state resulting from an accomplished process) or, in other words, by the fact that the purification of the *tathatā* (which is ontologically identical with the 'Immaculate Sphere') from adventitious stains has been accomplished.

491. *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* III.10.iv

YBh_t P 'i 344b2-4 (D zi 301a3-5) ≈ YBh_c 852b18-20:

[B28] *de la kha cig blo ma rdzogs pa'i phyir 'di snyam du sems te | tshor ba ni gnyis kho nar zad de | bde ba dang | sdug bsngal ba'o || sdug bsngal ba yang ma yin | bde ba yang ma yin no zhes bya ba gang yin pa de ni bde ba dang sdug bsngal ba med pa tsam gyis* rab tu phye ba*r zad pa'i phyir bde ba dang | sdug bsngal ba nye bar zhi ba kho na'i dbang du byas nas bcom ldan 'das kyis btags pa yin no snyam ste | ...*

[B28]-tr: In this connection, some [masters], because their understanding is imperfect, think like this: "There are only two feelings: pleasant (**sukha*) and painful (**duḥkha*). [The alleged third feeling] that is [stated] to be neither painful nor pleasant (**aduḥkhā-sukha*) [is actually not a third kind of feeling but] is characterized by [being] (= consists in) nothing but the absence of pleasant and painful [feeling] (**sukha-duḥkhâbhāva-mātra-prabhāvita*; YBh_c: 然唯苦樂無性所顯)). Therefore, it is with reference to (**adhikṛtya*) the mere coming to rest (**vyupaśama*) of both pleasant and painful [feeling] that the Exalted One has spoken of (or: used the designation of: **prajñapta*) [a neither painful nor pleasant feeling].

If °*prabhāvita* were to be taken in a causal sense, the passage would mean that the neither painful nor pleasant feeling is produced, or *arises*, from the absence of the both painful and pleasant feeling. This would, however, imply its existence as a third category of feeling, which would be incompatible with the claim of the aforementioned masters that no such third kind of feeling exists. Actually, the purport of the passage can only be to show what the alleged neither painful nor pleasant feeling really *is*, viz., the mere absence of both painful and pleasant feelings. This purport would seem to be underlined by the addition of °*mātra* ("merely", "nothing but"). Thus, in this case too the meaning "essentially characterized as

[2192] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 99,18-20.

(= consisting in) X" for °*prabhāvita* works well. An alternative (though, to my mind, a less probable one) might be to understand°*prabhāvita* as "established, promulgated, taught on the basis of X".

492. *Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* I.7.i

YBh$_t$ P 'i 191b1 (D zi 168a5f) ≈ YBh$_c$ 790c26-28:

[B29] *mya ngan las 'das pa spros pa med pa so so rang rig pa ni 'du byed med pa tsam gyis* rab tu phye ba*r zad pas na dngos por gdags su mi rung ngo* ||

[B29]-tr: Nirvana, being beyond diversification (*niṣprapañca*) and to be personally experienced (*pratyātmavedanīya*), is characterized by/as the mere (or complete?) absence of conditioned factors (**saṁskārābhāvamātraprabhāvita*; YBh$_c$: 唯是無行所顯) and therefore cannot be designated as an entity (*bhāva*, 有).

In this passage as well the addition of °*mātra* indicates that what is meant is *not* that Nirvana is *produced* by the cessation of conditioned factors (which would anyway be problematic in view of its being unconditioned) but rather a description, or indication, of its *nature* by way of negation, in order to show that it cannot be regarded as an entity in the way, or in analogy to how, conditioned things exist. Thus, in this passage, too, the meaning "distinctively /essentially characterized by (or: as, i.e., consisting in) X" appears appropriate, although here too "established [as a mere denomination] with reference to X" or "indicated by X" would also make sense.

493. *Śrāvakabhūmi*

In the *Śrāvakabhūmi*, I have so far noted only one occurrence, viz., ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 503,9-11:

[B30] *tatra sarvo bhāvanāmārgaḥ pratyavekṣya pratyavekṣya mīmāṁsāmanaskāreṇa prahīṇāprahīṇatāṁ yathāpratilabdhamārgābhyāsa*prabhāvita*ḥ* |

[B30]-tr: The whole Path of Cultivation is distinctively/essentially characterized by the [fact that], each time one has examined, by means of concentrative attention consisting in investigation, [the extent to which the defilements] have already been abandoned or have not yet been abandoned, one repeats the practice (*abhyāsa*) of the Path as one has attained it [at the stage of the *darśanamārga*].

The Path of Cultivation is *not*, of course, *produced* by the repeated practice of the Path (in a sense involving a temporal sequence of cause and effect) but rather *consists* in this repeated practice, *bhāvanā* and *abhyāsa* being quasi-synonyms. Thus *prabhāvita* is already used in its typical Yogācāra meaning in this text as well, which is almost certainly older than the Saṁdh. The sentence as a whole cannot be an interpolation because without it the *mīmāṁsā-manaskāra*, which is an indispensable element of a set of seven *manaskāra*s crucial for the structure of the ŚrBh, would be missing. It has, however, to be admitted that Hsüan-tsang's rendering of the passage[2193] does not show his usual rendering of *prabhāvita*, nor any other equivalent.

[2193] YBh$_c$ 476b10-12:

One should know that on this [stage] (*tatra*) the Path as one has obtained it is well cultivated (*yathāpratilabdhamārgābhyāsa*) insofar as by means of concentrative attention consisting in investigation (*mīmāṁsāmanaskāreṇa*) one examines repeatedly (*pratyavekṣya pratyavekṣya*), on the whole Path of Cultivation (*bhāvanāmarga*), [the extent to which the defilements] have already been abandoned or have not yet been abandoned (*prahīṇāprahīṇatām*).

當知 此中 由觀察作意 於一切修道 數數觀察已斷未斷 如所得道 而正修習。

Thus, I cannot exclude the possibility that his translation is based on a slightly different wording in which °*prabhāvita* was missing.[2194]

4. Reconsideration of Some Occurrences of *prabhāvita* Discussed by Matsumoto

494. RGV II.4 and MSABh 34,8f (ad MSA IX.4c)

494.1. The only passage treated by Matsumoto for which he (M1: 205a) unconditionally accepts the use of °*prabhāvita* in a sense that excludes a causal and temporal relationship is RGVV 72,9-10:

[B31] *trividhabuddhakāya*prabhāvita*tvaṁ hi tathāgatatvam* |

[B31]-tr: Being a Tathāgata means, of course, to be constituted (= essentially and distinctively characterized) by the threefold 'body' of a Buddha.

494.2. However, in the case of another RGV passage (from the commenting verses),[2195] which also defines Buddhahood, viz., RGV II.4ab (80,7):

[B32] *buddhatvam avinirbhāgaśukladharma*prabhāvita*m* |,[2196]

he argues for a different interpretation of °*prabhāvita*. According to Matsumoto, this line means that Buddhahood has been *produced* (生み出された) by inseparable 'white' properties.[2197] In support of his interpretation, he[2198] refers to MSA IX.4c, where Buddhahood is qualified as *śukladharmamaya*. He understands this expression in a causal sense because the *Bhāṣya*

[B33] *śukladharmamayaṁ ca buddhatvaṁ pāramitādīnāṁ kuśalānāṁ tadbhāvena parivṛtteḥ* | (MSABh 34,8f)

justifies the statement with the argument that the Perfections (*pāramitā*) and the other wholesome (*kuśala*) [factors of the bodhisattva path] are transformed into it (sc. into Buddhahood)[2199] (*tadbhāvena parivṛtteḥ*). This causal connection of the wholesome factors with Buddhahood is, according to Matsumoto,[2200] furthermore supported by MSA IX.1-2, where it is stated that Buddhahood is obtained because through the accumulation of immeasurable wholesome [factors] (*ameyaiḥ kuśalācayaiḥ*) all obstacles (*āvaraṇa*) have vanished in the

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[2194] Hsüan-tsang's rendering 於一切修道 ("on the whole Path of Cultivation") might suggests that he had a locative (**sarvabhāvanāmārge* ?) before him. If this was the case, °*abhyāsaprabhāvitaḥ* would not construe. Hsüan-tsang's translation suggests °*abhyāso veditavyaḥ*, but it could also be that 當知 is merely his addition and that his text had simply °*abhyāsaḥ*. Still, we should also consider the possibility that he had the transmitted text before him, perhaps with some minor variant or mistake, and preferred rendering it ad sensum, disregarding *prabhāvita* because it seemed to add little to the content of the sentence.

[2195] On the structure of the RGV(V) see Takasaki 1966: 10–19 and S 1971: 123–130.

[2196] M1: 197b18–198b9 (text [30]); 199b19–200a2.

[2197] M1: 198b7-9.

[2198] M1: 198b10–199a17.

[2199] M1: 199a5: それ (buddhatva) に転じる (parivṛtti) から.

[2200] M1: 199a18–b19.

course of time. I find Matsumoto's argumentation problematic in several regards, as I shall try to show in the following paragraphs (§§ 494.3–494.7).

494.3 There is no guarantee that the 'white' dharmas of RGV II.4 are the same as the wholesome factors of MSABh 34,8f. On the contrary, the 'white' dharmas of RGV II.4 are expressly characterized as inseparable (*avinirbhāgavṛtti*), i.e., of course: inseparable from Buddhahood, whereas the wholesome factors of MSABh 34,8f still have to be transformed into Buddhahood (or, perhaps, rather into its properties). Hence, the 'white' dharmas of RGV II.4 are the properties of Buddhahood, as is confirmed by the next verse (*buddhadharmaiḥ*), while the wholesome factors of MSABh 34,8f belong to the bodhisattva path. Thus, even if we admit that according to MSABh 34,8f Buddhahood is the result of a transformation of the wholesome factors of the path, this cannot be the purport of RGV II.4. Actually, RGV II.5 expressly characterizes the dharmas under discussion as something Buddhahood is *endowed* with[2201] (*yukta*), and not as something it is produced from.

494.4. It may be worth considering *tad-* in *tadbhāvena* at MSABh 34,9 as referring less to Buddhahood[2202] than to the 'white' dharmas, or at least as referring to Buddhahood with the *implication* that it consists of an analogous set of 'white' or beneficial dharmas.[2203] In other words, I tend to take the sentence to mean that Buddhahood is *śukladharmamaya* because the wholesome (*kuśala*) factors of the path are transformed into a set of 'white' dharmas constituting Buddhahood, or into Buddhahood as made up by these 'white' dharmas. If this is correct, the 'white' factors in MSA IX.4c would indeed correspond to those of RGV II.4, i.e., they would be the completely pure and perfect *buddhadharma*s, but the compound *śukla-dharmamaya* would have to be understood not, as Matsumoto does, as "arisen from 'white' dharmas" but as "made of, i.e., constituted by or consisting of, 'white' dharmas", as the Tibetan translation (*chos dkar (po'i) rang bzhin*) actually takes it.[2204] This, then, would corroborate that in the parallel expression *śukladharmaprabhāvita* at RGV II.4 we also have to understand *°prabhāvita* not in a causal meaning but as "constituted by" in the sense of "distinctively/essentially characterized by".

494.5. MSABh 34,8f may mean that the wholesome factors of the bodhisattva path are actually *transformed* into *buddhadharma*s. This would imply that a chain of moments consisting in certain psychic (and physical?) dharmas is gradually purified, to the effect that the former, imperfect moments are followed by ever more pure ones and finally, when

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2201 Cf. also MSA IX.12c: *buddhatvaṁ śukladharmapravaraguṇayutā āśrayasyânyathāptiḥ*.

2202 This is indeed how the pronoun is understood in the Chinese translation, where we read that the 'white' dharmas constitute the Buddha's 'body' because he has transformed the six *pāramitā*s and all the other wholesome dharmas [of the bodhisattva-path] into Buddhahood (T 31.1604: 602a28f: 白法為佛身者，轉六波羅蜜等一切善法為佛體故。).

2203 The latter alternative seems to be supported by Sthiramati (SAVBh P mi 122b4f; D mi 108b1f), who, however, only comments on the verse, taking IX.4c to mean that Buddhahood has both been brought about by 'white' dharmas and consists of such dharmas. *Asvabhāva (SAṬ P bi 74b2) does not comment on the sentence.

2204 MSA(Bh)$_t$ P phi 163a1 and 4 (D phi 152b6 and 153a1). — The suffix-like *°maya* "made of" is somewhat similar to *°prabhāvita* in that its meaning also oscillates between a causal and an identificatory relation, as is evident from the fact that it is rendered into Tibetan sometimes as *(las) byung ba*, sometimes as *(kyi) rang bzhin* (cf. *AKBh-I* pt. 1: 288; M1: 220f n. 73). Cf. also *AiGr* II.2: 770, enumerating, in accordance with Pāṇini, various connotations of *°maya*, like "daraus gemacht", "davon herrührend", "daraus bestehend".

Buddhahood is attained, by entirely perfect ones. The latter would then, inspite of their perfection, be conditioned factors. This is the view of the full-fledged Vijñānavāda system as known from Hsüan-tsang's *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* or from the **Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa* (*Fo-ti ching lun* 佛地經論: T 26.1530). But this view is different from the position of the RGV(V), where both Buddhahood itself and its properties or *guṇa*s are stated to be unproduced (*akṛtaka*: RGV II.5) and unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*).[2205] Buddhahood is endowed with these qualities by its very nature (*buddhaguṇaiḥ prakṛtiyogāt*: RGVV 42,3; °*guṇayukta⟨ḥ⟩ svabhāvataḥ*: RGV I.42). It is difficult to see how in this system the unproduced Buddhahood or its equally unproduced properties could be produced by the factors of the Path. Buddhahood as well as its inherent properties can only be purified from external obscurations (and in this sense *manifested* or revealed) by means of the wholesome factors of the Path, as the author of MSA IX.1–3 actually puts it.[2206] Nor is a causal relationship between Buddhahood and its own properties possible. Rather, the properties are already contained in Buddhahood just like jewels in a box that is opened (MSA IX.2cd, 3d). For this systematic reason too °*prabhāvita* at RGV II.4 should not be taken as "produced from" but rather as "constituted by" or "[essentially] characterized by".

494.6. Matsumoto (M1: 200a) argues that if °*prabhāvita* had a copula-like function, expressing an equation, it would not make any difference to say A-*prabhāvitam* B or B-*prabhāvitam* A because both would express the same equation (A=B). But the function of the copula is not necessarily to express equivalence. It may as well express inclusion or subsumption, or attribution of a property, and in these cases the predication cannot be reversed. The correct statement "A horse is a mammal" is not, of course, equivalent to "A mammal is a horse", which, as a general statement, is clearly false. Even in the case of coextensive concepts, a categorial difference may prevent the simple reversal of the predication. Let us assume that a special bird (X) is characterized by a specific blue colour (Y) not occurring anywhere else. In this case, we could say "The X-bird is Y-blue" or "The X-bird is specifically characterized by Y-blue", but not "Y-blue (subject) is the X-bird (predicate noun)", or "Y-blue is specifically characterized by the X-bird". We would rather have to use another formulation, e.g. "A Y-blue thing is an X-bird", or "Y-blue specifically characterizes an X-bird". The categorial distinction between a thing and its property, between substantive and adjective, inherent in the Indo-European languages, would necessitate a shift in the mode of expression. Therefore, Matsumoto's argument is not cogent.

494.7. Even more surprising is the fact that in the case of the statement under discussion ([B32]), viz., that Buddhahood is *śukladharmaprabhāvita* ("A is B-*prabhāvita*"), the reverse statement is indeed also found, provided that we accept *dharmakāya* as equivalent to Buddhahood and *guṇa* as equivalent to *śukladharma*. In another commenting verse, we read:

[B34] *guṇā dvātriṁśad ity ete*[2207] *dharmakāya*prabhāvit*āḥ* (RGV III.37; cf. also RGVV 77,1),

which represents the pattern "B is A-*prabhāvita*", thus the reverse of [B32]. The question is how to understand °*prabhāvita* in this passage. One possibility would be to take it to mean

[2205] RGV I.5; RGVV 85,7 (read *ākāśavad asaṁskṛtaguṇāvinirbhāgavṛtty api tathāgatatvam* with ms. B and Tib. *'jug pa yang*); cf. also 73,3.

[2206] MSA IX.1–2: ...°*āvaraṇakṣayāt sarvākārajñatāvāptiḥ ... vivṛtā ratnapeṭêva buddhatvaṁ* ...; IX.3: ... *sarvāvṛtīnaṁ kṣayāt ... buddhatā ratnānām iva ... peṭā samudghāṭitā*.

[2207] I.e., the 32 immaterial properties of the Buddha, viz., the ten *bala*s, etc.

that these qualities are manifested, displayed, by the *dharmakāya*, but to assume that they are characterized by essentially being, or simply essentially are, [part of] the *dharmakāya* would make good sense as well. At any rate, in view of what has been said in § 494.5, even at RGV III.37 *prabhāvita* should not, against Jñānaśrīmitra[2208] (whose *sambhogakāya*-centred theory of the Buddha is surely different from that of the RGV), be understood in the sense of a causal relationship (*tadutpatti*) in the strict sense. Even if a causal interpretation of RGV III.37 were accepted (i.e., *dharmakāya* → [*buddha*]*guṇa*s, A → B), it would be different from the causal interpretation proposed by Matsumoto for RGV II.4, which expresses the reverse relationship (i.e., [*buddha*]*dharma*s → *buddhatva*, B → A). For Matsumoto, for whom causality implies a temporal sequence,[2209] this could only mean that the *guṇa*s (of the Path) produce the *dharmakāya*, which in its turn gives rise to the *buddhaguṇa*s. But such a causal interpretation appears incompatible with the characterization of the *buddhaguṇa*s as intrinsic to Buddhahood and as unconditioned (§ 494.5).

Mutual causality would, however, not be possible as long as causality is considered to imply a temporal sequence, as Matsumoto presupposes.

495. MSABh 34,7f (ad MSA IX.4ab)

[B35] {1} *sarvadharmāś ca buddhatvaṁ,* {2} *tathatāyā abhinnatvāt* {3} *tadviśuddhi-*prabhāvita*tvāc ca buddhatvasya* | {4} *na ca kaścid dharmo 'sti parikalpitena dharmasvabhāvena* |

495.1. In the above passage, too, Matsumoto understands °*prabhāvita* in a causal sense, taking {1}–{3} to mean that

[B35]-tr(M) {1} 'All dharmas are Buddhahood': {2–3} because as regards Buddhahood, *tathatā* is not different, and because it has been produced by the purification of the latter (= *tathatā*).[2210]

In order to support his interpretation, Matsumoto adduces two passages in which a similar idea is expressed in such a way that instead of a tatpuruṣa compound ending in °*prabhāvita* we have a bahuvrīhi ending in °*lakṣaṇa*, which he considers as conveying a causal meaning (see Pt. II § 362).

495.2. The first passage is MSABh 45,5 (ad MSA IX.60; M1: 201b: [33]):

[B36] (*svābhāviko*) *dharmakāya āśrayaparivṛttilakṣaṇaḥ* |

Matsumoto takes this statement to mean that the *dharmakāya* has *āśrayaparivṛtti* as its indispensible cause (要因), and in support of his interpretation he adduces Sthiramati's commentary:

[B36]-com: *nam kun gzhi rnam par shes pa la yod pa'i gzung ba dang 'dzin pa'i dri ma spangs nas chos kyi dbyings me long lta bu'i ye shes su gyur pa na chos kyi sku zhes bya'o* || (SAVBh P mi 152a5f; D mi 135b6).

[2208] JñN 434,13-15.

[2209] Cf., e.g., M1: 198b3-5: "prabhāvita" には、やはり、... 時間的因果関係の意味が込められていると思われる.

[2210] M1: 198b20–199a1 and 202b9-11: 「一切法は、仏たること (buddhatva) である」。仏たることは、真如 (tathatā) が異なっていないから、また、それ (tathatā) を浄化すること (viśuddhi) によって生みだされたもの (prabhāvita) であるから。

The syntactical position of *chos kyi dbyings* (i.e., *dharmadhātu*) in the Tibetan translation is problematic, and some kind of corruption is to be suspected,[2211] but what is important for Matsumoto's argument is that Sthiramati describes the *dharmakāya* as the result of the removal of impurities in the *ālayavijñāna* and its transformation into the mirror-like knowledge (*ādarśajñāna*) of the Buddha. But Sthiramati's explanation, though surely influenced by the MSABh ([B36]), is not a comment on [B36] but rather directly comments on the word *svābhāvikaḥ* in MSA IX.60a, explained by Sthiramati as referring to the *dharmakāya* and then commented upon in [B36]-com. Thus, we cannot expect Sthiramati's explanation to correspond to the MSABh in every respect. In particular, we are not entitled to take his temporal clause (*nam ... na*) to be semantically equivalent to *°lakṣaṇa* in the MSABh clause. We rather have to be aware of the difference: In the MSABh, nothing prevents us from understanding *āśrayaparivṛtti* in the sense of the *state* that has resulted from the process of renewal or transmutation and is, as the accomplished result, the essential characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*) of the *dharmakāya*, and not its cause. Against this, Sthiramati defines the *dharmakāya* merely as the final result of the *process* of renewal, with explicit references to the *temporal* dimension (*nam ... na*, *spangs nas*) of this process, whereas the aspect of *causality* remains implicit even in Sthiramati's comment.

495.3. The second passage adduced by Matsumoto is MSA IX.56ab (M1: 202a: [35]):

[B37-1] *sarvadharmadvayāvāratathatāśuddhilakṣaṇaḥ*

Matsumoto (M1: 202a13-15) wonders what subject should be supplied for this bahuvrīhi which is obviously a predicative element. He opts for *dharmakāya*, the neuter *buddhatva* being less suitable (M1: 202a17–b4). Actually, there is no need to supply a subject because it is indeed contained in the text itself. We simply have to realize that the verses 56–59 are a syntactical unit. The basic nominal sentence including subject[2212] and predicate[2213] is found in 59cd:

[2211] From a systematic point of view, it is hardly possible to equate the *ādarśajñāna* with the *dharmadhātu*, as Matsumoto (M1: 202a3) does in his translation of the sentence:

"... 法界 (*dharma-dhātu*) たる大円鏡智 (*ādarśa-jñāna*) ...".

Nor would it be admissible to take *dharmadhātu* as the subject of *gyur pa* because it is the *ālayavijñāna*, and not the *dharmadhātu*, that is transformed into the *ādarśajñāna* in the process of the Renewal of the Basis. My guess is that *dang* has dropped out (or ought to have been inserted) after *chos kyi dbyings*, and that we might perhaps translate as follows:

"When, after the removal of the impurity consisting in [the dichotomy of] object (*grāhya*) and subject (*grāhaka*) that exists in the *ālayavijñāna*, [the emptiness that is present in the *ālayavijñāna*] has become the [purified] *dharmadhātu* ⟨and⟩ [the *ālayavijñāna* itself] the mirror-like knowledge, this is called '*dharmakāya*'."

My additions in square brackets are based on the second explanation of *āśrayaparivṛtti* in Sthiramati's commentary on MSA IX.12, according to which the eight *vijñāna*s are transformed into the four *jñāna*s and the emptiness present in them (as well as in the other *skandha*s) becomes the purified *dharmadhātu* (SAVBh P mi 128a3f; D mi 113b3f). If my interpretation of the passage under discussion is correct, Sthiramati's position would coincide with the theory reported in CWSL 58a6-13. Alternatively, one could perhaps presuppose a compound **dharmadhātvādarśajñāna* in the sense of "knowledge that is (like) a mirror of the *dharmadhātu*" (i.e., the *nirvikalpajñāna*). In this case, however, the *dharmakāya* = *svābhāvikaḥ kāyaḥ* as defined in this passage would not, as it surely should, include the purified *dharmadhātu*, at any rate not explicitly.

[2212] That the subject of the four verses is *dharmadhātur viśuddhaḥ* is confirmed by SAṬ P bi 82a1 (*chos kyi dbyings de ni* ...) and also by the introductory remark of the *Bhāṣya*, according to which these verses deal with *dharmadhātuviśuddhi*, which can be understood in the concrete sense of *vi-*

[B37-2] *dharmadhātur viśuddho 'yaṁ buddhānāṁ samudāhṛtaḥ,*

and the first seven lines contain predicative complements to the predicate *samudāhṛtaḥ*. We only have to read °*bhāvanā-samudāgamaḥ* (as one word: bahuvrīhi compound) in IX.57b and to emend °*'kṣayatā phalaṁ* in IX.57d to °*'kṣayatā-phalaḥ* (another bahuvrīhi).[2214] We may thus translate:

> [B37]-tr: This purified Dharma-Sphere of the Buddhas is stated to have the [accomplished] purification of the 'Suchness' (/true nature) of all dharmas[2215] from both obstacles as its [essential] characteristic.

Once again, there is no reason to follow Matsumoto in interpreting °*lakṣaṇa* in a causal sense (要因: M1: 202a12). On the contrary, the verses make use of a standard set of categories,[2216] the first of which is normally termed *svabhāva*, while *hetu* is the second, followed by *phala*, *karman*, *yoga* and *vṛtti*. Since *hetu*[2217] and *phala* are treated in verse 57 of our series, verse 56, specifying two *lakṣaṇa*s of the purified *dharmadhātu*, must refer to its *svabhāva*, as is explicitly confirmed by the *Bhāṣya*.[2218] Hence, in this verse *lakṣaṇa* must not be interpreted as having a causal meaning, but is clearly equivalent, or quasi-synonymous, to *svabhāva*, and we have to take *śuddhi* (the *Bhāṣya* has *viśuddhi*) in the sense of the *state* resulting from the process, and not in the sense of the process.

495.4. To come back to MSABh 34,7f ([B35]), I hope that I have convincingly shown that the basis of MATSUMOTO's interpretation, viz., the causal meaning of *lakṣaṇa* in the parallel formulations, is arbitrary in the case of [B36] and definitely untenable in the case of [B37]. On the contrary, if [B37] is to be taken as the basis for interpreting °*prabhāvita* in [B35], we would rather have to understand this expression in the sense of "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as", coming close to "having the nature of". But we should not ground our interpretation on parallelism only. In view of the fact that °*prabhāvita* is polysemous, we cannot exclude the possibility of its meaning "produced by" or "manifested by", provided that this makes systematic sense and fits the argument. From a systematic point of view, the idea that Buddhahood as a *spiritual state* is produced by the purification of the *tathatā* in the sense of a process in the course of which the latter is freed from its adventitious stains would seem to be unobjectionable, and the same would also hold good for the idea that if Buddhahood is ontologically identified with the *tathatā* it would be disclosed or *revealed* by the removal of the adventitious obscurations of the latter. But the idea that Buddhahood is essentially

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śuddho dharmadhātuḥ: cf. S1969: 112; *Sār* 173,1-2: *'dharmadhātuviśuddhiḥ' 'suviśuddho dharmadhātuḥ' ... iti nârthabhedaḥ kaścit.*

2213 Viz., *samudāhṛtaḥ*, perfect participle in the function of a finite verb.

2214 Thus already TAKASAKI 1966: 402; see also NAITŌ 2009: 98. The corruption is probably due to the *Bhāṣya* where the compound is resolved. The same corruption has also happened, in precisely the same situation (series of verses construed in precisely the same way and with the same set of categories), at RGV I.35b (cf. TAKASAKI 1966: 207 n. 67; 394,1; 401 with n. 6).

2215 The position of the members of the compound is unusual (which is, however, no rare phenomenon in the MSA). My analysis (like Matsumoto's) follows the *Bhāṣya*.

2216 Cf. TAKASAKI 1966: 400–408.

2217 °*samudāgamaḥ*, explicitly equated with *hetu* in the *Bhāṣya*.

2218 MSABh 44,10: *eṣa svabhāvārtham ārabhyaîkaḥ ślokaḥ*. Cf. also *Bhāṣya* on MSA VII.1 (25,10f), explicitly equating, in the context of the same set of categories, *lakṣaṇa* with *svabhāva*. For *svabhāva* as a gloss of *lakṣaṇa* cf. also, e.g., MAVṬ 167,14.

characterized by the accomplished purification of the *tathatā*, or is essentially characterized *as* (= consists in) the *tathatā* being in a state of accomplished purification, is equally impeccable. One idea does not exclude the other, and the question may just be which one is more important, or more in the foreground, in the present context. Since the statement as a whole is about identity, I would opt for the meaning "essentially/distinctively characterized by/as" and translate the passage as follows:

> [B35]-tr(S): {1} On the one hand (*ca*), Buddhahood is all dharmas,[2219] {2} because Suchness is not different [from them][2220] {3} and because Buddhahood is essentially characterized by the [accomplished] purification of Suchness (i.e., is essentially just Suchness in the state of accomplished purification from all adventitious impurities). {4} On the other hand (*ca*), no dharma at all exists, [viz.,] in the form of its fictitious dharma-nature.[2221]

[2219] This would be the natural interpretation of the clause (cf. also NAITŌ 2009: 33) in accordance with the habitual word order in a nominal sentence (PredN – Subj), and it would also fit in with the corresponding part of the verse text (MSA IX.4ab) because in the verse text *buddhatva* is the subject throughout from IX.1 up to IX.12: "Buddhahood is all dharmas, and at the same time it is no dharma at all" (*sarvadharmāś ca buddhatvaṁ dharmo naîva ca kaścana*). Still, in MSABh$_t$ and SAṬ (see fn. 2220) and apparently also in the Chinese translation (see fn. 2221), *sarvadharmāḥ* is taken as the subject, and *buddhatvam* as the predicate:

> "On the one hand, all dharmas are Buddhahood, ...".

Cf. also SAVBh P mi 122a7 (*chos thams cad la sangs rgyas zhes bya'o*). The motive may have been that in the MSABh the complementary sentence {4} clearly has the dharmas as its subject (*asti* can hardly be a copula, cf. MSABh$_t$ P phi 163a3: *yod pa ma yin no*), so that for the sake of preserving the complementarity of the two statements the dharmas were also taken to be the subject in {1}, which makes good sense in the *Bhāṣya* (though, as pointed out before, not in the verse text).

[2220] Or, if *tathatāyā(ḥ)* is taken as an ablative: "because they [do not exist] apart from Suchness". But MSABh$_t$ (P phi 163a2f and D 152b7: *de bzhin nyid tha dad pa'i rang bzhin ma yin pa'i phyir ... chos thams cad kyang sangs rgyas nyid yin la ...*) seems to presuppose a genitive, and so does the Chinese version (see fn. 2221). Cf. also SAṬ P bi 74b1f (D bi 66b2f):

> Because Suchness pervades all dharmas and because dharma and dharmin are not separate, all dharmas are stated to be Buddhahood.
>
> *de bzhin nyid ni chos thams cad kyi rjes su song ba yin la | chos dang chos can dag kyang tha mi dad pas de'i phyir chos thams cad sangs rgyas nyid du brjod do ||.*

In contrast to Matsumoto (see § 495.1: [B35]-tr(M)), I do not think that *buddhatvasya* in {3} is to be construed also with {2}. In my understanding, the argument runs thus: {1} Buddhahood is (in a sense) all dharmas (/All dharmas are [ultimately] Buddhahood), {2} because Suchness is not different from the dharmas (or: because they are not different from Suchness; i.e.: because Suchness is their true nature) {3} and because Buddhahood is essentially Suchness purified from adventitious stains.

[2221] In the Chinese translation (T 31.1604: 602a28–b2), {3} is not represented at all. But this translation appears very inaccurate in many regards. The rendering of MSA IX.4–5 (in one verse) starts with pāda 4c (白法為佛身 "the white dharmas constitute the Buddha's body"), replacing *tad* with "the Buddha's body", obviously representing *buddhatva* taken over from pāda 4a. The second pāda of the Chinese verse (非無亦非有 "is not non-existent and is also not existent") can hardly be called a translation, but 非無 ("is not non-existent") seems to represent pāda 4a because it is commented upon by 真如無別故 ("because the *tathatā* is not different"), which corresponds to {2} in [B35]. 亦非有 ("and is also not existent") on the other hand would represent pāda 4b since it is explained by 自性不成就故 ("because own-being is not accomplished"), which reminds one of *na ... (asti) ... svabhāvena* in {4} but also of °*bhāvenâpariniṣpatteḥ* in the commentary on pāda 4d. In the second half of the Chinese verse (corresponding to MSA IX.5), the similes are omitted, and the cause of the crops consisting in wholesome [factors] (Ch. only: "the cause of wholesome roots") is not Buddhahood (as

495.5. Actually, there are further parallel statements in the MSA(Bh) in support of a relation of essential identity between Buddhahood and the purified 'Suchness' or 'Dharma-Sphere', e.g.:

[B38] MSABh 38,2-3 (ad IX.23): *agraṁ nairātmyaṁ viśuddhā tathatā, sā ca buddhānām ātmā svabhāvārthena* |

[B39] MSA IX.37: *sarveṣām aviśiṣṭâpi tathatā śuddhim āgatā* | *tathāgatatvaṁ* ... ||

[B40] MSABh 188,21 (ad XXI.61): *viśuddhā tathatā niṣpannaḥ paramārthaḥ* | *sa ca buddhānāṁ svabhāvaḥ* |

496. *Sopadhika-nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg

496.1. On the basis of his conclusions regarding the meaning of °*lakṣaṇa* and °*prabhāvita*, Matsumoto also reconsiders several expressions of the *Sopadhika-nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ* of the VinSg, beginning with SopNBhVin # I.3.B.2 (44,2-3;[2222] see M1: 203a: [36]):

[B41]: *gnas gyur pa de ni de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pas* rab tu phye ba ... *yin la* |

and SopNBhVin # I.6.a–b (50,12-18;[2223] see M1: 203a–b: [37]):

[B42] {1} *phung po'i lhag ma med pa'i mya ngan las 'das pa'i dbyings su yongs su mya ngan las 'das pa'i gnas gyur pa* ... *mtshan nyid ji lta bur brjod par bya zhe na* |

{2} *smras pa* | {2a} *spros pa med pa'i mtshan nyid dang* | {2b} *chos kyi dbyings shin tu rnam par dag pa'i mtshan nyid yin no* ||

496.2. My former translation of these passages into German would correspond to the following English translation:

[B41]-tr: This Renewal of the Basis (**āśrayaparivṛtti*) is constituted by the purification of Suchness (i.e., the true nature) (**tathatā-viśuddhi-prabhāvitā*) ...

[B42]-tr: {1} What kind of essential characteristic should one ascribe to the Renewal of the Basis (**āśrayaparivṛtti*) of a person who has entered the state of Extinction Without Remainder[2224] (**nirupadhiśeṣe nirvāṇadhātau parinirvṛtasya*)?

{2} Answer: {2a} It is characterized by [being] free from, or being beyond, [all inadequate] diversification (**niṣprapañca-lakṣaṇā*), {2b} and it is characterized by (i.e., consists in) the [state resulting from] the complete purification of the Source of [Supramundane] Properties (i.e., the 'Dharma-Realm' = Suchness) (**dharmadhātu-suviśuddhi-lakṣaṇā*)[2225].

496.3.0. In both passages, Matsumoto pleads again for a causal interpretation. However, in view of the preceding discussion (§ 495) of similar passages where °*prabhāvita* alternates with °*lakṣaṇa*, his proposal appears problematic.

496.3.1. As regards [B42], it would, both systematically and contextually, make good sense to understand **āśrayaparivṛtti* in an ontological sense as essentially *constituted* by (i.e.,

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in Skt.) but the Dharma. It seems unwise to draw any conclusion with regard to {3} from this rather free translation. The only thing one may say is that {3} receives no support from it, but this is hardly sufficient to cast serious doubts on the authenticity of {3}.

2222 YBh_t P 'i 137b2f (D zi 122a7; YBh_c 747c23).

2223 YBh_t P 'i 139a2-4 (D zi 123b5f; YBh_c 748b10-13).

2224 More exactly: without any remainder of 'possessions' (*upadhi*; Tib. *phung po* takes them as the five skandhas, i.e., in the sense of *antya upadhiḥ* = *arhatsāntānikāḥ skandhāḥ*: S 1969: 80).

2225 Cf. S 1969: 148 n. 117(a).

consisting in) the completely pure/purified *dharmadhātu* = *tathatā*. This would hardly be different from saying that **āśrayaparivṛtti* has the pure/purified **dharmadhātu* as its nature (*svabhāva*). Apart from this, I do not see why it should not be equally possible to take the passage to mean that the **āśrayaparivṛtti* of one who has entered into final Nirvana is [distinctively and essentially] characterized by (being) the *state* of the accomplished purification of the **dharmadhātu* —**niṣprapañca* is anyway a *property* by which the **āśrayaparivṛtti* can only be distinctively characterized, and hardly ontologically constituted.

496.3.2. In the case of [B41], on the other hand, the causal aspect is beyond doubt, in view of the fact that the expression **tathatā-viśuddhi-prabhāvita* is followed by a set of unambiguously causal expressions (**tathatā-gotraka*, **tathatā-bījaka*, **tathatā-samudāgata*: see § 519 text [B63]), meant to convey more or less the same idea.[2226] But the purport of the passage is not confined to elucidating the cause or origin of the *āśrayaparivṛtti* and rather points to its supramundane *origin* in order to elucidate its supramundane *nature* and, thereby, its compatibility with the fact that the mundane basis of existence, the *ṣaḍāyatana*, continues more or less unchanged while the arhat is still alive but nonetheless free from defilements.[2227] As the terms *gotra* (["cattle-stall">] "clan", but also "mine" or "matrix", "gangue")[2228] and *bīja* ("seed") suggest, the origin of a person or thing also determines affiliation with a social class or biological species. In the same way, *°prabhāvita* may express both origin and distinctive nature. This seems to be the case in [B41], and this is why I chose the ambivalent expression "constituted" ("konstituiert") in my translation.[2229]

496.4. We should, however, keep in mind that in the framework of this text, too, it is not without problems to speak of an origin, or cause, of **āśrayaparivṛtti*. In SopNBhVin # I.7 (52,8-12), it is pointed out that the **āśrayaparivṛtti* is permanent (*nitya*) because it is **tathatā-viśuddhiprabhāvita* and unoriginated (*ma byung ba*, **abhūta*), unborn (*ma skyes pa*, **ajāta*). In this case, **tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvita* can only mean "constituted (i.e., essentially characterized) by the *state* that has resulted from the purification of the *tathatā*", in the sense that the *āśrayaparivṛtti* is, ontologically, nothing but the *tathatā* or the 'unconditioned realm' (*asaṁskṛto dhātuḥ*: # I.4.B.1 (48,1f)) purified of *adventitious* obscurations, just as when the sky is purified of clouds (# I.6.c.B.2 (52,5f)). Thus, in its ontological aspect, *āśrayaparivṛtti* cannot be produced but only *unveiled* or disclosed by a process of purification (and this may indeed be an additional nuance of *tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvita* in # I.7). What can be generated and have a cause is only this *manifestation* of *tathatā*, or the state of accomplished purification from adventitious defilements and the process resulting in that state. It is only in this sense that *āśrayaparivṛtti* can be stated to have the cultivation of the Path that has *tathatā* for its object as its cause (**tathatâlambana-mārga-bhāvanânvaya*: # I.5.b.B.1 (50,5f); cf. text [B64] in § 520 and the discussion in § 526).[2230]

[2226] The expression *tathatāviśuddhi-prabhāvita* seems to be reminiscent of the *Prajñāpāramitā* phrase *asaṁskṛta-prabhāvita* (Vajr 33,1f; Aṣṭ 18,23f [cf. M1: 207]). Here, too, *°prabhāvita* would seem to connote not only origin but also 'nobility', so to speak, just as when the Tathāgatas are stated to be *prajñāpāramitātaḥ prabhāvitāḥ* or *nirjātāḥ* (see Pt. II § 359 fn. 1819).

[2227] S 1969: 48,25-28 (# I.5.a.B.3) and 50,6-9 (# I.5.b.B.1).

[2228] Cf. SEYFORT RUEGG 1976: 342 and 358 n. 15.

[2229] Cf. also S 1969: 112f.

[2230] As I was kindly informed by a colleague, my understanding of *āśrayaparivṛtti* in the SopNBhVin in S 1969 has recently been criticized by a scholar in a conference paper who assumes that I had

497. MAVṬ 101,10-15 (ad MAVBh 35,14)

[B43] {1} *tṛtīyayā* (sc., *bhūmyā*) *tanniṣyandāgrārthaṁ*, *pratividhyati iti prakṛtam, dharmadhātuprativedha*prabhāvita*tvād buddhavacanasya* |

{2} ta⟨*thā hi*[2231] *sarvākāraparisuddhasya dharmakāyākhyasya dharmadhātor ādhipatyena pravṛttatvād*[2232] *dharma*⟩*dhātuniṣyandaḥ sūtrādiko deśanādharmaḥ* |

{3a} *dharmadhātvagratayā tanniṣyandadeśanādharmāgratā,*[2233]

{3b} *dharmadhātupariśuddhinimittatvāc ca* |

[B43]-tr: {1} "By means of the third [stage the bodhisattva penetrates] into the excellence of its outflow[2234]" — 'penetrates' is to be supplied from the preceding context (*prakṛta*) —, because the teaching of the Buddha has been generated by (or: has arisen from) [his] penetration into the 'Dharma-Sphere'.

{2} This is so because the 'outflow of the Dharma-Sphere', [i.e.,] the Dharma [in the sense of the Buddha's] teaching — the sūtras, etc. —, has come forth under the influence of the entirely purified 'Dharma-Sphere', which is [also] named 'Dharma-Body'.

{3a} Due to the excellence of the 'Dharma-Sphere', the Dharma [consisting in the Buddha's] teaching, being its outflow, is excellent [as well],

{3b} and also because it is [in its turn] the cause of the purification of the 'Dharma-Sphere' [in the *vineyas*] (cf. MAVṬ$_t$ P 78a8: *chos kyi dbyings yongs su dag par bya ba'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir ro*).

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asserted that there was only one type of *āśrayaparivṛtti* (in the YBh?), viz., one that involves a reshaping of the basis, so that the 'renewed' or 'transmuted' basis would necessarily be conditioned (like the 'sixfold basis' in earlier strata of the YBh). I am afraid that the author of the paper has not read my study very carefully. Actually, I am sure my study contains sufficiently clear statements to the effect that — regardless of the *semantic* problems posed by the expression *parivṛtti* — from the *doctrinal* point of view *āśrayaparivṛtti* as a *process* is, in the SopNBhVin, nothing but a purification of *tathatā* from *adventitious* impurities and hence does not affect or condition *tathatā* itself in any way but merely discloses or *manifests tathatā* in its true, intrinsically pure nature (S 1969: 113,22ff; 101,17f). In an *ontological* perspective, *āśrayaparivṛtti* is nothing but *tathatā* itself in its purified state (ib. 112,4f; 113,11; 115,21-24; 145,5f) and hence unconditioned and eternal (*nitya*). But the ontological perspective must be distinguished from the *spiritual* or 'existential' perspective. Though there is no change at all on the *tathatā* level, there is one on the subjective level, on the level of the adventitious impurities, which have to be removed by each individual sentient being in order to *disclose tathatā* in its intrinsic purity, and insofar as *āśrayaparivṛtti* indicates the removal of these impurities, it can only be the *result of a process* and as such has to have causes and conditions, if only on an ultimately illusory level. If this is denied, we would all have already attained Nirvana, not only on the *tathatā* level but also on that of individual experience. My choice of the ambiguous expression "constituted" ("konstituiert") for °*prabhāvita* was deliberate in order to comprise the different connotations resulting from the different perspectives (S 1969: 111,9-13).

[2231] Thus with STANLEY 1988: 133 n. 254, stating that the ms. reads *tathā* before the lacuna, not *ya* (YAMAGUCHI: *ya*⟨*smāt*⟩).

[2232] My reconstruction differs from YAMAGUCHI's and (from *sarvākāra*° onward) follows JñN 494,19f, which is marked by the final *iti* as a quotation from the (MAV-)*Ṭīkā* (JñN 494,19). Jñānaśrīmitra's *pravṛtta* is confirmed by MAVṬ$_t$ (P tshi 78a8), using *rab tu byung ba'i phyir ro* here instead of *rab tu phye ba'i phyir ro* in the preceding sentence.

[2233] Thus with the ms. and Matsumoto (204b7), against YAMAGUCHI, who unnecessarily conjectures °*tāyā*.

[2234] I.e., the Buddha's teaching as the outflow of the 'Dharma-Sphere' (*tad-* = *dharmadhātu-*).

I agree with Matsumoto (M1: 204a22–205a5) that in this passage °*prabhāvita* is obviously used in a causal sense. However, in contrast to Matsumoto who seems to understand *dharmadhātupariśuddhinimittatvāt* in {3b} as a bahuvrīhi and as a rephrasing of the preceding expression (which he reconstructs, with Yamaguchi, as **pariśuddha...dharmadhātuvaśena prabhāvito*),[2235] I take it as a tatpuruṣa and as an *additional* reason for the excellence of the Dharma as teaching. But although I agree with Matsumoto in taking *prabhāvita* in this passage in the sense of "generated", it is worth noting that the text is quite explicit in pointing out that excellence of origin guarantees excellence of essence. Thus, °*prabhāvita* here too conveys, by implication, the nuance of "essentially formed or characterized by" or even "distinguished by". The *deśanādharma* not only originates from the 'Dharma-Sphere' but also participates, by this very fact, in its excellence.

498. YBh$_t$ P zi 302b4: see Pt. II §§ 360.2 [A12] and 363.

499. ASBh 114,23-25

[B44] {1} *parinispanno* {2} {2a} *viśuddhyālambanatvāt* {2b} *paratantre*[2236] *parikalpitalakṣaṇābhāvasvabhāvatvāc ca* {3} {3a} *paramārthaś caîṣa* {3b} *niḥsvabhāvatā*-prabhāvitaś *cêti* {4} *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatayā niḥsvabhāvaḥ* |

499.1. Again, Matsumoto (M1: 205b22–206b21) understands °*prabhāvita* in a causal sense, taking the passage to express a causal relationship between

a) the Perfect [nature] (*parinispanna*) = ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) as the *effect*, and

b) lack of own-being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) = having the nature of the absence of the Dependent in the Fictitious (*paratantre parikalpitalakṣaṇābhāvasvabhāvatvam*) as the *cause*.

He even takes *artha* in *paramārtha* to mean "effect" (結果: M1: 206a22), corresponding to °*prabhāvita* "produced by". But it is hard to imagine a non-existence as a cause (at least in the strict sense of the word),[2237] and it is also hard to accept the *parinispannaḥ svabhāvaḥ* as an effect, unless, perhaps, one assumes that the *parinispannaḥ svabhāvaḥ* is to be understood here in the sense of *samyagjñāna*, as in MAV(Bh) III.13cd. But there is nothing indicated in our passage that would justify such an assumption, and even in the MAV(Bh) passage the *parinispannaḥ svabhāvaḥ* also includes the True Nature or 'Suchness' (*tathatā*) of all dharmas, which is unconditioned and not in any sense an effect (see remarks on [B42]), and thus cannot be regarded as *produced* by a lack of own-being, or as being *rendered* devoid of own-being by it (in a *causal* and temporal sense, i.e., after not having been so before).[2238] In

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[2235] Cf. M1: 205a1-2: ここでは"*-prabhāvita*"の意味が"*-lakṣaṇa*"ではなく"*-nimitta*"という表現によって示されている。

[2236] TATIA's ed. and the ms. read *paratantra*-, and this reading is confirmed by ASBh$_t$ P śi 104a5 (D li 84a7) and ASVy$_t$ P shi 307a2f (*gzhan gyi dbang dang kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid med pa'i* ..., suggesting a somewhat unexpected emphasis on the unreality of the *paratantrasvabhāva* as well). But ASVy$_t$ D li 250b3, reading *gzhan gyi dbang du | kun brtags pa'i mtshan nyid med pa'i* ..., may signalize a problem, and Hsüan-tsang (ASVy$_c$ 752a14: 於依他起中無遍計所執相所顯自體故) definitely presupposes the reading *paratantre parikalpita*°. This reading is clearly preferable (cf. M1: 221fn.83, referring to MAV I.1b: *dvayaṁ* [= *parikalpitaḥ svabhāvaḥ*] *tatra* [i.e., *abhūtaparikalpe* = *paratantre svabhāve*] *na vidyate*).

[2237] One might, at best, consider the possibility of taking it as an *ālambanapratyaya*.

[2238] The phrase *parinispannaḥ* ... X-*niḥsvabhāvatayā niḥsvabhāvaḥ* does not of course express a causal relation but one of essential constitution: the *parinispanna* does not *become* devoid of own-

more closely related texts like the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*[2239] and the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun*[2240] and as far as I can see also in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*[2241], the *pariniṣpannaḥ sva-bhāvaḥ* even consists *only* in 'Suchness' (*tathatā*). That this holds good for [B44] as well is evident from the fact that the *pariniṣpanna* is qualified as the "objective support of purification" (*viśuddhyālambana*), which in another VinSg passage[2242] clearly refers to 'Suchness' and at the same time indicates the reason for its being *paramārthasat*, thus showing that in the present context *artha* in *paramārtha* should not be understood as "effect" but rather as "object".

499.2. Apart from this, a closer scrutiny of the structure of [B44] reveals that Matsumoto's causal interpretation is impossible. As indicated by the subdivision introduced by me in the quotation of [B44], the basic layer of the syntax of [B44] is a nominal sentence consisting of the subject ({1})[2243] and a predicate noun enlarged by an instrumental ({4}). The instrumental is a compound consisting of two members the syntactical (and logical) relationship of which was clarified in advance in section {3}, the sub-sections {3a} and {3b} corresponding to the two members of the compound, respectively. Section {3}, in its turn, has been justified in advance by section {2}, the sub-sections {2a} and {2b} again corresponding to {3a} and {3b}, respectively. In view of this structure of the sentence, it is clear that *paramārtha* {3a} is explained, and in fact almost paraphrased, by *viśuddhy-ālambana* {2a}, and *niḥsvabhāvatā-*

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being through the causal agency of a certain (X-) lack of own-being; rather, the *pariniṣpanna* has always, by its very nature, been devoid of own-being due to, or in terms of, this lack of own-being, i.e., because this lack of own-being is (part of) its very nature.

2239 YBh_t 'i 20a1-3 (D zi 18b3f; YBh_c 703b2-5; TAKAHASHI 2005: 140 # 2.2.3): *yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid gang zhe na | rnam par dag par bya ba'i phyir ... chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid 'phags pa'i ye shes kyi spyod yul ... gang yin pa'o ||.*

2240 HsienY 557b13f: 圓成實者，所謂 諸法真如自體。

2241 Saṁdh VI.6: ... *chos rnams kyi yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid gang zhe na | chos rnams kyi de bzhin nyid gang yin pa ste |* (*... *yā dharmāṇāṁ tathatā*). The following sentence is syntactically somewhat difficult in the Eastern recension, but in view of the Western recension ($Saṁdh_t$ S 20b6–21a1) I am fairly sure that it is merely a relative clause further specifying the *tathatā*:

gang byang chub sems dpa' rnams kyis brtson 'grus kyi rgyu dang | yang dag par tshul bzhin yid la byed pa'i rgyus rtogs par 'gyur ba yin te | de rtogs pa goms par byas pa yang dag par grub pas kyang bla na med pa yang dag par rdzogs pa'i byang chub kyi bar du yang dag par 'grub pa'o ||

This may be tentatively reconstructed as follows:

**yasyāḥ bodhisattvānām ātāpānvayād yoniśomanaskārānvayāc ca prativedho (bhavati), tatprativedhā-bhyāsasamudāgamena ca yāvad anuttarasamyaksambodhisamudāgamaḥ |*

Translation:

('Suchness',) into which the bodhisattvas, in consequence of their zeal and in consequence of their appropriate contemplation, obtain direct insight (**prativedha*, cf. $Saṁdh_{TH}$ *so sor chud pa*), and, through the accomplishment of the repeated practice of this insight, finally attain the Highest Perfect Awakening.

Such an understanding would also basically agree with the Chinese versions ($Saṁdh_{Hs}$ 693a22-25; $Saṁdh_{Bo}$ 669c22-24). The Tun-huang version of the sentence (HAKAMAYA 1986a: 602,4-8; 2008: 680,2-6: 64b2-4) is unfortunately lacunary.

2242 YBh_t P zi 304a3 (D zhi 289a3f; YBh_c 696b23f); see KRAMER 2005: 72 and 107 (# 5.4); TAKA-HASHI 2005: 125 and 186 (# 1.5.4).

2243 Anteposition of the Subj because the section explains the ascription of the same predicate (*niḥsvabhāva*) to a sequence of three themes (the three *svabhāvas*): cf. Pt. II § 445.2 with fn. 2044.

prabhāvita {3b} by *paratantre* (or *paratantra-*) *parikalpitalakṣaṇābhāvasvabhāva-* (bahuv.) {2b}. This shows that °*prabhāvita* is intended here as practically equivalent to °*svabhāva* (bahuv.), which definitely excludes a causal interpretation. Therefore, the passage should be translated as follows:

[B44]-tr: {1} The Perfect [Nature] {4} is devoid of own-being in terms of lack-of-own-being as the ultimate reality, {3} in the sense that (*iti*) it is {3a} [on the one hand] the ultimate reality (/most excellent object) {3b} and [on the other hand] essentially characterized as lack of own-being, {2a} because [on the one hand] it is the objective support of purification, {2b} and because [on the other hand] it has the nature of [being] the absence of the Fictitious [Nature] in the Dependent [Nature].

499.3. That this interpretation is correct would seem to be proved by the much shorter definition of the *Hsien yang sheng chiao lun* (T 31.1606: 557b20-22):

[B45] 勝義無性, 謂 圓成實自性。由此自性 體是勝義 又是諸法無性故。

[B45]-tr: Lack-of-own-being as the ultimate reality (**paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*): i.e., the Perfect Nature (**pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ*), because this Nature is in itself (體) the ultimate reality (**paramārtha*) and *is* [at the same time] the lack of own-being (**niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all dharmas.

In this formulation, °*prabhāvita* is missing and not only the ultimate reality (**paramārtha*) but also the lack of own-being (**niḥsvabhāvatā*) of all dharmas is simply *equated* with the *pariniṣpanna*. As I am going to show in § 513, such an *equation* of the *pariniṣpanna* with lack of own-being (**niḥsvabhāvatā*) is, side by side with the statement that the *pariniṣpanna* is *prabhāvita* (i.e., essentially characterized) *by* [or: *as*] the lack of own-being of all dharmas, also found in Saṁdh VII.6, on which [B44] is ultimately based.[2244]

499.4. A simple equation of *pariniṣpanna* with *niḥsvabhāvatā* and even *abhāva* is also found in Sthiramati's *Triṁśikābhāṣya* (*47,9f; L. 41,23f):

[B46] ... *tasmāt pariniṣpanna eva svabhāvaḥ paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā, pariniṣpannasyâbhāvasvabhāvatvāt* |

[B46]-tr: ... Therefore, The Perfect Nature itself (*eva*) is the lack of own-being that is the ultimate reality, because the Perfect [Nature] has the nature of [the] non-existence [of the Fictitious Nature].

499.5. This kind of passage clearly excludes a causal relation between *pariniṣpanna* and *paramārtha* on the one hand and *niḥsvabhāvatā*, etc., on the other. The relation involved is rather identity or, more precisely, 'constitution', in the sense that A is constitutive of B because A is a distinctive and essential characteristic of B. This kind of relation holds good also for negative characteristics, and it seems it is particularly in such cases that °*prabhāvita* is often preferred to a simple equation: The *pariniṣpanna is* the *paramārtha* (positive term) and

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[2244] Cf. also the following passage from the VinSg (YBh_t P 'i 24b6f; D zi 22b7; YBh_c 705a6-8; TAKAHASHI 2005: 144f # 2.9[end]):

don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kho nas ni yongs su grub pa'i ngo bo nyid ngo bo nyid med pa yin te | de ci'i phyir zhe na | chos thams cad kyi don dam pa yin pa dang | ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis rab tu phye ba *yin pa'i phyir ro* ||

唯由勝義無自性性故 圓成實自性說無自性。何以故。由此自性 亦是勝義 亦一切法無自性性之所顯故。

The Perfect Nature (**pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ*) is devoid of own-being only in terms of lack-of-own-being as the ultimate reality (**paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*). Why? Because this Nature is both the ultimate reality and distinctively/essentially characterized (**prabhāvita*) as [the] lack of own-being [of all dharmas: YBh_c].

is at the same time disti ctively and essentially characterized by (being) the lack of own-being of all dharmas (negative term). In view of this slight categorial difference between simple equations and (at least some) formulations using °*prabhāvita*, the latter may also be taken to imply a connotation of revealing, disclosing or indicating, i the sense that what is stated to be X-*prabhāvita* is, with this expression, not exhaustively described but merely pointed to, be it by means of a characteristic feature or *via negationis* (cf. also Pt. II §§ 360.2 and 363).

5. *Prabhāvita* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and the Problem of Interpolation

500. Among the occurrences of °*prabhāvita* in early Yogācāra sources, those in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh) are of special importance because this text is now widely recognized as being pre-Saṁdh. Matsumoto (M1: 213a-214a) discusses some of the BoBh occurrences in connection with his thesis that in pre-Asaṅga texts °*prabhāvita* is consistently used only in the sense of "produced", which means that occurrences in earlier texts like the BoBh that do not lend themselves to being interpreted in this sense should not occur or, if they do, must be later *interpolations*, as he is indeed eager to prove.

501. In order to substantiate this thesis, Matsumoto starts with the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkārabhāṣya* (MSABh) — to be regarded as a pre-Asaṅga text? —, stating (M1: 212b8ff) that according to NAGAO's index this text contains only one occurrence of *prabhāvita* (viz., MSABh 46,5-7 [ad IX.65]), and at that in a sentence which has no correspondence in the Chinese translation and can therefore, according to Matsumoto, be suspected of being an interpolation, the more so as it is not commented upon by *Asvabhāva and Sthiramati. But both *Asvabhāva and Sthiramati comment only on selected passages of the commentary, and the Chinese translation of the MSA(Bh) is rather free and unreliable as regards textual details.[2245] Methodologically speaking, these kinds of Chi ese translations are strong evidence in positive cases, i.e., when their wording confirms that of the transmitted Sanskrit (or Tibetan), but they have to be used with great caution i cases of disagreement, which may be due to free rendering, misunderstanding or deliberate change on the part of the translator(s). This holds good even for minor omissions, especially of difficult words or phrases, or those which may have been considered redundant. Apart from this, even if the passage under discussion were in fact an interpolation, it is definitely not the only occurrence of *prabhāvita* in the MSABh. Actually, there are three more. One of them has been discussed by Matsumoto himself (M1: 198f) and has already been reconsidered above (§§ 494 and 495), and neither this passage nor the other two (for which see §§ 468 and 469) give the impression of being interpolated.

502.1. As for the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* (BoBh), Matsumoto discusses two occurrences of °*prabhāvita*, viz., BoBh$_D$ 26,15f and 27,7, as well as an occurrence of *prabhāvyate* at BoBh$_D$ 278,10. In all these cases, he concludes, from the absence of an equivalent in the two earlier Chinese translations by Guṇavarman (T 30.1582: 431 A.D.) and Dharmakṣema (T 30.1581: slightly earlier),[2246] that either the word *prabhāvita* or the expression containing it is a later interpolation.

[2245] For an example, see fn. 2143, and for another one fn. 2221.

[2246] Cf. DELHEY 2013: 524 with n. 130.

502.2. 1. However, in this case too we are dealing with two Chinese translations that as far as textual criticism of the Sanskrit text is concerned may have to be handled with great caution. I am anything but a specialist in this matter, but as far as I can see it would be hazardous to regard these versions as meticulous renderings of every word and phrase of the Indian text on which they are based.

2.1. In the case of Dharmakṣema, the original on which his translation is based does not, on the whole, seem to have been substantially different from the transmitted Sanskrit text. There are, to be sure, occasional major disagreements, also confirmed by Guṇavarman's version, like the absence of a whole paragraph[2247] or conspicuous differences in the arrangement of materials or in the number of items subsumed under a certain concept.[2248] But while some of these differences may be due to subsequent redactional interference, others may simply reflect fluctuations of the written or even oral transmission of the text. Other minor divergences like the absence of phraseological elements that are not essential for the information conveyed by a sentence are more likely to be due to the translator's license. The same would seem to hold good for slightly different syntactical patterns or minor variants in the arrangement of textual elements that do not affect the basic purport of the passage. At any rate, such minor divergences are hardly reliable evidence for the assumption of a different wording in the original, unless they are supported by additional evidence like early Sanskrit manuscripts (unfortunately unavailable in this case) or internal inconsistencies of the transmitted Sanskrit text.[2249]

2.2. Guṇavarman's[2250] translation inspires still less confidence.[2251] It diverges from the transmitted Sanskrit most conspicuously, much more than Dharmakṣema's translation.[2252] If

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[2247] For such a passage (BoBh$_D$ 113,17–115,20), see S 2007b: 435f.

[2248] Cf. SUEKI [Y.] 1980: 46f.

[2249] As in the case of the passage mentioned in fn. 2247.

[2250] On Guṇavarman, see SHIH 1968: 125–137, esp. 131; STACHE-ROSEN 1973.

[2251] Cf. DEMIÉVILLE 1957: 110 (= 1973: 301). Cf. also DELEANU 2012: 6f n. 11; DELHEY 2013: 524f n. 133.

[2252] Cf. SUEKI [Y.] 1980, who suggests that Guṇavarman's version may represent the earliest available stage of the textual development of the BoBh. Still, most of the divergences listed by Sueki are not likely to inspire confidence in the reliability of Guṇavarman's translation. To give just two examples: [**1.**] In the case of the ten *buddhakārya*s of BoBh$_D$ 280,25ff, both Dharmakṣema and Guṇavarman expressly count only nine, although thereby the parallelism of these *kārya*s to the ten groups of *āveṇika-buddhadharma*s (contained in all versions) is disturbed. However this somewhat puzzling fact (cf. SUEKI 1980: 47,14f) may be explained, what is much more disturbing is the way these nine *kārya*s are connected with the *āveṇika-buddhadharma*s in Guṇavarman's version. For in contrast to Dharmakṣema (T 30.1581: 959a8ff), who simply disregards the second group (the four *sarvākārāḥ pariśuddhayaḥ*), Guṇavarman (T 30.1582: 1013a26ff) cuts the first *kārya* into two, and then continues with the third *kārya*, performed by means of the ten *bala*s, as in the transmitted Sanskrit, but at the end he has one *kārya* too many (the one performed by means of the *sarvākāravarajñāna* in the other versions) and hence fuses it with the *kārya* performed by means of the *vāsanāsamudghāta*. [**2.**] In the list of the names of the twelve *vihāra*s of a bodhisattva (T 30.1582: 1002b16ff; SUEKI 1980: 42–44), Guṇavarman has, after *adhiśīlavihāra*, the item **adhiprajñavihāra* instead of *adhicittavihāra* as found in the other versions,[1] but in his definition he specifies this *vihāra* as the cultivation of mundane *dhyāna*s (T 30.1582: 1002c12f; SUEKI 1980: 43), i.e., in terms of *samādhi* and hence *citta* (see Pt. IV § 573), just as the other versions. What is more, instead of counting the following three *vihāra*s as separate items, Guṇavarman takes them as sub-items of his *adhiprajñavihāra*, with the effect that in order to arrive at the number of twelve *bodhisattva-vihāra*s he has to split up some of the last four

Guṇavarman's version were regarded as faithfully mirroring an Indian original, this would mean that the BoBh must have undergone a process of fundamental revision, and a revision at that which would have been not only a matter of doctrinal change or refinement but in the first place a thorough-going transformation of phraseology, syntactical patterns and presentation, going far beyond occasional modifications, explications or additions. I must confess that I consider this highly improbable in the case of a text which, although titled as a sūtra by Dharmakṣema and even furnished with a sūtra-like introduction in Guṇavarman's version, is actually a doctrinal text, a *śāstra*, and almost certainly has been so from the outset. Thus, unless convincing evidence to the contrary is produced, I consider it highly probable that Guṇavarman's version is more a free and to a certain extent even selective paraphrase than a translation, perhaps not even based on a manuscript but composed from memory,[2253] and perhaps in addition modified by the involvement of Chinese translation assistants.[2254]

3. On account of this, I am rather hesitant to draw conclusions for the textual history of the Sanskrit text from these two Chinese versions unless such conclusions are corroborated by additional clues, like conceptual incoherence or formal inconsistency of the transmitted Sanskrit text. In particular, I am reluctant to attach great importance to mainly stylistic divergences like the absence of Chinese equivalents for words in the Sanskrit text that are not essential for conveying the gist of the sentence but which are rather elements of syntax or style, and if °*prabhāvita* is used in a sense that comes close to °*lakṣaṇa* or °*svabhāva* (at the end of bahuvrīhis), it surely belongs to this category.

502.3. In the following paragraphs, I shall first (§§ 503–505), with special attention to Dharmakṣema's and Guṇavarman's translations, re-examine the BoBh passages discussed by Matsumoto, and then (§§ 506–509) the remaining occurrences of *prabhāvita* I have been able to discover in this text. My aim is to ascertain whether in any of these passages *prabhāvita* is somehow mi ored in one of these two translations, and to check whether, if (or where) this is not the case, this fact requires the assumption of a different original, i.e., is thus not explicable by what I regard as the overall character of these two translations, respectively.

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items in a rather strange way. Regardless of what may have happened, I cannot imagine that this reflects a more original version of the text. It is more likely the effect of a fairly arbitrary way of translating or of complications in the translation process. [3] Apart from this, Guṇavarman's translation poses serious problems in connection with his rendering of passages that expose aspects of the specific ontology of the BoBh as found in the other versions. E.g., the crucial paragraph BoBh$_D$ 36,4-10 (cf. Pt. I § 303.2) is missing in Guṇavarman (see IKEDA 1996), and in other important passages too his rendering is particularly abbreviated or deviant (cf., in this connection, also § 503.3). Even so, I strongly hesitate to believe that there was an original with a different philosophical position, but I readily admit that the matter requires to be explored more thoroughly and on a much more comprehensive scale.

[1] One possible explanation might be that in Guṇavarman's ms. (or memorized text?) *adhicittavihāra* had simply dropped out of the introductory list of *vihāra*s, and that he adapted the subsequent explanations to the wording of the list as he had it.

[2253] Cf. DELEANU 2006: 232,6.

[2254] Cf. DELEANU 2006: 230.

503. BoBh$_D$ 26,15f

503.1. Let me start with Dharmakṣema's and Guṇavarman's renderings of the first passage adduced by Matsumoto (M1: 213a–b), viz., BoBh$_D$ 26,15f (BoBh$_W$ 39,2f; TAKAHASHI 2005: 88 # 3.1; text confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 25b8f and YBh$_c$ 486c24f):

[B47] *tat punas tattvalakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthānato 'dvaya*prabhāvita*ṁ*[2255] *veditavyaṁ* | *dvayam ucyate bhāvaś câbhāvaś ca* |

[B47]-Dh: 又真實相 建立二種。一者有性。二者無性。(T 30.1581: 893a18)

[B47]-Gu: 真實義者 復[2256]有二種。一者有。二者無。(T 30.1582: 968b24f)

Even Matsumoto does not try to interpret °*prabhāvita* in this passage in the sense of "produced". This meaning is indeed clearly excluded here; for *tattva*, "[true] reality", i.e., the undescribable, inexpressible (*nirabhilāpya*) nature of things, the 'Suchness' (*tathatā*), which had been introduced in the immediately preceding sentence (BoBh$_D$ 26,13), is surely not produced, and hence its essential characteristic (*lakṣaṇa*)[2257] cannot be produced either. Hence °*prabhāvita* is used here rather in the sense of "revealed" (or, perhaps, "indicated") or in the sense of "distinguished", i.e., "distinctively/essentially characterized":

[B47]-tr: "Moreover, one should know that this essential characteristic of true reality is, from the point of view of [how it may] be established/defined (*vyavasthānataḥ*), distinctively/essentially characterized by/as neither of the two. 'The two' means: existence and non-existence."

[B47]-Dh-tr: "Moreover, the characteristic of true reality is established as twofold: firstly, existence, secondly, non-existence."

[B47]-Gu-tr: "Moreover, as for the meaning of true reality, there are two kinds: firstly, existence, and secondly, non-existence."

503.2. The rendering of the passage in Dharmakṣema ([B47]-Dh) has not only no equivalent for *prabhāvita*[2258] but also not one for *advaya* (or for *veditavyam* and for *ucyate*). The same is true of Guṇavarman's translation ([B47]-Gu). In addition, in his translation *lakṣaṇa* is replaced by 義 (真實義 = *tattvārtha*), and *vyavasthānataḥ* is not represented at all. Theoretically, it is possible to assume that these two translations are based on an original reading **tat punas tattvalakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthānato* (Gu: **sa punas tattvārtho*) *dvayam: bhāvaś câbhāvaś ca*. But apart from the (to my mind arbitrary) claim that °*prabhāvita* in its typical Yogācāra meaning ought not to occur in an early text like the BoBh, I cannot find any compelling reason for postulating such a different original reading. As far as I can see, the transmitted Sanskrit wording of the passage does not contain anything suspicious or

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[2255] According to TAKAHASHI, the available mss. avoid the ambiguity arising from the sandhi by reading °*taḥ advaya*° (thus also BoBh$_D$) or even °*taḥ* | *advaya*°. Still, this need not have been so in earlier mss., and even less so in oral transmission (see § 502.2.2.2 with fn. 2253).

[2256] 復 is missing in the Sung, Yüan and Ming editions.

[2257] On the meaning of *lakṣaṇa* see Pt. II § 362.

[2258] Theoretically, one might consider the possibility that 性 (in 有性 and 無性) stands for °*prabhāvita* (see §§ 506.2 and 507.2) and that Dharmakṣema merely transposed it, rendering "... **dvayaprabhāvitaṁ* ...; *dvayaṁ ucyate bhāvaś câbhāvaś ca*" as if there were "... **dvayaṁ: bhāvaprabhāvitam abhāvaprabhāvitaṁ ca*". But there are also other passages where Dharmakṣema renders just *bhāva* and *abhāva* as 有性 and 無性, with no trace of °*prabhāvita* in the transmitted Sanskrit text (see BoBh$_D$ 37,13, 37,16 and 235,14 = T 30.1581: 896a19, a21 and 943b25; but simply 有 and 無 at 893a25 and 943b21 = BoBh$_D$ 26,4 and 235,8).

incoherent. Hence, I consider it more likely that the original used by Guṇavarman and Dharmakṣema was similar to the transmitted Sanskrit text and that they merely misinterpreted their original as *vyavasthānato dvayaprabhāvitaṁ* instead of *°to 'dvaya°*. In addition, they rendered the gist of what they understood to be the meaning of the passage as briefly as possible, without bothering with words which they considered to be accessory; *°prabhāvita* may well have been one of these words if it was taken to mean "[essentially] characterized by" or "[essentially] consisting in". I therefore strongly doubt that the evidence of these two versions is sufficient to prove the existence of an earlier Indian version where *°prabhāvita* was missing;[2259] all we can safely assert is that this expression is not corroborated by them either.

503.3. As regards *advaya* in [B47], in view of the final resumé confirmed by *all* versions, viz.,

[B48] *yad advayaṁ, tan* (v.l.: *sā*) *madhyamā pratipad* ... | *tasmiṁś ca tattve* ...,[2260]

this concept would seem to be essential for the logical coherence of the whole train of thought. Existence and non-existence are clearly defined as inadequate characterizations of true reality, not only in the transmitted Sanskrit text but also in Dharmakṣema's version, which apart from the initial *dvaya* instead of *advaya* fully agrees with the transmitted Sanskrit. The situation with Guṇavarman is more complicated. For him too existence (*bhāva*) is the nature of dharmas as conventionally conceived by ordinary people, but non-existence is not the other extreme, i.e., the radical negation of any ontological basis of these conventional dharmas, but rather the fact that it is only because of the [wrong] view of [ordinary] beings that the conventional nature of dharmas is called 'existence', when in reality it is fundamentally non-existent.[2261] This would mean that for Guṇavarman true reality is characterized both by existence as something merely imputed to conventional dharmas and by non-existence as their true status, and this is existence and non-existence as taught by the Buddhas.[2262] But then Guṇavarman abruptly switches over to equating this true reality (*tattva*) with the middle way (*madhyamā pratipat*), which means *neither* existence *nor* non-existence,[2263] as in the transmitted Sanskrit text. It is not easy (and would require a much broader investigation) to decide whether Guṇavarman had a different Sanskrit text before him or whether he deliberately interpreted or paraphrased the section on non-existence in terms of his own ideas and in a way that fitted in with the initial *dvaya* (instead of *advaya*). Still, from the point of view of internal coherence the transmitted Sanskrit text —confirmed by all the versions but Guṇavarman's, even by Dharmakṣema's (except that he, too, reads *dvaya* in

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2259 Still, one might argue that the Sanskrit original of Dharmakṣema and Guṇavarman(?)read **tat punas tattvalakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthānatodvayam | dvayam ucyate bhāvaś câbhāvaś ca*, and that they merely mistakenly understood *°natodvayam* (scriptio continua, as usual in mss.) as *°nato dvayam* and simplified the construction by disregarding unnecessary elements like *dvayam ucyate* in their renderings. In this case, however, one would have to explain what the motive of a later redactor might have been for changing **advayam* into *advayaprabhāvitam* if *advayam* as a PredN of a Subj *°lakṣaṇam* had been felt to be idiomatically impeccable in the original version.

2260 BoBh$_D$ 27,5f; TAKAHASHI 2005: 89 (# 3.4–4.1); T 30.1581: 893a25f: 無二者, 是名中道 ...。如是真實 ...; T 30.1582: 968c4f: 非有非無 名為中道 ...。如是中道 ...。

2261 T 30.1582: 968c1-3: 世流布有 ... 眾生見故 名之為有。法性本無 名之為無。

2262 T 30.1582: 968c3f: 諸佛如來所說有無 名之真實。

2263 T 30.1582: 968c4f: 真實者 名為中道。非有非無 名為中道。

[B47]) — surely deserves preference.For this reason, I think that the correct reading in [B47] is indeed *'dvaya* (i.e., *advaya*) and that *dvaya* as presupposed by [B47]-Dh and [B47]-Gu is based on a misunderstanding.

504. BoBh$_D$ 27,6f

504.1. The second passage adduced by Matsumoto (M1: 213b), i.e., BoBh$_D$ 27,6f (BoBh$_W$ 39,27–40,2; TAKAHASHI 2005: 89 # 4.1; text confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 26b3f and YBh$_c$ 487a12f) follows just a few lines after [B47] and belongs to the same train of thought:

[B49] {1} *tasmiṁś ca tattve buddhānāṁ bhagavatāṁ suviśuddhaṁ jñānaṁ veditavyaṁ* | {2} *bodhisattvānāṁ punaḥ śikṣā-mārga-prabhāvitaṁ tatra jñānaṁ veditavyaṁ* |.

In this sentence, "produced" would, it is true, seem to make sense, but on the other hand {2}, contrasting with {1} describing the specific quality of the Buddhas' understanding of true reality, is more likely to indicate, likewise, the specific *quality* of the respective understanding of the bodhisattvas: their understanding of true reality is not yet completely purified but still *characterized* by the path of training, i.e., preliminary, imperfect, and in need of further purification.

[B49]-tr: {1} One should know that with regard to this true reality (see [B47]) the understanding of the Buddhas, the Exalted Ones, is perfectly pure.[2264]

{2} Against this, the understanding of the bodhisattvas with regard to it (= true reality) is — thus should one know — characterized (/constituted) by the path of training.

504.2. As Matsumoto remarks, °*prabhāvita* of this passage is also not represented in the two early Chinese translations:

[B49]-Dh: {1} 如是真實，是佛世尊淨智境界，{2} 是諸菩薩所應修學。(T30.1581: 893a26f)

[B49]-Dh-tr: {1} This true reality is the domain[2265] of the pure knowledge of the Buddhas, the World-honoured Ones; {2} it is [something] with regard to which the Bodhisattvas [still] have to train.

[B49]-Gu: {1} 如是中道 諸佛世尊 除壞障礙。是故名之為一切智。{2} 菩薩摩訶薩 雖學如是中道 猶有障礙。是故不得為一切智。(T 30.1582: 968c5-8)

[B49]-Gu-tr: {1} With regard to this Middle Way, the Buddhas, the World-honoured Ones, have removed [all] obstacles; therefore, one calls them omniscient.[2266] {2} As for the bodhisattvas mahāsattvas, even though they train themselves in this Middle Way, there are still obstacles; therefore, they cannot be regarded as omniscient.

504.3. Dharmakṣema's version ([B49]-Dh) is fairly accurate as regards the purport of the passage, but it is obvious that he does not stick to the syntactical structure of the original and ignores accessory elements (like *veditavyam* or *punaḥ*). In {1}, he transforms the Sanskrit construction

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[2264] In taking *suviśuddhaṁ* as a PredN, I follow the Tibetan (YBh$_t$ P zhi 26b3:... *ye shes ni shin tu rnam par dag par rig par bya'o*) and Hsüan-tsang (YBh$_c$ 487a12-13: 佛世尊智於此真實已善清淨). The same holds good for °*prabhāvitaṁ* in {2}.

[2265] 境界 often renders Skt. *viṣaya*, which may be used to indicate the specific objective domain of a certain sense faculty or knowledge, thus acquiring the technical meaning of "object".

[2266] Or: "one calls [their comprehension] omniscience", and accordingly in the next sentence; cf. *HIRAKAWA* 9a (s.v. 一切智: *sarvajña*, but also *sarvajñatā*, *sarvajña-jñāna*).

A^{Lok} B^{Gen} $C^{Nom(PredN)}$ $D^{Nom(Subj)}$ *veditavyam*, or: A^{Lok} B^{Gen} $C^{Nom(Attr)}$ $D^{Nom(Subj)}$ *vedi°*,[2267]

into

$A^{Subj(Nom)}$ *copula* $B^{(Gen)}$ $C^{(Attr)}$ $D^{(Gen)}$ domain/object$^{PredN(Nom)}$.

In {2}, he keeps to this construction[2268] but simplifies "the object of an understanding characterized by the path of training" to "object of training" (lit.: "what they should cultivate and [with regard to what they should] train"). Since 諸菩薩所應修學 is equivalent to 諸菩薩之所應修學, the element 諸菩薩 ("the bodhisattvas") is virtually a genitive, like 佛世尊 ("the Buddhas, the World-honoured Ones") in {1}). In spite of this syntactical restructuring and the fact that a few elements of secondary importance (like *veditavyam* and, due to restructuring and simplification, strictly speaking, even *mārga*) are not represented, I do not see any cogent reason to assume a different original for Dharmakṣema's version. As regards °*prabhāvita*, this word as well is not represented, at least not in the place where it belongs, which is understandable if Dharmakṣema understood it as a quasi-synonym of °*lakṣaṇa* or °*svabhāva* (bahuv.). Alternatively, we might consider the possibility that he understood it in the sense of (or even had a variant reading) °*paribhāvita* ("cultivated") and integrated it as 修 into his syntactically loose rendering of the whole compound.

504.4. From the perspective of the transmitted Sanskrit text, Guṇavarman's translation ([B49]-Gu) looks, once again, more like a paraphrase, with considerable differences not only as regards the syntax but also as regards the concepts employed (e.g., "the Middle Way" instead of *tattva*, or "have removed [all] obstacles" instead of "perfectly pure"). In place of the element *jñāna* in {1} and {2} of the Sanskrit, Guṇavarman has two separate sentences referring to omniscience, and *śikṣāmārga-prabhāvita* is represented by the phrase: "even though they train themselves in this Middle Way, there are still obstacles". If we assume that Guṇavarman's rendering reflects the wording of an earlier Sanskrit version, I myself do not see any reason why a redactor would have replaced this rather explicit and colourful phraseology with the one found in the transmitted Sanskrit. I find it much more probable that Guṇavarman's rendering is rather the result of a translation style in which the original was freely rephrased, abbreviated or, as in the present case, developed or embellished. If this is correct, it seems utterly impossible to draw any valid conclusion with regard to the absence of °*prabhāvita* in the original used by Guṇavarman, unless the transmitted Sanskrit itself were to offer some clue for its interpolatedness. But this is not the case. It rather appears to be an integral and even indispensable element without which the Sanskrit sentence could not be construed.

505. BoBh$_D$ 278,6-12

1. The third passage mentioned by Matsumoto (M1: 213b19-21), viz., BoBh$_D$ 278,6-12 (BoBh$_W$ 403,11-19; text basically confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 240b4-7 and YBh$_c$ 573c19-25), contains only an occurrence of the finite verb *prabhāvyate*. It deals with the three applications of mindfulness (*smṛtyupasthāna*) of a Buddha:[2269]

[2267] I.e., if the sentence is taken to mean: "It should be known that with regard to this True Reality the Buddhas … have an understanding that is perfectly pure." The same holds good for {2}.

[2268] The Subj has to be supplied from {1}.

[2269] Cf. ANĀLAYO 2012: 283–285.

[B50] (*trīṇi smṛtyupasthānāni* ...|) {1} *dīrgharātraṁ Tathāgata evaṁkāmaḥ* | {2} *kaccin mayā sudeśite dharme vineyāḥ*[2270] *pratipattau yathāvad avatiṣṭherann iti* | {3a} *tasya ca dīrgharātraṁ tat-kāmasya dharmasvāmino gaṇaparikarṣakasya* {3b} *tasyāḥ prārthanāyāḥ saṁpattivipattibhyām asaṁkleśas tribhiḥ smṛtyupasthānaiḥ samāsataḥ* prabhāvyate | {4} *tāni punar etāni parṣattrayaprabhedāt trīṇi vyavasthāpyante* | {5} *tisraḥ parṣadaḥ katamāḥ* | {6} *ekāntena samyak pratipadyante sarva eva. iyam ekā parṣat* |[2271] ...

In this passage, *prabhāvyate* is most naturally understood in its traditional meaning "revealed" or "elucidated", i.e., in the sense of *prakāśyate*:

[B50]-tr: {1} For a long time the Tathāgata has been wishing: {2} 'I hope that (*kaccid*), as regards the Dharma (and Vinaya) that has been well taught by me, those to be trained will remain duly engaged in practising [it].' {3a} But (*ca*) [even though] the Master of the Dharma (*dharmasvāmin*), the Leader of the Community, has been wishing so for a long time, {3b} he is not defiled/disturbed[2272] by the success or failure of this earnest wish. [This fact] is succinctly disclosed (/ made clear, indicated) by means of the three Applications of Mindfulness. {4} These, in their turn, are established as three because there are three different assemblies [of listeners]. {5} Which are the three assemblies? {6} } All [members of the assembly] exclusively understand-and-practise (*pratipadyate*) correctly: this is one assembly; ...[2273]

2. The early Chinese versions run as follows:

[B50]-Dh: (三念處 ....。) {1} 如來長夜作如是念。{2} 我善法律 {3a} 為大法主。{3b} 於受不受 不起惱心。{4} 略說三種眾。{6} 一者正趣。... {7} 於此三眾 以正念心 而無增減。(T 1581: 958c3-6)

[B50]-Dh-tr: {1} The Tathāgata has, for a long time, been thinking like this: {2} 'I am, with regard to the good *dharmavinaya*, {3a} the great Dharma-master'. {3b} [Still, regardless of] whether [the audience] accepts or does not accept [his teaching], he does not feel annoyed. {4} Briefly stated, [there are] three kinds of assembly: {6} Firstly, [listeners] with correct orientation. ... {7} With regard to these three assemblies, on account of mindfulness, [the Tathāgata] has no increase or decrease (i.e., remains in a state of unwavering equanimity).

[B50]-Gu: (三念處。) 如來說法 至心聽受 心得歡喜 受諸安樂 如法而住 不違佛教。佛亦不喜。修集捨心 不失正念 亦不放逸。... (T 1582: 1012c16-18)

[B50]-Gu-tr: When the Tathāgata (cf. {1}) preaches the Dharma (cf. {2}), [some people] listen to it and receive it attentively, their hearts rejoice, they obtain all [kinds of] peaceful happiness, live in accordance with the Dharma (cf. {6}), and do not counteract the Buddha's teaching. Even so, the Buddha does not rejoice; cultivating equanimity, he does not forfeit mindfulness, nor does he become negligent (cf. {3b}). ...

[2270] For *mayā sudeśite dharme vineyāḥ*, YBh_t P zhi 240b4 (= D wi 207b3) has *ngas legs par bstan pa'i chos 'dul ba rnams la*, which sounds rather strange, and YBh_c 573c20 諸有情類 於我善說法毘柰耶 ...; should we read *mayā sudeśite dharm⟨avinay⟩e vineyāḥ*?

[2271] In {3b}, I read *prarthanāyāḥ* with $BoBh_W$ 403,14 ($BoBh_D$: *prārthitāyāḥ*). In {6}, *pratipadyante sarva eva* follows Dutt and his ms. (362b1) against $BoBh_W$ *pratipadyate sarvam eva*.

[2272] I.e., no undue emotions like being glad/proud or sorry/angry arise in him.

[2273] In this and the other versions, the three dots stands for an analogous description of the other two assemblies. The second assembly is the one that understands everything wrongly, the third assembly is mixed.

3. The structure of Dharmakṣema's rendering ([B50]-Dh) roughly agrees with that of the transmitted Sanskrit, with the exception that he adds a sentence ({7}), which looks like a transposition of some elements of {3b} to the end of the paragraph. Apart from this, the main difference is that most segments are considerably shorter. Of {2}, only *mayā sudeśite dharm⟨avinay⟩e* is somehow represented by 我善法律 and has been combined with (為)大法主, which seems to represent *dharmasvāmino* of {3a}. Of the elements of {3b}, only *saṁpattivipattibhyām asaṁkleśaḥ* is somehow recognizable in Dharmakṣema's version. It is only in {7}, after the introduction of the three assemblies, that the equanimous reaction (無增減, a rephrasing of *asaṁkleśa*?) of the Buddha is stated to be due to *smṛtyupasthāna* (its characterization as threefold being omitted here as redundant). The expression *prabhāvyate* is not rendered by Dharmakṣema, at least not explicitly, but he may perhaps have taken it in a causal sense (cf. 以 ... 無 ... in {7}). In my opinion, these divergences of Dharmakṣema's version from the transmitted Sanskrit do not require the assumption that the original he had before him was essentially different. They can as well be explained as being due to his being concerned with rendering only the gist or purport of the original, so that words or phrases regarded as dispensable (e.g., the repetitive elements at the beginning of {3a}, the whole of {5}, and even *ekāntena* and *sarvam eva* in {6}) could be omitted, textual elements could be differently arranged if that was found convenient for some reason or other. Therefore, the lack of an unequivocal equivalent for *prabhāvyate* is hardly sufficient for proving its absence in Dharmakṣema's Sanskrit original. Moreover, there is not the slightest formal indication in the transmitted Sanskrit of its being interpolated. Even from Matsumoto's point of view there would be no need for such an assumption since *prabhāvyate* appears to be used here in a sense which is by no means peculiar to the Yogācāra tradition.

4. Guṇavarman's version ([B50]-Gu) is rather far from the wording of the transmitted Sanskrit (and the other versions), and, in my opinion, once again best explained as a very free rephrasing rather than as a translation strictly speaking. If the original on which his version is based was indeed more or less identical with the transmitted Sanskrit, he would have integrated all the information considered important by him into the characterization of the three assemblies (i.e., {6}), embellishing, at the same time, this textual element by a more colourful description of the assemblies' reaction to the teaching of the Buddha. The syntax of the passage would thus have been thoroughly restructured, and the fact that *prabhāvyate* is not represented does not allow any conclusion with regard to its presence or absence in the Sanskrit original on which Guṇavarman's translation was based.

506. BoBh$_D$ 219,17-20

506.1. Among the occurrences of °*prabhāvita* in the BoBh that are not mentioned by Matsumoto, BoBh$_D$ 219,17-20 (BoBh$_W$ 320,15-19; text confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 190a1-3 and YBh$_c$ 553b28–c2) is of special interest:

[B51] *tatra katamo bodhisattvasya pratītyasamutpāda-pravṛtti-nivṛtti-pratisaṁyukto 'dhiprajña-vihāraḥ | yas tam eva satyāvabodham adhipatiṁ kṛtvā tad-ajñānāt sa-hetuka-duḥkha-pravṛtti-pravicaya-*prabhāvita*s taj-jñānāc ca sa-hetuka-duḥkha-nirodha-pravicaya-*prabhāvito *vihāraḥ |*

[B51]-tr: What is the bodhisattva's abiding [in a state] relating to comprehension concerning the arising-and-going-on and the cessation of origination in dependence? [It consists in the fact that] by virtue of precisely this [aforementioned] comprehension of the

[four] Truths[2274] [the bodhisattva] abides [in a state] that is distinctively/essentially characterized by the discernment that the arising-and-going-on (*pravṛtti*) of suffering and its causes [results] from not knowing the [Truths] (*tad-* = *satya-*), and by the discernment that the cessation of suffering and its causes [results] from knowing them.

Since in this passage °*pravṛtti-(/nirodha-)pravicaya-prabhāvito vihāraḥ* is clearly a *definition* of °*pravṛtti-(/nivṛtti-)pratisaṁyukto 'dhiprajña-vihāraḥ* and since *pravicaya* is, in Abhidharmic definitions, *equated* with *prajñā*,[2275] a causal meaning of °*prabhāvita* is improbable here, and its interpretation as "distinctively/essentially characterized by" clearly deserves to be preferred.

506.2. This time such an interpretation would seem to be confirmed also by Dharmakṣema's version, where the equivalent of °*prabhāvita* is obviously 性 (cf. also § 507.2: [B53]-Dh{2}):

[B51]-Dh: 云何緣起生滅相應慧住。菩薩 真諦覺為增上已 有因緣苦生 有因緣苦滅 觀察性住。(T 30.1581: 940a24-26)

[B51]-Dh-tr: "How is abiding in comprehension concerning arising and cessation [in terms] of origination-in-dependence [to be defined]? [It is that] abiding of a bodhisattva which has the nature of the discernment of the arising of suffering [as?] having causes and conditions and of the cessation of suffering [as?] having causes and conditions, [a discernment reached] after [the bodhisattva] has made awakening to real Truth his determinant (or: guiding principle)."

506.3. Guṇavarman once again simplifies and modifies the statement considerably:

[B51]-Gu: 若觀四諦 見一切苦 從因緣生 從因緣滅, 是名共十二因緣行。(T 30.1582: 1002c15-17)

[B51]-Gu-tr: "When [the bodhisattva] contemplates the four Truths and sees that all suffering arises from causes and conditions and ceases due to causes and conditions, then this is called the course/practice (行, *vihāra*) connected with the twelve[-membered chain of] causes and conditions."

Since in this rendering the definiens does not even contain an equivalent for *vihāra* (= 行 in the definiendum), one cannot expect an equivalent for °*prabhāvita* either, since its function is to express the relation of this substantive to its qualification.

506.4. Apart from this, both translations have no equivalent for *tad-ajñānāt* and *taj-jñānāt*, which makes a major difference in meaning. In this case, one could imagine that these words were lacking in the Sanskrit text on which Dharmakṣema's and Guṇavarman's renderings are based, but I consider it more probable that they had the same Sanskrit before them as we do but failed to fully grasp the meaning of this somewhat terse passage or at least did not manage to translate it in a way that did full justice to it. Actually, the presence of *ajñāna* and *jñāna* in [B51] is confirmed by the corresponding phrase in the passage introducing the 13 *vihāra*s, viz., $BoBh_D$ 217,17f:

[B52] *tasya ca tattvasyâjñānād yathā pravṛttir duḥkhasya jñānāc ca punar apravṛttir duḥkhasya bhavati sattvānāṁ, ...*

[2274] Cf. $BoBh_D$ 233,13 (read *catvāry āryasatyāni* with $BoBh_W$ 341,16) and 233,17f.

[2275] Cf., e.g., YBh_{Bh} 60,7f (= AS 6,8f): *prajñā katamā? ... dharmāṇāṁ pravicayo ...*; AKBh 54,22: *matiḥ* (= AK II.24b) *prajñā dharmapravicayaḥ*; PSk 6,3: *prajñā katamā? ... pravicayo ...*; $Prak_H$ 693a19: 慧云何。謂 心擇法性。

[B52]-tr: And [he perceives] that suffering arises-and-continues for sentient beings because they do not know this true reality and that suffering will not arise [anymore] due to [their] coming to know [it, i.e., true reality] …,

and in this case, at least Guṇavarman's (T 30.1582: 1002b20f) rendering confirms the transmitted Sanskrit:[2276]

[B52]-Gu: 若不如實見 流轉生死。若如實見 則斷眾苦。

[B52]-Gu-tr: If one does not correctly perceive [the Truth], one floats around in *saṁsāra.*[2277] If one correctly perceives [it], then one cuts off all suffering.

507. BoBh$_D$ 189,11-16

507.1. 1. Another interesting passage is BoBh$_D$ 189,11-16 (BoBh$_W$ 278,25–279,6; text basically[2278] confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 167a6–b1 and YBh$_c$ 544b12-17), containing four occurrences of *prabhāvita* and, moreover, a phraseology similar to that of [B47]:

[B53] {1} *tāny etāni catvāry api saṁskṛta-lakṣaṇāny abhisamasya saṁskārāṇāṁ samāsato dvayāvasthā*-prabhāvit*āni*:

{2} *bhāva*-prabhāvit*āny abhāva*-prabhāvit*āni ca.*

{3} *tatra Bhagavatā yo bhāvas tad ekaṁ saṁskṛta-lakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthāpitaṁ.*

{4} *yas tv abhāvas tad dvitīyaṁ saṁskṛta-lakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthāpitaṁ.*

{5} *sa ca bhāvas teṣāṁ saṁskārāṇāṁ sthity-anyathātva*-prabhāvita *iti kṛtvā tṛtīyaṁ saṁskṛta-lakṣaṇaṁ vyavasthāpitaṁ.*

2. In this passage too "produced" does not make any sense. (Coming into) existence and (fading into) non-existence are *not* the *causes* of the 'marks of the conditioned' but rather *underlie* them, as a more essential level, one that is more in tune with the ontology of momentariness.[2279] This is obvious from {3}, {4} and {5}, where it is stated that (coming into) existence is *established as* one 'mark of the conditioned', (fading into) non-existence as a second one, and again existence, in a different perspective, as a third one. It is not easy to settle what, precisely, °*prabhāvita* means here, but at least in {5} "distinctively/essentially characterized by" would seem to hit the mark, although it must be kept in mind that *sthity-anyathātva* is rather an *additional* feature of *bhāva*, representing its "existence feature" as contrasted with the "entering into existence feature" prominent in {3} (*bhāva* = *jāti*). The precise meaning of °*prabhāvita* in {1} and {2} is more difficult to grasp. Actually, while in {5} it is stated that *bhāva* is *prabhāvita* by *sthityanyathātva*, i.e., the third *saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*, in {1} and {2} the statement is the other way round: the *saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*s are said to be *prabhāvita* by *bhāva* and *abhāva*. Hence, in [B53] °*prabhāvita* obviously expresses a mutual relationship between the *saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*s and *bhāva* / *abhāva*. Taken as a whole, they are equivalent. More specifically, three (or two, if *sthityanyathātva* is counted as one) *lakṣaṇa*s are equivalent

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[2276] Dharmakṣema's translation (T30.1581: 939c23) also lacks equivalents for *ajñāna* and *jñāna* in this passage: "He knows [how] sentient beings produce suffering and make it cease" (知眾生生苦滅苦; the character 知 in this passage has a different function, since its subject is the bodhisattva, and not sentient beings, as in the case of *jñāna* and *ajñāna* in [B52]).

[2277] Or perhaps: ... one makes [the stream of] *saṁsāra* flow on (/continue) (?).

[2278] I.e., with the exception that in {4} YBh$_t$ P zhi 167a8 (= D wi 147a4) has *ngo bo nyid gang yin pa* = **yas svabhāvaḥ* instead of *yas tv abhāvaḥ*, just like Dharmakṣema, whereas YBh$_c$ 544b15 (無分) confirms the transmitted Sanskrit text.

[2279] Cf. VON ROSPATT 1995: 43.

to *bhāva*, one (sc., *vyaya*) to *abhāva*. In other words: the four (or three) *saṁskṛtalakṣaṇa*s are essentially characterized as, or — reduced to their essential nature — consist in, *bhāva* and *abhāva*, respectively. On the other hand, *bhāva* can be defined as distinctively and essentially characterized, or even manifested, by arising, being in existence and change (or change while being in existence), and, analogously, *abhāva* as distinctively and essentially characterized, or manifested, by vanishing (*vyaya*), if we want to be complete.

3. Thus, my translation of the passage would run as follows:

[B53]-tr:[2280] {1} [If] all these four 'marks of the conditioned' of the conditioned factors[2281] [are] taken together, they are, briefly, characterized by [being reducible to] a twofold state:

{2} [they are, respectively,] characterized as (entering into) existence and characterized as (fading away into) non-existence.

{3} Among these, (entering into) existence has been established by the Exalted One as one mark of the conditioned.

{4} (Fading into) non-existence, on the other hand, has been established [by him] as a second mark of the conditioned.

{5} In addition (*ca*), in view of [the fact] that the aforementioned (*sa*) existence (*bhāva*) is [also experienced as] characterized by those conditioned factors being subject to change while being in existence,[2282] [this] has been established [by him as] a third mark of the conditioned.

507.2. 1. In the earlier Chinese translations of Dharmakṣema and Guṇavarman the passage runs as follows:

[B53]-Dh: {1} 此四有為相 略說二種。{2} 有性及無性。{3} 如來 以起故 立一有為相。{4} 以自性故 立第二有為相。{5} 諸行住老故 立第三有為相。(T 30.1581: 935a2-5)

[B53]-Dh-tr: {1} These four 'marks of the conditioned' are, briefly, taught to be twofold: {2} of the nature of existence and of the nature of non-existence. {3} On account of arising, the Tathāgata has established one 'mark of the conditioned'. {4} On account of own-nature(!), he has established a second 'mark of the conditioned'. {5} Because conditioned factors (*saṁskāra*) age while being in existence, he has established a third 'mark of the conditioned'.

[B53]-Gu: {1} 如是四相 見有二種。{2} 一者有。二者無。{3+5} 有者 三相。{4} 無者第四相。(T 30.1582: 997b20f)

[B53]-Gu-tr: {1} As for these four marks, [the bodhisattva] sees that there are two kinds: {2} firstly, existence, secondly, non-existence. {3+5} As for existence: [it comprises] three marks. {4} As for non-existence: [it constitutes] the fourth mark.

2280 Cf. also VON ROSPATT 1995: 43 n. 82.

2281 After some reflection, I prefer to construe *saṁskārāṇāṁ* not with the following (as Tibetan [P zhi 167a7: *'du byed rnams kyi gnas skabs*] does) but with the preceding; cf. BoBh$_D$ 189,2: *saṁskṛtasya saṁskṛtalakṣaṇāni*.

2282 I choose this rendering because the text switches over to a set of three *lakṣaṇa*s instead of four. If they are counted as four, *sthity-anyathātva* should be understood as a dvandva: "being in existence [only for a moment] and being [numerically or qualitatively] different [from the previous *kṣaṇa*]". Cf. BoBh$_D$ 189,5-7: *utpannasya yas tatkālāvipraṇāśaḥ, sā sthitir iti paśyati | taṁ pūrvaniruddhaṁ saṁskārakṣaṇasvabhāvam apekṣya tasyôtpannasya yad anyatvam anyathātvaṁ vā, sā jarêti paśyati*. Cf. also VON ROSPATT 1995: 64 n. 139.

2. Just as in [B51]-Dh, so in this passage, too, 性 in Dharmakṣema's ([B53]-Dh) rendering of {2} may represent °*prabhāvita*, though in this case we cannot be sure since he also has 有性 and 無性 in [B47]-Dh and at T 30.1581: 896a19-21 (BoBh$_D$ 37,13f and 16), where they correspond to just *bhāva* and *abhāva*. In any case, the other two occurrences of °*prabhāvita* (in {1} and {5}) have no equivalent in Dharmakṣema, and in Guṇavarman's translation ([B53]-Gu) there is no trace of any of the four occurrences *prabhāvita* at all. Even so, the most likely explanation is, once again, that neither Dharmakṣema nor Guṇavarman felt bound to render all phraseological details of the Sanskrit and that it is for this reason that they tend to disregard the somewhat elusive °*prabhāvita* when it was used in an identificatory function and precisely for this reason may have appeared to them more or less redundant. On the other hand, if we assume that it was absent in their original we would, once again, have to ask why a later redactor should have taken the trouble to add, four times, the word °*prabhāvita* in a sentence that up to this point must have been felt to be impeccable both syntactically and from the point of view of meaning, and what difference the fourfould addition of °*prabhāvita* was considered to make.

3. Actually, from the point of view of content the only serious difference of Dharmakṣema's version from the transmitted Sanskrit I am able to perceive is in {4}, where Dharmakṣema reads 自性 = *svabhāva* instead of *abhāva*, which is, however confirmed not only by Hsüan-tsang but also by Guṇavarman. Actually, 自性 = *svabhāva* does not make sense in connection with the second *lakṣaṇa*, which must be *vyaya* since *sthityanyathātva* is reckoned here as the third and last one). It must therefore be a mistake, probably based on a miswriting or misreading of **yas svabhāvaḥ* for *yas tv abhāvaḥ*. From a graphic point of view, this mistake is easy to explain, and it has also happened in the Tibetan translation.[2283] This variant is therefore no evidence for Dharmakṣema having used a substantially different original, but on the contrary supports the assumption that the Indian text he used was, as in the case of the Tibetan translation, basically the same as the transmitted Sanskrit text.

4. Apart from supporting, in {4}, the correct reading *abhāva*, Guṇavarman's rendering once again diverges considerably from the transmitted Sanskrit, compared with which it is much shorter. In particular, {5} is combined with {3}, and the term *sthityanyathātva* does not appear. But I am very hesitant to take this to mean that Guṇavarman had an earlier, less developed version at his disposal. He may as well have condensed the information of his original into what he considered its gist, and since the terms *sthiti* and *anyathātva* had already been discussed before,[2284] Guṇavarman may not have felt the need to explicitly mention them again. Most interesting, however, is another divergence: In the transmitted Sanskrit text and also in Dharmakṣema's translation, in the second part of the passage, viz., {3}{4}{5}), only three *lakṣaṇa*s are distinguished, whereas in the introductory sentence ({1}) they had been stated to be four. In contradistinction to this, in Guṇavarman's version the second part is adjusted to the introductory sentence by stating that *three lakṣaṇa*s are related to *bhāva* and the *fourth* to *abhāva*. But once again there is no need to assume that his rendering is based on a different original. Actually, I consider it more likely that Guṇavarman harmonized the second part ({3}{4}{5}) with the introductory sentence ({1}) than that the somewhat surprising disagreement was (for what reason?) secondarily introduced by an Indian redactor.

[2283] See fn. 2278.

[2284] T 30.1582: 997b17f and 19.

508. BoBh$_D$ 231,14-16

There are two more occurrences of °*prabhāvita* in the BoBh. The first of them is BoBh$_D$ 231,14-16 (BoBh$_W$ 338,18f; text confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 201b4 and YBh$_c$ 557c29–558a1):

[B54] *śrutâkāra-dharmâlokâvabhāsa-samādhy-ālokâvabhāsa*-prabhāvita*tvād asyā bhūmeḥ prabhākarîty ucyate*.

In Guṇavarman's translation (T 30.1582: 1004c26), the sentence is hardly recognizable, but Dharmakṣema has it as:

[B54]-Dh: 聞行法{行法}[2285]明照 三昧明照 故名明地。(T 30.1581: 942c5f)

[B54]-Dh-tr: [This bodhisattva stage] is illuminated by the light of the Dharma in the form of [the teaching] heard [from the Buddhas] and illuminated by the light of *samādhi*; therefore it is called the 'Stage of Light'.

Dharmakṣema does not corroborate °*prabhāvita* because he does not render it separately, but once again this is explicable in view of the identificatory function of this word, whereas it would be hard to explain its later interpolation if the sentence had been unobjectionable without it. In any case, Dharmakṣema does not support the meaning "produced from" for °*prabhāvita* in the present passage. To take it in this sense would anyway imply a reversal of the relation implied in the name of this bodhisattva stage, for *prabhākarī* means "producing light" and not "produced by/from light", i.e., this stage is not a product but rather a source of light and thus specifically characterized or distinguished by light. The most probable rendering of the Sanskrit would thus be:

[B54]-tr: Because this [bodhisattva-]stage is distinctively characterized by the splendour of the light of the Dharma in the form of the teaching heard (*śruta*) [from the Buddhas][2286] and by the splendour of the light of deep concentration, it is called "the one that produces radiance".

509. BoBh$_D$ 282,1-3

1. The last occurrence of °*prabhāvita* I have noted from the BoBh is found at BoBh$_D$ 282,1-3 (BoBh$_W$ 408,27–409,3; text confirmed by YBh$_t$ P zhi 244a6f and YBh$_c$ 575a27–b1):

[B55] {1} *sarve caite buddhadharmā atyarthaṁ parārthakriyānukūlāḥ parārthakriyā*prabhāvit*āś ca tathāgatānāṁ*. {2} *na tathā śrāvakapratyekabuddhānāṁ*. {3} *tasmāt tasyaîva te* (BoBh$_W$: *tasyaîte*) *āveṇikā ity ucyante*.

Here, too, "produced from" makes little sense. At best, one might consider "produced for the sake of ...". Even "manifested (or indicated) by" may be defensible. But "distinctively /essentially characterized by" or "distinguished by" makes good sense as well:

[B55]-tr: {1} All these properties of a Buddha are, in the case of the Tathāgatas, in the highest degree favourable for activity in the interest of others, distinguished by activity in the interest of others. {2} They are not so in the case of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. {3} Therefore, they are stated to be peculiar to the [Buddha] alone.

2. The older Chinese translations run as follows:

[B55]-Dh: {1}自利利他 {2} 非如聲聞緣覺, {3} 故名不共。(T 30.1581: 959a25f)

[B55]-Dh-tr: {1} As regards one's own benefit and the benefit of others (or: [Since they] benefit [not only the Buddha] himself [but also] benefit others), {2} [the qualities of a

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[2285] This seems to be a dittography.

[2286] I.e., I take *śruta* here in the sense of *sūtrādikaṁ śrutam* (ASBh 100,8).

Buddha] are not like [those of] the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas. {3} Therefore, they are called peculiar.

[B55]-Gu: {1} 如來一切佛法, 悉為眾生,不自為己。{2} 聲聞緣覺所有之法, 但為自利, 少利於他。{3} 是故二乘無不共法。無上佛法 終無似於聲聞辟支佛法。(T 30.1582: 1013b21-24)

[B55]-Gu-tr: {1} All Buddha-properties of the Tathāgata are for the sake of [other] sentient beings, not for [the Tathāgata's] own sake. {2} Whatever properties the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas have, they are merely for the sake of their own benefit, and rarely benefit others. {3} Therefore, the [adepts of these] two vehicles lack the 'peculiar properties'. The insuperable Buddha-properties have no similarity at all with the properties of the śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas.

In this case, Dharmakṣema's rendering ([B55]-Dh) is extremely abbreviated in {1}, but it is not probable that he had a fundamentally different original before him, since in this case even Guṇavarman confirms a fuller text. But Guṇavarman's translation ([B55]-Gu) is not literally identical with the transmitted Sanskrit either, for he adds 不自為己 ("not for his own sake") in {1} and expands {2} and {3}, without, however, adding any information that is not implied in the transmitted Sanskrit text as well. Thus, Guṇavarman's rendering may well be just a more explicit paraphrase of an original basically identical with the transmitted one. Nor does the fact that his version lacks an equivalent for *parārthakriyā-prabhāvitāḥ* (if we take 悉為眾生 as representing *parārthakriyānukūlāḥ*) necessarily imply that it was missing in his original; for since this expression merely underlines the preceding *parārthakriyānukūlāḥ* and hardly adds any substantial information to it, Guṇavarman may well have considered it redundant. On the other hand, one could as well argue that {1} would be perfectly alright without the expression *parārthakriyā-prabhāvitāś ca*, so that the possibility that the whole expression is a gloss that crept into the text later on cannot be excluded either.

510. To sum up, there are (apart from one instance of the finite form *prabhāvyate* in the sense of "is revealed", "is shown") about a dozen occurrences of °*prabhāvita* in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi*. In all of them, "distinctively/essentially characterized by/as" makes good sense, whereas "produced from" is impossible or at least odd in most cases. None of the occurrences shows any formal sign of later interpolation, and only in one case ([B55]) the whole expression that ends in °*prabhāvita* would be dispensable and might (but of course need not) be a later gloss. In the other cases, °*prabhāvita* has, as far as I can see, a meaningful syntactical function and cannot easily be dispensed with. If there existed an older version of the respective passages in which the essential message had been adequately expressed without using °*prabhāvita*, one would have to ask why a later redactor should have felt the need to insert it. The fact that in the early Chinese translations of the text most occurrences of °*prabhāvita* are not represented is explicable by the character of these translations, none of which appears to be strictly literal. Guṇavarman's rendering is, as far as I can judge, not so much a translation as rather a free rephrasing, and even Dharmakṣema's version aims to catch the gist of the sentence and tends to abbreviate, disregarding merely phraseological or functional elements, among which °*prabhāvita* in its identificatory function can be reckoned. In one or two cases (see §§ 506.2 and 507.2), however, Dharmakṣema seems to have rendered °*prabhāvita* by °性 ("[having the] nature [of] ...").[2287]

[2287] Cf. Pt. II § 360.2 ([A15]) and fn. 1836.

6. *Prabhāvita* in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*

511. Let me now proceed to the occurrences of *prabhāvita* in the *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra* itself. Actually, the word is not only found in Saṁdh VIII.7 (ⓧ), the passage which inspired Matsumoto to rediscuss the meaning of *prabhāvita*, but there are further occurrences. Last but not least in view of the use of *prabhāvita* in the BoBh as discussed in the preceding chapter, Matsumoto's categorical denial of any meaning other than "produced" in a text as early as the Saṁdh is hardly tenable. Nonetheless, an *a priori* exclusion of the possibility that the Saṁdh *de facto* used the word only in this sense is not possible either. The decision rather depends on the result of a careful examination of the other occurrences. If in all these passages the meaning "produced" is required or at least natural, this would no doubt enhance the probability that in the disputed passage in Saṁdh VIII.7 it is also used in this sense. Should, however, the meaning "produced" turn out to be definitely inapplicable in at least some of the other occurrences, it cannot be categorically postulated for the disputed passage (ⓧ) either.

512. Saṁdh III.5

512.1. Textual material (Tib.: Saṁdh 45,28-33; Saṁdh$_{\text{TH}}$: missing; Chin.: Hsüan-tsang: T 16.676: 691a8-11; Paramārtha: T 16.677: 713b20-22; Bodhiruci:[2288] T 16.675: 667c25-28):

[B56] (*gang gi phyir ...*) *don dam pa ni 'du byed rnams kyi bdag med pas*[2289] rab tu phye ba *yin pa ... de 'i phyir 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang | don dam pa'i mtshan nyid ... tha dad pa zhes byar mi rung ngo ||*

[B56]-Hs: ... 又即諸行 唯無我性 唯無自性 之**所顯現** 名勝義相。... 是故 勝義諦相 與 諸行相 … 一向異 不應道理。

[B56]-Pa: ... 由諸行無我無性**所顯**是真。... 以是義故 真如與行…異 是義不然。

[B56]-tr: Because ... ultimate reality (*paramārtha*) is distinctively/essentially characterized as[2290] the lack of self (= 'own-being') of the conditioned factors (**saṁskāra-nairātmya-prabhāvita*), ... therefore the character that is ultimate reality (*paramārtha-lakṣaṇa*, i.e., the character [of conditioned factors viewed from the perspective] of ultimate reality) cannot be said to be something other (*anyat*)[2291] than the character of conditioned factors [as such] (*saṁskāralakṣaṇa*) (i.e.: it cannot be a separate entity existing side by side with them on the same ontological level).

[2288] Bodhiruci's translation is often hard to assess and therefore not discussed unless there are special reasons.

[2289] Thus with Saṁdh$_{\text{t}}$ P 9a6-8, S 12b4, D 8b3-5 and YBh$_{\text{t}}$ P 'i 53b6; LAMOTTE suggests *med pa ⟨tsam dang ngo bo nyid med pa tsam nyid kyi⟩s* with Hsüan-tsang ([B56]-Hs) and the parallel sentence quoted below ([B57]); Paramārtha's version ([B56]-Pa) supports *ngo bo nyid med pa (nyid)* but not *tsam*; Bodhiruci (得於無我第一義名) confirms the transmitted Tibetan text.

[2290] POWERS 1995: 45: "distinguished by"; so also on p. 101–105 and on p. 299 in the passages discussed in §§ 513, 514 (twice, but once "distinguished *as*": see fn. 2298), 515 and 517. Similarly HAKAMAYA 1994: 135 (... によって特徴づけられる = "distinguished by") in the passages discussed in §§ 513, 514 and 515).

[2291] Cf. *SHT* III (1971) no. 923 (cf. MATSUDA 1984: 81 附記2) A3: *(kecid e)[va]m āhu | na hy eva saṁskāralakṣaṇād anyat paramārtha[l](akṣaṇam)///*, corresponding to Saṁdh III.1 (42,13-15): *kha cig ni 'di skad ces "'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang | don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa ma lags so" zhes mchi |*.

512.2. My translation of °*prabhāvita* is, in the first place, based on the fact that the *paramārtha*, being identical with Suchness (*tathatā*),[2292] cannot be generated, so that a causal interpretation of °*prabhāvita* is excluded (see Pt. II §§ 360.2 and 363). Ultimate reality is not *caused* by the lack of own-being of the conditioned factors but *consists* in this lack of own-being. What might be considered as an alternative is that ultimate reality is *disclosed* or indicated by this lack of own-being as what it essentially is. But a causal relation *sensu stricto* between the *paramārtha* and the *dharmanairātmya*, involving two different entities and a temporal sequence, is impossible.

512.3. Furthermore, the sentence is the reversal of the *prasaṅga* formulated a few lines before (Saṁdh 45,17-21; Saṁdh$_{TH}$ missing; Hsüan-tsang: T 16.676: 691a2-4; Paramārtha: T 16.677: 713b16f; Bodhiruci T 16.675: 667c20f):

[B57] *gal te 'du byed kyi mtshan nyid dang don dam pa'i mtshan nyid tha dad pa yin par gyur na ni | des na 'du byed rnams kyi bdag med pa tsam dang | ngo bo nyid med pa tsam nyid don dam pa'i mtshan nyid yin par yang mi 'gyur |*

[B57]-Hs: 若勝義諦相與諸行相一向異者，應非諸行唯無我性唯無自性之所顯現是勝義相。

[B57]-Pa: 復次 若真如相異行相者，以是義故 一切諸行但惟無我及以無性 應非真實。

[B57]-tr: If the character that is ultimate reality (*paramārtha-lakṣaṇam*) were something other (*anyat*) than the character of conditioned factors [as such] (*saṁskāra-lakṣaṇāt*),[2293] then the mere lack of self (**nairātmyamātra*) and the mere lack of own-being (**niḥsvabhāvatāmātra*) of the conditioned factors could not be the character that is ultimate reality.

The interesting point is that in this passage it is only in Hsüan-tsang ([應非 ...] A 之所顯現是 B = [*na*] A-*prabhāvitam* B [*syāt*]) that we find the same construction as in [B56], whereas the Tibetan version this time has a simple equation (A B *yin pa*[*r mi gyur*] = Skt. [*na*] A B [*syāt*]) instead of the construction with °*prabhāvita* (B *ni* A *(kyi)s rab tu phye ba yin pa* = Skt. A-*prabhāvitaṁ* B). This is confirmed by Paramārtha, who likewise has an equivalent for *prabhāvita* only in [B56] but a simple negative copula (非) in [B57]. This strongly supports an interpretation of *prabhāvita* as coming close to a copula in cases where an *essential* or *distinctive* qualification or identification is intended. For the present context, this is moreover corroborated by the fact that in Saṁdh IV.9 *dharmanairātmya* is coordinated with *tathatā* and *paramārtha* in the form of an apposition,[2294] a fact which clearly implies identity or at least equivalence and excludes a causal relationship.

513. Saṁdh VII.6

513.1. Textual material (Tib.: Saṁdh 68,25-32; Saṁdh$_{TH}$: HAKAMAYA 1987a: 348 = 2008: 670,1-8 [Stein Tib. no. 683a5–b3]; Hsüan-tsang: T 16.676: 694a26–b1; Bodhiruci: T 16.675: 670c22-26):

[2292] Saṁdh IV.9 (51,10-12: see fn. 2294), using *tathatā* and *paramārtha* in apposition, i.e., equating them.

[2293] Cf. *SHT* III (1971): 180 (frgm. 923: A3), corresponding to Saṁdh 42,13f.

[2294] Saṁdh IV.9 (51,10-12): *phung po gcig gi de bzhin nyid don dam pa* (so to read with Saṁdh$_t$ S 16a6, YBh$_t$ P 'i 56b5 and Saṁdh 51,18 instead of LAMOTTE's *pa'i*) *chos bdag med pa rab tu rtogs nas* (**ekasya skandhasya tathatāṁ paramārthaṁ dharmanairātmyaṁ pratividhya*).

[B58] {1} *don dam yang dag 'phags gzhan yang chos rnams kyi yongs su grub pa'i mtshan nyid gang yin pa de'ang don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ces bya'o* || {2} *de ci'i phyir zhe na* | {3} *don dam yang dag 'phags chos rnams kyi chos bdag med pa gang yin pa* {3a} *de ni* | *de dag gi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ces bya ste* | {3b} *de ni don dam pa yin la* | {4} {4a} *don dam pa ni* {4b} *chos thams cad kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid kyis* rab tu phye ba *yin pas* {5} *de'i phyir don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid ces bya'o* ||

[B58]-TH: {1} *yang dond dam gyung drung 'phags* || *gang chos rnam gyi yongsu rdzogs pa'i mtshan nyid de yang* | *ngas dond dam pa la ngo bo nyid myed pa zhes bshad do* || {2} *de ji'i phyir zhe na* {3} *dond dam gyung drung 'phags* | *gang chos rnams gyi chos la bdag myed pa'o* || {3a} *de ni de dag ste ngo bo nyid med ces bya'o* || {3b} *dond dam pa yang de'o* || {4} {4a} *dond dam pa ni* {4b} *chos thams chad gyi ngo bo nyid myed pa la* rab du goms pa*'o* || {5} *de'i phyir na' dond dam pa la ngo bo nyid myed pa zhes bya'o* ||

[B58]-Hs {1}復有諸法圓成實相 亦名勝義無自性性。{2} 何以故。{3} 一切諸法法無我性 {3b} 名為勝義，{3a} 亦得名為無自性性。{4} {4a} 是一切法勝義諦故，{4b} 無自性性之所顯故，{5} 由此因緣 名為勝義無自性性。

[B58]-tr: {1} Furthermore, Paramārthasamudgata, the Perfect Character (**pariniṣpanna-lakṣaṇa*) of the dharmas, too, is called **paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*. {2} Why? {3} The lack of self of the dharmas as dharmas (**dharmāṇāṁ dharmanairātmyam*),[2295] Paramārthasamudgata, {3a} is called their lack of own-being (**niḥsvabhāvatā*), {3b} and it is [also][2296] the ultimate reality[2297] (**paramārtha*). {4} Since [the Perfect Character] is [thus] {4a} the ultimate reality {4b} [and at the same time] distinctively/essentially characterized (**°prabhāvita*) as the lack of own-being of all dharmas,[2298] {5} therefore it is called the "lack of own-being [that is] the ultimate reality" (**paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*).

[2295] The *dharmanairātmya* is the *pariniṣpannaḥ svabhāvaḥ*, for the latter is defined as 'Suchness' or True Reality (*tathatā*) at Saṁdh VI.6 (61,1f; see fn. 2241), and the *tathatā* is juxtaposed with *dharma-nairātmya* at IV.9 (51,10: see fn. 2292).

[2296] Saṁdh$_{TH}$ *dond dam pa yang de'o*; cf. [B44] *paramārthaś caiṣa(ḥ)*. Cf. also [B58]Hs {3a} (*after* {3b}!): 亦得名為...

[2297] Or perhaps better: "highest object" or "object of the highest [insight]" (cf. MAVBh 23,22f and 41,18f), in the sense that it is the objective support of purification (*viśuddhyālambana*, cf. Saṁdh 68,23-25).

[2298] My translation follows Hsüan-tsang in taking *paramārtha* ({4a}) as part of the predicate, not as the subject as in Saṁdh$_t$. (and Saṁdh$_{TH}$), but follows Saṁdh$_t$. (and Saṁdh$_{TH}$) in construing **sarva-dharmāṇām* with *niḥsvabhāvatā* {4b}, and not with *paramārtha*, as Hsüan-tsang does. For Saṁdh$_t$., see POWERS 1995: 101: "Since the ultimate is distinguished as the lack of own-being of all phenomena, it is an 'ultimate lack of own-being'." The logical structure of the passage is lucidly represented in Tsong-kha-pa's paraphrase in Legs-sNying 489,5f (cf. THURMAN 1984: 197; HAKAMAYA 1994: 139):

> The Perfect [Nature], [which is] the lack-of-self of [dharmas as] dharmas, is [on the one hand] the ultimate reality (/highest object) (*paramārtha*) because it is the objective support of purification, and [on the other hand] the lack of own-being (*niḥsvabhāvatā*) of dharmas because it is distinguished by, i.e. established by nothing but, the lack of own being of dharmas: in this sense, it is called 'lack of own-being as the ultimate reality (/highest object)' (*paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*).
>
> *chos rnams kyi chos kyi bdag med yongs grub ni rnam par dag pa'i dmigs pa yin pas don dam pa yang yin la* | *chos rnams kyi bdag gi ngo bo nyid med pas rab tu phye ba ste de tsam gyis bzhag pa yin pa'i phyir chos rnams kyi ngo bo nyid med pa zhes kyang bya bas don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa zhes bya'o* ||

513.2. This passage ([B58]) is the direct or indirect basis of [B44] and confirms my interpretation of the latter, because in contrast to [B44]{1}+{4}, where the *pariniṣpanna* is merely stated to be devoid of own-being *in terms of* the *paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*, in the thesis ({1}) of [B58] the *pariniṣpanna* is simply *equated* with the *paramārtha-niḥsvabhāvatā*, which leaves no room for any causal relationship between them. A causal interpretation of °*prabhāvita* as it is used in {4b} is thus definitely excluded. One might also refer to Tsong-kha-pa's explanation of "distinguished by X" (X *kyis rab tu phye ba* = X-*prabhāvita*) by way of the gloss "established by nothing but X" (X *tsam gyis bzhag pa*).[2299] In contrast, the rendering of X-*prabhāvita* as X *la rab tu goms pa* ("[being] fully accustomed to") in the Tun-huang version ([B58]-TH) is obviously influenced by the common use of *bhāvita* in the sense of "cultivated", "repeatedly practiced"[2300] but hardly makes good sense in the present context. In this connection, it may also be worth mentioning that when explaining a similar passage in the "Maitreya-chapter" (of the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*), the *Bṛhaṭṭīkā* is quite explicit in taking °*prabhāvita* to mean "having the nature of ...".[2301]

514. Saṁdh VII.7

514.1. Textual material (Tib.: Saṁdh 69,15-18; Saṁdh_{TH}: HAKAMAYA 1987a: 346,2-4 = 2008: 670,13-15 [Stein Tib. no. 683b5]; Chin.: Hsüan-tsang: T 16.676: 694b3-6; Bodhiruci: T 16.675: 671a4-6):

[B59] {1} *'di lta ste dper na | nam mkha' gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid med pa nyid tsam gyis* rab tu phye ba *dang | thams cad du song ba ji lta ba* {2} *de lta bur ni don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid de las*[2302] *chos bdag med pas* rab tu phye ba *dang thams cad du song ba gcig blta bar bya ste |*[2303]

[B59]-TH: {1} *'di lta ste nam kha la gzugs gyi ngo bo nyid myed pa tsam ba dang | kund du 'gro bar goms ///* (lacuna)

[B59]-Hs: {1} 譬如虛空 惟是眾色無性所顯 遍一切處, {2} 一分勝義無自性性 當知亦爾, 法無我性之所顯故, 遍一切故。

[B59]-Bo: {1} 如空中華 色無體相得名, {2} 如是第一義諦無自體相 亦復如是。

[B59]-tr: {1} Just as space (/the sky) is distinctively/essentially characterized as the mere lack of own-being of material things (**rūpa-niḥsvabhāvatā-mātra-prabhāvita*) and is all-pervading (**sarvatraga*),[2304] {2} so one[2305] of the [two kinds of] *paramārtha-niḥ-*

[2299] See fn. 2298.

[2300] See also Pt. II § 375.2 with fn. 1871.

[2301] See Pt. II § 360.2 [A15].

[2302] YBh_t P 'i 64a7f (D zi 58b1): *med pa de las* instead of Lamotte *med pa nyid* ⟨*las*⟩ = P 19a3.

[2303] Slightly different Saṁdh_t S 25a1f: *de la 'di lta ste | nam mkha' gzugs kyi ngo bo nyid med pa tsam gyis* rab tu phye *zhing kun tu 'gro ba de bzhin du de dag las gcig don dam pa ngo bo nyid med par blta ba ni gang chos la bdag med pas* rab tu phye ba *kun tu 'gro ba'o* ||

[2304] The reference to all-pervasiveness is missing in [B59]-Bo. Bodhiruci also differs from the other versions by comparing the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* not to space or the sky but to a "flower [growing] in the sky" (空中華), but this would seem to be based on a misunderstanding or textual corruption because the sky-flower has already been employed at the beginning of the paragraph as a simile for the *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā* (which characterizes the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*).

[2305] I.e., the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* that is equated with the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa*, in contradistinction to the one that refers to the *paratantralakṣaṇa* insofar as the latter lacks the nature of *paramārtha*

svabhāvatā should be understood as distinctively/essentially characterized as the lack of own-being of the [dharmas as] dharmas (*dharmanairātmya-prabhāvita*) and as all-pervading.

514.2. In {2}, *prabhāvita* indicates the relationship between a form of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *dharmanairātmya.* Since these two concepts are equivalent, as Matsumoto also does not fail to recognize (M1: 206b8-10), a causal relation between them is hard to conceive. Hence, *prabhāvita* cannot mean "produced" here. It rather expresses a relation of essential identity. This is also confirmed by the illustration ({1}). Since space (*ākāśa*) is either an unconditioned (*asaṁskṛta*) entity or no real entity at all, it cannot be *generated* by the lack of own-being of material things (cf. § 474). It would rather seem to *consist* in this lack of own-being or at least to be revealed or *indicated* by it, or to be *established* as a conventional notion referring to this lack of own-being. But I wonder if the latter possibility would also work in the case of the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*. Moreover, it may not fit in with the qualification of both *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* and space as all-pervading (**sarvatraga*), which hardly suggests that we are dealing with a mere denomination. "All-pervading" rather points to an omnipresent 'reality', albeit one that can only be described in negative terms. In the case of space, "all-pervading" hardly fits in with the reduction of space to *empty* space, definable as the mere absence of material things (see § 474). This may be one of the reasons why the Saṁdh has replaced 'absence' with 'lack of own-being',[2306] although I have to admit that the precise implications of this replacement are not clear to me. Perhaps what the passage has in mind is space in the sense of the sky, and the lack of own-being of material things refers to the insubstantiality of mist, clouds, etc. As for the Tun-huang version ([B59]-TH), it once again uses the odd rendering *goms* for *°prabhāvita* (and moreover misconstrues it by extending its scope to **sarvatraga*).

515. Saṁdh VII.9

515.1. Textual material (Saṁdh 70,5-21; Hsüan-tsang: T 16.676: 694b15-24; Saṁdh$_{TH}$: HAKAMAYA 1987a: 346,5-12 = 2008: 670,16-13 [fol. 56a1-4; second half only]; cf. Bodhiruci: T 16.675: 671a17-28):

[B60] ... {1} *yang don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid chos bdag med pas* rab tu phye ba *las dgongs nas ngas chos thams cad ma skyes pa | ma 'gags ... pa'o zhes bstan to ||* {2} *de ci'i phyir zhe na | 'di ltar* {2a} *don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa nyid chos bdag med pas* rab tu phye ba *ni rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang | ther zug ther zug gi dus su rnam par gnas pa kho na yin la | de ni chos rnams kyi chos nyid*[2307] *'dus ma byas pa ... yin te |* {2b} *rtag pa rtag pa'i dus dang | ther zug ther zug gi dus su chos nyid de nyid kyis rnam par gnas pa 'dus ma byas pa gang yin pa de ni 'dus ma byas pa'i phyir ma skyes pa dang ma 'gags pa yin ... te |* {3} *de'i phyir ...* (≈{1}) ||

[B60]-TH: ... {3} *de lta bas na* (≈{1}) *chos bdag myed pa yang | shin du bsgoms pa yang | don dam pa la | ngo bo nyid myed par | ngas ldem po ngag du bshad pa | ma skyes pa | ma bgags pa | ... ni | chos thams cad do ||*

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because it does not function as an objective support for purification (*viśuddhyālambana*) (Saṁdh VII.6 [68,18-25]).

[2306] Thus also CWSL 48a15f (in the same context). Tsong-kha-pa, when referring to the simile of Saṁdh VII.7 in Legs-sNying 490,1f, tacitly replaces the lack of own-being of material things with their absence (*nam mkha' gzugs med pa tsam la 'jog pa bzhin du*).

[2307] Cf. YBh$_t$ P 'i 64b7 and Saṁdh$_t$ S 25b2 (*chos nyid | 'dus ma byas pa nyid*); in LAMOTTE's text, *du* has been added after *chos nyid.*

[B60]-tr: {1} Also thinking of the **paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* that is distinctively/essentially characterized (**prabhāvita*) as **dharmanairātmya*,[2308] I (= the Buddha) have taught that all dharmas are unoriginated (**anutpanna*) and without cessation (**aniruddha*). ... {2} Why? Because {2a} the **paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* that is distinctively /essentially characterized (**prabhāvita*) as *dharmanairātmya* is definitely (**eva*) established (**vyavasthita*) always and for ever (**nityaṁ nityakālaṁ śāśvataṁ śāśvatakālam*), and is the unconditioned (**asaṁskṛta*) inalienable nature (**dharmatā*) of the dharmas ...; {2b} and what is established always and for ever as one and the same inalienable nature [of all dharmas], unconditioned, is, on account of being unconditioned, unoriginated and without cessation. ... {3} Therefore ... (≈{1}).

515.2. In [B60], too, *prabhāvita* indicates the relationship between a form of *niḥsvabhāvatā* and *dharmanairātmya* and hence cannot be understood in a causal sense, just as in [B59]. Besides, {2} explicitly characterizes the *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* as unconditioned, permanently established and without origination, thus excluding any possibility of its being caused or conditioned. The Tun-huang version ([B60]-TH) once again oddly associates *prabhāvita* with *bhāvayati* in the sense of cultivating, this time in a transitive sense (*shin du bsgoms pa*), and the syntactically bizarre rendering of especially the first half of the passage[2309] inspires little confidence in the translator's understanding of the meaning of the sentence as a whole.

516. Saṁdh IX.29

516.1. The Tibetan translation (Saṁdh 146,3-11;[2310] Saṁdh$_{TH}$ missing) is largely in agreement with Hsüan-tsang's Chinese version (T 16.676: 707c20-25):

2308 I.e., the one that constitutes the *pariniṣpannalakṣaṇa* (Saṁdh 68,25-32), not the one that characterizes the *paratantralakṣaṇa* (Saṁdh 68,17-25). POWERS 1995: 103: "... thinking of an ultimate lack of own-being that is distinguished by being the selflessness of phenomena, ...".

2309 While it is hard to make sense of ... *yang* ... *yang*, [B60]-TH seems to mirror the main structure of the word order of the original, so that we may hypothetically reconstruct it as something like {3} **tasmād dharmanairātmyaprabhāvitām api paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatāṁ mayā saṁdhāyôktam: anutpannā aniruddhāḥ ... sarvadharmāḥ (iti?)*. That **dharmanairātmyaprabhāvitām* preceded **paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatāṁ* as a specifying attribute is also confirmed by the sTog version (Saṁdh$_t$ S 25b5) of the canonical text. Actually, the latter term requires specification because according to Saṁdh VII.6 there are two kinds of *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*. The sTog version of {3} (... *la yang dgongs nas*) also confirms the presence of a particle corresponding to **api* (or **ca*), though not its problematic duplication in [B60]-TH. As for the position of the particle, I have let myself be guided by Saṁdh$_{TH}$, but a position after °*niḥsvabhāvatām* would also make sense, since the purport of the passage is that the Buddha has taught that "all dharmas are unoriginated", etc., not only with reference to the *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā* (of the *parikalpitalakṣaṇa*, cf. Saṁdh VII.8) but also with reference to this type of *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* (in other words: this type of *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā* is added to the *lakṣaṇaniḥsvabhāvatā*, and *not* to the *other* type of *paramārthaniḥsvabhāvatā*, in which case **api* would surely have to follow immediately after the attribute). In {1} the conjunctive particle was perhaps placed in the very beginning of the sentence (cf. Saṁdh$_t$ S 25a7: *yang don dam yang dag 'phags chos la bdag med pas rab tu phye ba don dam pa ngo bo nyid med pa* ⟨*la*?⟩ *dgongs nas* ...): **api ca/khalu* ...(?). Surely authentic is the word order of [B60]-TH in the final portion of {3} ≈ {1}, viz.: PredN – Subj (against all other versions), since in the original emphasis would seem to be on the PredN. Saṁdh$_{TH}$ probably mirrors the original also in placing the *verbum dicendi* as well as the pronoun of the first person in front of the quotation, but as regards the position of **mayā* before **saṁdhāya* I am less sure (sTog connects **mayā* with **uktam*: ... *zhes ngas bshad do*).

2310 Saṁdh$_t$ P 52a7–b2; D 47b6–48a1. The Tibetan syntax in S (68b8–69a3) differs considerably: ... *gnas ngan len rab tu spangs pa rnam pa dus bag la nyal 'di dag rab tu phye ba lags* | ... *rnam pa gsum*

[B61] *bcom ldan 'das bag la nyal de dag gnas ngan len spangs pa rnam pa dus* rab tu phye ba *lags* | *spyan ras gzigs dbang phyug rnam pa gnyis*[2311] *kyis* (P : *gsum gyis* DS)[2312] *te* | *gnas ngan len lpags shun la yod pa lta bu spangs pas ni dang po dang gnyis pa* rab tu phye ba *yin no* || *spri*[2313] *la yod pa lta bu spangs pas*[2314] *ni gsum pa'o* || *gnas ngan len snying po la yod pa lta bu spangs pa gang yin pa de ni thams cad kyi thams cad du bag la nyal med pa'i gnas skabs yin te* | *sangs rgyas kyi sa yin par ngas yongs su bstan to* ||

[B61]-Hs: 世尊。此諸隨眠 幾種麁重斷所顯示。佛告觀自在菩薩曰。善男子。但由二種。謂 由在皮麁重斷故 顯彼初二。復由在膚麁重斷故 顯彼第三。若在於骨麁重斷者, 我說 永離一切隨眠位在佛地。

[B61]-tr: Exalted One! By how many kinds of abandonment (**prahāṇa*) of corruption (**dauṣṭhulya*) are those propensities (**anuśaya*) characterized?[2315] By two (/three) kinds, Avalokiteśvara! The first and the second [kind of *anuśaya*s] are characterized by the [accomplished] abandonment of the corruption which is located, so to speak, in the outer skin/bark (**tvaggata*).[2316] The third [is characterized] by the [accomplished] abandonment of [the corruption] which is located, so to speak, in the endodermis (**phalgugata*). As for the [accomplished] abandonment of the corruption which is located, so to speak, in the heart-wood (**sāragata*), it is a state completely free from propensities, it is the stage of the Awakened Ones (**buddhabhūmi*) — thus have I taught.

516.2. The three kinds of propensities (**anuśaya*) are those still present on the ten bodhisattva stages (Saṁdh IX.28). On the first five stages, inborn (**sahaja*) defilements (**kleśa*) still arise but are no longer accompanied by the non-inborn defilements, i.e., those based on wrong concepts. On the sixth and seventh stage, there are still propensities of the second kind: weak [inborn] *anuśaya*s that are either subtle or suppressed by the cultivation of meditative

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gyis te | *shun la yod pa lta bu'i gnas ngan len spangs pa ni* | *dang po dang gnyis pa'o* || *phri la yod pa lta bus ni gsum pa'o* || *gang yang snying po la yod pa lta bu'i gnas ngan len rab tu spangs te* | *bag la nyal thams cad kyi thams cad du med pa'i gnas skabs de ni sangs rgyas kyi sar bshad do* ||.

[2311] The reading *gnyis* (P) has been adopted by Lamotte, in accordance with [B61]-Hs. It is also supported by YBh$_t$ P 'i 99b1 (D zi 89b5): *rnam pa gnyis kyi phyir te* and the *mūla*-text as quoted in SaṁdhVy P cho 23a5 (D jo 19a7): *rnam pa gnyis kyis zhes bya ba ni*.

[2312] The reading *gsum* ("three": DS; so also POWERS 1995: 297) is confirmed by the older Chinese versions, viz., the one by Guṇabhadra (see [B61]-Gu) and the one by Bodhiruci (T 16.675: 684b26). Therefore, the number "two" is likely to be a later modification. The motive could have been that the abandonment of the third kind of *dauṣṭhulya*, being accomplished only when one attains the stage of a Buddha, does not characterize any of the three kinds of *anuśaya*s still left on the bodhisattva path. If Guṇabhadra's version mirrors an older and simpler form of the Sanskrit original of the paragraph, and one at that where the number "three" made perfect sense, the somewhat odd presence of this number in some witnesses of the later (reworked) version is probably a relic of the older version.

[2313] Thus YBh$_t$ P 'i 99b2 (D zi 89b5) and SaṁdhVy D jo 19b2 and b5 (P cho 23a8 and b5: *phri*); Saṁdh$_t$ PD *pri*; S *phri*; LAMOTTE reads *khri*.

[2314] Thus YBh$_t$ P 'i 99b2 (D zi 89b6) and the *mūla*-text at SaṁdhVy D jo 19b5 (P cho 23b5); but *spangs pa* in Saṁdh$_t$ (P, D, S), LAMOTTE and the *mūla*-text at SaṁdhVy D jo 19b2 (P cho 23a8).

[2315] POWERS 1995: 267 ("... into how many kinds of abandonment of errant tendencies are these predispositions divided?") seems to presuppose a somewhat different understanding. MULLER's (2013: 1201) rendering of Hs ("... in how many kinds of debilitation do these latencies appear?") skips 斷.

[2316] According to To-ryun (T 42.1828: 579a29–b2), the expressions "skin/bark", etc., when translated by 皮膚實, refer mainly to a tree, but when translated by 皮膚骨 or 皮肉心, they can be applied to sentient and insentient (i.e., vegetal) beings alike.

practices. On the last three stages, defilements (**kleśa*) do not arise any longer, and only the third kind of propensity persists, viz., extremely subtle *anuśaya*s based on (*la gnas pa*)[2317] the 'obstacle to [the comprehension of] what is to be comprehended' (**jñeyāvaraṇa*). This kind of propensity is removed only at the time of the attainment of the *buddhabhūmi*, together with the abandonment of the third kind of corruption (**dauṣṭhulya*): the one that is located, so to speak, in the heart-wood (**sāragata*). The first two kinds of corruption somehow correspond, respectively, to the non-inborn defilements (which cease with the attainment of the first bodhisattva stage) and to the inborn defilements (which have ceased on the last three stages). It is not quite clear precisely in what these corruptions consist. In the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* ($BoBh_D$ 243,13-15), the distinction of *dauṣṭhulya* located in the skin/bark, the endodermis and the heartwood is applied to the *jñeyāvaraṇa* only,[2318] but in the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*[2319] we find a different interpretation. Here, the *dauṣṭhulya* located in the skin /bark is corruption entailing rebirth in evil forms of existence and dislike for spiritual effort. The *dauṣṭhulya* located in the endodermis[2320] is the corruption related to defilements [less pernicious than those arising from the preceding class], and *dauṣṭhulya* located in the heart-wood is the corruption related to the *jñeyāvaraṇa*, responsible for the presence of the *anuśaya* of [undefiled] lack of knowledge (*ajñāna*), remnants of which are present even on the highest bodhisattva stages. This explanation of the set appears fairly adequate to the context of Saṁdh IX.28–29, but more systematic investigation would seem to be required.

516.3. The main problem in the context of my investigation is, however, how to understand *prabhāvita* in [B61]. The passage starts with asking for the relation between, on the one hand, the three kinds of propensities (*anuśaya*) that are still present on the bodhisattva stages and, on the other hand, the successive abandonment of the three kinds of corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*), which would seem to be the most fundamental function of the bodhisattva path. If we take *prabhāvita* in a causal sense, the question would mean: By how many kinds of abandonment of *dauṣṭhulya* are the three kinds of *anuśaya*s produced? But is it really natural to take an *abandonment* of *dauṣṭhulya* as the *cause* of any *anuśaya*? One might argue that what is brought about by the abandonment of a certain set of corruptions is a modified, i.e., weakened or diminished state of propensities. I cannot exclude this possibility, but I do not find it very natural either, less so in view of the fact that the first two *anuśaya*-states are related to one and the same abandonment of corruption. I consider it much more probable that the interlocutor of the Buddha wants him to explain by how many kinds of [accomplished] abandonment (cf. Tib. *spangs pa*, pf.!) of corruption the three phases of *anuśaya*s of gradually decreasing intensity or coarseness are *characterized*. In this case, no difficulty arises from the fact that the first and the second *anuśaya*-state are both related to the abandonment of the first category of corruption: both of them are only characterized by this much, because the second

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[2317] The precise meaning of this expression is not clear to me. An in-depth investigation into the theory of *anuśaya* and *dauṣṭhulya* in Saṁdh IX exceeds the limits of this study.

[2318] Corruption corresponding to the *kleśāvaraṇa* (obstacle consisting in defilements) was treated immediately before ($BoBh_D$ 243,7-13) and also divided into three categories to be eliminated successively, but the terms *tvaggata*, etc., are not used in this connection.

[2319] YBh_t P 'i 16b3-6 (D zi 15b3-5; YBh_c 701c29–702a7; KRAMER 2005: 95 and 168f (# 3.5.4.2.4)).

[2320] As KRAMER (2005: 169 n. 343) points out, Tib. *phra mo* instead of *spri la* as in $BoBh_t$ is obviously a corruption. Since the equivalent for Skt. *phalgu* appears both as *spri* and *phri*, an early misreading of **phri la* as *phra mo* seems quite probable.

category of corruption is abandoned only with the attainment of the eighth stage, with the result that there is no longer any actual occurrence of defilements. And the third category of corruption (the one corresponding to the *jñeyāvaraṇa*) is abandoned only with the attainment of the *buddhabhūmi*, and hence its [accomplished] abandonment does not characterize any *anuśaya*-state at all.

516.4. It may be interesting to have a look at the interpretation of [B61] in the SaṁdhVy. In this text, the *anuśaya*s of Saṁdh IX.28–29 are somehow related to forms of corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*) corresponding to the *kleśāvaraṇa*,[2321] whereas the threefold *dauṣṭhulya* of Saṁdh IX.29 is understood, with the BoBh, as corruptions corresponding to the *jñeyāvaraṇa*,[2322] and the meaning of *prabhāvita* in [B61] is taken to amount to "being [still] present without having been abandoned".[2323] The commentator thus takes the question to mean: By the abandonment of how many kinds of *jñeyāvaraṇapakṣyaṁ dauṣṭhulyam* are these three kinds of *anuśaya*s (related to forms of *kleśāvaraṇapakṣyaṁ dauṣṭhulyam*) still not abandoned but present?[2324] In other words: How many kinds of abandonment of *dauṣṭhulya* do the three kinds of *anuśaya*s survive, or: against how many are they resistant? This interpretation would seem to *presuppose*, as a matter of principle, a causal relation between the abandonment of *dauṣṭhulya* and the *abandonment* of the *anuśaya*s, but this causality cannot be expressed by the term *prabhāvita* because the text does not deal with this causality as such but rather with its limitations.

516.5. This is, however, different in the two earlier Chinese translations, viz., those by Bodhiruci and Guṇabhadra. In the latter (T 16.678: 717c19-21), the question runs as follows:

[B61]-Gu: ... 菩薩幾種過斷名斷彼使。...有三種。初皮過斷。第二膚過斷。第三骨過斷。離一切使者 我說唯佛地。

[B61]-Gu-tr: ... As for a bodhisattva, how many kinds of faults (i.e., corruption) [must] be cut [in order that] he may be called one who has *cut off* those *anuśaya*s? ... There are three kinds. First, the skin-faults are cut. Second, the flesh-faults are cut. Third, the bone-faults are cut. As for being free from all *anuśaya*s, I teach that [this holds good] only [on] the stage of a Buddha.

2321 SaṁdhVy P cho 22a7–b1 (D jo 18b4f) enumerates three kinds of *kleśāvaraṇapakṣyaṁ dauṣṭhulyam*, which basically correspond to those of $BoBh_D$ 243,7-13. It has to be kept in mind, however, that these three kinds of corruption are not exactly parallel to the three *anuśaya*s of Saṁdh IX.28. Rather, the first kind (*āpāyikakleśapakṣya*) is eliminated with the entrance into the first bodhisattva stage and hence does not correspond to any of the *anuśaya*s of Saṁdh IX.28; the second kind (*anutpattika-dharma-kṣānti-viśuddhi-vibandha-kleśa-pakṣya*) covers the first two *anuśaya*s, and only the third kind (**sūkṣmaḥ kleśānuśayaḥ*) would seem to correspond to the third *anuśaya* of Saṁdh IX.28 (SaṁdhVy P cho 22b4-7; D jo 18b7–19a3).

2322 SaṁdhVy P cho 22a4f (D jo 18b2): *gnas ngan len spangs pa rnam pa dus zhes bya ba ni shes bya'i sgrib pa'i* (D : *pa* P) *phyogs dang mthun pa'i gnas ngan len spangs pa rnam pa dus zhes bya bar sbyar ro.*

2323 SaṁdhVy P cho 22a5 (D jo 18b2): *rab tu phye ba lags zhes bya ba ni ma spangs par yod pa'i don to.*

2324 SaṁdhVy P cho 23a4f (D jo 19a6): *nyon mongs pa'i bag la nyal gsum shes bya'i* (e.c. : *zhes bya ba'i* DP) *sgrib pa'i gnas ngan len rnam pa* gsum de (e.c. : *de gsum* DP) *las rnam pa du spangs pas kyang da dung ma spangs par yod ces dri ba'i phyir ...*; P 22a5f (D 18b2f): *nyon mongs pa'i sgrib pa'i phyogs dang mthun pa'i gnas ngan len gsum po de dag shes bya'i sgrib pa'i phyogs dang mthun pa'i gnas ngan len rnam pa du spangs pas kyang da dung ma spangs par yod par rig par bya zhes zhus pa yin no.*

According to this rendering, with which Bodhiruci's (T 16.675: 684b25f: 菩薩斷幾種過名斷諸使) is practically identical, what the *question* addresses is, indeed, the relation of the removal of *dauṣṭhulya*s not with the aforementioned kinds of *anuśaya*s themselves but with their *removal*. This would surely allow for a causal relationship. Even so it remains questionable whether Guṇabhadra and Bodhiruci actually understood °*prabhāvita* in a causal sense. Matsumoto (M1: 223 n. 90) is probably right in assuming that they somehow rendered *prabhāvita* by 名 (i.e., "called", "named"; cf. Bodhiruci's standard translation 得名). Apart from this, Guṇabhadra's rendering of the *answer* in [B61] is very brief, stating merely that there are three kinds of corruptions (viz., those located in the skin, etc.) that must successively be removed and that the only persons who [by removing them?] have removed all *anuśaya*s are the Buddhas. Guṇabhadra does not relate the successive removal of the different kinds of corruption to a successive removal of the different kinds of *anuśaya*s mentioned in Saṁdh IX.28. It may well be that his translation is based on a simpler original and not merely a simplified rendering of the text as attested by the later versions, but I must leave it to others to clarify this issue. As for Bodhiruci's translation, it seems to be based on Guṇabhadra's but is more amplified. In particular, Bodhiruci tries to relate the successive removal of the corruptions to its respective effect, but the result is rather confusing. For after introducing the three categories of corruption (located in the skin, etc.) as that by the removal of which the *anuśaya*s are removed, he then turns these three categories into 'obstacles' (障, **āvaraṇa*, viz., 'obstacle [located] in the skin', etc.) and makes *their* removal the *cause* of the removal of three kinds of *corruption*(!). I find it hard to believe that this rather confusing presentation had a basis in the underlying Sanskrit original.

517. Saṁdh X.9

517.1. The canonical Tibetan version of the passage concerned (Saṁdh 161,22-27)[2325] runs as follows:

[B62] {1} *bcom ldan 'das | de bzhin gshegs pa'i sems 'byung ba'i mtshan nyid ji lta bur rig par bgyi lags* | {2} *'jam dpal | de bzhin gshegs pa rnams ni sems dang | yid dang | rnam par shes pas* rab tu phye ba *ma yin mod kyi* | {3} *'on kyang de bzhin gshegs pa'i sems ni mngon par 'du byed pa med par 'byung ste* | {4} *sprul pa lta bur rig par bya'o* ||

517.2. For the sake of discussing this passage, a comparison with the other versions, viz., Saṁdh$_{TH}$ (Hakamaya 1987b: 576 = 2008: 610, fol. 23a1), Hsüan-tsang (T 16.676: 710b29–c4), Bodhiruci (T 16.675: 687b3-6) and Guṇabhadra[2326] (T 16.679: 719c21-23), is inevitable:

[B62]-TH: /// *pa las* skyes pa *ma yin gyis* {3} *yang dag par gshegs pa'i sems skye ba ni mngon bar 'dus ma byas pa ste* | {4} *de sprul pa lta* {*bur*?} *bur shes par bya'o* ||

[B62]-Hs: {1} 世尊。云何應知諸如來心生起之相。{2} 佛告曼殊室利菩薩曰。善男子。夫如來者 非心意識生起**所顯**。{3} 然諸如來 有無加行心法生起。{4} 當知此事猶如變化。

[B62]-Bo: {1} 世尊。世尊如來心生何等相。願為我說。{2} 佛告文殊師利。文殊師利。如來非心意{意}[2327]識**得名**。{3} 而無諸行心生**得名**。{4} 依應化身說名為生。

[2325] P 58b3-5; D 53b5f; S 77b2-4 (slightly different: {1} ... *de bzhin gshegs pa'i sems 'byung ba ji ltar 'tshal bar bgyi* | {2} ... *de bzhin gshegs pa ni sems dang | yid dang | rnam par shes pas rab tu phye ba ma yin mod kyi* | {3} *mngon par 'du byed pa med par de bzhin gshegs pa'i sems 'byung ba* {4} *sprul pa lta bur shes par bya'o* ||); see also the quotation in YBh$_t$ P 'i 106b2-4 (D zi 95b6f).

[2326] Cf. T 55.2145: 12c26 + 13a5-8; Hakamaya 1994: 37.

[B62]-Gu: {1} 世尊。如來心起 有何相。{2} 佛告文殊師利。如來無心意識起。{3} 然如來無行心起。{4} 當知如化。

517.3. In spite of the preceding lacuna, it is almost certain that in [B62]-TH *las skyes pa* at the end of {2} renders °*prabhāvita*, i.e., that the translator(s) understood °*prabhāvita* in the sense of "arisen from". At first glance, this would seem to fit in with the fact that {1} asks for the arising of mind processes (*citta*) in the Tathāgata. But on closer inspection it becomes clear that at least in all the other versions the question in {1} is not about the *origin* of the Tathāgata's mind processes but rather about the specific *character* (*lakṣaṇa*) of their arising. Therefore, one would expect the answer to give information not about their source but about the specific way they arise, and this is precisely what {3} and {4} do: in the case of the Tathāgata, mind processes arise without volitional impulse or conceptual effort (*abhisaṁskāra*), just like apparitional phenomena (*nirmāṇa*), i.e., they automatically arise under the influence of his *former* effort consisting in the cultivation of salvific strategies and insight [on the bodhisattva path] (Saṁdh 162,2-4). As part of the answer to the question posed in {1}, the section {2}, containing a negated statement contrasting with {3} and {4}, should indicate how mind processes do *not* arise in the Tathāgata. We may infer from the second part of the answer that they do not arise in a way that involves a volitional impulse, which would be the way mind processes arise in ordinary beings. In other words: the mind processes arising in a Tathāgata are essentially different from those arising in ordinary beings, or: the Tathāgatas are not characterized by ordinary mind processes. This is precisely what {2} would mean if we take *prabhāvita* in the sense of "essentially characterized by", just as in the preceding Saṁdh passages:

[B62]-tr: Exalted One! How should one understand the character (**lakṣaṇa*) of the arising of mind processes (*citta*) [in the case] of a Tathāgata? [Answer:] Mañjuśrī! Tathāgatas are not characterized (**prabhāvita*) by [what is normally designated as] mind (**citta*), thought (**manas*) or awareness (**vijñāna*) (i.e., by ordinary mind processes involving effort).[2328] Rather, the mind processes of the Tathāgata arise without any effort (**abhisaṁskāra*). One should know that they are like apparitions (**nirmāṇa*).

517.4. As for the Chinese translations of {2}, Bodhiruci ([B62]-Bo) agrees with Tib., 得名 being his standard rendering of *prabhāvita*. Hsüan-tsang ([B62]-Hs), however, adds 生起 before 所顯 = **prabhāvita*. This addition is easily explicable as supplied from the question ({1}) and from the second section of the answer ({3}), motivated by the wish to render the phraseology more homogeneous:[2329]

[B62]-Hs-tr: ... {2} As for the Tathāgata, [the specific nature of his mind] is not revealed (/distinctively characterized) by *an arising of* [ordinary forms of] mind, thought and cognition. ...

As for Guṇabhadra ([B62]-Gu), his version of {2}, viz.,

[B62]-Gu-tr: ... {2} ... As for the Tathāgata, there is no [ordinary] arising of mind, thought or cognition. {3} Rather, in the Tathagata mind arises without effort (行 "activity" rendering **abhisaṁskāra*) ...

[2327] Among the testimonia used by T, the second 意 appears to be supported only by the Korean canon.

[2328] Cf. POWERS 1995: 299: "Mañjuśrī, Tathāgatas are not distinguished by mind, thought, or consciousness".

[2329] Cf., in this connection, also Bodhiruci's repetition of 得名 = *prabhāvita* in {3}.

gives, at first glance at least, the impression that he rendered °*prabhāvita* with 起 ("arising"). But in this case *citta*, *manas* and *vijñāna*, as the first member of the presumable compound ending in °*prabhāvita*, should be that *from* or *by* which the Subj, i.e., the Tathāgata, has not arisen or been produced, which would not make sense as an answer to the question, since what is asked for is the character of the arising *of* mind in Tathāgatas. I therefore rather assume that Guṇabhadra supplied the concept of arising (起) from the context, i.e., from the question ({1}) and from the second part of the answer ({3}), and that he changed the syntactical pattern of {2} from "X is not characterized by Y" to "as for X, there is no arising of Y".

7. Conclusion

518. It should have become clear from the preceding re-examination of the meaning of *prabhāvita* that in Yogācāra texts the semantic field of this word is not confined to the meaning "produced" or "arisen", but comprises further connotations, like "disclosed by" or "indicated by", "distinguished by", "distinctively and/or essentially characterized by/as", sometimes coming close to "having the nature of", and perhaps also the connotation of "established [as a denomination] on the basis of". It may also be worth mentioning that °*prabhāvita* is often qualified by abstract or negative concepts, as well as by concepts followed by °*mātra*, indicating a reductive purport. I have also tried to show that this holds good not only for post-Saṁdh sources but already for the earlier strata of the YBh, especially for the BoBh — where the occurrences of °*prabhāvita* in a non-causal meaning can hardly be rejected as interpolations on the mere basis of earlier Chinese translations of doubtful accuracy, without any inconsistencies in the transmitted Sanskrit text — and, what is most important, for the Saṁdh itself. For this reason, the interpretation of *prabhāvita* in ⓧ, the controversial passage at Saṁdh VIII.7, cannot *a priori* be confined to "produced by" but has to be determined from the context.

Appendix to Pt. III: On **tathatābīj(ak)a*

1. Outline of the Problem

519. In a wider context, the passage from which [B41] (see § 496) is an excerpt has also been critically discussed in MATSUMOTO 2004.[2330] In this case, MATSUMOTO (M2: 148 with n. 143) merely presupposes his understanding of **tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvita* as argued for in M1. His actual criticism is rather directed against my interpretation of the subsequent expression **tathatābīj(ak)a*. As indicated above (§ 496.3.2), the passage has the function of explaining why in an arhat *āśrayaparivṛtti* has taken place and displays its effects even though the 'sixfold basis' (**ṣaḍāyatana*) continues practically unchanged. In context, the passage runs as follows:

[B63] {1} *dgra bcom pa'i gnas gyur pa ni yod de* | {2} *de yang skye mched drug las gzhan dang gzhan ma yin pa nyid du brjod par mi bya'o* || {3} *de ci'i phyir zhe na* | *'di ltar gnas gyur pa de ni de bzhin nyid rnam par dag pas rab tu phye ba dang* | *de bzhin nyid kyi rigs can dang* | *de bzhin nyid kyi sa bon can dang* | *de bzhin nyid las yang dag par grub pa yin la* | ...[2331]

[B63]-tr: {1} [Of course] there exists a Renewal(/Transmutation) of the Basis (**āśraya-parivṛtti*)[in the case] of an arhat. {2} But this [Renewal of the Basis] cannot be defined as something other (**anya*) than the 'sixfold basis' nor as identical (**ananya*) with it. {3} Why? Because this Renewal of the Basis is constituted by (/ has been made to emerge through) the purification of Suchness (**tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvita*), has Suchness as its *gotra*,[2332] has Suchness as its 'Seed' (**tathatābīj(ak)a*), has come forth (**samudāgata*?) from Suchness. ...

520. In my note on the passage (S 1969: 115f n. 48), I explained *bīja* (like *gotra*) in the sense of "cause", "disposition" ("Anlage") and took the statement that Suchness is the 'Seed' of the Renewal/Transmutation of the Basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*) to mean that Suchness, in the capacity of object-condition ("Objekt-Ursache": *ālambanapratyaya*), produces ("erzeugt") non-conceptual insight, the intensive (or rather: repeated) cultivation of which results in *āśrayaparivṛtti*. The German terminology used by me may not always be felicitous, but what I meant should be clear from the parallel passages to which I referred, i.e.,

[B64] *dgra bcom pa'i gnas gnas gyur pa ni skye mched drug gi rgyu las byung ba ma yin gyi* | *de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i lam bsgoms pa'i rgyu las byung ba yin te* |[2333]

[B64]-tr: The *āśrayaparivṛtti* of the arhat has not arisen from the 'sixfold basis' (**ṣaḍ-āyatana*). It rather has arisen from the repeated cultivation of the Path that has Suchness as its objective support (**tathatālambanamārgabhāvanā*).

[B65] {1} *gal te bag chags des sa bon thams cad bsdus la* (P : *pa* D) | *de yang kun tu 'gro ba'i gnas ngan len ces* (P : *zhes* D) *bya bar gyur na* | *de ltar na 'jig rten las 'das pa'i*

[2330] M2: 126f text [43]–[44] and 138ff.

[2331] S 1969: 42+44 # I.3.B.1–2 (YBh$_t$ P 'i 137b1-3; D zi 122a6f; YBh$_c$ 747c21-24).

[2332] See § 496.3.2 with fn. 2228.

[2333] S 1969: 50 # I.5.b.B.1 (YBh$_t$ P 'i 138b8f; D zi 123b3; YBh$_c$ 748b6f); M1: 203b–204a text [38].

chos rnams skye ba'i sa bon gang yin | de dag skye ba'i sa bon gyi dngos po gnas ngan len gyi rang bzhin can yin par ni mi rung ngo zhe na |

{2} *smras pa |* {2a} *'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon dang ldan par skye'i* (P : *skye ba'i* D) {2b} *bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon dang ldan pa ni ma yin no ||*[2334]

[B65]-Hs: {1} 問。若此習氣攝一切種子, 復名遍行麁重者, 諸出世間法 從何種子生。若言 麁重自性種子為種子生, 不應道理。

{2} 答。{2a} 諸出世間法 從真如所緣緣種子生。{2b} 非彼習氣積集種子所生。[2335]

[B65]-Pa: {1} 若依此習而攝一切諸法種子, 諸出世法 何者為本 而得生耶。諸惡法種不為其因。{2a} 此出世法 真如境界作緣得生。[2336]

[B65]-rec(Yamabe): {1} **yadi tayā vāsanayā sarvāṇi bījāni*[2337] *saṁgṛhītāni sā ca sarvatragadauṣṭhulya⟨m?⟩ ucyata evaṁ lokottaradharmāḥ kiṁbījā utpadyante, na hi te dauṣṭhulyasvabhāvabījā iti yujyate ity*

{2} **āha* {2a} *lokottaradharmās tathatālambanapratyayabījā utpadyante,* {2b} *na tûpacitavāsanābījāḥ |*[2338]

[B65]-tr(S): {1} If [it were indeed true that] this imprint (viz., the *parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā*) comprises all Seeds and is also called 'omnipresent corruption', then [we must ask:] from what Seed (lit.: having what as their Seed) do the supramundane dharmas arise? For it is not reasonable that they have (i.e., arise from) something that has the nature of corruption as their Seed.[2339]

{2} Answer: {2a} The supramundane dharmas arise from (lit. arise [in such a way that they] have) Suchness ['functioning' as] object-condition as their 'Seed';[2340] {2b} they do not have (i.e., arise from) an accumulated imprint as their Seed.

521. Two similar passages could be added (and were actually used by me in other contexts)[2341]. The first passage is from the 'Nivṛtti Portion':

[B66] ... *de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i shes pas kun tu bsten* (e.c. : *brten* DP) *cing goms par byas pa'i rgyus gnas 'gyur bar byed do ||*[2342] (transl. see § 530).

2334 YBh_t P zi 30a7–b1; D zhi 27b3-5; cf. M2: 120 text [40]. As pointed out by Yamabe (1990b: 72 n. 11), a quotation in YVy P yi 112b6 (D 'i 92b4f) reads

{2a} *'jig rten las 'das pa'i chos rnams ni de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon las byung ba yin gyi |* {2b} *de'i bag chags bsags pa'i sa bon* (D : om. P) *las byung ba ma yin no ||*,

and a quotation in VGPVy P li 431a1 and 3 (D ri 358b2 and 3) has

{2a} *de bzhin nyid dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi* (D : *gyis* P) *sa bon can no.*

2335 YBh_c 589a13-17; M2: 120 text [39].

2336 $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1025c13-16; M2: 120 text [38].

2337 Matsumoto (M2: 121,5 with n. 97) suggests **sarvabīj(āni)*, which may mean "all Seeds" or "the Seeds of all [dharmas]".

2338 YAMABE 1990b: 71; cf. M2: 120,9-11. Yamabe is surely right in discarding my former tentative reconstruction of *dang ldan pa* as **-anugata(?)*.

2339 Tib.: "then what could be the Seed of the arising of the supramundane dharmas? The entity that is the Seed of their arising cannot reasonably be [something] that has the nature of corruption."

2340 For Tib., see fn. 2370.

2341 [B66]: S 1987: 198 and 205; [B68]: S 1969: 145.

The second passage is MAV I.15c:

[B67] *hetutvāc cāryadharmāṇāṁ* (sc. *dharmadhātuḥ śūnyatāyāḥ paryāyaḥ*),

and is commented upon by Vasubandhu (MAVBh 23,23–24,2) as follows:

[B68] {1} *āryadharmahetutvād dharmadhātuḥ* | {2} *āryadharmāṇān tadālambana-prabhavatvād* | {3} *hetvartho hy atra dhātvarthaḥ* |

[B68]-tr(S): {1} [Emptiness is called] *dharmadhātu* because it is the cause of the dharmas of the Noble Ones, i.e., the supramundane dharmas), {2} for the dharmas of the Noble Ones originate from it [insofar] as [it is their] objective support. {3} In this [expression], '*dhātu*' means indeed "cause".

522. On the basis of these passages, I felt entitled to interpret the statement that *āśraya-parivṛtti* has Suchness as its 'Seed' the way I did (§ 520). That is:

1. According to text [B64] (and text [B66]), *āśrayaparivṛtti* (as a spiritual and existential achievement) arises from the repeated cultivation (*bhāvanā*) of the Path (*mārga*) that has Suchness as its objective support. This Path can hardly be anything but supramundane (*lokottara*), non-conceptual (*nirvikalpa*) insight (*jñāna*),[2343] attained for the first time at the stage of *darśanamārga.*

2. According to text [B65], this insight, as a supramundane dharma, cannot arise from a Seed consisting in accumulated imprints because these imprints are all included in the category of corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*), located in the *ālayavijñāna* conceived as the root of pollution (as in the 'Nivṛtti Portion').[2344] Thus, the supramundane insight must arise from some other 'Seed' or source, and this is, according to texts [B65] and [B68] as I understand them, Suchness insofar as it is the object condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of this insight.

3. As Yamabe[2345] makes clear, this does not of course involve any causal activity on the part of Suchness, and this is why I have taken (as Yamabe also does) the expression "Seed" to be used here in a loose sense, "by way of a metaphor of the metaphor" (S 1987: 79,7f), so to speak. Thus, for the arising of supramundane insight, further conditions are required: conditioned (*saṁskṛta*) factors that are impermanent and exercise a causal function in a more active sense at the moment of their existence. But they cannot be called the *Seed* of the first supramundane insight because they are essentially different from it in that they are not yet direct experience of True Reality and hence mundane, not supramundane. It is only with Suchness itself that supramundane insight is essentially *homogeneous*, so that in a somewhat later source this insight is called "insight in [the case of] which what is cognized and what cognizes are completely alike" (*samasamālambyālambakajñāna*).[2346] It would seem to be in this sense that Suchness is stated to be the 'Seed', so to speak, of supramundane insight.

[2342] YBh$_t$ P zi 9b2 (D zhi 8a3; YBh$_C$ 581c5f; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020b9f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 41,3f [2001: 406,2] # 5.b.C.1). Similarly YBh$_t$ P zi 9b4f (D zhi 8a4f; YBh$_C$ 581c10f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 41,16f [2001: 406,11f] # 5.b.C.2(a)). Cf. M2: 143 texts [55]–[58].

[2343] Cf., e.g., YBh$_t$ P zi 302b5-7 (D zhi 287b4-6; YBh$_C$ 696a7-11; KRAMER 2005: 69 and 102: # 2.5.1; TAKAHASHI 2005: 122 and 182: # 1.2.5.2).

[2344] See Pt. I § 236.

[2345] YAMABE 1990b: 82 (quoted also in M2: 190), adducing YBh$_t$ P 'i 5b7 (*de bzhin nyid ni dmigs pa'i rkyen gyis bsdus pa kho na yin no*) and 7a4f (*de bzhin nyid ni rgyu ma yin no*). Cf. KRAMER 2005: 121 with n. 101 and 129 with n. 147.

[2346] AS 66,3f (ASBh 76,20f). For the earlier use of this expression in the ŚrBh, see fn. 479.

4. Accordingly, Suchness is indirectly also the 'Seed' of *āśrayaparivṛtti*, as the culmination of the purification process initiated by the first supramundane insight and carried on by its repeated practice.

5. Still, if *āśrayaparivṛtti* is viewed from the ontological perspective, where it is nothing but Suchness itself purified of all adventitious obscurations, Suchness could perhaps, metaphorically, also be called the 'Seed' of *āśrayaparivṛtti* in the sense that ontologically the latter is primordially present in a hidden, adventitiously obscured form, just as a seed might be viewed as the hidden,incarcerated presence of the plant or tree.

523. For Matsumoto (M2: 138ff), this interpretation is inacceptable because it is incompatible with his concept of the specific '*dhātuvāda*' as advocated by the Yogācāras. According to this specific '*dhātuvāda*', Suchness is the 'locus' of all dharmas, i.e., if I understand him correctly, a deeper layer of reality on which they are grounded, but it is not their cause, i.e., Suchness does not generate them, because Suchness, being permanent, has no generative function (M2: 129,10). Since "Seed" (*bīja*) is equivalent to "cause", Suchness cannot be the Seed of dharmas either, neither in the strict sense nor in a 'loose' one. For this reason, Matsumoto rejects my understanding of text [B63] as well as that of most of the parallel materials adduced above, and proposes different interpretations.

524. 1. I am not quite sure whether Matsumoto's model taking Suchness as a 'locus' underlying the dharmas as a kind of ontological fundament is entirely appropriate. Apart from the problem of the adequacy of a spatial metaphor (which tends to blur that we are dealing with different dimensions of reality), would it be less justified to understand Suchness as the True Nature of dharmas, hidden *within* them, and only in this sense sometimes described as a 'deeper' layer 'covered' by them and 'underlying' them?

2. However this may be, Matsumoto is no doubt right in rejecting any causal *activity* in the strict sense on the part of Suchness.[2347] Surely Suchness has no constructive relation at all to the *saṁsāric* world, and the causes or Seeds from which the saṁsāric world is constantly regenerated are to be found within the saṁsāric world's own domain. Yet, there must be some relation of Suchness to the process of *liberation*. I readily admit that my use of the expressions "Ursache" (cause) and "erzeugt" (generates) in S 1969: 115 ("... indem sie [i.e., Suchness] als *Objekt*-Ursache das vorstellungsfreie Wissen erzeugt") is somewhat misleading. But even so Suchness must have some influence in connection with the process of spiritual purification.

3. There can hardly be any doubt that the decisive turning point in this process — the point where the first supramundane (*lokottara*) dharma emerges in the personal continuum of a worldly person (*pṛthagjana*), transforming him or her into a noble person (*ārya*) — is, traditionally, the *darśanamārga*, the first direct comprehension of the four Truths. In some parts of the VinSg, including the 'Nivṛtti Portion', this comprehension is redefined as a non-conceptual insight into the *dharmadhātu* (YBh_t P zi 9a7 [# **5.b**.B.2]) or Suchness (*tathatā*: YBh_t P zi 123b5; b6+ 124a1f). As the objective support (*ālambana*) or object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*) of this first supramundane insight, Suchness doubtless contributes to its arising as one of its conditions, and as a decisive one at that.

[2347] See fn. 2345. Cf. also T 43.1832 (Hui-chao's subcommentary on the CWSL): 719a11f: "Suchness cannot *directly* (or: by itself, as a causal agent) produce [any] dharmas" (真如不能親生諸法).

4. But this does not of course mean that Suchness has to act. Even a stone that becomes the object-condition of a perception is just there, without doing anything.[2348] Activity is on the part of the perceiving subject. Similarly, Suchness is just there, before as well as afterwards. Thus, if its mere presence as a 'locus' would be sufficient, Suchness ought to be perceived by any mental dharma at any time, because Suchness is the 'locus' of all dharmas. Thus, there must be some preparation or spiritual activity on the part of yogis that discloses Suchness, i.e., opens, so to speak, the way for Suchness to become the object-condition of their insight so as to be directly perceived. Suchness does not act or change in any way, but nonetheless it is only under specific circumstances, for which the individual subject is responsible, that Suchness becomes, by its mere presence, a basic condition for the arising of non-conceptual insight, and not just a condition among others, but rather the condition that is constitutive for the supramundane nature of this insight and could, in *this* sense, be taken to be analogous to a Seed.

2. Discussion of the Passages Involved

As for MATSUMOTO's extended criticism of my understanding of the passages adduced in §§ 519–521 and his own interpretation, I must confine myself to a brief rejoinder, which I hope will be sufficient to show why I cannot accept his objections as conclusive.

2.1. The Passages from the *Sopadhika-Nirupadhika-bhūmi-viniścayaḥ*

525. In the case of text [B63], Matsumoto (M2: 148) proposes taking the expressions **tathatāgotr(ak)a*, **tathatābīj(ak)a* and **tathatāsamudāgata* as sloppy formulations, to be interpreted in the light of the initial predicate noun **tathatāviśuddhiprabhāvita*, i.e., as abbreviations of **tathatāviśuddhigotr(ak)a*, etc. Thus, **tathatābīj(ak)a* has to be understood as "having the purification of Suchness as its Seed". In this way, the causally active factor is the process of purification, not Suchness. In Matsumoto's terminology (cf. M2: 149): the Seed or cause of *āśrayaparivṛtti* (as an existential event) is not the inactive 'locus' (Suchness) but belongs to the 'super-locus' level of conditioned dharmas. In this way, the passage would be in full agreement with the specific '*dhātuvāda*' of the Yogācāras. Whether this interpretation is more convincing than the assumption of a loose, analogous use of the concept of Seed (*bīja*) is a question I must leave to others. The real problem is rather the question of what, precisely, is meant by "purification", and how it comes about or gets started.

526. An answer (or at least part of an answer) to this problem is supplied by text [B64], where it is stated that the *āśrayaparivṛtti* results from the repeated cultivation (**bhāvanā*) of the Path that has Suchness as its objective support. Matsumoto is surely right in emphasizing that in this passage what is declared to be the cause of *āśrayaparivṛtti* is not Suchness, or Suchness as an objective support, but the repeated practice of the Path (*mārga*) that *has* Suchness as its objective support. What is less convincing is that for a reason not completely clear to me he attaches some importance to construing the expression **tathatālambana* (bahuv.) not with *mārga* but with *bhāvanā*. This might be possible if *bhāvanā* were used in the sense of "contemplation". But in connection with *mārga* as the preceding member of the compound, *bhāvanā* can hardly mean anything but "repeated cultivation", viz., of the Path

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[2348] Cf. AKVy 218,21-23: *dvividhā hi pratyayāḥ: janakāś câjanakāś ca. ālambanapratyayaś câjanakaḥ, ālambanamātratvāt.*

consisting, in the first place, in insight (*jñāna*),[2349] and it is clearly this insight that must have an objective support. Perhaps Matsumoto presupposes his favourite understanding of *ālambana* as 'locus', i.e., "support" in an ontological sense. But such an understanding is not supported by the Tibetan translation (... *la dmigs pa'i lam*) or by Hsüan-tsang (緣真如境) and will be discussed later (see § 533). Yet the main question that poses itself is how the first moment in this process of repeated cultivation, i.e., the very first insight that has Suchness as its objective support, or, in other words, the first supramundane insight, comes about — a question to which I shall come back in ch. 2.3.

2.2. The Passage from the 'Nivṛtti-Portion' (YBh$_t$ P zi 9b2)

527. In the case of text [B66], Matsumoto's criticism (expressed in a lengthy note of 22 pages)[2350] is directed both against my (tentative) reconstruction of the passage and against my interpretation. As regards the reconstruction, I proposed (S 1987: 198 (3b)) — contrary to the Tibetan version, which suggests an instrumental **tathatālambanajñānena* — an objective genitive to be construed with the following expression that probably corresponds to **āsevanā-nvayād bhāvanānvayāt*.[2351] My argument was that the instrumental is not confirmed by Paramārtha's rendering and that Hsüan-tsang's rendering is at least ambiguous, and that although there are sufficient parallels for a construction of this kind of phrase with an objective genitive,[2352] I was not able to find any instance of its being construed with an instrumental. Matsumoto does not adduce any such instance either, and in the only passage where a suitable instrumental occurs in the vicinity it belongs, syntactically, to the preceding sentence, while in direct connection with **āsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayāt* the very same expression reoccurs as an objective genitive.[2353]

528. One of Matsumoto's other arguments in favour of an instrumental in the original is based on a closer analysis of Hsüan-tsang's rendering, viz.,

[B66]-Hs: 由緣真如境智修習多修習故 而得轉依 (YBh$_c$ 581c5f).

[2349] In YBh$_c$ (748b7: 然彼唯用緣真如境修道為因), the situation is different since the sequence has been reversed (修道 would correspond to **bhāvanāmārga*), to the effect that **tathatālambana* could be construed with *bhāvanā* in the sense of "[repeated] contemplation" as well as with **bhāvanāmārga*. But I presume that the reversal of the sequence is Hsüan-tsang's work.

[2350] M2: 192–214 (n. 138).

[2351] If Matsumoto (M2: 204,12-14) is right in assuming that in view of the parallel material a compound **āsevanābhāvanānvayāt* can be excluded, the possibility that the original had a compound **tathatālambanajñāna-āsevanābhāvanānvayāt*, i.e., a tatpuruṣa in which the case of the first member (°*jñāna-*) would have been a matter of interpretation, can be disregarded.

[2352] More examples could, of course, be added to those noted by me in S 1987 n. 1247 and to those additionally adduced by Matsumoto (M2: 199 text 32 and perhaps 196 text 21), e.g.: ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 226,3f; 288,19–289,2; 324,8-10 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 90,10f; 174,16f; 226,8f); BhāvBh 149a3f (see § 528, text [B70]).

[2353] ŚrBh 499,5-8 (cf. M2: 194 text 13): *evaṁ ... sūkṣmayā prajñayā catvāry* (ms.) *āryasatyāny avatīrṇṇo bhavati | tasyaîvam āsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayāt* (Tib. and Ch. add: *bahulīkārānvayāt*) *tasyāḥ prajñāyāḥ* (ms.!) *samasamālambyālambakaṁ jñānam utpadyate*. The position of the objective genitive *after* the noun on which it depends is not unusual (as suggested in M2: 195,8); cf. THOMMEN 1903: 28,2-6, with examples from the Aśoka inscriptions (cf., e.g., RE IV C [K,Dh]: *anālaṁbhe pānānaṁ avihisā bhūtānaṁ*); SPEYER 1986: 85 # 115: "Mṛcch I, p. 44 *śaṅkayā tasyāḥ* (by supposing, it was she)".

Actually, in the case of the passages collected by Matsumoto (M2: 204f) where *āsevanānvayāt* (etc.: A) is construed with an objective genitive (B), Hsüan-tsang uses either the pattern '於B(中)A故' or the pattern ' AB故', but he nowhere renders this phrase by the pattern found in [B66]-Ch, viz., '由BA故'. From this, Matsumoto concludes that in [B66]-Ch 由 does not go with 故 but marks 緣真如境智 as an instrumental (**tathatālambanajñān<u>ena</u>*). But this conclusion is deceptive and based on an insufficient collection of parallel material, since a further search has indeed yielded two exact parallels for $B^{gen.obj.}$ $A^{abl.}$ being rendered by '由BA故':

[B69] *sa eṣāṁ indriyāṇām eteṣāṁ ca balānām āsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayād bahulīkārānvayān nirvedhabhāgīyāni kuśalamūlāny utpādayati* ... ($ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 324,8-11; $ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II 226,8f).

[B69]-Ch: 即由如是 諸根諸力 漸修漸習 漸多修習 為因緣**故**, 便能發起…順決擇分…善根。(YBh_c 444c10-12).

[B70] *tasya ca manasikārasyâsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayād bahulīkārānvayāt samasamālambyālambakajñānam utpadyate* | (BhāvBh 149a3f; cf. SUGAWARA 2010: 216; 2013: 831; VON ROSPATT 2013: 861 n. 15).

[B70]-Ch: **由**此作意修習多修習**故** 所緣能緣平等平等智生。(YBh_c 393b26f)

529. Even so, I am by no means sure that the conjecture I proposed in S 1987 is necessary and that the instrumental suggested by the Tibetan translation might not, after all, be the original reading.[2354] Actually, Matsumoto's (M2: 205f) reference to the parallel instrumental **pravṛttivijñānālambanena manaskāreṇa*[2355] in the preceding section of the text, referring to the contemplative activity immediately before attaining direct insight into Truth for the first time, is quite persuasive.

530. I also agree with Matsumoto's suggestion that we might, strictly speaking, have to supply **kuśaladharmabhāvanāyāḥ* as the object of **āsevanā*, etc. (M2: 207f). But I cannot follow him when he proposes understanding **kuśaladharmabhāvanā* in terms of wholesome *karma*, to be practiced by the *bodhisattva* and to be redirected by him to the attainment of Buddhahood (M2: 210f). Of course the wholesome dharmas include wholesome karma,[2356] and certainly **āsevanā*, etc., can be used with regard to dedicating oneself to wholesome (but just as well to unwholesome) karma.[2357] But the wholesome dharmas are not confined to the

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[2354] Cf. the Addenda and Corrigenda to the reprint [2007] of S 1987: 701 (ad p. 198,17-20), where I suggested, probably under the influence of SAKUMA 1990 II: 156 and before having had time to read Matsumoto's criticism:

Perhaps better: "by means of insight, through continuously cultivating [it]".

[2355] YBh_t P zi 9a4f (D zhi 7b5f; YBh_c 581b22-24; HAKAMAYA 1979: 40,8-11 [2001: 405,4-6]: # **5.b**.B.2; transl. see S 1987: 197 ⓵ⓐ): *dge ba'i chos bsgom pa de yang so so'i skye bo sems gnas par bya ba'i phyir 'jug pa'i rnam par shes pa la dmigs pa'i yid la byed pas brtson par byed pa ni*[1] | *de'i dang por bden pa mngon par rtogs pa la 'jug par bya ba'i phyir bsgom* (P *sgom*) *ste* |

[1] A quasi-quotation in SaṁdhVy P co 104b8 has *brtson par byed pa <u>na</u>*.

[2356] As in $BoBh_D$ 96,13-15, quoted in M2: 210 text 82.

[2357] As in YBh_{Bh} 187,16f, 183,18f (Matsumoto's reading *prāṇātipāte āsevite* ... is confirmed by the ms.) and 184,6f, quoted M2: 208f (texts 77, 69 and 73). But these passages are embedded in a context (*karmasaṁkleśa*) that is completely different from that of the passage under discussion (path to liberating insight and Nirvana).

domain of karma but comprise all *spiritually* wholesome mental factors as well,[2358] including the supramundane dharmas. Likewise, dedicated practice and repeated cultivation (*āsevanā*, *bhāvanā*, etc.) are not confined to karma but may as well refer to all levels of *spiritual* practice.[2359] This is surely also the case in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' when it is stated that one should know that *ālayavijñāna*, the root of pollution, comes to an end by means of the cultivation of wholesome dharmas (**kuśaladharmabhāvanā*).[2360] For we are not dealing here with specific aspects of the bodhisattva path but with the path to liberation for all persons, śrāvakas as well as bodhisattvas.[2361] What is at stake is not the achievement of the specific glorious properties of a Buddha or salvific activity for the sake of others over eons, but rather the realization of liberating insight into Truth (**satyābhisamaya*) and the attainment of arhatship by means of exterminating *ālayavijñāna* and accomplishing the Renewal/Transmutation of the Basis (*āśrayaparivṛtti*), with Nirvana without remainder as the final goal. This is brought about not so much by wholesome karma (which is rather preliminary and anyway required) as by means of spiritual practice, and it is no doubt in the first place this spiritual practice, from its preparatory stages up to the repeated cultivation of supramundane insight, that is envisaged by the expression *kuśaladharmabhāvanā*. I therefore prefer to understand text [B66] in this sense:

[2358] The *kuśalā dharmāḥ* at ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 308,1-4 (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 200,12-14) referred to by Matsumoto (M2; 211,22-24) are by no means confined to those that are opposed to bad conduct (*duścarita*) but include those that are opposed to the hindrances (*nivaraṇa*) [to meditation] and to the spiritual fetters (*saṁyojana*), just as the unwholesome dharmas (ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 307,12-15; ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 200,8-10) are not limited to defiled karma and bad conduct but include the mental and spiritual defilements (*kleśa*) that give rise to such conduct.

[2359] Cf. *SWTF* s.v. *āsevita* and *CPD* s.v. *āsevati*, *āsevanā*, *āsevita*. Cf. also, e.g., ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 289,2f (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 174,16f): *bodhipakṣyāṇāṁ ... āsevanā*, etc.; 310,22–311,2 (II 206,10f): referring to the wholesome dharmas enumerated in fn. 2358; 253,9f (II 118,17f): *mārgasatyaṁ ... āsevitavyaṁ*, etc.; 499,6f: *āsevanāt ... prajñāyāḥ* (see fn. 2353). At ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 443,19 (*tasyâsevanānvayād bhāvanānvayād bahulīkārānvayāt tatprathamataḥ kleśaprahāṇāya mārga utpadyate*), DELEANU (2006: II 450 # 3.28.2.1.4: "Because of assiduous practice ..., for the first time is the path ... generated by him") seems to understand *tasya* as standing for the practitioner, but I would prefer to take it as an objective genitive referring to the *ādhimokṣiko manaskāraḥ* at the end of the preceding sentence, as in the Tibetan (YBh$_t$ wi 201a2f: *de kun tu bsten ... pa'i rgyus ... lam skye bar 'gyur zhing ...*) and the Chinese version (YBh$_c$ 466b22-24: 即此**勝解**善修善習善多修習為因緣故 最初生起斷煩惱道; for the syntactical analysis of this sentence see DELEANU 2006: II 418 n. 76) as well as in the parallel at HsienY 515a12f (多修習此種類故 ... 起...道, probably corresponding, in spite of the transitive verb, to **tasyâsevanānvayāt ... mārga utpadyate*; cf. CHOI 2001: 83 # 28.0 and 128 n. 441).

[2360] YBh$_t$ P zi 9a3f (D zhi 7b5;YBh$_c$ 581b22f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 39,19-21 [2001: 404,11f]: end of # **5.b**.B.1; S 1987: 197⓪; WALDRON 2003: 187,8-10):

One should know that this *ālayavijñāna*, which is in this way (i.e., as described in # **5.b**.A) the root of pollution, may [nonetheless be made to] come to an end, namely by means of the cultivation of the [spiritually] wholesome factors [to be described in **5.b**.B.2 and C.1].

de ltar na kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rtsa ba kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de ni 'di ltar dge ba'i chos bsgoms pas rnam par ldog par rig par bya'o ||; tentative reconstruction: **tasyaîvaṁ saṁkleśamūlasyâlayavijñānasya vinivṛttir veditavyā yaduta kuśaladharmabhāvanayā.*

[2361] Thus explicitly YBh$_t$ P zi 9a6f (D zhi 7b7; YBh$_c$ 581b26-28; HAKAMAYA 1979: 40,13-15 [2001: 405,7f]: # **5.b**.B.2]; S 1987: 197(2a); WALDRON 2003: 187):

"Having cultivated such practice (**evaṁ pratipannaḥ*), one has attained certainty of being [on the] right [track to Liberation] (**samyaktvaniyāma*) either as a disciple or as a bodhisattva."

de de ltar zhugs shing nyan thos kyi yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs sam | byang chub sems dpa'i yang dag pa nyid skyon med pa la zhugs te (...).

[B66]-tr(S): ... [one] renews/transmutes one's Basis through dedicated practice and repeated cultivation [of the wholesome dharmas, especially] in the form of insight that has Suchness as its objective support (*tathatālambanajñāna).

2.3. The *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* Passage on the Seed of the Supramundane Dharmas

2.3.1. Reconsideration of the Passage (YBh$_t$ P zi 30a7–b1) in its Historical Context

531. The problem the solution of which text [B65] is intended to provide is somewhat different. As pointed out above (§ 522.2), the passage starts from the assumption that all Seeds (in the strict sense of the term, equated with accumulated imprints) are included in the category of 'ubiquitous corruption' (**sarvatraga-dauṣṭhulya*) consisting in being impregnated by clinging to the fictitious nature of things (*parikalpitasvabhāvābhiniveśavāsanā*) and taken to be assembled in *ālayavijñāna* (obviously conceived as the root of pollution, as in the 'Nivṛtti-Portion'). This leads to the question what, then, could be the Seed for the arising of supramundane dharmas. They cannot arise from *ālayavijñāna* if the imprint-Seeds it contains or consists of are all of the nature of corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*). So what is the Seed from which the supramundane dharmas emerge? In my understanding (which is essentially the same as Yamabe's) the answer is that what the supramundane dharmas, and especially the very first of them that constitutes the (first moment of the) *darśanamārga*, have as their 'Seed' is Suchness [insofar as it 'functions'] as their object-condition. This interpretation is formalized by Matsumoto as

tathatā = *ālambanapratyaya* = *bīja*.[2362]

532. As has already been indicated before (§ 523), this pattern of interpretation is rejected by Matsumoto because being a Seed would involve, according to him, a *causal activity* of Suchness, which he considers typical of the position of (at any rate Far Eastern) adherents of the *ekayāna* position[2363] but impossible in the specific Yogācāra pattern of '*dhātuvāda*', where there is no causal activity on the level of 'locus' (= Suchness) on account of its permanence. Therefore, the Seed of the supramundane dharmas must belong to the 'super-locus' level of dharmas, and the passage has to be interpreted accordingly. Matsumoto achieves this by explaining the element **tathatālambanapratyaya* not as a karmadhāraya but as a bahuvrīhi, i.e., according to him the passage means:

[B65]-tr(M) "{2a} The supramundane dharmas arise [in such a way that they] have that (/something) which has Suchness as its objective support as their Seed."[2364]

[2362] M2: 122, 124, etc. The problem with this formalized representation of my interpretation is that the abstract equation sign suggests that Suchness is essentially and thus automatically and always *ālambanapratyaya*, but this 'function' is actually dependent on the spiritual status of each single sentient being, on his or her 'openness', so to speak. Suchness in itself is always available, but sentient beings must remove their individual obstacles that prevent its manifestation.

[2363] Matsumoto quotes passages from Fa-pao 法寶 (M2: 127f text [45]), Saichō 最澄 (M2: 131f texts [48] and [49]) and Genshin 源信 (M2: 134 text [50]). For Fa-pao's position and its rebuttal by Hui-chao, see YOSHIMURA 2013: 1244–1249; cf. also id. 2006: 90f.

[2364] M2: 121,8: 出世間の諸法は、真如を所縁縁とするものを種子として ... 生じる。

533. It is not quite clear to me precisely what Matsumoto considers to be "that which has Suchness as its objective support", less since he (M2: 123) goes one step further by interpreting *ālambanapratyaya* in terms of 'locus', taking *ālambana* and *pratyaya* to be quasi-synonymous in this sense.[2365] Accordingly, he symbolizes his interpretation of the phrase as

bīja (B) ⊣ *tathatā* = *ālambanapratyaya* (A).[2366]

However, such an extremely unusual interpretation of the expression *ālambanapratyaya*, which is, after all, a technical *term*, is hardly acceptable. Apart from this, it would also seem to pose problems from a systematical point of view; for according to what Matsumoto calls the specific *dhātuvāda* pattern of Yogācāra, *all* dharmas have Suchness as their 'locus', but most of them, being thoroughly pollutional, are clearly not the Seed of supramundane dharmas, so that some specification would be indispensable. If, however, the expression *ālambanapratyaya* is, as it surely should be, understood in its usual sense, that which has Suchness as its object-condition must be some form of the *mind* or a *mental* factor; more precisely: some form of insight (*jñāna*). But if this was what the author of the VinSg passage had in mind, would one not expect him to have used a less ambiguous formulation like **tathatālambana(pratyaya)jñānabījā utpadyante* instead of the misleading **tathatālambanapratyayabījā utpadyante*?[2367]

534. Apart from this, one would have to ask what kind of insight could actually be the Seed of the supramundane dharmas if having Suchness as its objective support is the condition. Strictly speaking, it is not before the *darśanamārga*, i.e., the first supramundane insight, that Suchness is directly perceived, so that properly speaking only supramundane insight can be said to have Suchness as its objective support. In this case, Matsumoto's interpretation would amount to declaring the supramundane dharmas to be their own Seed, which may work for the later moments, since they may have the preceding ones as their Seed

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[2365] M2: 123,8-12. For a critical remark on this interpretation of the expression *pratyaya*, see Pt. I § 190 and fn. 1040, for *ālambana* Pt. I § 241.1. In the present context, Matsumoto (M2: 185–187 n. 104) tries to establish the meaning 'locus' for *pratyaya* on the basis of MAV(Bh) I.9ab (*ekaṁ pratyayavijñānaṁ dvitīyam aupabhogikam*), suggesting that in spite of Sthiramati's equation of *pratyaya* with *hetu(pratyaya)*, *pratyaya* should rather be understood as 'locus' because in the *Bhāṣya* the *pratyayavijñāna* = *ālayavijñāna* is contrasted with the *pravṛttivijñāna*s and because *pra-√vṛt* favours, according to Matsumoto, a locative complement (M2: 186,21-24). The latter assumption has already been discussed in Pt. I § 44.3. To my mind, we rather have to contrast *pratyaya*° with *aupabhogika*, which surely means the mind in its aspect of actual experience, so that there is good reason to understand *pratyaya*° as referring to the mind insofar as it conditions actual experience (e.g., by leading to rebirth: cf. MAV I.10b). As for *ālambana*, Matsumoto (M2: 125f) adduces two passages in support of the meaning 'locus'. However, in the first one (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ I 30,20f and 32,7 and 11: *jñeye vastuny ālambane*) there is no reason at all to depart from the usual meaning "objective support", for *jñeyaṁ vastu* and *ālambana* refer to the "thing to be cognized" by being made the objective support (*ālambana*) of the various levels of yogic contemplation, just as in ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 42,6–56,4. It is only in the other passage, viz., RGV IV.73ab, where space or ether is characterized as *nirālamba* and *nirāśraya*, that the context is reminiscent of the old canonical meaning (cf. SN I 53,17 [SOM. 121,10]: *appatiṭṭhe anālambe* "without footing and without hold"; cf. Pt. I § 241.1.2), but significantly enough in this case the concept is *negated*, and the contextual perspective is entirely different.

[2366] M2: 119, 123, 150, 158, 165.

[2367] The possibility that *pratyaya* might be taken here in the sense of "understanding" would seem to be ruled out by the ubiquitous terminological use of the expression *ālambanapratyaya* in doctrinal Buddhist texts.

(provided that we do not restrict the use of the term "Seed" to latent potentialities).[2368] But this scheme would not be applicable to the core of the problem, i.e., to the very first supramundane dharma on the *darśanamārga* stage, which surely cannot have itself as its Seed. If, however, we assume that what functions as the Seed in the case of the first supramundane insight is a preliminary contemplation of Suchness in the form of a conceptual construct, such a contemplation would still be mundane and would, at least in the systematic framework of our passage,[2369] still belong to the realm of clinging to the fictitious nature (*parikalpita-svabhāvābhiniveśa*) and hence hardly be sufficiently homogeneous to be called the Seed of supramundane insight.

2.3.2 Support from the Exegetical Tradition

535. Matsumoto would probably answer that his interpretation is precisely the same as the one proposed by later Yogācāras. But later Yogācāras seem to have differed considerably in their interpretation of the passage. Unfortunately, these interpretations have come down only in the form of second hand or even third hand reports by Chinese and Korean authors — transmitted in the first place in To-ryun's (道倫, Tao-lun) and Chi's (基) commentaries on the YBh, viz., the *Yü-ch'ieh-lun chi* (瑜伽論記: T 42.1828) and the *Yü-ch'ieh-shih-ti-lun lüeh-tsuan* 瑜伽師地論略纂: T 43.1829), respectively — and in the form of a few hints in Tibetan translations of later Yogācāra texts (VGPVy, YVy). Moreover, as far as I can judge, the material is by no means always sufficiently clear and unambiguous. An exhaustive treatment of the issue would no doubt require a much more careful study of the respective sources and of Far Eastern secondary literature than is possible in the context of the present study, and I must confine myself to a few admittedly provisional remarks.

536.1. There can be no doubt that among the explanations ascribed to later Yogācāra masters there are several that are based on taking **tathatālambanapratyaya* as a bahuvrīhi, and to this extent Matsumoto is right.[2370] But problems start when we ask for the noun this

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[2368] For *samyagjñāna* arising from *samyagjñāna*, cf. YBh$_t$ P zi 304a6f (YBh$_c$ 696c2f; KRAMER 2005: 72 and 108 [# 6.5]; TAKAHASHI 2005: 125f and 188 [# 1.6.5]), but this holds good only for the later moments, for the first moment can only arise from the other two causes indicated, viz., listening to the right doctrine (**saddharmaśravaṇa*) and correct reflection (**yoniśomanaskāra*). Still, this passage does not use the concept of Seeds (*bīja*).

[2369] Though not necessarily for later exegetes: see § 544.3. Cf. VGPVy P li 431a4–b2 (D ri 358b4–359a1), where the preparatory wholesome factors, and especially the *laukikāgradharma*s, are taken to be, in some sense at least, uncontaminated (**anāsrava*), and ASBh 23,19–24,1, where it is stated that the *nirvedhabhāgīya*s, in spite of being still accompanied by spiritual corruption (*kleśadauṣṭhulya*), may nevertheless in some sense be called "uncontaminated" because they counteract contamination.

[2370] As for the Tibetan rendering of **tathatālambanapratyaya* as *de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen*, Matsumoto (M2: 184,14-19) seems to take it as corroborating a bahuvrīhi interpretation of the Skt. phrase. The same rendering is, however, also found in YBh$_t$ P zi 30b2f (the passage immediately following text [B65]), where the presence of the **tathatālambanapratyaya* in *all* [sentient beings] is adduced by an opponent as incompatible with the Yogācāra assumption of distinct *gotra*s and *agotraka*s, and where it can only refer Suchness itself (cf. also M2: 154f). Apart from this, it is worth noting that in the quotation of the phrase in VGPVy P li 431a1 and 3 (see text [B72]) the expression is rendered as *de bzhin nyid dmigs pa'i rkyen* (without *la*; cf. YAMABE 1990b: 72 n. 11), which suggests a karmadhāraya interpretation. Actually, the phrase "X *la dmigs pa'i rkyen*", for which I have not been able to find parallels except for the quotation of [B65]{2} in YVy P yi 112b6(f), is, at least to me, anything but clear. There is no doubt that "X *la dmigs pa*" often corresponds to X-*ālambana*, which

bahuvrīhi is meant to qualify, and for its precise relation to the final element of the compound, viz., *bīja*. In particular, I am not convinced that the assumption (cf. M2: 130) that **tathatā-lambanapratyaya* (bahuv.) qualifies an implied noun for "insight" or "comprehension" (like *jñāna*) and that this insight *is* the Seed of the supramundane dharmas (and particularly of the very first of them) can be taken for granted in all the cases concerned. Such an assumption would presuppose that the expression "Seed" (*bīja*) is applied, as is, to be sure, often the case in earlier Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources (see Pt. I § 251), to a reproductive, or homogeneously productive, *actual* dharma, and *not* in the more technical sense of a homogeneously productive *latent capacity*, as it is defined in the *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論: CWSL).[2371] However, although one would certainly expect later exegetes to tend to understand the expression "Seed" in its technical meaning, it would be unwise to exclude the possibility that in specific situations some of them may have taken it as being used in the same way it often was in earlier sources.

536.2. As an unambiguous instance for such a less strict use, one could adduce the explanation, ascribed by Chi (基) to *Jayasena[2372] (勝軍), that the 'Seed' from which the insight of the *darśanamārga* arises consists in the immediately preceding "supreme mundane factor" (**laukikāgradharma*,[2373] i.e., the last phase of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*s), which is called **tathatālambanapratyaya* (bahuv.) because it has Suchness [in the form of a] conceptual image [inspired by] the Buddhist teaching (**deśanādharma*) as its objective support (see § 544.3).

536.3. I am not so sure, however, that this is also the meaning of the explanation of text [B65]{2a} that is quoted by Matsumoto (M2: 130 text [47]) from Hui-chao's (慧沼, 648–714) *Neng hsien chung pien hui jih lun* (能顯中邊慧日論: 'The Sun of Insight Illuminating the Middle and the Extremes'):

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may be taken as a bahuvrīhi, but seems to have been analyzed differently by the Tibetan translators, who obviously tended to understand it as a tatpuruṣa (nomen agentis with an objective genitive as its first member) in the sense of "apprehending X" (see, e.g., ASBh 93,12 *tathatālambanatvāt* = $ASBh_t$ P śi 83b3 *de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i phyir*). On the other hand, *dmigs pa'i rkyen* corresponds to *ālambanapratyaya*, normally understood as a karmadhāraya in which *ālambana* has an objective meaning (cf. Ch. 所緣緣; YBh_{Bh} 110,19f: = *viṣaya*; AKBh 100,3-5: all dharmas: visibles, etc.), i.e., as "condition consisting in the objective support"). In the phrase under discussion, however, the Tibetan translators have, so to speak, created a hybrid in which *ālambana* is, although combined with *pratyaya* (*rkyen*), nonetheless taken as a verbal noun (*dmigs pa* construed with *la*), which I find rather puzzling. It is true that the Tibetan expression can hardly mean "Suchness as the object-condition", but understanding it as "having Suchness as its object-condition" appears equally impossible. I must admit that it is not clear to me precisely what the Tibetan translators had in mind, but I do not see how the phrase could mean anything but "condition of (/consisting in) that which apprehends (or: [the act of] apprehending) Suchness", though I have to admit that the precise import of this phrase is not quite clear to me.

2371 CWSL 8a5f (Similarly 40a23-25):

> What kind of dharma is called 'Seed' in this [context]? A specific capacity, [located] in the *mūla-vijñāna*, that directly produces its own [homogeneous] fruit/effect.
> 此中何法名為種子。謂 本識中 親生自果 功能差別。

2372 Thus DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1948: 48a ("bonne lecture pour Śrīsena", a reconstruction he had used in his translation [1928: 102, 105]).

2373 Mostly used in uncompounded form (pl.: ŚrBh 500,10 and 13; ASBh 122,17; AK VI.25c; sg.: ASBh 76,18) but occasionally also as a compound (AKBh 345,5: pl.). I use the compound and render it in the sg. for the sake of convenience.

[B71] 答意 以真如為所緣緣之能緣之智種 為出世法因,[2374]

and translated by him as follows:

[B71]-tr(M): (The meaning of the answer is:) The Seed *consisting in* the insight that is the apprehending [subject] that has Suchness as its object-condition is (/functions as?) the cause of the supramundane dharmas.[2375]

But I shall come back to this passage later (§ 549).

537. I am, however, still convinced that a bahuvrīhi interpretation of the expression **tathatālambanapratyaya* is rather artificial and does not correspond to the original purport of text [B65], but is due to an adaptation of the passage to later doctrinal developments and terminological consolidations. The natural understanding of the compound in this context is no doubt taking it as a karmadhāraya, and this is in fact how it is understood by what seems to be an older stratum of exegetical approaches (which has no connection with *ekayāna* ideology, no more than the VinSg passage itself).

538. Evidence for an exegetical approach of this kind would seem to be found in the *Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* (VGPVy), which after raising the objection how uncontaminated factors could have contaminated factors as their Seed[2376] adduces three explanations. According to the first of these, uncontaminated (*anāsrava*, i.e., supramundane) mind or insight, when arising in the continuum of a sentient being for the very first time, does not have the usual four conditions, but has only three of them:

[B72] *'di la kha cig na re* "... *de la* (1.) *chos kyi mchog ni byed pa po yin pa'i phyir dang go skabs 'byed pa'i rgyu yin pa'i phyir bdag po'i rkyen dang mtshungs pa de ma thag pa'i rkyen yin no* || (2.) *des bskyed pa'i sa bon ni bdag po'i rkyen kho na yin no* || (3.) *de bzhin nyid ni dmigs pa'i rkyen te* ⟨|⟩

de ltar na zag pa med pa'i dang po ni rkyen gsum gyis skye'o ||

de ltar byas na ʻ*de bzhin nyid dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon can no*ʼ *zhes bya ba dang mthun par byas pa yin no*" *zhes zer te* |

"*rgyu'i rkyen med do*" *snyam du bsams pa'i phyir ro* ||[2377]

[B72]-tr: With regard to this [issue], some [masters] say:

"... In this case, (1.) the "supreme mundane dharma" (*(laukika-)agradharma*, i.e., the last moment of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*s immediately before the *darśanamārga*), is [both] a 'condition of dominance' (*adhipatipratyaya*) and the 'immediately preceding condi-

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[2374] T 45.1863: 429a1f.

[2375] M2: 130,12f: ...「真如」を「所縁縁」とする「能縁」たる「智」という「種子」が、出世間の諸法の「因」である、というものである。

[2376] VGPVy P li 430b5f (D ri 358a7): *zag pa dang bcas pa ji ltar zag pa med pa'i sa bon du 'gyur ba ma yin nam zhe na* |

[2377] VGPVy P li 430b6–431a2 (D ri 358a7–b2). Cf. also YVy P yi 112b5-7 (D 'i 92b4f): Some masters are reported to deny the existence of supramundane dharmas in the *ālayavijñāna*, with explicit reference to text [B65]{2} (as well as to the subsequent passage: P 113a6-8). They take this to imply that there are no such Seeds at all (P 113a4f), and they obviously understand Suchness 'functioning' as object-condition to take over the role of the lacking Seed; for the opponent argues that in this way they cannot explain the fact that the result is differentiated into three types of Awakening (viz., of śrāvakas, etc.) since the object[-condition] (i.e., Suchness) is undifferentiated (P 113a2: *dmigs pa tha dad pa ma yin pa'i phyir ro*), and since Suchness does not perform any wilful or arbitrary activity (*'dod pa bzhin byed pa*) so that it might present itself to some persons in such a way that only the defilements (*kleśa*) are removed, but to others in such a way that also the *jñeyāvaraṇa* is abandoned (P 113a2f).

tion' (*samanantarapratyaya*), because it is the agent (**kartṛ* or *kāraka*) and because it gives way [to the supramundane insight];

(2.) the Seed (*bīja*) generated by the "supreme mundane dharma" [by way of impregnation] is merely [yet another] 'condition of dominance' (*adhipatipratyaya*) [for the emerging supramundane insight];

(3.) Suchness is [its] object-condition (*ālambanapratyaya*).

In this way, the first uncontaminated [mind or insight] arises through three conditions only.

In this way, [our explanation] is in accordance with the statement [of the VinSg] that [the supramundane dharmas] have Suchness ['functioning' as the] object-condition as their 'Seed' (= text [B65]{2a})."

For what is meant (**abhipreta*?) is that [in this case] there is no [homogeneous] primary cause (*hetupratyaya*).

This explanation — which is basically in accordance with an explanation of text [B65] ascribed by Chinese exegetes to *Jayasena: see § 544.1 — is unambiguous in denying the presence of a (homogeneous) primary cause (**hetupratyaya*),[2378] and thus of a homogeneous Seed that could function as such a cause, at the moment when supramundane dharmas arise for the very first time. The explanation obviously presupposes the position that *ālayavijñāna* is the principle of pollution and thus cannot contain Seeds of supramundane dharmas, and that no such Seeds are present anywhere else in the personal continuum. The passage does mention a Seed, viz., the one generated by the *laukikāgradharma*, and this Seed is stated to contribute to the arising of the first supramundane insight just like the actual *laukikāgradharma* itself, the latter being specified as the 'agent', which may mean: the factor that *actively* initiates the breakthrough into a supramundane state of mind. But in our text neither the *laukikāgradharma* nor the Seed it generates is stated to be associated with Suchness as its object-condition. Suchness is rather introduced separately as the object-condition of the newly arising supramundane insight itself. Thus, the most natural way to bring this theory in line with the VinSg passage (i.e., text [B65], which is actually adduced in support) is, in my opinion, the assumption that *tathatā* in its 'function' as the object-condition of the first supramundane insight takes over, so to speak, the role of the latter's Seed in the sense of [homogeneous] primary cause because it is the only *supra*mundane condition involved in its arising.

539.0. In the Chinese materials, too, there is evidence that some exegetes took the compound **tathatālambanapratyaya* in text [B65]{2a} not as a bahuvrīhi but as a karmadhāraya:

539.1. Even the above-quoted Hui-chao (慧沼, see § 536.3) remarks, on another occasion, that in the statement that "[the supramundane dharmas] arise from *tathatā* ['functioning'] as object-condition as their 'Seed'" it is only by way of analogy or figuratively that the object-condition (**ālambanapratyaya*) is called 'Seed', since Suchness is not [really] the Seed of

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[2378] The definition of the *hetupratyaya* in terms of Seeds is already found in YBh_{Bh} 110,18 (see fn. 2179); cf. also 108,5-11 and YBh_t P zi 15b5–16a2 (D zhi 13b1-5; YBh_c a583b21–c1). For a definition from the point of view of fully developed Vijñānavāda, see CWSL 40a21–b6: Seeds are *hetupratyaya* for subsequent homogeneous Seeds and simultaneous homogeneous actual dharmas. Actual dharmas are, by means of impregnating the *mulavijñāna*, *hetupratyaya* for homogeneous Seeds. The position that only Seeds can be *hetupratyaya* is mentioned but judged to be incomplete, and the view that homogeneous or even heterogeneous actual dharmas can be *hetupratyaya* for each other is stated to be either based on figurative speech or a concession to other systems (cf. COOK 1999: 243; JIANG 2005: 268f).

conditioned dharmas.[2379] In this case, Hui-chao unambiguously presupposes a karmadhāraya interpretation of the compound **tathatālambanapratyaya*.

539.2. When To-ryun (道倫) reports the exegesis of text [B65]{2a} by *Jayasena on the one hand and *Candrapāla and Dharmapāla on the other as transmitted in the (lost) YBh commentaries[2380] of (Hui-)ching (惠景) and (Wen-)pi (文備),[2381] he simply has them explain why the first supramundane dharma is stated to arise from Suchness as object-condition (從真如所緣緣生), but the word "Seed" (種子, **bīja*) is completely disregarded in this explanation (see § 544.1). That the expression 真如所緣緣 (**tathatālambanapratyaya*) is not taken as a *bahuvrīhi* here is particularly clear in the case of the exegesis ascribed to *Candrapāla and Dharmapāla; for according to this report these two masters are not content with enumerating the conditions from which the supramundane dharmas of the first *bhūmi* arise, viz., an original uncontaminated Seed as *hetupratyaya* (see § 546), the *mokṣabhāgīya*s, etc., as *adhipatipratyaya*, the *laukikāgradharma* as *samanantarapratyaya*, and Suchness as *ālambanapratyaya*.[2382] They are rather recorded to have expressly added that in stating that the supramundane dharmas arise from **tathatālambanapratyaya* the [YBh-]*śāstra* does so because it explains [their arising only] from the point of view of the condition enumerated last, i.e., Suchness as *ālambanapratyaya*, while remaining silent on the others.[2383] It is true that for Candrapāla and Dharmapāla the preparatory contemplations up to the *laukikāgradharma* also arise, in a sense, from Suchness as their object-condition,[2384] but in the present context this is of no concern, because these preparatory contemplations have already been assigned the functions of *adhipati-* and *samanantarapratyaya*. The *ālambanapratyaya* here can only be Suchness as the object-condition of the newly arising supramundane insight itself. Thus, this explanation also clearly presupposes an interpretation of **tathatālambanapratyaya* as a karmadhāraya and a figurative use of the expression "Seed", to the extent that this word is completely disregarded in the explanation.

539.3. As I understand To-ryun's report of *Jayasena's (勝軍) explanation of text [B65] according to (Shen-)t'ai (神泰),[2385] *Jayasena, who only posits [Seeds in the form of] fresh imprints (唯立新熏習, see § 542), is said to have explained the statement of text [B65]{2a} as follows:

[2379] T 45.1863: 448b3f: 真如所緣緣種子生者, 似(/假)說所緣緣為種子。真如實非有(with v.l.; ed.所)為法種。Cf. also X 49.814: 411a17f (see fn. 2405).

[2380] Cf. DELEANU 2006: I 252.

[2381] T 42.1828: 614c7-19, largely identical with T 43.1833: 860a7-19 (subcommentary to the CWSL by Chih-chou 智周: 679–723).

[2382] T 42.1828: 614c15-18 (cf. T 43.1833: 860a15-18): 以本有無漏種子為因緣, 解脫分等為增上緣, 世第一法為等無間緣, 真如為所緣緣故, 初地出世間法得生。

[2383] T 42.1828: 614c18f: 論從後緣說, 故云 諸出世間法 從真如所緣緣生。Cf. T 43.1833: 860a18f: 論從後緣 隱前不說, 云 從真如所緣緣生。

[2384] T 42.1828: 614c14f: "If one explains the text in accordance with *Candrapāla and Dharmapāla, ... [it is] because Suchness 'functions' as object-condition [that] the *mokṣabhāgīya*s and the other *kuśalamūla*s come about" (若依護月護法消文, ... 真如為所緣緣故, 順解脫分等善根得生。). Cf. also § 544.

[2385] Cf. DELEANU 2006: I 252.

[B73] 真如是所緣緣 無漏初起。唯從正智所緣(/作)種子生。初無漏 不從因緣生。[2386]

[B73]-tr [It is through] Suchness being the object-condition [that] uncontaminated (*an-āsrava*) [insight] arises for the first time. [Thus, the purport of the YBh passage is that] it is only from the objective support (所緣, with v.l.) of correct (i.e., supramundane) insight (**samyagjñāna*) as 'Seed' that [this insight] arises. The first uncontaminated [insight] does not arise from a [Seed properly speaking, in the sense of] a [homogeneous] primary cause (*hetupratyaya*).

I admit that my interpretation is based on the presupposition that the v.l. 所緣 is the correct reading (and not 所作 as in the printed text) and that **samyagjñāna* does not refer to the preparatory stage but (as usual)[2387] to supramundane insight itself. But my understanding of the passage would at least agree with Chi's (基) report that *Jayasena proposed, as one alternative, to take text [B65]{2a/b} to mean that [the first supramundane insight] does not arise from [a Seed in the sense of] a direct homogeneous cause but, in that very moment, arises only due to Suchness 'functioning' as its objective support.[2388]

2.3.3. Exegesis of the Passage in the Light of Later Developments

540. As indicated above (§ 522.2), the problem raised in text [B65] would seem to result from the specific concept of *ālayavijñāna* as found in the 'Nivṛtti Portion', where its function of comprising all Seeds (or being the Seed of all dharmas)[2389] is combined with (and, in a sense, limited by) its being conceived as the root of pollution (**saṁkleśamūla*), infested with corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*). Conceived in this way, *ālayavijñāna* and the Seeds it comprises are entirely on the side of what must be eliminated, and cannot serve as the source for the antidote consisting in the supramundane factors. Text [B65] (as I understand it) therefore tries to derive them directly from Suchness (as the supramundane realm, so to speak), by way of its becoming the objective support of insight. But this solution is not without problems.

1. First, the question arises how it is possible that Suchness becomes the objective support of insight, and why this doesn't happen all along, since Suchness has been present within every sentient being all the time. As the passage immediately following upon text [B65] points out, the comprehension of Suchness is normally impeded by some obstacle (**āvaraṇa*). It is obvious that for the removal of such obstacles preparatory spiritual practice is required. This issue is not addressed in connection with text [B65], but actually such preparatory spiritual practice is taken for granted already in the 'Nivṛtti Portion', where it is called "repeated cultivation of wholesome factors" (**kuśaladharmabhāvanā*: see § 530). But in view of the fundamentally corrupt nature of *ālayavijñāna* the origin of this preparatory spiritual practice, too, poses a problem, and the attempt, in one paragraph of the 'Nivṛtti Portion'

[2386] T 42.1828: 614c28f (the 金-ed. [vol. 121: 596b15f] omits 真如 at the beginning of the quote and adds 也 at the end). Should one punctuate not after 生 but after 初無漏 ("...that one generates the first uncontaminated insight; [this insight] does not arise from ...")? From the point of meaning, it would not make much difference.

[2387] Cf., e.g., the use of *samyagjñāna* in the five-*vastu*-pattern (KRAMER 2005: 43–49). Cf. also fn. 2420.

[2388] T 43.1829: 184c26-28: 如勝軍師。... 或不從因緣生。當於此時以真如為所緣故生。(金-ed. [vol. 120: 132a1] has 云 for 不)

[2389] YBh$_t$ P zi 8b1 (D zhi 7a5; YBh$_C$ 581b4; VinSg$_{Pa}$ 1020a18f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 38,3f [2001: 402,17]: # **5.b**.A.4]: *kun gzhi rnam par shes pa de nyid ni sa bon thams cad pa yin pa'i phyir* ... (Hs: 能持一切法種子故...; Pa: 為一切本).

(YBh_t P zi 8b4–9a3: # **5.b**.B.1), to derive spiritually wholesome practice, nonetheless, from Seeds in the *ālayavijñāna* is inconsistent with the fundamentally negative concept of the latter in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' and therefore looks heterogeneous.[2390]

2. Second, even if the coming about of preparatory practice removing the obstacles is taken for granted, the derivation of supramundane dharmas merely from Suchness 'functioning' as the objective support could appear unsatisfactory from a doctrinal point of view, for as a conditioned factor supramundane insight should normally also have a [homogeneous] primary cause in the strict sense, i.e., should arise from a Seed properly speaking, functioning as its *hetupratyaya* (see§ 536.1).

541. As is well known, two basic patterns to solve these problems can be traced in the sources. The *first* pattern tries to solve them solely on the basis of a salvific process induced from outside, so to speak, whereas the basic assumption of the *second* pattern is the acceptance of originally existing, innate uncontaminated Seeds in the personal continuum.

2.3.3.1. Exegesis on the Basis of a Salvific Process Induced from Outside

542. The first view was, according to the Chinese tradition, propounded by the masters *Jayasena (勝軍) and Nanda[2391] and is essentially based on the *śrutavāsanā* theory as introduced in *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* I.45–49.[2392] This theory rejects the existence of originally existing, innate uncontaminated Seeds and derives the first emerging of supramundane insight in a sentient being's mind continuum from the imprint (*vāsanā*) of hearing, or listening (*śruta*) to,[2393] the Buddhist teaching, which is an outflow (**niṣyanda*) of the completely pure *dharmadhātu*, i.e., Suchness as experienced by a Buddha.[2394] The newly emerging supra-

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[2390] Cf. S 1987: 209–213. In compilations like the YBh, the heterogeneity of a piece of text need not of course mean that this piece was interpolated later. It may well have been inserted into preexisting material in the course of the compilation process (or even before).

[2391] CWSL 8b6-23, esp. b13-15 (position of *Jayasena and Nanda according to T 43.1830: 305a20). In connection with the interpretation of text [B65]: T 42.1828: 614c7-13 (≈T 43.1833: 860a7-13) and c27-29 (*Jayasena); T 43.1829: 184c1-14 and 26-28 (*Jayasena); for Fa-pao, see text [B76].

[2392] Cf., for more details, S 1987: 79f # 4.8.5.

[2393] Though *śruta* is also used in a passive sense and then defined as the Buddhist teaching consisting in the sūtras, etc. (see fn. 2286), I follow Lamotte (1938: II 66: "audition")[1] in taking it, in the present context, as an action noun (cf. PW s.v. *śruta* 4.b: "das Hören"). Whereas the Tibetan rendering *thos pa* suggests "hearing" in the sense of something that happens to the subject, i.e., in the sense that a person gains an opportunity to hear the teaching of a Buddha, Sanskrit √*śru* may include the nuance of listening (*SWTF* III 230b s.v. *śru* 3: "zuhören, hinhören, …").

[1] Similarly FRAUWALLNER 1956b: 342 [III.1] = 2010a: 224: "Hören"; 2010b: 364: "hearing"; NAGAO 1982: 219: 聞くこと; *NAKAMURA* II 1371b (s.v.聞): ① 教えを聴聞すること; 1371c (s.v. 聞熏習): 聞くこと.

[2394] Cf. T 42.1828: 614c8f (*Jayasena; ≈ T 43.1833: 860a8f):

> The Buddhas and bodhisattvas, on account of having realized Suchness, successively (展轉, **param-parayā*) cause the canonical texts in twelve divisions to flow out (~ *niṣyanda*) [from it] and disseminate them in the world.
>
> 諸佛菩薩 由證真如 展轉流出十二部經 流行在世。

Still more detailed X 49.814 (成唯識論義蘊): 411a13-16:

> The Tathāgata, with Suchness as object-condition, causes to flow out, precisely from [this] Suchness, great concentration, insight and compassion. This is the Tathāgata's *saṁbhogakāya*. Again, from the

mundane insight is thus ultimately rooted in a Buddha's supramundane insight as its homogeneous origin (which in its turn is based on Suchness as its objective support). According to MSg I.46, the *śrutavāsanā* in a sentient being's personal continuum exists together with the *ālayavijñāna* but does *not* form *part* of it. The reason is that whereas the *ālayavijñāna* is, just as in the 'Nivṛtti Portion', taken as the source of pollution,[2395] the *śrutavāsanā* is opposed to pollution, for although the *śrutavāsanā* is mundane it finally becomes, through cultivation, the Seed of the first supramundane state of mind just because it ultimately derives from the supramundane *dharmadhātu* (= Suchness).

543. In part of the pertinent sources, this imprint is recognized as the *hetupratyaya* of the supramundane dharmas,[2396] and in the Chinese tradition this view is also ascribed to *Jayasena, albeit only as one of two alternatives.[2397] *Jayasena's primary view seems to have been that the imprint of hearing the Buddhist teaching is only capable of producing the wholesome factors of the preparatory path up to the 'supreme mundane factor' but cannot function as the (by nature homogeneous) primary cause (*hetupratyaya*) of the first supramundane dharma but only as a determinant condition (*adhipatipratyaya*).[2398] Thus, the first supramundane insight arises from the three other *pratyaya*s only, without a *hetupratyaya*,[2399] just as in Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma the first supramundane state of mind arises without a 'homogeneous cause' (*sabhāgahetu*).[2400]

544.0. In connection with the exegesis of text [B65]{2a}, the reports on how *Jayasena and Nanda understood its formulation are not uniform and, as far as I can judge, not always unambiguous.

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saṁbhogakāya, he causes the *nirmāṇakāya* to flow out. From this *nirmāṇakāya*, he causes the twelve-membered teaching to flow out. This is called the 'outflow right Dharma'.

如來 以真如為所緣緣。即從真如 流出大定智悲。即是如來報身。復從報身 流出化身。從此化身 流出十二分教。此名等流正法。

Cf. also VGPVy P li 430a8–b4 (D ri 358a3-6).

2395 MSg I.45: *kun nas nyon mongs pa'i rgyu*.

2396 Thus ASBh 35,26–36,2 (ad AS 28,9f *hetupratyaya ālayavijñānaṁ kuśalavāsanā ca*): *kuśalavāsanā mokṣabhāgīyānāṁ vāsanā draṣṭavyā* | *teṣāṁ lokottarādhigamaniṣyandadharmanaimittikatvād tadvāsanāyā lokottaradharmahetutvaṁ veditavyam* | (em. with SAKUMA 1996: 15). For a more sophisticated theory, distinguishing between a contaminated *śrutavāsanā*, which is only a superior *adhipatipratyaya* of the (first) supramundane dharma, and an uncontaminated *śrutavāsanā* (actually the primordial uncontaminated Seed impregnated by and reinforced through hearing the Buddhist teaching: see ch. 2.3.3.2) as the *hetupratyaya* of the (first) supramundane dharma, see CWSL 9a14-19.

2397 T 42.1828: 487a28f + b1:

*Jayasena says: ... As regards [the causal relation of] the *gotra* developed by training (i.e., the *śrutavāsanā*) to the non-conceptual insight of the first Bhūmi, there are two explanations. One says that it has [the function] of *hetupratyaya*, because it is, like [non-conceptual insight], [included in] the *mārgasatya*. ...

勝軍云。... 習種 望初地無分別智 有兩解。一云。有因緣。何以故。同是道諦故。

2398 T 42.1828: 487b1f (continued from fn. 2397):

Another [explanation] says: It has only [the function of] a determinant condition (**adhipatipratyaya*).

一云。唯有增上緣。

2399 T 42.1828: 614c11-13 (only three *pratyaya*s) and c27-29 (no *hetupratyaya*: 初無漏 不從因緣生); Cf. also the similar position maintained in text [B72] (§ 538).

2400 T 42.1828: 487b2: 如小乘苦忍無自分因. Cf. DHAMMAJOTI 2003: 43f.

544.1. In To-ryun's report, the passage is taken to refer to both the wholesome contemplations of the preparatory path (*mokṣa-* and *nirvedhabhāgīya*s) and to the first supramundane insight (in this report taken to arise without a *hetupratyaya*). According to *Jayasena, even in the case of the preparatory contemplations it is possible to call them to arise from Suchness as object-condition, though strictly speaking[2401] only in an indirect sense, i.e., by calling them so after their ultimate root, i.e., in the sense that by taking the Buddhist teaching as their actual objective support these contemplations are, ultimately, based on the Buddha's direct experience that has Suchness itself as its objective support.[2402] In the case of the first supramundane insight, it is simply stated that it arises without a *hetupratyaya*, from the 'supreme mundane dharma' as its *adhipati-* and *samanantarapratyaya* and from Suchness as *ālambanapratyaya.*[2403] The latter phrase (從真如所緣緣生) is, apart from the omission of the expression "Seed" (*bīja*, 種子), identical with the (Chinese) formulation in [B65]{2a} and can, in the context of the enumeration of the *pratyaya*s involved, only be understood on the basis of a karmadhāraya interpretation of the expression **tathatālambanapratyaya*. That the word *bīja* (種子) is disregarded would seem to indicate that it is understood in a merely figurative sense and thus not considered relevant from a doctrinal perspective.

544.2. In Tao-i's (道邑)[2404] *Ch'eng wei-shih lun i-yün* (成唯識論義蘊), the statement of text [B65]{2a} that Suchness is the 'Seed' of a sentient being's first supramundane state of mind is likewise taken to refer to Suchness as the ultimate foundation of the whole the process culminating in the emerging of supramundane insight:

> [B74] 此{於}出世心 據本而論 從真如生, 假說真如名為種子, 故言「從真如所緣緣種子生」。[2405]
>
> [B74]-tr: This [first] supramundane [state of] mind [which has arisen on the basis of the *śrutavāsanā*], if considered with reference to its *ultimate* root, has arisen from Suchness. [Thus,] figuratively speaking, Suchness may be called its 'Seed'. For this reason, [the VinSg] says that [the supramundane dharmas] arise from Suchness ['functioning'] as object-condition as their 'Seed'.

This explanation, too, obviously starts from an understanding of 真如所緣緣 (**tathatālambanapratyaya*) as a karmadhāraya, but it would seem that in this case it is Suchness as the object-condition of the *Buddha*'s nonconceptual insight that is taken to be the (ultimate) 'Seed' of a sentient being's first supramundane insight by way of the imprint of hearing the Buddha's teaching.

[2401] I.e., if Suchness itself is intended, and not merely a conceptual image of Suchness (as in text [B75]).

[2402] T 42.1828: 614c9-11 (continuing the text quoted in fn. 2394):

> ... Before the *darśanamārga*, the *mokṣa-* and *nirvedhabhāgīya*s arise with that canonical teaching as their object-condition. Being named after their fundamental origin (i.e., Suchness as the object-condition of the Buddhas' supramundane insight), they may be said to arise from Suchness as objective support.
>
> ... 見道已前, 順解脫分 順決擇分 緣彼經教作所緣緣生。從本為名 名「從真如所緣緣生」。

Similarly T 43.1833: 860a9-11. Cf. also T 43.1829: 184c1-4.

[2403] T 42.1828: 614c11-13: 初地出世聖道, 一 從世第一法順決擇善為增上緣等無間緣生。二 從真如所緣緣生。For a similar view, see § 538.

[2404] T'ang period: *BusshoKD* VI: 16c; *FK* 2927b.

[2405] X 49.814: 411a17f, quoted T 67.2266: 281c3-5, where the character 於 is missing.

544.3. The situation is clearly different in Chi's (基) above-mentioned (§ 536.2) account of *Jayasena's exegesis of text [B65]{2a} on the basis of the alternative view ascribed to the latter (cf. § 543), this time in the form that the 'supreme mundane dharma', as the mundane culmination of a process of cultivation by which the *śrutavāsanā* is increasingly strengthened, functions as the (homogeneous) primary cause (*hetupratyaya*) of the first supramundane insight:

[B75]由決擇分世第一法 緣真如教法為所緣故，以此為因緣種子 生見道智。即說世第一法 名「真如所緣緣種子」。以緣教法影像真如修習為緣故，言「從真如所緣緣種子生」。[2406]

[B75]-tr: Because the 'supreme mundane dharma', [which is the final stage] of the *nirvedhabhāgīya*s, takes the Buddhist teaching of Suchness as its objective support, [it is] by means of this [dharma] as the 'Seed' [in the sense of] *hetupratyaya* [that one] generates the insight [consisting in the] *darśanamārga* (i.e., the first supramundane dharma). [Thus, it is] precisely the 'supreme mundane dharma' [that] is called "the 'Seed' [consisting in that which has] Suchness [as its] object-condition". And because [the first supramundane dharma] is conditioned by the cultivation [of a contemplation] that apprehends Suchness [in the form of a] conceptual image [inspired by] the Buddhist teaching (**deśanādharma*) as its objective support, it is [in the VinSg] stated to "arise from the 'Seed' [consisting in that which has] Suchness [as its] object-condition".

In this explanation, if we start from [B65]-rec(Yam.) (§ 520), the expression **tathatālambanapratyayabīja* is doubtless analysed as a two-layered bahuvrīhi. Moreover, just as in Matsumoto's interpretation, the subordinate bahuvrīhi **tathatālambanapratyaya* is taken to qualify a supplied noun, viz., the *laukikāgradharma* as the *jñāna* immediately preceding the first supramundane insight, and this *jñāna* is taken to *be* the Seed of the first supramundane insight, which means that the word "Seed" is, in this explanation, too, not used in its technical meaning of a latent capacity as defined in the CWSL (§ 536.1).

544.4. As in the preceding explanation, so also in Fa-pao's (法寶, ca. 627–705) report of Nanda's interpretation of text [B65]{2a} the expression **tathatālambanapratyaya* would seem to be understood as a bahuvrīhi referring to an insight, but the 'Seed' (*bīja*) is here clearly understood in the technical sense of the *śrutavāsanā*, taken to be the Seed *of* the supramundane dharmas because it can ultimately be traced back to the Buddha's direct experience of Suchness:

[B76] 難陀等云。是聞熏習種子[a]。從佛正體智為名[b] 名[c]為「真如所緣緣種子」。[2407]

[B76]-tr1: Nanda and others say: [This Seed] is the Seed [that consists in] the *śrutavāsanā*. Naming it after the Buddha's direct comprehension of True Reality (i.e., of Suchness),[2408] [the VinSg] calls it "Seed [resulting from an insight that has] Suchness as its object-condition".

[2406] T 43.1829: 184c10-13: Cf. also the resumé of this view ibid. 184c28: "[The first supramundane insight] arises from the *laukikāgradharma* as its *hetupratyaya*" (又用世第一法為因緣生。).

[2407] SUEKI [F.] 1995: 788,3f; T 45.1863: 428c15f; M2: 128,6 text [45]㋕. Vari nt readings: [a] SUEKI's texts om. 子; [b] T 45.1863 and M2 om. 為名; [c] T 45.1863 wrongly 各. — For the construction "從 X 為名 名為 Y" cf., e.g., T 42.1828: 496c10f and 637b18, or T 43.1831: 625a2. More frequent is the pattern "從 X 為名 名 Y" (e.g., T 42.1828: 360b7f; 442b15f; 445b7; etc.).

[2408] 正體智 = the fundamental, non-conceptual insight (根本無分別智): *NAKAMURA* I 702b.

I am not completely sure that this is the only way of interpreting this passage, but at any rate it seems to be the most natural one. However, if we look at it from the point of view of the presumably underlying Sanskrit ([B65]-rec(Yam.)), the two-layered bahuvrīhi would require an analysis that is different from the one presupposed in text [B75]. For instead of analysing the compound as "the 'Seed' of which is [an X = *jñāna*] that has Suchness as its object-condition" we would have to assume a less common analysis, i.e., something like "the Seed of which is [one that results] *from* [an X = *jñāna*] that has Suchness as its object-condition".

2.3.3.2. Exegesis on the Basis of Originally Existing Uncontaminated Seeds

545. The *second* position[2409] is ascribed by the Chinese tradition to *Candrapāla[2410] and, in the form of a kind of synthesis integrating the *śrutavāsanā* theory,[2411] to Dharmapāla[2412] or Śīlabhadra.[2413] It is characterized by the assumption that in the subliminal mind of sentient beings (more precisely: of those that are basically qualified to attain Nirvana) there are, from the time beginningless, also uncontaminated (*anāsrava*) Seeds (or: Seeds of uncontaminated dharmas) that can be activated by spiritual practice and will then function as the *hetupratyaya* of supramundane dharmas. This pattern presupposes a concept according to which the subliminal mind as such, the mind that contains all Seeds, is not only the root of pollution and fraught with corruption (even though the name '*ālayavijñāna*' has come to be limited to this aspect), but also the source or innate presupposition of purification. Such a wider concept of the subliminal "mind containing all Seeds"[2414] could refer to certain passages of the YBh like YBh_{Bh} 25,1f, where the implication is that in the case of persons qualified to attain Nirvana the "mind containing all Seeds" (*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*) is furnished with a Seed for one of the three forms of Awakening (*bodhi*).[2415]

[2409] CWSL 8a20–b6; YVy P yi 112b5 and 112b7–113a4 (D 'i 92b4; and 92b5–93a2); VGPVy P li 431a2-4 (D ri 358b2-4).

[2410] E.g., T 43.1830: 304b6f; T 42.1828: 614c13f, 15f and 29f.

[2411] CWSL 8b23–c18; 9a7-11.

[2412] E.g., T 43.1830: 305c25; cf. also T 43.1829: 184c21-25 and 185a2-8.

[2413] T 42.1828: 615a3-7; T 43.1833: 860a19f.

[2414] Cf. CWSL 13c12f: 或名種子識, 能遍任持世出世間諸種子故。

[2415] This passage (actually quoted in support of the existence of original uncontaminated Seeds in CWSL 8a26-29) is suspected by Matsumoto (M2: 370) of being an interpolation because it uses the expression *sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam* and because it is only very loosely connected with the preceding and the following passage. The first argument has been shown to be inconclusive in Pt. I ch. 4.2.6.1. The second observation is correct but can also be explained as a result of the compilation of heterogeneous materials, especially in the case of the ManoBh, which appears particularly inhomogeneous from the point of view of composition. — It may be worth noting that in one of the proofs for the existence of *ālayavijñāna* in the 'Proof Portion' (YBh_t P zi 3a8–b4 = ASBh 12,25–13,3; YBh_c 579b23-29; HAKAMAYA 1978a: 12 = 2001: 333f [# iv]; GRIFFITHS 1986: 134f; SPARHAM 1993: 129f) it is argued that the six traditional *vijñāna*s cannot be one another's Seed because of the heterogeneity of successive moments, exemplified not only by the fact that a wholesome moment of mind may be followed by an unwholesome one and vice versa, but, among other things, also by a reference to a contaminated or mundane moment being followed by an uncontaminated or supramundane one and vice versa. Since this is to prove that only the neutral *ālayavijñāna* can function as the Seed of all of them, *ālayavijñāna* should, for the author of this argument, also contain the Seeds (or function as the Seed) of uncontaminated, supramundane dharmas.

546. It is obvious that for the representatives of this theory the first supramundane insight can easily be derived from the respective uncontaminated Seed as its (homogeneous) primary cause (*hetupratyaya*). Thus, to them text [B65] — which, if read without prejudice, suggests that this insight arises from Suchness as its 'Seed'— must have appeared as a somewhat peculiar way of expressing things, acceptable only if not taken in a literal, strictly terminological sense, as suggested by Hui-chao's remark referred to in § 539.1 or by Candrapāla's explanation indicated in § 539.2.

547. The possibility to interpret **tathatālambanapratyaya* as a bahuvrīhi and, accordingly, the higher compound **tathatālambanapratyayabīja* as a two-layered bahuvrīhi was not without problems either.

1. If analysed in the same way as in text [B75] (§ 544.3) and by Matsumoto, which is no doubt the most natural way, i.e., as "having as its 'Seed' [an insight] that has Suchness as its object-condition", the result would be that what is established as the 'Seed' of the first supramundane insight would be either the immediately preceding still mundane *jñāna* or, at best, the supramundane *jñāna* of the Buddha as the remote cause, but not a Seed in the terminological sense of a specific capacity in the subliminal mind in accordance with its definition in the CWSL (see § 536.1), let alone in the sense of a primordially present uncontaminated capacity. Thus, why should the proponents of the theory that the first supramundane dharma arises from precisely such an originally present uncontaminated Seed as its (homogeneous) primary cause (*hetupratyaya*) have resorted to such an (after all somewhat artificial) interpretation of text [B65]{2a} if it did not even help them to explain the passage in terms of their central tenet?

2. Basically, the same holds good also for an interpretation of [B65]{2a} in terms of text [B76] (§ 544.4), i.e., in the sense that the first supramundane insight "has a Seed [that ultimately results] from [the Buddha's insight] that has Suchness as its object-condition". But in this case the expression "Seed" could at least be understood in its terminological sense of a latent capacity in the subliminal mind: not, to be sure, in its aspect of a primordially present uncontaminated capacity but at least in its aspect of having been reinforced — or (according to the modified theory as ascribed to Dharmapāla) supplemented with new imprints — in the course of the process that starts with hearing the Buddhist teaching rooted in the Buddha's own experience of Suchness. Actually, there is some evidence that [B65]{2a} was interpreted in this line even by proponents of primordial, inherently present uncontaminated Seeds. Thus, in the VGPVy (ad MSg I.45) the proponent of inherently present uncontaminated Seeds, confronted with the seemingly contrary evidence of [B65]{2a}, suggests the following explanation:

> [B77] "*de bzhin nyid dmigs pa'i rkyen gyi sa bon can*" *zhes 'byung ba gang yin pa de ni chos kyi dbyings kyi rgyu mthun pa thos pa'i bag chags kyi sa bon pa zhes bya ba'i rim pa 'di kho na la* (P : *las* D) *dgongs nas bstan pa yin no* ... ||[2416]

[2416] VGPVy P li 431a3f (D ri 358b3f). Cf. also T 43.1829: 185a2-4 and 6-8:

> According to the bodhisattva Dharmapāla, [there are] original uncontaminated Seeds, [just] as master *Candrapāla advocates]. [But according to Dharmapāla] it is additionally necessary to freshly produce uncontaminated Seeds: [only] then correct insight will newly arise. ... Unless there is a fresh impregnation (in the form of *śrutavāsanā*), the old (primordial) Seed surely lacks [the force] to generate its fruit. Now, as regards [the fact that some texts] mention [only] the fresh impregnation: [this] has been formulated [thus] with reference to what is predominant. [It is] for this reason [that in the VinSg passage under discussion too] it is stated that [the supramundane dharmas] arise from the Seed

[B77]-tr: When it is stated [in the VinSg passage under discussion] that [the supramundane dharmas] are **tathatālambanapratyayabīja* (bahuv.), this has been taught with the intention of [indicating] precisely this sequence, viz., [that supramundane insight] has as its Seed the imprint (*vāsanā*) of hearing (*śruta*) [the Buddhist teaching, which is] the outflow of the *dharmadhātu* (= Suchness).

In connection with his interpretation of MSg I.45, the proponent of this explanation had, however, clearly stated that the function of the process of the more and more intensive impregnation by hearing (and practising) the Buddhist teaching is actually to strengthen the inherently present uncontaminated Seeds[2417] that are the [homogeneous] primary cause of supramundane insight,[2418] and that it is only due to their subtlety that these inherently present Seeds themselves are not expressly mentioned in these texts.[2419]

548.0. However, in order to explain the passage in terms of their central tenet that the first supramundane dharma arises from a primordial uncontaminated Seed as its direct homogeneous cause, another syntactical embedding of the bahuvrīhi **tathatālambanapratyayabīja* would seem to be required. As far as I can see, there is evidence for two different solutions.

548.1. One of these solutions is, if my understanding is correct, indicated in To-ryun's report of (Shen-)t'ai's (神泰) account of Candrapāla's explanation of text [B65]{2a}:

[B78] 護月等 唯立本有熏習。本有熏習 性證真如。是本有熏習所緣緣。此熏習 名「真如所緣緣種子」。聖道 初起 從此生也。[2420]

[B78]-tr Candrapāla and others posit only primordially existing imprints (i.e., inherently present Seeds). [These] primordially existing imprints (i.e., the uncontaminated ones) by nature (i.e., virtually, not actually) experience Suchness. It is [in this sense that Suchness is] the object-condition of [these] primordially existing imprints. These imprints are [therefore] called 'Seeds [that have] Suchness as object-condition' (**tathatā-*

[resulting] from [hearing the Buddhist doctrine which is an outflow of the Buddha's insight] that has Suchness as object-condition.

如護法菩薩: 本無漏種, 如護月師。要更新生無漏種子, 方得正智新起。... 若無新熏, 舊種必無生果。今說新熏者, 就勝而說。故言「真如所緣緣種子生」。

Cf. CWSL 9a19-21. For YVy P yi 112b7f (D 'i 92b5f) see fn. 2425.

2417 VGPVy P li 431a2 (D ri 358b2f):

What has been taught [in MSg I.45] is that the inherently present uncontaminated Seeds must be strengthened by a sequence of imprints of hearing [the Buddhist teaching] that is the outflow of the *dharmadhātu*.

zag pa med pa'i sa bon chos nyid kyi(s?) gnas pa chos kyi dbyings kyi rgyu mthun pa thos pa'i bag chags kyi rim pas yongs su gso bar bya ba yin par bstan to.

2418 This follows from the statement that [even the very first supramundane state of mind] arises through all the four conditions (*rkyen bzhi kho nas skye'o*: VGPVy P li 431a3).

2419 VGPVy P li 431a2f: *phra ba'i phyir dngos su lhang por ni ma bstan to.*

2420 T 42.1828: 614c29–615a3 (the 金-ed. [vol. 121: 597a1] omits the second 本有熏習). Cf. also T 43.1829: 184c28–185a2 (Candrapāla), esp. 185a1f:

The uncontaminated Seeds have, by nature (i.e., latently), Suchness as objective support. [In this sense, they are] comprised in [what has] Suchness as object-condition.[1] Because the correct insight (**samyagjñāna*) of the *darśanamārga* arises with [these] original Seeds [as its homogeneous primary cause], [the VinSg passage] states that it arises with a Seed that is *tathatālambanapratyaya* (bahuv.).

無漏之種 性緣真如 真如所緣緣攝。見道正見 用本種生故, 言「真如所緣緣種生」。

1 Taken in isolation, the sentence would admit of different interpretations, e.g.: "Suchness is comprised in the object-condition", but as far as I can see this would not fit with the argument.

lambanapratyayabīja). When the *āryamārga* comes about for the first time, it arises from these [imprints].

According to this explanation, the reconstructed Sanskrit of [B65]{2a} would have been taken to mean that the supramundane dharmas arise [in such a way that they] have Seeds that [by nature, i.e., virtually][2421] have Suchness as their object-condition and therefore give rise to an insight that equally has Suchness as its object-condition, though now in an actualized form. In other words, the proponents of this interpretation would, to be sure, have taken **tathatā-lambanapratyayabīja* as a two-layered bahuvrīhi but would have taken its first member, the subordinate bahuvrīhi **tathatālambanapratyaya*, to qualify *bīja* (and not a word to be supplied, like *jñāna*).

548.2. The other solution might have been to take the two-layered bahuvrīhi[2422] to mean "the Seed of which is [the Seed] of [insight] that has Suchness as its object-condition",[2423] which would amount to interpreting [B65]{2a} as indicating that the supramundane dharmas (especially the very first one) arise from their specific, primordially existing uncontaminated Seed(s). This is how To-ryun interprets the sentence, obviously following (Hui-)ching's (惠景) report on Dharmapāla's interpretation:[2424]

[B79] 答意 明 三乘見道 從本有種子, 是緣真如無分別智正因。今從彼生, 故言「從真如所緣緣種子生」。[2425]

[2421] Of course, strictly speaking a Seed, being a latent potentiality, does not cognize anything and therefore has no object-condition. Thus expressly T42.1828: 487a22:

Since dharmas [in the state of] Seeds do not apprehend an object, [the two types of *gotra*, being Seeds,] do not have [the function of object-condition [with regard to each other].

種子法 不緣境故 無緣緣。

But speaking from the perspective of their effect, it does not appear unreasonable to describe the Seeds of cognitive factors, as the latent, potential prefiguration of these factors, as having the same structure as these in a latent, potential form.

[2422] The situation for the autochthonous Chinese exegetes was, of course, somewhat different insofar as the higher bahuvrīhi ("arise having X as their Seed") had been transformed by Hsüan-tsang into a different construction ("arise from X as their Seed"). Nor does his rendering of **tathatālambana-pratyaya* as 真如所緣緣 reflect a bahuvrīhi interpretation (as, e.g., an ad sensum rendering by a Vb – Obj sequence 緣真如 would have done).

[2423] I.e., the higher bahuvrīhi would have to be taken as a bahuvrīhi in which the first member is related to the second member as a genitive attribute, i.e., it would follow examples like *uṣṭramukha* (see fn. 2433), but without the comparative connotation.

[2424] T 42.1828: 614c19: 景師 更為{識}護法等釋此文 (v.l. and 金-ed. om. 識). Cf. also T 43.1829: 184c23-25; X 50.818 (by the Korean monk T'ai-hsien 太賢, active around 753 [*HôbRép* 241b]): 53a11:

As for Dharmapāla's explanation, as [it is reported] in [To-ryun's] 'Records on the YBh', [it runs thus]: [The Seed from which the supramundane dharmas arise is] the Seed of insight that apprehends Suchness as its object.

若護法釋, 如瑜伽記: 緣真如境智之種子。

[2425] T 42.1828: 614c25-27. I am not sure whether the explanation of [B65]{2a/2b} by the proponent of [primordial] uncontaminated Seeds in YVy P yi 112b7f (D 'i 92b5f) is to be understood in a similar sense. If we follow the reading of D (and disregard the problems involved in the Tibetan rendering of the presumable compound **tathatālambanapratyaya*: see fn. 2370), this explanation may be rendered as follows:

The cause of the [supramundane dharmas] is the strengthening (**poṣaṇa*?) of the [original uncontaminated?] Seed of [mind and mental factors?] that have Suchness as their object-condition (bahuv.?).

[B79]-tr: The meaning of the answer (in [B65]) is to make clear that the *darśanamārga* of [those who cultivate one of] the three vehicles [arises] from primordially existing Seeds, [which] are the direct [homogeneous] cause of the non-conceptual insight that apprehends Suchness [as its objective support] (**tathatālambana*)[2426]. Now, since [it is] from this [cause that the first supramundane dharma] arises, [the VinSg text] says: "[The supramundane dharmas] arise from the Seed of [insight that has] Suchness as [its] object-condition".

549. From this perspective, the above-quoted passage from Hui-chao 慧沼 (see § 536.3) should perhaps better be understood in a similar sense:[2427]

[B71]-tr(S): The meaning of the answer is: The [uncontaminated] Seed *of* the insight that is the apprehending [subject] that has Suchness as its object-condition is the [homogeneous] cause of the supramundane dharmas.[2428]

550. Likewise, the similar explanation of text [B65]{2a} in Tao-i's (道邑) *I-yün* (義蘊) should also be understood in this way:

[B80] 謂 出世心 從能緣真如無漏心種子生也。[2429]

[B80]-tr [This] means: the supramundane mind arises from the [primordial] Seed *of* the uncontaminated mind that apprehends Suchness [as its objective support].

Tao-i is, however, aware of the fact that this interpretation does not easily fit in with the wording of [B65]{2a}, even in its Chinese rendering, for he considers it necessary to add an explanation:

[B81] 以真如是所緣緣故 即從所緣真如 [a10]說能緣之智種子生無漏也。[2430]

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de bzhin nyid la dmigs pa'i rkyen rnams(!) *kyi sa bon brtas* (D : *rtas* P) *par bya ba ni de dag gi rgyu yin gyi* ...

However, P reads *kyis* for *kyi*, which would change the meaning considerably, for the cause would then consist in the fact that the [original uncontaminated?] Seed [of the supramundane dharmas] is strengthened *by* [the cultivation of cognitive acts] that have [a conceptual image of?] Suchness as their object-condition.

2426 Represented in Chin. as if taken as an agent noun governing an objective genitive, but this could also be an ad sensum rendering of a bahuvrīhi.

2427 Cf. also Hui-chao's remark that contaminated [dharmas] cannot engender (let alone *be!*) the Seed of uncontaminated [dharmas] (T 43.1832: 719a11: 有漏不能生無漏種).

2428 Matsumoto's (M2: 190 n. 122) argument for an *equation* of *jñāna* and *bīja* — although no such pattern is found in the CWSL (M2: 130,16f and 190 n. 23 referring to SUEKI [F.] 1995: 799 n. 5) — is that otherwise the statement of [B71] would not correspond to the interpretation of [B65] by "Dharmapāla and others" as reported by Fa-pao (法寶), viz.:

護法等云: 此是緣真如智 [1]。以真如為所緣緣故 名真如所緣緣種子。(M2: 128,6 text [45]㉜; SUEKI [F.] 1995: 788,2f; T 45.1863: 428c13-15).

[1] The 一乗仏性権実論 (SUEKI [F.] 1995: 788 below, first line) actually adds 種 here!

However, in the case of this (admittedly somewhat terse) text, too, I wonder if it should not rather be understood as follows, especially if the v.l. that adds 種 after 智 is, as I tend to assume, authentic:

Dharmapāla and others say: This [Seed] (viz., the one referred to in text [B65]{2a}) is [that of] insight that apprehends Suchness [as its objective support]. Because [this insight] has Suchness as [its] object-condition, [the VinSg passage calls this Seed] 'Seed of [what has] Suchness as object-condition' (**tathatālambanapratyayabīja*).

2429 X 49.814: 411a8f, quoted T 67.2266: 281a21f.

2430 X 49.814: 411a9f, quoted T 67.2266: 281a22-24.

[B81]-tr: Because Suchness is [essentially and distinctively] the object-condition [of uncontaminated insight], [it is] precisely [by using a formulation chosen] from [the perspective of] Suchness as the objective support [that the VinSg passage actually] teaches that the Seed *of* the insight that is the apprehending [subject of this objective support] generates uncontaminated insight.

2.4. *Madhyāntavibhāga(bhāṣya)* I.15c

551.1. As regards text [B67] (MAV I.15c: see § 521), Matsumoto (M2: 169,17–170,2) seems to take the possibility into account that occasionally a more radical, monistic '*dhātuvāda*' pattern, according to which the 'locus' is the *cause* of dharmas, may have intruded into Yogācāra thought. But what is at stake is anyway only the *supra*mundane dharmas, and my impression is that '*hetu*' is not necessarily used here in the strict sense of active causation. Perhaps, what is meant is not far from what the commentary (text [B68]) suggests, provided that we take the reference to the objective support (*ālambana*) in a similar sense as in text [B65], i.e., in the sense that the *dharmadhātu* (= Suchness) automatically contributes, without any activity on its part, to the arising of the supramundane dharmas as soon as it becomes the objective support or object-condition (*ālambana(pratyaya)*) of insight (in other words: as soon as the obstacles veiling it are removed). This would imply that Matsumoto's interpretation of *tadālambana* in [B68]{2} as a bahuvrīhi (M2: 165)[2431] should be rejected for the same reasons as his interpretation of *tathatālambanapratyaya* as a bahuvrīhi in text [B65] (see § 533).

551.2. Still less acceptable appears Matsumoto's extremely forced if not impossible suggestion to interpret, in order to prevent Suchness (= 'locus' 〔A〕) from becoming a cause or source 〔B〕, even the compounds in [B68]{1} as bahuvrīhis:

[B68]-tr(M): {1} Because it *has* the cause 〔B〕 of the noble dharmas, it is the *dharmadhātu* 〔A〕, i.e., that 〔A〕 which *has* the *dhātu* 〔B〕 of dharmas.[2432]

It is hard to imagine that an Indian reader might have understood the expressions *āryadharmahetutvāt* or *dharmadhātu* in such a strange way.

1. To be sure, from a formal point of view nothing prevents from taking *āryadharmahetu* as a bahuvrīhi, but in this case it would normally be understood as "having the *āryadharma*s as its cause". Even if Matsumoto's suggestion to take it as a bahuvrīhi in which the first member is related to the second member as a genitive attribute (M2: 167,7) is accepted, this would hardly amount to "what has (= supports) the cause of the noble dharmas" in the sense of Suchness as the 'locus' underlying the 'super-locus' comprising both the *āryadharma*s and their cause. Analyzed in the way proposed by Matsumoto, *āryadharmahetu* would rather mean "the cause of which is that of (or similar to that of) the noble *dharmas*",[2433] which would hardly make sense in the case of Suchness.

2431 Cf. M2: 163,10f: 諸の聖法が、それ〔A〕を所縁とする起源〔B〕をもつ (tad-ālambana-prabhava) からである。("Because the *āryadharma*s have an origin (B) that makes it (A) its objective support").

2432 See M2: 163,10 and 167,3f: 聖法の因〔B〕をもつが故に、法界〔A〕、つまり、諸法の界〔B〕をもつもの〔A〕である。

2433 Cf. the majority of the examples in *AiGr* II.1: 277 (# 109, a, α). For the indigenous analysis of such compounds, see *Mahābhāṣya* ad Pāṇini 2.2.24, Vārttika 12: *uṣṭramukham iva mukham asyôṣṭramukhaḥ*.

2. Likewise, *dharmadhātu* taken as a bahuvrīhi of the same type would hardly mean "what has (= supports) the *dhātu* (= cause) of dharmas" (cause-of-dharmas ⊣ Suchness) but rather "the *dhātu* of which is that (or: similar to that) of the dharmas", which again does not make sense in the case of a quasi-synonym of Suchness. Apart from this, one would have to ask how *dharmadhātu*, if originally a bahuvrīhi, comes to be used as a masculine substantive.

Pt. IV: Reconsidering the Question of the Origin of Yogācāra 'Idealism' and the Problem of the Relation of Philosophical Theory and Spiritual Practice in Buddhism

552. In a paper published in German almost 40 years ago (S 1973) as well as in a partial English version (S 1976a), I tried to trace the origin of what may be called Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) 'idealism',[2434] with the result that the earliest occurrence of an 'idealist' position in the Yogācāra school proper as well as of the characteristic term '*vijñaptimātra(tā)*' seems to be in *Saṁdhinirmocana-sūtra* (Saṁdh) VIII, more precisely: VIII.7–8. In addition, I also tried to locate the earliest available occurrence of the expression '*cittamātra*', which is sometimes regarded as equivalent to '*vijñaptimātra*' in post-Saṁdh Yogācāra sources[2435] and is found already in a couple of pre-Yogācāra (or at least pre-Vijñānavāda) Mahāyāna sūtras, the one with the earliest *terminus ante quem* being, so far, the *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṁmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra* (PratyS), where '*cittamātra*' is found in # 3L:

> This (or: whatever belongs to this) triple world (**traidhātuka*) is nothing but mind (or thought: **cittamātra*). Why? Because however I imagine things, that is how they appear.[2436]

In both the Saṁdh and the PratyS the 'idealist' position, or 'idealist'-looking formulation, emerges in the context of a reflection on the ontological status of objects (or persons) perceived in visualizing or visionary[2437] meditative concentration. I therefore concluded that the origination of such an 'idealist'(-looking) position or formulation was closely connected with spiritual practice. As pointed out in the introduction to Pt. II (§ 340), this thesis was uncompromisingly rejected by Robert H. Sharf (1995) and Johannes Bronkhorst (2000),[2438] and, most recently, by Eli Franco (2009). Franco also takes issue with the extended thesis of my German paper (S 1973) that other fundamental Buddhist philosophical theories, too, appear to be rooted in spiritual practice.

553. Surely spiritual practice is not the only driving force in Buddhist history, but if importance is mirrored in the proportion of space allotted to a subject in the textual sources — in the old canon as well as in many later texts, like the *Visuddhimagga* or even the *Abhidharmakośa* (three chapters out of eight) and, last but not least, as is evident already from the title, the *Yogācārabhūmi* —, there can hardly be any doubt that spiritual practice (in the sense

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[2434] See Pt. II § 339.3.

[2435] E.g., MSg II.7.1, quoting the *cittamātra* passage from the DBhS as scriptural evidence for *vijñaptimātratā*; similarly VśVṛ 3,2f (reconstr.; cf. VśVṛ$_t$ D shi 4a3f).

[2436] PratyS 3L (36,21-23): *khams gsum pa 'di dag ni sems tsam mo || de ci'i phyir zhe na | 'di ltar bdag ji lta ji ltar rnam par rtog pa de lta de ltar snang ngo* ||; cf. HARRISON 1990: 42.

[2437] For terminological distinctions see BRETFELD 2003: 169f.

[2438] Cf. also BUESCHER 2008: 177 with n. 2, who, however, completely disregards my remarks on the Mahāyānist background of the extension of the ontological status of the visualized images to the objects of ordinary experience (S 1973: 171f; S 1976a: 243f; 249,5-9).

of a generic term covering roughly the same area as *yoga*) was a matter of foremost concern for the Buddhist masters. It is true that the overwhelming majority of texts dedicated to spiritual practices are concerned with the normative description and systematization of these practices,[2439] but this cannot not detract from the importance the subject of spiritual practice was accorded in Buddhist discourse, at least in theory.[2440] This does not, however, automatically mean that my former thesis is right. In what follows, I shall try to respond to the aforementioned critics and to reconsider and, where necessary, clarify, modify or revise my thesis, with no claim to definitely settle the complex matter but in the hope of contributing to a more balanced and nuanced solution in the future. I shall first (ch. 1) deal with the question of the origin of 'idealism' and 'idealist'-looking formulations, and then (ch. 2) discuss some of Franco's arguments against my extended thesis.

[2439] Cf. S 1978: 119 and, especially, S 1981, particularly 200f.

[2440] Cf., in this connection, also the considerate remarks on the issue in DELEANU 2000: 79f.

1. 'Idealism' and 'Idealist'-looking Formulations

1.1. Methodological Considerations

554. As indicated above (§ 552), in the two passages which I take to contain the earliest available occurrence of '*vijñaptimātra*' and '*cittamātra*', respectively, the 'idealist' position or 'idealist'-looking formulation is *not* derived from, or anticipated by, the *content* of an entirely new, unprecedented experience attained in meditative trance, i.e., from a kind of a sudden intuitive discovery or 'revelation' of all objects, or the whole world, as being nothing but mind or representation. Hence, Bronkhorst's (2000: 81,4-7) suspicion that the passages may just be instances of the

> commonplace in Indian philosophical literature to claim that the truths proclaimed by the school concerned (...) are confirmed by, or even based upon, the perception of spiritually advanced persons

is hardly to the point. As was clearly stated in my former paper,[2441] in the passages concerned the 'idealist' position or 'idealist'-looking formulation is developed in connection with a *reflection on* the content, i.e., on the objects (or persons) visualized or visioned; to be more precise: not on the objects (or persons) as such but on their *ontological status*. This means that we have to distinguish between, on the one hand, reflective deductions made from doctrinally accepted features of certain meditative practices and, on the other, the idea, or cliché, of a direct perceptional realization, confirmation or even discovery of a theoretical position or doctrinal tenet *in* the meditative experience of accomplished yogis. These are two entirely different issues, and it is only the former on which I based my argument regarding the emergence of Yogācāra 'idealism' as well as of the pre-Yogācāra 'idealist'-looking formulation.

555. It is not probable that such a reflection arose spontaneously already in the state of vision or visualizing concentration. It is more likely that it was developed outside this state. Especially the visions of the Buddha Amitāyus dealt with in the PratyS were, by most practitioners and adherents, almost certainly experienced or regarded as a real encounter with this Buddha.[2442] In this case, the critical reflection on the ontological status of the content of the vision, not to mention the conclusion drawn from it regarding the status of the whole world, is more easily explained as having occurred outside the Buddha vision. The PratyS, to be sure, describes it in terms of a subsequent reflection of the visionary (probably after emerging from the meditative state)[2443]. But actually this reflection is almost certainly the assessment of the author (or authors) of the PratyS, ascribed to the visionary with a prescriptive intention, i.e., with the intention of teaching visionaries how to regard the content of their vision. This assessment does not, by the way, necessarily imply that the author himself had successfully practised this type of visionary meditation, nor even, strictly speaking, that there was anybody who had. The decisive point is rather that this type of vision

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2441 S 1973: 169,15-18; 176,17-20; S 1976a: 249,1-5.

2442 BRETFELD 2003: 189 (# 2).

2443 Cf. SAKURABE 1981: 1a2f (三昧より立ちいでたのち).

was *believed* to be available and was appreciated as spiritually helpful, at least by the audience of the text.

556. In the case of the meditative concentration envisaged by the Saṁdh, the situation may be somewhat different. This meditative concentration includes, among other things, the 'contemplation of the repulsive' (*aśubhabhāvanā*), i.e., the visualization and contemplation of corpses in their successive stages of decay.[2444] In this case, it can be presupposed that the yogi is tacitly aware of the fact that these objects are, at any rate, not normal things since he has produced them deliberately by means of a specific technique of visualization. In the PratyS (# 3J), these visualized corpses are even, as a matter of course, adduced as an example of illusory appearances, side by side with dreams (## 3B, etc.) and reflected images (# 3K). But it was probably a matter of subsequent reflection, or even Abhidharmic systematization, to define their ontological status more precisely, and the answer was not uncontroversial even within the early Yogācāra tradition, since in some passages the visualized objects are defined as a special kind of 'derivative matter' (*upādāyarūpa*), whereas in other passages it is stressed that they are nothing but mental images.[2445] The latter view is emphatically set forth also in the Saṁdh (VIII.7), where the issue is indeed brought up in the context of a theoretical discussion on visualizing meditative practice, and it is, moreover, in this connection that the 'ideality' of the objects visualized in meditative concentration is extended to the objects of everyday experience (VIII.8). In this case, too, it is not necessarily required that the author of the text was himself a successful practitioner of this type of visualizing meditation. The practice had been a well-known and recognized element of the Buddhist tradition from early times, and was thus surely taken for granted even by those who had no practical experience of their own. The subsequent (Saṁdh VIII.9: see § 584) redrawing of the path to liberating insight — in terms of a contemplative practice that takes the acts of visualizing contemplation themselves as its object,[2446] leads to the comprehension that the visualized images are mere representations (*vijñaptimātra*) and culminates in the insight that this is the true nature (**tathatā*) [of all phenomena] — is, though descriptive in form, clearly prescriptive in its intention.

557. Provided that we start not from the prescriptive revision of the meditative practices concerned but from their traditional form, Franco (2009: 111,4-6) is doubtless right in stating that there "is no one-to-one correspondence between the content of the meditation and a metaphysical doctrine", i.e., while involved in meditative contemplation the yogi or visionary does *not* experience the whole world as being nothing but mind or representation, and at least in the case of the Buddha visions he may not even be aware of the imaginary character of the visualized object. But the same holds good for dreams as well, the illusory nature of which is

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[2444] See Saṁdh VIII.3–4 and 12. According to Saṁdh VIII.3–4, these images or rather replicas are of canonical *texts* (sūtras, etc.) or their contents (*don* = *artha*, cf. VIII.12: 93,22-24; cf. also MSA[Bh] XIV.4–6). Alternatively, contemplative concentration may also start from personal instruction (**avavādānuśāsanī*) and consist in, e.g., a visualization of bloated corpses, etc. (Saṁdh VIII.12: 93,25-28; cf. MSg II.7.2), or in the contemplation of the impermanence, etc., of all conditioned things (Saṁdh 93,28-31).

[2445] S 1973: 167; 172,6-9; S 1976a: 239f; 244,14-17.

[2446] With respect to this point, too, Saṁdh VIII seems to have reinterpreted a specific feature of spiritual practice as described in the ŚrBh, viz., the understanding of the final phase of the preparatory path as a series of contemplative acts directed at the immediately preceding moment of contemplation (S 1982a: 79; 2007: 222f; cf. also fn. 478 and fn. 479).

not normally realized while one is dreaming but only after waking up. In the case of hallucinations like a mirage, an experienced person may be aware of their illusory nature (similar to the *aśubhā* practitioner), but an inexperienced person is not. If such phenomena can nonetheless be used as a starting-point for developing a general illusionism or 'idealism', why not objects visualized in meditation?

558.1. Against this, Sharf, according to whom the role of meditative experience in Buddhist history has been greatly exaggerated,[2447] claims that

> [t]here is simply no need to trace the emergence of Buddhist idealism to experiences attained in meditative trance; idealist positions can be derived from philosophical inquiry into the status of perceptions arising due to simple epistemic error (the rope-snake analogy comes to mind), or from the reflection on the ontology of dreams (as is found in the Taoist Chuangtzu). (SHARF 1995: 238,7-13)

In a note he adds:

> There are, of course, several varieties of Western idealism that share aspects of Mahāyāna idealism, yet that make no appeal to privileged meditative insight (Berkeley and Hegel come to mind). (ibid. 271 n. 10)

558.2. As a historian of ideas, I am not concerned with what idealist positions *can* be derived from but with what the transmitted sources *actually indicate* as the context in which, or the motive(s) from which, such a position took shape in the specific case under investigation. I admit that this is only possible in a hypothetical way, because in Indian literature, especially anonymous literature, we are not normally fortunate enough to have a source at our disposal in which the author explicitly states that he has introduced a certain idea (or concept, term) for the first time for this or that reason (and even if we had, a sceptic might doubt the sincerity of such a declaration). What we can (and, to my mind, should) do is to try to trace the earliest available source in which the respective idea occurs and to ask whether it contains a passage that is sufficiently explicit to disclose a plausible, satisfactory *context* of and, perhaps, *motivation* for the introduction of the new idea and, if available, of the characteristic term(s) or phraseology by which it is expressed.[2448] If this is possible, the hypothesis based on it would be the most probable candidate for the truth under the given circumstances, and any other hypothesis would be arbitrary unless supported by equally strong or better reasons — and a sweeping reservation, as a matter of principle, against the importance of meditative concentration (*samādhi*), or spiritual practice in general, in Buddhism will hardly suffice as a counter-argument.

559. Against such a procedure, Franco objects that in the case of a Mahāyāna sūtra like the PratyS it may not be possible at all to draw historical conclusions about the origination of a doctrine because

> [t]he Mahāyānasūtras are obviously not historical narratives or reports in the sense that they provide information on the historical situation in which their teachings came into being. ... The mode of presentation has more to do with religious topology and literary conventions than with an actual historical situation. (FRANCO 2009: 112,2-5 and 16-18)

Franco is doubtless right as far as the scenario of Mahāyāna sūtras is concerned, the description of the assembly, its location in time and space, the physical presence of the Bud-

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2447 SHARF 1995: 228,15f.

2448 Cf. S 1987: 9f (# 1.4).

dha, the interlocutors, etc. But the 'idealist'-looking formulation under discussion has nothing to do with this scenario and is rather part of the message proper for the sake of which the scenario had been staged. For the argument of the text it does not matter whether such visions or visualizations were actually achieved by the bodhisattvas to whom they are ascribed. All that is required is that the practicability and actual occurrence of the respective experiences was taken for granted — and we have no reason at all to doubt this — and that at least the people addressed held these meditative practices in high esteem, regardless of whether they actually attained them or merely aspired to them. Etic scepticism with regard to the factual occurrence of such experiences is hardly sufficient to jeopardize the historical significance of an argument as long as it makes good sense in its context from an emic perspective, i.e., in the framework of the system of beliefs and values of the audience to which the argument is addressed.

560. 1. In tracing the earliest *available* occurrence of an idea, key terms or characteristic expressions used to denote this idea may be helpful, and it is with the help of the two terms '*vijñaptimātra(tā)*' ("nothing but representation") and '*cittamātra*' ("nothing but mind") that I tried to discover passages that might represent the original situation of the emergence of Buddhist 'idealism'.

2. To this attempt Franco objects, from a methodological point of view, that my

> emphasis on a key term raises the question whether a given theory and the term that designates it coincide. (FRANCO 2009: 115,3f)

In other words: On the one hand, we cannot be sure that the idea as such had not already existed before the characteristic terms — in our case: '*vijñaptimātra*' and '*cittamātra*' — were introduced; on the other hand, terms may not have been technical terms from the outset, and may have been used in quite different meanings or functions for some time before acquiring an established terminological sense.

3. This is no doubt correct, and we should consequently pursue our investigations on two different but overlapping tracks: on the one hand, exploring the history of terms and, on the other, exploring the history of ideas. The first investigation starts from concepts used by the investigated tradition itself, the second tends to be based on concepts belonging to our own tradition (like 'idealism') or developed by scholars for the purpose, which is legitimate if handled with sufficient care. Both types of investigation should, of course, cover the whole historical development of their respective subject as a process; they are by no means limited to, but surely also include, the question of the origin(s), which is my primary concern in the context of the present discussion.

4. It may well be that a certain idea can be traced further back than the term, but in a given case this remains a purely theoretical assumption as long as no appropriate passage is adduced (in the case under discussion: a passage that clearly expresses an 'idealist' position without using one of the characteristic terms, and that has good chances to be earlier than the PratyS). Franco does not come up with any.[2449]

561. It goes without saying that even if both types of investigation are carried out exhaustively, our conclusions about the origin of a term as well as of an idea and about the

[2449] As for attempts to interpret even the early canonical texts in terms of an idealist ontology on the basis of a few apparently ambiguous passages, it may suffice to refer to the critical discussion in HAMILTON 1996: xxv–xxix and 131–135. Cf. also fn. 2510.

context and motive(s) of their introduction are bound to remain hypothetical, unless (or, perhaps, even if) we could, by way of exception (see § 558.2), discover a text explicitly stating (or rather having the Buddha or an authorised speaker state) that a term or idea is being introduced for the first time. Normally, we cannot exclude the possibility that the term /idea was taken over from an older source no longer available to us, or that its original context fell into oblivion at an early date or was never codified. Besides, with regard to the motive(s) the earliest texts are not necessarily explicit, and later sources may introduce motives that came to play a role only afterwards. Thus, all we can achieve is, in most cases, more or less reasonable *hypotheses*. But this much we should surely try. The mere *possibility* of lost materials can hardly be an excuse for abstaining from drawing conclusions, hypothetical though they may be, from the available sources. In the case of the question of origin, the strongest evidence will normally be the one offered by the *earliest available* source (provided, of course, that our relative chronology is reliable), especially as long as we have no concrete indication that there was actually a still older source relevant to the matter, and as long as the evidence of the available text is sufficiently explicit, consistent and plausible. I am, of course, aware of the fact that what is plausible for one scholar may not at all be so for another, for whatever reasons. But perhaps we should rather ask whether a certain train of thought could have been regarded as plausible by the author of the text with a view to his presumable audience, which means that it is in the first place *their* convictions, patterns of thought and evaluations that we have to take into account.

562. As pointed out above (§ 560), I agree with Franco in that the first occurrence of an idea and the introduction of a term that is later on used to denote this idea need not coincide, and that in principle we have to investigate both issues separately. But at a certain state of research (and surely so 40 years ago, when the available research tools were much less sophisticated than nowadays) there may be practical limits, especially with regard to the investigation into the origins of an *idea*, and to exhaustively discover its occurrences in an extremely vast mass of largely unexplored material may be difficult if not impossible. In such a case, it would not seem unreasonable, as a *heuristic device*, to start with locating possibly relevant passages with the help of *terms* that may suggest the presence of the respective idea, especially such as were, later on, actually used to denote it, in the hope that such a search may lead one to a sufficiently early source where the term is used in a sense akin to the investigated idea and in a sufficiently explicit and coherent context. This may not yield certainty about the origin of this idea, but it would at any rate supply us with a working hypothesis based on concrete evidence (provided, of course, that the evidence of the text is assessed convincingly), and it would be the task of further research to present earlier or more significant evidence if available.

563. There is yet another point. As already indicated, some expressions may have become terms only in the course of time. The expression '*cittamātra*' seems to belong to this type; it may but need not have an 'idealist' meaning in early sources.[2450] On the other hand, there are

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[2450] [1.] *Cittamātra* excluding merely a substantial self (*ātman*): e.g., ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 490,21-23 (see S 1987 n. 221); AS 34,20-23 (AS$_G$ 29,26-28); probably also YBh$_t$ P 'i 185b4f (D zi 163a5f; YBh$_c$ 788c14f); cf. S 1973: 174; S 1976a: 245 (with n. 3); cf. also ASBh 86,11f, using *vijñānamātra* instead of *cittamātra*;

[2.] *cittamātra* excluding mental factors associated with the mind (*caitasikā dharmāḥ*) as entities of their own: YBh$_t$ P zi 80b2 (D zhi 77a1; YBh$_c$ 609a3f): view of an opponent, see fn. 2121;

also terms that seem to have been freshly coined in a specific situation, intentionally, by an author who was well aware of the fact that he was introducing a new idea, or at any rate an innovative interpretation or explication of a traditional idea,[2451] novel or unfamiliar at least to his audience or to the tradition to which he belonged. This does not exclude the existence of preliminary stages or prefigurations of the respective idea in other traditions or even in the same circles. The new term may even encapsulate traces of its historical background.[2452] But most probably it signalizes, at the same time, some innovative shift, further step, or reservation. In my opinion, '*vijñaptimātra*' is such a term. For this reason, I find Franco's wholesale disregard of the significance of terminology, revealed by his — deliberate[2453] — use of the term '*vijñaptimātra*' even in connection with the PratyS, where it does not occur at all, altogether inacceptable. We simply cannot be sure that the expression used in this text, viz., '*cittamātra*' — not yet, to be sure, a technical term but probably not an accidental choice either, let alone a current expression —, had precisely the same connotations as '*vijñaptimātra*'.

564. 1. In my former paper, my starting point and first aim was to discover the origin, and original context, of 'idealist' thought in what we are used to call the 'Yogācāra school', the earliest textual sources of which are, in my opinion, the *Yogācārabhūmi* (YBh) and the Saṁdh, and I tried my best to take into consideration both the idea as such and the characteristic terms. The result was that as far as I can see the YBh itself[2454] contains only some half-way, 'semi-idealist' developments and a couple of occurrences of '*cittamātra*' in a non-'idealist' sense,[2455] and that a full-fledged 'idealist' position as well as the term '*vijñaptimātra*' is only found in Saṁdh VIII, being explicitly introduced in VIII.7–8 in connection with the aforementioned (see § 556) reflection on the status of the objects of a (basically traditional) practice of visualizing contemplation.

[3.] *cittamātra* referring to purely mental feelings, based on the mind only, in contrast to such feelings as are [also] based on the physical sense faculties: AKBh 145,3: *manaḥsaṁsparśajā ... vedanā caitasikīty ucyate, cittamātrāśritatvāt* (↔ *rūpīndriyāśritatvāt* in the case of *kāyikī vedanā*);

[4.] *cittamātra* referring to karma dependent on the mind only in contrast to karma put into action by body or speech: AKBh 239,2: *te* (= *samādhijāḥ sapta rūpiṇaḥ kuśalāḥ karmapathāḥ*) *hy avijñaptir eva, cittamātrādhīnatvāt*. Cf. also § 578.2.1[3].

[5.] Cf. also Suv III.84–85 (p. 39f): *saha cittamātreṇa* = "as soon as they think of them" (EMMERICK 1990: 16). Similarly MSA XVIII.75 *cittamātrāt samṛddhitaḥ* (cf. SAVBh P tsi 153b3: *sems tsam gyis* = *bsam pa'am smon lam btab pa tsam gyis*).

Vijñaptimātratā may also occasionally *include*, besides 'ideality', a denial of *caitta*s as entities different from *citta*: MSABh 63,20f (ad MSA XI.34).

2451 In emic terms, one would rather speak of recovering or bringing to light a facet or deeper meaning of the Buddha's teaching that had been overlooked, fallen into oblivion or even been misinterpreted. Cf. also, though from a somewhat different perspective, FRANCO 2009: 112 and 122.

2452 The terms may not "wear a tag saying how the tenet they refer to came about" (FRANCO 2009: 115,21f), but they may not have been employed or chosen at random either, and may sometimes even evoke certain associations — and thus give a hint — concerning their historical background and even purport.

2453 Cf. FRANCO 2009: 109fn. 30.

2454 I.e., apart from the incorporation of the complete text of the Saṁdh in the VinSg.

2455 See fn. 2450.

2. In a second step, I tried to elucidate a possible background of this passage in pre-Yogācāra Mahāyāna sūtras, this time letting me be guided by the term (or rather expression) '*citta-mātra*' (for to my knowledge there is no occurrence of '*vijñaptimātra(tva/tā)*' prior to Saṁdh VIII). This led me to the PratyS as that which has a good chance of being the earliest available source, and one with a sufficiently explicit and (at least in an emic perspective) plausible context at that, once again that of a practice of visualization or vision.[2456] I have to admit that this part of my investigation does not meet the requirement of an exhaustive search for occurrences of 'idealist' (or 'idealist'-looking) statements irrespective of terms. Even from the point of view of letting oneself be guided by terminology, further terms ought perhaps to be checked as well, such as '*abhūtaparikalpa*'[2457] ("imagination of what is unreal" or "false imagination": a central term in connection with an 'idealist' position in the Maitreya works) or even '*kalpanā(mātra)*' and '*vikalpa(mātra)*' ("*(*nothing but*)* imagination").[2458] Still, these terms, in contrast to '*cittamātra*' and '*vijñaptimātra*', include an *express* nuance of falseness and most likely were, originally, nothing but phraseological variants of illusionism. However this may be, as long as no alternative passage of comparable age and with a sufficiently explicit and consistent context is presented (and neither Bronkhorst nor Franco present any), the PratyS would remain the most promising candidate in our search for an answer, if only a hypothetical one, to the question of the origin of what at least looks like an 'idealist' formulation in pre-Yogācāra Mahāyāna sūtras.

565. In his article, Franco does not enter into a discussion of the Saṁdh passage but limits himself to the PratyS, as the "oldest source of the *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine" (2009: 109,25f). Indicating his reason for disregarding the Saṁdh, he states:

> To what extent can one rely on this source, which is not a historiographic source and which perhaps originated two centuries after the theory of *vijñaptimātratā*, in order to draw a conclusion about its origin? (ibid.: 109,21–24)

As pointed out before, I do not approve of Franco's wholesale disregard of the significance of terminology (the term '*vijñaptimātra(tā)*' is, to my knowledge, not attested in any text before the Saṁdh, at any rate not in an 'idealist' sense), and I consider Saṁdh VIII.7–8 to represent the introduction of an 'idealist' position not necessarily into the Buddhist tradition as a whole but at any rate into the *Yogācāra tradition* properly speaking (see § 564). It can be taken for granted that the circle in which Saṁdh VIII was composed was familiar with the *cittamātra* passage of the *Daśabhūmikasūtra*, and was probably also aware of the PratyS, and perhaps of other pertinent sources like the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* (Pt. II §§ 458.1–458.3) as well. But this does not of course mean that the first emergence of an 'idealist' position or 'idealist'-looking

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2456 Since the text does not expressly describe the Buddha vision as being the result of a deliberate effort or visualization technique and since it is assumed by its practitioners to culminate in a real encounter with the Buddha, it is perhaps preferable to speak of visions instead of visualizations (see BRETFELD 2003: 188f), but we cannot of course be sure that no such technique is tacitly presupposed (cf. also the reference to having an image of the Tathāgata made or a picture painted: PratyS 40,16-18; cf. BRETFELD, ibid.).

2457 Cf., e.g., *Sāgaramatiparipṛcchā* quoted RGVV 49,12 and 16f (cf. also RGV I.63d) and VkN VI.5–6, but in both cases the evidence of the Chinese translations may pose problems (for the VkN passage, see HARRISON 2010: 235f).

2458 Cf., e.g., *Bhavasaṁkrāntisūtra* # 8.4 (TSENG 2010: 442f); Saṁdh I.5 (38,7f: see Pt. I § 304.2 with fn. 1630) MaiQ # 35 (see Pt. I § 308.2 with fn. 1658); MSA IX.81; cf. VI.10 with MSABh 24,25; IV.14 ≈ XX.25 with 16,2f and 180,4f.

formulation in earlier Mahāyāna sūtras must have taken place in the same context or due to a similar motive. For the question of the original context and motivation of the introduction of an 'idealist' position into the Yogācāra 'school' proper, a clarification of the original context and motivation of an 'idealist' view or formulation in earlier sūtras is not decisive. In this methodological issue I agree with Bronkhorst (2000: 82 # 2; cf. Pt. II § 341), although I cannot accept his evaluation of Saṁdh VIII.7–8 and the solution he himself proposes (see §§ 580–583).

566. On the other hand, the assessment of the testimony of the PratyS is, of course, of crucial importance when we ask for the origin of 'idealist' views in the *Buddhist tradition as a whole* and when we extend, for *this* purpose, the investigation to pre-Yogācāra occurrences of 'idealist'-looking expressions like '*cittamātra*', and to the question of *their* original context and motivation. In this connection, we are, however, confronted with another objection, made by Christian Lindtner (1997: 161f) and taken into consideration also by Bronkhorst (2000: 82 # e), viz., that the characterization of the whole world as "nothing but mind" (*cittamātra*) in the PratyS and some other early Mahāyāna sūtras does not intend 'idealism' but merely *nominalism*. In my opinion, the label 'nominalism' is somewhat unfortunate; it would suit teachings according to which the phenomenal world is nothing but names or denominations (*nāmamātra*, *prajñaptimātra*, etc.),[2459] but it hardly fits in with the phraseology of the (third chapter of) the PratyS, which, being concerned with *visionary* experiences, quite naturally does not refer to names or language but only to mind and imagination. In its intention, however, Lindtner's (and Bronkhorst's) objection is justified, and Lindtner's (1997: 162) alternative suggestion, viz., to take '*cittamātra*' in these texts as indicating simply *māyāvāda*, i.e. *illusionism*, is basically correct. This is clear from the fact that the paragraphs concerned alternatively also use expressions emphasizing the imaginary aspect, especially (a verbal equivalent of) '*vikalpa*' (*rnam par rtog pa*: # 3L [36,23]) and '*manyanā*' (# 3O, vs. 4), and that the mind itself is also, quite emphatically, declared to be illusory (# 3M; #3O, vs. 2d–3d and vs. 4cd). Still, in contrast to '*vikalpa*' and '*manyanā*' the word '*citta*' as such does not convey the nuance of falseness or deceptiveness, and the illusionistic connotation of '*citta-mātra*' is thus not explicit but merely *contextual*. Moreover, the mind itself is stated to be illusory only in a subsequent step; *provisionally*, though not ultimately, the mind is accorded a privileged position,[2460] and it is in this *weak* sense we may perhaps speak of an 'idealist' approach.

[2459] E.g., Pañcav$_D$ 99,14; 100,5; 101,19; Śat 325ff; *Bhavasaṁkrāntisūtra* (TSENG 2010: 440–443) # 8.1–3. Cf. LINDTNER 1997: 162. The label would also appropriately characterize the explanation of the phenomenal world in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh (see Pt. I § 303.1–303.2). A 'nominalist' element is still palpable in the pattern of the three *lakṣaṇa*s (Saṁdh VI.4) and in that of the five *vastu*s (cf., e.g., KRAMER 2005: 69 and 101 [## 2.1–2.2]; TAKAHASHI 2005: 121 and 182 [## 1.2.1–1.2.2]). Traces are found even in later Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources (cf., e.g., MAV V.16, or the *sarvatra-gam abhilāpadauṣṭhulyam* at AS 76,14f and ASBh 92,5-7 (ed. °*sarvadharmanāmābhi*° with Tib. [ASBh$_t$ P shi 82b1], but ms. °*sarvadharmāṇām abhi*° [like ASBh$_C$ 742a26]; see YAMABE 1990b: 68).

[2460] Cf. S 1973: 176 n. 47:

> "Es sei jedoch bemerkt, daß dieser Idealismus für das Bhadrapālasūtra [i.e., PratyS] nur ein rein spirituell-praktisch motivierter vorläufiger Standpunkt ohne ontologische Relevanz ist. Endziel ist ... die Vermittlung der Einsicht in die Unwirklichkeit *aller* Erscheinungen, auch des Geistes selbst."

S 1976a: 248,8f:

> "The reduction of objects to the mind is thus merely a preliminary step towards the intuition of complete Emptiness."

567. In Saṁdh VIII.7-8, on the other hand, the mind itself is not declared to be illusory. The text (VIII.7, 2nd part) even contains an express refutation of the kind of argument by means of which the illusory nature even of the mind itself had been demonstrated in the PratyS, viz., of the argument that the reflexive cognitive activity that ensues from the object being nothing but mind is impossible (see Pt. II § 452.2). Thus, in the Saṁdh text the privileged position of the mind appears to be much stronger than in the PratyS, so that we may speak of an 'idealist' view in a much stronger sense. From this point of view, too, Franco's sloppy use of the term '*vijñaptimātra*' in connection with the PratyS (see § 563) should not be followed.

568. In the Yogācāra(-Vijñānavāda) sources after the Saṁdh, the situation is somewhat complicated and cannot be dealt with here in detail. It is true that most post-Saṁdh Yogācāra texts, as far as they describe the decisive phase of the preparatory path (i.e., the *prayoga-mārga*) leading up to the first direct experience of True Reality or Suchness (i.e., the *darśana-mārga*) in 'idealist' terms, come closer to the PratyS in that they point out that even the notion of "mind/representation only" has to be surmounted. It is also worth noting that in several of the older post-Saṁdh Yogācāra sources the term "representation only" (*vijñaptimātra*), and even the use of '*vijñapti*' in a corresponding sense, is absent or rare. This holds good not only for the works that continue the tradition of the YBh (*Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* 顯揚聖教論[2461] and *Abhidharmasamuccaya*).[2462] Rather, it holds good also for decidedly Mahāyānist (and basically Vijñānavāda) texts like *Madhyāntavibhāga* and *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra*,[2463] since these two texts, although incidentally referring to the *vijñaptitathatā* of Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3,[2464] do not employ the term '*vijñaptimātra*' in their description of the *prayoga-mārga*; the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* occasionally even uses '*cittamātra*' in this context.[2465] On the other hand, the development of (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda thought is also characterized by a strong tendency to establish — in line with the purport of Saṁdh VIII and in contrast to that of the PratyS — the mind, in some form or other, as an intermediate level between fiction and ultimate reality, and on this level it was possible to create not only an elaborate 'idealist' Abhidharma-like system but also an elaborate theory of the Buddhas and their salvific activity in the world. This tendency is clearly expressed already in the *Madhyāntavibhāga*[2466] and is systematically developed, in terms of "(mere) representation" (*vijñapti(mātra)*), in the *Mahā-yānasaṁgraha* (second chapter), where this terminology is (in the third chapter) also applied in the context of the *prayogamārga*.

2461 Two occurrences of *vijñaptimātra(tā)*: see Pt. I § 15.2 fn. 74.

2462 No occurrence of *vijñaptimātra*, nor of *vijñapti* in a non-traditional sense. At AS_t P li 110a4–b1 (AS 65,19–66,2: reconstructed), the *prayogamārga* is described in conventional terms, but at AS_t P li 123a6f (AS 82,20-23), a verse is quoted in which this process is described in terms of 'mind-only' but without using the term '*vijñaptimātra*' (see Pt. I § 15.2 fn. 75).

2463 See Pt. I § 15.1 with fn. 68. In the *Dharmadharmatāvibhāga*, *vijñaptimātra* is indeed used in this context (cf. MATHES 1996: 91, lines 585, 587f, 591f, in contrast to p. 84 lines 417, etc.), but this text is suspected of having been composed much later (MATSUDA 1996b, especially (158)f, with further references in n. 9).

2464 See Pt. I § 15.1 fn. 69.

2465 MSA VI.7; XIV.24.

2466 Cf. MAV I.1a (*abhūtaparikalpo 'sti* ...), etc.

1.2. Reassessment of the Textual Evidence

569. Still, two crucial questions remain. The first is whether my assessment of the context and the motivation of the two passages I regard as the starting point of Yogācāra-'idealism' and of the pre-Yogācāra 'idealist'-looking phraseology, respectively, is appropriate. The second is whether they are indeed the earliest available evidence, respectively, and, if so, whether the context and motivation suggested by them is indeed historically plausible as the original context and motivation of Yogācāra-'idealism' and of the pre-Yogācāra 'idealist'-looking phraseology, respectively, or if there are more convincing alternatives. I shall discuss these two questions first with reference to the PratyS (ch. 1.2.1) and then with reference to the Saṁdh (ch. 1.2.2).

1.2.1. The *Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṁmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra*

570. As for my assessment of the context of the 'idealist'-looking formulation in the third chapter of the PratyS, Sharf flatly rejects my conclusion that in this text the thesis of universal idealism (now I would rather call it merely an 'idealist'-looking formulation) "originated from the *generalization* of a situation observed in the case of objects visualized in meditative concentration, i.e., in the context of *spiritual practice*" (S 1976a: 247,16-18), stating that

> this scripture suggests quite the opposite, insofar as it succeeds in explicating a doctrinal point by drawing an analogy to dreaming — an experience common to all irrespective of one's spiritual practice. (SHARF 1995: 271 n. 10)

Similarly, Franco (2009: 113f) points out that in the PratyS the 'idealist' position is imbedded a chapter which also refers to "the reflection of light[2467] in mirrors and similar shining objects" (113,1f) and in which "the doctrine that all elements of existence are illusory is also presented in connection with the phenomenon of dreams" (113,34f). From this he, too, deduces that the doctrine of *vijñaptimātratā* may as well have been developed as a result of thoughts about such reflections or about dreams, the "connection between dreams and *vijñaptimātratā*" being "also contextually smooth" (113,38f), and he adds that "given the significance of dreams in Indian culture ... one could even argue for certain plausibility" in favour of a development of an 'idealist' position as a result of a reflection on dreams (114,1-3). In addition, Franco (2009: 116,17-117,1) considers my thesis to be further jeopardized by the fact that an alternative explanation has been supplied by P. Harrison:[2468]

> Following Paul Harrison, the idealistic teachings of the PratyS can be seen as an attempt to harmonize ... the practice of the visualization of the Buddha with the doctrine that everything, including the Buddha himself, is unreal. If this hypothesis were confirmed, the doctrine did not arise from meditative practice but from the need to harmonize contradictory theories: a previously existing doctrine and/or practice of meditation being adjusted to a new philosophical theory.

571. I have no problem with Harrison's thesis, but I fail to see why it should contradict my own, for it refers to a different question. Harrison is concerned with the *motive* behind the

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[2467] Actually: of one's own body, or of the body of the respective man or woman (# 3K, p. 35,20: *bdag nyid kyi gzugs*; p. 36,2f: *skyes pa 'am bud med kyi lus*); similarly T 13.419: 922c22f: 其身 "his/her body", 其形 "his/her figure", and T 13.416: 877a16 己形 "his/her own figure", but a18 己面像 "a reflected image of his/her own face", and T 13.418: 905c20f 自見影 and c24 自見其影 "sees his/her own reflected image".

[2468] Franco (2009: 117 n. 45) refers to HARRISON 1978 (no specific page).

chapter we are discussing. His thesis tries to answer the question why at all the text deals with the Buddha visions the way it does. But his answer, plausible though it is, offers no clue for explaining why the text uses, of all expressions, the expression "mind only" (*cittam eva*, *cittamātra*), and not just one of the words for "illusory" or "false". One might perhaps argue that the author(s) of the PratyS wanted to be more polite to the practitioners of Amitāyus visions, but even this would still leave us with the question why the choice fell on the expression "mind only" and not on anything else. Thus, in order to explain the peculiar phraseology (without which one would hardly think of taking the text to express an 'idealist' view at all), we are in any case thrown back upon the *context*.

572. With regard to the context, however, both Sharf and Franco disregard two facts which are of foremost importance for my conclusion:

1. In the third chapter of the PratyS, it is in the first place in order to clarify the illusory nature of the visions of the Buddha Amitāyus that examples of everyday experiences, viz., dreams (PratyS ## 3B–3I) and the perception of reflected images (## 3K–3L), are adduced. They are, with one casual exception,[2469] not adduced here as a means for comprehending the illusory nature of ordinary things, or of the whole world. Moreover, it should not be overlooked that in order to illustrate the nature of the Buddha visions the sūtra (# 3J) also makes use of the bloated corpses visualized in the meditation on the repulsive (*aśubhabhāvanā*), as just another instance of what the audience takes for granted to be mere appearance[2470] just like dreams and reflected images — a fact which significantly both Sharf and Franco pass over in silence.

2. The expression "nothing but mind" (*cittamātra*, **cittam eva*) emerges only towards the end of the chapter, directly and exclusively in connection with the Buddha visions: immediately after the statement that the experience of the bodily presence of the Buddha was not a real encounter (# 3L, p. 36,21: *cittamātra*) and, later on (## 3N/3O), with express reference to the content of these visions, viz., the Buddha and the visionary's own body (# 3O.1: *sems nyid* = **cittam eva*).[2471]

573. If it was on the analogy of dreams that the author of the PratyS introduced an 'idealist' view, why is it that when speaking of dreams he refers only to the fact that dharmas are not produced (# 3H), but does not define them as "nothing but mind"? Why does this

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[2469] In PratyS # 3H, the reflection on the dream experience is stated to arouse *anutpattikadharmakṣānti* in the respective person, i.e., the "patient acceptance of the fact that dharmas are not produced" (Harrison). Still, even in this paragraph the dream experience would seem to be used, in the first place, to illustrate the illusory character of the Amitāyus visions.

[2470] Cf., in this connection, the fact that also in Theravāda sources like Buddhaghosa's *Visuddhimagga* the visualized images are stated to be products of imagination or mental creations (*saññā̆ja*): VisM IV.31 (102,18f); VI 57 (153,5); VIII.216 (236,4f); Sp II 427; cf. VisM-mhṭ ad VI.57 (Rew. I 390): *saññajo ti bhāvanāparikappasaññāya jāto* ... *saññāmattasamuṭṭhāno*; cf. also *Vimativinodanī* (CSCD; My. I 218) ad Sp II 427: *saññājan ¯ ti bhāvanāsaññāya parikappitaṁ, na uppāditaṁ, avijjamānattā*). For the meaning of *saññā* in such connections, cf. VETTER 2000: 25.

[2471] The earlier prose version of this section (# 3N, cf. HARRISON 1990: 234f) contains a similar sentence (cf. T 13.419: 923a2-4: 以意作佛。亦以意見。但是我意為佛。[1] 如來**但意耳** 及我身意也。). T 13.418: 906a2 and T 13.416: 877b6 only identify the Buddha or Tathāgata (and the visionary's own body) with the mind but do not represent **eva*.

[1] For my punctuation, see fn. 2066.

expression not occur in so many other early Mahāyāna sūtras like the *Prajñāpāramitā* in 8,000 lines, which frequently compare phenomena with dreams? Why, on the other hand, if dreams are what is to be characterized in the first place, the choice of "nothing but mind" (*cittam eva* and *cittamātra*), and not just one of the usual expressions for "illusory" or "false"? To be sure, perceiving things in dreams is a state of the mind, and it would not be off the mark to characterize the objects perceived in dream as being nothing but mind.[2472] But is there a current, habitual phraseological or doctrinal association of dreams with *citta* in the earlier (i.e., pre-PratyS) Buddhist tradition? Even if such an association could be shown to exist, we would have, in this regard, a deadlock situation, for in the Buddhist tradition there is definitely a very close phraseological and doctrinal association of *citta* with meditative concentration (*samādhi*).[2473] Cf., e.g., the three kinds of training (*śikṣā*), among which training concerned with the mind (*adhicittaṁ śikṣā*) means *samādhi*,[2474] or frequent expressions like "the mind is, or has been, concentrated" (*cittaṁ samādhiyati*,[2475] *samāhitaṁ cittam*[2476]). In view of this well-documented close association of *citta* with *samādhi*, I cannot but find it highly significant that the expression "nothing but mind" (*cittamātra*, *citta(m eva)*) does not occur in connection with dreams or reflected images but emerges only in the final reflection on the Buddha visions (for sure a type of *samādhi*). That this is hardly accidental may receive additional support from the fact that the only other association of illusory objects with the mind (*citta*) in the third chapter of the PratyS is in connection with the meditation on the repulsive (see § 572.1), i.e., once again in connection with a *samādhi*: here, the fact that the

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[2472] Cf., e.g., T 17.839 ('Sūtra on divining the retribution of good and evil karma' 占察善惡業報經, transl. by *Bodhidīpa[?], [active] 590–618 [*HôbRép* 237b]): 907b25f: "Moreover, one should know that the phenomena outside the mind are, like the various objects perceived in dreams, merely created by the imagination of the mind, without any external things" (又復當知: 心外相者 如夢所見種種境界 唯心想作, 無實外事。); 908c1-3: "Those among them who have keen faculties know already beforehand that all external objects are merely created by the mind, false and unreal, like a dream or an illusion (**māyā*, i.e., an appearance conjured up by a magician)" (其利根者 先已能知: 一切外諸境界 唯心所作, 虛誑不實, 如夢如幻等。); T 10.300 ('Section on the inconceivable realms of the Buddhas from the *Buddhāvataṁsaka-sūtra*' 佛華嚴經不思議佛境界分, transl. by *Dev(endr)aprajña, active 689-691 [*HôbRép* 241b]): 906b6-8: "Just as a person perceives in a dream various things in the same place — and although they are perceived [thus] they do not obstruct [one another] because they are unreal —, in precisely the same way all these Buddha-fields are merely transformations-manifestations (**pariṇāma*) of nothing but the mind (**cittamātra*) ..." (如人夢中 於一處所 見種種事。雖見 非真實故 不能為礙。如是如是 此諸佛刹 皆唯心量之所變現。...). Cf. also Hsüan-tsang's translation of the *Large Prajñāpāramitā* (T 5.220): 13c4-7: "When a bodhisattva ... wants to comprehend that all dharmas are like an illusion (*māyā*), like a dream, ... made to appear by the mind (*citta*) only, ..." (若菩薩 ... 欲通達一切法如幻如夢 ... 唯心所現, ...); similarly T 7.220: 8c13-16; the passage is not found in the respective place in any other version: see Pañcav$_D$ after 24,21; Śat 81,11; T 8.221: 3b6 (*Mokṣala(?)); T 8.223 (Kumārajīva) 219c16; for Dharmarakṣa and the Gilgit ms. of the Pañcav see ZACCHETTI 2005: 183f (passage absent between ## 1.147 and 1.148).

[2473] For *citta* or *cetas* as terms for the mind as the centre or 'subject' of contemplative concentration see S 1969: 86 (with note d).

[2474] Cf., e.g., AN I 231,22-26 and 235,21-24; VisM III.1; for the Sanskrit tradition: SaṅgP 388b27–c1 (STACHE-ROSEN 1968: 87: III.41); AKBh 365,17f.; ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 262,2-13; (ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 130,6-12); HsienY 513a17-24, etc. (CHOI 2001: 67, etc.).

[2475] DN I 73,23, etc. (see *PTC* II 132a [entry ~ *samādhiyissati*]); AKBh 39,2 (sūtra); 384,11.

[2476] MN I 21,33, etc. (see *PTC* II 132a); ASBh 76,13, etc.; *samāhitacitta* (bahuvr.) AKBh 156,5, etc. (see *AKBh-I* s.v.); ASBh 5,9, etc. (see SAKUMA 1996 s.v.).

decaying corpses appear before the contemplating monk is stated to be an effect of his mental concentration (*cittaikāgrya*).[2477] The Chinese versions even characterize these corpses as "produced by the mind only",[2478] which almost sounds like *cittamātra*.

574. There is thus good reason to assume that the use of the expression "nothing but mind" in the third chapter of the PratyS was evoked by the immediate context in which it actually appears, viz., the reflection on the Buddha visions as a kind of *samādhi*, and not by the preceding reflections on dreams or reflected images, where the expression does not appear and which have only a subservient function in this chapter. Franco's sweeping reference to the "significance of dreams in *Indian* culture, apparent already in the Vedic period" (114,1f) is hardly relevant to the issue. In my opinion, it would seem much more to the point to refer to the central importance, or prestige, attributed to meditative practices in the *Buddhist* tradition, if not in practice then at least in theory. The central issue of the third chapter of the PratyS is, to be sure, not simply a demonstration of illusionism (let alone 'idealism') on the model of dream experience but, in the words of Franco summarizing Harrison (see § 570), "an attempt to harmonize the practice of the visualization of the Buddha with the doctrine that everything, including the Buddha himself, is unreal". One might even think of an 'inclusivistic' integration of this practice into the illusionist strand, or of a defense of illusionism against reservations on the part of Amitāyus devotees, by offering an illusionist reinterpretation of the core of their spiritual practice and religious belief, viz., the Buddha visions taken as a real encounter with Amitāyus. The main subject of the chapter is thus an analysis of these Buddha visions or visualizations, i.e., of a certain type of *samādhi*, whereas dreams or reflected images are only resorted to as an expedient in order to convince the Amitāyus devotees of the illusionary character of even those lofty, vivid visions. Since the 'idealist'-looking formulation "nothing but mind" (*cittamātra*, *cittam eva*) emerges only in direct connection with the main subject, viz., the Buddha visions, and is easily explained by the close association of *samādhi* with *citta*, there is no reason to take a detour through dreams.

575. Thus, from the point of view of the *context* in which the statement is embedded, I for my part do not perceive any reason for doubting the possibility that the third chapter of the PratyS basically documents or mirrors the situation of the first emergence of an 'idealist'-looking formulation characterizing the whole world as "nothing but mind" (*cittamātra*). Accordingly, at least from this point of view I fail to see why we should assume that the PratyS should have borrowed the 'idealist'-looking formulation from an earlier source, as Bronkhorst (2000: 80f) and Franco suggest. According to Franco (2009: 117,1-8), one may

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[2477] PratyS # 3J (34,23-25): *dge slong de'i sems rtse gcig pa'i dbang gis mdun na keng rus 'dug pa mthong ngo* ||.

[2478] Cf. T 13.418 (Lokakṣema, active ca. 170–190 C.E.) 905c12f: 是意所作想有耳; T 13.419 (around the first half of the third century C.E.: HARRISON 1990: 218f) 922c15f: "These [bones] are all merely produced by the mind" (是皆意所作耳); T 13.416 (transl. by *Jñānagupta in 595: HARRISON 1990: 212–215) 877a8f: "Those scattered bones ... are only produced by the mind, one just perceives one's own mind" (彼骨散 ... 唯心所作 還見自心).[1] Cf. also the fact that this statement is preceded by the remark that the corpses and skeletons have not come from anywhere nor gone anywhere, which resembles the observation in # 3L that the Tathāgatas have not come from anywhere and that the visionary himself has not gone anywhere (see § 576.1).

[1] I take 還 as an indicator of the reflexivity of the verbal action; Cf. Saṁdh$_{Hs}$ 698b3f (Saṁdh VIII.7): "How can this mind 'turn round' so as to perceive this [very same] mind?" (云何此心還見此心).

> speculate that the *buddhānusmṛti*-Meditation was first harmonized with a previously existing *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine, because the author of the sūtra emphasizes that the *buddhānusmṛti* functions within the frame of the *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine by assuming a mutual influence between the mind of the meditator and that of the Buddha. Then, in a second stage of development, the *vijñaptimātratā* doctrine was integrated into Mahāyāna Illusionism, according to which even the mind and its images are unreal.

Apart from Franco's problematic use of the term '*vijñaptimātratā*' for a period in which it has not been traced so far, I must confess that I do not understand why a mutual influence of the mind of the meditator and the mind of the Buddha should imply an 'idealist' doctrine. Does, e.g., telepathy imply 'idealism'? Nor does Franco specify in what, precisely, this mutual influence consists. All I can find in this regard in the text of the third chapter of the PratyS (# 3J) is the statement that in order to see the Buddha in meditative concentration three conditions must be fulfilled: the powerful influence (**anubhāva*) of the Buddha, sufficient strength of one's own wholesome potentialities (**kuśalamūla*), and the power (*byin*)[2479] resulting from the attainment of meditative concentration (**samādhi*). The last two conditions are traditional, and the idea of the Buddha's *anubhāva* influencing the mind of other persons is ubiquitous in Mahāyāna texts[2480] and not entirely unknown to 'mainstream' sources either.[2481] Thus, quite obviously none of these three conditions presupposes an 'idealist' position. Therefore, Franco's suggestion appears inacceptable, and unless more convincing arguments or reliable evidence can be presented, I do not see any need to postulate an 'idealist' teaching that predates the PratyS, merely in order to escape the undesired conclusion that an 'idealist'-looking expression first emerged in the context of the reflection on a spiritual practice.

576.1. Still, this does not mean that there are no problems at all, and I must admit that there is indeed one — albeit not raised by my critics —that makes me feel somewhat uncertain. In PratyS # 3L, we read that the bodhisattvas, after having encountered the Tathāgatas in meditative concentration and after having received answers to their questions, ask themselves whether these Tathāgatas came from anywhere, or whether they themselves went anywhere. They then understand that the Tathāgatas did not come from anywhere, and that they themselves did not go anywhere either,[2482] and right after that they realize that

> the triple world (**traidhātuka*) is nothing but mind/thought (**cittamātra*). Why? Because however I imagine things, that is how they appear. (see § 552)

[2479] Cf. HARRISON 1990: 308,3.

[2480] Cf., e.g., Aṣṭ 2,6f; 7,14; 17,12f; 98,29ff + 99,3f (Aṣṭ$_{L}$ 425c12-14; 426c21; 429a20; 443b13-16; KARASHIMA 2011: 2,6–3,1; 15,6; 39,1; 192,6-8; FALK & KARASHIMA 2012: 30,9); Pañcav$_{D}$ 98,11f; 144,15; Pañcav$_{K}$ II-III: 2,11; 177,16 and 23. The idea is omnipresent in the *Buddhāvataṁsaka*: cf., e.g., T 9.278: 397b21; c24; 398b14; c22, etc.; Gv 36,21; 133,26; 271,11f; 272,25; 303,20; T 10.280 (兜沙經, a section preserved in a translation by Lokakṣema: cf. NATTIER 2005: 326f): 445c26; 446b8f.

[2481] Cf., e.g., *Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra* (ed. E. WALDSCHMIDT) # 26.16, quoted *SWTF* III 261a (s.v. *buddhānubhāva*), or MVu I 184,3f, 263,4f, 266,3f, etc. (see FAURÉ et al. 2009: 189a s.v. *buddhānubhāvena*).

[2482] Contrary to the belief of the bodhisattvas that they *fly* to the various Buddha-fields, as in T 13.397. (see fn. 2486): 395c12-19; 399a22f; 402c18f; cf. 394b12f (see VETTER 2013: 304 [ch. V], 306 [end of ch. V]). Cf., in this connection, also PratyS # 3C, where the idea that the bodhisattvas "travel instantaneously to that world-system through obtaining magic power" is expressly excluded.

Here, one might indeed argue that the generalizing statement that the whole world is nothing but mind crops up somewhat abruptly. If this statement is a generalization of the situation observed in the case of the Buddha visions, wouldn't one expect the text to start with an express statement that the content of the vision, i.e., the Buddhas appearing in front of the meditator, or the meditator's own body travelling to a distant Buddha-field, is nothing but the meditator's own mind, as found at the beginning of ## 3N/3O, and only thereafter proceed to the generalization?[2483] And is the expression '*traidhātuka*', normally referring to the three spheres of the saṁsāric world, precisely what one expects in connection with a vision of the supramundane Tathāgatas and, perhaps, their 'fields'?

576.2. To this objection, one could perhaps reply that the meditators' realization of their encounter with the Buddhas being "nothing but mind" is, as a matter of course, *implied* in their realization of the fact that neither the Tathāgatas (such as Amitāyus) left their distant Buddha-fields to come here nor the meditators themselves went there. And in this context the expression "triple world" could perhaps be understood as focusing not so much on the impure world of saṁsāric existence as on the *phenomenal* world including both ordinary beings and Buddhas in their visible form as well as their respective surroundings, all to be realized as being "nothing but mind", both in the vision and, analogously or even *a fortiori*, in ordinary experience. In the context of the vision, one could even concretely think of the *space* extending between the meditator and the Buddhas considered to reside in remote, sublime world-spheres (*lokadhātu*)[2484] as well as of the *bodies* (those of the Buddhas and their retinue and that of the meditator) that had been experienced as if having traversed this space so as to meet either here or there.[2485] And the apparent abruptness of the *cittamātra* sentence could even be deliberate, being meant to indicate that the 'ideality' of the whole world dawns upon the visionaries all of a sudden as soon as they become aware of the fact that their space-pervading vision was not a real encounter. Still, some feeling of unease may remain, so that a

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[2483] Actually, in his translation of one of the parallels contained in the *Sūryagarbhasūtra* (see § 578.2.2), Narendrayaśas has inserted the sentence "They (= the visualized Buddhas) are merely created by my mind!" (T 13.397: 257a27: 唯我心作) between the statement that the bodhisattvas realize that the Buddhas in the vision did not come from anywhere nor go anywhere [at the end of the vision][1] and the sentence corresponding to the generalization.

[1] In this point, the *Sūryagarbhasūtra* diverges slightly from the PratyS.

[2484] Cf. the *Buddhāvataṁsaka* passage (quoted in fn. 2505) according to which not only the bodies of sentient beings but also the 'fields' (**kṣetra*) are fabricated by the mind. Cf. perhaps also Gv 360,9-21, where it is stated that Śrīsaṁbhava and Śrīmati perceive the whole world (*sarvaloka*) as illusory (*māyāgata*): the triple world (*traidhātuka*) as well as all [Buddha-]fields (*sarvakṣetrāṇi*) and the assembly of Buddhas and bodhisattvas.

[2485] In the parallel to PratyS 3.L+N contained in the *Sūryagarbhasūtra* (see § 578.2.2), the sentence under discussion occurs in a slightly modified form, focussing indeed on the bodies: "The cause of the *bodies* of the whole triple world (**traidhātuka*) is the mind alone (**cittamātra*)" (Kj S vol. 63 [na]: 261b4f: *khams gsum pa thams cad kyi lus kyi rgyu ni sems 'ba' zhig go*; the parallel passage at 257a6 has *lus kyi rgyu khams gsum pa 'di ni sems tsam pas* | ...; cf. T 13.397.: 223c7 = 224a19: 我三界心 是心因身; similarly 397.: 256b6, but 257a27f has 三界受身 "the appropriation of bodies in the triple world", suggesting **upādāna* for what the other versions render as "cause"). Subsequently, in the passage corresponding to PratyS 3N, the *Sūryagarbhasūtra* points out that the visionary not only realizes that the (physical appearance of the) Buddha and the visionary's own body is nothing but his own mind but that this also holds good for the *space* where the Buddhas had been visualized (Kj S vol. 63 [na] 257b1: *sems nyid kyang nam mkha' 'o*; cf. T 13.397.: 223c8f = 224a20-22).

reconsideration, however brief and provisional, of the question of a possible predecessor or prefiguration of the *cittamātra* sentence may indeed be called for.

577. 1. It goes without saying that we can hardly exclude the possibility of some lost or yet undiscovered source having used the term '*cittamātra*' or some equivalent expression in a similar sense before the PratyS. But as long as this is just an abstract possibility without any definite clue pointing to the actual existence of such an occurrence, its assumption remains arbitrary. And even if there were clues for postulating such an occurrence, it would probably be useless for an (albeit hypothetical) reconstruction of the history of 'idealism' (or 'idealist'-looking formulations), because we would know neither the context nor the precise purport of such a lost occurrence. What is required to disprove my hypothesis would thus be available textual evidence containing an 'idealist' or 'idealist'-looking formulation that is demonstrably or at least arguably earlier than the PratyS. Yet, Franco does not come up with any, nor with one documenting "an earlier stage of development" (FRANCO 2009: 116,3f), whatever such an "earlier stage of development" might mean in this connection. Does it mean an unambiguously 'idealist' statement still lacking the key-terms '*cittamātra*' or '*vijñaptimātra*', or merely a statement suggesting a limited 'idealism' (e.g., of dream objects, or objects visualized in meditative concentration, for that matter),[2486] or one propounding an ambivalent or 'semi-idealist' position like the *vikalpa*-theory found in Mahāyānist sections of the *Yogācārabhūmi*?[2487] The first alternative would work, but the other two would not. We would still have to ask for the context and the motives that led to a generalized, unambiguously 'idealist' position or 'idealist'-looking formulation, and these may have been quite different from those of the "earlier stage of development".

2. In connection with 'idealist'-looking formulations lacking the key-terms '*cittamātra*' and '*vijñaptimātra*', it may, to be sure, be worthwhile to search for early passages declaring all dharmas to be mere fictions (*kalpita*, *vikalpa*, etc.: see § 566), but we should keep in mind that in contrast to '*cittamātra*' these expressions are *explicitly* illusionist and may be regarded as having an 'idealist' connotation only if the delusive mental activity is somehow accorded an (at least provisional) privileged position over the illusory phenomena it creates. I do not exclude the possibility of the existence of earlier materials with more clearly 'idealist' formulations, but a comprehensive search for such passages would definitely exceed the limits of this study and must be left to others. All I can offer is a few remarks on some passages that declare the world to be mind only or to be created by the mind, but even these

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[2486] In this connection, it is worth mentioning that according to T. Vetter (2013: 305 [second paragraph from below]) the idea that the Buddha-fields visited by bodhisattvas in meditative concentration are in reality merely mental creations may also have been expressed (albeit in a somewhat enigmatic formulation [395b6f, etc.] and with nothing that looks like representing the expression '*cittamātra*') in another early text, the "Bodhisattvas of the ten directions" (十方菩薩品: T 13.397.17), translated into Chinese (or composed) probably around 170 AD by a disciple of An Shih-kao. Yet, it seems that in this text the idea has apparently not yet been developed into a generalized characterization of the whole world as created by the mind, because in the case of the objects of the five senses the formulation is different, suggesting that these objects are "given from outside" (VETTER 2013: 307 # 6).

[2487] Especially in the second part of the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* and in the corresponding parts of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* (see Pt. I §§ 303.2 and 290.2, respectively; cf. S 1973: 166f; S 1976a: 239).

remarks are quite preliminary and anything but exhaustive, since they are based on an entirely provisional screening of the pertinent sources.

578.0. My (admittedly hypothetical) assumption that the third chapter of the PratyS basically represents or at least mirrors the original context of the emergence of an 'idealist'-looking formulation referring to the whole world rests on two presuppositions:

1. on the comparatively early date of the oldest Chinese translations of the PratyS, and
2. on a preliminary comparison of the PratyS passage with the pertinent passages in other early sources using the expression '*cittamātra*' or an equivalent phraseology.[2488]

578.1. It goes without saying that the date of a text's translation into Chinese can only serve as a *terminus ante quem* for the dating of the original text itself and that the fact that text A was *translated later* than text B does not automatically exclude the possibility that text A was *composed before* text B. The early translation date is thus only a preliminary means for a chronological arrangement of the sources and has to be confirmed by other criteria. Still, it would perhaps not be unfair to say that the *onus probandi* is, in the first place, with the scholar who advocates the chronological priority of a text attested only later, and that *ceteris paribus* the text attested earlier has a certain probability of being the older one.

578.2.1. Among the pertinent texts I have checked, some seem to presuppose the expression '*cittamātra*', or even the sentence "this whole world is nothing but mind", as a ready-made formulation and do not, as far as I can see, offer a context from which the choice of this specific phraseology can be plausibly derived:

[1.] This holds good for the occurrence in the sixth chapter of the *Dasabhūmikasūtra* (see Pt. II § 456.2.2).

[2.] It is, in my opinion, also true of the "Sūtra of the Buddha ascending to the Tuṣita heaven and preaching the Dharma to his mother", which has been transmitted in two Chinese translations, of which one (T 17.815: 佛昇忉利天為母說法經) is ascribed to Dharmarakṣa, active during the second half of the third century AD,[2489] the other (T 17.816: 道神足無極變化經)[2490] to An Fa-ch'in (安法欽), active between 281 and 306.[2491] Here, the statement that the three-sphered world (*traidhātuka*) is nothing but mind (**cittamātra*)[2492] is introduced in order to answer the question how a bodhisattva comprehends that everything is like empty space, i.e.: in the context of Mahāyāna illusionism. But the *cittamātra*-sentence is introduced abruptly right at the beginning of the answer, without any preparation, and thus looks like an already established phrase.[2493]

[3.] Likewise, in the *Lokottaraparivarta* of the *Buddhāvataṁsaka* (earliest Chinese translation: T 10.292, by Dharmarakṣa), the phrase that the world comprising the three spheres is nothing but mind is introduced as a fact and extended to the three times, and at

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[2488] Cf. SAKAMOTO ^{2}1964: 346; S 1973: 176 n. 48; LINDTNER 1997: 161f.

[2489] ZACCHETTI 2005: 3.

[2490] Something like: "Sūtra of the limitless transformations /miracles (**prātihārya*) through the supranormal power (**ṛddhi*) of Awakening".

[2491] *HôbRép* 235 s.v. An Hōkin.

[2492] T 17.815: 788b28 (其三界者心之所為) and 789a27 (一切三界心之所由); T 17.816: 801a14f and 802a3.

[2493] S 1973: 176 n. 48.

least in the Chinese versions emphasis is on the mind's boundlessness (無量無邊).[2494] This is especially true of Dharmarakṣa's version, which apart from that presupposes an entirely different understanding of '*cittamātra*':

> "Moreover, this bodhisattva, in an instant [as short as] producing [but one single] thought[2495] (*cittamātra*), pervades the three world-spheres, and completely comprehends the meaning(?) of the three periods of time. As for what is attained by his mind, there is, in between and far off, nothing it does not penetrate."
>
> 又其菩薩 發意之頃 普入三界，亦悉普解三世之義。其心所達 中間迥絕 靡所不通。(T 10.292: 628c26-28)

[4.] In the *Dharmasaṅgītisūtra* (Chinese transl. by Bodhiruci, active between 508 and ca. 535),[2496] a series of characterizations of the dharmas is introduced by the statement that they are only mind (**cittamātra*), their kernel or essence (**sāra*) being nothing but imagination (**parikalpa*); they are insubstantial, devoid of substance, rootless, like a magical illusion (**māyā*).[2497] In this case, the 'illusionist' connotation of '*cittamātra*' is made explicit, but here too this expression looks very much like a ready-made phrase inherited from an earlier tradition.

[5.] The *Laṅkāvatārasūtra* can, in view of its conceptual framework, safely be assigned to a later period.

578.2.2. Others agree with the PratyS in using the expression '*cittamātra*' or an equivalent phraseology in direct connection with a reflection on Buddha-visions and are either, in view of their later *terminus ante quem*, dependent on the PratyS or, if not, would be equally suitable for backing up my hypothesis:

[1.] In the *Sūryagarbhasūtra*, there are two occurrences of the *cittamātra* sentence (with a small but interesting addition: see fn. 2485).[2498] The immediately preceding sentence is similar to the one that precedes in the PratyS (36,17-21), and the subsequent text is very close to PratyS ## 3L and 3N (the prose version corresponding to 3O). As for the wider context, the passage under discussion (as well as its repetition) is embedded here in a lengthy instruction referring to Buddha-visions and other visionary or visualizing practices, including the contemplation of the repulsive (*aśubhabhāvanā*), but there is no mention of dreams or reflected images. To judge from the date of the Chinese translations — the earlier one (T 13.397(13)) is by Dharmakṣema (385–433) —, the *Sūryagarbhasūtra* may

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[2494] T 9.278: 642a14f (Buddhabhadra); T 10.279: 288c5f (Śikṣānanda; Engl. transl. CLEARY 1993: 1047). Tibetan: Kj S vol. 32 (nga) 237a2; cf. ICHIGO 1985: 296,2-5; Sanskrit: TUCCI 1958: 217,9-11: ... *cittamātraṁ traidhātukam avatarati (...), tac ca cittam anantamadhyatayâvatarati.* Cf. LINDTNER 1997: 161; S 2009: 141 n. 386.

[2495] Cf. KARASHIMA 1998: 118f; ZACCHETTI 2005: 179 and 295 (# 1.132).

[2496] *HôbRép* 237a, s.v. Bodairushi(I).

[2497] Kj S vol. 64 (pa): 307a5f (D mdo-sde zha 79b3; T 17.761: 641c20f): *chos thams cad ni yongs su rtog* (D : *rtogs* S) *pa'i snying po tsam du bas te sems tsam mo* || *rdzas ma lags pa'o* || *rdzas ma mchis pa'o* || *sgyu ma ltar rtsa ba ma mchis pa'o* ||. The quotation in Śāntarakṣita's autocommentary on the *Madhyamakālaṅkāra* (ICHIGO 1985: 296,10-12; cf. LINDTNER 1997: 162) is slightly different, one of the variants being *kun brtags pa'i* ("purely imagined": **parikalpita*) instead of *yongs su rtog pa'i* ("imagination": **parikalpa*), and ... *du bas pa* (= *du zad pa*) follows after *sems tsam.*

[2498] Kj S vol. 63 [na]: 257a6 and 261b4f (D mDo za 151b3 and 154b1); T 13.397(13): 223c7 and 224a19 (Dharmakṣema); T 13.397(14): 256b6f and 257a27f (Narendrayaśas).

not be as old as the PratyS, but even if it were (or at least the section concerned), this would only strengthen my argument.

[2.] The *Muktaka* chapter of the *Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra* (see Pt. II § 458.3).

578.2.3. Of particular interest in connection with the question of possible antecedents or stimuli of the 'idealist'-looking formulation of the PratyS is the ninth decade of the '*Suyāma gāthās*' of the *Buddhāvataṁsaka*,[2499] also known as "Mind-Only Poem" (唯心偈).[2500] This series of verses, as I understand it,[2501] agrees with the PratyS in that here, too, the idea that the Buddhas as they are encountered in visions are nothing but the visionary's mind (*citta*) seems to be alluded to (though without using the expression '*cittamātra*')[2502], and here, too, this idea follows upon the statement that the *skandha*s [of sentient beings] and the whole world are created by the mind, but here this statement is embedded in a comparison of the mind (*citta*) with a painter (*citrakāra*). This comparison has a precursor in the early Buddhist canon[2503] and occurs in a fully elaborated form in several passages of the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthāna-sūtra*.[2504] In this text, the mind is taken to 'paint' the various forms of existence into which sentient beings may be reborn in accordance with their karma. Similarly, in another passage of the *Buddhāvataṁsaka*, the mind is stated to paint, by means of karma, all 'fields' (**kṣetra*, i.e., worlds), just as it paints the bodies of sentient beings.[2505] In the latter case, however, the use of verb *brtags pa* (**kalpita*?) suggests an *illusory* creation, and the same holds good for the ninth decade of the '*Suyāma gāthās*', for here the colours of the picture, with which the *skandha*s and the world painted by the mind are compared, are explicitly said to be merely imagined (**parikalpita*).[2506] This assumption is confirmed by a passage from the seventh decade of these *gāthās*, where the world (and the *skandha*s = sentient beings) rooted (via

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[2499] Kj P no.761.25, vol. ri 63a6–b6; S vol. 30 [kha] 63a4–b7; T 9.278: 465c14–466a6; T 10.279: 102a9–b1 (Engl. transl.: CLEARY 1993: 451f). For details, see S 2009 ## 77–82, esp. # 81.1.

[2500] HAMAR 2010: 189.

[2501] Otherwise, obviously, I. HAMAR (2010: 191), according to whom, "[t]his poem is supposed to reveal Mahāyāna Buddhology rather than the way consciousness creates the objects of experience." It "does not revolve around mind generally, or the human mind particularly, but the Buddha's mind, the absolute mind", and the painter "is a simile for Buddha who is able to manifest himself in the world in various ways in order to teach living beings." If this interpretation were to be preferred, these *gāthā*s would seem to be of no concern for the present discussion. Still, in view of parallels pointed out below, at least vs. 6 (see fn. 2506) of the poem can hardly be understood in such a way and rather refers to the mind of ordinary sentient beings. Cf. also SAKURABE 1981: 4b–5a.

[2502] Its occurrence in Śikṣānanda's version (T 10.279: 102b1: …一切唯心造) must be ascribed to the translator.

[2503] SN III 151f (no. 22.100; $SĀ_C$ no. 267). Cf. VETTER 2000: 248f; KIMURA 1989: 62; HAKAMAYA 2009: 68–74; HAMAR 2010: 190.

[2504] LIN 1949: 65–71; KIMURA 1989: 63–66; HAMAR 2010: 191; cf. S 2009: 148 n. 415.

[2505] Kj S vol. 29 (ka) 199b4f (D Phal-chen vol. ka 142a6f; T 10.279: 51c20-23 [CLEARY 1993: 244; cf. T 9.278: 415b10-13]: *ji ltar ri mo'i gzugs kyi rnams || ri mo'i las kyis bris pa ltar || de bzhin zhing rnams 'di dag kun || sems kyis ri mor bris pa yin || sems can lus kyi rnam pa dag || ji ltar sems kyis brtags pa ltar || de bzhin zhing gi rnam pa yang || thams cad las kyis rnam par bris ||*; transl. see S 2009: 154 n. 432.

[2506] Kj S vol. 30 (kha) 63a5f (P ri 63a7f; T 9.278: 465c16f; T 10.279: 102a11f [CLEARY 1993: 451]): *ji ltar ri mo'i las rnams la || tshon rnams sna tshogs kun 'du ba || … sems kyis yongs su brtags pa yin ||*.

karma) in the mind are expressly stated to be an illusion (**māyābhūta*).[2507] There can thus hardly be any doubt that also the tenth decade, though not using the expression '*cittamātra*', is nonetheless basically in agreement with the PratyS in that sentient beings and the world are regarded as an illusory manifestation of the mind (*citta*), and for this reason it may likewise be considered an 'idealist'-looking formulation. However, since this passage (as well as the other two) belongs to those parts of the *Buddhāvataṁsaka* that were first translated into Chinese by Buddhabhadra between 418 and 420 AD, i.e., more than two centuries after the PratyS, it would appear quite hazardous to take it as a precursor of the PratyS, unless it could convincingly be shown to have, in spite of its considerably later date of translation, nonetheless originated before the PratyS. As long as such a reversal of the chronological sequence suggested by the translation dates is not convincingly demonstrated, I myself prefer to start from the PratyS and to take the '*Suyāma gāthās*' to have been inspired by the latter, especially as regards the reference to Buddha-visions in this connection.

579. Even so, I do not exclude the possibility that what inspired the *cittamātra* sentence in the PratyS may have been precisely the idea of the mind (*citta*) compared with a painter creating, by means of karma, the manifold (*citra*, Middle Indic *citta*) forms of existence. Provided that the elaboration of this simile in the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra* reflects ideas that were current at a sufficiently early date, as seems to be confirmed by the fact that the comparison is alluded to in the *Kāśyapaparivarta*,[2508] an acquaintance of the author(s) of the PratyS with this simile may not be unlikely. In particular, if formulations, occasionally met with in the *Saddharmasmṛtyupasthānasūtra*, that amount to describing the mind as 'painting' the triple world (**traidhātuka*)[2509] could be assumed to have been known to the circle within which the PratyS was composed, it may well have been this simile that inspired them to have the bodhisattvas spontaneously generalize their realization of the illusory character of their encounter with the Buddhas of other world-systems in terms of the triple world being nothing but [a painting (*citra*, Pkt. *citta*) created by the] mind (*citta*), now clearly (and why not for the first time?) in an 'idealist' or rather illusionist sense and, on account of the visionary context, without reference to the role of karma. Still, in view of the absence of an express reference to the comparison of the mind with a painter in the (third chapter of the) PratyS passage, this cannot but be a hypothetical suggestion.[2510]

[2507] Kj S vol. 30 (kha) 62a1f (D Phal-chen vol. ka 303b1; T 9.278: 465b2-4; T 10.279: 101b26-28 [CLEARY 1993: 449]): see S 2009: 151f with n. 424.

[2508] KP_{SH} 145 (# 99[11]; KP_{VD} 35): *cittaṁ hi kāśyapa citrakarasadṛśa vicitrakarmābhisaṁskaraṇa-tayā.*

[2509] Tj P mDo 'u 145a4-8 (D ya 136a2-5; T 17.721: 23c19-25; LIN 1949: 66–68); cf. also yu 28a2 and ru 171b6-8 (T 17.721: 114b5 and 288c22-26).

[2510] For other background elements from the early Buddhist canon like SN I 39,10f (1.62: *cittena nīyatī loko* ...) or Dhp 1–2 (*manopubbaṅgamā dhammā manoseṭṭhā manomayā*; cf. Uv 31.23–24, etc.; AN I 11,6-13) see SAKURABE 1981: 6f. Still, all these passages merely emphasize the central role of the mind (*citta*), or of one's thoughts and volitions, with regard to spiritual or karmic pollution and purification, without any epistemic or ontological implications (cf. also fn. 2449). The spiritual and karmic aspect (*cittasaṁkilesā ... sattā saṁkilissanti*, etc.) is equally predominant in SN III 151f (see fn. 2503). As regards the interpretation of *manomaya* in Dhp 1–2, I fully agree with Hamilton (1996: 140–142), who rightly states that to interpret the passage ontologically "is completely to ignore the context in which it is found". Apart from this, Uv 31.23-24, *Gāndhārī Dharmapada* vs. 201f and *Patna Dharmapada* vs. 1 (and probably also vs. 2) have *manojavā(ḥ)* instead. This reading would also

1.2.2. The *Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*

580.0. In the case of the Saṁdh, the *context* of the passage which I assume to represent or mirror the situation of the introduction of an 'idealist' theory and the term '*vijñaptimātra(tā)*' into the Yogācāra school, i.e., VIII.7–8, is unambiguous. The question can only be whether my assumption that we have to start from this passage is correct or whether there is another or even better alternative. Bronkhorst (2000) thinks there is one. He resumes his extended argumentation as follows (93,22-25)[2511]:

> *Vijñaptimātratā* ... seems to have made its appearance (at least in Yogācāra) as a result of reflections pertaining to the mechanism of karmic retribution and the nature of *ālaya-vijñāna*.

His main arguments seem to be the following (§§ 581.1–581.3):

581.1. The need to account for the mechanism of karmic fruition easily leads to 'idealism' as soon as this mechanism is conceived in purely mental terms (88, 93). This is made explicit in Vasubandhu's *Viṁśikā*[2512] (71f). In early Yogācāra, mind (*vijñāna*), and then more specifically the subliminal *ālayavijñāna*, is regarded as containing the Seeds of corporeal matter and even of the external world, as well as the imprints of karmic acts contributing to the actualisation of these Seeds, in the sense that corporeal matter is the direct result and the external world the by-product of karma,[2513] when its imprints stored up in the mind, or in *ālayavijñāna*, become mature for fruition (84–88). It is thus to be expected that even before Vasubandhu at least some thinkers

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seem to be presupposed by most of the Chinese versions of the verse (for references see MIZUNO 1981: 82f), in the majority of which the expression is not taken to mean "swift as thought" (T 23.1442: 751b27 心速疾; cf. Uv_t 31.24 *yid mgyogs*) but rather "impelled by the mind (or thought)" (T 4.210: 562a13, etc.: 心使; T 17.765: 664a6 and 15: 意所使; Vi 371b14: 意所引). An exception seems to be the (Mahāyānist) *Aṅgulimālīyasūtra*, where the corresponding expression is rendered as "arisen from thinking" (T 2.120: 540a9: 意生, which may represent **manomaya*).

[2511] Unspecified references in § 580 refer to the pages of BRONKHORST 2000.

[2512] Vś vs. 6–7 with *Vṛtti*.

[2513] In the Yogācāra tradition, the idea that the formation and dissolution of the external things (*bāhyā bhāvāḥ*) — i.e., of the surrounding world (*bhājanaloka*, lit. "the world that is the container [of sentient beings]") — is conditioned by karma is already expressed in the *Manobhūmi* of the MauBh of the YBh_{Bh} (30,21–31,5; 36,19f; cf. also AS 55,11 [see BAYER 2010: 183]: common karma of sentient beings differentiates the external world). This function is taken over by the *ālayavijñāna* in the 'Nivṛtti Portion' of the treatment of *ālayavijñāna* in the PañcMBhVin (YBh_t P zi 8a4+6; YBh_c 581a25f+28f; $VinSg_{Pa}$ 1020a13f+15f; HAKAMAYA 1979: 37f [2001: 402f] # **5.b**.A.2; WALDRON 2003: 185). In the Sarvāstivāda tradition, the idea of common karma is found in Buddhavarman's *Vibhāṣā* (Vi_2 87b7f; cf. a27; cf. Vi 106c12f and c26f; cf. also Vi 41b4f; MiśAHṛd 960a13f; AKBh 95,15-17; 192,5), but I cannot present pertinent material from canonical Abhidharma texts. The idea is also testified to in the *Ch'eng-shih lun* (成實論: CSL 296c29–297a3; 304c16f) and in the *Vimuttimagga* (T 32.1648: 451c11; EHARA et al. 1977: 267), though, in the latter case, expressly contrasted with the view that there is no such 'common karma' (復有說 ... 無有共業). It should, however, be kept in mind that in the earlier layers of the YBh the imprints of karma are not called 'Seeds' (*bīja*) (cf. YAMABE 1989: 47 # 3 and 49 # 2) and that hence the Seeds of external material aggregates contained in the mind continuum (*cittasantati*) according to YBh_{Bh} 52,15f and 55,14 (see Pt. I § 263.6 with fn. 1473) are hardly karmic imprints but rather what may be called 'homogeneous Seeds'. Similarly, in the aforementioned passage of the 'Nivṛtti Portion', too, it is probably not only due to karmic imprints but also by means of 'homogeneous Seeds' that *ālayavijñāna* generates the surrounding world.

must have hit upon, and have had the courage to accept, the evident solution: the external world is nothing but a mental image. (88,13-15)

581.2. As a form of mind or 'awareness' (*vijñāna*), *ālayavijñāna* must, he argues, according to Abhidharmic standards cognize or apprehend some object. But this posed a serious problem in view of the fact that *ālayavijñāna* was thought to be present also in unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti*. This problem, too, could be solved more easily by an idealist position assuming an unconscious perception of some purely mental object (89–92):

> ... without accepting *vijñaptimātratā* it is much more difficult to account for the *vijñāna* nature of *ālayavijñāna*, esp. with reference to unconscious states like *nirodhasamāpatti*. (90,13-16)

581.3. In view of the preceding considerations, Bronkhorst (89f; 92f) considers the passage Saṁdh VIII.37.1.1 to be the key for the introduction of *vijñaptimātratā*. The passage is the first item in a list of 16 forms in which mind (**citta*) may arise (*sems kyi skye ba*):

> *brtan pa dang snod rnam par rig pa ⟨mi rig pa⟩'i ni di lta ste | len pa'i rnam par shes pa'i'o* ||[2514] (= **asaṁvidita-sthira-bhājana-vijñapter yadutâdānavijñānasya* |)
>
> [First, the arising] of an unconscious (or perhaps rather: not fully conscious) steady cognition (or: [process of] representation) of the 'receptacle' (i.e., of the surrounding world), viz., the 'mind [that is characterized by] appropriation' (*ādānavijñāna*).

That the 'receptacle' cognized by the *ādānavijñāna* (the Saṁdh's preferred term for the subliminal form of mind, i.e., *ālayavijñāna*) is to be understood as a mere representation (*vijñaptimātra*), or mental image, can be gleaned from the remark that follows the enumeration of the 16 forms in which mind may arise: a bodhisattva is expert in [where the mind should] settle (*gnas pa*, **sthiti*?[2515]) when he correctly understands the *vijñaptitathatā*, i.e., the Truth ('Suchness') [consisting in the fact that conditioned factors are mere] representations.[2516] According to what Bronkhorst considers the preferable hypothesis, the purport of this passage must be understood against the background of the two aforementioned problems: the problem of the mechanism of the fruition of karma (including the production of the so-called external world), and the problem of the cognitive (*vijñāna-*) nature of the *ādāna-* or *ālayavijñāna* requiring its cognizing an object even in unconscious states. By explaining the surrounding world as a subliminal or subconscious representation created by the *ādānavijñāna*, the passage presupposes, for Bronkhorst, that the two problems had been solved by newly introducing the principle of *vijñaptimātratā*, i.e., in 'idealist' terms.

582.0. Bronkhorst's hypothesis is very interesting, but not without problems.

[2514] For the addition of *mi rig pa* in accordance with the quotation of the passage at YBh$_t$ P 'i 86a6 (against D zi 78b3 where *mi rig pa* is also missing) and with the Chinese translations by Bodhiruci and Hsüan-tsang, see S 1987: 385f. YBh$_t$ (P, D) has, moreover, *snod kyi* instead of *snod*. In the sTog Kanjur (vol. 63: 53a4) the passage runs thus:

<u>*rab tu mi rtogs shing*</u> *brtan <u>pa</u> snod kyi* rnam *par rig <u>pa</u> ni 'di lta ste | len pa'i rnam par shes <u>pa'o</u>* ||,

confirming the presence of an expression that qualifies the cognitive aspect of the *ādānavijñāna* as subliminal, though not necessarily supporting the reconstruction of *mi rig pa* as **asaṁvidita(ka)* (chosen after Tr 3a + TrBh, where the Tibetan likewise has *mi rig pa* for *asaṁvidita(ka)*: see BUESCHER 2008: 52–55).

[2515] Cf. ASBh 41,21.

[2516] Saṁdh VIII.37.2: *ji ltar gnas pa la mkhas pa yin zhe na | gal te rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin rab tu shes pa'o* ||. For the definition of *vijñaptitathatā*, see fn. 2527.

582.1. If the basic motivation for introducing *vijñaptimātratā* (or an 'idealist' theory) was its usefulness in the context of accounting for the mechanism of karmic retribution, would one not expect explicit statements to this effect, or at least sufficiently explicit descriptions of this mechanism in 'idealist' terms, in Yogācāra sources earlier than the *Viṁśikā*? Even later (possibly post-Saṁdh) parts of the YBh do not make use of 'idealist' terms when describing corporeal matter or the surrounding (i.e., insentient) world as products of karma or *ālaya-vijñāna*, nor do I remember such a use in still slightly later texts of the more conservative type like the *Abhidharmasamuccaya* or the *Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* (顯揚聖教論: T 31.1602). And decidedly Mahāyānist texts of this period like the *Mahāyānasūtrālaṅkāra* (MSA), the *Madhyāntavibhāga* (MAV) and the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha* (MSg) along with the commentaries (*Bhāṣya* = Bh) on them ascribed to Vasubandhu tend, to be sure, to regard the surrounding world as a mere appearance, but I am not aware of this view being, in these texts, explicitly connected with, let alone derived from the problem of the mechanism of karma. In MSABh 151,3-14 the dependence of corporeal as well as external matter on the mind is only used to prove the momentariness of material things,[2517] without any hint at 'idealist' implications. Even the MSg (I.33), when referring — quite briefly, by the way — to the mechanism of karma in connection with proving the indispensability of the *ālayavijñāna*, does not introduce 'idealist' concepts or the term '*vijñaptimātra(tā)*' in this connection (nor, at least not in explicit terms, in its first chapter as a whole).[2518] This does not, however, necessarily mean that Vasubandhu's argumentation in the *Viṁśikā* was entirely novel, with no root in the tradition. But we may have to look for such a root in a different strand. I am thinking of the idea of the mind (*citta*) as a painter of the diversity of existences or of the multifarious world, which has already been referred to in § 578.2.3, for this idea normally involves karma as an intermediate agent.[2519] As mentioned above (see ibid.), in some passages of the *Buddhāva-taṁsaka* the idea of the mind as a painter of the diversified world comes to assume an 'idealist'-looking flavour, and possibly Vasubandhu drew his inspiration from this side (though surely closer investigation is required). But *ālayavijñāna* is alien to this strand, and is, significantly, not made use of in the *Viṁśikā* either.

582.2. As for the argument that an 'idealist' (*vijñaptimātratā*) position makes it easier to adapt the cognitive nature of *ālayavijñāna* to its presence in unconscious states, I must confess that I fail to perceive the point. Why should an unconscious, or subliminal, vague *perception* of the surrounding world, or of one's body, be less compatible with such a state than a subliminal mere *representation* (i.e., purely mental creation) of these objects? At any

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[2517] Cf. VON ROSPATT 1995: 145–147.

[2518] According to MSg I.60, the insentient surrounding world is not removed by liberating insight because it is kept going by the imagination (*vikalpa*) of the other sentient beings; all that happens is that the liberated person's perception of it is purified, to the effect that for a Buddha his surrounding world (*kṣetra*, "field") is pure. This can, of course, be *interpreted* in *vijñaptimātra* terms, but as it stands the phraseology is still similar to that of the 'Five *vastu* chapter' of the VinSg (KRAMER 2005: 90 and 159 [# 2.2.3]), for which see § 585. — The brief reference to the infinite ways of experiencing the agreeable and disagreeable results of karma in MSg II.10.11 occurs, to be sure, in the chapter explaining *vijñaptimātratā* but forms part of an enumeration of phenomena qualified as infinite, without any hint of the privileged role the mechanism of karma might have played in connection with the introduction of an 'idealist' interpretation of the phenomenal world. Cf. also § 586.

[2519] See S 2009 ns. 415, 424, 432.

rate, I am not aware of any passage expressly deriving an 'idealist' position from this problem (see § 586).

582.3.0. Even if we accept the two problems pointed out by Bron horst as possible motives for introducing *vijñaptimātratā*, the Saṁdh passage claimed to document or, at least, to mirror this event (viz., VIII.37.1.1: see § 581.3) is hardly convincing evidence.

582.3.1. Actually, neither in this passage nor in the wider context of the whole of Saṁdh VIII.37 (nor even, apart from a couple of casual references,[2520] in the whole of ch. VIII) is there any mention of the concept of karma, let alone the problem of the mechanism of its retribution, and there is no reference to *nirodhasamāpatti* or other unconscious states either, in any case none that reveals any interest in problems connected with the presence of a subliminal form of mind (*ālaya-* or *ādānavijñāna*) in that state.[2521]

582.3.2. Rather, the purport of Saṁdh VIII.37 is to show how a [less advanced] bodhisattva can acquire the great powers or capacities of a [high-level] bodhisattva. The answer is that he must be well-versed (**kuśala*) in six points, the first of which (VIII.37.1) is the arising of mind (**citta*). Expertness in this point obviously means nowing all the varieties of mind that may arise, these varieties differing according to their cognitive function, i.e., apprehension or representation of various objects, and according to their association with different types of feeling (*vedanā*) and spiritually relevant mental factors. It is only in connection with this distinction of various forms of mind (*citta*, *vijñāna*) according to their different cognitive functions, etc., that (in VIII.37.1.1) the subliminal form of mind (*ādānavijñāna*), too, is taken into account.

582.3.3. As far as I can see, the reason is simply an attempt to be complete. In our passage, the *ādānavijñāna* is clearly presupposed as already nown, i.e., Saṁdh VIII.37 surely presupposes Saṁdh V, where the *ādānavijñāna* is introduced as the 'All-Seed Mind' (**sarva-bīja(ka)ṁ cittam*, i.e., the mind containing all Seeds, or functioning as the Seed of all [dharmas]),[2522] and is stated to appropriate — doubtless also under the influence of karmic

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2520 Saṁdh VIII.20.9 (as one of ten kinds of content a bodhisattva must understand) and 35.1 (*śamatha* and *vipaśyanā* on the first *bhūmi* counteract *kleśa-*, *karma-* und *janma-saṁkleśa* insofar as these three, respectively, lead to and consist in evil rebirth).

2521 The expression *'gog pa la dmigs pa'i (sems)* (**nirodhālambanaṁ (cittam)*) of Saṁdh VIII.37.1.8 (117,16), specifying one of two kinds of **animittavijñapti*, could at most refer to the state of mind by which one resolves to enter into the *nirodhasamāpatti* (cf. *Saṁdhinirmocanavyākhyā* P co 255a4: *'gog pa'i snyoms par 'jug pa la dmigs pa*), but hardly to the state of *nirodhasamāpatti* itself. More probably, however, it refers to the *ănimittaḥ samādhiḥ*, which according to SamBh 185,15f (# 4.1.2.1.3.1; YBh_t P dzi 162b7; YBh_c 337b16) is the concentrative state of one who contemplates the cessation of the five items of appropriation as peaceful (*animittaḥ katamaḥ? teṣām evopādānaskandhānāṁ nirodhaṁ śāntato manasikurvato yā cittasya sthitir aikāgryam*) and thus has cessation (*nirodha*) as its objective support. Cf. also AKBh 449,10. Since this *samādhi* is not necessarily supramundane (AKBh 450,1-5; Vi 539c19f; YBh_t P 'i 8a7–b1 [see KRAMER 2005: 81 and 136: # 10.2.21.2]), its being mentioned alongside the supramundane mind (as the other type of **animittavijñapti*) would make sense. The "supramundane [mind]" of Saṁdh VIII.37.1.8 is, of course, the insight into True Reality (*tathatā*) from the *darśanamārga* level onward. — The only reference to *nirodhasamāpatti* in Saṁdh I am aware of is in X.9, where the spontaneous rearising of the cognitive functions after deep sleep and *nirodhasamāpatti* (161,32–162,2) is used to illustrate the spontaneous arising of (salvific) thoughts (*citta*) in the Buddha's *dharmakāya* due to the impulse (**abhisaṁskāra*) of the previous cultivation (**bhāvanā*) of salvific strategies and insight.

2522 For a detailed discussion of this concept, see Pt. I ch. 4.2.6.

residues — the corporeal basis of a new existence.[2523] But in Saṁdh V there is no mention at all of *vijñaptimātratā*, nor even of a cognitive function of the *ādānavijñāna*, and I do not think that Buescher (2008: 164 # 80) is right in asserting that "the notion of a *sarvabījakaṁ cittam* ... logically implies the notion of *vijñaptimātratā*".[2524] It is true that in the last prose paragraph of that chapter (V.6) a Mahāyānist relativization of all phenomena is proclaimed and that *ādānavijñāna* is, in V.2, stated to contain the imprints (*vāsanā*) of phenomenal (*nimitta*), verbal (*nāman*) and conceptual (*vikalpa*) diversification,[2525] but this does not yet necessarily imply 'idealism' in terms of *vijñaptimātratā*. In any case, it hardly involves a clear recognition of such an implication.[2526] In Saṁdh VIII.37, on the other hand, the intention is to enumerate all kinds of mind (*citta*, *vijñāna*) and to subordinate them to the principle of "representation only", as is clear from Saṁdh VIII.37.2. This paragraph, however, uses the term '*vijñaptitathatā*' as a ready-made one and thus *presupposes* its introduction and definition in VIII.20.2.3,[2527] which in its turn already *presupposes* the concept of *vijñaptimātratā* and its generalized application as introduced in VIII.7–8. Provided that my reconstruction and interpretation of the crucial sentence (ⓧ: see Pt. II ch. 2–3) is correct, the principle of *vijñaptimātratā* is introduced in VIII.7 as a kind of deliberate reinterpretation of the Abhidharmic definition of *vijñāna* as "cognition of an objective support" (*ālambanavijñapti*). If this is so, it stands to reason that in VIII.37.1 the various kinds of mind which the bodhisattva should understand in terms of *vijñaptitathatā* must all be structured in accordance with the Abhidharmic definition, i.e., must be perceptions /cognitions of some objective support (*ālambanavijñapti*, cf. VIII.37.1.2)[2528], and that this holds good for the *ādānavijñāna* as well: it too must be the perception of some objective support (VIII.37.1.1), and as VIII.37.2 makes explicit this objective support has, in accordance with the principle established in VIII.8, to be understood as a mere representation, just as in the case of the other forms of mind.[2529]

582.3.4. That the cognitive function of the *ādānavijñāna* is continuous and subconscious results from its being conceived as a subtle continuous flow (Saṁdh V.7). The only problem that remains is the choice of the surrounding world (*bhājanaloka*) as its objective support. Bronkhorst would probably take this as evidence for his thesis. He would probably argue that instead of presupposing *vijñaptimātratā* as already given we rather have to start from this specific object of the *ādānavijñāna* and that we have to explain it as a deliberate interiorization of the surrounding world in order to render its emergence as a by-product (*adhipatiphala*) of karmic imprints accumulated in the *ādānavijñāna* more plausible. But would this not equally hold good for the *primary* product of karmic imprints, i.e., the body,

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[2523] See Pt. I ch. 4.2.5.7.

[2524] See Pt. I ch. 2 and 4.3; cf. also § 263.

[2525] Corresponding to the first three (i.e., the mundane) categories of the chapter on the five *vastus* of the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the VinSg: see Pt. I § 302.

[2526] Cf. Pt. I § 290.3.

[2527] *rnam par rig pa'i de bzhin nyid ni 'du byed rnams* (Jñg 50,7 adds *kyi*) *rnam par rig pa* ⟨*tsam*⟩ (with YBh$_t$ P 'i 78b4 and Jñg) *nyid gang yin pa'o* ||; Saṁdh$_t$ S 43b1: ... *gang 'du byed rnams rnam par rig pa tsam mo.* Skt. may be reconstructed as **vijñaptitathatā yā saṁskārāṇāṁ vijñaptimātratā.*

[2528] See Pt. II § 355.1.3.

[2529] Cf. ARAMAKI 2000: 57.

which is not mentioned as an object of *ādānavijñāna* in our passage? Actually, there are other possible explanations. The surrounding world may have been chosen because it is the only available object that is sufficiently stable to suit the steady flow of the *ādānavijñāna*. Or the cognitive function of the *ādānavijñāna*, which has merged with and lies hidden in the body and appropriates it, may have been conceived of in analogy to that of the faculty of sight, which is located in the eye but perceives only the visible things of the surrounding world. This, too, is, to be sure, mere speculation, but in any case sufficient to show that Bronkhorst's thesis has no solid textual fundament. Thus, I do not see any cogent reason to reject the assumption that the starting point of the *vijñaptimātratā* theory is precisely the passage where this concept is not just presupposed but expressly introduced and even defended against an objection, viz., Saṁdh VIII.7–8.

583. Against this, Bronkhorst (2000: 92,29-33) argues that

> the essential link with meditation in the passage of the Saṁdhinirmocana Sūtra loses much of its credibility through the circumstance that this passage appears to have borrowed the idealist notions, along with their link with meditation, from earlier non-Yogācāra texts.

However, as far as I can see those pre-Yogācāra Mahāyāna sūtras that make use of an 'idealist'-looking formulation in the context of meditative concentration do so in connection with Buddha visions, and this is surely not the kind of meditative concentration from which the argument at Saṁdh VIII.7–8 proceeds.[2530] Thus, a mechanical borrowing of the "link with meditation" from these sources is highly improbable. Apart from this, there is absolutely no need to assume such a mechanical borrowing, because meditative concentration, centred around the crucial concepts of calm abiding (*śamatha*) and contemplation (*vipaśyanā*), is the main subject of the whole of ch. VIII of the Saṁdh.[2531] Now, basic concepts, like the four terms "image associated with reflective thought" (*savikalpaṁ pratibimbam*), etc., introduced in Saṁdh VIII.2, have been taken over from the *Śrāvakabhūmi* (ŚrBh)[2532] — the chapter of the 'Basic Section' (MauBh) of the YBh that is devoted to conservative (non-Mahāyānist) spiritual practices —, and in connection with the explanation of these terms the ŚrBh had quoted a sūtra in which the objects visualized in practices like the meditation on the repulsive (*aśubhabhāvanā*) are expressly taught to be nothing but cognition (*jñānamātra*), nothing but seeing (*darśanamātra*), nothing but recollection (or mindful observation: *pratismṛta(/smṛti)-mātra*).[2533] In my opinion, it is, above all, this passage that has been used by the author(s) of Saṁdh VIII as the point of departure for introducing a generalized 'idealist' position. The choice makes perfect sense if we take into account that — in view of the conceptual framework of the wider context — the audience addressed were most probably adherents of the Yogācāra tradition as codified in the YBh, and especially in the ŚrBh. In order to convince such an audience (such as tended towards the Mahāyāna but also open-minded followers of the śrāvaka path) of a generalized 'idealist' view, starting from the objects visualized in

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2530 Cf. § 556 with fn. 2444.

2531 Cf. Saṁdh VIII.1: *byang chub sems dpa' ci la gnas | ci la brten te theg pa chen po la zhi gnas dang lhag mthong sgom par bgyid lags* |; cf. also VIII.41, giving the whole chapter the name *rnal 'byor nges pa'i don bshad pa* (*yoganītārthanirdeśa* acc. to LAMOTTE, confirmed by a ms. fragment: MATSUDA 2013: 939f).

2532 As for chronology, cf. Pt. II fn. 2108.

2533 See Pt. II § 458.5.1.

meditative concentration was surely more promising than referring to dreams or hallucinations — experiences a more conservative audience would probably have dismissed as anomalous, atypical products of reduced or disturbed mental activity, whereas the visualizations were believed to be experienced in a state of intensified concentration and lucidity.

584. But what was the *motive* for introducing a generalized 'idealist' position? The answer would seem to be provided by the text itself, since the introduction of the 'idealist' position is followed, in Saṁdh VIII.9, by a redesigning of the path to liberating insight in terms of "nothing but representation" (*vijñaptimātra*): through realizing the 'ideality' of the images visualized in meditative concentration, one finally attains insight into True Reality or Suchness (*tathatā*) in the sense that *all* conditioned things are nothing but representation (*vijñaptitathatā*) (Saṁdh VIII.20.2.3).[2534] From this, I concluded in my earlier paper[2535] that the motive was to delineate, or explain, the Mahāyānist path to liberating insight, which culminates in a state where even ordinary phenomena have disappeared, in a more plausible way than earlier descriptions (or 'descriptions') had succeeded in doing; perhaps, I should now add, with the additional intention of enhancing its acceptability also for more traditional Yogācāras like the ŚrBh circle. It is hard to decide whether this innovative concept of the path was based on actual practice; it may well have been merely prescriptive or purely theoretical. But this does not detract from its emic significance. For the Yogācāras, even for those who were merely concerned with systematization and theoretical plausibility, meditative concentration and liberating insight were surely a subject of no less importance than, e.g., the mechanism of karma.

585. As a theoretical position, the generalized 'idealism' of Saṁdh VIII is different not only from the realism of the everyday world-view as well as from that of the conservative strata of the YBh but also from a radical illusionism or negativism that uncompromisingly stresses the unreality of everything. In this perspective, the purport of Saṁdh VIII would be basically in agreement with that of the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh, which tries to steer a middle course between realism and what is denounced as a nihilistic misinterpretation of the Mahāyāna sūtras teaching emptiness (BoBh 31,10ff), and it could even be understood as the consummation of this attempt, as indicated already in my earlier papers.[2536] In this regard, I suppose I basically agree with Buescher (2008: 162; 172ff). However, in contrast to him, I consider the theory of the three 'characters' (*lakṣaṇa*) or 'natures' (*svabhāva*) and that of the three kinds of lack of 'own-being' (*niḥsvabhāvatā*)[2537] in Saṁdh VI and VII and in the *Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* as well as the theory of the five *vastu*s in the latter text to be merely an intermediate stage, not yet presupposing the concept of *vijñaptimātratā*,

[2534] Cf. also Saṁdh VIII.36.3 (esp. 115,15-25), where penetration into the sevenfold *tathatā* is stated to be the *darśanamārga*, with the attainment of which the bodhisattva reaches *samyaktvaniyāma* (see fn. 2361) and the first *bhūmi* as well as the *vastuparyantatā* (in terms of the set of four concepts of Saṁdh VIII.2 taken over from the ŚrBh (see fn. 2108)).

[2535] S 1973: 169–171; 1976: 242f.

[2536] S 1973: 171,11–172,9; S 1976a: 243,9–244,19.

[2537] Which in Saṁdh VII.19–21 is expressly stated to serve the same purpose as the theory of the *Tattvārthapaṭala* is declared to.

because the latter is neither mentioned in these texts nor, to my mind, logically implied.[2538] Nonetheless, a connection with the problem addressed in the *Tattvārthapaṭala* of the BoBh would indeed furnish the introduction of an 'idealist' position into the Yogācāra school with a *theoretical* motiv tion. But surely one that is not devoid of *spiritual* concerns either, for a nihilistic interpretation of emptiness is expressly declared to have disastrous consequences both for oneself and for others.[2539] Moreover, a theoretical *motive* for the generalization would not exclude the possibility that an important and perhaps decisive incentive or *stimulus* for a novel, 'idealist' solution came from the *context* in which we find it for the first time, viz., a reconsideration of the structure of meditative concentration and the objects visualized therein that starts from categories developed in the ŚrBh, where these objects, in a sūtra quotation, had already been defined as mere images in the mind. This is, at any rate, what textual evidence suggests. One may, of course, try to go back behind the transmitted text and to reconstruct the thought process(es) that preceded codification, but I am afraid that if such an attempt discards the clues offered by textual evidence it is bound to result in pure speculation.

586. 1. It is true that collections of proofs for a certain theory are usually later then the emergence or introduction of the theory itself and are liable to contain many arguments that were adduced *post festum* and reflect later stages of development. Even so, at least the earliest of these collections may be expected to include also the original motive(s), or at any rate to indicate the direction in which we should search. For this reason, it may be interesting to have a look at what appears to be the earliest transmitted list of arguments meant to prove the non-existence of external objects (and thus *vijñaptimātratā*)[2540], viz., the list found in the *Mahāyānasaṁgraha*[2541] and, as an unmarked quotation, in the *Abhidharmasamuccayabhāṣya*.[2542]

2. Among the arguments listed there, the first says that one and the same object appears differently to different classes of beings: spirits, animals, men, and gods. The second argument[2543] adduces cases where the absence of a real object is more or less widely acknowledged: past and future things, dreams, and the two kinds of reflected images (viz., images reflected in a mirror and images visualized in meditative concentration)[2544]. The third argument (according to the prose) runs thus: if [everyday] objects were truly real, true reality would be known by everybody without effort, and (according to the verse) insight [into true

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[2538] See Pt. I ch. 2 and ch. 4.3.

[2539] BoBh$_D$ 31,18-20 (see Pt. I § 297); less radically, Saṁdh VII.20 (77,29-33): a nihilistic understanding of the Mahāyāna sūtras focussing on emptiness, lack of essence, etc., does *not* exclude that there might be some limited increase of wholesome (*kuśala*) dharmas, but because it entails the collapse of true insight, it prevents the accumulation of an *immeasurable* amount of wholesome dharmas (as required for a successful striving for Buddhahood).

[2540] Though only as a preliminary truth, as in most earlier (Yogācāra-)Vijñānavāda sources: cf. the last quarter of the last verse: "Because there is no object, the cognitive act, too, [does not really exist]" (MSg VIII.20.f = II.14^b.f: *de med pas na rnam rig med*; ASBh 42,15: *vijñaptes* [sc. *abhāvaḥ*] *tad-* [= *artha-*] *–abhāvataḥ*).

[2541] MSg II.14 (prose) and 14^b (verses, = MSg VIII.20).

[2542] ASBh 41,21–42,15 (key words of the prose + verses).

[2543] For this argument, see also Pt. II § 397.4.1. Cf. also MSg II.6 (dreams), II.7.2 (images of corpses visualized in meditative concentration) and II.8 (past things).

[2544] Cf. MSgU$_t$ P li 328a4 (D ri 271a2f).

reality] would not be non-conceptual (*jñānaṁ na syād akalpakam*), i.e., it would not, as it should, be an experience in which all phenomena have disappeared. In the fourth and the fifth argument, it is pointed out that the assumption of the existence of real objects would be incompatible with the capacity, ascribed to spiritually advanced persons, to transsubstantiate material things (e.g., earth into gold) or make material things appear at will. The final argument appeals to 'non-conceptual insight' as an *experience* proving the non-existence of all objects.

3. It is obvious that in none of the arguments an 'idealist' position is derived from primarily theoretical problems like those from which Bronkhorst assumes it to have arisen (mechanism of karmic fruition, etc.). Rather, in all these arguments the 'idealist' position is deduced from some kind of *experience*: from certain aspects of everyday experience, from experience assumed for mythological beings, but in most of the arguments from experience claimed for spiritually advanced persons. With the possible exception of non-conceptual insight,[2545] it is, however, not in the experience itself that representations are revealed to be mere representations without an 'external' object. This fact is rather brought home only by *reflecting* on them and on their exemplary significance, and for such a reflection it is not necessarily required that one must have had such an experience oneself. It is sufficient that the experience was taken for granted, be it as a peculiar property of non-human beings or as an achievement attained by accomplished yogis. Even so, it is undeniable that in the set of arguments assembled in the MSg those that take recourse to aspects of spiritual practice (including the images [of bloated corpses, etc.,] visualized in meditative concentration) form the majority. This fact shows, at any rate, that in that period for the Yogācāras themselves their 'idealist' position derived not least from considerations concerning spiritual practice. This need not mean that these Yogācāras were Buddhist modernists; they may just have been *yogācāra*s, or at least systematizers of the heritage of a community in which *yoga* was widely practised or, at any rate, held in high esteem, at least in theory.

[2545] Even in this case, the experience, as postulated by an important strand of the Mahāyānist tradition, merely manifests the ultimate non-existence of the diversified world; its interpretation as testifying to a (provisional) 'idealism' would rather be a matter of subsequent, or external, interpretation.

2. Other Theories

2.1. General Considerations

587. As indicated above, Franco's criticism is not confined to my thesis regarding the origin, or original context, of Yogācāra 'idealism' and its possible prefiguration in terms of *cittamātra*, but also extends to the other instances of Buddhist philosophical theories with regard to which I had tried to show that they, too, probably derive from spiritual practice. He also points to a number of cases as contradicting my thesis that such a kind of development may be typical for the Buddhist tradition.[2546] Now, I definitely did not claim that *all* Buddhist theories originated directly from spiritual practice. This should be clear from the qualifications contained in the sentence from the conclusion of my paper which Franco himself quotes on p. 95,18-21 of his article, viz.,

> Für die zentralen, das Ganze bestimmenden philosophischen Theorien gilt, dass sie, zum mindesten zum größten Teil, unmittelbar aus der spirituellen Praxis hervorgewachsen sein dürften.[2547] (S 1973: 185,42-44)

But I must admit that this sentence is not sufficiently precise, and to a certain extent even misleading.

588. As I see it now, at least three issues are in need of clarification or revision:

1. the concept of 'spiritual practice' (see § 589),
2. the characterization of the kind of theories on which my thesis was focused as "the central ones, those determining the whole" ("die zentralen, das Ganze bestimmenden ... Theorien") (see §§ 590 and 591), and
3. the expression "directly" ("unmittelbar") (see § 592).

589. While expressly defining 'spiritual practice' as the mental aspect of religious practice in a wider sense, including also moral or ethical exercises,[2548] I nonetheless *de facto* focused on practices of meditative concentration. This is surely too narrow if the problem of the relation between theoretical positions and religious practice is to be explored in a comprehensive perspective. Ethical concerns, mental attitudes of veneration (of the Buddha, etc.), aspirations to a religious goal, etc., should then no doubt be included. Apart from this, the meditative practices concerned comprise different types: not only "altered states of consciousness" like visualizations, imagination and visions[2549] or reductive absorptions

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[2546] I would no longer venture a comparison with other philosophical traditions (S 1973: 185,44–186,4) I am not sufficiently familiar with.

[2547] I.e.: "As for the central philosophical theories, which define the whole, it may be said that they, or at any rate most of them, have directly developed from spiritual practice."

[2548] Cf. S 1973: 162: "Mit 'spiritueller Praxis' meine ich die geistige Seite religiöser Übungen, d.h. solcher Übungen oder Handlungen, die direkt oder indirekt auf das Heil ausgerichtet sind," including in the first place "moral or ethical exercises" and "practices of meditation, deep concentration, or trance" (S 1976a: 236,15f).

[2549] Cf. fn. 2437.

resulting in a state where most or all experience of diversity has vanished, but also meditations proper in the sense of obser ing or deliberately contemplating certain aspects of reality, often with the tendency to emphasize, extend or radicalize these aspects for the sake of spiritual advancement, in a concentrated but not necessarily altered state of mind.

590. As regards "philosophical theories", what I had in mind are, in the first place, the basic and comprehensive ontological theories, more precisely (and this I failed to make explicit) such as are *counterintuitive*, in the sense of standing in sharp contrast to the everyday world view, like the negation of a self (*ātman*), the theory of the momentariness (*kṣaṇika-tva*) of all things, illusionism and 'idealism'. It was these theories that I assumed to be, predominantly, rooted in spiritual practice, and I expressly distinguished these kinds of theories from others, usually more delimited ones, that were developed in order to solve more specific or second-degree doctrinal problems. As an example for these latter kinds of problems I adduced (S 1973: 185,35-39) the question of the mechanism of the retribution of karma in the absence of a permanent self. I might also have referred to theories developed in order to solve problems arising in connection with textual exegesis. With regard to theories established for the sake of solving these kinds of problems I expressly pointed out that I do *not* regard them as having originated in direct connection with spiritual practice.[2550] Actually, it is doubtless these kinds of theories that constitute, by far, the majority, to the extent that on closer reflection I have to admit that I find it difficult to adduce more than a few theories of the type I had in mind (for an additional case see § 598), and my former statement that it would be easy to adduce further examples was clearly not sufficiently considered. On the other hand, the comparatively small number of the theories concerned is outweighed by their fundamental importance for Buddhist thought.

591.0. Among the theories which I did not take into consideration two groups may deserve some comment:

1. theories of spiritual practice, often in the form of what we may call pseudo-descriptions because they are in fact formalizing, systematizing or prescriptive, and
2. theoretical assumptions of early Buddhism prior to consistent doctrinal systematization, i.e., of Nikāya or Āgama Buddhism, which I expressly excluded from the focus of my investigation (see S 1976a: 236,9ff).

591.1. It is undeniable that Indian Buddhist texts contain very few cases of reports (first-person accounts) on personal spiritual practice or experience (SHARF 1995: 235f).[2551] Although occasionally some closeness to actual practice is still palpable,[2552] this is by no means the rule. Many texts on spiritual practice, including apparent 'descriptions' of actual

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[2550] S 1973: 185,39f: "Solche Theorien sind oft nur noch lose oder gar nicht mehr in der spirituellen Praxis verwurzelt."

[2551] A remarkable exception are the canonical descriptions of the Buddha's own practice and Awakening, but even these are, at least in part, literary products with a prescriptive and corroborative function (i.e., with the function of grounding the Buddhist Truths in perfect insight and demonstrating the superior spiritual status of the Buddha by crediting him with supranormal cognitions and faculties).

[2552] S 1982a: 82–85, discussing a description (in ŚrBh$_{Sh}$ 499,17ff) of a state of deep calm stated (in the text itself!) to be misunderstood by others (Mahāyānists?) as liberating comprehension (*abhisamaya*) but actually merely preceding it. This looks, by the way, like a nice old parallel to the devaluation of the experiences and practices of competitors as merely *samatha* by modern *vipassanā* teachers, as pointed out by SHARF (1995: 261,31-34).

practices, are, as I myself pointed out a long time ago,[2553] obviously stereotyped and prescriptive or, from the Abhidharmic period onward, systematizations deriving from attempts to harmonize and standardize the canonical heritage and from theoretical motives. There is also a tendency of new theoretical positions being afterwards integrated into spiritual practice as an object of contemplation,[2554] or even claimed to be the content of liberating insight or of an experience confirming the respective theory.[2555] On the other hand, at the basis of such stereotyped, composite or reinterpreted 'descriptions' of spiritual practices there are, in many cases, simpler elements or patterns the actual spiritual function of which is still obvious. Without the building material of these basic units of spiritual practice, the stereotyped, composite and standardized 'descriptions' could hardly have arisen, and without a significant if not crucial importance of spiritual practice for the earliest Saṅgha the — at any rate theoretical — prestige of this subject in later periods would hardly be explicable. The ritualization and the disinterest in actual spiritual practice widely observable, as SHARF (1995: 240ff) points out, in institutionally established ('verpfründet') Buddhist monasticism today and even in the early Middle Ages should not lightly be projected back upon the formative period of early Buddhism; such a procedure would, in my opinion, be highly problematic from a methodological point of view.

591.2. As for the Nikāya or Āgama period, the type of theory I was concerned with would seem to be, at the most, *in statu nascendi*. On the one hand, theoretical commitments that were considered superfluous from a spiritual point of view were largely avoided. On the other hand, those theoretical positions that were regarded as supportive do not blatantly conflict with common-sense or current views of the time. For example, belief in rebirth is not specifically Buddhist but was, in some form or other, accepted by other ascetic groups as well and was probably taken for granted by a significant part of the society of the time. Impermanence and pain — as, e.g., exemplified in the old explanation of the Truth of Suffering (if we disregard its last item) — are a matter of everyday experience. What characterizes the Buddhist attitude from early times onward is the special *emphasis* placed on them, with a tendency towards *universal* statements: everything is impermanent, everything is painful (or at least unsatisfactory, inadequate: see § 598). But are such statements, first of all, doctrinal positions resulting from theoretical reflection? Or are they guidelines for contemplation in the first place, expatiating on an everyday existential feeling and widening or deepening it in the course of or for the sake of spiritual advancement? Closer investigation would be needed, but at least to me texts like SN 35.33–52 ("everything is subject to birth, aging, disease, dying, sorrow, ... impermanent, unsatisfactory, not self", etc.) look very much like contemplations. The same holds good for texts like SN 35.28 ("everything is ablaze") or SN 35.1–12 (all senses and sense objects are impermanent, etc.). At any rate, the spiritual purpose of this kind of texts is explicitly stated: seeing things in this way leads to detachment and liberation.

592. I have to admit that my use of the expression "directly" ("unmittelbar") in the above-quoted sentence (§ 587) is rather infelicitous. It could be taken to mean that some truth experienced by or revealed, all of a sudden, to a yogi in meditative or mystical trance was

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[2553] S 1981, esp. 200–202. Neither Sharf (1995: 271f n. 11) nor Franco take this publication into account.

[2554] Cf. S 1976b: 258ff.

[2555] Cf. S 1981: 211f.

afterwards, more or less spontaneously, transformed (by him or his followers) into a theoretical position.[2556] But it should be clear from my hypothesis concerning the origination of Yogācāra 'idealism' (and also its prefiguration in the PratyS) that my thesis was not meant to be narrowed down to this type of "directness", for in the case of 'idealism' what I took as the starting-point of the theory is not the content proper of the meditative experience (e.g., the image of bloated corpses, or the Buddha encountered in a vision) but the 'ideality' of this content, of which the yogi or visionary is not necessarily aware in the meditative state itself but (if at all) rather when reflecting on it afterwards (cf. §§ 555–556). In addition, there must have been a motive for the generalization as well as a certain background for its feasibility, so to speak, and it is here that not only aspects of spiritual practice but also theoretical motives and presuppositions would seem to have been involved (cf. §§ 584–585). In the other cases dealt with in my earlier paper (S 1973: 176–185), the situation assumed by me is, to be sure, somewhat different, but even though I concede that my sketchy suggestions are not adequate to the complexity of the processes, their basic validity is not dependent on the assumption of a simplistic "directness", which would indeed be hard to defend. It is true that in my treatment the influence of theoretical considerations and external factors did not receive due attention, but Franco's wholesale disregard of the contribution of spiritual practice to the origination of the theories concerned appears equally one-sided. In contrast to him, I would still maintain that spiritual practice (especially deliberate contemplations as pointed out in § 591.2), or at least spiritual concerns, played a *significant* role in the origination of most (though not necessarily all) of the fundamental and at the same time 'counterintuitive' Buddhist ontological theories, though the role of such concerns may differ from case to case. If we ask why at all these theories developed in Buddhism (or, more precisely, in certain strands of Buddhism) but were rejected by most of the other traditions, the answer can be found, in my opinion, in the peculiar accents of Buddhist spirituality as the *matrix* from which these

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[2556] As an example of such a direct derivation of a theoretical assumption from spiritual practice, Franco (2009: 96–100) adduces the introduction of cosmological spheres corresponding to the four deep concentrations (*dhyāna*s) and the last two states beyond the corporeal world (*ārūpya*s) as states of meditative absorption. On the other hand, he (ibid. 103; 120f) rightly points out that in the *Brahmajālasutta* (DN I 13ff) *non*-Buddhist ascetics are expressly criticized for deriving all kinds of unwarranted or misleading theoretical positions directly from experiences had in meditative concentration. Yet, in many of these cases the theory is wrong because it is too rashly derived from an *incomplete* experience. Apart from this, the main thrust of the text would seem to be against theories and views (*diṭṭhi*), be they wrong or merely useless, which are espoused in a self-opiniated or even aggressive way and thus are not just wrong or useless but the object of obdurate clinging and a cause of dispute and struggle, and thus spiritually disastrous for the proponent. It should also be kept in mind that in connection with a stereotyped description (or 'description') of the Buddhist path to liberation (FRAUWALLNER 1953: 162ff, esp. 168f) similar experiences are ascribed to the advanced Buddhist practitioner including the Buddha himself immediately before his Awakening. In particular, this is the case with 1. the memory of former lives (this time *not* expressly limited: ... *aneke saṁvaṭṭavivaṭṭakappe*, in contrast to the *Brahmajālasutta* where it is stated to cover up to 40 such periods at the most: DN I 15,29-32), and 2. the observation of sentient beings dying and being reborn in accordance with their karma. In *this* context, these experiences obviously have the function of setting the stage for the insight into the four Noble Truths, which would seem to imply that they were considered to correspond to reality. Still, there is no reason to assume that the theoretical assumptions involved (rebirth and karmic retribution) were *derived* from such experiences. We may rather have to do with an instance of the cliché that extrasensory truths were believed to be *corroborated* by the experience of spiritually accomplished persons (cf. §§ 554 and 601).

theories could develop under certain conditions,[2557] and without which such a development would most probably not have taken place.

2.2. Specific Theories

593. In order to elucidate these general remarks, I shall first (§§ 594–597.2) briefly revisit the relation to spiritual practice of those theories which I discussed in S 1973 in addition to Yogācāra 'idealism', with one more example added (§ 598). Thereafter (§§ 599–602), I shall comment on a couple of further theories adduced by Franco as counter-evidence.

594. Let me start with the *no-self theory*, that is, the theoretical *denial* of a *self* (*anātma-vāda*). In view of the early Buddhist tendency to avoid a theoretical commitment in this matter,[2558] I can hardly imagine that this theory could have originated independent of the well-documented canonical '*not-self contemplation*', i.e., the comprehension and contemplation of the 'five items of appropriation'[2559] (*upādānaskandhas*), or all objective as well as subjective elements that occur in ordinary (and even meditative)[2560] experience, as *not* deserving to be regarded in terms of "this is [truly] mine" (*etaṁ mama*), "this [is what] I am" (*eso 'ham asmi*), "this is my [true] self" (*eso me attā*),[2561] or simply as not being (part of) one's self (*anattā*)[2562] — no doubt a spiritual practice, and one expressly stated to lead to

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[2557] This is where theoretical or other motives may come in, and the assumption of such additional factors seems to be required in order to explain why the theories concerned were not developed in or taken over by all strands of Buddhism.

[2558] I am, of course, well aware of the controversy among scholars regarding the Buddha's (or early Buddhists') position with regard to the existence or non-existence of a true (metaphysical) self, but in my opinion an unbiased screening of the textual material suggests that in the early period the issue was deliberately left undecided, a theoretical commitment in either direction being considered spiritually disadvantageous. For an admittedly preliminary and — especially in view of WYNNE 2010(2011) — no longer entirely up-to-date exposition of my view see S 2000b.

[2559] For different proposals regarding the meaning and translation of the expression *upādānakkhandha*, see fn. 850.

[2560] Cf., e.g., MN no. 64 (I 435,26ff): even in the meditative states, the five items are to be contemplated as impermanent, unsatisfactory and not-self; only the abandonment of everything conditioned, the deathless sphere or state (*amatā dhātu*), is recognized as peaceful and sublime.

[2561] As far as I can see, the negation of this latter aspect merely means that the *respective object* of contemplation (*eso*) is not one's self, but does not necessarily imply that there is no self at all, as IMANISHI (1990: 49,13-16; 50,11) seems to suggest.

[2562] [1.] Five *upādānakkhandhas*: two patterns of argumentation: 1. what is (part of) one's (true) self should not lead to affliction, and one should be able to autonomously determine how it should or should not be; 2. (the more frequent one; cf. VETTER 2000: 325f) what is (part of) one's (true) self should be permanent and satisfactory. Both patterns are found side by side in MN no. 35 (I 232f) and Vin I 13f = SN 22.59, corresponding to Saṅghabh I 138f (for the *Vinaya* of the Mahīśāsakas and that of the Dharmaguptakas: see BAREAU 1963: 190–198). For discussion, further parallels and references, see, e.g., IMANISHI 1990: 41–51; VETTER 2000: 85–88 and 116–119 (also with regard to the nature of Saccaka's tenets: 116 n. 35); WYNNE 2009a and 2009b; KUAN 2009; ANĀLAYO 2011: 223–232. At least in their Indian versions, both pericopes, as they stand, merely emphasize the *not*-self (and not-one's-own) character of the five items; even the final remark of the redactor(s) that the minds (*cittāni*) of the listeners were freed from contaminants (*āsava*) may perhaps show a certain reluctance to speak of 'persons,' but is hardly conclusive evidence for a full-fledged theoretical *no*-self position (cf., in this connection, passages like MN I 183,37–184,2, DN I 84,8-10 etc.). What would seem to come

detachment and liberation at that (see § 591.2).[2563] I therefore disagree with Franco when he states, basing himself on E. Steinkellner (2002: 183), that the *anātman* doctrine

> developed not from spiritual practice, but as a reaction to the *pudgala* theory of the Vātsīputrīyas. (FRANCO 2009: 103)

The second part of this statement may be true, but I cannot accept the first, and I am not sure that it is a faithful rendering of Steinkellner's intention. What Steinkellner actually says is that the *anātmavāda* as a philosophical dogma obviously owes its arising not to the (more or less spontaneous) desire to support this *practice* — i.e., the canonical contemplation of the *skandhas* as not being (part/property of) one's self — ontologically, but to the need to ward off an undesired development, viz., the *pudgalavāda*, the theory of a 'person' as an entity, however difficult to define.[2564] If Steinkellner's statement could be taken to mean that the dogmatization of the canonical not-self practice into the no-self theory did not happen simply because people *spontaneously* felt a need to back it up ontologically, but rather took place because they were *driven* to an ontological commitment by the appearance of the *pudgala* theory in a rival faction, I have no objection. In this case, my assumption of a *significant*

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closer to a negation of a self (though still not yet categorically negating it) are passages according to which a disciple of the Buddha not only does not perceive the *upādānakkhandhas* as self but also does not perceive a self that owns them, nor their being inherent in a self or a self being inherent in them (MN I 300, SN III 3–5, etc.: cf. VETTER 2000: 328 [F X]).

[2.] Elements of experience (six senses and six kinds of objects): e.g., SN IV 1–6 (35.1–6; 9; 12); IV 28,22 (35.45): *sabbaṁ ... anattā*, where "everything" (*sabbaṁ*) is to be understood as comprising not only all sense faculties along with their objects but also the corresponding kinds of awareness, contact /impression and feeling, as is clear from the unabridged wording in SN 35.33, which is also explicit with regard to the spiritual purpose of seeing things in this way; similarly SĀ_C nos. 195 and 196 (**anātman*: 50a23 and b7f).

[3.] In a related pattern (e.g., SN 18.21–22; 22.71–72; SĀ_C nos. 198 and 199; MN III 18,29–19,9; cf. AKBh 142,10; VETTER 2000: 130f with n. 44), the comprehensive contemplation of the five items in terms of "this is not mine, this [is] not [what] I am, this is not my self" is stated to be, finally, conducive to the cessation of the notions of 'I' and 'mine' with regard to "this body endowed with sentience (*saviññāṇaka*) as well as with regard to all [alluring] phenomena outside" and [finally to the cessation even] of the [involuntary and unspecific] conception [of identity with them] (*(asmi)māna*) and the [deep-rooted] inclination or lingering habit (*anusaya*) [to identify oneself with them, which may continue even when a rational understanding of the not-self nature of each of the five items has already been achieved][1] (*imasmiṁ ca saviññāṇake kāye bahiddhā ca sabbanimittesu ahaṁkāra-mamaṁkāramānānusayā na honti*), which means liberation.

[1] My interpretation of the compound *ahaṁ*° suggests that the last two members should be understood in the light of the *Khemakasutta*: SN 22.89, esp. III 130,28–131,7; SĀ_C no. 103, esp. 30b27–c4; cf. ASBh 62,5-11.

[4.] A somewhat different pattern is the rejection of all kinds of apodictic theoretical assertions concerning a self (*ātman/attan*), both with regard to its nature (like being permanent or impermanent, etc.) as also with regard to its existence *or non-existence* (e.g., MN I 8; III 228ff; DN I 13ff; cf. also SN 44.10). Such views are, not least, discarded as expressions of attachment and entanglement preventing liberation (MN I 8,17-22), i.e., because they are *spiritually* detrimental.

[2563] In this regard, my understanding seems to be basically in agreement with A. WYNNE's (2010) statement that the "purpose of this method of teaching is quite obviously soteriological" (210,26f), i.e., that the Buddha's "aim is the spiritual transformation of his disciples" (210,16f). "By avoiding positive statements of truth the Buddha leaves his disciples in a cognitive vacuum, a state of detachment from ideas about reality and identity in which potential misunderstandings have been negated" (210,27-29).

[2564] No doubt a theoretical tenet, but surely not as a theory for its own sake, without spiritual motives in the background (cf. VETTER 1988: 42; ELTSCHINGER & RATIÉ 2013: 82–84, esp. fn. 116).

genetic relation between the old not-self practice and the formation of the no-self theory would not be jeopardized, and the appearance of the *pudgala* theory would just have been the trigger that motivated or even necessitated a theoretical commitment. But *why* in the world was the *pudgalavāda* felt, by the other groups, to be a misdirected position? I do not see any other answer than that they found it incompatible with what they must have felt to be the *tacit* theoretical presupposition of the canonical *anātman* contemplation, and hence considered it *spiritually* pernicious,[2565] the more so if occasional passages with more radical formulations, like the verses of the nun Vajirā/Śailā,[2566] which come close to a kind of pre-doctrinal, *de facto* denial of an *ātman* or a person, had already formed part of their canon. I readily admit that this short reply is very much *ad hominem*, but a thorough and comprehensive re-examination of the issue would definitely exceed the limits of the present study, the more so since basic controversial issues concerning earliest Buddhism are involved, the clarification of which, if possible at all, I must leave to others.

595. Incidentally, one could perhaps compare the development of the no-self theory with that of the rejection of plants as sentient beings. In the early period, we do not find a clear-cut dogmatic denial of their sentience but only a kind of reticence, probably for practical reasons (not so much, I admit, in connection with spiritual practice, but rather in terms of practicability of life), with the inherent tendency to solidify into a *de facto* denial. In this case, too, it is only later on, and probably under the impact of attacks on the part of other communities, particularly the Jainas, that this attitude developed into a full-fledged *theoretical*, doctrinal denial.[2567]

596. Concerning the doctrine of *momentariness* (FRANCO 2009: 100), it was already in 1976[2568] that I retracted my assumption that it might have originated *directly* from a specific contemplation in which even solid material things are split up into chains of moments, because I had arrived at the conclusion that in this case the opposite development — admittedly no less remarkable and instantiated in detail in S 1976b —, is more probable, viz., that a new theory secondarily comes to be integrated into contemplative practice. This has been confirmed by a thorough investigation of the matter by A. von Rospatt (1995, especially pp. 196–218). Even so, one might ask why it was precisely in the Buddhist tradition that such a theory came to be developed. I find it hard to imagine that this would have happened without the 'matrix' of the strong emphasis on the contemplation of impermanence in early

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[2565] It is in this sense that the verse from Candrakīrti's MAvat (VI.120 = PrasP 340,8-11), quoted S 1973: 178 (with n. 55), makes sense as an *emic* confirmation, even though it stems from a much later period as FRANCO (2009: 103) is doubtless right in pointing out.

[2566] SN I 134f (no. 5.10; SOM. 296f), esp. 135,19: *suddhasaṅkhārapuñjo 'yaṁ, na-y-idha sattûpa-labbhati*; AKBh 466,1-4 (... *śūnyaḥ saṁskārapuñjo 'yaṁ, na hi sattvo 'tra vidyate*); cf. VETTER 2000: 11; 61; 66 n. 141; 157 (with Chinese parallels). Cf. also pāda c of the verse quoted AKBh 466,8f: *nâstîha sattva ātmā vā* ... (from the *Pārāyaṇa* of the Sarvāstivāda or Mūlasarvāstivāda canon and identical with PG 4; cf. also PrasP 355,4). Also passages like Saṅghabh I 158,6–159,21 (ELTSCHINGER 2013: 187–190) would seem to mirror the transition to the no-self position (*na câtrâsty ātmā* ...), in contrast to I 157,7-21 (ibid. 174), where the Sanskrit, in contrast to the Tibetan, keeps to the not-self phraseology (ibid. 177).

[2567] For details, see S 1991b and S 2009 pt. I.

[2568] S 1976b: 258,26-38 with n. 45.

Buddhism. Actually, von Rospatt's judgement is quite circumspect. It is true that he considers the doctrine of momentariness to be

> primarily based on the analysis of change in terms of substitution and on the conviction that things are always changing (ibid. 217 # 4.2),

i.e., on a theoretical assumption. Even so, he does not at all deny the possibility that certain meditations, especially on the body as constantly undergoing change or as being threatened by death at every moment, could have functioned as a catalyst (ibid. 217,14), prompting the development of the doctrine of momentariness. In this case, the dependence of the theory on spiritual practice would be indirect but still significant. The same may hold good for systematized *antisubstantialism*, regardless of whatever theoretical considerations were more directly responsible for its formation.

597.1. 1. As regards the origin of what I called, for want of a better label, Mahāyānist *illusionism*,[2569] ubiquitous in as early a text as the *Prajñāpāramitā* in 8,000 lines (*Aṣṭasāhasrikā*: Aṣṭ) and probably even somehow anticipated in certain circles of 'mainstream' Buddhism,[2570] I have not much to add to what I proposed in S 1973: 180–185, and in spite of Franco's (2009: 105–108) doubts I am still convinced that my proposal is basically reasonable. It is true that in the case of this doctrine the context of its origins may be irretrievably lost and that we can only speculate about the cause(s) or motive(s) that triggered its formation. But once again I find it hard to imagine that such a theory (if we may call it so)[2571] could have developed without a suitable 'matrix' in the tradition.

2. Among the traditional elements[2572] that would account for essential aspects of illusionism as found in the Aṣṭ and some other early Mahāyāna texts are surely the two kinds of spiritual practice I referred to in S 1973:

a) an experience of transphenomenality, though, perhaps, not so much the "attainment of the cessation of conscious mental activity and feelings" (*saṁjñāvedayitanirodhasamāpatti*),[2573] but rather a set of three concentrative absorptions (*samādhi*) or 'gates to deliverance' (*vimokṣamukha*), concerned with emptiness (*śūnyatā*), freedom from appearances (*ānimitta*) and not being fixed on anything (*apraṇihita*), respectively,[2574] and

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[2569] It should be noted that understanding the world, or all dharmas, as illusory is characteristic only of one (albeit influential) strand of Mahāyāna Buddhism.

[2570] Cf. VETTER 2001: 70-82.

[2571] I am not quite sure whether, and if so in which sense, statements like "all dharmas are like magical illusions, like a dream" (*sarvadharmā api ... māyopamāḥ svapnopamāḥ*: Aṣṭ 20,14f) have a theoretical, or metaphysical, purport, or are rather in the first place deliberate contemplative attitudes.

[2572] For more specifically Mahāyānist spiritual motives, see S 1973: 183f.

[2573] As indicated in fn. 152, the interest of Mahāyāna sūtras in this attainment appears to be rather limited. In S 1973, I referred to KP # 144. Another reference to *nirodhasamāpatti* is in Pañcav$_D$ 70,14–71,7, yet another would seem to be in VkN III.3 (cf. DELEANU 2000: 72): *tathā pratisaṁlīyasva*[1] *yathā nirodhāc ca na vyuttiṣṭhasi sarveryāpatheṣu ca saṁdṛśyase*. But as far as I can see (after checking the entries for *nirodha*, *nirodhasamāpatti* and *saṁjñāveditanirodha* in *AA-I*) there is no occurrence of this concept in the Aṣṭ.

[1] Ed. °*yaś ca*, but see Tib. *nang du yang dag par gzhag par gyis shig*.

[2574] See, e.g., DN III 219(# li); SN IV 360 (no. 43.4); AN I 299 (no. 3.163); Daśo III.8; AKBh 449,7 (sūtra: cf. AKṬU P thu 119b6; D nyu 74b6); *suññatā cetovimutti* and *animittā cetovimutti*: MN I 297,35–298,4; abiding in *suññatā* in the sense of transcending all *nimitta*s: MN III 111,6-8. For the

b) a contemplation of the skandhas or of objects of desire as fleeting, deceitful and insubstantial, *comparable* to illusory phenomena (*māyopama*, etc.).

3. The most important text of the latter kind, the 'Sermon [in which the skandhas are described as] comparable to a lump of foam, [etc.]' (*Phenapiṇḍūpamasutta*),[2575] expressly describes a contemplation (*nijjhāyati ... upaparikkhati*) leading to detachment and liberation. What is emphasized in this text is, to be sure, merely the pithlessness, fickleness and unreliability of the skandhas (they appear to him as *rittaka*, *tucchaka*, *asāraka*). But the text employs as comparisons, side by side, both things patently devoid of substance (a lump of foam, a bubble, the hollow stem of a banana tree) and straightforward illusory phenomena (a fata morgana, an illusion created by magic), and this fact tends to efface the borderline between contemplating things as lacking substance and viewing them as mere illusions.[2576]

4. I do not hesitate to claim that the aforementioned two elements of traditional spiritual practice are essential parts of the 'matrix' from which illusionism could develop, in whatever context and for whatever reason(s), and I am convinced that this justifies the assumption of a *significant* genetic relation, albeit not necessarily a direct one. It may be worth mentioning in this connection that the *Larger Prajñāpāramitā*[2577] contains in fact a passage reshuffling the *Phenapiṇḍopamasūtra* into a pattern of contemplation for the bodhisattva practising the "perfection of insight" (*prajñāpāramitā*).

597.2. To claim a purely theoretical motivation for the development of an illusionist stance by regarding Nāgārjuna's *Mūlamadhyamakakārikā* as representing or reflecting the original motivation — if this is what Franco (2009: 108) intends by his reference to this text — appears still more hazardous than starting from the earliest versions of the *Prajñāpāramitā* texts, unless the common assumption of the chronological priority of the latter could be disproved. But even in this case one may ask whether Nāgārjuna would have thought and argued the way he does without the 'matrix' of certain more radical spiritual practices and attitudes in the earlier Buddhist tradition,[2578] which probably formed the deeper layer, so to speak, of his motivation to refute the ontological consolidations and reifications of mainstream Abhidharma.

598.0. To the aforementioned theories, I should like to add a theoretical radicalization of the concept of pain or suffering (*dukkha*/*duḥkha*) as testified to in a number of Abhidharma texts.

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importance of transcending *nimitta*s in the Aṣṭ see, e.g., Aṣṭ 6,15ff (KARASHIMA 2011: 12f; FALK & KARASHIMA 2012: 56), for the triad *śūnyatā*, *ānimitta*, *apraṇihita* Aṣṭ 170,11f (KARASHIMA 2011: 323,2); 173,7f and 183ff and DELEANU 2000: 69 and 74 as well as 2013: 898 n. 44, for a detailed discussion of the meaning of *apraṇihita* DELEANU 2000: 93–95 (n. 23).

2575 SN 22.95; $SĀ_C$ no. 265; T 2.105 and 106; AKṬU P tu 273a3–275a3 (D ju 239a2–240b6; HAKAMAYA 2006: (5)–(10)); see also ASBh 19,25f. Cf. VETTER 2000: 241–244.

2576 For a similar mixture, cf. also Vajr # 62a (p. 62,1-4; transl.: p. 92; SCHOPEN 1989: 107 fol. 12b1f; transl.: p. 131).

2577 Aṣṭād (1974) 65f; $Pañcav_K$ VI-VIII: 80f. Cf. also PrasP 41,9ff and 549,2ff; *Bodhicittavivaraṇa* vs. 12–13 (LINDTNER 1982: 188f).

2578 Cf., in this connection, also the rejection of all views or positions in texts like the *Aṭṭhakavagga* (see GÓMEZ 1976; VETTER 1990: 44ff).

598.1. In the canon and also in most of the Abhidharma traditions, it is a matter of course that feelings *as feelings* are of three kinds, i.e., they may be painful (*dukkha*), pleasant (*sukha*), or neither painful nor pleasant (*adukkhāsukha*, i.e., neutral). In the context of the 'not-self contemplation', however, all the five 'items of appropriation' (*upādānakkhandha*) are stated to be *dukkha* on account of their impermanence,[2579] and in other sermons the same is stated of all conditioned things (*saṅkhāra*),[2580] or of everything (*sabba*),[2581] in most cases expressly with the spiritual motive of generating detachment from them. Of course, just like "all conditioned things" or "everything", so also the five *upādānakkhandhas* declared to be *dukkha* comprise also feelings (*vedanā*), and not only painful feelings but *all* feelings, including pleasant and neutral ones. Occasionally, this is explicitly emphasized.[2582] To qualify even these feelings as *dukkha* no doubt sounds contrary to the everyday view of things, but it should be clear that in this generalized use the meaning of *dukkha* shifts, in view of its being derived from mere impermanence, from "painful" to "unsatisfactory", "ultimately insufficient and disappointing", applicable to everything impermanent, and that the purpose of this shift is to promote detachment. In one text, this tendency is carried one step further in that the monk is even enjoined to regard the *pleasant* feelings in particular as *painful*,[2583] and not merely in the sense of impermanence (reserved, in this text, for the contemplation of neutral feelings), but in a more serious sense, perhaps by way of anticipating the frustration or painful consequences they entail.[2584] Still, even in this case the text explicitly states that the purpose is to cut off desire.[2585]

598.2. Some Abhidharma masters,[2586] however, proceeded to a *theoretical* denial of pleasant feelings as such. According to these masters,[2587] there *are* no pleasant feelings; *all* feelings are exclusively *painful* in the strict sense of the word, for what is felt as pleasant is either a mere remedy of pain (*duḥkhapratikāra*) or just another kind of pain (*duḥkhavikalpa*). Similar ideas are also found in the poems of Aśvaghoṣa.[2588] Whatever the original context or motive(s) of this counterintuitive doctrinal fixation, it could hardly have originated without the aforementioned canonical passages recommending a deliberate perception or contempla-

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2579 MN I 232f, Vin I 14, etc. (see fn. 2562[1.], second pattern); cf. also Vin I 10,30; ŚrBh$_{Tai}$ II 118,6.

2580 AN I 286 (no. 3.134); Dhp 277–279 (Th 676–678; Uv 12.5–8, etc.).

2581 SN IV 28 (nos. 35.43–45); SĀ$_c$ no. 196.

2582 SN IV 216,20–217,3 (no. 36.11; SĀ$_c$ no. 473 and 474 [121a20-28]; cf. AKBh 330,10f and 331,5f; AKṬU P thu 37b6–38a5; D nyu 6a2-7); SN IV 204f (no. 36.2, cf. Sn vs. 738f).

2583 SN IV 207 (no. 36.5): *sukhā ... vedanā dukkhato daṭṭhabbā*. Cf. SĀ$_c$ no. 467; AKṬU P thu 39a5–b3 (D nyu 7a3-7; cf. AKBh 330,11 (read *sukhā ve°* with AKVy) and 331,13f; CSL 282b20-22.

2584 I.e., in the sense of what in other places is called *vipariṇāmaduḥkhatā* (cf. S 1977: 919f).

2585 SN IV 207,10-15: *yato kho ... bhikkhuno sukhā vedanā dukkhato diṭṭhā hoti ..., ayaṁ vuccati ... bhikkhu sammaddaso acchejji* (v.l. *acchecchi*) *taṇhaṁ vivaṭṭayi saṁyojanaṁ ... antam akāsi dukkhassā ti.*

2586 "Śrīlāta and others" according to Yaśomitra (AKVy 518,21) and Pūrṇavardhana (YAMABE 2003: 235 with n. 26).

2587 AKBh 330,9-19; *Pañcavastukavibhāṣā* (T 28.1556) 994c5-18; NA 663a5-29; CSL 281c16–283b9; cf. Kv II.6 and Kv-a 57f; Vi 402c16-29 (Vi$_2$ 300b24–c5; Vi$_3$ 474b3-11); 714c2f; S 1977: 922f. Cf. KATŌ J. 1989: 183–197; HARADA 1996: 147f; KRITZER 1999: 130–136; YAMABE 2003: 234f.

2588 YAMABE 2003: 235f; HONJŌ 1987: 394–392 rl = (88)–(90) (# 1.4).

tion of all feelings as *dukkha* or, particularly, of pleasant feelings as painful,[2589] and it is probably not sheer coincidence that the aforementioned denial of pleasant feeling and some of the arguments to support it are also found in a Chinese meditation manual compiled by Kumārajīva (ca. 344–409) from Indian meditation manuals.[2590] The view that all feelings are essentially painful would thus seem to be another instance of a *significant* (though not necessarily 'direct') genetic dependence of a theoretical position on a spiritual practice.

599.1. Among the additional theories adduced by Franco, only a few fall under the category of the theories I am concerned with. One of the most interesting cases is the theory that dharmas exist not only when they are present but also when they have disappeared into the past or when they are still in the future; in other words: the theory that all dharmas exist (*sarvāstivāda*): the past, the present and the future ones. This position is, of course, counter-intuitive only with regard to the past and future entities. Franco's (2009: 101) assumption that it is not based on meditative practice sounds quite plausible, since in a sense this theory may indeed appear to run counter to the traditional emphasis on impermanence and could even be charged with having some similarity to Sāṅkhya ontology.[2591] Still, Franco's proof is not beyond doubt. For he only quotes the motives adduced by Vasubandhu, i.e., by an author who lived centuries after the origination of the theory, so that we cannot be perfectly sure whether the information supplied by him has preserved the original context and motive(s). In order to reach certainty, we would rather have to trace the original context itself, which may prove impossible. In any case, it would be necessary to carefully sift the earlier sources,[2592] but to do so would would take me too far afield.[2593]

599.2. Still, even a cursory glance at the presumably earliest available source from proponents of this theory, the *Vijñānakāya*, yields a somewhat surprising picture. The respective section of this text (VijñK 531a23–537a26) also includes, to be sure, the argument that when the basic unwholesome factors (**akuśalamūla*) entail karma producing a painful result (**vipāka*) in the future, this can only be explained if past and/or future dharmas exist.[2594] And the text also presupposes theoretical axioms like the principle that two cognitive events (**citta*) cannot arise simultaneously in one and the same person,[2595] or the principle that cognitive acts cannot arise without an (existing) objective support.[2596] But what strikes one most is the fact that the great majority of the arguments are, apart from being based on sūtra passages, concerned with issues of spiritual practice. To indicate just a few examples:

[2589] Cf. the quotation of the respective canonical passages in support of this theory in AKBh 330,10f, CSL 282b20-22, T 28.1556: 994c7f and NA 663a26 and 28f.

[2590] YAMABE 2003: 237f.

[2591] Cf. AKBh 297,4 and 301,1.

[2592] I.e., as far as I can see, the *Vijñānakāya* (cf. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1925: 343–358) and the *Mahāvibhāṣā* (cf. DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1936–1937), but also Kv I.6–7.

[2593] There is plenty of secondary literature on historical as well as doctrinal and philosophical aspects of the *sarvāstivāda*: see DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN & LODRÖ SANGPO 2012: II 1803f.

[2594] VijñK 531b17–c4; 532a23–b10. Cf. also 536c15–537a11 (contemplation of the six kinds of *vijñāna* as impermanent, unsatisfactory, etc.), and 537a12-26 (eradication of the contaminants (**āsrava*)).

[2595] VijñK 531b7f: 有一補特伽羅非前非後二心和合。一是所觀。一是能觀。此不應理。

[2596] VijñK 535a8–b9, esp. b8f: 言決定有無所緣心 不應道理。

a) the argument that the contemplation (and recognition) of the basic unwholesome factors, which is indispensable for liberation, is not possible while they are present and can only objectify them while they are past or future because two cognitive events (one being the object and another the subject of contemplation) cannot occur simultaneously in one person (531a27–b17; 532a4-23);

b) the argument that for the same reason the application of mindfulness to the mind and its various states or to the presence and absence of mental factors obstructing or favouring spiritual progress would be impossible (VijñK 533a4–534a5);

c) the argument that in the case of a person whose body belongs to the *kāmadhātu* but who is an arhat and has entered *nirodhasamāpatti* could not be a person with few wishes (**alpeccha*), because having few wishes is a dharma associated with the mind and hence not present in *nirodhasamāpatti*, and thus can exist in that person only as a past and/or future dharma (VijñK 535c23–536a6; cf. 536a7-19).

It is obvious that these arguments are theoretical *reflections on* how certain essential elements of spiritual practice are possible at all. Even so, if these arguments may be taken to mirror, somehow, the motive(s) that gave rise to the *sarvāstivāda*, the origination of this doctrine, too, was related much more closely to spiritual practice than later sources suggest.

600. As regards the Yogācāra theory of the three *lakṣaṇa*s or *svabhāva*s (cf. FRANCO 2009: 117) as well as that of the three forms of *niḥsvabhāvatā*, they may not have a significant genetic relation to meditative practice, but this need not mean that there are no spiritual concerns at all behind the curtain (see § 585).

601. Another issue addressed by Franco is the *tathāgatagarbha* theory, the idea of a Buddha, or Buddha-nature, within every sentient being.

1. Franco (2009: 118f) quotes, with approval, Zimmermann's (2002: 75) statement that we simply cannot know whether the idea resulted from a novel meditative experience or from philosophical problems. But one of the earliest texts using the term *tathāgatagarbha* is the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra*, and there is also a kind of precursor, the *Tathāgatotpattisaṁbhava-nirdeśa*,[2597] propounding a similar idea: the idea that the Wisdom of a Buddha (*tathāgata-jñāna*) is, in a hidden form, fully present in every sentient being. Both texts are unambiguous in declaring that it is due to the presence of the hidden Buddha-nature or Buddha-wisdom in all sentient beings that they all may actually attain Buddhahood in the future. Thus, the idea, to be sure, may not have arisen as a metaphysical foundation for an already existing meditative or even visionary experience (at any rate there is, to my knowledge, no evidence pointing in this direction), but its introduction is expressly connected with a new concept of the *spiritual goal*, viz., the attainment of Buddhahood by all sentient beings. Zimmermann (2002: 77) himself suggests that one motive (among others) for introducing the idea of *tathāgatagarbha* may have been the need to explain why the *ekayāna* movement (as represented by the *Lotus sūtra*) could declare Buddhahood to be the only form of final emancipation and accessible to all. The *tathāgatagarbha* concept (and in a sense already the idea of the *tathāgatajñāna* as set forth in the *Tathāgatotpattisaṁbhavanirdeśa*) would have supplied this claim with a metaphysical basis. Thus, the idea seems to be closely related to a spiritual context, though in a way considerably different from the cases dealt with in §§ 594–598.

[2597] See the quotation in RGVV 22,10–24,8.

2. It may, by the way, be worth mentioning that both in the *Tathāgatagarbhasūtra* and in the *Tathāgatotpattisaṁbhavanirdeśa* the hidden, unnoticed presence of Buddhahood or Buddha-wisdom in all sentient beings is, indeed, the object of a direct, supranormal experience: not, however, of human meditators but of the Tathāgata. Yet, I agree that this has nothing to do with the historical origin of these ideas but is rather a stratagem of religious authorization, of conferring authenticity on an idea, comparable to, e.g., the verification of rebirth chain or the karma doctrine by the Buddha or advanced meditators in the fourth *dhyāna* as described in the early canonical texts (FRANCO 2009: 97).

602. The concept of the 'transformation (or transmutation, renewal) of the basis' (*āśraya-parivṛtti*) (FRANCO 2009: 117) does not refer to a philosophical theory of the kind I had in mind. It is rather a description (or 'description', and in that sense a theory) of the fundamental transformation a person undergoes in the course of spiritual practice, especially on the advanced levels. Still, if, as the *Śrāvakabhūmi* suggests,[2598] the starting point of the concept was to indicate a gradual removal of corruption/inertness (*dauṣṭhulya*) in body and mind and its replacement with ease (*praśrabdhi*) in the course of meditative practice, the original idea may not be far from describing an experience (unless one supposes that Buddhist monks did not meditate at all, or at least not with any success worth mentioning). This would not, of course, exclude that subsequent reinterpretations of the concept were determined by theoretical, systematic considerations.

603. It may be worth mentioning that Franco, for whatever reason, does not refer to my hypothesis concerning the origination of the Yogācāra concept of *ālayavijñāna*. As can be gleaned from Pt. I of this study, I have, in S 1987, tried to show that this concept may have been introduced in connection with doctrinal and, particularly, *exegetical* considerations concerning a specific state of concentrative absorption, viz., *nirodhasamāpatti*. My hypothesis was developed in explicit contrast to the opinion of some Japanese scholars according to whom the idea of *ālayavijñāna* is the conceptualization of a direct psychological experience in the course of yogic practice.[2599] Interestingly enough, precisely this latter opinion has recently been defended by N. YAMABE (see Pt. I § 8) with serious arguments deserving careful consideration.

604. In conclusion, let me assert that I fully agree with Franco in that the problem of the relation of philosophical theory, or metaphysics, on the one hand and spiritual practices and concerns on the other is much more complicated than it may appear from at least certain phrases of my former article, and that each case should be investigated and assessed separately and with great care. I may have overstated my point in my former paper, but in my opinion Franco falls to the other extreme, throwing the baby out with the bathwater. Should my thesis be more convincing in its present form, this would not least be thanks to the criticism raised against its earlier formulation.

[2598] SAKUMA 1990 I, especially pp. 27–31; 2011: 41.

[2599] S 1987: 180–182 (# 7.4).

Abbreviations:

a) Sigla:

[A], [B], [M], [S]: see Pt. II § 346.

Bo, Bu, Dh, Hs (Hs_{Sa}, Hs_{MSg}), Pa, Tib (Tib_{MSg}, Tib_{Sa}) TH: see Pt. II §§ 344–345.

Bh (Bh_{Dh}, Bh_{Hs}, Bh_{Pa}, Bh_{t}): see Pt. II, ch. 5.2.1 and ch. 5.2.2.

Bych: see Pt. II, ch. 5.4

Jñg: see Pt. II, ch. 5.3

[S1], [S2], [S3], [S4]: see Pt. II § 352.

[S5], [S6A], [S6B]: see Pt. II § 357.5.

[S7]: see Pt. II § 461.

U (U_c, U_t): see Pt. II § 394.

ⓣ: see Pt. II § 356.1

ⓧ, ⓨ : see Pt. II §§ 343–345

b) Special Symbols and Abbreviations:

§	paragraph (used exclusively in references to paragraphs of the present study!).
#	paragraph (in primary or secondary sources quoted in the present study)
B	BUESCHER 2008
bahuv.	Bahuvrīhi
c (subcribed)	Chinese translation
ch(s).	chapter(s) of the present study
IP	'Initial Passage': see Pt. I § 25
lr	pagination from left to right
M1	MATSUMOTO 2003
M2	MATSUMOTO 2004
My.	see CSCD (in Abbreviations **d**)
Obj	grammatical object
PredN	predicate noun
rec	Reconstruction
rl	pagination from right to left
S (+ year)	SCHMITHAUSEN (see References)
Subj	grammatical subject
t (subscribed)	Tibetan translation
tatp.	tatpuruṣa
Vb	Verb

c) Primary Sources:

AAĀ	*Abhisamayālaṁkārālokā* of Haribhadra
$AAĀ_V$	*Abhisamayālaṁkārālokā*, ed. P.L. VAIDYA, Darbhanga 1960
$AAĀ_W$	*Abhisamayālaṃkār'ālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*, ed. Unrai WOGIHARA, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1932–1935.
AAmṛt	*Abhidharmāmṛtarasa* of Ghoṣaka: T 28.1553.
AAvat	*Abhidharmāvatāra* of Skandhila: T 28.1554. Tibetan version in: VAN VELTHEM 1977: 81–109.
Abh	*Abhidhānappadīpikā*, ed. W. SUBHŪTI, Colombo 1900 (quoted from CSCD).
ĀbhGN	*Ābhiprāyikagāthānirdeśa* in the *Cintāmayī bhūmi* of the *Yogācārabhūmi*, ed. Takashi MAEDA, in: *Bunka* 55.1-2 (1991): 101–71 (= *62–92*). Revised reprint see $ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II: Appendix IV.
ADī	*Abhidharmadīpa* with *Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*, ed. Padmanabh S. JAINI, Patna 1959.
ADīVṛ	*Vṛtti* (*Vibhāṣāprabhāvṛtti*) on ADī (q.v.).
$AHṛd_1$	**Abhidharmahṛdaya* of Dharmaśreṣṭhin, transl. Gautama Saṅghadeva: T 28.1550.
$AHṛd_2$	**Abhidharmahṛdaya* (commented upon) by Upaśānta, transl. Narendrayaśas: T 28.1551.
AK	Vasubandhu: *Abhidharmakośa(-kārikā)*; ed. see AKBh.
AKBh	Vasubandhu: *Abhidharmakośa-bhāṣya*, ed. P(rahlad) PRADHAN, Patna 1967. EJ. = *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu. Chapter I: Dhātunirdeśa, ed. by Yasunori EJIMA. Tokyo: Sankibo 1989. LEE = *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya* of Vasubandhu. Chapter IX: Ātmavādapratiṣedha, ed. by Jong Cheol LEE with critical notes by the late Prof. Yasunori EJIMA. Tokyo: Sankibo 2005. LO.SA. = DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN & LODRÖ SANGPO 2012.
$AKBh_{Hs}$	Chinese transl. of AKBh by Hsüan-tsang: T 29.1558.
$AKBh_{Pa}$	Chinese transl. of AKBh by Paramārtha: T 19.1559.
$AKBh_{LVP}$	see DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN 1923–1931.
$AKBh_t$	*Chos mngon pa'i mdzod kyi bshad pa* (Tibetan transl. of AKBh): Tj P no. 5591, mngon-pa'i bstan-bcos, gu 27b6–ngu 109a8 (vol. 115: 127–283); D no. 4090, mngon pa, ku 26b1–khu 95a7.
AKṬT	Sthiramati: *Abhidharmakośabhāṣya-ṭīkā Tattvārthā nāma*: Tj P no. 5875, ngo-mtshar bstan-bcos, to 1–tho 565a8 (vol. 146:193–147:282); D no. 4421, sna tshogs, tho 1–do 387a7.
AKṬU	Śamathadeva: *Abhidharmakośa-ṭīkā Upāyikā (nāma)*: Tj P no. 5595, mngon-pa'i bstan-bcos, tu 1–thu 144a7 (vol.118: 97–275); D no. 4094, mngon pa, ju 1–nyu 95a7.
AKVy	Yaśomitra: *Sphuṭārthā Abhidharmakośavyākhyā*, ed. Unrai WOGIHARA, reprint Tokyo 1971.
AN	*Aṅguttaranikāya*, ed. R. MORRIS, E. HARDY. London: PTS 1885–1900.
Ap	*Apadāna*, ed. M.E. LILLEY, London: PTS 1925–1927.
Ap-a	*Visuddhajanavilāsinī* (*Apadāna-aṭṭhakathā*), ed. C.E. GODAKUMBURA, London: PTS 1954.
ĀP	Dignāga: *Ālambanaparīkṣā*, ed. E. FRAUWALLNER, *WZKSO* 3(1959): 157–161 (= FRAUWALLNER 1982: 833–837).

AS	*Abhidharmasamuccaya* of Asaṅga, ed. Pralhad PRADHAN, Santiniketan 1950.
AS$_{G}$	V.V. GOKHALE: "Fragments from the Abhidharmasamuccaya of Asaṅga, in: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society, Bombay Branch*, N.S. 23 (1947): 13–38.
AS$_{Li}$	LI Xuezhu: "Diplomatic Transcription of Newly Available Leaves from Asaṅga's *Abhidharmasamuccaya* —Folios 1, 15, 18, 20, 23, 24—", in *ARIRIAB* 16 (2013): 241–253.
AS$_{t}$	*Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa* (Tibetan transl. of AS): Tj P no. 5550, sems-tsam, li 51a2–141b2 (vol. 112: 236–272); D no. 4049, sems-tsam, ri 44b1–120a7.
ASBh	*Abhidharmasamuccaya-bhāṣya*, ed. Nathmal TATIA, Patna 1976.
ASBh$_{t}$	*Chos mngon pa kun las btus pa'i bshad pa* (Tibetan transl. of ASBh): Tj P no. 5554, sems-tsam, shi 1–143b2 (vol. 113: 83–141); D no. 4053, sems-tsam, li 1–117a5.
Asl	*Atthasālinī Dhammasaṅganī-aṭṭhakathā*, ed. E. MÜLLER. London: PTS 1897 (rev. ed. 1979).
Aṣṭ	*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. P.L. VAIDYA, Darbhanga 1960.
Aṣṭ$_{L}$	Lokakṣema's (active ca. 170–190: HARRISON 1990: vii) Chinese translation of the Aṣṭ: T 8.224; crit. ed. in KARASHIMA 2011.
Aṣṭ$_{ms}$	*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, A Sanskrit Manuscript from Nepal, reproduced by Lokesh CHANDRA, New Delhi 1981.
Aṣṭ$_{t}$	*'Phags pa Shes rab kyi pha rol tu phyin pa brgyad stong pa* (Tibetan transl. of Aṣṭ): Kj P no. 734: sher-phyin, mi 1b1–312a8; D. no. 12: sher-phyin, ka 1b1–286a6; S no. 15, vol. 50 (ka): 1b1–407b4.
Aṣṭ$_{W}$	*Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. U. WOGIHARA: s. AAĀ$_{W}$
Aṣṭād	*Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*. Ed. Edward CONZE: The Gilgit Manuscript of the Aṣṭādaśasāhasrikāprajñāpāramitā. Chapters 55 to 70: Roma, IsMEO 1962; chapters 70 to 82: ibid. 1974.
ASVy$_{C}$	**Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* (Chinese): T 31.1606.
ASVy$_{t}$	**Abhidharmasamuccaya-vyākhyā* (Tibetan): Tj P no. 5555, sems-tsam, shi 143b2–362a8 (vol. 113: 141–229); D no. 4054, sems-tsam, li 117a5–293a7. ASVy$_{c}$ andASVy$_{t}$ contain the text of AS interspersed with the respective parts of a commentary that is substantially the same as ASBh but with a few additions. On the complicated question of authorship and on the Tibetan translations of ASBh and ASVy, see BAYER 2010: 41–44 and the meticulous discussion in VAN DER KUIJP 2013: 1402–1419.
AVinSū	*Arthaviniścayasūtra*: N.H. SAMTANI, (ed.): *The Arthaviniścayasūtra & Its Commentary (Nibandhana)*, Patna 1971.
AVinSūN	*Arthaviniścayasūtranibandhana* of Vīryaśrīdatta. Ed. see AVinSū.
BBhU	T 26.1530: **Buddhabhūmy-upadeśa*, ascribed to *Bandhuprabha (親光) et al. and transl. (probably: compiled) by Hsüan-tsang.
BBhVy	*Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna*, ed. Kyoo NISHIO: The Buddhabhūmi-sūtra and the Buddhabhūmi-vyākhyāna of Çīlabhadra, Pt. I, Tokyo: Kokusho Kankokai 1982.
BhāvBh	*Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh of the YBh, quoted according to YBh$_{ms}$; cf. SUGAWARA 2010.
BoBh	*Bodhisattvabhūmi* (of the MauBh of the YBh, or, if specified accordingly, of the VinSg).
BoBh$_{D}$	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. Nalinaksha DUTT, Patna 1966.
BoBhVin	*Bodhisattvabhūmi* of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*: YBh$_{t}$ P zi 300a6–'i 136b8; D zhi 285a6–zi 121b6; YBh$_{c}$ 694c18–747b26.

$BoBh_W$	*Bodhisattvabhūmi*, ed. Unrai WOGIHARA, Tokyo 1930–36.
BoBhVy	*Bodhisattvabhūmi-vyākhyā* of rGya mtsho sprin (*Sāgara- or *Samudra-megha): Tj P no. 5548, sems-tsam, ri 1-425a6 (vol. 112: 43–214); Tj D yi 1b1–338a7.
BuCar	Aśvaghoṣa: *Buddhacarita*, ed. E.H. JOHNSTON, reprint Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass 1972 (1st ed.: Lahore 1936).
CSL	Harivarman: *Ch'eng-shih lun* (成實論: T 32.1646), usually reconstructed as **Tattva-* or **Satyasiddhi*. WILLEMEN's proposal *Jñānakāyaprodbhūtopadeśa* (in: *Journal of Buddhist Studies* 4/2006: 244–250, on the basis of a Chinese transliteration) sounds rather strange, and the matter would seem to be in need of reconsideration.
CPS	Ernst WALDSCHMIDT: *Das Catuṣpariṣatsūtra. Eine kanonische Lehrschrift über die Begründung der buddhistischen Gemeinde*. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1952 (I), 1957 (II), 1962 (III).
CWSL	*Ch'eng wei-shih lun* (成唯識論): T 31.1585, compiled by Hsüan-tsang (玄奘). LVP = DE LA VALLÉE POUSSIN 1928–1929. For an English translation, see COOK 1999 (indicating the page and column of T 31.1585 in the margin).
$D\bar{A}_c$	*Dīrghāgama*, Chinese translation: T 1.1
Daśo	*Daśottarasūtra*. Ed. Kusum MITTAL: *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus*, I: Fragmente des *Daśottarasūtra* aus zentralasiatischen Handschriften [I–VIII], and Dieter SCHLINGLOFF: *Dogmatische Begriffsreihen im älteren Buddhismus*, Ia: *Daśottarasūtra* IX–X. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1957, 1962.
DBhS	*Daśabhūmika-sūtra*. For ms. A and ms. B see MATSUDA 1996.
$DBhS_K$	*Daśabhūmīśvaro nāma Mahāyānasūtraṁ*, ed. Ryūkō KONDŌ, Tokyo 1936.
$DBhS_R$	*Daśabhūmikasūtra*, ed. Johannes RAHDER. Paris, Louvain 1926.
$DBhS_t$	Tibetan translations of the DBhS: a) Kj P no. 761.31, phal-chen, li 49a5–168a6 (vol. 25: 1–45); S no. 10.31, vol. 31 (phal-chen, ga) 63a2–210a7; b) S no. 38, vol. 54 (mdo-sde, ga) 31b2–151b2.
Dhp	*Dhammapada*, ed. O. VON HINÜBER and K.R. NORMAN. Oxford: PTS 1994. Quoted by verse number.
Dhp-a	*Dhammapada-aṭṭhakathā*, ed. H.C. NORMAN, London: PTS 1906–1914.
Dhs	*Dhammasaṅgaṇi*, ed. E. MÜLLER. London: PTS 1885.
DhSk	*Dharmaskandha*: T 26.1537.
$DhSk_D$	*Fragmente des Dharmaskandha*, ed. Siglinde DIETZ. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1984.
Divy	*Divyāvadāna*, ed. P.L. VAIDYA. Darbhanga 1959.
DN	*Dīghanikāya*, ed. T.W. RHYS DAVIDS and J.E. CARPENTER, London: PTS 1890–1911.
$E\bar{A}_c$	*Ekottarikāgama*, Chinese translation: T 2.125
Garbh	*Garbhāvakrāntisūtra*: see § 60.4 with fn. 336. In the case of the extended version ($Garbh_I$, $GarbhV_c$, $GarbhV_t$), page/folio numbers refer to the middle part only (cf. KRITZER 2009: 77), i.e., the account of conception and gestation.
$Garbh_{Bo}$	T 11.310 (*Ratnakūṭa*) no 13 (322a–326b): 佛為阿難說處胎會, transl. by Bodhiruci.
$Garbh_{Dh}$	T 11.317: 胞胎經, transl. by Dharmarakṣa (竺法護).
$Garbh_I$	T 11.310 no. 14 (328a4–335b2):入胎藏會, transl. by I-ching (義淨)

$GarbhV_c$	Garbh contained in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, Chin. transl. by I-ching (義淨): T 24.1451: 253a16–260c1.
$GarbhV_t$	Garbh contained in the *Kṣudrakavastu* of the *Mūlasarvāstivāda-vinaya*, Tib. transl.: Kj P no. 1035, 'dul ba, de 119b8–145b7; D no. 6, 'dul ba, tha 124b6–153a1; S no. 6, vol. 9 ('dul ba, ta) 190a3–232a5.
GhVy	*Ghanavyūhasūtra*
$GhVy_{c1}$	Chinese translation of GhVy by Divākara: T 16.681.
$GhVy_{c2}$	Chinese translation of GhVy by Amoghavajra: T 16.682.
$GhVy_t$	*'Phags pa rgyan stug po bkod pa zhes bya ba theg pa chen po'i mdo*, Tibetan transl. of GhVy: Kj P no. 778, mdo sna-tshogs, cu 1–62b8 (vol. 29: 131–157); D no. 110, mdo-sde, cha 1–55b7; S no. 250, vol. 77 (mdo-sde, la) 291b4–370a6.
Gv	*Gaṇḍavyūhasūtra*, ed. P.L. VAIDYA, Darbhanga 1960.
HsienY	*Hsien-yang sheng-chiao lun* 顯揚聖教論: T 31.1602 (ascribed to Asaṅga, transl. by Hsüan-tsang).
It	*Itivuttaka*, ed. E. WINDISCH, London: PTS 1889.
It-a	*Paramatthadīpanī* (*Itivuttaka-aṭṭhakathā*), ed. M.M. BOSE, London: PTS 1934–1936.
Jā	*Jātaka, together with its Commentary*, ed. V. FAUSBØLL. London: PTS 1877–1896.
JñN	*Jñānaśrīmitranibandhāvali*, ed. Anantalal THAKUR, Patna: K.P.Jayaswal Research Institute 1959.
JP_S	*Jñānaprasthāna*, trans. (Gautama) Sanghadeva: T 26.1543.
JP_H	*Jñānaprasthāna*, trans. Hsüan-tsang: T 26.1544.
KP_{SH}	*Kāśyapaparivarta*, ed. A. von STAËL-HOLSTEIN, Shanghai 1926.
KP_{VD}	The *Kāśyapaparivarta*, Romanized Text and Facsimiles, ed. M.I. VOROBYOVA-DESYATOVSKAYA. Tokyo: IRIAB 2002.
KSi	Vasubandhu: *Karmasiddhi*, ed. Étienne LAMOTTE: "*Las grub pa'i rab tu byed pa.* Version tibétaine du *Karmasiddhiprakaraṇa*", in: *Mélanges Chinois et Bouddhiques* 4/1935–36: 183–205.
KSi_{Mu}	The Tibetan Text of the *Karma-siddhi-prakaraṇa* of Vasubandhu, with Reference to the *Abhidharma-kośa-bhāṣya* and the *Pratītya-samutpāda-vyākhyā*, crit. ed. by Gijin MUROJI. Kyoto 1985.
KSiṬ	*Las grub pa'i bshad pa* (*Karmasiddhi-ṭīkā*) of Sumatiśīla (Blo bzang ngang tshul): Tj P no. 5572, sems-tsam, ku 69a6–117b1 (vol. 114: 203–223); D no. 4071, sems-tsam, hi 63b1–102a5.
Kv	*Kathāvatthu*, ed. A. TAYLOR. London: PTS 1894–1897.
Kv-a	*Kathāvatthu* Commentary (*Pañcappakaraṇa-aṭṭhakathā* III), ed. N.A. JAYA-WICKRAMA, London: PTS 1979.
Laṅk	*Laṅkāvatārasūtra*, ed. Bunyiu NANJIO. Reprint Kyōto: Otani University Press 1956 (original ed. 1923).
$Laṅk_t$	*'Phags pa Lang kar gshegs pa'i theg pa chen po'i mdo* (Tibetan transl. of Laṅk): Kj P no. 775, mdo sna tshogs, vol. ngu: 60b7–208b2; D no. 107, mdo sde, ca 56a1–191b7.
Legs-sNying	Tsong kha pa: *Legs bshad snying po*, ed. in: The Collected Works (gSung 'bum) of rJe Tsoṅ-kha-pa Blo-bzaṅ-grags-pa, ed. Ngawang Gelek Demo, vol. 21,New Delhi 1979.
$MĀ_c$	Chinese translation of the *Madhyamāgama*: T 1.26.

MaiQ	'Maitreya's Questions': see CONZE and IIDA 1968.
MAlaṅP	Kamalaśīla: *Madhyamakālaṅkārapañjikā*, ed. in ICHIGO 1985.
ManoBh	*Manobhūmi* (= second chapter) of the MauBh of the YBh; ed. in YBh_{Bh}.11–72.
MauBh	The 'Basic Section' (*maulī bhūmiḥ* or *maulyo bhūmayaḥ*: see Pt. I § 1 with fn. 2) of the YBh.
MAvat	Candrakīrti: *Madhyamakāvatāra*, ed. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN, St. Pétersbourg 1912.
MAV(Bh)	*Madhyāntavibhāga(-bhāṣya)*, ed. Gadjin M. NAGAO, Tokyo 1964.
$MAVBh_t$	Tibetan translation of MAVBh: Tj P no. 5528, sems-tsam, bi 1–32b7 (vol. 108: 119–133); D no. 4027, sems-tsam, bi 1–27a7.
MAVṬ	Sthiramati: *Madhyāntavibhāga-ṭīkā*, ed. Susumu YAMAGUCHI, Nagoya 1934.
$MAVṬ_t$	Tibetan translation of MAVṬ: Tj P no. 5534, sems-tsam, tshi 19b7-170b8 (vol. 109: 136–196); D no. 4032, sems-tsam, bi 189b2–318a7.
MHṛd	Bhavya: *Madhyamakahṛdaya*; ed. see LINDTNER 2001.
Mil	*Milindapañha*, ed. V. TRENCKNER, London: PTS 1880.
Mil-ṭ	*Milindaṭīkā*, ed. P.S. JAINI, London: PTS 1961.
MiśAHṛd	**Miśraka-Abhidharmahṛdaya* (雜阿毘曇心論, often reconstructed as **Saṁyuktābhidharmahṛdaya*, as in DESSEIN 1999, but cf. AKVy 251,15): T 28.1552.
MMK	Nāgārjuna: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikāḥ*, ed. J. W. DE JONG. Adyar, Madras: The Adyar Library and Research Centre 1977. LVP = ed. of the Kārikā text in PrasP.
MN	*Majjhimanikāya*, ed. V. TRENCKNER, R. CHALMERS. London: PTS 1888–1899.
Mp	*Manorathapūraṇī Aṅguttaranikāyaṭṭhakathā*, ed. M. WALLESER, H. KOPP. London: PTS 1924–1956.
MPPU	**Mahāprajñāpāramitā-upadeśa* (大智度論), ascribed to Nāgārjuna: T 25.1509.
MPS	*Mahāparinirvāṇasūtra*, ed. Ernst WALDSCHMIDT, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1950, 1951.
MSA(Bh)	*Mahāyānasūtrālaṁkāra(-bhāṣya)*, ed. Sylvain LÉVI, Paris 1907.
$MSABh_t$	Tibetan translation of MSABh: Tj P no. 5527, sems-tsam, phi 135b7–287a8 (vol. 108: 56–117); D no. 4026, sems-tsam, phi 129b1–260a7.
MSg	*Mahāyānasaṁgraha* of Asaṅga. Quoted after LAMOTTE 1938 vol I. See also NAGAO 1982, 1987.
MSg_{Bu}	*Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, transl. by Buddhaśānta: T 31.1592
MSg_{Dh}	*Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, transl. by Dharmagupta: see $MSgBh_{Dh}$
MSg_{Hs}	*Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, transl. by Hsüan-tsang: T 31.1594
MSg_{Pa}	*Mahāyānasaṁgraha*, transl. by Paramārtha: T 31.1593
MSgBh	Vasubandhu: *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-bhāṣya*.
$MSgBh_{Dh}$	Chinese translation of MSgBh by Dharmagupta: T 31.1596.
$MSgBh_{Hs}$	Chinese translation of MSgBh by Hsüan-tsang: T 31.1597.
$MSgBh_{Pa}$	Chinese translation of MSgBh by Paramārtha: T 31.1595.
$MSgBh_t$	Tibetan translation of MSgBh: Tj P no. 5551, sems-tsam, li 141b2–232b5 (vol. 112: 272–309); D no. 4050, sems-tsam, ri 121b1–190a7.
MSgU	*Asvabhāva: *Mahāyānasaṁgraha-upanibandhana*.

$MSgU_c$	Chinese translation of MSgU by Hsüan-tsang: T 31.1598.
$MSgU_t$	Tibetan translation of MSgU: Tj P no. 5552, sems-tsam, li 232b5–356b7 (vol.113: 1–50); D. no. 4051, sems-tsam, ri 190b1–296a7.
MVu	*Mahāvastu*, ed. É. SENART. 3 vols. Paris 1882–1897.
MVy	*Mahāvyutpatti*, ed. R. SAKAKI. Kyoto 1916, with Sanskrit and Tibetan Indexes, 1925 and 1936.
MVy[ISH]	Yumiko ISHIHAMA and Yoichi FUKUDA: *A New Critical Edition of the Mahāvyutpatti*, Tokyo: The Toyo Bunko 1989.
NA	Saṅghabhadra: **Nyāyānusāra* (or °*sāriṇī*?) (阿毘達磨順正理論: T 29.1562).
Nett	*Nettipakaraṇa*, ed. E. HARDY, London: PTS 1902.
Nidd I	*Mahāniddesa*, ed. L. DE LA VALLEE POUSSIN and E.J. THOMAS, London: PTS 1916.
Nidd II (Nāl.)	*Cullaniddesa*, quoted from the ed. in the Nālandā-Devanāgarī-Pāli-Series, General Editor: Bhikkhu J. KASHYAP, Nālandā 1959.
NidSa	Chandrabhāl TRIPĀṬHĪ: *Fünfundzwanzig Sūtras des Nidānasaṁyukta.* Berlin: Akademie-Verlag 1962.
NirupBh	*Nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh of the YBh: ed. in S 1991a.
$Pañcav_D$	*Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. Nalinaksha DUTT, Calcutta 1934.
$Pañcav_K$	*Pañcaviṁśatisāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. Takayasu KIMURA, Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin 1986 (II–III); 1990 (IV); 1992 (V); 2006 (VI–VIII).
PañcBh	(= first chapter) of the MauBh of the YBh, ed. in YBh_{Bh}.2–10.
PañcMBhVin	*Viniścaya* of *Pañcavijñānakāyasaṁprayuktā Bhūmiḥ* + *Manobhūmi* (combined: in VinSg): YBh_t P zi 2a7–111b2; D zhi 1b3–107a4; YBh_c 579a10–620c21.
ParySg	*Paryāyasaṁgrahaṇī* section of the YBh.
Paṭis	*Paṭisambhidāmagga*, ed. A.C. TAYLOR, London: PTS 1905–1907.
Paṭis-a	*Saddhammappakāsinī* (*Paṭisambhidāmagga-aṭṭhakathā*), ed. C.V. JOSHI, London: PTS 1979.
PG	*Paramārthagāthāḥ* (in the *Cintāmayī Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh of the YBh), ed. with English transl. in WAYMAN 1961: 167–174; ed. and transl. of the Commentary ibid. 174–185; gāthās 28–41 re-edited with English transl. in S1987: 223–241.
PPU	Ratnākaraśānti: *Prajñāpāramitopadeśa*, ed. LUO Hong (forthcoming).
$Prak_G$	*Prakaraṇa*(*pāda*), transl. by Guṇabhadra and Bodhiyaśas: T 26.1541.
$Prak_H$	*Prakaraṇa*(*pāda*), transl. by Hsüan-tsang: T 26.1542.
PrasP	Candrakīrti: *Prasannapadā*, ed. in: *Mūlamadhyamakakārikās de Nāgārjuna avec la Prasannapadā Commentaire de Candrakīrti*, ed. Louis de LA VALLÉE POUSSIN, St.-Petersbourg 1913.
PratyS	*The Tibetan Text of the Pratyutpanna-buddha-saṁmukhāvasthita-samādhi-sūtra*, ed. Paul HARRISON, Tokyo: The Reiyukai Library 1978.
PrĀVNS	*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅganirdeśa-sūtra*, in: *Mahāyānasūtrasaṁgraha*, ed. P. L. VAIDYA, Darbhaṅga 1961: 117f.
Ps	*Papañcasūdanī Majjhimanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, ed. J. H. WOODS, D. KOSAMBI, I. B. HORNER. London: PTS 1922–1938.
Ps-pṭ	*Līnatthappakāsinī II* (Dhammapāla: *Papañcasūdanī-purāṇaṭīkā*). Quoted from CSCD (normally with reference to My.); Mūl. = Mūlapaṇṇāsa; Majjh. = Majjhimapaṇṇāsa; Upar. = Uparipaṇṇāsa.

PSk	Vasubandhu: *Pañcaskandhaka*, ed. LI Xuezhu and Ernst STEINKELLNER, with a contribution by Toru TOMABECHI. Vienna: Austrian Academy of Sciences, and Beijing: China Tibetology Research Center, 2008.
PSkBh	*Pañcaskandha(ka)-bhāṣya* of Sa'i rtsa lag (*Pṛthivībandhu, or *Vasubandhu?): Tj P no. 5569, sems-tsam, hi 101a7–231a8 (vol. 114: 42–94); D no. 4068, sems-tsam, si 32a1–139a7. Since the ascription to *Vasubandhu (if this is what Sa'i rts lag stands for) is hardly justified (unless a later author had the same name), I quote the text as *Pṛthivībandhu's Bhāṣya, to avoid confusion.
PSkV	Sthiramati: *Pañcaskandhaka-vibhāṣā*, ed. in KRAMER 2010: 121ff. Quoted acc. to the folios of the Sanskrit ms.
PSkV$_t$	Tibetan translation of PSkV: Tj P no. 5567, sems-tsam, hi 1–67b1 (vol.114: 1–29); D no. 4066, sems-tsam, shi 195b6–250a7.
PSkViv	Guṇaprabha: *Pañcaskandhaka-vivaraṇa* of Tj P no. 5568, sems-tsam, hi 67b1–101a7 (vol. 114: 29–42); D no. 4067, sems-tsam, si 1–31b7.
PSVy	Vasubandhu: *Pratītyasamutpāda-vyākhyā* (*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅga-nirdeśa*): Tj P no. 5496, mdo tshogs 'grel pa, chi 1–71a8 (vol. 104: 277–305); D no. 3995, mdo 'grel, chi 1–61a7.
PSVy$_{Tu}$	Giuseppe TUCCI: "A Fragment from the *Pratītya-samutpāda-vyākhyā* of Vasubandhu", reprinted in: Giuseppe TUCCI: *Opera Minora*, pt. I, Roma: Dott. Giovanni Bardi Editore 1971: 239–248. [Original ed. in: *Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society* 1930: 611–623.]
PSVyṬ	*Pratītyasamutpādavyākhyā-ṭīkā* (*Pratītyasamutpādādivibhaṅga-nirdeśa-ṭīkā*) of Guṇamati: Tj P no. 5497, mdo tshogs 'grel pa, chi 71a8–283b6 (vol.104:306–105: 33); D no. 3996, mdo 'grel, chi 61b1–237a7.
PVA	Prajñākaragupta: *Pramāṇavārttikālaṅkāra*, ed. Rāhula SĀṄKṚTYĀYANA, Patna 1953.
RGV(V)	*Ratnagotravibhāga(-vṛtti)*, ed. E.H. JOHNSTON: *Ratnagotravibhāga Mahāyānottaratantraśāstra*, Patna 1950.
ŚA	*Śāriputrābhidharma*: T 28.1548.
SĀ$_C$	*Saṁyuktāgama*, Chinese translation by Guṇabhadra (and Pao-yün 寶雲): T 2.99.
SacAcBh	*Sacittikā* and *Acittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the YBh, ed. in S1987: 221f.
SacBhVin	*Sacittikā Bhūmiḥ* of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*: YBh$_t$ P zi 189a7–190b6; D zhi 181b7–183b1; YBh$_C$ 651b5–652a6.
Sadd	*Saddanīti*, ed. Helmer SMITH, Lund 1954.
SamBh	*Samāhitā Bhūmiḥ* of the YBh, ed. in DELHEY 2009: I 125–228.
Saṁdh	*Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra*. Quotations (unless specified otherwise) refer to the edition of the Tibetan text in LAMOTTE 1935.
Saṁdh$_t$	Kj-version of the Tibetan translation of Saṁdh: Kj P no. 774, mdo sna tshogs, ngu 1b1–60b7 (vol. 29: 1–85); D no. 106, mdo-sde, ca 1–55b7; S no. 106, vol. 63 (mdo-sde, na) 1–80b1.
Saṁdh$_{Bo}$	Chinese translation of Saṁdh by Bodhiruci: T 16.675.
Saṁdh$_{Hs}$	Chinese translation of Saṁdh by Hsüan-tsang: T 16.676.
Saṁdh$_{TH}$	Tibetan translation of Saṁdh from Tun-huang (fragmentary), synoptic ed. in HAKAMAYA 1986a, 1987a and 1987b, reprinted in HAKAMAYA 2008: 697–606 lr = (84)–(175).
SaṁdhṬ$_C$	*Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra-ṭīkā* of Wŏn-ch'ŭk (圓測, Yüan-ts'ê): X 21.369.
SaṁdhṬ$_t$	Tibetan translation of SaṁdhṬ$_C$ (Ven-tshig = Wŏn-ch'ŭk): Tj P no. 5517, mdo tshogs 'grel pa, ti 1–di 198a5 (vol.106: 1–349); D no. 4016, mdo 'grel, ti 1–di 175a7.

SaṁdhVy	*Saṁdhinirmocanasūtra-vyākhyāna* of Byang chub rdzu 'phrul: Tj P no. 5845, ngo mtshar bstan bcos, co 1 – cho 217a2 (vols. 144: 191 – 145: 89); D no. 4358, sna tshogs, cho 1 – jo 183b7.
SāṁmitNŚ	*Sāṁmitīyanikāyaśāstra*: T 32.1649.
Saṅghabh	*The Gilgit Manuscript of the Saṅghabhedavastu*, Being the 17th and Last Section of the Vinaya of the Mūlasarvāstivādins, ed. Raniero GNOLI, Rome: Is.M.E.O. 1977 (pt. I), 1978 (pt. II).
SaṅgP	*Saṅgītiparyāya*: T 26.1536. For Sanskrit fragments and a complete translation of the Chinese text see STACHE-ROSEN 1968.
Sār	*Sāratamā*, A Pañjikā on the Aṣṭasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā sūtra by Ācārya Ratnākaraśānti, ed. Padmanabh S. JAINI, Patna 1979.
Śat	*Śatasāhasrikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. Pratāpacandra GHOṢA, Calcutta 1902.
SAṬ	*Asvabhāva: *Sūtrālaṁkāra-ṭīkā*: Tj P no. 5530, sems-tsam, bi 45a5–196a7 (vol. 108: 138–198); D no. 4029, sems-tsam, bi 38b6–174a7.
SAVBh	Sthiramati: *Sūtrālaṁkāra-vṛtti-bhāṣya* (doubtful title, re-sanskritized from Tib. *mDo sde'i rgyan gyi 'grel bshad*?): Tj no. 5531, sems-tsam, mi 1 – tsi 308a8 (vol. 108:199 – 109:125); D no. 4034, sems-tsam, mi 1 – tsi 266a7. Sthiramati's authorship has recently been called into question with serious arguments: cf. UENO Yasuhiro in *IBK* 60.1 [125]: 449–445 rl = (110)–(114) and 60.3 [127]: 1346 (no. 78).
SavitBh	*Savitarkasavicārādibhūmi*: third chapter of the YBh, comprising Bhūmis 3–5: *Savitarkā savicārā Bhūmiḥ*, *Avitarkā vicāramātrā Bhūmiḥ*, and *Avitarkāvicārā Bhūmiḥ*. SavitBh of the MauBh: ed. in YBh_{Bh} 73–232.
Śikṣ	Śāntideva: *Śikṣāsamuccaya*, ed. Cecil BENDALL, St. Petersburg 1902; reprint s'Gravenhage 1957.
Śikṣ_{t}	Tibetan transl. of Śikṣ: Tj P no. 5336, dbu-ma, ki 3a8–225a7 (vol. 102: 183–272); D no. 3940, dbu-ma, khi 3a2–194b5.
Sn	*Suttanipāta*, ed. D. ANDERSEN & H. SMITH. London: PTS 1913. Quoted by verse number unless specified otherwise.
SN	*Saṁyuttanikāya*, ed. L. FEER, London: PTS 1884–1898. SOM. = SN I, ed. G. A. SOMARATNE, Oxford: PTS 1998.
Sn-a	*Paramatthajotikā II Suttanipātaṭṭhakathā*, ed. H. SMITH. London: PTS 1916–1918.
SopBh	*Sopadhikā Bhūmiḥ* of the MauBh of the YBh, ed. in S1991a.
SopNBhVin	*Sopadhikā and Nirupadhikā Bhūmiḥ* of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī*, ed. and transl. into German in S 1969: 40–71.
Sp	*Samantapāsādikā Vinayaṭṭhakathā*, ed. J. TAKAKUSU & M. NAGAI. London: PTS 1924–1947.
Spk	*Sāratthappakāsinī Saṁyuttanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, ed. F. L. WOODWARD. London: PTS 1929–1937.
Spk-pṭ	*Līnatthappakāsinī III* (Dhammapāla: *Sāratthappakāsinī-purāṇaṭīkā*). Quoted from CSCD (with reference to My.)
ŚrBh_{Sh}	*Śrāvakabhūmi* of Ācārya Asaṅga, ed. Karunesha SHUKLA, Patna 1973.
ŚrBh_{Tai} I, II	*Śrāvakabhūmi*, Revised Sanskrit Text and Japanese Translation. Śrāvakabhūmi Study Group, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taishō University. Tokyo: Sankibo. I = first chapter (1998), II = second chapter (2007).
ŚrBh_{Tai} III	The *Śrāvakabhūmi*, Sanskrit Text, Analysis, and Japanese Translation of the *Tṛtīyaṁ Yogasthānaṁ*. In: *Annual of the Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taishō University*, 30/2008: (1)–(79) [Part XXII]; 31/2009: (1)–(81) [Part XXIII]; 32/2010: (1)–(47) [Part XXIV]; (33/2011: (105)–(151) [Part XXV];

	34/2012: (45)–(85) [Part XXVI].
Suv	*Suvarṇabhāsottamasūtra*, ed. Johannes NOBEL, Leipzig 1937.
Sv	*Sumaṅgalavilāsinī Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā*, ed. T. W. RHYS DAVIDS, J. E. CARPENTER, W. STEDE. London: PTS 1886–1932.
Sv-pṭ	*Dīghanikāyaṭṭhakathā-ṭīkā*, ed. L. DE SILVA, London: PTS 1970.
TattvP	*Tattvārthapaṭala* (= chapter 4 of the first Yogasthāna) of the BoBh.
Th, Thī	*Theragāthā* and *Therīgāthā*, ed. H. OLDENBERG and R. PISCHEL, 2nd ed., with Appendices by K.R. NORMAN and L. ALSDORF, London: PTS 1966 (quoted by verse).
Th-a	*Paramatthadīpanī* (*Theragāthā-aṭṭhakathā*), ed. F.L. WOODWARD, London: PTS 1940–1959.
Tr	Vasubandhu: *Triṁśikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi*, ed. s. TrBh
TrBh	Sthiramati: *Triṁśikā-bhāṣya*, ed. Hartmut BUESCHER: *Sthiramati's Triṁśikā-vijñaptibhāṣya*, Wien: ÖAW 2007. L. = ed. Sylvain LÉVI, Paris 1925.
TrBh$_t$	Tibetan translation of TrBh: Tj P no. 5565, sems-tsam, si 170a5–201b8 (vol. 113: 300–312); D no. 4064, sems-tsam, shi 146b2–171b6), crit. ed. in BUESCHER 2007 (see TrBh).
TrṬ	Vinītadeva: *Triṁśikā-ṭīkā*, Tibetan translation: Tj P no. 5571, sems-tsam, ku 1–69a5 (vol. 114: 175–203); D no. 4070, sems-tsam, hi 1–63a7.
Ud-a	*Paramatthadīpanī* (*Udāna-aṭṭhakathā*), ed. F.L. WOODWARD, London: PTS 1926.
Uv	*Udānavarga*, ed. Franz BERNHARD. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1965.
Uv$_t$	*Udānavarga*, Bd. 3. Der tibetische Text, unter Mitarbeit von Siglinde DIETZ hrsg. v. Champa Thupten ZONGTSE. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1990.
UvViv	*Prajñvarman's Udānavargavivaraṇa*. Transliteration of its Tibetan version by Michael BALK. 2 vols. Bonn: Indica et Tibetica Verlag 1984.
Vajr	*Vajracchedikā Prajñāpāramitā*, ed. Edward CONZE, Rome 1974. See also SCHOPEN 1989.
VaSg	*Vastusaṁgrahaṇī* Section of the YBh; division into paragraphs according to the synopsis in MUKAI 1985: 27–41.
VGPVy	*Vivṛtagūḍhārthapiṇḍavyākhyā* (on MSg; anonymous; cf. ŌTAKE 2007: 95; VAN DER KUIJP 2013: 1399f): Tj P no. 5553, sems-tsam, li 356b7–434a8 (vol. 113: 50–81); D no. 4052, sems-tsam, ri 296b1–361a7.
Vi	**Mahāvibhāṣā(-śāstra)*, transl. by Hsüan-tsang: T 27.1545.
Vi$_2$	**(Abhidharma-)vibhāṣā(-śāstra)*, transl. by Buddhavarman between 437 and 439 A.D. (COX in WILLEMEN et al. 1998: 232): T 28.1546.
Vi$_3$	**Vibhāṣā(śāstra)* (鞞婆沙(論)) of *Sitapāṇi or *Śītapāṇi (尸陀槃尼), transl. by *Saṅghabhadra et al. in 383 A.D.: T 28.1547.
Vibh	*Vibhaṅga*, ed. C. A. F. RHYS DAVIDS. London: PTS 1904.
Vibh-a	*Saṁmohavinodanī* (*Vibhaṅga-aṭṭhakathā*), ed. A.P. BUDDHADATTA. London: PTS 1923.
VijñK	*Vijñānakāya*: T 26.1539.
Vin	*Vinayapiṭaka*, ed. H. OLDENBERG. London: PTS 1979–83.
VinSg	*Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* Section of the YBh.

$VinSg_{ms}$	Fragmentary Sanskrit manuscript (Ms.Ind.VII.23(421)) of part of the PañcMBhVin from the St. Petersburg Collection (cf. MATSUDA 1988: 17f), accessible to me through the kindness of Prof. Kazunobu Matsuda (see Preface).
$VinSg_{Pa}$	Paramārtha's partial translation of the *Viniścayasaṁgrahaṇī* Section of the *Yogācārabhūmi* (決定藏論): T 30.1584.
VisM	Buddhaghosa: *Visuddhimagga*, ed. Henry Clarke WARREN, revised by Dharmananda KOSAMBI. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press 1950.
VisM-mhṭ	*Visuddhimagga-mahāṭīkā* (My. = Burmese ed. quoted acc. to CSCD; Rew. = ed. REWATADHAMMA, Varanasi 1969).
VkN	*Vimalakīrtinirdeśa*, ed. by the Study Group on Buddhist Sanskrit Literature, The Institute for Comprehensive Studies of Buddhism, Taisho University. Tokyo: Taisho University Press 2004 ("Transliterated Sanskrit Text Collated with Tibetan and Chinese Translations"), 2006 ("A Sanskrit Edition Based upon the Manuscript Newly Found at the Potala Palace").
Vś(Vṛ)	*Viṁś(at)ikā Vijñaptimātratāsiddhi* with *Vṛtti* by Vasubandhu, ed. Sylvain LÉVI, Paris 1925.
$VśVṛ_t$	Tibetan translation of VśVṛ: Tj P no. 5558, sems-tsam, si 4b1–11a1 (vol. 113: 234–236); D no. 4057, sems-tsam, shi 4a3–10a2.
VyY	*Vyākhyāyukti*, ed. Jong Cheol LEE: The Tibetan Text of the *Vyākhyāyukti* of Vasubandhu. Tokyo: Sankibo 2001.
YBh	*Yogācārabhūmi(-sāstra).*
YBh_{Bh}	*Yogācārabhūmi* of Ācārya Asaṅga, ed. Vidhushekhara BHATTACHARYA, University of Calcutta 1957.
YBh_c	Hsüan-tsang's Chinese translation of the *Yogācārabhūmi*: T 30.1579.
YBh_{ms}	Sanskrit manuscript of the YBh: see BANDURSKI 1994: 64f # 27.
YBh_t	Tibetan translation of the YBh, in particular: 1. $MauBh_t$ (without ŚrBh and BoBh): Tj P no. 5536, sems-tsam, dzi 1-332a8 (vol. 109:211–110:33); D. no. 4035, sems-tsam, tshi 1–283a7; 2. $ŚrBh_t$: Tj P no. 5537, sems-tsam, wi 1-236a8 (vol. 110: 35–130); D no. 4036, sems-tsam, dzi 1–195a7; 3. $BoBh_t$: Tj P no. 5538, sems-tsam, zhi 1-247a8 (vol. 110: 131–231); D no. 4037, sems-tsam, wi 1–213a7; 4. $VinSg_t$: Tj P no. 5539, sems-tsam, zi 1 – 'i 142b8 (vol. 110:233–111:121); D no. 4038, sems-tsam, zhi 1 – zi 127a4; 5. $VaSg_t$: Tj P no. 5540, sems-tsam, 'i 143a1–382a5 (vol. 111: 121–217); D no. 4039, sems-tsam, zi 127a4–335a7; 6. $ParySg_t$: Tj P no. 5542, sems-tsam, yi 27a3–56b1 (vol. 111: 231–242); D no. 4041, sems-tsam, 'i 22b1–47b7.
YidKun	Tsong-kha-pa, *Yid dang kun gzh'i dka' 'grel*, ed. New Delhi: International Academy of Indian Culture 1961. See also KELSANG & ODANI 1986: 147–184, and SPARHAM 1993: 163–241.
YVy	*Yogācārabhūmi-vyākhyā*: Tj P no. 5544, sems-tsam, yi 82a6–176a3 (vol.111: 253–290); D no. 4043, sems-tsam, 'i 69a1–140b7.

d) Reference Works, Journals, Text Corpora, etc.

AA-I	Ryusei KEIRA & Noboru UEDA: Sanskrit Word-Index to the *Abhisamayālaṃkārālokā Prajñāpāramitāvyākhyā*. Tokyo: Sankibo 1998.
AiGr	J. WACKERNAGEL, A. DEBRUNNER, *Altindische Grammatik*, vol. I-III, Göttingen 1896–1930.
AiSynt	Bertold DELBRÜCK,): *Altindische Syntax*, Halle an der Saale 1888 (reprint. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft 1968).
AKBh-I	Akira HIRAKAWA: *Index to the Abhidharmakośabhāṣya*, pt. 1-3. Tokyo: Daizo Shuppan 1973–1978.
APTE	Vaman Shivram APTE: *The Practical Sanskrit-English Dictionary*. Bombay ^{3}1924.
ARIRIAB	*Annual Report of The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology at Soka University.*
ATBSt	Arbeitskreis für Tibetische und Buddhistische Studien der Universität Wien
BHSD	Franklin EDGERTON: *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Vol. II: Dictionary. New Haven: Yale University Press 1953.
BHSG	Franklin EDGERTON: *Buddhist Hybrid Sanskrit Grammar and Dictionary*. Vol. I: Grammar. New Haven: Yale University Press 1953.
BusshoKD	ONO Genmyō 小野玄妙 (ed.): *Bussho kaisetsu daijiten* 佛書解說大辭典, 13 volumes. Revised edition Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha 1964 (reprint 1977).
BW	NYANATILOKA: *Buddhistisches Wörterbuch*. Konstanz: Verlag Christiani 1953.
CBETA	Chinese Buddhist Electronic Text Association (CD-ROM containing T vols. 1–55 and 85, Hsü tsang ching 卍新纂續藏經 vols. 1–88, and other collections).
CDIAL	Ralph L. TURNER: *A Comparative Dictionary of the Indo-Arian Languages*. London: Oxford University Press 1966.
COUVREUR	COUVREUR, F.S: *Dictionaire classique de la langue chinoise*. Taipei: Kuangchi Press 1966 (reprint).
CPD	*A Critical Pāli Dictionary*, by V. TRENCKNER, ed. D. ANDERSEN, H. SMITH et al. Copenhagen 1924 ff.
CSCD	Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana CD-ROM, Version 3. Vipassana Research Institute, Dhammagiri, Igatpuri 422403, India. My. = Myanmar edition of Pāli texts (as referred to in CSCD).
D	sDe-dge (Derge) block-print of the Tibetan Tripiṭaka (Kj/Tj).
DP	Margaret CONE: *A Dictionary of Pāli*, Oxford: PTS 2001 (Part I), Bristol: PTS 2013 (Part II).
EDS	*An Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Sanskrit on Historical Principles*, ed. A.M. GHATAGE. Poona 1976 ff.
EWA	Manfred MAYRHOFER, *Etymologisches Wörterbuch des Altindischen*. Heidelberg: C. Winter 1992 (vol. I), 1996 (vol. II).
FK	HSING YÜN 星雲 (ed.), *Fo-kuang ta-tz'u-tien* 佛光大辭典, 8 vols. Taiwan: Fo-kuang ch'u-pan-she 1989.
HDC	LUO Zhufeng 罗竹风 (ed. in chief): *Hanyu dacidian* 漢語大詞典. 12 vols., with index. Shanghai: Hanyu dacidian chubanshe 1990–1994.
HIRAKAWA	Akira HIRAKAWA: *Buddhist Chinese-Sanskrit Dictionary*. Tokyo: The Reiyukai 1997.
Hôb	*Hôbôgirin*, Dictionnaire encyclopédique du bouddhisme d'après les sources

	chinoises et japonaises, ed. S. LÉVI, J. TAKAKUSU, P. DEMIÉVILLE. Tokyo, Paris 1929 ff.
HôbRép	*Répertoire du canon bouddhique sino-japonais*, compilé par P. DEMIEVILLE, H. DURT, A. SEIDEL (Fascicule annexe du *Hôbôgirin*). Tokyo, Paris 1978.
HokJIBS	*Hokkaido Journal of Indological and Buddhist Studies* (印度哲学仏教学).
Hōrin	*Hōrin*: Vergleichende Studien zur japanischen Kultur / Comparative Studies in Japanese Culture, Düsseldorf: Haus der Japanischen Kultur (EKŌ).
IBK	*Indogaku bukkyōgaku kenkyū* 印度學佛教學研究 (*Journal of Indian and Buddhist Studies*).
IIBSt	The International Institute for Buddhist Studies (of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies, Tokyo).
IRIAB	The International Research Institute for Advanced Buddhology, Soka University.
IsMEO	Istituto Italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
JÄSCHKE	H.A. JÄSCHKE: *A Tibetan-English Dictionary*, reprint London: Routledge & Kegan Paul 1958 (1st ed.: 1881).
JAOS	*Journal of the American Oriental Society.*
JIABS	*Journal of the International Association of Buddhist Studies.*
JICPBS	*Journal of the International College for Postgraduate Buddhist Studies.*
JIPh	*Journal of Indian Philosophy.*
KIK (Yuga)	*Kokuyaku issaikyō* 國譯一切經, Indo senjutsu-bu 印度撰述部, Yugabu 瑜伽部, 12 vols., reprint Tokyo: Daitō shuppansha 1977 (1st ed.: 1930–1933).
Kj	*Kanjur* (*bKa'-'gyur*)
KomK	*Komazawa daigaku bukkyōgakubu kenkyū kiyō* 駒沢大学仏教学部研究紀要
KomR	*Komazawa daigaku bukkyōgakubu ronshū* 駒沢大学仏教学部論集
MW	Monier MONIER-WILLIAMS: *A Sanskrit-English Dictionary.* Oxford 1899, reprint 1951.
NAKAMURA	NAKAMURA Hajime 中村元: *Bukkyōgo daijiten* 佛教語大辞典, 3 vols. Tokyo: Tōkyō-shoseki-kabushiki-kaisha 東京書籍株式会社 1975.
NEGI	J.S. NEGI: *Tibetan-Sanskrit Dictionary*, 16 vols., Sarnath, Varanasi: Central Institute of Higher Tibetan Studies 1993–2005.
NBGN	*Nihon bukkyō gakkai nempō* 日本仏教學會年報 (*The Journal of the Nippon Buddhist Research Association*).
NStICB	*Nagoya Studies in Indian Culture and Buddhism* (*Saṃbhāṣā*)
ÖAW	Österreichische Akademie der Wissenschaften
P	Daisetz T. SUZUKI (ed.): *The Tibetan Tripiṭaka, Peking Edition*, Reprinted under the Supervision of the Otani University, Kyoto. Tokyo and Kyoto: Tibetan Tripiṭaka Research Institute 1955–1958.
PTC	*Pāli Tripiṭakaṁ Concordance*, ed. F.L. WOODWARD and E.M. HARE. London 1952ff.
PTSD	*The Pāli Text Society's Paḷi-English Dictionary*, ed. T.W. RHYS DAVIDS & W. STEDE. London: PTS 1921–1925.
PW	Otto BÖHTLINGK and Rudolph ROTH: *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch.* 7 vols., St. Petersburg 1855–1875.
pw	Otto BÖHTLINGK: *Sanskrit-Wörterbuch in kürzerer Fassung.* 4 vols., St. Petersburg 1879–1889 (reprint Delhi 1991).

S	Stog blockprint of the Tibetan Kj.
SHT	*Sanskrithandschriften aus den Turfan-Funden*, ed. Ernst WALDSCHMIDT et al., 11 vols., Wiesbaden (/Stuttgart): Franz Steiner 1965ff.
SWTF	*Sanskrit-Wörterbuch der buddhistischen Texte aus den Turfan-Funden*, ed. Heinz BECHERT, Klaus RÖHRBORN. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht 1973 ff.
T	*Taishō shinshū daizōkyō* 大正新修大藏經 (Tripiṭaka in Chinese), ed. TAKAKUSU Junjirō and WATANABE Kaikyō. Tokyo 1922–1933. Quoted from CBETA.
TIJBS	*Thai International Journal for Buddhist Studies* (Mahidol University).
Tj	*Tanjur* (*bsTan-'gyur*).
Tshig chen	ZHANG Yisun (KRANG dByi-sun) et al.: *Bod rgya tshig mdzod chen mo.* Beijing: Mi-rigs-dpe-skrun-khang 1993.
WEBSTER	*Webster's Third New International Dictionary*, ed. Philip Babcock GOVE and the Merriam-Webster editorial staff, 1961, reprint Cologne: Könemann 1993.
WZKS(O)	*Wiener Zeitschrift für die Kunde Süd(- und Ost)asiens*
X	*Shinsan zokuzōkyō* (*Xuzangjing*): The Shinsan Dainihon Zokuzokyo 卍新纂續藏經. Tokyo: Kokusho kankokai. Vol. 1-88. Quoted from CBETA.
YBh-I	YOKOYAMA, Koitsu, and Takayuki HIROSAWA: *Index to the Yogācārabhūmi.* Tokyo: Sankibo Busshorin. Chinese-Sanskrit-Tibetan:1996; Sanskrit-Tibetan-Chinese & Tibetan-Sanskrit-Chinese: 1997.

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Addenda et Corrigenda

§ **1** The view that the YBh is rather a compilation of various, partly heterogeneous strands and pieces of materials is nowadays shared by a considerable number of scholars (DELHEY 2013: 502; cf. also HAKAMAYA 2013: 312), though others still emphasize conceptual consistency (cf. LUSTHAUS 2013: 578 n. 1).

§ **7.2–3**: For an outline of more or less different alternatives, see KRAGH 2013: 53–59. Cf. also § 9. At any rate, it should be taken into account that the time of the inclusion of a textual unit or textual complex into the YBh as we have it need not coincide with the time when this unit or complex came into being, and it is rather improbable that these textual units and complexes and the ideas expressed in them emerged in a way that could be arranged as a linear sequence, one by one, and not rather in a more complex process of partly parallel or overlapping emergence in more or less different circles.

§ **13**: Regarding the question whether Vasubandhu (the Kośakāra) was a Yogācāra from the outset, Buescher (2013: 380f) basically seems to share the position advocated by Harada and Kritzer, whereas Park (2013, especially 952f, 973f, and 980) expresses reserves. The main aim of BUESCHER 2013 is, however, a reconsideration of the problem of the identity of the Kośakāra with the author of texts like the MSABh. I fully agree with him that this question cannot be decided on the basis of legendary accounts but only on the basis of style, argumentation, etc. (cf. § 13 fn. 53), which according to Buescher point to different persons (cf. also VON ROSPATT 1995: 187 n. 408, quoted in BUESCHER 2013: 392 n. 53). Cf. also SAKUMA 2013b: 339ff. Even so, a comprehensive and multi-faceted investigation of the issue would still seem to be a desideratum. — I have to admit that my attempt (S 1967) to establish the expressions *vijñānapariṇāma* and *santatipariṇāma* as typical for the Kośakāra is marred by the occurrence of *santatipariṇāmaviṣeṣa* in MSABh 152,21. (S 1987: 263; SAKUMA 2013b: 355f; BUESCHER 2013: 385–387).

§ **15.2** + fn. 76: For AS 41,19–42,2, ASBh 54,1-3 and YBh_{Bh} 53,9-15 cf. also HAYASHIMA 1989: 27f and 25f, respectively. Still, in AS 42,1 (HAYASHIMA 1989: 29,27f), *piṇḍasaṁjñā-vibhāvanatām upādāya* hardly means "on the basis of (に基づいて) laying open (顕わにする)" the notion of gross material things as units (*piṇḍa*) but rather "for the purpose of (cf. *BHSD* 145b) annihilating (/causing to disappear)" this notion (cf. AS_t P li 91b4: *rnam par gzhig pa*; AS_c 675b27: 遣; cf. also ASBh 53,24: *piṇḍasaṁjñā vigacchati*). As for YBh_{Bh} 53,9-15, Hayashima's (1989: 25,34-36) suggestion to take the sentence *utpadyamānas tu svabījāt samudāya evôtpadyate 'ṇur vā madhyo vā mahān vā* as an opponent's objection — with *svabījāt* taken to refer to the atoms as the cause — is not supported by the Sanskrit phraseology nor confirmed by YBh_t (P dzi 29b5) and YBh_c (290a17f). In my opinion, the purport of the sentence is rather to point out that when [a gross material thing] arises just this gross material thing as such, be it small, middle or large, arises [directly] from its Seed [in the mind series: YBh_{Bh} 52,12f + 15f], but is not accumulated from atoms (cf. also YBh_c 598a20f: …諸聚色 最初生時 全分而生). Likewise, the sentence *tatra samudāyo 'pi sapradeśaḥ, paramāṇur api sapradeśaḥ* (YBh_{Bh} 53,12; HAYASHIMA 1989: 26,1f) is not characterized as an opponent's view in any version. We may rather have to take it to mean that even the atoms have *pra-*

deśa(s) (i.e., are three-dimensional?) but no parts (*avayava*). Cf. T 42.1828: 331c29–332a4 (and T 43.1829: 19b16-19), where the passage is expressly explained in this sense.

§ **16.1**: From the three occurrences of '*vijñaptimātra*' listed by LUSTHAUS (2013: 594 with n. 43) from the Chinese translation of the YBh, the second and the third belong to the quotation of Saṁdh VIII in the VinSg. In the first occurrence (YBh_c 595c11), 唯識 does not represent *vijñaptimātra* but merely *vijñāna* (in the sense of *vijñānam eva*), in a context that has nothing to do with *vijñaptimātra*: "For this reason, *vijñāna* [alone] is not [counted as] a *vijñānasthiti*" (*tasmād vijñānaṁ na vijñānasthitiḥ*: $VinSg_{ms}$ 19b5; see fn. 1121).

§ **50**: Cf. also CHEN 1998: 125 (below): "But Buddhism regards the genuine sense faculties as consisting of pure, transparent matter (*rūpaprasāda*)" (但是佛教認為真正的感覺器官是由清淨透明的物質(淨色)所構成).

§ **80.2**.4 + fn. 479:

[A.] The text of the *Śrāvakabhūmi* passage on the process of generating the *sama-samālambyā-lambaka-jñāna* ($ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 497,18–498,7 and 499,6-11) has now been reedited with emendations and English translation in SUGAWARA 2013 (827f and 831f: [G] and [J]) and in VON ROSPATT 2013 (862 n.16).

[1.] I have little to add to von Rospatt's excellent translation, apart from that in the last sentence (499,10) I think we have to take *cittaṁ* as the virtual subject of *praskandati*:

> … and when he [now] sets his mind upon *nirvāṇa* with complete commitment, [it = his mind] jumps forward [towards *nirvāṇa* (i.e., finds pleasure in *nirvāṇa*), …
> (*nirvāṇe câdhyāśayataś cittaṁ pra⟨ṇi⟩dadhataḥ praskandati, …*).

Cf. the corresponding negative statement in $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 497,3-7:

> He again and again causes his mind to become weary and afraid of the existential fact (cf. KRAGH 2013: 28 n. 12) of Suffering and its Causes, and after having done so he again and again sets [his mind] upon *nirvāṇa*. Even so, *it* does not [do] *him* [the favour to] jump forward (i.e., *his mind* does not find pleasure in *nirvāṇa*).
> (*sa punaḥ punas tac cittam udvejayaty uttrāsayati duḥkhasatyāt samudayasatyād, udvejyôttrāsya punaḥ punar adhyāśayato nirvāṇe praṇidadhāti* | *tathâpy asya na praskandati* |).

[2.] In the immediately preceding sentence (499,8f: *yenâsyaûdārikaś câsmimānaḥ ... samudācarataḥ prahīyate*), Sugawara (2013: 828 # [J]) keeps the ms. reading *samudācarataḥ* against the emendation *samudācārataḥ* proposed by me and (ib. 831f) renders the passage as follows:

> Thereby, through putting [this] into practice, the coarse form of self-conceit [associated] therewith … is abandoned.

But *samudācarataḥ* can only be a gen.sg., abl.sg. or acc.pl. of the present participle[2600] and would thus have to be construed with a noun or pronoun, and the only theoretical possibility I can imagine would be to take it as a gen.sg. and to construe it with *asya*, referring to the yogi. The passage could then perhaps be taken to mean: "Thereby, for him who puts [this] into practice the coarse form of self-conceit … is abandoned." Yet, even though *sam-ud-ā√car* (as well as the verbal noun *samudācāra*) is often used in the sense of performing or committing

[2600] A mi. nom. sg. masc. of the present participle in °*tas* (*BHSG* # 18.33; cf. CHOONG 2013: 86 n. 21) to be construed with *asmimāno* would make sense but appears extremely improbable in a text like the ŚrBh.

(especially wholesome or unwholesome) actions (with a *person* as the grammatical or logical subject), both the verb and the verbal noun are also employed in the sense of actual arising (especially in contrast to latent presence: cf. fn. 150), and it is this use that seems to prevail in the *Śrāvakabhūmi*. In this case, the (grammatical or logical) subject is *dharma*s; cf., e.g., $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 172,5 ($ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II 8,6): *na câsya na samudācarati rāgo* ...; 390,3 ($ŚrBh_{Tai}$ III [2009]: 54,5): *nivaraṇāni câbhīkṣṇaṁ samudācaranti*). In this sense, the °*tas*-form of the verbal noun is not unusual; cf., e.g., $BoBh_D$ 243,8-11 ($BoBh_W$ 356,16-22): In the *pramudita* sojourn (*vihāra*), [corruption (*dauṣṭhulya*)] corresponding to the defilements leading to bad existences (*āpāyikakleśapakṣya*) has been abandoned completely (i.e., also in its latent form), but as far as [their] actual arising is concerned (*samudācāratas*, YBh_t P zhi 212b8 *kun tu spyod pa las*), the strong and medium corruption corresponding to *all* defilements has been abandoned.[2601] In the 'sojourn that is free from phenomena without any effort being required' (*anābhogo nirnimitto vihāraḥ*), corruption corresponding to the defilements impeding the purity of the acceptance of dharmas lacking origination (*anutpattikadharmakṣāntiviśuddhivibandhakleśa-pakṣya*) has been abandoned completely, but as far as [their] actual arising is concerned *all* defilements have been eliminated (*samudācāratas tu sarvakleśānām*). I do not see why this use should not be accepted also for the passage under discussion. The emendation to *samudā-cārataḥ* is, after all, fully supported by the Tibetan (YBh_t P wi 229b7: *kun nas spyod pa'i sgo nas*).

[3.] Since apart from one doubtful case the term *samasamālambyālambakajñāna* seems to be used as a compound, it would indeed be possible to take it to mean "comprehension *of* that which is objectified and that which objectifies [as] being completely alike (sc., impermanent, etc.)", thus leaving no room for an Ego 'in the background'.

[B.] As for the parallel in the *Bhāvanāmayī Bhūmiḥ*, it suffices to refer the reader to the excellent rendering of this passage in VON ROSPATT 2013: 861 n. 15. I have to admit, however, that the syntax of the passage is not entirely clear to me: the ablative *samyakprati-vedhāt manasikārāt* (confirmed by YBh_C 393b23f 作意正通達故, with a reversal of *prati-vedha* and *manasikāra*), on which the first part of the passage depends, does not construe well with the following text (cf. the rendering *yang dag pa ji lta ba bzhin du rab tu shes shing yid*

[2601] Here and in the second part of the following sentence, *prahāṇaṁ* has, of course, to be supplied from the first part of the sentence. In both cases, Hsüan-tsang's rendering 皆不現行 ("all of them do not actually arise [any longer]": YBh_C 562b3 and b6) may be understood as an adequate *ad sensum* rendering of *samudācāratas* ... *prahāṇam* and thus does not necessarily require the conjectural addition of a negation in the Skt. text (as proposed in CHOONG 2013: 90 with n. 33). Still, a negative form *asamudācāratas* would also make sense: cf. $BoBh_D$ 232,6f: "The [wrong] view of a self and ... all disturbances are abandoned in such a way that they definitely do not actually arise [any longer]" (*satkāyadṛṣṭiḥ* ... *sarveñjitāni câtyant**a**samudācārataḥ prahīyante*; the negative form *asamudācārataḥ* is confirmed by YBh_t P zhi 202a5f *kun tu mi spyod pas* and YBh_C 558a20 不現行). Cf. also $ŚrBh_{Sh}$ 312,26-28 ($ŚrBh_{Tai}$ II 208,16-18): "[A bad factor] that has not arisen has already been abandoned in so far as it does not actually occur [at the moment], [but] it [still] has to be abandoned in so far as it should not present (or: actualize) itself [in the future]" (*anutpannaṁ* ... *yat* [sc. *pāpakaṁ vastu*], *tad asamudācārataḥ prahīṇam eva, tad asaṁmukhībhāvataḥ prahātavyam* ...; here, too, ***a**samudācārataḥ* is confirmed by YBh_t D dzi 115a5: *kun tu **mi** spyad pa'i sgo nas*). As regards $BoBh_D$ 243, the existence of a reading ***a**samudācāratas* would seem to receive strong support from Dharmakṣema's translation, especially in the second sentence, where his version has 不行 一切煩惱, i.e.: "In the sense of not [actually] occurring, *all* afflictions (/defilements) [have been abandoned]", which would correspond exactly to an original ***asamudācārataḥ sarvakleśānām*.

la bye de | in YBh$_t$ P dzi 321a3f). Perhaps it is influenced by the ablatives of the enumerations of the preceding paragraph (*manasikārapratívedhataḥ*, etc.: SUGAWARA 2013: 846), and then anacoluthically continued by switching over to a construction with a finite verb (*pratividhya ca ... samutsṛjya ... manasikaroti*).

§ **89.3** + fn. 515: YBh$_{Bh}$ 18,16-20 does not speak of a "cold sensation" (LUSTHAUS 2013: 592, last paragraph) but merely of the body getting cold in those parts that are abandoned by the *vijñāna* (similarly AS 42,19f and MSg I.42). In argument viii of the 'Proof Portion' (LUSTHAUS 2013: 593) it is, to be sure, stated that due to the withdrawal of the *ālayavijñāna* from part of the body one observes that [this part of] the body is cold and no longer felt. But it is not clear whether this refers to two steps of a process in which the dying person first feels the respective part of the body becoming cold and then does not feel it anymore, or whether the dying person simply does not feel the respective part of his or her body any longer, whereas its coldness may as well be observed by a bystander when he or she touches this part of the dying person's body. In any case, the point made by the argument would seem to be that it is only the gradual withdrawal of the 'somatic' *ālayavijñāna* that can explain the fact of the successive cooling down and numbness of the body.[2602]

§ **166.2** and 220.1–3: For a discussion of the antiquity of this text and the question whether it was taken over by the SavitBh from the VaSg or the other way round, see KRITZER 1999: 157–159. A third possibility might be that originally this piece of text was just one of the materials circulating in the early Yogācāra community and came to be incorporated into the VaSg and into the SavitBh independently.

§ **170**(.1–2): I find my understanding of *upādāna* in MMK basically confirmed by the translation and explanation of the respective verses in SIDERITS & KATSURA 2013, where *upādāna* is rendered as "appropriation [i.e., state of being]" in 16.3 (p. 165) and as "what is depended upon" in 22.7 (p. 245), as "appropriation [and the appropriator]" in 8.13 (p. 97), but as "appropriation" (in the sense of "taking the psychophysical elements as 'me' or 'mine' " [p. 167], etc.) in 3.7 (p. 48), 16.6 (p. 167), 18.4 (p. 197), and 26.6 (p. 312).

§ **208** + fn. 1157: On this passage and its context (NA 352b5-16) cf. also CHEN 1998: 125–129.

§ **227**: An understanding of *upādāna* in Saṁdh V.2 as an action noun is unambigously supported by Wŏn-ch'ŭk (圓測, Yüan-ts'ê) in SaṁdhṬ$_c$ 245b20(f): 此中 所說執受義者，是能 執受 (…). Cf. CHEN 1998: 134f.

§ **240.3**.4: For a basically similar explanation, see CHEN 1998: 144f, based on TAKASAKI 1985: 47,8-12.

§ **253**: In view of the somewhat bewildering rendering of the initial lines of the PañcBh (YBh$_{Bh}$ 4,2-12) in LUSTHAUS 2013 (580–583), I feel obliged to offer a translation in order to

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[2602] In CWSL 17a19f, it is expressly stated that the part of the body where — on account of the fact that the *(ālaya)vijñāna* has withdrawn from it so as to leave it unappropriated —the tangible 'coldness' has arisen is in fact *insentient* (冷觸起處 即是非情). In this statement, 觸 cannot, of course, refer to the mental factor 'impression' — because this would be incompatible with the insentience of the respective part of the body — but only to an objective quality ('tangible': **spraṣṭavya*) of this part of the body; cf. YBh$_C$ 280a9-11: 彼所緣者，謂 觸。 … 此復多種。 謂 … 冷 …(= YBh$_{Bh}$ 8,19f: *ālambanaṁ* [sc. *kāyavijñānasya*] *katamat* | *spraṣṭavyam anekavidham ..., tadyathā ... śītam* …).

disclose my own understanding of the passage (especially of its grammatical structure, whereas my English equivalents may not be the best possible choice):

{A} What is the level associated with the five groups of [sensory] awareness (*pañca-vijñānakāyasamprayuktā bhūmiḥ*)?[2603] The five groups of [sensory] awareness as such (*svabhāvataḥ*, lit.: from the point of view of their own-being or nature), their basis (*āśrayaḥ*), their objective support (or point of reference: *ālambanam*), their retinue (*sahāyaḥ*), and their function (*karma*): [this] is, in short, the level associated with the five groups of [sensory] awareness.

{B} What are the five groups of [sensory] awareness? Visual awareness (*cakṣurvijñā-nam*), auditory, olfactory, gustatory, and tactile awareness.

{C} What is visual awareness? The respective perception of visibles, which is based on the faculty of vision (*yā cakṣurāśrayā rūpaprativijñaptiḥ*).

{D} What is the basis (*āśrayaḥ*) of visual awareness?

{1.} Its simultaneous basis (*sahabhūr āśrayaḥ*) is the faculty of vision. {2.} Its immediately preceding basis (*samanantara āśrayaḥ*) is the *manas*. {3.} Its Seed-basis (*bījāśrayaḥ*) is the *ālayavijñāna*, which contains/comprises all Seeds (*sarvabījakam*), is that which appropriates the [physical] basis (*āśrayopādātṛ*), and is included in [the category of what is result of the] maturation [of karma] (*vipākasaṁgṛhītam*).

— This [triad], summed up, becomes a twofold basis: one that is material (/physical) (*rūpī*) and one that is immaterial (*arūpī*). The material (/physical) one is the faculty of vision, the immaterial one is the other [two]. —

{E} {1.} What is the faculty of vision? [It is] the pellucid matter (*rūpaprasādaḥ*) deriving from the four primary elements (*catvāri mahābhūtāny upādāya*) that is the support of visual awareness (*cakṣurvijñānasaṁniśrayaḥ*); [like the other sense faculties, it (= *cakṣus*) is] invisible but [physically] resistant (*anidarśanaṁ sapratighaṁ*, ms.).[2604]

{2.} What is the *manas*? The awareness that has elapsed immediately before the [respective] visual awareness (*yac cakṣurvijñānasyânantarātītaṁ vijñānam*).[2605]

{3.} What is the mind containing all Seeds (*sarvabījakaṁ vijñānam*)? The [result of karmic] maturation that contains all Seeds (*sarvabījako vipākaḥ*) [and] has come about due to previous delight in mundane diversity [as its] cause (*pūrvakaṁ prapañcarati-hetum*[2606] *upādāya ... nirvṛttaḥ*).

§ **263.6** + fn. 1473: Translation of YBh_{Bh} 52,15f: "For (*tathā hi*) the Seeds of all elements and [kinds] of derivative matter, those pertaining to oneself (= to one's body) and the external ones, reside in the mind-stream within (= of sentient beings individually)". KRAGH (2013: 65 n. 122) construes *adhyātmaṁ* with the preceding *upādāyarūpāṇāṁ*, but in this case one would

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[2603] In this passage, the expression does not seem to designate the title of the chapter but rather its subject, viz., the (everyday) level of sensory awareness, as what in a spiritual perspective would be regarded as the lowest level of awareness or understanding. If the expression is referred to the title of the chapter, we would have to translate: "What is the *Bhūmi* concerning … (cf. KRAGH 2013: 51)? [The treatment of] …".

[2604] The ms. consistently construes these two adjectives with the sense faculty to be defined, i.e., has neuter forms in the case of *cakṣus*, *śrotra* and *ghrāṇa*, feminine forms in the case of *jihvā* (*anidarśanā sapratighā{ḥ}*) and masculine forms in the case of *kāya* (*anidarśana⟨ḥ⟩ sapratighaḥ*).

[2605] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 61,17f: *yasya vijñānasyânantaraṁ yeṣāṁ vijñānānāṁ utpattiniyamaḥ, sa teṣāṁ samanantarapratyayaḥ.* Still more explicit is ASBh 37,26f: *tasmād ekasmin saṁtāne paścimasya cittasya pūrvakaṁ cittaṁ cittāntareṇânantaritaṁ samanantarapratyayaḥ.*

[2606] Cf. YBh_{Bh} 18,21.

expect *adhyātmaṁ* to precede the latter, and indeed both Tib. (YBh$_t$ P dzi 29a6f: *nang gi sems kyi rgyud la*) and Ch. (YBh$_c$ 290a4f: 內相續心) correctly construe *adhyātmaṁ* with the following *cittasantatau*. Actually, it is hard to see why external derived matter (visibles, etc., outside the body) should be excepted from what arises from Seeds in the mind.

§ **291** + fn. 1575: For *dharmasthitijñāna* and the two passages quoted from YBh$_{Bh}$ 229 and 13, see also TAKAHASHI 2013: 564f (in YBh$_{Bh}$ 229,10, read *yuktaiḥ padavyañjanair* with ms.).

§ **339.2**, fn. 1722: For similar passages from a much later source (Ratnākaraśānti), see ISAACSON 2013: 1039 (*cittamātram idaṁ viśvam, asaty arthe 'rthapratibhāsaṁ cittam eva vāsanābalād utpadyate yathā svapne*) and 1046 (*cittam evâitat tena tenâkāreṇa bhrāntaṁ pratibhāsate yathā svapne, nâsti cittād bāhyaṁ cittagrāhyam*). Theoretically, one might take the latter sentence to leave room for an existence of external things that cannot be apprehended by the mind, but for such an assumption explicit textual support would be welcome.

§ **357.2** + fn. 1798: According to *AiGr* II.2: 626f (# 466.a) the suffix *-ti* for verbal abstracts is normally added only to primary verbal stems, so that (°)*jñapti*, if taken to be derived from the causative stem, is, strictly speaking, irregular. — For a good survey of representative attempts (mostly by Japanese scholars) to ascertain the meaning(s) and systematic function(s) of *vijñapti* in the Yogācāra tradition, see CHEN 1997. As I have already indicated in the Preface, a comprehensive discussion of this issue is beyond the limits of the present study.

§ **462.2**: In view of the fact that in the case of PrasP 60,6 the available mss. all read *vijñānasya viṣayaṁ* (v.l. *viṣamaṁ*) *prati vijñaptiḥ* (sc. *svalakṣaṇam*) and that the reading *viṣayaṁ prati vijñaptir vijñānasya svalakṣaṇam* is also attested in the ms. of the *Madhyamakāvatārabhāṣya* for MAvat 6.203 (courtesy of Dr. Anne MacDonald), I now hesitate to emend *ālambanaṁ prati vijñaptiḥ* in the PSk ms. (text [A26]) to *ālambanaprativijñaptiḥ* (text [A27]).

§ **476**: As regards **dharmamātraprabhāvita*, cf. YBh$_{Bh}$ 137,2, where in the context of reducing the self (*ātman*) to a mere denomination of dharmas this so-called self is, among other things, characterized as *dharmamātralakṣaṇaḥ* (cf. ELTSCHINGER & RATIÉ 81, line 3 from below).

§ **594** + fn. 2558: My main problem with NANIWA 2005 is that the author (156f) seems to consider the assumption of a theoretical position with regard to question of the existence or non-existence of a (true) self or ego to be inescapable and therefore disregards or even discards the possibility of deliberately refraining from a theoretical commitment.

Supplement:

fn 169: With regard to CHUNG & FUKITA 2011: 13–36, see also the reply in ANĀLAYO: *Madhyama-āgama Studies*, Taipei: Dharma Drum Publishing Corporation 2012: 516–521.

§ **186.1** with fn. 1006: For a detailed assessment of MN no. 117, SĀ$_c$ no 785 and related texts see ANĀLAYO: *The Dawn of Abhidharma* (forthcoming), chapter 4.1.

Indices

[Reference is to the paragraphs (x, y, ...) and footnotes (fn. x, fns. x, y, ...), occasionally to whole chapters (Pt. X ch. y). An asterisk (*) indicates that only a few major occurrences of the respective lemma have been entered. Still, completeness is not claimed in other cases either. In the index locorum, mere references that are not translated, paraphrased or commented on (e.g., by emendations) in the text or in the footnote itself have not normally been included. The addition of (B.) or (M.) after a lemma or sublemma indicates that the expression or position is Buescher's or Matsumoto's, respectively. Major lemmata are in bold type. The Index of modern authors contains only those names that are referred to frequently or in a detailed way (e.g., in the form of critical remarks. In other cases as well as in the case of my own works, I have added appropriate information to the respective title as listed under "References".]

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漢字

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